

MYKHAYLO I. BRAICHIVSKYI

ANNEXATION OR REUNIFICATION



Triumphant entry of Grand Hetman Bohdan Z. Khmelnytskyi into Kiev 14th January, 1649

MYKHAILO I. BRAICHEVSKYI

ANNEXATION OR REUNIFICATION

CRITICAL NOTES ON ONE CONCEPTION

TRANSLATED AND EDITED BY

George P. Kulchycky
Youngstown State University



1974

UKRAINISCHES INSTITUT FÜR BILDUNGSPOLITIK
MÜNCHEN e. V.

ANNEXATION OR REUNIFICATION

by

M. I. BRAICHEVSKYI

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(English translation)

UKRAINISCHES INSTITUT FÜR BILDUNGSPOLITIK

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C O N T E N T S

FOREWORD <i>by George P. Kulchycky</i>	7
ANNEXATION OR REUNIFICATION <i>by M. I. Braichevskiy</i>	9
NOTES ON ANNEXATION OR REUNIFICATION <i>by George P. Kulchycky</i>	61
AN APPRAISAL OF THE PEREIASLAV AGREEMENT OF 1654 <i>by Alexander Ohloblyn</i>	78
THE RUIN — SÉQUEL TO THE PEREIASLAV AGREEMENT <i>by George P. Kulchycky</i>	97
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF EVENTS	113
GLOSSARY	117
APPENDIX I	121
APPENDIX II	125
APPENDIX III	127
INDEX	132

FOREWORD

The last few years bear witness to the dissident intellectual movements in the Soviet Union and its constituent Republics. "Samvydav" in Ukraine and "Samizdat" in the RSFSR constitute the self-published clandestine literature proliferated by means of retyping from the original unpublished works of the dissidents. It is obvious that in the process of copying many mistakes creep in, mistakes that were not made by the author. These discrepancies may be observed in Braichevskyi's work as it appeared in different publications.

In my translation I have used the copy published by *Vyzvolnyi Sliakh* (see footnote ¹¹) and have made corrections wherever possible. Unfortunately, a few of the sources used by the author are unavailable to me and therefore it was difficult to correct some errors, which would not have been made by the author who is an excellent scholar. Most of the mistakes were found in the footnotes and therefore deal with the mechanics of the paper rather than the text.

Finally, although we do not agree with the author's Marxist-Leninist position and his class analysis of history, we do agree with him that Soviet historiography has departed from true scholarship and serves the interests of the Russian state.

About the author:

M. I. Braichevskyi is a well known Soviet historian, archaeologist, and senior member of the Historical Section of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR. He is the author of numerous major publications: *Roman Coins on the Territories of the Ukrainian SSR* (1959), *The Origins of Rus in Soviet Scholarship* (1959), *The When and How of the Emergence of Kyiev* (1963), *Near the Sources of Slav Statehood* (1964), *The Origin of Rus* (1968), and many others.

M. I. Braichevskyi is also co-author of the two-volume *History of Kyiev* (1959-1960), editor of several important books and author of more than one hundred articles. The author has also given papers at six scholarly congresses and has participated in many extensive archaeological excavations.

In 1968 Braichevskyi, together with 138 other intellectuals and workers, signed a letter addressed to L. Brezhnev, O. Kosygin, and

M. Podgorny protesting the political trials held in Ukraine and the Soviet Union. Shortly thereafter he was relieved of his duties at the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR (AN — Ukr. SSR).

The article, "Annexation or Reunification," was written in 1966 and submitted to the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR. for publication. It was never published and according to reliable sources the author was reprimanded for it by A. Skaba, the Director of the Historical Section of the Academy. The work received notoriety after it appeared in the "Samvydav" or clandestine literature of Ukrainian intellectuals and in 1972 was re-published by the *Novi Dni* journal in Toronto, Canada, *Vyzvolnyi Sliakh* in London, England, and *Smoloskyp* in Baltimore, U.S.A.

G. P. Kulchycky

ANNEXATION OR REUNIFICATION

(Critical notes on one conception)

By *Mykhailo I. BRAICHEWSKYI**

1

Among other unpleasant phenomena, connected with the so-called cult of the individual, persist many distortions in the sphere of historical studies, especially in the history of Ukraine. The struggle against "harmful consequences of the cult of the individual" until the autumn of 1964 led mainly to the elimination of Stalin's name (even in such contexts where mention of his name was absolutely essential) and to the re-examination of certain principles, at one time advanced by Stalin himself and elevated to the position of undisputed dogma. This re-examination was often confined to perfunctory searches, at a time when the real substance of the matter remained unknown. Meanwhile in the course of the 30s, 40s, and early 50s, certain theses were implanted in our historiography, which are representative of obvious perversions of historical truth and a revision of the theoretical foundations of Marxism-Leninism.

In the realm of Ukrainian historical scholarship especially noticeable are the pitiful distortions that appeared after 1947, when the historians of Soviet Ukraine collectively — Institute of History of the AN-Ukrainian SSR (Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) — were without cause accused of bourgeois nationalism,¹ and in scholarly institutions produced what was an abnormal atmosphere in which dictates of incompetent persons prevailed. Fearing further accusations, Ukrainian historians gave in and revised a series of fundamental theses, among them even these, that were absolutely correct and adequately reflected the real historical process.

Addressing the XXII Congress of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union), and pointing to the situation which appeared in Ukraine after 1947, when Kaganovich stood at the helm of the CCC(b)U (Central Committee of the Communist Party (bolshevik) of Ukraine.), M. V. Pidhornyi (then First Secretary of the CCC(b)U) stressed:

"Considering himself incapable of sin, Kaganovich personally,

*) Translated by Dr. George P. Kulchycky, Assistant Professor of Soviet and East European History at Youngstown State University.

circumventing the CC (Central Committee), decided the most important questions affecting the life of the Republic, besides that very often incorrectly. Being a great master of intrigue and provocation, and not having any reasons, he accused the outstanding writers of the Republic, including many top Party workers, of nationalism.

At the instruction of Kaganovich the press carried scolding articles against writers devoted to the Party and people. But this did not satisfy Kaganovich. He strove to obtain a convocation of a plenary session of the CC with an agenda that called for a "struggle against nationalism as the major threat to the CP(b)U," although *in reality there was even no thought of such a threat* (italics ours — M. B.).²

In this situation with the inspiration and preparation of Kaganovich appeared a decision of the CCC(b)U dated July 27, 1947, signed by him, in which the Ukrainian historians collectively were severely reprimanded for "residues of bourgeois nationalism."

It would appear that the cited declaration of comrade Pidhornyi should have directed us to a critical reappraisal of that which was done in Ukrainian historiography in the course of 1947-1956. But this did not occur and everything, in essence, remained as before; the general works in the history of Ukraine, scholarly-popular literature contained formulations in the countenance, in which they appeared after the decision of the CC-C(b)U of 1947 and reached their culmination point in the form obtained in the "Theses of the CC-CPSU relating to the 300th anniversary of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia," published at the end of 1953.

But the errors of many important suppositions, which presently have universal dissemination, are quite obvious; their incompatibility with historical truth is demonstrated without special difficulty by way of direct comparison with the sources. Often, when explaining that or another question the historian finds himself in a distressing situation and must, so as to conform to the letter of the decrees, simply conceal from the reader widely known and totally undisputed facts.

This state of affairs inflicts unusually great moral and political harm to our scholarship, especially to that acute ideological struggle which our people are conducting against the bourgeoisie world. By distorting or concealing facts, in advance defending erroneous theses, which are based on one-sided and tendentiously selected materials, we are supplying our ideological enemies with extraordinarily sharp weapons against ourselves, permitting them to accuse us of falsifying historical progress.

To avoid accusations of not having proof, I will present one characteristic example. In 1964 in West Germany there was published

an article by the emigree Yaroslav Polianskyi, devoted to post-war historiography, in which among other things, we read:

"It is typical that Soviet (radianski) Ukrainian historians always purposely conceal the Battle of Konotop (July 1659), in which Ivan Vyhovskyi, commanding the combined Kozak-Tatar-Polish forces, inflicted a decisive defeat on the Russian army.

"Not Soloviov, nor any other representatives of the Russian imperialist school of historians dared to hide such historical facts."

It is very difficult to deny such accusations. We may scold our enemies (which, as a matter of fact, we do very willingly, forgetting that abuse alone, among other things, is a very poor method of discussion), but even our friends in similar instances are forced to keep silence in the face of such overwhelming facts. Because, as Kuzma Prutkov maintained: "If once you lie, who will believe you."

In this article I want to raise the question, which has become timely long ago, which has for a long time been discussed in scholarly lobbies, but has as yet not made its way outside the walls of these lobbies. Here the concern is with clearing up, but especially with the appraisal of events connected with the National-Liberation War of the Ukrainian masses against aristocratic Poland and the passage of Ukraine under the protectorate of Russia; thus, about the events of the middle and second half of the XVII century, but specifically between 1654 and 1667.

This is one of the questions that particularly sustained countless revisions after 1947. The situation became more complex at the time of the boisterous commemoration of the 300th Anniversary of the Pereiaslav event, which by its meaning was almost equated with the most outstanding revolutionary coup in the history of mankind. The revision of conceptions which reigned in Soviet scholarship until the end of 1947 found, among other things, a new terminology: instead of the generally accepted word "annexation" (pryiednannia) of Ukraine to Russia the term "reunification" (vozziednannia) of Ukraine with Russia was now decreed and became binding for all texts. It must be mentioned that this terminological reform was carried out in defiance of the active protest of the major portion of the specialists, but this protest under the conditions of the "cult of the individual" was ignored, and the problem was resolved by administrative procedure.

To be sure, from the philological point of view, the change has the appearance of an absolute absurdity. Only parts of a single whole may be reunited. To avoid the accusation of being subjective, let us turn to the meanings given to this term by dictionaries. The academic dictionary of the Russian language defines the word "vossoediniat" as follows: "To again reunite divided parts of a whole (nation, collective etc.), to gather anew a whole that has fallen apart."

Now then, the question is of reuniting (vozziednannia — in its Ukrainian transliteration), a *nation*, and not *nations*. From the historical point of view, application of this definition to the event in which we are interested is elementary ignorance. Ukraine and Russia were formed after the disintegration of Rus under conditions of a separate existence; prior to 1654 they were never united.

D. M. Ushakov's dictionary defines "vossoedinenie" as "union anew," "reuniting that which was torn away." But this definition does not help the situation.

Ukraine was never torn away from Russia; the concern here is with two different nations that were formed independently of each other and under different historical conditions.

One may speak of the "reunification" of Russian lands in the Muscovite state during the XIV-XV centuries, one may and should talk about the "reunification" of all Ukrainian lands into a united Ukrainian Soviet state; it's even possible, considering that a corresponding unity of Rus in the X-XII centuries existed, of the "reunion" of the ancient Rus lands, that is, if Rus represented in itself a historical reality in the XVII century.

But it is impossible to "reunite" Ukraine with Russia, if one recognizes the existence of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples as separate ethnic components of Eastern Slavdom.

It is not by chance then, that even when speaking about the creation of the Soviet Union we use the term "unification (obiednannia) of Ukraine and Russia."

But it is self-evident that the substance of the problem is not in words, but in that which stands back of these words.

Thus the appraisal of the phenomena went through a decisive modification.

Even in the 30's Soviet historiography treated the Treaty of Pereiaslav as an "alliance of Ukrainian and Russian feudalists" which, in essence, juridically shaped the commencement of colonial rule of Russia over Ukraine. Conforming to the general conception of Marxism-Leninism this act, as well as every act of colonial occupation, was viewed as an absolute evil.

The year 1937 witnessed the publication of an enactment of the Administrative Commission concerned with a contest for the best text on the history of the USSR (in the background motivating this competition was Stalin). In this enactment it was said that the "authors do not see any positive role in the deeds of Khmelnytskyi in the XVII century, in his struggle against the occupation of Ukraine by aristocratic (panska) Poland and Turkish Sultanate; the fact of the passing, for example, of Georgia at the end of the XVII century under

the protection of Russia, as well as the fact of the passing of Ukraine under the rule of Russia, is looked upon by the authors as an absolute evil, outside of the context of concrete historical circumstances of that age; the authors do not see that Georgia had an alternative — either to be swallowed up by the Persia of the Shah and the Turkish Sultanate, or to become a protectorate of Russia. Similarly, before Ukraine there stood the alternative — to be swallowed up by Poland or the Turkish Sultanate, or to come under the protection of Russia. They do not see that the second perspective was for all that the lesser of the two evils.”³

Inasmuch as the conditions of the cult of the individual are concerned, each thesis connected with the name of Stalin immediately took on the meaning of an absolute truth, which was not to be subjected to even the minutest scrutiny, the formula of the “lesser evil” acquired general and universal dissemination, particularly in regard to the question of annexation of Ukraine to Russia. Thus, in Volume I of the *History of Ukraine*, published during the Great Fatherland War, we read:

“Naturally, in appraising this annexation, under no condition may it be forgotten that Ukraine united itself with Tsarist Russia, that tsarism, which was a dictatorship of landowner-serfholders, was conducting a colonial offensive against Ukraine; we also should not forget that the kozak officers, starting with Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, were restoring large land holdings, “submissiveness” of the peasants in Ukraine. All these facts we should not overlook, *but must declare that this was an evil* (italics ours — M. B.). But this was a lesser evil in comparison to what awaited the Ukrainian people in the event that Ukraine were conquered by Poland or Turkey.”

Corresponding ideas are also found in other texts of Ukrainian history, that were published at this time.

But after the decree of 1947 the annexation (priednannia) of Ukraine to Russia was regarded as an *absolute good*, as the best perspective for the Ukrainian people, as a pre-condition for further progress. “The reunification (voziednannia) of Ukraine with Russia” was now examined as the “lawful consequence of the preceding history of the two large fraternal Slav peoples — Russian and Ukrainian.”⁴

Thus it appears that in contradistinction to all other nations, for whom the road to an independent existence was affirmed to be an absolutely necessary pre-condition of normal development, the Ukrainian people could flourish only under the beneficial rule of Tsarist Russia.

The emergence of the question of occupation of the Ukrainian lands by the Tsarist government as an *absolute good* for the Ukrainian people did not appear in our historiography as an isolated instance. This was a part of a greater general conception, which one Ukrainian historian accurately dubbed as the "theory about the messianic role of Russia." This theory is nothing more than a poignant relapse to the great power chauvinism in Soviet historical scholarship of the 40's and 50's, that chauvinism, against which V. I. Lenin as early as 1922 declared "war not for life, but till death."⁵

The essence of the messianic role of Russia lies in the removal of the Russian people and its history outside of the framework of these laws, which constitute the content of historical materialism. Inasmuch as the theoretical side of this question is very crucial in connection with the substance of our article, I feel it is necessary to dwell on it in more detail.

From a certain point in time in our historiography there appeared a tendency to examine the nation of the Russian people as being something outside of the realm of history, independent of real historical context, having no connection with the conditions of that or another social-economic formation. Concrete expression of this is found in several aspects, beginning with the setting off of the Russian socialist nation from all the other socialist nations of the USSR (the memorable toast "to the Great Russian people!") and ending with the projection of contemporary manifestation of the relations between peoples of the Soviet Union upon relations during the feudal and capitalist epochs.

In connection with this emerged the desire to regard the Soviet Union as the direct heir of "one and indivisible" Russia. All criticism of the imperialist policies of Russian Tsarism was looked upon as something dangerous, that might inflict damage to the friendship of the Soviet peoples. "The separation of the history of Ukraine from the history of Russia, a slanted appraisal of the Kyievan Rus and the War of Liberation, 1648 to 1654, were necessary for the Ukrainian nationalists, so as to . . . conceal from the working classes the mutual origin and historical association of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples, to sow enmity between these nations, with the intent of alienating Ukraine from revolutionary, socialist Russia, and throw her at the mercy and plunder of the bourgeois West."⁶

This was how the ideological collision was formed. To recall the Battle of Konotop or elaborate on the text of the Hadiach Agreement became dangerous, because it could be interpreted as a desire to "sever" Ukraine (as if it were a button on a Russian uniform) and "throw" her at someone's "mercy."

The social-economic and historical boundaries between Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union were erased. The class approach in appraising every event was no longer binding. The Russian feudal state was declared to be the state of the Russian people. Statesmen like Suvorov or Ushakov, who secured for the tsars the rule over their own and foreign peoples, who embodied in life their usurping claims, and even tsars, such as Peter I or Ivan IV (the Terrible), were elevated almost to the level of national heroes, glorified in song, genuflecting before them, epopees were dedicated to them, tragedies, films etc., etc.

As early as May, 1941, Stalin criticized the widely known article of F. Engels, devoted to the foreign policy of Tsarist Russia, precisely for his sharp exposure of Russian imperialism.⁷ This attack, though marked by cautious formulation, nevertheless served to a certain extent as an incentive for the revision of Marxist appraisals of a whole series of events and phenomena, linked by this "delicate" theme, but most of all with the theme of national-liberation movements, directed against Russian rule.

Thus, in 1950 a decisive re-examination of attitudes relating to the movement of the north-Caucasian tribes under the leadership of Shamil was initiated. Prior to this, that movement was examined as a national liberation war against foreign oppression, which had an objective progressive character. Now it was interpreted to be a reactionary movement, inspired by Turkey and England.⁸ Similarly re-evaluated were the revolt of Kenesary Kasimov in Kazakhstan,⁹ and the 1916 revolt in Turkmeniia¹⁰ as well as a series of other historical events. The single theoretical "foundation" for this ideological metamorphosis was that all these movements were directed against Russian domination.

Simultaneously with the problem of annexation of the non-Russian nations to Russia raised also was the question of re-examination of the "lesser evil" formula. First to raise this question was M. Niekchina in the journal *Voprosy Istorii*,¹¹ which elicited a fairly dull, but very characteristic discussion.¹² The essence of the new approach to the problem lay in the fact that the mechanical use of this formula without consideration of the concrete circumstances of that or another fact, leads to the slanting of historical reality. Characteristically, that in relation to the annexation of Georgia and Ukraine the formula of "lesser evil" in this discussion (in conformity to the earlier cited document of the Administrative Commission of 1937) was not yet under scrutiny. But the tsarist conquest of the Volga region, Central Asia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and other countries obtained a new definition, as being enormously beneficial for these peoples.

However even this discussion, which very clearly reflected the return of post-war soviet historiography to the side of great-state

chauvinism, sustained devastating criticism for . . . being a creature of local nationalism (!). Appearing at the XIX Congress of the CPSU (b) (Communist Party of the Soviet Union [bolshevik]) in October of 1952, the then First Secretary of the CCP(b) (Central Committee of the Communist Party [bolshevik] of Azerbaijan Bagirov (executed in 1953 in connection with the Beria case) declared:

“The journal *Voprosy Istorii* not only failed to assist the historians of our national republics in comprehending the character of that or another historical event, but quite often itself assumed an erroneous position on these questions.

In the past year the journal contrived an aimless, abstract discussion about the so-called “lesser evil” formula which deals with the question of annexation of the non-Russian nations to Russia. It is unknown what objective the journal was pursuing with this discussion, but in any event it failed to render to our local cadres, in the national republics, any assistance in their struggle against manifestations of bourgeois nationalism in questions of history, if the contrary were not the case. This, instead of that, which on the foundation of a plurality of historical data, archival materials and documents could to the fullest extent elevate the question of progressiveness and beneficiality of the annexation of the non-Russian peoples to Russia. Not in the least underestimating the reactionary colonial policy of tsarism, it must not be forgotten that for many peoples in such concrete historical circumstances, when threatened by backward Turkey and Iran, who were supported by the Anglo-French imperialists, the annexation of these peoples to Russia was for them the only alternative and had an exceptionally propitious significance in their later fate. It does not appear that the journal *Voprosy Istorii*, guided by the utterances of comrade Stalin about the role of the Great Russian people in the family of the Soviet peoples, is objectively, concretely developing and determining what is urgent, vitally important for us, for the further strengthening of the friendship of the peoples of our country the question about the priceless assistance which was and continues to be extended to all the peoples of our country by our older brother — the Russian nation.”¹³

In this long and slanted citation (the word “question” here, for example, was repeated six times!) a clear pronouncement was secured for a tendency which at that time pretended to seize the dominant place in soviet historiography, a tendency to found a chauvinistic platform by necessitating the strengthening of the friendship of Soviet peoples.

Characteristically, the author of the cited declaration made his appearance as the representative of Azerbaijan, a nation that in the past through its own experience tasted the colonial oppression

from the side of tsarism. How can one ignore the well known words of V. I. Lenin that, "the Russified foreigners always overreact when it comes to the true Russian mood."¹⁴

The consequences of Bagirov's declaration were not slow in coming: the editorial staff of the journal suffered repressions, and the responsible editor P. M. Tretiakov was fired from his post.

Since that approximate time our historiography has gained a much propagated theory which is difficult to characterize other than, "nationalism inside out."

As it is known, the fundamental difference between nationalism and Marxism lies in that it (nationalism) considers the relations between nations as the chief motivating force in the historical process, at a time when Marxism considers class relations as the foundation, examining the national problem as only one of the manifestations or aspects of social struggle. In the tendency, which is under discussion, social class aspects appear to be pushed into the background, whereas the problem of national relations emerges at the forefront of the stage.

But in contradistinction to nationalism, which always considers the national-liberation movement as a progressive factor of historical development, our historiography of the 50's examined it as a phenomenon that was absolutely reactionary (that is, if it was directed against Russia).

This tendency was very clearly revealed in Ukrainian historiography of the 1947-1966 years. In essence it remains intact to the present day. It received a fairly comprehensive expression in particular in the first of the two-volume *History of the Ukrainian SSR* published in 1953 by the frightened Institute of History after the appearance of the decree of 1947.

From this book the reader was to become persuaded that, beginning with the XIX century up to the October Revolution, the major factor in the historical development of the Ukrainian nation was not the class struggle, not change in the social-economic formations, but the idea of "reunification with the fraternal Russian nation." Besides, this thesis was elevated to the level of a generally accepted principle in appraising the histories of all nations of former Tsarist Russia.

"The history of the peoples of the USSR" is a unified process. The history of a separate people of our country can be properly treated and understood only in connection with the history of other peoples and, first of all, with the history of the Russian people" — it was written at the decree of the CC-CP(b)U (Central Committee of the Communist Party (bolshevik) of Ukraine) in 1947.¹⁵

The participants in the discussion relating to the "lesser evil" formula expressed themselves even more precisely. "Upon the

correct decision (about the formula of "lesser evil," — M. B.) greatly dependent is the creation of the true *history of the fraternal nations of the USSR as the history of friendship with the Great Russian people.*" (Italics ours — M. B.)¹⁶

Thus, the principal task is formulated with unprecedented frankness: the interpretation of the histories of all the non-Russian peoples of the USSR as the histories of their relations with Russia. And this was made to look like Marxism.

From these positions appraised also was the Pereiaslav Agreement. "With this historic act there was concluded the protracted struggle of the freedom-loving Ukrainian people against foreign oppressors for reunification with the Russian people in a unified Russian state."¹⁷ Therefore we will not be surprised that the act of reunification (vozziednannia) was now examined as the summing up of results of the total earlier history of the Ukrainian peoples (since its major historical goal was precisely the unification with Russia); we will not be surprised also that it is precisely the Pereiaslav Agreement that now becomes the criterion by which Ukrainian history is divided into periods; that, let's say, the first volume of the *History of Ukraine*, published back in 1943, was proved by this same event, thus, fundamentally the division of the historical process was based not on division by social-economic formation, but on the history of international relations. And this also was made to look like Marxism.

Because of this the history of Ukraine obtained a peculiar interpretation. It appeared that in the course of many centuries the Ukrainian people fought mainly against their own independence, that an independent existence was a major evil for our peoples, and that therefore all those who summoned the people to struggle for national independence were the most implacable enemies of the Ukrainian people. All concrete events in the history of Ukraine — events, tendencies, deeds of individual persons and even the individuals themselves — were appraised not from the class standpoint, social by nature, but from their attitude to Russia.

In the event that an individual championed the idea of "reunification" he gained a favourable appraisal, independently of all other conditions; the one who questioned the idea or took part in an anti-Russian, anti-Tsarist liberation war obtained the label of a "loathsome traitor," "enemy's henchman" and "most implacable foe," again independently of his class position and social program.

Here is an interesting gallery of appraisals of the foremost statesmen of Ukrainian history from mid-XVII to the beginning of the XVIII centuries, quoted from Volume I of the *History of the Ukrainian USSR*:

Ivan Vyhovskiy — “filthy traitor”;
Iurii Khmelnytskyi — “worthlessness, a marionette in the hands of the pro-Polish group of the Ukrainian feudal aristocracy,” and to that add, “Turkish henchman” and the man who “betrayed the interests of the people”;
Pavlo Teteria — “henchman and obedient agent of the Polish gentry”;
Ivan Briukhovetskyi — “demagogue,” and from other sources “traitor”;
Petro Doroshenko — “Turkish puppet, traitor,” who strove to deliver Ukraine into the bondage of eternal enemies of the Ukrainian people — the “Turkish Sultanate and Crimean Khanate”;
Hryhorii Lisnytskyi and Iurii Nemyrych — “endeavoured to tear away Ukraine from Russia and restore the rule of the Polish-aristocracy”;
Kost’ Hordienko — “traitor” and “demagogue”;
Ivan Mazepa — “filthy traitor, who sold Ukraine into foreign enslavement,” who “bound himself to transform the Left Bank of Ukraine into a province of the Polish-Aristocratic state,” who “assisted the Swedes in their ruin and plunder of the Ukrainian lands,” “hated by the Ukrainian people as the ally of Aristocratic Poland” etc.;
Pylyp Orlyk and other Mazepynovites — “traitors, agents of Aristocratic Poland and the Swedish king.”

But enough (even though the list could have been extended). Among the mentioned were men of very different categories and by character of their activity truly outstanding statesmen, for example: Petro Doroshenko and at the same time ne'er-do-wells, like I. Briukhovetskyi and Iura Khmelnytskyi. But all of them fell into the same category because of one symptom: all of them had to take up the cause against Russia. This was the criterion used for the above-cited definitions. But in certain, relatively rare, instances where a Ukrainian statesman of that epoch because of other symptoms fell into grace and received a “favourable appraisal,” (as for example, the outstanding Koshevyi, Commander of the Zaporozhian Kozaks and the Sich, Ivan Sirko), his activities directed against Russia were carefully concealed.

Incredible, but true: in a special monograph, dedicated to the popular movements on the Left Bank of Ukraine in the second half of the XVII century, absent is the revolt of I. Sirko against the Tsarist Voievods (nobility) in 1663. It is needless to say that no mention of this event may be found in general popular courses or texts.

On the other hand, an individual like Vasyl Kochubei — a feudalist and oppressor — was raised onto the shield and elevated almost to

the level of a national hero, thanks mainly to the known (Kochubei's) denunciation of Mazepa to Peter his ally. He was proclaimed an outstanding patriot and martyr, and one of our eminent historians reached the point of advising teachers to take students on field trips to the grave site of Kochubei, in order to nurture in them the feeling of soviet patriotism. And all this also was made to look like Marxism!

In keeping with the idea of safeguarding the "eternal friendship of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples" even many works of Taras Shevchenko were proscribed, because they contained a critical attitude to the "reunification." So for example the 1954 edition of *Kobzar* was published without the works "Velykyi Lokh," "Stoit v Seli Subotovi," "Chyhyryne, Chyhyryne" and others. And this also was called Marxism!

3

From that time much water has flown down the Dnieper. Significant events have taken place in the life of our people. Audible were the words of the XX and XXII Congresses, the Plenary Session of the CC-CPSU met in October, 1964. In the social life of our country there occurred a renewal of the Leninist principles of life and work. Many outstanding workers of the past were rehabilitated, who in the years of the "cult of the individual" sustained unjust discrimination. The people washed from its path the likes of Beria and Bagirov.

In some respects Soviet historical scholarship also advanced. Many important questions were reexamined and received a correct interpretation. A little was done in that area that interests us; raised in particular was the question of the indispensability of careful research and interpretation of the National Liberation Movement in Ukraine. But, for the time being, the cart is still in the same place: not even a partial clearing up of the picture of the movement. Besides, the historians were incapable of pointing out any concrete facts or events that could be defined as facts and events of the Ukrainian National-Liberation Movement. A few even express the doubt — did such a movement ever exist in Ukraine? A proper doubt, when all the real facts of the National-Liberation War are examined as a continuous chain of high treason. In order to pry this matter from a dead point, it is necessary, at least, to once again re-examine many basic questions, that in the 30's and 50's sustained an unwarranted revision and today lead the researchers astray onto an erroneous path.

Marxism-Leninism maintains that every nation has the inalienable right to an independent historical development, which is recognized as the normal path to progress. From here — the major principle in

solving the national question, formulated by V. I. Lenin — the right of every nation to self-determination, up to separation into an independent state. This principle was laid into the foundation of the nationality policy of our Party; this principle governs the Party and our whole peoples when dealing with every problem connected with nationality relations.

In conformity with this, every kind of national oppression, rule of one nation over another is a great and undisputed evil, a brake on the path of general human progress. V. I. Lenin uncompromisingly applied this principle in the practical appraisals of every phenomenon or event. "Unless a Social-Democrat of a great, oppressive, annexing nation," he wrote in 1916, defining the general merger of nations, "forgets for a moment about 'his' Nikolai II, 'his' Wilhelm, George, Poincare and others *also about the merger* (italics by V. I. Lenin) with smaller nations (by way of annexation) — Nikolai II for 'merger' with Halychyna, Wilhelm II for 'merger' with Belgium and others, then such a Social Democrat will be a ludicrous doctrinaire in history, an instrument of imperialism in practice."¹⁸

And a little later: "The center of gravity of international education of workers in the oppressed countries inevitably should be based on the propagation and defence of the right of secession of oppressed countries. Without this there is no internationalism. We have the right and should *treat* every Social-Democrat of the oppressor nation, who does not conduct this type of propaganda, as an imperialist and villain. This is an unconditional requisite, even if the *chance* of secession were likely and 'realized' for socialism in only 1 out of 1000 instances." (italics by V. I. Lenin).¹⁹

When after the February Revolution of 1917 certain parts of Russia witnessed the brisk activity of decentralizing forces and tendencies toward national self-determination, which to some represented a very serious threat to the course of proletarian internationalism, V. I. Lenin resolutely spoke against such fears: "If Finland, if Poland, Ukraine secede from Russia, there is nothing bad in this. What is bad in this? Whoever said that is a chauvinist. One has to be insane, to continue the policy of Tsar Nikolai."

Out of this emerges yet another aspect of the problem — support of wars of national liberation. The foundation of Marxist comprehension of this problem is found in Lenin's teachings about just and unjust wars. V. I. Lenin repeatedly stressed that communists are not ordinary pacifists, they do not renounce all wars, this is dependent on the purpose for which it is being waged. Revolutionary wars aimed at obtaining social or national liberation merit support. "We can not be opposed to national-liberation wars"²⁰ V. I. Lenin emphasized. "In a confrontation among nations," he wrote elsewhere, "accord-

ing to the general principle war is just from the side of the oppressed nation (regardless, if it is defensive or offensive) from the military point of view.”²¹

These principles also governed Lenin’s practical work. Thus characterizing the conditions within multi-national Russia after the February Revolution, he wrote, “At the present time we are witnessing the national movement in Ukraine and we declare: we unconditionally support the full and absolute independence of the Ukrainian people. We should break with that old, bloody and filthy past, when the Russia of the capitalists and oppressors played the role of executioner of other nations. We will sweep away this past, of that past we will not leave one stone upon another.”²²

And here over several decades Soviet historians, who consider themselves Marxist-Leninists, began to elevate that “filthy and bloody past,” using various means to diffuse its madrigals about the “beneficiality of the annexation of non-Russian nations to Russia.”

The position of unconditional support of national liberation movements may not be undermined by the consideration, whoever stands at its head, of what kind of social order may emerge in the event of success. This, a problem that is of a totally different order, is always solved concretely, when approached from a realistic historical setting. It is self-evident, national-liberation movements during the period of bourgeois revolutions were bourgeois movements and could not culminate with a socialist victory; the question about the latter (socialist revolution) at that time generally was not on the order of the day. But, regardless of that, they (bourgeois revolutions) had a great progressive meaning: “. . . These were progressive wars, and objective revolutionary democrats, as well as all socialists, during such wars were always sympathetic to that country (that is, to the bourgeois) which contributes to the overthrow or subversion of the most dangerous adherents of feudalism, absolutism and oppression of foreign nations.”²³

In our case this has very great significance. In the historical literature of the 40’s and 50’s, which sought to reappraise the national-liberation movements in Tsarist Russia, there was a great reluctance to accentuate the fact that for the most part leading these movements were representatives of the upper social strata, who adhered to conservative views. The authors of these works very assiduously emphasized that Shamil, Kenesary, Dzhunaidkhan and others were feudalists and followed a policy which sought/to preserve the feudal order. Such a position is difficult to define other than anti-historical. Yet specific circumstances of the epoch, level of the socio-economic development of nations, which are being discussed, suggest no other alternative. And the occupation of these countries by Russia could in no way contribute to their transition onto a higher rung of historical develop-

ment — quite the contrary, it retarded and postponed this transition, as does every type of colonial oppression. Even these forces that propagated the idea of annexation of these peoples to Russia also belonged to the feudal social strata and actualized a similar policy which defended the feudal order, relying on the Tsarist government, which locally always supported the most reactionary tendencies.

If one were to accept the point of view of our writers, then all liberation movements during the feudal period should be condemned as reactionary. Bohdan Khmelnytskyi was a feudalist: he also defended the feudal order (more will be said about this later), therefore the National-Liberation War of the Ukrainian People against aristocratic-magnate Poland under his leadership should be rightfully qualified as a movement that was reactionary and anti-national (*antynarodnyi*).

Obviously this is not the case. Every specific epoch has its specific laws and may be appraised only from the position determined by these laws. But the general principle of progressiveness of *all types* of struggle, directed against *all types* of oppression, is qualified by that which independently of the nearest tangible social-economic outcome of national liberation, normal development of the nation, that threw off the yoke of foreign domination, always opens before us a much wider perspective for social progress.

From here, in effect, emerges Lenin's formulation on the question about the nationalism of oppressed nations. "In *every* bourgeois nationalism of an oppressed nation," wrote Lenin, "there exists a general-democratic content *opposed* to oppression and it is precisely *this that we unconditionally support*" (italics by V. I. Lenin).

V. I. Lenin stressed that it is always necessary to distinguish between the nationalism of an oppressor nation and the nationalism of a nation that is oppressed, the nationalism of a great nation and the nationalism of a smaller nation. "Concerning the latter nationalism almost always in historical reality we the nationals of a great nation, *were revealed to be perpetrators of countless coercions.*"⁵²

A very profound and correct thought, which is often overlooked in the exaltation of struggle against "remnants" or "residues" of bourgeois nationalism. It is forgotten that the nationalism of an oppressed nation is always a reaction to the chauvinism of an imperialistic nation, a reaction to the persecution that an oppressed nation experiences from the side of the ruling nation.

Presently mankind is living through the collapse of the colonial system: an unprecedented sweep of wars of national liberation has enveloped colonial and dependent countries, which in the course of the past decades one after another are gaining victory and winning state sovereignty. In the social plan, these new nations rarely assume

the progressive stance. Only some of them consciously choose the socialist path to development; in many the attainment of self-determination is realized in the framework of the nationalist idea, yet the newly created regimes are not distinguished by their democratic, nor progressive tendencies. But this does not influence our attitude to national-liberation movements in such countries; the blocking of the path of historical progress can be realized by none of the reactionary systems, which in one way or another are predestined for destruction. From here, the general-political principle of support for the national-liberation movements in colonial and dependent countries, apart from what social forces at this moment stand at the head of this movement, "in these countries, where the national-liberation movement is headed by the bourgeois and is progressing under the flag of nationalism, the working class supports the activities of the national government, directed at the maintenance of state sovereignty and subversion of the positions of imperialism in economic life."²⁶

The above-cited views have a methodological and theoretical meaning. All this is evident and recognized by all, as it concerns the present, and also in conformity with the past. But . . . with the exception of Russia. Russia is not subject to the operation of the laws of historical progress propagated by Marxism. Everyone knows that the revolt of the American colonies of England against the mother country as well as the creation of the United States of America at the end of the XVIII century was an event of great progressive significance. All are agreed that the Sepoy Revolt in India against English rule in the middle of the last century, although drowned in blood, deserves great respect and enthusiasm. No one would think of expressing doubt in the progressive nature of the war of liberation of the Greek nation for sovereignty at the advent of the XIX century, even though the real consequence of this struggle was the ruin of the country and annihilation of the population by the Turks.

But the revolts of I. Vyhovskyi or Mazepa against Russian rule in Ukraine — "betrayal" and "crime." The revolts of Petryk Ivanenko, supported by (at least, at the outset) the wide circle of kozaks and common people, is qualified by us as "the hostile activity of the Turkish henchman" and the "enemy of the Ukrainian people." The argumentation for this position is the same: every type of national-liberation movement in/ Ukraine, directed against the Tsarist government, is a reactionary and hostile movement, because it leads to the "separation" of Ukraine from Russia, at a time when the interests of the Ukrainian people, so to speak, called for the continuation of existence under the supremacy of the Russian Empire.

And this appraisal in our historiography was prevalent not only in relation to Ukraine, but to all nations that had the misfortune of

entering into the framework of Russia — that, in the words of V. I. Lenin, prison of nations.

At times the matter took on the character of an anecdote. Thus, the afore-mentioned M. Bagirov, desiring to demonstrate the reactionary character of the national-liberation war of the north Caucasian mountaineers under the leadership of Shamil, cites an excerpt from a letter of the leaders of this movement to the Turkish Minister of War Riza-Pasha: "Since the beginning of time the only desire of the Cherkassians, as the whole world knows, was independence, to which we have the real and undisputed right. Until this desire is fulfilled with the assent and assistance of the European states, with that in absolute compliance with our wishes, even the thought of concluding peace with Russia will not enter into our head."²⁷

To view attitudes to Russia as the major criteria of historical appraisal, the tendency to examine the history of non-Russian peoples as a history of their relations with Russia — have so permeated the consciousness of the author of the brochure (Bagirov), that he fails to even notice the paradox of his own position, does not see that the above-mentioned citation speaks against him. It is possible to doubt the sincerity of the leaders of Muridism, (the Moslem movement in the Caucasus 1825-1850 against Russia) but every honest democrat can sign his name under the cited words.

And all this has only one direction and in one way or another leads to the thesis about the "selectivity" or "exclusiveness" of the mission of Russia in world history.

4

Now let us at least briefly examine that concrete argumentation, which was cited in our historiography to the advantage of this conception, and attempt to determine its methodological and theoretical worth. But then, this task is not altogether that complicated, because the argumentation used does not distinguish itself with special variety, complexity, nor depth. In the presence of a significant diapason of concrete definitions, promoted in regard to different peoples, the general principles come to this:

1. Annexation to Russia meant an alliance of non-Russian peoples with the Russian people and, therefore, contributed to the development of their primordial friendship, promoted their common struggle against their common enemies and, primarily, against Tsarism.
2. Annexation to Russia strengthened the economic ties of the

annexed peoples with the Russian people, contributed to their social-economic progress.

3. Annexation to Russia meant the merger of the annexed people with a high and advanced Russian culture which thus promoted their cultural development.
4. Annexation to Russia was the salvation of these peoples from occupation by other countries (Poland, Turkey, Iran).
5. Annexation to Russia of the non-Russian peoples dealt a blow to the imperialistic countries that opposed Russia on the world arena and, therefore, strengthened her international position.

The theoretical impossibility of this argumentation is obvious even from the vantage point of general historical considerations. Indeed, with the aid of similar "arguments" it is possible to justify any type of colonial brigandage in whatever epoch and in any part of the globe. With similar success it may be affirmed that, let's say, the occupation of India by England contributed to the drawing together of the English and Indian peoples in their mutual struggle against English and all other types of imperialism.

Further, did not this occupation contribute to the establishment of tight economic ties between India and England (who stood on a much higher rung of social-economic development) and, by this to definite economic progress? Did it, this occupation, not promote the cultural drawing together of both countries and the influence of the English culture on the Indian culture? Did not this "annexation" of India to England guarantee her security from "engulfment" by, let's say, France or Portugal, Holland or even some other country?

Finally, did the occupation of India not strengthen the international position of England, did it not deal a blow to her adversaries in colonial brigandage?

These questions alone are sufficient in exposing the real nature of the "argumentation." But considering its diffusion in literature and its generally used character, we will allow ourself a brief examination of each of the five enumerated arguments and — particularly — in relation to the appraisal of the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654.

1. The first of the cited arguments appears to be the most important and by the same token the most unpleasant. We feel that to explain the annexation of non-Russian peoples to Tsarist Russia, as well as their alliance with the Russian people, in principle is an impossibility. Such an idea could/have appeared in our historiography only as a consequence of forgetting the dialectics of historical process and the desire to examine Russia, the Russian people, extra-historically, as something static, as something that is equal to itself at all stages of existence. I fear that there exists a need here for an examination of a terminological understanding as to the concept "people" (narod).

In general understanding this concept is sufficiently complex,

inasmuch as in conditions of a class society every people, every nation, has a complex structure. Every element of this structure in a definite comprehension is a part of the people (narod). Therefore, when I read, for example, the declaration: "through the act of reunion (vozziednannia) the Ukrainian people has strengthened its tight and indissoluble historical bond with the Russian people, in which it found a great ally, a loyal friend and defender in the struggle for its social and national liberation," then immediately a question crops up in my mind: what is meant by the term "Ukrainian people" (Ukrainskyi narod)? Kozak officers led by Khmelnytskyi and the Russian boyars led by Tsar Alexis Mikhailovich? Or the Ukrainian commoners and Ukrainian peasants? Or these and the other together? In the situation that existed at the time of the Jubilee in 1954 (300th Anniversary of the signing of the Pereiaslav Agreement), to ask such questions was an impropriety. In other instances formulations were more transparent.

"In the mutual struggle against mutual enemies — of Tsarism, landlords and capitalists, as well as against foreign oppressors—there grew and solidified the friendship of the *toilers* of Russia and Ukraine"²⁹ (italics ours, — M. B.). Or "Reunification of Ukraine with Russia strengthened the association of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples in their mutual struggle against the social oppression of Ukrainian and Russian landlords."³⁰

In a word, it is clear: the concern with the people (narod) is meant to be understood as concern with the "toiling masses." Therefore "reunification" of Ukraine with Russia promoted the friendship of the Russian and Ukrainian toilers in their struggle for mutual interests. Some have gone so far in their writings as to declare Bohdan Khmelnytskyi "the founder of the alliance of the two fraternal peoples."³¹ Approximately the same appeared in print about the annexation of the other non-Russian peoples to Russia.

But here is what V. I. Lenin wrote about this state of affairs: "The cursed history of the autocracy left us heirs to a great *alienation* (italics by V. I. Lenin) between the working classes of different peoples, oppressed by this autocracy (samoderzhavie). This type of alienation is a *great evil, an immense impediment* in the struggle against the autocracy"³² (italics ours — M. B.).

As we can see, this statement is diametrically opposed to the above cited one. And correct here is, undisputedly, V. I. Lenin. As a great dialectician, he is not content with superficial considerations, but looks deeply, uncovering and demonstrating the dialectic complexity and contradicting character of historical reality. The inclusion of non-Russian peoples into the body of the Russian Empire not only failed to promote the strengthening of the bonds and association of the toilers of the different nationalities, but to the contrary, hampered it,

became an impediment. Living under Tsarist rule, notwithstanding that the latter was the mutual enemy of Old Russia (and, first of all, the enemy of the Russian people itself), not only did not unite the toiling masses of these nations, but to the contrary, divided them. The Tsarist government incited one nation against another, desiring to direct the activities of the masses not into the social class channel, but that of national struggle and to claim that this pogromist policy had absolutely no success would be unjustified optimism. In connection with this V. I. Lenin wrote: "...It is sufficient to mention . . . how we treat foreigners, how we refer to a Pole in no other way than a 'poliachysko,' how we refer to a Tatar in no other way than a 'kniiaz,' a Ukrainian not other than a 'khokhol,' a Georgian and other Caucasian foreigners, — as 'kavkazkyi cholovik.'³³

The natural solidarity of the toilers of different nationalities, in one way or another, characteristic of all epochs, sustained great damage from the fact that different peoples found themselves within the framework of one imperialist state, under the rule of one national government. It is correct that not the Russian people, but Russian Tsarism oppressed the Ukrainian people, realizing its colonial policy in Ukraine. But the Tsarist regime carried this out with the hands of the Russian people, the hands of those peasants who were forced at the order of the ruling classes to don riflemen's caftans or soldiers' uniforms and annihilate the women and children in Baturyn, destroy the Zaporozhian Sich, wipe Turbair off the face of the earth, evoking from the Ukrainian people hate and alienation to that nation from which they came.

And it would be very great naiveté to think that a solid Ukrainian peasant or Kozak of the XVII-XVIII centuries could clearly distinguish between the soldier who killed his son and raped his daughter, and him who dispatched this soldier into Ukraine and made out of him a murderer and rapist.

Thus, V. I. Lenin was absolutely correct when he emphasized that in the Eastern European multi-national countries (Russia, Austria) it was an "especially difficult task to unite the class struggle of the workers of the oppressing and workers of the oppressed nations."³⁴

The main flaw in the thesis, which we are presently examining, is found in the fact that when weighing every concrete fact of "annexation" (pryiednannia) lost is the class approach in the appraisals. Constructed is an appearance, as if reference were made to the unification of peoples (meaning the toiling masses). But in reality what occurred was the union of the ruling classes against these peoples. Therefore, it is not the masses that were uniting against their mutual oppressors, but to the contrary, the oppressors were uniting, so as to be able to

more successfully subdue the masses, which they desired to disunite, inciting one against the other. And this was guaranteed with that "union" which did not have an abstract character, but was realized in the framework of a state, which always has a distinct strict class character.

But one error invites another. The unwillingness to renounce a theoretically faulty idea about the "union (or alliance — G. K.) of peoples" in the framework of Tsarist Russia finds our historians perfectly ready to examine the latter as the state of the Russian people. Pronouncements that allude to this thesis may be readily found in post-war historiography: "The Russian people in a protracted and dedicated struggle with Tatar-Mongolian and other foreign oppressors subdued the feudal divisions, asserted its national sovereignty and created a mighty centralized state with its capital in Moscow."³⁵

Therefore, it was not the feudal class that created Tsarist Russia of the XVI century, but the Russian people. This state was not a machine designed to preserve the rule of the feudalists over the people, but an instrument for the preservation of the interests of the people! This is how absurd the situation was getting. But this was necessary, so as to be able to say a little later that supposedly in the XVII century Ukraine entered into the framework of the "state of the Russian people."

Speaking about the "eternal friendship" of nations in Tsarist Russia, we are tolerating a great theoretical error, projecting the present situation into the distant past. To a degree this has the character of a political blunder, in that it depreciates the meaning of the October Revolution, which destroyed the Tsarist prison of nations together with its national inconsistencies.

5

I. The other four arguments appear to be less important, nevertheless they also need definite clarifications, inasmuch as their lack of theoretical foundation has such an obvious character. We note, nonetheless, that whereas the just examined argument is in its totality unsound and in the scheme of the development of relations between the toiling masses of the Russian and non-Russian nations the passing of the latter under the rule of the Tsarist regime had an exclusively negative significance, other arguments have a more complex character, and here side by side with the negative sides there are also positive moments. Specifically, this applies to the second and third points, which deal with internal relations.

II. It is obvious that there is no doubt, that the "annexation" (pryiednannia) of the non-Russian nations to Russia should have been positively reflected in the development of their economic relations. In a certain aspect this should have been of positive significance, although the realistic dimensions of this advantage should be measured separately in every concrete case. Here is the general dialectic of colonial policy: every metropolis occupying a foreign country proceeds to bring capital there due to the high dividend, which is promised by the despoilation of the natural wealth of the occupied lands and exploitation of the cheap labour force of the oppressed peoples. Besides, the colonial policies of England, France, The Netherlands and other western European countries as one of its consequences brought the colonies into the productive world market and, in conformity with this, their definite economic development, even though the latter for the most part took on a monstrous form.

But, while speaking about this, that the annexation of that or another country to Russia promoted the strengthening of its economic ties with Russia, one should not overlook the onesidedness of this theme. However, the strengthening of these ties with all the other countries also to a great extent neutralized the positive effect. The passing of Ukraine under the protectorate of Russia really opened "very wide perspectives for the economic convergence of Ukraine with Russia in the framework of a single powerful Russian state."³⁶ But together with this Ukraine was forfeiting economic ties with Poland (which because of Gdansk was the gateway to western Europe) and Lithuania; and weakened her ties with Turkey and her dependencies (Moldavia, Wallachia, Crimea, Semyhoroddia). More than that, whereas not all of Ukraine was annexed, but only its eastern portion, the act (Pereiaslav) had a negative influence on the development of economic relations in the interior of the country and, thus, on the process of the formation of the general Ukrainian market.

But the main essence of the matter may be seen in that the economic development of countries occupied by Tsarism took on an unnatural, one-sided character. This was progress in the interest of the metropolis, the type of development that strongly chained the dependent country to the Russian economy, transformed this country into an object of economic exploitation. This was a union of horse and rider, in which Russia played the role of the latter.

Research on the economic status of Ukraine within the framework of Russia reveals that in the industrial section prior to the October Revolution Ukraine was developed no less than the central Russian lands. But this was due mainly to the mining industry (Donbas, Kryvyi Rih) and manufacturing in the remaking of peasant-agrarian raw goods, which do not withstand distant

transporting. Commensurate with this the industrial development of Ukraine was realized mainly because of foreign capital; thus the major part of surplus value flowed outside the borders of the country. This was done, to be sure, not for the sake of insuring the economic progress of Ukrainian lands, but for the sake of the tremendous profits, which guaranteed this investment. Ukraine, as well as other Tsarist-occupied lands, became the object of colonial despoilation and if general progress forced a path for itself, then this was not due to, but contrary to, her dependent existence.

V. I. Lenin in the text of his speech, prepared for delivery before the IV State Duma in 1913, wrote: "... in nine years collected in Ukraine were 3,400,000 thousand, and returned (into Ukraine) for different expenses were 1,760,000 thousand karbovanci. The question that emerges is, what were the objectives for which almost half of the total sum were expended, that were collected in Ukraine." Revealed in this was the colonial (in the economic sense of the word) status of Ukraine in the framework of the Russian Empire and the predatory direction of the policy of the Tsarist government in the non-Russian areas of the state. And this policy Tsarism began to implement in Ukraine soon after the annexation — even before the final liquidation of Ukrainian statehood (granting of Ukrainian lands to Russian landlords, establishment of state (Russian) manufacturing complexes and the like).

This was the general historical logic of colonialism, the lawful dialectic path of development of countries that had the misfortune of falling into the position of dependencies. A similar picture may be observed in the Caucasus, Central Asia, Siberia, perhaps in a more monstrous form became these areas at the moment of annexation were more underdeveloped economically than Ukraine. Naturally, they also developed within the framework of the general all-Russian market, but this was a spontaneous development, which came about despite the colonial policies of Russia and which was artificially retarded because of the colonial status of these areas. Academician Gafurov was absolutely correct when, speaking about the threat of capitalism in Tadzhikistan in the XIX century, he declared that in Central Asia without the annexation to Russia "the capitalistic relations would have begun to blossom, and possibly at a much greater pace than in the colonial conditions that emerged."

III. In our literature there is a widespread notion that the annexation of the non-Russian peoples to Russia had a beneficent influence on their cultural development. Having Ukraine in mind, for the most part they quote from V. H. Belinskii's works: "Merging forever with consanguineous Russia, Little Russia (Malorosiia) which was what Belinskii called Ukraine — opened for herself the door to civilization, education, art, and scholarship. In union with Russia

there now awaited her a great future.”³⁷ Having cited this passionate statement, the authors of the commemorative monograph *The Liberation War of 1648-1654 and Reunification of Ukraine with Russia (Vyzvol'na viina 1648-1654 rr. i vozz'iednannia Ukrainy z Rosiieiu)*, for instance, declared: “History has brilliantly affirmed the prophecy of this distinguished son (Belinskii) of the Russian nation.”³⁸

But here is what V. I. Lenin wrote about this state of affairs: “At a time when all civilized nations of the world are competing with each other in the field of popular education so as to prevent the break up, the deterioration and demoralization of the country, in Russia the persecutions of the literacy of the Slavic peoples in the sphere of education in their native language are taking on unheard-of dimensions, the Ukrainian and Polish peasants are artificially kept from literacy. Let us take the official data from the *Russian Yearly (Schorichnyk Rosii)* from 1910, published by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. These statistics reveal that in European Russia the percentage of literate population is comprised of only 30% — that is less than half that which exists in the most backward of European countries — Austria.

But even if oppressively disgraceful is the general Russian illiteracy, protected and fostered by our government, then it is even more frightful in Ukraine. I took seven exclusively Ukrainian gubernias, that is, gubernias where the Ukrainian population comprises 2/3 of the total population. These gubernias are: Poltava, Podillia, Kharkiv, Volyn, Katerynoslav, Chernihiv. *And what was revealed?* Not even in one of these gubernias did literacy approximate the central Russian figure, which I just cited from the official yearly. In the Katerynoslav gubernia the literates account for only 29% of the population. This is exact data taken from government statistics, cited with respect to the extent of the ruin and the wilderness into which our government drives the Slav nations of a great Slav state.

Thus I revealed to you data related to the percentile norm of literacy of the Russian and Ukrainian populations from the 1910 yearly published by the Ministry of Interior. I must also tell you, that the 1652 study of the Archdeacon Paul of Aleppo about literacy in Ukraine reveals that almost all members of families, and not only male persons, but wives and daughters, know how to read. The censuses of 1740 and 1748 disclose that in seven Hetmanate regiments (polky — see glossary) of the Poltava and Chernihiv gubernias with 1034 villages there were 866 schools where lessons were conducted in the Ukrainian language. One school for every 740 souls. In 1804 an Ukaz was published forbidding teaching in the Ukrainian langu-

age. The census of 1897 disclosed that the most illiterate people in Russia were the Ukrainians. They were at the lowest stage of literacy. This was in 1897 and it meant that out of 100 souls only 13 were illiterate.³⁹

There is the "civilization" to which Ukraine opened the door for herself, having fallen under Tsarist rule.

It appears that enough has been said so as to be able to properly appraise Belinskii's declaration and those who like to cite him. But the historical meaning of every event is most precisely defined on the basis of its consequences. In the cited case the consequences are obvious, but we are more interested in the theoretical side of the matter, because the thesis about the beneficiality of the influence of the advanced culture always appears at the forefront of the stage in connection with the appraisal of the annexation to Russia not only of Ukraine, but also other countries.

The interrelationships of different national cultures operated, are operating, and will continue to operate independently of borders and political systems, but in our instance of decisive significance is a different question, that is — in what way was the colonial position of that or another country under the tutelage of Tsarist Russia *reflected* in the development of her culture. These conditions were determined, naturally, not by the personal contacts of outstanding statesmen of Russia and other peoples (let's say, Akhundov or Shevchenko with Chernishevskii and Dobroliubov), but by the much deeper factors of social-economic order about which Lenin spoke.

Therefore, approximately the same can be repeated, that was said earlier on the occasion of the economic relations of the annexed countries: even if it were possible to talk about the strengthening of cultural ties with other countries, but inasmuch as XVII-XVIII century Russia, in the cultural sense, as is known, was a very backward country, then here also the benefits are revealed as less than a loss.

The major theoretical mistake of this thesis is distinguished by this, that at the base of historical appraisals are placed super-structural events. Besides, interests of the cultural order, even if they were absolutely realistic, may not predominate, whenever the economic development and national sovereignty are concerned. Cultural relations develop quite well even without state unification (even better without it, because in such an instance there are no barriers that rise with attempts at national intimidation and national alienation, which are a consequence of the social-economic inequality of nations).

Often reference is made to a well known place in the letters of F. Engels to K. Marx, where he writes, that the "rule of Russia

plays a civilizing role for the Black and Caspian Seas and Central Asia areas, for the Bashkirs and Tatars.⁴⁰ This appraisal is correct to the extent to which it is correct to affirm that imperialist states (who in most cases are distinguished by a much higher level of historical development) actualized a "civilizing influence on their colonies. The concretization of this thesis as it pertains to Russia (which never was among the number of advanced countries of the world) in our historiography sometimes came down to anecdotes.⁴¹

Returning to our question dealing with relations between Ukraine and Russia in the period following the convocation of the Pereiaslavskaya Rada (assembly), we must emphasize: To think that "reunification" (voz'iednannia) with Russia insured the beneficial influence of the progressive Russian culture, which was itself in the process of development, on the Ukrainian culture,⁴² is bitterly ironic. This is so because Russian culture in the XVII-XVIII centuries was in a deplorable state and stood significantly below the Ukrainian culture. She could not only fail to exert a beneficial influence on Ukrainian culture, but quite to the contrary, was herself developing under the beneficent influence of the latter. It is common knowledge that literacy in Russia was at a very low level, at a time when in Ukraine it was the acquisition not only of the wealthy strata, but also of the general democratic layer of society. Ukraine's starshyna (officerdom) for the most part was made up of persons who had an excellent education, and in this respect differed significantly from the Russian boyars (nobles), the major portion of whom were illiterate or half literate. The Kievan Academy until the middle of the XVIII century (up to the founding of Moscow University) remained the only higher educational institution in Russia and the original supplier of cadres of intelligentsia for the whole country.

Ukrainian literature, descriptive art, architecture, music, theaters stood on an incomparably higher level than in Russia. Even before the National-Liberation War of 1648-1654 the Muscovite government invited Ukrainian scholars and masters, entrusting them with important cultural ideological tasks. Thus, in the 30's of the XVII century Iepifanii Ielovynetskyi and Arsenii Stanivskyi were connected with the translation work of religious books which was linked to the preparation of church reform. After annexation (of Ukraine to Russia) in the course of a period of time the most outstanding cultural workers of general Russian dimensions were mainly Ukrainians or at least alumni of Ukrainian educational institutions. As an example let us name a few outstanding writers and public workers — F. Prokopovych, St. Iavorskyi, Ia. Kozelskyi, V. Kapnist, the president of the Russian Academy of Sciences K. Rozumovskiy, the artists L. Tarasevych, A. Losenko, D. Levytskyi,

V. Borovykovskiy, the sculptor I. Martos, composer D. Bortnianskiy, M. Berezhivskiy and many others. It is sufficient to imagine even the mentioned figures against the background of their times, to be able to comprehend their outstanding role in the development of the Russian culture.

The last two arguments are concerned with the sphere of international relations.

IV. Very much favoured in our historiography is the proposition which benefits the thesis about the "beneficiality" of Tsarist colonial policy, a thesis that claims that the annexation of non-Russian nations to Russia was for them the only way out of their situation, that this annexation saved them from the encroachment of other countries.

Initially the formulation of this question was proposed in the earlier cited enactment of the Administrative Commission concerned with a contest for the best history text of the USSR (1937). Enunciated here was the idea that the annexations of Ukraine and Georgia to Russia were a lesser evil when compared to the prospect of falling under the rule of Poland, Turkey, and Iran. Subsequently the fig leaf of the "lesser evil" was discarded; they began to talk about the "beneficiality" of annexation, as a means of salvation from colonial encroachment on the part of other countries.

Similarly, the positive side of the Russian conquest of Central Asia was perceived in that the Central Asian areas did not become colonies of England.⁴³ The seizure of the Volga area (Khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan) by Russia "saved" these lands from Turkish encroachments.⁴⁴ Through annexation to Russia, Azerbaijan was saved from the threat of "eventual enslavement" by Iran and Turkey.⁴⁵

Similar utterances could be cited further, but we think that enough has been said. These who are even slightly acquainted with Soviet historiographical literature of the post-war years, know well that analogical declarations without fail make their appearance, as soon as reference is made to the question of that or another fact of annexation by Tsarist Russia. This method of justification of the Tsarist colonial policy appears to be very convenient, because always in every concrete situation, together with Russia, there are to be found an adequate number of other pretender-bandits, eager to take into their hands that which is not in its proper place.

But the logic of such argumentation appears to be very questionable and unintentionally reminds one of ancient deliberations such as, to what extent is horseradish sweeter than radish. This method of "saving" from encroachment is really an outstanding chef-d'oeuvre of Jesuit sophistication.

Here is what Lenin wrote about a similar state of affairs: "These circumstances, where the struggle for national liberation against one

imperialist state may be under certain conditions exploited by another 'great' power for her own similar imperialistic goals — so also very little is needed to force Social-Democrats to renounce the acknowledgement of the right of national self-determination, as countless instances of utilization by the bourgeois of republican slogans with the goal of political deceit and financial robbery, as for example, in the Romance countries, are not able to force Social-Democrats to renounce their republicanism."⁴⁶

Naturally, the perspectives of enslavement by different states are not always equivalent in meaning. Thus there exists the possibility of choosing the comparatively lesser evil. But every evil remains evil. And to be overjoyed because Ivan's head was cut off by Peter and now, so to speak, there was no longer any need for Simeon to do this, — is hardly becoming. And even the method of measuring the extent of the concrete evil is not always successfully determined with sufficient exactness and without doubt.

Especially in regard to the fate of Ukraine in the middle and second half of the XVII century the matter does not appear altogether simple. To say nothing about the perspective of eventual consolidation of an independent Ukrainian state (a perspective, from our conviction, that was absolutely realistic under the condition of reliance not on *feudal*, but on bourgeois tendencies of development), even the alternative of Russian protection, about which Bohdan Khmelnytskyi spoke at the Pereiaslav Assembly, did not seem absurd to most of the participants.

And it was not accidental at the time, following the death of B. Khmelnytskyi, that the pro-Polish and pro-Turkish parties were significantly strong in Ukraine, the position of which the government (Russian) contrary to its own wishes and contrary to its own interests, strengthened through its reckless policy and pointless offensive against the autonomy of the Hetmanate.

It is not possible to back away from such factors as, let's say, the Hadiach Agreement of 1658 which (and which in our literature is referred to by no other title than "disgraceful") granted to Ukraine within the framework of the Commonwealth (Rich Pospolyta) significantly greater autonomous rights than the March Statutes of 1654 — within the framework of the Russian state. As it is known, in keeping with this agreement the Commonwealth was to be composed of three formal juridically equal parts — the Polish Kingdom, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Grand Duchy of Rus (within the boundaries of Ukraine, annexed to Russia in 1654), who together were to choose their mutual king. The Grand Duchy of Rus was to receive full internal autonomy and self-government.

In addition, there was the possibility of a Swedish orientation, which took into account the strained relations between Sweden and

Russia, as well as with Poland. In this respect also not all is well in our literature. Particularly, the alliance of I. Mazepa with the Swedish king Charles XII everywhere is presented as an act that returned Ukraine under the rule of the Polish crown. In works, dedicated to the Northern War, reiterated (without noting the sources) is the well known concoction that Mazepa did this because he desired a princely title and two palatinates (Polotsk and Vitebsk), — a version absolutely improbable because, as Hetman of Ukraine he had significantly more than this so-called “reward for treason.” At the same time the content of the agreement of Mazepa with Charles XII and the Polish king Stanislav Lesczynski is well known from the documents of 1709-1710:

“Ukraine on both sides of the Dnieper River with the Zaporozhian Army and the Little Russian (Ukrainian) nation must be forever free from all foreign rule. The Allied states under no pretext of her liberation, nor protection over her, nor under any other may lay claim to absolute rule over Ukraine and the Zaporozhian army, nor on vassal allegiance or any type of subordination, and may not collect from her any profits or taxes . . . Respect of her borders, inviolability of her freedoms, her lawful rights and privileges should be devoutly maintained, so that Ukraine may forever enjoy her rights and liberties without any diminution.”⁴⁷

But to our great sorrow, the tendency to model the historical processes for the sake of corroborating beforehand the postulated thesis — quite frequently by way of ignoring or distorting facts and sources — is a phenomenon in our scholarship that is unrestrained.

V. And, finally, the last argument favouring the idea of “beneficiality” of the annexation of non-Russian peoples to Russia rests on the idea that the annexation strengthened Russia and dealt a blow to her enemies.

One can not dispute the correctness of this thesis, what is true is true: Russia strengthened her international position by conquering one country after another. It is true that the annexation of Ukraine to Russia strengthened the position of Russia and undermined the positions of Poland, Turkey, and Crimea. It is true that the conquest of the North Caucasian peoples dealt a blow to English aspirations in the Near East. It is true that the annexation of Georgia and Azerbaijan as well as the acquisition of Armenia were achieved at the expense of Turkish and Iranian interests.

All this is true, as well as the attempts to seize control of, let's say, the Straits (Bosphorus and Dardanelles), which the Russian Empire so actively manifested throughout all of the XIX century, was advantageous to the Tsarist regime and in the event of the realization of this goal the positions of Russia would have been significantly strengthened.

But, for God's sake, what bearing does this have on the interests of these countries that became the victims of colonial brigandage? Can the enrichment of the robber be considered justification of the act of robbery? It is absolutely understood that the realization of colonial policy is always conducted in the interest of imperialist countries, which secure their comfort at the expense of the oppressed nations.

"The reunification of Ukraine with Russia weakened the international position of the Turkish Empire, but specifically the position of the Khanate of Crimea, a Turkish dependency . . . Reunification of Ukraine with Russia created favourable conditions for determining very vital historical tasks — acquisition of the northern shores of the Black and Azov Seas which guaranteed free access to these seas, which had extraordinary significance for the economic development of our country."⁴⁸

In a word, thanks to the "reunification of Ukraine with Russia" the latter obtained incomparably superior conditions for the implementation of her other expansionist plans — annexation of Moldavia (" . . . as early as 1656 representatives of the Moldavian government expressing the will (!) of the Moldavian people, turned to Tsar Alexis Mikhailovich with an appeal to annex Moldavia to Russia and to assist Moldavia in obtaining her freedom from the Turkish yoke"),⁴⁹ Crimea, the North Caucasus, Poland; these expansionist plans, which from a definite period of time are quoted in our literature as facts of the "heroic past of the Russian people," as the material of exalted patriotic achievement.

But here is what V. I. Lenin wrote about this state of affairs:

"We are overcome with a sense of national pride and as a result we *particularly* despise *our* (italics by V. I. Lenin, — M. B.) servile past (when the landlord-gentry led the commoners to war, in order to stifle independent Ukraine, Poland, Persia, China) and our servile present, when these very landlords with the assistance of the capitalists led us to war, in order to subdue Poland and Ukraine, in order to put down the democratic movement in Persia and China, in order to strengthen the band of Romanovs, Bobrynskys, Purishkeviches, which shames our Great Russian national dignity. It is not one's fault, that he was born a slave, but a slave who not only renounces his quest for freedom but justifies and embellishes slavery (for example, calls the strangulation of Poland and Ukraine as "defence of the fatherland" of the Great Russians), such a slave is a crude boor and cad, who calls forth a just feeling of indignation, contempt and disgust."⁵⁰

Similarly, numerous "reunifications" and "annexations" strengthened the international position of the well known "Gendarme of Europe" and weakened his partners (Austria, etc., — G. K.) But this

strengthening is not one in which we may take pride, that can be applauded, justified, or forgiven.

Now, returning to the concrete question concerning the appraisal of the Pereiaslav Treaty of 1654, we are obliged to clarify (even if in a general way) the following questions:

1. What did Ukraine represent in itself in the middle of the XVII century and what circumstances brought on the war of 1648-1654.
2. What was the class position of B. Khmelnytskyi and his surroundings.
3. What was the Tsarist government seeking in Ukraine and what goal did it pursue, intruding in the Polish-Ukrainian conflict.
4. What does the Pereiaslav Act consist of and what were the resulting consequences in the future development of Ukraine and Russia.
5. Did the Andrusovo Armistice of 1667 and the "Eternal Peace" of 1686 confirm and crown the "union of two fraternal peoples."
6. What Social-Economic changes occurred in Ukraine within the framework of Russia in the course of the latter part of the XVII and XVIII centuries.

Each one of these questions could become the subject of a special monograph, but treatment of concrete problems of Ukrainian history in Soviet historiography and publication of a series of fundamental monographs, based on an assiduous adaptation of archival sources,⁵¹ provide the opportunity to rely on existing research experience.

1. The generally accepted notion about Ukraine in the second half of the XVI and first half of the XVII centuries is, as about a country of serfs, with the indivisible rule of the feudal order. This notion, nevertheless, appears not altogether correct.

According to the calculations of O. S. Kompan, nearly 46% of the population of Ukraine in the XVII century was comprised of city dwellers.⁵² This figure seems to be so startling that not only other researchers express their doubt in it (although they can not point out where the mistake is to be found), but even the author himself was surprised by the outcome of *his own work*, suggesting a fore-warning, that the concern, naturally, is not so much with the actual population of the cities (artisans and tradespeople), as with simple — peasant — residents of settlements with city privileges. To avoid getting bogged down in this polemic, we must point out that in our case the character of occupation of this 46 per cent is of significance.

Of significance is the fact that city rights assured them of their status beyond the framework of servitude in the proper sense of the word (they, naturally, were bound to perform certain duties to the benefit of the feudal owners of the land, on which these cities and towns stood, but they enjoyed personal freedom).

Thus there remains 54 per cent of the population of Ukraine. Included in this figure is a definite segment of the population which was comprised of kozaks, who lived outside of the cities, but who were also exempted from servile obligations. The specific importance (weight), for the time being, is not precisely determined, but it is possible to suppose that after subtracting them there remains not more than one half of the population.

Further, the research of I. D. Boiko revealed that as early as the XVI century nearly 40% of the peasant population of Ukraine was pauperized — totally or to such a degree that it could not guarantee its livelihood from its own farm.⁵⁴ This segment of the population was forced to sell its labour services and lived on earnings obtained from wealthier peasants and latifundists.

Finally, it is absolutely necessary to keep in mind a peculiar phenomenon in the history of Ukraine, known as the "sloboda," the residents of which for a definite period of time were partially or fully freed from the performance of feudal duties.

When taking all this into account, it will be revealed that in the XVI and first half of the XVIII centuries only a fourth of the population of Ukraine really lived in a state of servitude. This should fundamentally alter the general appraisal about the social-economic situation in Ukraine prior to the beginning of the *National Liberation Wars*. The feudal relationships were applicable only to the upper strata of the social structure, through which very vigorously penetrated new, bourgeois (more precisely petit-bourgeois) tendencies. The fundamental social figure in Ukraine at that time became the personally free petty producer-peasant, the most classic example of which was the kozak type.

At the time of the National Liberation War of 1648-1654, the great feudal landholdings in Ukraine for all practical purposes were liquidated together with their bearers — magnates and the greater nobility (shliakhta), which was either destroyed physically or fled to the west saving its life. The noble estate at the end of the war was represented by an insignificant number of persons, who for the most part belonged to the lower strata of that social class. By substance the only form of great feudal proprietorship, to speak of, at this time were the monastic landowning estates of the Orthodox Church.

The second half of the XVI century marks the sharp growth of commodity-moneyed relationships, connected to the general crisis of the feudal economy affecting the whole of Europe. As it is known, K. Marx considered the XVI century the turning point — the beginning of the new, bourgeois epoch. Ukraine formed an inseparable part of the world market, her history was indissolubly tied to these processes, which at this time determined the major directions of worldwide history.⁵⁶

The XVI century in Western European countries was marked by a turn to industrial development. In England at this time, for example, the agricultural economy began to orient itself on wool manufacturing, which found its expression in a shift from agriculture to grazing of fine-wooled sheep ("enclosure"). One of the apparent results of this was the sharp rise in the export of bread to western European countries, in that number also from Ukraine (through Gdansk and other Baltic ports). Also becoming export oriented were the land-owner (manor) and petty merchant (peasant-kozak) economies. This also definitely exerted an influence upon the *social-economic* state of Ukrainian society.

A very significant phenomenon in the economic life of Ukraine during the second half of the XVI and first half of the XVII centuries was the emergence and diffusion of manufactured products. It encompassed for the most part industries which also produced for export — manufactures of saltpetre, potash, bahrocy, rope, masts, etc., as well as iron ore, glass works and certain branches of the food industry. Hundreds of ore mines, glassworks, potash, shacks, breweries, founded on the exploitation of freely hired labour, with typical manufacturing division of labour, form an extremely important expression of the new tendencies, that signified the disintegration of the feudal system and the active development of bourgeois relations.⁵⁷

All these instances determined serious upheavals in the state of Ukrainian society of the XVI-XVII centuries. The great breakdown of feudalism, based on the primordial isolation and self-sufficiency of an agrarian economy, the birth and development of bourgeois relations with their tendency of establishing and strengthening of economic ties on the national scale; the process of formation of the general Ukrainian market, which was formed as a definite integral element of the general European market, — all this determined a new stage also in the ethnic development of the Ukrainian peoples — the process of formation of the Ukrainian nation.⁵⁸ The awakening of national consciousness also found its expression at the beginning of the military struggle of the Ukrainian people for its national (and at the same time — social) liberation, which was initiated at the end of the XV century with the revolt of Khrystofor Kosynskiy.⁵⁹

The most active force in this struggle was kozakdom. From the vantage point of class characteristics it formed the most clearly defined part of the bourgeois element, which emerged and was formed as the antithesis to the feudal class. In the middle of the XV century the kozaks created their own political organization — the Zaporozhian Sich, that — in the words of Marx — "original kozak republic" which under conditions of foreign domination of the major part of Ukraine and final elimination of any kind of politically autonomous Ukraine, took upon itself the function of standard bearer

of Ukrainian statehood. Later, in the XVIII century, as a result of the successful National-Liberation struggle the state organization of Zaporizhzhia was extended to almost all of Ukraine.

From a certain point of view the unbroken chain of "peasant-kozak revolts" from 1591 to 1648 may be examined as the struggle of two states, one of which (feudal in its makeup) occupied the territory of the second, determined to maintain its rule further, and the second (bourgeois by nature) defended its independence and desired to liberate and restore under its jurisdiction its own territory. In this instance the state activity of B. Khmelnytskyi should be examined (objectively, disregarding his conscious orientation on feudal tendencies) not as the creation of the Ukrainian state, but as the extension of the historically formed political system of Zaporizhzhia (which in this case took up the cause in the name of all of Ukraine) into the districts (volost), that is the territory liberated from foreign domination.

The historical tragedy of Ukraine in the XVII century lay in the fact that B. Khmelnytskyi and other persons, who stood at the head of the National Liberation struggle, did not understand the objective historical tendencies and, leaning on the remnants of feudal strength, in the social plan strove to keep Ukraine from these fundamental changes and upheavals that were dictated by the logic of historical development. Thus, to what extent Khmelnytskyi was able to carry out the historical mission placed upon him is a separate question, which demands a special examination.

6

Excessive idealization of B. Khmelnytskyi is a characteristic trait of soviet historiography from the times of the cult of the individual. Up to the mid 30's this statesman of Ukrainian history evoked a somewhat reserved treatment, which was determined by a realistic appraisal of his class position. Thus, in volume 59 of *Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia (The Great Soviet Encyclopedia)* he is acknowledged as a characteristic representative of the "upper strata of feudal-kozak officerdom which desired to equalize its privileges with the feudalists of Poland — the Polish aristocracy (shliakhtha)."⁰⁶

Class interests of the Ukrainian shliakhtha are also used to explain the cruel chastisement by Khmelnytskyi of the revolts of the masses, which continued to be concerned with the recognition of equality of the Ukrainian feudalists with that of the Polish feudalists. In his policies after the resumption of peasant revolts Khmelnytskyi often made use of clearly provocative methods, which pursued the goal of breaking the strength of the peasant revolts... Treasonous

were the tactics of Khmelnytskyi with regard to the national revolts under Nechai, Bohun and others; Khmelnytskyi not only "maintained neutrality," but even gave direct assistance to the Polish armies, which quelled the popular revolts; there are known instances of direct inspiration of revolts, the goal of which was their ruin."⁶¹

At that time (in the 1930's) the notion was that B. Khmelnytskyi "was not and could not have been the leader of the revolution and played in it the role of a traitor to the revolutionary kozak-peasant masses, fostering the consolidation of the colonial rule of Russia over Ukraine as well as servile oppression."⁶²

With the end of the 30's commenced the gradual elevation of Khmelnytskyi onto the shield, as the leader of the National-Liberation War of the Ukrainian people against aristocratic Poland. The turning point was the earlier mentioned decision of the Administrative Commission and its contest for the best textbook of the history of the USSR, where for the first time during the Soviet period a positive appraisal was made of Khmelnytskyi's deeds and the Pereiaslav Act. In 1939, was published K. Osypov's book, based, it is true, not so much on direct research of historical data, as on the base of the widely known monograph of M. Kastomarov. Simultaneously a propaganda campaign was initiated benefitting Khmelnytskyi in literature and art (the play of Korniiichuk, film of I. Savchenko and others). In these works the class membership of B. Khmelnytskyi was carefully camouflaged, and in its place different means were used to underline his merits in relation to his leadership of the revolt of the kozak masses and the populace.

The highest point of these apologetics was reached during the Great Fatherland War, especially in connection with the establishment of the Order of B. Khmelnytskyi.

Here are a few statements, characteristic of these days:

"The most outstanding political figure of that time, he (Khmelnytskyi — G. K.) understood very well that the salvation of the Ukrainian people was possible only by pursuing one path — in union with the fraternal Russian peoples. To the solution of two basic tasks Bohdan Khmelnytskyi devoted his life: liberation of Ukraine from the foreign yoke and unification of Ukraine with Russia. To realize these goals he strove with all the strength of his mighty will, his inexhaustible energy. In the service of his great idea he placed at its disposal his brilliant organizational talent, outstanding qualities as strategist and military leader, his art as a distinguished diplomat."⁶⁴

"A fiery patriot and fearless warrior, who could with equal passion hate his enemies, as well as love his own native land, Khmelnytskyi brilliantly solved the tasks put before him by history."⁶⁵

"Great son of the Ukrainian nation,"⁶⁶ "wise statesman and glori-

ous leader,"⁶⁷ "national hero of the Ukrainian people,"⁶⁸ — to words of praise there is no limit. "In the veins of our nation flows, seethes, boils the hot blood of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi,"⁶⁹ . . . Hear ye, hear ye! Not the nation's blood flows in the veins of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, but to the contrary — the blood of Khmelnytskyi flows in the veins of the nation!!! This is the resulting absurdity accompanying an immeasurable and unstifled enthusiasm.

The cited definitions acquired the importance of official doctrine and became strongly entrenched in historical literature.

We thus note two extreme points of view in the appraisal of the deeds of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi in Soviet historiography: negative up to 1937 and enthusiastically panegyric after that, and both of these, as in every extremism, are not altogether correct. Bohdan Khmelnytskyi was indeed an outstanding statesman of his age and a national hero — to the extent to which he raised and headed the revolt against aristocratic Poland, gained a whole series of brilliant victories, and secured the liberation of Ukraine from under the Polish-aristocratic yoke. Thanks to this he has earned the eternal glory and gratitude of the Ukrainian peoples, which has found its expression in numerous heroic songs and ballads (*dumakh*), dedicated to this glorious leader of the National Struggle.

But together with this it must not be forgotten that B. Khmelnytskyi was a typical figure of the feudal class and representative of the feudal ideology *in that period, when the feudal system long ago became a reactionary force on the path of progress*. Consequently while adhering to a constructive program it is impossible to regard him as a progressive statesman — to the degree to which he considered as his goal the maintainance of the national movement in a certain framework, demanded the preservation of the feudal order in Ukraine, not stopping short of direct betrayal of the rising masses (as was the case, for example, near Berestechko).

For this he was mercilessly reproached by the most revolutionary minded representatives of social thought in Ukraine and, especially, T. H. Shevchenko (the poet) who could not forgive this half-hero, half-traitor, that — putting his class interests above national interests — he threw himself into the embrace of Tsarism, by this condemning Ukraine for several centuries to groan in a servile hell.

As the representative of the feudalized Ukrainian starshyna, B. Khmelnytskyi from the beginning defended the interests of his social group, committed to the preservation and enlargement of the autonomy of Ukraine within the framework of the Polish Commonwealth. It is in exactly that role that he appeared in Maslovy Stav in 1636, and in Warsaw in 1647, with grievances against the arbitrary activities of Koniecpolski and his hanger-on Chaplinski.

Initiating his revolt against magnate predominance, with the knowledge and even support of king Wladislaw IV, he possibly did not expect the consequences which this action was to bring with it.⁷⁰ He brought to life forces which were difficult to manage, and was therefore obliged to seek punitive measures, so as to somehow neutralize the anti-feudal enthusiasm of the common masses.

F. P. Shevchenko (the historian) cites convincing material to support the opinion that at least during the first stage of the Liberation War B. Khmelnytskyi had no intention of taking Ukraine out of the framework of the Commonwealth.⁷¹ The primary goal of his policy during that period was to realize a maximum of benefits for the kozak starshyna (enlargement of the register, restoration of certain autonomous rights of the kozak army, guarantees dealing with the rights of the Orthodox Church and the like). These were precisely the major points discussed with the Polish commissioners in the winter of 1648-1651, the Zbarazh and Bilocerkiivsky Agreements. Besides, it was precisely this that became the main text of the agreement with the Tsarist government (March Statutes of 1654). These documents clearly reflected the conservative position of Khmelnytskyi himself and that segment of the starshyna that supported him — the preservation of the interests of the Ukrainian shliakhta at the expense of the common masses.

This position found its expression in the practical deeds of the Ukrainian government, headed by Khmelnytskyi, after liberation. Numerous manifestos demanding submissiveness, acknowledgment of landed feudal proprietorship, the desire to return the kozak masses back into commoners, distribution of new estates to the representatives of the starshyna, putting down of all types of anti-feudal revolts, and even direct radical acts (we'll mention for example the executions of Hladky, Mozyr, and others in 1651) — all this had a single precisely formulated objective. To characterize this as the activity of a "people's hero," "defender of the interests of the common masses" — is permissible only under conditions of total abandonment of the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

But most striking is the effort of the historiography of the 40's and 50's to convince the reader that B. Khmelnytskyi almost from the cradle dreamt about "reunification with the fraternal Russian nation." In order to somehow prove this thesis, an anecdotal argument is cited: in one of the reports of Buturlin to Moscow, it is said that Khmelnytskyi supposedly related that "when he was still young, his father advised him: when you begin to serve, do not permit yourself to go to war against the Muscovite government."⁷²

From this it follows that the father of Khmelnytskyi supposedly advised the future Hetman to orient himself on Moscow (although it is clear to all, that reference is made only to abstinence from

campaigns against the Muscovite state). With this totally forgotten is the necessity of an elementary critical approach to the utilization of historical sources: this (and similar to it) declaration, which without any doubt made up part of the customary diplomatic play, had as its objective to bend the Tsarist government to the side of Khmelnytskyi. This idea is accepted as good coin and is interpreted in its literal sense as a full and sincere exposition of the true mood of the kozak Hetman.

But, while posing the question in such a manner, our historiography is unable to reply to the sacramental question, which of necessity becomes one of the most crucial: why in such a case Khmelnytskyi, preparing the revolt against Poland, seeking possible allies, did not make even the smallest attempt to enter into relations with Moscow? Why did he prefer to turn to the Crimean Khan for assistance, with whom until then Ukraine had exclusively hostile relations, making great sacrifices and gambling with the life of his own son? Why didn't this simple and, it appears, natural thought about an alliance with Russia enter his head?

But there is no secret of the fact that in the spring of 1648 Tsarist Russia did not appear to be a potential ally, but an absolutely realistic enemy of the insurgent Ukrainian nation. Bound to Poland by treaty obligations to give assistance to her with military forces, the Muscovite government was in reality ready to interfere in the Polish-Ukrainian conflict, not on the side of B. Khmelnytskyi, but on the side of aristocratic Poland.⁷³ Russian forces stood ready in the border cities of Putivl, Sevsk, Khotytsk. Only the eruption of a popular revolt in Moscow prevented the further development of events.⁷⁴

Nevertheless mention of this in our historiography is unacceptable, although the analogy of the genuine interests of the two neighbouring peoples goes begging.

As it is known, the first attempt to enter into relations with the Tsarist government was made by B. Khmelnytskyi only after the battle of Korsun, when the victory of the revolution became obvious, but even then under mysterious circumstances. In June of 1648 the kozaks intercepted a courier with a letter from the Sevsky palatine (voievoda) to Adam Kysil. Khmelnytskyi ordered the release of the courier, giving him, instead of an answer from the Kyivan palatine, his own letter to Tsar Aleksis Mikhailovich. In this letter are found the following words: "we would wish an autocratic (samoderztsia) ruler in our country, such as your Tsarist Highness."⁷⁵ These words are very loosely interpreted in our literature as an expression of desire to pass under Russian supremacy.⁷⁶ But there is not even one word about such a possibility in this document; even if these words were not deemed to be a common courtesy (reference is made to the desire to have a ruler, similar to Aleksis Mikhailovich, and not about him),

the allusion does not seem very clear. Because of this there exists a large body of literature, in which researchers are agreed that the letter of Khmelnytskyi dated June 8 reflects the political situation in Poland after the death of king Wladislaw IV. At the moment when this letter was written, in Poland there was no king, and the candidacy of Aleksis Mikhailovich was one of the probabilities. And so, obviously taken into consideration is the possible election of the Muscovite Tsar to the Polish throne.

No matter how this letter is interpreted, it must not be forgotten that B. Khmelnytskyi, conducting a complicated diplomatic game and seeking potential objects of orientation, very generously made overtures and innuendos also to the left — to the Turkish Sultans, and to the Crimean Khan, and to the Swedish King, to say nothing of the Polish King, in numerous letters in which he invariably referred to himself as a loyal subject and footstool.

In a letter to Adam Kysil, written in the same month of June, 1648, Khmelnytskyi assured the addressee of his loyalty to the Commonwealth and asked Kysil to be the intercessor on behalf of the Zaporozhian Army and guarantees of their former freedoms: "We have distributed over all Ukraine manifestos stating that each member of our Zaporozhian Army, as well as other noble (shliakhetskyhk) subjects, under fear of severe punishment must stop the rebellions and disorders so that we may in the greatest affection of his Royal Grace, whom the Lord God in His Holy Benevolence to us and all of the Commonwealth will willingly grant, continue to remain."⁷⁷

And in a letter to King Wladislaw IV, also written in June of 1648, he assured him: "But we, as before, were loyal subjects of Your Royal Grace, so also today we are ever ready, struggling against the enemies of the Commonwealth, to give up our lives for the dignity of Your Royal Grace our Lord and Benefactor."⁷⁸

Thus to discern between what is the expression of real aims and what is a part of the diplomatic game — is not that simple.

7

The reverse side of idealization of B. Khmelnytskyi in Soviet historiography is the idealization of Russian Tsarism. From a definite period in time the Muscovite government for us was made to take on the image of defender of Ukraine. In this we observe a tendency leading to the removal of the principle that separates Russian Tsarism and the Russian people.

And so, in Volume I of *Istoria Ukrainskoi RSR (History of the Ukrainian SSR)* we read that in the struggle with the Turko-Tartar

conquerors "to the defense of Ukraine came the strong Russian state, capable of resisting the foreign invaders."⁷⁹ In reality it would be more correct to state the opposite. It is known that the Zaporizhzhia up to the XVII century continued to be a mighty shield against Turko-Tartar aggression, which defended the southeastern borders of the Commonwealth. From the middle of the XVII century it protected the southern borders of the Muscovite state, whereas in the XV-XVI centuries Tartar attacks repeatedly ravaged Russian lands (often reaching Moscow), then in the XVII-XVIII centuries not one similar incident is known and great credit for this belongs to the Zaporozhzhian (as well as Don) Kozaks.

The Russo-Turkish wars of the XVIII century were conducted first of all with Ukrainian forces and at the expense of Ukraine; only with the end of the XVIII century Zaporozhzhia, as a military shield, became unnecessary and was liquidated in 1775 by the forces of General Takelyi. Thus it would be more correct to talk about the defence of Russia by Ukraine from the Turko-Tartar threat, and not the other way around.

Russian Tsarism viewed Ukraine as a part of its primordial domain, that supposedly back during the period of Kievan Rus (Ukraine) was included under the Russian crown (the house of Monomakhus). The annexation of Ukraine to Russia in 1654 was accordingly appraised as the return of these domains, — analogous to that, as prior to this were retaken Smolensk, Pskov and other Russian lands.

But the annexation of Ukrainian lands posed serious problems for the Tsarist government. This act (Pereiaslav) took place on the waves of a popular struggle, which had clearly expressed anti-feudal directions, and in the end was responsible for almost the total elimination of great feudal estates (with the exception of monastic lands). The characteristic tendency of the epoch was the mass transition of common peasants into kozak status, which factually meant their emancipation from most of the feudal obligations. Thus, realistically we may talk about the triumph of the petit-bourgeois element in the class structure of the Ukrainian society of that period. This had to be taken into account.

In the meantime the major principle of Tsarist policy concerning Ukraine consisted of the progressive application of legal forms that prevailed in the interior of Muscovy. In other words, concern was with *restoration of feudalism*, and in its most cruel, most brutal, half Asiatic form. This process was extended over a century and a half, thanks to the active resistance of the Ukrainian people — resistance that found its expression in numerous armed uprisings (Pereiaslav Revolt of 1666, Revolt of 1668, Revolt of Bulavin in 1707

and others). This protest quite often took an anti-Russian character.

But this protest to the present remains unexplained in our historiography; the major obstacle to this is the departure of historians from the fundamental Marxist principle of class approach to every concrete historical event. Earlier we cited definitions used to describe the major historical statesmen of Ukraine of the second half of the XVII and beginning of the XVIII centuries. Due to a widespread notion, I. Vyhovskyi, P. Teteria, P. Khanenko, K. Hordienko, to say nothing of I. Mazepa or P. Orlyk, are called "traitors," "henchmen," "agents," "most malicious enemies" of their native country.

Thus there emerges a fairly strange picture: the Ukrainian nation in the course of a century was not able to put forward from its midst one important political figure, who would not be revealed as a traitor or someone's agent, — because sooner or later he was obliged to resist Tsarism. Even Briukhovetskyi — that ne'er-do-well, that innate servant and lackey, — under pressure of circumstances was forced (true, without success) to take up arms against Russian rule.

Obviously, the causes of this strange situation lie not in the sphere of psychological pathology, but must have some historical, social foundation. When reference is made to the "treason" of a Hetman (that is, the head of the state), then this "treason" turns into treason against himself. It is difficult to imagine that someone, having become Hetman and having concentrated in his hands real power over a sovereign (even though a vassal) state, could dream of the role of agent or henchman of aristocratic Poland or the Turkish Sultanate, or some other power. In this there is no logic. And even if it is possible to assume that a certain individual by virtue of his mental incapability could just not comprehend the realistic correlation of values (as let's say, the same Briukhovetskyi, who humbly begged for a noble (boyar) title, not understanding that the position of Hetman was worth much more), but to assume mass, consistent lack of understanding of the political situation by literally all outstanding statesmen of the Ukraine of that period is scarcely possible.

With this manner of exposition, which is characteristic of our historiography, remaining as a complete mystery are the motives for the behaviour of all these "traitors" and "agents." It is not clear why Ivan Vyhovskyi, having the support of the Russian government, decided to restore Polish-Aristocratic rule over Ukraine (and thus over himself). It is not clear why Mazepa, enjoying the unlimited trust of Peter I, decided to sell Ukraine (and thus, himself) to foreign oppressors. It is not clear why Petro Doroshenko, who at the outset was Russian oriented and worked for the unification of all Ukrainian lands within the framework of the Russian state, suddenly signed an

alliance with the Turkish Sultan and recognized the protectorate of Turkey. Such obscure "why's" may be supplied in great abundance.

Evidently, concern here is not with particular instances, and the real causes of that chain of events in which we are interested should be sought in the realm of fundamental class relations of that epoch. These causes are rooted not only in the position of one or another Ukrainian political activist, but primarily in the policy of Russian Tsarism itself, which had in mind the transformation of Ukraine into a province of the Russian state, imposing upon her (Ukraine) the general Russian order, and bringing to naught all the achievements of the National Liberation War of 1648-1654.

8

Now we may also approach the question dealing with what took place in Pereiaslav on January 5, 1654. Presently in our historiography the generally accepted formula is that the Pereiaslav Agreement represented the "reunification of two fraternal peoples — Ukrainian and Russian."

"The reunification of Ukraine with Russia, which *united two great Slavic peoples* (italics ours, — M. B.), was of enormous progressive significance for the further political, economic and cultural development of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples."⁸⁰

This formula about the unification of two peoples is historically incorrect. In reality uniting were not peoples, but states, one of which was feudal, and the other — in the person of the officer-dominated government — desired (against the will of its own people) to restore feudalism. The contracting parties of the Pereiaslav Agreement were in no way representative of the peoples interests — neither *Tsar Aleksis Mikhailovich*, nor B. Khmelnytskyi and his government. Declarations to the effect of: "Carrying out the will of the popular masses, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi in 1653 strengthened the negotiations with the Russian government concerning the reunification of Ukraine with Russia,"⁸¹ or "The decision of the Zemsky Sobor concerning the reunification of Ukraine with Russia was a manifestation of the will and desire of the whole Russian peoples to offer assistance to the fraternal Ukrainian peoples..."⁸² very widespread in literature, do not reflect the essence of the matter. Concerning the real interests of the peoples (Ukrainian or Russian) no one thought or asked either in Moscow nor in Pereiaslav; the problem was solved on a totally different level. Participation of the rank and file kozaks and townspeople at the Pereiaslav Rada (Assembly), as well as service people at the Zemsky Sobor of 1653, manifested the popular context of events as little as the shouts "agreed, agreed!", by which the rank and file kozak and commoners greeted the Hadiach Agreement of 1656.

Both sides, concluding the Pereiaslav Act, were agreed at least in one respect, in the desire of reestablishing the feudal order in Ukraine. This is very clearly expressed in the demand of the Ukrainian starshyna, which with B. Khmelnytskyi at its head carried on the negotiations at Pereiaslav 10-12 January, and which was laid down at the base of the agreement with the Tsarist government: "In the Zaporozhian Army whoever occupied a rank up to this time, today the Sovereign requested, ordered to live in a manner such that the shliakhtych would remain a shliakhtych, a kozak a kozak, a member of the petty bourgeois a petty bourgeois (meschanin)."⁸³

Similarly this point of view was expressed by B. Khmelnytskyi even before the oath of January 8, 1654: "And whoever was a shliakhtych, or kozak, or urban dweller (meschanin), and who prior to this had rank and property, let all this be as before."⁸⁴ Consequently, the concern was with the maintainance of the class structure of feudal society.

But particularly concerned was the starshyna with the pacification of the rebelling peasants. As has already been noted, one of the direct and immediate results of the National Liberation War was the mass peasant transition into kozak ranks, that is, their passage from feudal dependent status into the status of individual free petty manufacturers. This process evoked a negative reaction from the ruling circles of the Ukrainian aristocratic (shliakhta) community which survived, and the starshyna, which sought to equalize its rights and privileges with that of the aristocracy and assume a definite place within the feudal class. In the passing of commoners into kozak ranks (pokozachennia) it saw a threat to its aspirations and therefore wanted to see the return of the major portion of the peasantry into its former status of serfs. This desire found its expression even in the March Statutes of 1654. The register was restricted to 60 thousand kozaks; all crossed off the registry were obliged to return into the commoner status; "When our Great Sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, grants to Bohdan Khmelnytskyi and all of the Zaporozhian Army his sovereign charters ordering the maintenance of our privileges, then you must inspect among yourselves and make certain: who will be a kozak or commoner; and that the Army of Zaporozhia numbers 60,000. Our Great Sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, willed them this, and ordered that a certain number of registered kozaks be maintained."⁸⁵

A second concern of the Ukrainian aristocracy and officerdom was to safeguard its properties: "and grant that the Great Sovereign wills that state charters be given protecting their properties."⁸⁶ These interests were also carefully insured by the Tsarist government.⁸⁷

Thus S. Zarudnyi and P. Teteria, who in March of 1654 conducted negotiations in Moscow, obtained Tsarist charters to estates "with peasants and all gratifications" — for themselves and for the Hetman. Thereafter the Ukrainian starshyna and shliakhta, as if a pack of wolves, rushed forth soliciting Tsarist charters. Numerous properties were obtained by the families of Vyhovskyi, Zolotarenko, and others.⁸⁸

This tendency evoked an active protest from the kozak regulars. Characteristic testimony of this is found in the grievance of I. Vyhovskyi to the Tsarist government, transmitted through P. Teteria in August of 1657: "although his Tsarist Majesty rewarded him, the secretary, and his father, and brothers, they do not control any of this, afraid of the Zaporozhian Army." Further Teteria requested "that His Tsarist Majesty keep what was granted to him by His Tsarist Majesty, by forbidding revelation of such, . . . because as soon as the Army (that is the kozaks) hears that he, the secretary, and his friends obtained such great wealth, all of them will immediately be slain."⁸⁹

Even Teteria himself, having received a charter to the city of Smila, was forced to conceal it from the army and begged that information about this charter be kept from the kozaks.

Similar facts very clearly reveal the class situation in Ukraine at the moment of annexation to Russia and the class character of the Pereiaslav Agreement. This agreement represented a class conspiracy of the Ukrainian starshyna, which actively feudalized itself with Russian Tsarism, oriented toward the preservation (or more correctly, restoration) of the feudal order in Ukraine. By its character and direction, this was an anti-popular (national) act, summoned to pacify the rebelling toiling masses, betrayal of the national interests.

B. Khmelnytskyi and his associates in the likeness of I. Vyhovskyi, I. Zolotarenko, M. Pushkar and others saw in tsarism that force which would assist them in keeping in hand the unruly rabble. In a specific understanding tsarism really assumed the role of "defender," but by no means the defender of the Ukrainian people.

It is necessary to point out that he (B. Khmelnytskyi) did this quite consistently and willingly, because he observed in Ukraine a series of very dangerous freedom-loving tendencies, which could have easily been transferred beyond the borders of Ukraine. It is known that the Liberation War of the Ukrainian nation evoked a revolt of the Polish peasantry (headed by Kost Naperski); it found its resonance also in Russia. The fears of the Tsar and boyars were not without foundation; not even 15 years passed after Pereiaslav, when the peasant war broke out in Russia under the leadership of

Stephan Razin, which threatened the existing order. This war broke out due to active influence of events in Ukraine; Zaporozhian Kozaks directly participated in it, and in Ukraine this uprising found a widespread response. Therefore absolutely comprehensible is the attentiveness with which the Muscovite government *observed the events in Ukraine*, why it was so hesitant in deciding the question of inclusion of Ukrainian lands into the framework of Russia, preferring to come to terms with Poland, rather than tolerate the further development of anti-feudal tendencies.

Entirely obvious was the position of the Tsarist government also as to the political status of Ukraine within the framework of the Russian state. But here its interests were fundamentally different from the interests of the Ukrainian starshyna; it examined the autonomy of Ukraine as a temporary and annoying concession, desiring to settle accounts with her if possible more rapidly, — at a time when the ruling circles of Ukraine were very much bent on an assiduous defence of its “liberties.” The starshyna with B. Khmelnytskyi at its head expected to preserve the autonomy of the kozak state and that political order, which had crystallized in the process of the Liberation War (republican system, election of all segments of the government, its own military organization, financial system, rights of international relations.)

Thus, to honour the Pereiaslav Agreement the Tsarist government, in any event, had no intention and, if the process of liquidation of the Ukrainian state dragged on for almost one and a half centuries, then this was not because of a lack of desire on its part. That century and a half in the history of Ukraine takes on the guise of a peculiar duel, in which the determined Tsarist thrusts alternated with outbursts of active armed resistance of the Ukrainian people, which forced the Russians into a temporary retreat.

Even B. Khmelnytskyi himself began to perceive the centralizing tendency from the side of Moscow, in connection with which he had serious doubts about the future fate of the Russo-Ukrainian alliance. His successor, I. Vyhovskyi, was compelled to raise arms against his recent protectors and “benefactors.” The Hadiach Agreement and Battle of Konotop somewhat cooled off the enthusiasm of Tsarist politicians and stood as an impediment to the immediate realization of Tsarist plans. But the Andrusiv Truce of 1667, negotiated by Russia with the Polish-Lithuanian state, totally negated the Pereiaslav Act.

*

In the text of the Andrusiv Treaty we read: “And whatever cities and lands of the Crown of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania *are conquered* (italics ours, — M. B.) and relinquished to the domain

and state of his Tsarist Majesty (here the territories are enumerated), must all remain on the side of his Tsarist Majesty."⁹⁰

Thus the concern here is with the passing to Russia of lands *not uniting of their own volition, but lands reconquered by Russia*. Ukraine here is completely ignored as a juridical entity or political contractor — this distinction is given to the Polish Commonwealth. The representatives of Ukraine, as it is known, were not permitted to participate in the negotiations. Two states — Poland and Russia — resolved their differences by military means and one of them ceded to the second a part of its territories.

And so, the decisions of the Pereiaslav Assembly had the validity of an official act during the course of 13 years. The further history of the development of Ukrainian-Russian relations was determined by other factors, other agreements and documents.

The Andrusiv Truce should have indeed been the turning point in the history of Ukraine; in a conquered land, naturally, the laws of the conqueror country prevail. This in any case was so until then, when Russia as a consequence of war with Lithuania and Poland included in the boundaries of her state frontiers, let's say, Smolensk, Polotsk, Novgorod-Siversky and other lands, the latter became organic parts of the Muscovite state and a sphere of promotion for all of her social-political institutions. With the autonomy of Ukraine, her republican order etc., were undesirable (from the Tsarist point of view) things that had to be eliminated once and for all.

But once again this did not occur. The Andrusiv Truce brought on a revolt in Ukraine, which was led by P. Doroshenko and I. Sirko and which even I. Briukhovetskyi was *forced to join*. Tsarist rule was threatened. It was hard pressed to retreat; the process of integrating Ukraine into the framework of the Muscovite state was again halted, although the "Eternal Peace" of 1686 reiterated the fundamental stipulations of the Andrusiv Truce. The integration was only slowed down, but the tendency itself was further preserved. The consequences are generally known.

The social-economic processes, which were in progress in Ukraine during the second half of the XVII century and which in their final form determined the historical appraisal of the passing of Ukraine under Russian protection, had an absolutely certain and defined character. For the time being there is no opportunity nor the need to precisely relate the course of events and the results with which they were crowned. We think that here there is nothing controversial, nor unclear. Therefore let us directly enumerate these results.

1. Feudal arrangements were restored to their fullest extent and in their most brutal forms of complete and final servitude, which bordered on slavery. Great estates were restored to their fullest

extent. The Ukrainian shlakhta (together with the feudalized starshyna), as it had often done prior to this, betrayed its own peoples (nation). In the course of a protracted period of time it made efforts to obtain from the Tsarist government equal rights with the Russian nobility, and having achieved that goal by way of direct merger with it, renounced all of her former "freedoms and privileges." In its place the servile order, which existed in the Russian state, was extended by direct act to the Ukrainian peasantry and existed here (as in all of Russia) until 1861. Thus all the social-economic achievements of the National-Liberation War were in the final analysis brought to nought.

2. By the middle of the XVII century Ukraine was a country in which bourgeois elements emerged quite distinctly and began to play the role of the major factor in historical development. These elements through the logic of the new order were artificially subdued; they proved to be incapable of opposing the mounted and well armed feudal machine of Tsarist Russia. At the end of the XVII century bourgeois relations in Ukraine were expressed much more feebly than before the beginning of the National-Liberation War, to say nothing about the 50's of the XVII century, when great feudal landholdings were practically liquidated. In place of the petty-bourgeois peasant-economy production again came latifundia (production), based on the use of servile labour. Manufacturing production weakened; deprived of self rule cities experienced the decline of social-economic life.

3. The political autonomy of Ukraine was liquidated finally and fully in the second half of the XVII century. In 1764 definitely abolished was the Hetmanate; in 1775 taken and destroyed was the Zaporozhian Sich — the last bearer of Ukrainian statehood. From that time up to 1917 Ukraine did not have its own state.

4. A significant step backward was taken in the sphere of cultural life. A country with almost one hundred per cent literacy, as it was described by Paul of Aleppo, Ukraine at the beginning of the XIX century was transformed into a country of almost total illiteracy. In the branch of scholarship, literature, art, Ukraine became a deep province, which was ableged to prove its ability and right to its proper cultural development. The most capable and talented representatives of the Ukrainian intelligentsia were included (and continue to be included) in the number of workers of the Russian culture (Mykola Hohol, Mykhailo Hlynka, Illia Repin and others).

5. The Ukrainian language was proscribed as early as the beginning of the XVIII century by a special decree (ukaz) of Peter I, published in 1709 which declared that "learning of any separate particular dialect is forbidden." This ukaz dealt a severe blow to the book-printing concerns (it forbade publication of all Ukrainian books,

except religious ones). Ukraine which for a long time was a supplier of books to other countries, Russia among that number, now was obliged to import books from Russia printed in a foreign (for her) language. This in turn was painfully reflected in the realm of Ukrainian literature, which up to Taras Shevchenko was regarded as a "literature of secondary quality." Later the Tsarist government often reaffirmed the ban on the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian book printing through its circulars (Valuiev Ukaz of 1863, Emsky Ukaz 1876).

All this, naturally, came as a consequence not of "reunification of two fraternal peoples" but of a class conspiracy between Tsarist Russia and Ukrainian slakhta and starshyna, which for the sake of its class interests betrayed its nationality, interests of its country, of its peoples.

We must now determine the sum total of results raised by the title question (Reunification or Annexation). We think that the answer is self-evident and emerges from what has been said.

In January of 1654 the Ukrainian state voluntarily acknowledged the protectorate of the Muscovite state and entered into its framework under the condition that its autonomy be precisely defined by agreement. This was an act of annexing the Ukrainian state to the Russian state.

In 1667 the Tsarist government betrayed the agreement, arrived at thirteen years before in Pereiaslav, and concluded a pact with the Polish Commonwealth which concerned itself with the territorial partition of Ukraine between the Polish-Lithuanian and Russian states. Consequently Left Bank Ukraine was now considered by the Tsarist government, as conquered (or reconquered) territory. Therefore this was an act of unlawful occupation of Left Bank territories of Ukraine by Russian Tsarism, a manifestation of colonial tendencies, an innate characteristic in the course of its whole existence.



FOOTNOTES

- 1) *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*, No. 8, 1947, 1-10.
- 2) *Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopedia*, Vol. 59, (Moscow, 1935), p. 818. Hereafter cited as BSE.
- 3) *Tezy do 300-riccha vozziednannia Ukrainy z Rosiieiu*, (Kiev, 1954), p. 54.
- 4) *Istoriia Ukrainy*, Vol. I, (Ufa: Published by the AN-USSR, 1943), p. 307.
- 5) V. I. Lenin, *Tvory*, Vol. 33, p. 325.
- 6) *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*, No. 8, 1947, p. 5.
- 7) J. Stalin, "O state Engelsa. Vneshniaia politika russkogo tsarizma," *Bolshevik*, No. 9, 1941, 1-5.
- 8) M. D. Bagirov, *K voprosu o kharaktere dvizheniia miurydyzma i Shamila*, (Hospolitizdat, 1950). See also: "Reshenie Soveta Ministrov SSR ob otmene prisudzheniia G. Guseinovu Stalinskoi premii za knigu iz istorii obshchestvennoi i filosofskoi misli v Azerbaidzhane v XIX v.," *Pravda*, May 14, 1950.
- 9) *Pravda*, December 26, 1950. See also "O nekotorykh voprosakh istorii narodov Srednei Azii," *Voprosi Istorii*, No. 4, 1951, 55-64.
- 10) Iu. Tarasov "O kharaktere dvizheniia 1916 g. v Turkmenii," *Voprosi Istorii*, No. 9, 1951, 111-117.
- 11) Given the nature of the "Samizdat" or "Samvydav" it is obvious that some discrepancies will exist between the original and the retyped versions. These discrepancies may be observed in footnotes 11 to 14. Braichevskiy's article has been published in the West by two different publishers and obviously from two different copies of the original; *Vyzvolnyi Sliakh*, Vol. XXV, Nos 6-7 (June — July, 1972), and *Shyroke More Ukrainy: Dokumenty Samvydavu Ukrainy*, (Paris: Smoloskyp Publishers, 1972). In this citation *Vyzvolnyi Sliakh* cites *Voprosi Istorii* No. 9, 11, 1951, 1952, N 3, p. 7, while "Smoloskyp" cites the same source but a different copy: No. 4, 1951 pp. 44-48. In this instance "Smoloskyp" is probably correct.
- 12) *Vyzvolnyi Sliakh* cites *Pravda*, October 7, 1952. This is incorrect; there should be no footnote here and "Smoloskyp" in its version does not include one.
- 13) Here "Smoloskyp" cites *Pravda*, October 7, 1952, whereas *Vyzvolnyi Sliakh* cites V. I. Lenin, *op. cit.*, Vol. 36, p. 648. The former citation is correct.
- 14) Here "Smoloskyp" cites V. I. Lenin, *op. cit.*, Vol. 36, p. 648, whereas *Vyzvolnyi Sliakh* cites *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*, no. 8, 1947, p. 2. Again the "Smoloskyp" version is correct. Hereafter only minor discrepancies appear in the footnotes.
- 15) *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*, No. 8, 1947, p. 2.
- 16) M. Mustafiev, "O formule naimenshee zlo." *Voprosi Istorii*, No. 9, 1951, p. 197.
- 17) *Tezy do 300-riccha . . .*, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
- 18) V. I. Lenin, *Tvory*, Vol. 22, p. 321.
- 19) *Ibid.*

- 20) *Ibid.*, Vol. 24, p. 262.
- 21) *Ibid.*, Vol. 35, p. 155.
- 22) *Ibid.*, p. 218.
- 23) *Ibid.*, Vol. 26, p. 305.
- 24) *Ibid.*, Vol. 28, p. 379. The “Smoloskyp” version cites Vol. 20 and not 28.
- 25) *Ibid.*, Vol. 36, p. 549.
- 26) *Ukrainska Radianska Entsyklopedia*, Vol. 10, p. 20.
- 27) *Bagirov, op. cit.*, p. 12.
- 28) *Tezy do 300-riccha . . .*, *op. cit.*, p. 10-11.
- 29) *Ibid.*
- 30) *Ibid.*, p. 3.
- 31) *Pravda*, October 11, 1943.
- 32) V. I. Lenin, *Tvory, op. cit.*, Vol. 36, p. 309. (Smoloskyp has p. 407).
- 33) *Ibid.*, p. 549.
- 34) *Ibid.*, Vol. 36. (Smoloskyp has Vol. 27, p. 135-136).
- 35) *Tezy do 300-riccha . . .*, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
- 36) *Istoria Ukrainskoi RSR*, Vol. I., p. 260.

36a) The “Smoloskyp” version uses an explanatory footnote which is not included by *Vyzvolnyi Shlakh*. I am therefore including this footnote as footnote 36(a) since it has no relationship to footnote 36. Similar to that, in later years the manufacturing industry of the Central Russian region developed at the expense of the industrial potentialities of Ukraine. In the 17th century, for example, by special decrees all Ukrainian nitrate was exported to Russia, while at the same time gunpowder had to be purchased from Russian manufacturers.

37) *Pro vitchyznu*, (Kyiv: 1950), p. 53. This source is not to be found in the “Smoloskyp” version.

38) Kyiv, 1954, p. 267.

39) V. I. Lenin, *Statti i promovy pro Ukrainu*, (Kyiv: 1936), 206-207.

40) K. Marks and F. Engels, *Tvory*, Vol. 27, p. 231.

41) Thus, for example, S. Abramzon, desiring to demonstrate the “beneficial influence of the Russian culture” (exerted, — G. K.) on the Kirghiz (peoples, — G. K.), cited such imagination-shattering facts: the Kirghiz (peoples, — G. K.), so to speak, learned from the Russians to use samovars, forks, beds, window shades and the like. *Ocherki kultury kirghizkogo naroda*, (Moscow: 1946), p. 75.

42) *Istoria Ukrainskoi RSR, op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 361.

43) “O nekotorykh voprosakh istorii narodov Srednei Azii,” *Voprosi Istorii*, No. 4, 1951, p. 8.

44) K. Naiakshin, “K voprosu o prisoedinenii Srednego Povolzha k Rossii,” *Voprosi Istorii*, No. 9, 1951, 108-111.

45) “Istoricheskoe znachenie prisoedinenia Azerbaidzhana k Rosii,” *Voprosi Istorii*, No. 8, 1952, p. 83.

46) V. I. Lenin, *Tvory, op. cit.*, Vol. 22, p. 138.

47) *Zapysky. N. T. Sh.*, (Lviv, 1909), Vol. XVII, 18-19.

- 48) *Istoria Ukrainskoi RSR, op. cit.*, 80-81.
- 49) *Ibid.*, p. 261.
- 50) V. I. Lenin, *Tvory, op. cit.*, 80-81.
- 51) I. Krypiakievych, *Bohdan Khmelnytskyi*, (Kyiv: 1954); V. L. Holobutskii, *Zaporozhske kozachestvo*, (Kyiv: 1957); F. P. Shevchenko, *Politychni ta ekonomichni zviazky z Rociieiu v XVII st.*, (Kyiv: 1959); O. S. Kompan, *Mista Ukrainy v druhii polovyni XVII st.*, (Kyiv: 1963); I. D. Boiko, *Selianstvo Ukrainy v druhii polovyni XVI — pershii polovyni XVII st.*, (Kyiv: 1963).
- 52) Kompan, *Mista Ukrainy . . .*, *op. cit.*, p. 73.
- 53) V. K. Iakunskyi, "Z pryvodu vidhukiv na stattiu "Pro stvorennia istorychnoho atlasu Ukrainy"," *Ukrainskyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal*, No. 4.
- 53) V. K. Iakunskyi, "Z pryvodu vidhukiv na stattiu "Pro stvorennia istorychnoho atlasu Ukrainy"," *Ukrainskyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal*, No. 4.
- 54) Boiko, *Selianstvo Ukrainy . . .*, *op. cit.*, p. 320.
- 55) Krypiakievych, *Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, op. cit.*, p. 269, and others.
- 56) O. S. Kompan, "Porivnialno — istorychni metod i vsesvitno-istorychni aspekt doslidzhennia niznioho feodalizmu," *Ukrainskyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal*, No. 1, 1966.
- 57) The question about Ukrainian manufacturing of the 16th century in our literature has not yet been asked, notwithstanding its first-rate significance. Important materials, however, may be found in the book of I. D. Bojko, *Selianstvo Ukrainy, op. cit.*, 68-80.
- 58) K. G., Guslistii. "Obrazovanie ukrainskoi natsii v usloviakh vozniknoveniia i formirovaniia hurzhuaznykh otneshenii," *Narodi evropeiskoi chasty SSR*, Vol. I, (Moscow: 1964), p. 577.
- 59) O. M. Apanovych, "Natsionalno — vyzvolni viiny v epokhu fevdalizmu," *Ukrainskyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal*, No. 12, 1965.
- 60) BSE *op. cit.*, Vol. 59, p. 316.
- 61) *Ibid.*, p. 817.
- 62) *Ibid.*, p. 816.
- 63) K. Osipov, "Bogdan Khmelnytskii" from the series *Zhin zamechatelnykh liudei*, (Moscow: 1939).
- 64) *Pravda*, October 11, 1943.
- 65) *Bohdan Khmelnytskyi*, (Kyiv-Kharkiv: 1954), p. 11.
- 66) *Ibid.*, p. 10.
- 67) *Ibid.*, p. 13.
- 68) *Ibid.*, p. 24.
- 69) *Radianska Ukraina*, October 14, 1948.
- 70) Shevchenko, *Politychni ta ekonomichni . . .*, *op. cit.*, p. 96.
- 71) *Ibid.*, 58-157.
- 72) *Akty Iugo Zapadnoi Rosseie*, No. 4, Vol. X, p. 244.
- 73) Krypiakievych, *Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, op. cit.*, 417-418.
- 74) Shevchenko, *Politychni ta ekonomichni . . .*, *op. cit.*, p. 81.
- 75) *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho*, (Kyiv: 1961), p. 49.

76) In Vol. I of the *Istoriia Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kyiv: 1953) p. 227, is to be found a facsimile of this document with the inscription "Fotokopiiia lysta B. Khmelnytskoho vid 8 chervnia 1648 r. rosiiskomu tsariu Oleksiu Mykhailovychu z prokhanniam pryiniaty Ukrainu de skladu Rosiiskoi derzhavy."

77) *Dokumenty, Bohdana Khmelnytskoho, op. cit., p. 53.*

78) *Ibid., p. 35.*

79) *Istoriia Ukrainskoi RSR, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 264.*

80) *Ibid., p. 258.*

81) *Ibid., p. 255.*

82) *Ibid.,*

83) *Istoriia Ukrainy v dokumentakh i materialakh, Vol. III, p. 257.*

84) *Ibid., p. 255.*

85) *Ibid., p. 262.*

86) *Ibid., p. 255.*

87) *Krypiakevych, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, p. 273.*

88) *Ibid., p. 279-280.*

89) *Akty . . ., op. cit., Vol. XV, 717-720.*

90) *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rosiiskoi imperii, Vol. I, p. 656.*



NOTES ON ANNEXATION OR REUNIFICATION

by

George P. KULCHYCKY

1

The term "cult of the individual," as used by Braichevsky in his opening remarks, became widely accepted after Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" of 1956. It deals with that period of time during which Stalin dominated all aspects of Soviet society, from the early thirties up to his death in 1953. Stalin's domination was also extended into the field of history, which from the 1930's ceased to be a science and became a creature of the state.

Shortly after the October Revolution there existed different schools of thought and different approaches to history. In Ukraine, specifically, several historical schools emerged: the "cultural-historical" or "sociological" school headed by M. Hrushevsky, the "socio-economic" school headed by D. Bahalii, the "historico-economic" school headed by M. Vasylenko, and the "Marxist" school of M. Iavorskyi. Although all these schools were communist-oriented, the prevailing spirit within them was the national (Ukrainian) spirit.

Thus although Marxist-oriented, the above-mentioned schools led an uneasy existence during the so-called period of "Ukrainization," which coincided with Lenin's New Economic policy in the Soviet Union.

After Lenin's death and the defeat of the Trotskyites as well as the Left and Right Deviationists, Stalin assumed full control over the Soviet Union and inaugurated the period of the "cult of the individual," which expressed itself in the term, "Stalin is the Lenin of Today." Regarding himself an "expert" on the nationality question, Stalin proceeded to cleanse the histories of the different nationalities of "bourgeois-nationalist" deviationism. From now on the "regular scheme" became binding on Ukrainian historians. This scheme is based on three myths: a) the myth of a "united Russian peoples," which proclaims the fraternal unity of the Ukrainian, Byelorussian, and Russian peoples and makes Moscow the heir to the Kyievan Rus state (Ukraine); b) the myth that "reunification of Ukraine with Russia" and "union of two 'Russian' peoples" occurred with the signing of the Pereiaslav Agreement; and c) the myth of a "common

fatherland," formerly the Tsarist regime and now the Soviet Union. To accept other schemes over this "regular scheme" was to question the authority of the Communist Party and fall into the category of "bourgeois nationalists."

During World War II, the Communists were in no position to demand strict compliance with the historical schemes provided by Moscow. But by 1947, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine took direct supervision of the Historical Institute of the AN-Ukrainian RSR. In that same year K. Lytvyn, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine in charge of ideological matters, published an article, "On the History of the Ukrainian People." Here he attacked various heresies committed by Ukrainian historians during the war and laid down the following directives:

1. Ukrainian historians must delimit historical periods in accordance with Marxist socio-economic principles.
2. They must depict the unity of the historical processes of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples, and disprove Hrushevsky and his followers who asserted the contrary.
3. They must present the Kievan Rus, the Medieval East Slavic Empire whose capital was Kiev, as "the cradle of three peoples:" the Great Russian, the Ukrainian, and the Byelorussian.
4. They must devote attention to the historical struggle of Slavic peoples for unity, which heretofore had been ignored by "bourgeois historians."

In 1954 the Central Committee, in conjunction with the 300th Anniversary of the "Reunification of Ukraine with Russia," adopted a slightly varied thesis in which emphasis was placed on "reunification" rather than the "class character" and "Marxist periodization of history." The main points of the thesis read as follows:

1. "The Russian, Ukrainian, and Byelorussian peoples trace their origin to a single root — the ancient Russian people who founded the early Russian state — Kiev Rus" (Thesis I).
2. Throughout its history, the Ukrainian — and, for that matter, the Byelorussian people too — desired reunification with the Russian people. (Thesis I-VI).
3. The reunification was a progressive act. (Thesis VI).
4. Throughout its entire history, the Russian people had been the senior brother in the family of the East Slavic peoples. Its main virtue consisted in giving rise to a strong working class, which in turn produced its vanguard, the Communist Party (passim).

Because of the above-cited theses Ukrainian historians refrained from writing Ukrainian history lest they fall into the "nationalist-

bourgeois" category. Thus the history of Kievan Rus (early Ukrainian history) became the domain of the Russian historian; the Ukrainian War of Independence, 1917-1921, became the domain of the leadership of the Communist Party. The Ukrainian historian was given the task of writing such works as "The Ukrainian-Russian Relations and influences on the economy and culture of Ukraine," "The struggle against foreign oppressors," "The fraternal assistance of the Russian peoples to Ukraine," "The Soviet Fatherland," etc., etc.

Writing about Soviet historiography, Prof. Oleksander Ohloblyn noted that the enforcement of the use of the "regular scheme" is "indicative of the decadence, ruin, and corruption not of Ukrainian, but Soviet historiography. Evil begets evil, which inevitably, sooner or later, turns against him who has given it life." And so it came to pass when at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party Anastas Mikoian, while criticizing the output of Ukrainian historians under Stalin, referred to Ukrainian Soviet History as "such historical nonsense." Although this was a direct attack against a Russian historian who wrote a history of Ukraine, indirectly it was a challenge to the Ukrainian historians to stop avoiding subjects that were too sensitive for Ukrainians to dwell upon during the Stalinist era.

The Ukrainian historians took up Mikoian's challenge and in the summer of 1956 held an important conference of Soviet Ukrainian historians which dealt with a reassessment of certain previous postulates, including the "reunion of Ukraine with Russia," Ukrainian-Russian relations during the War of Liberation 1648-1654, Russian chauvinism, and objectivity.

But what is acceptable and official policy today may not be acceptable tomorrow. Visibly Soviet Ukrainian historiography has changed little since 1956 and many problems of historiography continue to plague the Soviet Ukrainian historian.

M.I. Braichevskiy's work is clearly a continuation of the dialogue that prevails among Soviet Ukrainian historians behind closed doors. Clearly, as noted by M. I. Braichevsky in the first part of his work, concern is with falsification and concealment of facts, terminology and language (absolute evil, lesser evil, beneficiality, reunification, etc.), projection of the present situation into the past, and manipulation of history.

It must be pointed out, however, that M. I. Braichevsky is first and foremost a Marxist and therefore attacks Soviet historiography from the vantage point of a Marxist. But today it is also dangerous to be a strict Marxist-Leninist in the Soviet Union because while attacking the Soviet state, which purports to be a Marxist-Leninist state, one may get into trouble with the authorities if the views expressed are not in conformity with official policy.

In this second part of his masterful essay M. I. Braichevskiy excellently portrays the "extra legal" position of Russian history in relation to the histories of other peoples. This attitude to history and events may be observed as early as the end of the 19th century. Vera Zazulich's negation of Marx's economic laws, Chernishevskiy's "skachok," and Tkachov's "Voluntarism" reflect the mental attitude of the Russians, that is to say, "history and Marx have laid down certain laws but we Russians determine our own course and decide if we are bound to obey these laws."

Russian mentality is also reflected in its conviction that Russia has been singled out to carry out a mission here on earth. This Russian messianism has over the years brought to life many theories which aided Russian expansion. Early Muscovite rulers believed that they were the heirs of the Rus, Mongol, and Byzantine Empires. This gathering of "heritages" to which the Muscovites laid claim were not based on actual historic realities but on myths similar to the "Third Rome" theory. After having partially achieved their goals of "reuniting" territories that were never theirs, they proceeded to implement a new theory which would make them protectors of their "little Slav brothers." But Pan-Slavism, as the ideology became known, became a tool of Russian expansionism and by the end of the 19th century most Slavs, and especially the Serbians, learned that in the scheme of things, Russian interests came first. (It took Czechoslovakia a little longer, until 1948, to understand that indeed Pan Slavism was dead). But the idea of messianism did not die. The new vehicle of Russian imperialism was to be communism. And again the carrier of this new order was to be Russia and only Russia to the advantage of Russia. The center of this ideology of necessity was to be in Moscow, not Belgrade or Peking. Thus proletariat Russia again has a mission, in contrast to her socialist counterparts, and continues to be as messianistic as her predecessor Imperial Russia.

The similarity between the Soviet Union and Imperial Russia is striking in foreign as well as nationality policy. Clearly, and Braichevskiy recognises this, the Soviet Union is a state of the Russian people. Although Brezhnev and company talk about the "Soviet People" and the "Soviet Fatherland" they mean the Russian People and Russian Fatherland. Behind the façade of the soviet man, soviet culture, etc. exists the reality of the dominant Russian man, Russian culture, and Russian as the official language. Although the nationality policies of Imperial and Soviet Russia differ, the objective remains the same — cultural genocide.

A further connection between Imperial and Soviet Russia may be found in the Russian behaviour during World War II. The Soviet

leaders and official history books refer to World War II as the "Second Fatherland War," the First having been fought against Napoleon. Prince Pozharsky, Suvorov, and other imperial leaders became the standard-bearers of the new Soviet Russia. Stalin furthermore raised the victory toast not to the "Great Soviet Peoples" but to the "Great Russian People." Lenin indeed would refer to this toast as "Russian chauvinism."

3

In this section of his essay the author fails to make a distinction between Lenin the theoretician and Lenin the pragmatist. It is true that Lenin as early as 1900 came to the defense of the nationalities, but this defense was not motivated by a sincere desire to aid the nationalities, but by the desire to use these nationalities for his own objectives. Lenin the theoretician declared himself for "self-determination" of nations but in practice he advocated the policy of assimilation of nations. His practical policy reflected his real view on the national question and was dictated by the conviction that in a proletarian-international society there is no room for national divergence. A true socialist then is one who works for the assimilation of nations. "Assimilation of nations" favouring the dominant nation (Russia) speeds up "historical progress" and is "one of the most powerful motors transforming capitalism into socialism." But due to tactical considerations, Lenin the pragmatist does not dwell on the question of assimilation. His views on the nationality question are better understood if one evaluates "national demands" and "national separation" from the vantage point of the "struggle of the workers."

In reality Lenin's espousal of "self-determination" of nations, which was incorporated into the Bolshevik program in 1903, was "designed to achieve four interrelated purposes: 1) to prove to the non-Russians that the Bolsheviks were not simply another Great Russian Party; 2) to diminish the attractiveness of the local nationalist movements and recruit their intellectuals into the Bolshevik organization; 3) to encourage secessionist movements which would weaken the Empire and hasten the revolution; and 4) to prepare the foundations for a future reconciliation between the Great Russians and their former subjects on the basis of equality, once the revolution was accomplished." This Bolshevik policy culminated with the November 15, 1917, "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia," a document which proclaimed 1) "the equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia; 2) the right of the peoples of Russia to free self-determination, even to the point of separation and formation of independent states; 3) the free development of national minorities and ethnic groups inhabiting the territories of Russia; and 4) the abolition of any and all national privileges and disabilities."

The "Declaration" was designed to entice the non-Russian nationalities back into the new Russian proletarian state. Lenin was deeply disappointed when the non-Russian nations refused to participate in the newly formed political entity. The nations chose "sovereignty" over "federalism." Now confronted with the realities of "self determination of nations," Lenin used force to retain domination over the nationalities. His views about "oppressed" and "oppressing" nations were discarded and once again the Russians recaptured that "bloody past" of Imperial Russia, and once again, this time Bolshevik, Russia was to become in Lenin's words the "Prison of Nations."

The first to experience the practical aspects of Lenin's "self determination" were the Ukrainians and Finns. In both cases the Bolsheviks used force. The fact that the Central Rada government in Ukraine was "socialist" did not deter Lenin from attacking it. The truths of "socialism" could be found in Moscow and only in Moscow. This attitude again underlines the previously discussed concepts of "selectivity" and "exclusiveness" of Russia in world history.

It is obvious that in citing Lenin, M. I. Braichevskyi, himself a Marxist-Leninist, does not approach Lenin's writings critically enough. He deals with theory rather than reality, whereas Lenin dealt with both.

4

Here Braichevskyi, having enumerated the five arguments used to justify Russia's annexation of non-Russian peoples (*narod*), takes issue with the terminology used in the first argument "the union of non-Russian peoples with the Russian people." He asks the question of whether or not reference is made to the "toiling masses" whenever the word *narod* is used. He maintains that since the toiling masses (*narod*) were deprived of a voice at the Pereiaslav Rada, the agreement was signed between the ruling or oppressing elements of the Ukrainian society. The union that occurred, he further maintains, was between the two ruling groups so as to facilitate their continued oppression of the masses.

One may and should take issue with Braichevski's last statement. Forgetting the class approach to history, for a moment one may do well to examine the economic background of the leaders of the Ukrainian Liberation War. There were no Ukrainian "feudalists" who wanted to strengthen the feudalistic system. One may do well also to examine this as a War of National Liberation which was supported by the general mass of the Ukrainian population. Instead of limiting discussion to class interests it would be helpful to discuss the national aspirations of these leaders and their followers.

In essence, however, Braichevskyi is justified in discussing

terminology that influences the interpretation of history. This is precisely what his whole essay is about. By using the word *narod* in reference to the Tsarist regime the Soviet historians, he points out, project the present situation into the distant past. Similarly the word *vozziednannia* (reunification) is also a transfer of the present situation into the past. Nowhere in the original 1654 Pereiaslav document is the word *vozziednannia* to be found.

5

The absurdities of the remaining four arguments used to justify Russia's annexation of non-Russian peoples have been clearly demonstrated by Braichevskiy and warrant no further comment. What does merit attention on our part, and is understandably passed over by Braichevskiy since this would only cloud the development of his idea about the "reunification" of Ukraine and Russia, is K. H. Huslysty's cited statement (footnote 58) about Ukrainian society in the 16th-17th centuries and the formation of the Ukrainian nation. K. H. Huslysty, like many other Soviet historians, has accepted the official "Soviet scheme" of history which speaks about a common ancient Rus nationality from which emerged the Russian, Ukrainian, and Byelorussian nations. Clearly this scheme is opposed to the "rational scheme" presented to the Russian Imperial Academy in 1904 by M. Hrushevsky who maintained that "the Kievan state, its laws and culture, were the creation of one nationality, the Ukrainian-Rus," while the Vladimir-Moscow state was the creation of another nationality, the Great Russian. The Byelorussian Soviet historian V. I. Picheta concurred that the "early history of Ukraine is the history of the so-called Kievan Rus." The noted Russian historian A. E. Presniakov was also in agreement that the Ukrainian history had its origins in Kievan Rus while Russian history had its beginnings in Vladimir-Suzdal.

Soviet internationalism, however, rejects nationalistic histories. In the 1930's therefore the "soviet scheme" and its emphasis on all-union history were introduced. By this "scheme" Ukrainian history was closely bound to Russian history. The history of Kievan-Rus was now to be interpreted as a common heritage of the "fraternal peoples:" Russian, Ukrainian, and Byelorussian. This common "Ancient Rus" heritage assists Soviet historians in explaining the subsequent "reunification" of the three fraternal nations.

K. H. Huslysty then, in strict compliance with the "Soviet scheme," cannot envision, or does not care to entertain, the existence of a Ukrainian nation before the 16th century. A few of his colleagues, however, although not directly refuting the common nationality thesis, maintain that the beginnings of the Ukrainian language and nationality go back to the 12th-13th centuries (I. Boiko). M. I. Brai-

chevskiy, the author of the essay under discussion, also questions the common "Ancient Rus" nationality and maintains that as early as the Kyievan Rus period there already existed three distinct nationalities with their proper state structures and conflicting interests.

6

Soviet revision of history is quite obvious from this section of Braichevskiy's essay. Here the author successfully contrasts the attitude of official Soviet historiography before and after the 1930's towards Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, leader of the Ukrainian Liberation War.

One must, however, disagree with Braichevskiy's statement that B. Khmelnytskyi was a "typical" member of the feudal class as well as carrier of the feudal ideology. Here perhaps it would have been helpful to include the Soviet definition of a feudalist and feudalism. Just like the word *fascist*, which has received the incorrect connotation of anti-communist in Soviet historiography, so also the words *feudalism* and *feudalist* are used to lump together all those who were not "progressive" enough for the Soviet regime. Did in fact feudalism as a system exist in Ukraine during the period under discussion and if it did how did it differ from Western feudalism? Does the mere fact that Khmelnytskyi lived under this politico-economic system make him a feudalist? True he was wealthy, but this was due to his service as a "registered" kozak officer. The wealth that he accumulated was mainly due to his risky profession, as attested by the death of his father, who was also an officer, rather than by any feudal duties, responsibilities, or land holdings. One may not therefore accuse Khmelnytskyi of being a feudalist and sustaining the feudal order. Frankly, as Braichevskiy points out earlier while citing I. Boiko, the major segment of the population was in effect free from feudal obligations. Furthermore, Khmelnytskyi was careful not to restore the large landholdings and prevented the abuses of the Kozak officers, a number of whom did aspire to restore serfdom. It was only after Khmelnytskyi's death that one notes the growth of the wealth and power of the officers, and this was due not to the land policies of B. Khmelnytskyi but of the Tsar, who gave out lands to those officers who submitted to him. But even then one must not allow the general nature of the Ukrainian Kozak state to escape him. The nature of this state is vividly described by Teteria's request that knowledge of grants of land be kept from the rank and file Kozak.

It is true that B. Khmelnytskyi did put down peasant rebellions, but this was not motivated by his class interests but by the desire to restore order in the newly formed Ukrainian state. One must take into consideration the fact that not all of those who fought in

the Ukrainian War of Liberation were disciplined former registered or Zaporozhian Kozaks. Many of the participants belonged to the so-called "chern" (black folk) who had no understanding of order. It is these elements that Khmelnytskyi had to put down or else anarchy and chaos would prevail. The punitive expeditions were therefore not class-oriented and neither was, as Braichevskyi refers to it, Khmelnytskyi's "Betrayal" at Berestechko. Khmelnytsky, it is true, did abandon his army near Berestechko while it was engaged in battle against the Poles, but this "abandonment" was not due to his desire to "lose" the battle but to save the day for the kozaks. History records show that at the height of the battle the Turks and Tartars, unreliable to begin with, left their positions and thus weakened the position of Khmelnytskyi's army. Khmelnytskyi left the kozaks in order to persuade the Turks and Tartars to return. The former allies, however, not only refused but kept Khmelnytskyi from returning to his troops. Thus Khmelnytskyi's "betrayal," as Braichevskyi would have it, was not a willing act but an act beyond his control.

Braichevskyi also implies that Khmelnytskyi was interested in the preservation of the interests of his social group and the extension of Ukrainian autonomy within the Commonwealth. This desire for autonomy, however, occurs in 1636 and 1647 before the Ukrainian War of Liberation (1648-1654). What were his feelings afterwards? Could not his discussions with Wladislaw IV, the Polish King, have been diplomatic maneuvers as was the case with the Russian Tsar? And furthermore, while discussing with Wladislaw IV is there a possibility that he was buying time and knew that his discussions with the Polish King and the latter's acquiescence meant nothing without the approval and action of the Polish Seim (Diet). And finally, being a pragmatist, could not Khmelnytskyi have regarded the Commonwealth as the "lesser evil" in contrast to Russia? And could he not have regarded autonomy as the first step toward independence? Characteristically, Khmelnytskyi sought friendship among weaker, declining states (Poland and Turkey) because he saw a danger in an alliance with a powerful Russia. It was pragmatic rather than class considerations that prompted his actions.

A class analysis of certain historical events may be acceptable to a Marxist-Leninist-oriented historian but it should not be acceptable as the "holy of holies" of a true historian. There are other views and considerations that interacted during the turbulent years of the Ukrainian Liberation War and these have to be taken into consideration if a true picture of events is to emerge. Commitment to one ideology is a luxury that a historian cannot afford.

It is quite natural that the Soviet elevation of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi "onto the shield" was to play an important part in the Soviet scheme of things. Despite Soviet attempts to discredit B. Khmelnytskyi, before the 1930's, he remained a hero and liberator in the eyes of the Ukrainian population. It was therefore to Russia's advantage to use Khmelnytskyi's popularity in realizing two goals: 1) to camouflage Russian chauvinism (popularization of Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, Prince Pozharsky, Kuzma Minin (a capitalist), Suvorov, Kutuzov, and many other Russian leaders and statesmen); and 2) to justify the unification of Ukraine with Russia.

It was not by accident that Khmelnytskyi was further elevated "onto the shield" when Moscow ordered the creation of the "Order of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi" and created the "Ukrainian Front" during World War II. Stalin was aware of the wholesale Ukrainian defection to the Germans and hoped to use Ukrainian patriotism to his advantage by making these insignificant concessions. It was not by accident, again, that Stalin demanded the inclusion of the Ukrainian SSR into the United Nations. He realized that the walls of "Soviet friendship" were "cracking" and therefore attempted to create the "myth" of Ukrainian statehood so as eventually to be able to consolidate his position. In the end all these concessions worked to the advantage of the Russians.

Braichevskyi correctly points out that it was not the Muscovites (Russians) who defended Ukraine from foreign invasion but on the contrary, Ukraine remained the bastion of resistance against the Turko-Tartar invasions in Eastern Europe and defended the boundaries of both the Commonwealth and the Muscovite state. To substantiate Braichevskyi's claims let us briefly examine the emergence and importance of the Zaporozhian Kozaks, or as they referred to themselves, the "Defenders of Orthodoxy."

From the 15th century on, Ukraine was constantly threatened by Turkish and Tatar attacks. After the breakup of the Golden Horde the Crimean Tartars grew in strength and controlled Ukrainian access to the Black Sea. In 1497, the Crimean Tartars became vassals of the Ottoman Empire. The Tartars, economically primitive, thrived on spoils obtained from constant attacks on Ukraine. These spoils included not only cattle but slaves which were eventually sold on the Turkish slave markets. The first great attack was led by Khan Mengli Geray in 1482. The Tartars seized Kyiv together with a great amount of wealth and people. This success led the Tartars to invade Ukraine in full force two to three times a year.

The Lithuanian state, which included most of Ukraine, was thus faced with the task of warding off Tartar attacks. Although steps

were taken to strengthen Lithuanian and later, after the union, Polish-Lithuanian boundaries, the Tartar hordes continued to harass Ukrainian lands.

Rather than submit to the economic oppression brought by the Poles, many Ukrainians moved east and south into the steppe areas and established independent communities. But the danger of the Tartars remained and thus, in order to survive, the settlers had to become warriors known as kozaks. The centre of the Kozak settlement became Zaporozhia, an area beyond the Dnieper Cataracts. Here the Kozaks organized an island fortress, called the Zaporozhian Sich, under Prince Dmytro Vyshnyvetskyi. The Sich on several occasions was moved to different islands in the Dnieper River. Gradually, as more peasants fled from Polish rule, the kozaks living on the Sich were organized into a strong military force with their own social stratification and democratic traditions. The Hetman and officers were elected by the Kozak General Council and all decisions were made by majority vote.

The Zaporozhian Kozak Army was made up of volunteers, a major portion of which consisted of infantry. Tactics used were dictated by the geographic conditions of the steppes. Extensive use of light wagons was made during battles with the Tartars. The wagons served as fortresses, sometimes movable, for the Kozak Army. Trench warfare was also used. In addition to land campaigns the Kozaks also periodically carried out naval operations which sometimes carried them as far as the coastal cities of Turkey. These operations were carried out on light boats, "chaika," with 50 to 70 men each and armed with several cannons. Such operations, made up of several hundred similar boats, carried them to the gates of the Ottoman Empire: Istanbul (Constantinople).

Appreciating the fighting abilities of the Kozaks, the Lithuanian state attempted to create regular Kozak units under its control. In this attempt, after many failures, they succeeded only in 1568. After the union of Lithuania and Poland, these "Registered Kozaks," as they were known, served the Commonwealth against the Turks and Tartars, but during the Ukrainian Liberation War crossed over to B. Khmelnytskyi, formerly also an officer of the "Registered Kozaks," and the Zaporozhian Kozaks.

Needless to say, the Zaporozhian Kozaks initiated hostilities against Poland much earlier than 1648. One of the first wars against Poland was fought in 1592-1596 under the leadership of Khryshtof Kosynskyi. Many other wars followed and finally culminated with Khmelnytskyi's victory in 1648-1654.

The fiercest enemy of the Ukrainian Kozaks, however, continued to be the Tartars. In 1606 the Kozaks captured the city of Varna in Bulgaria; in 1614 the Kozak fleet crossed the Black Sea and destroyed

the Turkish cities of Sinope and Trebizond in Asia Minor; in 1615 they destroyed the suburbs of Istanbul and defeated a Turkish fleet in the Danube River; in 1616 they captured Kafa, the major market center for slaves. Later, after the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654, the Ukrainian Kozaks participated in the 1683 victory over the Turks at Vienna, and in 1687 and 1689 fought against the Crimean Tartars. The role and might of the Kozaks were recognized by the Popes who, through their envoys, on more than one occasion beseeched and paid the Kozaks to fight against the Turks.

In spite of the years of enmity between the Ukrainians and the Tartars and Turks, the Ukrainian Orthodox leaders chose to align themselves with Moslem Turkey rather than Orthodox Russia. Both Khmelnytskyi and later Petro Doroshenko realized the danger from the north. Understanding this threat, Khmelnytskyi took steps to align with Sweden, and such a treaty was finalized by his General Secretary, later Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky. Hetman Petro Doroshenko went further when he negotiated a treaty with the Ottoman Porte and Ukraine became a vassal state of Turkey.

Thus not only did the Treaty of Andrusovo, signed between Poland and Russia in 1667, negate the Pereiaslav Agreement and the "reunification" of the fraternal peoples, Ukrainians and Russians, but even Khmelnytskyi himself and later Vyhovskyi and Doroshenko crossed off the 1654 Agreement and confirmed that the act was a mere alliance between two states, an alliance, one might add, that was dictated by the circumstances in which Ukraine found itself.

8

Let us now examine the last part of Braichevskyi's essay and especially his concluding remarks about the Treaty of Pereiaslav and its consequences for Ukraine and the Ukrainians.

One may observe that from the beginning both the Ukrainian and Muscovite governments hesitated in their decision to sign the Pereiaslav documents. Both the Russians and Ukrainians were quick to observe that the interests of both nations were far from similar. The Russians feared mostly a war with the Commonwealth and the democratic ideas and institutions that prevailed among the Ukrainians. The singular interest shared by both was that of their common Orthodox religion, but even then Orthodoxy as practiced by the Russians was far removed from the Orthodoxy of Constantinople and Kyiv. That is precisely why Khmelnytskyi sought other allies before approaching Muscovy. This seeking of allies, I might add, continued even after the final ratification of the Pereiaslav Agreement and was a further attestation of the nature of the document itself, an alliance rather than a "reunion" with Russia.

And now let us examine Braichevskyi's five concluding remarks and the consequences of Pereiaslav.

1. The feudal order, if one may refer to it as such, did come to Ukraine and did culminate in servitude. Responsibility for this re-establishment of feudalism, however, does not lie with Khmelnytskyi but with his followers Vyhovskyi, Mnohohrishnyi, Samoilovych, Mazepa, and others. In time, as the Russian presence became more obvious, many members of the Ukrainian "shliakhta" did betray their nationality and attempted to equalize its status with the Russian gentry.

Because of the betrayal of the Ukrainian upper class the Russian government and Russian institutions made inroads into Ukraine. We find that at the end of the 17th century the living conditions of the Kozaks rapidly deteriorated. By the time of Peter I, Ukrainian Kozaks were extensively used by the Russians in their military campaigns and in the construction of fortifications (including the new capital of St. Petersburg). Subsequently these kozaks who still had land were deprived of it by forcible seizure, sale, or other means. The result of this policy was the equalization of the position of the kozak with that of the peasant.

The peasantry on the other hand remained free of duties to the "shliakhta" until the beginning of the 18th century. But this did not last very long, and as the latter became more aggressive several peasant revolts broke out, of which the 1687 revolt was of great importance. Thereafter, Ivan Mazepa, following the deposed Samoilovich in his universals (manifestos), warned against the oppression of the peasantry. Nevertheless by 1730, 52 per cent of the land was already in the hands of large landholders and monasteries. By 1735, only 35 per cent of the peasants remained free.

This state of affairs evoked new peasant rebellions. The largest, known as "Koliivshchyna," broke out in 1767-8. It began in Polish-held territories of Ukraine and spread to Russian-held territories. In 1799 in Katerynoslav there was a protest to the distribution of lands to large landholders. In 1807 in the Kyiv area the people protested the inclusion of Ukrainian lands and peasants into "military settlements." The revolt of Ustym Karmaluk was credited with over one thousand attacks against large landholders and his band sometimes numbered 200,000 men. In addition to Karmaluk's raids, which ended in 1835 after his death, numerous peasant rebellions broke out, the largest of which occurred in 1840 and 1848.

2. One cannot quarrel with Braichevskyi's statement that the bourgeoisie class began its emergence in Ukraine in the mid-17th century but was "artificially subdued" by the Tsarist feudal machine. We are in total agreement that it was the Russian feudal machine,

because at this point no such machinery existed in Ukraine. Khmelnytskyi had a definite economic policy which may be observed in his decrees and ordinances. His economic policy was mercantalistic rather than feudalistic, because of the desire to see a strong centralized state with an efficient financial and governmental administration. Whereas Khmelnytskyi's mercantalist policy is not well defined, the mercantalistic policies of Doroshenko and Mazepa are quite evident.

Although the Hetmans following Khmelnytskyi wanted to see a strong mercantalistic state, the interests of the Tsars were contrary to this. In 1781 Ukraine was incorporated into the Russian Empire and from that time until the 19th century, as attested by the Soviet economic-historian Liashchenko as well as Lenin, it was a colony in every sense of the word. Ukraine produced raw materials for the Russian manufacturers and in many cases was restricted from processing and manufacturing goods produced in the interior of Russia. The Ukrainian economy, in addition to providing Russia with raw materials, also became the agricultural heart of the Empire. Ninety per cent of the total wheat export from the Empire was obtained from Ukraine and solely accounted for Russia's favourable balance of trade. One Russian official observed that "we may starve but we must continue to export wheat." The brunt of the "starvation," however, was felt not by the Russians but by the Ukrainians, as evidenced by the 1932-1933 period, when Ukraine lost over six million of its population due to an artificial man-made famine designed and carried out by Stalin.

3. In this portion of his concluding remarks Braichevskyi briefly touches upon the liquidation of Ukrainian political autonomy. Needless to say, this was also a breach of the Pereiaslav Agreement. In 1768 the Hetmanate was abolished, in 1775 the Zaporozhian Sich, the last bastion of Ukrainian autonomy, was destroyed, and finally, in 1781 Ukraine was incorporated into the Russian Empire. But the idea of an independent, or at least an autonomous, Ukrainian political entity did not die. Many members of the Ukrainian "shliakhta" continuously worked toward that goal.

In 1917 the goal was achieved. After hundreds of years of subjugation, Ukraine re-emerged on the political arena of the world. At first the Ukrainians sought autonomy but in the course of events they demanded independence. On January 22, 1918, a Ukrainian National Republic was proclaimed in Kyiv and one year later, on January 22, 1919, Western Ukraine negated the Andrusovo Agreement of 1667 and joined the Ukrainian National Republic to create an indivisible Ukrainian state. But Ukrainian independence was short-lived. First the Germans and later the Bolsheviks interfered in the development of the new state. Ukraine was thus forced to take up arms against the Bolsheviks, the White Volunteer Armies, and Poland, who were

all equally hostile to Ukrainian sovereignty. Although Ukrainian forces were finally defeated in November, 1920, military operations continued until November, 1921.

History began to repeat itself. The Bolsheviks created a Soviet Ukrainian Republic but the real masters in this Republic were the Russians, who at first granted Ukrainians certain concessions and later, when they felt strong enough, re-established centralism under Moscow.

4. The author correctly asserts that Ukraine became a "deep province" and that its art, literature, and education declined. Yet the author fails to stress the importance of the Ukrainian culture prior to 1648 and its influence on the development of Muscovy. Perhaps much more could have been said about the religious brotherhoods, the Ostrow Academy and the Lviv Brotherhood, in fostering education. Definitely much more could have been said about the Mohyla Academy, which was the greatest learning center in Eastern Europe with as many as 2,000 students a year, many of whom were from the Balkans and Russia. The Academy also had its branches in many large cities of Ukraine. While many Ukrainians studied in the Mohyla Academy, others received their education in the Western European Universities. Ukraine became a middleman of culture between Russia and Europe. Great private and institutional libraries became a sign of Ukrainian interest in Western literature and especially the writings of the classics.

After Ukraine's annexation to Russia, however, the cultural life rapidly declined and reached the state described by Braichevskyi. In mid-19th century, however, Ukrainian cultural activity revived and continued to grow despite official Tsarist opposition. By 1918, there was no longer any doubt that Ukraine was on the threshold of a renaissance. For a while, in keeping with their policy of retreat (New Economic Policy, 1922-1928), the Bolsheviks allowed the Ukrainians to develop their culture. Thus from 1922 to 1928 the Ukrainians proceeded to reconstruct and enrich Ukrainian cultural life. But this "peredyshka" (breathing space) was of short duration. With Stalin's ascendancy, all those who were ardently engaged in the cultural life of Ukraine were physically eliminated. From now on all the cultural institutions were to be under the control of the Party and Moscow.

5. Dealing with the problem of language and the policy of Russification the author mentions several Imperial decrees that forbade the use of the Ukrainian language in Ukraine. The first of these was the Ukaz of 1709, which the author sufficiently describes in his text. The Ukaz of 1763 was issued in response to the organization of "Sunday schools," the publication of Ukrainian textbooks for these schools, and the cultural activity of an organization known as

the "Hromada." The decree forbade the printing of Ukrainian popular literature and even religious texts. On this occasion Valuiev, the Minister of the Interior, declared, "there is no separate Little Russian language, was not, and cannot be."

The Emsky Ukaz of 1876 further reinforced the policy of Russification in keeping with Alexander II's notion of the "oneness" of the Russian Empire. This Ukaz was largely due to the 1863 Revolution in Poland.

After the 1905 Revolution the Ukrainians again resumed publishing newspapers, books, and other literature in their native language. But once again, as the tide of the Revolution subsided, the then Minister of the Interior, Stolypin, declared his opposition to the use of the Ukrainian language and implemented his views into actual policy.

The linguistic policy of the Russian Empire was adopted by the Soviet Union. Today Russification has become more subtle in its forms. There are no outward denials of the non-existence of the Ukrainian language. Instead there is an attempt to saturate the market with Russian works and everything that is Russian. True, Ukrainian books are published but their number is not sufficient even for the libraries, to say nothing of individual readers. At times as few as 300 copies of a book are published, but most of these are exported outside the Soviet Union to show the West that the Ukrainians do have the right to publish their literature.

The process of Russification may be best observed in the Soviet educational policy. Under Khrushov the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR was revised. In this document provision was made whereby the parents could "choose" the school that they wanted their child to attend — Ukrainian or Russian. On the surface this provision appears quite innocent but in reality it is discriminatory. For a parent to choose a Ukrainian school is to invite official scrutiny and ruin a child's opportunity for advancement. This linguistic policy is also applied at the university level. A student is given a choice of taking his examinations in Russian or Ukrainian.

Another Russification method practiced extensively in the Soviet Union is resettlement. A graduate from a University rarely finds employment in his own area and, at least for several years, has to reside outside Ukraine. If he lives in one of the non-Russian republics he becomes an instrument of Russification, by using the Russian language as a media of communication, and at the same time he himself becomes Russified. This resettlement policy is applied also to Ukrainians serving in the Red Army as well as students who are obliged to leave Ukraine for definite periods of time and work in Kazakhstan or other areas.

Needless to say, the whole Ukrainian education system is so structured as to allow the Russians to dominate the most important

positions and make the most important decisions. The net result of this discriminatory policy is much more devastating than it was during the Tsarist regime.

In his article M. I. Braichevskiy has superbly demonstrated his knowledge of the subject matter relating to the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654. Although his Marxist approach to history and events sometimes mars his thinking and leads him astray, he does attempt to be objective in his treatment of the subject at hand and especially the state of Soviet historiography.

In conclusion let us examine the "General rules in Soviet Historiography" as stated in *The Soviet Empire: A Study in Discrimination and Abuse of Power*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965, p. 126-127.

"Soviet historiography is history by self-confirming hypothesis. The whole of Marxist-Leninist ideology constitutes the hypothesis. By accepted standards of historical scholarship, Soviet history is, therefore, history by manipulation and falsification. It can hardly be otherwise, for the Soviet system, driven by inner compulsion for ideological purity, demands total conformity to prevailing "truths" as they emerge in the inexorable dialectical processes of history. What was glorified yesterday may be condemned today. Villains become heroes; heroes become villains. As historical relativists, Soviet historians look at the past, not as something of itself, but rather as a preordained continuum of unfolding events beginning with primitive communal society, through stages of feudalism and capitalism, to be succeeded by socialism and finally arriving at the ultimate stage of communism. Through this distorted prism of Communist philosophy of history, they see history as a composite of events structured in clearly defined historical categories according to certain accepted "truths." When an historical development of the past contradicts prevailing "truth," that is, the general political line, then that "error" must be transformed into "truth." Hence, Soviet historiography is an exercise in political manipulation; objectivity, rejected as an instrument of "bourgeois" historians, has no role to play; and certainty of man's future development deprives it of those natural elements of mystery that have concerned historians since the day of Herodotus and Thucydides. As Dr. Sergius Yakobson, the American Slavic scholar, has said, "as long as the tutelage of the Party prevails, Soviet historiography will continue to be deprived of the elementary conditions and guarantees for pursuing objective and unhampered research. To perceive fully the tragedy of the Soviet historian," he added, "one has to keep in mind that he is forced to do his work under the aegis of the basically anti-intellectual Soviet regime."

AN APPRAISAL OF THE PEREIASLAV AGREEMENT OF 1654*

By Alexander OHLOBLYN

The appraisal of the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654 in both historical and historical-legal literature has been by no means uniform. Most discrepancies and even contradictions have been caused by the legal definition of the Pereiaslav Agreement. As far as this point is concerned, the opinion of the scholars vacillates between the conception of a complete incorporation of Ukraine with Muscovy according to the Pereiaslav Agreement and that of a simple military alliance between two independent and sovereign states. All varieties of opinion can be reduced to two principal groups.

The first group, represented for the most part by Russian scholars, supports the theory of a union or, at least, more or less close ties between two unequal countries, while the second one, composed chiefly of Ukrainian scholars, defends the conception of contractual relations between two more or less independent and sovereign countries.

To the first group belong the conceptions of the incorporation of Ukraine with Russia, either complete (D. Odynets, V. Myakotin in his later works) or incomplete (I. Rosenfeld), and of autonomy of Ukraine within the Muscovite Tsardom and later, within the Russian Empire (Baron B. Nolde and others).

The second group includes the conceptions of a real union between two states — Ukraine and Muscovy (M. Diakonow, O. Popov), their personal union embodied in the person of the Tsar of Muscovy (V. Serheyevych, R. Lashchenko and others), vassalage (Korkunow, V. Myakotin in his earlier works, Sokolsky, M. Pokrovsky, partly M. Hrushevsky, partly Professor Krypiakkevych, M. Slabchenko, Professor L. Okinshevych, Professor Yakovliv in his earlier works, and others), protectorate (partly M. Hrushevsky, partly Prof. Krypiakkevych, partly D. Doroshenko, Prof. B. Krupnytsky, Prof. Yakovliv, to a certain extent V. Lypynsky in his later works), pseudo-protectorate (Dr. B. Halaychuk), and, finally, that of a military alliance between two nations, Ukraine and Muscovy, consolidated by the protection of the Tsar (V. Lypynsky, Prof. I. Borshchak, Prof. Yakovliv, Dr. S. Ivanytsky and others in part).¹

*) Taken from: Alexander Ohloblyn's *Treaty of Pereiaslav 1654* (Toronto: Homin Ukrainy Publishing Co. Ltd., 1954). Translated by B. Budurovych.

Most prevalent in modern Ukrainian historiography are the conceptions of vassalage-protectorate and military alliance. Prof. L. Okinshevych is entirely correct when he observes that "vassalage and protectorate in the relationship between two states are formally close to each other."² Prof. Yakovliv is also of the same opinion when he stresses that "vassalage and protectorate occurred quite often in international relations, also in the form of a purely nominal dependence, where the dependence of the vassal state was limited to the use of certain titles by the monarch, to an alliance and to the obligation (or simply a promise) to pay tribute."³ In his opinion, "the relations between Ukraine and Muscovy are, according to the literal contents of the treaty, very close to those of nominal vassalage or protectorate."⁴

V. Lypynsky, in his analysis of the whole complex of the Ukrainian-Polish and Ukrainian-Muscovite relations in the time of Khmelnytsky, reached the conclusion that "his (Khmelnytsky's) agreement with Moscow in 1654 was a chance alliance, directed against Poland and concluded in order to liberate Ukraine from Polish domination, like all his former alliances with the Crimea and chiefly with Turkey."⁵ For this reason Lypynsky considers the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654 a "military alliance against Poland and the Tartars, guaranteed by a formal protectorate."⁶ Prof. Yakovliv also admits that "all historical facts show quite clearly that Khmelnytskyi regarded this agreement as a simple treaty of protection which was quite familiar to him since he had more than once concluded similar treaties in the past, as a temporary military alliance of two states"; however, "since Ukraine was at the time of the conclusion of the treaty of 1654 much weaker than Moscow, this military alliance acquired some attribute of vassalage and protection," though "actually this dependence . . . manifested itself very seldom and was more apparent in the demands of Moscow than in Khmelnytsky's voluntary acts." Later, "during the years following the conclusion of the treaty and especially in the last year of Khmelnytsky's life (1657), that dependence had become purely nominal, in proportion to the increase of the power of the Ukrainian State," and "Ukraine was, in fact, independent from Moscow."⁷

If we consider the specific tasks and peculiarities of history and jurisprudence and review the most recent publications of the younger representatives of the latter (Dr. B. Halaychuk⁸, Dr. S. Ivanytsky)⁹, it is possible to state that modern Ukrainian scholars have appraised the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654 in a more or less uniform way.¹⁰

The two basic opinions about the Pereiaslav Agreement as represented by the Ukrainian and the Russian scholars have remained unchanged. They proceed from a marked discrepancy in the national and political interests of Ukraine and Muscovy at the time of the

conclusion of the treaty and from their different political objectives after that event. It is "in this discrepancy in the relations between both contracting parties and their way of looking at the Pereiaslav Treaty as a temporary agreement which could later be modified and changed according to their wishes, that the difficulties of a legal and political definition of a new mutual relationship lie."¹¹ However, a legal definition of the Ukrainian-Muscovite agreement of 1654, even if scholars had a uniform opinion about it, is still inadequate for a historical appraisal of the Pereiaslav Treaty. In order to "explain the real legal nature of the Treaty of 1654 as well as the actual mutual relationship which resulted from that treaty, we have to consider not only the literal contents of the agreement but also that actual relationship inasmuch as it replaced the unfulfilled provisions of the treaty. "The appraisal of the treaty by the contracting parties and their neighbours is also of a certain importance," Professor Yakovliv writes.¹² Thus in order properly to define and appraise the Pereiaslav Agreement it is necessary to examine not only the documents of the treaty but also its historical circumstances.

How did the Pereiaslav Agreement change the political situation of Ukraine? First of all, we must state that after 1654 Ukraine remained a separate, independent state, with its own head — the Hetman, who was elected for life, with a distinct tendency toward making his office hereditary in one dynasty, with its own government, army (one of the best in Europe), foreign policy (the restrictions of the Pereiaslav Agreement concerning the relations with Poland and Turkey were not put into effect), social and economic order, legislative power and jurisdiction, finances (the obligation to pass the revenue from towns "to the Tsar's treasury" was not enforced) and, finally, with its own religious and cultural life. It is very important that all restrictions of Ukrainian sovereignty specified in the agreement (or, strictly speaking, in the Tsar's charter for the Kozak Army and in the "11 Articles") were not recognized by Bohdan Khmelnytsky and that the Muscovite government evidently did not consider this a violation of the agreement on the part of the Hetman. The only indication or symbol of the supremacy of the Muscovite Tsar in Ukraine was his new Ukrainian title — "Tsar of Little Russia, Grand Duke of Kiev and Chernihiv" — and the presence of Muscovite troops in Kiev.¹³

The chief symbol of the sovereignty of the Ukrainian State was the person of the Hetman in his capacity as the head of the state and its government. He was invested with full state authority in both internal matters of the state and its foreign policy, which he conducted independently. The Hetman's authority increased even more after 1654. He retained his legal power as "Sovereign and Hetman" of the Ukrainian (Rutheanian) State. In Ukrainian official documents

he is referred to as the "sovereign," the "supreme ruler and sovereign of our fatherland," "supreme lord," "commander-in-chief."¹⁴ His supremacy and authority were recognized by the higher Ukrainian clergy and the Ukrainian nobles. He was, in the words of Metropolitan Sylvester Kosiv, the "chief and commander of our country."¹⁵ After his death, Prince Stepan Sviatopolk-Chetvertynsky, the chamberlain of Bratslav and leader of the Ukrainian nobility, referred to him as "His Excellency, Worthy of Remembrance, His Grace, Lord Khmelnytsky, the Great Hetman, Defender of our Orthodox faith."¹⁶ Foreign rulers styled the Hetman "Illustrissimus Dux" (Most Serene Prince).¹⁷

In his letter to the Hospodar (Potentate) of Wallachia dated June 18, 1657, Bohdan Khmelnytsky calls himself "Clementia divina (by the grace of God) Generalis Dux Exercituum Zaporoviensium."¹⁸ His letter to (the Elector of Brandenburg) Frederick William (June 21, 1657), in which the Hetman calls himself "a friend of the Elector," is signed "Dux Cohortum Zaporoviensium."¹⁹

"The Hetman is like a prince or a king in his country, as the Tsar is a sovereign in his. He has conquered his country with his sword and liberated it from the (Polish) yoke," Vyhovsky told the Muscovite envoy (as quoted by Szebeszy, envoy of the Prince of Transylvania, on June 28, 1657).²⁰ Hetman Pylyp Orlyk writes in his "Exposition of the rights of Ukraine" (1712) that Bohdan Khmelnytsky "made Ukraine an independent principality and contented himself with the title of the Hetman of the Kozak Army which his son inherited from him, and the estates of the said principality continued to elect their princes after his death and no nation claimed the right to object to it."²¹

How was the Pereiaslav Agreement appraised in Ukraine and abroad?

A contemporary and fully authoritative Ukrainian appraisal of the Pereiaslav Agreement appears in the well known Manifesto of the Ukrainian government to the nations of Europe (1658): "We had not accepted the protection (protectionem) of the Grand Duke of Muscovy for any other reason but in order to preserve, with God's help, for ourselves and our descendants the freedom, won by arms and sanctified with our own blood which we have shed so many times . . . Because of religious ties and our free and voluntary submission we hoped that our subjection would be a just one, based on a genuine and sincere friendship, without encroachments on our freedom; we hoped, moreover, that it would continue to increase, according to their promises."²²

In spite of the unfortunate experience of the Ukrainian-Muscovite relations after the conclusion of the Pereiaslav Agreement and a gross violation of that treaty by Moscow, the Ukrainian government was anxious both in the time of Khmelnytsky and after his death to

maintain the alliance with Moscow. Khmelnytsky, while concluding a military convention with Sweden, an enemy of Moscow, in 1655, declared that the alliance with Moscow remained in force since it was advantageous to Ukraine.²³ An obvious example of this attitude was the Korsun agreement between Ukraine and Sweden (October 6, 1657). Concluding a treaty of "alliance and military association" with Sweden, the Ukrainian government made a reservation to the effect that the commitments which it had assumed under that treaty had no bearing upon its relations with "His Serene Highness the Duke of Muscovy to whom the Kozak Army is bound by a close (formal) alliance and will remain unalterably faithful to him."²⁴ Even in the Hadiach agreement with Poland (September 6, 1658) Ukraine, while returning to membership in the Commonwealth as the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia, made a reservation that "if the estates of the (Polish) Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania had to go to war against the Tsar of Muscovy, the Kozak Army would not be forced to participate in such a war;" only "if the Tsar should refuse to return the provinces of the Commonwealth and attack it, then all the forces of the Crown, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Ruthenian Kozak Army under the command of the Hetman should combine and go to war."²⁵

It was Moscow's open military aggression against Ukraine in the autumn of 1658 that forced the Ukrainian government to break the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance. In the manifesto issued in October, 1658, to all nations, the Kozak Army cited numerous instances of Muscovite perfidy and made the following declaration: "Thus have been exposed the perfidy and fraud of those who, without any fault on our part, prepared for us the yoke of servitude, at first by fomenting civil war in our midst and then by open armed aggression. So that this may be properly understood, we profess our innocence and praying for divine help declare that we have been forced to defend steadfastly our rightful cause and ask our neighbours to help us defend our freedom . . . We are not responsible for this war nor is it our fault that, having been and wishing to remain faithful to the Grand Duke (the Tsar of Muscovy), we have been forced to take up arms."²⁶

Very interesting was the appraisal of the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654 by the Ukrainian statesmen at the time of Mazepa. They generally had a high opinion of the lifework of Bohdan Khmelnytsky²⁷ and connected directly their own struggle for national liberation with the great Ukrainian revolution of 1648. This attitude is reflected in numerous state documents of Hetman Ivan Mazepa, in the writings of his antagonist Petryk, in literary works and various other historical materials of that time. A striking instance of this

attitude toward the epoch of Khmelnytsky is the well-known preamble to the "Bendery Constitution" of April 5, 1710.²⁸

Hetman Pylyp Orlyk also paid a great deal of attention to the Pereiaslav Agreement and to the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance of 1654 in general. In his manifesto to the governments of Europe, dated April 4, 1712, the Hetman wrote: "It is known to everybody that His Excellency Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky of immortal memory voluntarily, and not compelled by anyone, placed the Ruthenian people and the Kozak nation under the Tsar of Muscovy (... a soumis le peuple ruthene et la Nation Cosaque au Czar Moscovite). And Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich affirmed in a solemn pact under oath to guard forever under his protection the Kozak nation and the Ruthenian people." However P. Orlyk continues, "It is common knowledge that after the death of His Excellency Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky of blessed memory the Muscovite State violated in various ways the rights and liberties of the Kozak nation which it had itself formerly confirmed; the Tsar of Muscovy wanted to enslave the free Ruthenian people."²⁹

In his famous treatise "Exposition of the Rights of Ukraine" (1712), Orlyk gave a brilliant analysis of the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654: "The strongest and most invincible argument and proof of the sovereignty of Ukraine," he writes, "is the solemn treaty of alliance concluded by Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich on the one side and the Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Estates (les Etats) of Ukraine on the other. This treaty was concluded in 1654 and was signed by authorized representatives. It seemed that this solemn and detailed treaty which was named a permanent agreement ought to have established forever peace, freedom and order in Ukraine. This would have happened if the Tsar had executed it as scrupulously as the Kozaks believed he would. They handed over their fortresses to the Muscovite troops and combined their troops with those of the Tsar for the sake of the common cause; however, the Tsarist generals took advantage of their confidence, seized by cunning devices a great number of other fortifications and then began to command like masters in the whole country. Nevertheless the Kozaks retained a shadow of sovereignty and even after the death of Hetman Khmelnytsky the Tsar granted a charter to the Estates of Ukraine."³⁰

Hryhor Orlyk, an assistant to his father and continuator of his lifework and tradition, wrote in his "Memoirs" for Louis XV. of France (February 12, 1741): "It is certainly known to Your Majesty that the Kozak nation under Hetman Khmelnytsky after a prolonged war with Poland seceded from that Commonwealth... Hetman Khmelnytsky foresaw that the power of his nation, which he had founded, could not prevail against that of its neighbours and deemed it more advantageous to safeguard its security by the protection of

Russia which he accepted on terms most favourable to his nation.”³¹

In his “Remarks on Ukraine and the Kozak,” which Prof. Borshchak considered to be fragments of a history of Ukraine, Hryhor Orlyk wrote: “In the name of the rights of his nation Khmelnytsky rebelled against the (Polish) Crown which was chastised by God with defeats, for Khmelnytsky was a leader of genius and had the backing of the whole Kozak nation who believed in the justice of their cause. . . . After ten (sic) years of war which made the name of the Kozaks known throughout the world, Khmelnytsky accepted the protection of the Tsar of Muscovy for the country and the nation with all the rights of a free nation. However, the perfidy of the Tsar of Muscovy was the reason that immediately after Khmelnytsky’s death the rights of the Kozak Nation began to be violated by the Muscovites and then these people who value freedom more than anything else in the world revolted, and war continued a long time in Ukraine. . . .”³²

To the statesmen of the age of Mazepa, the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654 was something in the nature of a prototype of the Ukrainian-Swedish agreement of 1708. The King of Sweden substituted for the Tsar of Muscovy and “took forever this people (Ruthenian nation) and the Kozak Army under his protection, guardianship, patronage and custodianship in order to throw off the Muscovite yoke.”³³ The Bendery Constitution, too, confirmed the permanent protectorate of the Swedish kings over Ukraine.³⁴

Generally speaking, the nature of the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654 was correctly understood in 18th century Ukraine. Both the government of the Ukrainian State and the broad masses of the population knew that the alliance between Ukraine and Muscovy, which resulted from the Pereiaslav Treaty, was an association of free and equal partners. Hetman Demian Mnohohrishny told Taneev, a Muscovite envoy, on the occasion of the Andrusiv Agreement of 1667 (which, among other things, provided for the return of Kiev to Poland): “The Sovereign did not conquer us with his sword; we submitted to him voluntarily, because of our common faith. If he has no use for Kiev and other Ukrainian towns and gives them back to the (Polish) King, we shall look for another ruler.”³⁵ This declaration was repeated almost word for word by Petro Ivanenko (Petryk), later the Hetman of the so-called “Khan’s Ukraine,”³⁶ in his letter to the chief otaman of the Sich (1692): “The Muscovite Tsars . . . have not conquered us by sword, but our ancestors submitted to them voluntarily, for the sake of the Christian faith.”³⁷ Hryhory Pokas, an army clerk, stressed in his “Description of Little Russia” (1751) that Ukraine “joined the Russian state of its own will.”³⁸ Hryhory Poletyka spoke of “voluntary submission, based on treaties concluded by Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Little Russian people.”³⁹

Semen Divovych, a translator with the General Chancery of the

Army and the author of the famous "Discourse Between Great Russia and Little Russia" (1762), makes his Ukraine say the following words: "I have submitted to your Sovereign, not to yourself . . . Do not think that you are my mistress, but the Tsar is our common ruler, both yours and mine."⁴⁰

The Ukrainian tradition of the Pereiaslav Agreement has been vividly recorded in the "Istoria Rusov." It is emphasized throughout this memorable production of Ukrainian national and political thought. "The whole world knows that the Ruthenian people and its Kozaks, having been at the beginning a sovereign nation, dependent only on itself . . . joined Muscovy voluntarily, merely because of the common faith; now, after we have made it what it is today, it unscrupulously and shamelessly scorns and offends us."⁴¹

The idea of the independence of Ukraine and of the sovereignty of the Ukrainian State continued to live among the widest circles of the Ukrainian people in the 17th and 18th centuries, beginning with the head of the state, the Hetman, and ending with the rank-and-file Kozaks. Thus, e.g., Hetman Ivan Samoilovych uses the expression "our state" and strives for the "extension of its bounds."⁴² Petro Ivanenko concludes in 1692 a treaty of alliance with the "Crimean State" on behalf of the "Little Russian State."⁴³ The elders and town-folk of Poltava who complained to Hetman Mazepa (in 1690) about harsh treatment by the settlers from the Right Bank Ukraine, were indignant because such things happened in a country which was not "stateless" or "lawless."⁴⁴ A common Kozak of the village of Yukhiniv in the district of Novhorod Siversky relates in 1721 "how the Poles were brought to ruin in our Little Russian towns" and how "the (Roman Catholic) priests fled from this state to Poland."⁴⁵ And when a Ukrainian monk died in distant China (Peking), it was recorded on his tombstone that he "was born in the Kingdom of Little Russia, regiment (district) of Nizhyn."⁴⁶

It was on this foundation of Ukrainian statehood (although it was oppressed by the imperialist centralism of Moscow which had violated the Pereiaslav Agreement) that the idea of sovereign "Little Russian nation" developed — a notion which was characteristic of the Left Bank Ukraine in the 18th century.

The independence of the Ukrainian State was also recognized by Moscow both during and after the Pereiaslav negotiations. The Muscovite formula "King Jan Kazimierz . . . violated his oath and thereby freed his subjects — you, Orthodox Christians — from subjection,"⁴⁷ was a peculiar, but indisputable recognition of Ukraine's sovereignty and independence. We have already mentioned the formula "the Muscovite State of the Sovereign and the Ukraine of the Kozak Army," used in Buturlin's report (Stateyny spisok).⁴⁹ During the Moscow negotiations the Muscovite government undoub-

tedly recognized that the Hetman of the Kozak Army had the right to represent all the estates of Ukraine and it was as a result of his petition that those estates received Tsarist charters. The subjection" of the Hetman and the Kozak Army together with the whole Ukrainian population did not change this situation. Professor Yakovliv correctly observes that the formula, "subject of our Tsarist Majesty," as the Tsar styled the Hetman after 1654, was used in Moscow "with reference to kings or rulers of those countries and states which entered into a contractual relationship with the Tsar of Muscovy, seeking his protection against their enemies."⁵⁰ According to the concepts of international law of that time, a "sovereign who was under someone's protection" did not cease to be a sovereign.⁵¹ It is, therefore, no wonder that the Muscovite government, even at a later time, recognized the existence of a separate Ukrainian State. Thus, e.g., in 1666 Steward Kyril Khlopov, Muscovite voyevoda in Starodub, wrote: "in the Little Russian State, in the town of Starodub . . ."⁵²

To be sure, the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654 brought something new as far as the legal aspect of the relationship between Ukraine and Muscovy was concerned. Ukraine recognized the protection of the Tsar of Muscovy. In one of the Muscovite patents of 1654 (granted to the guilds of Kiev) we find the following formula: "how by the grace of God the Grand Duchies of Kiev and Chernihiv, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the whole Kozak Army and the whole Little Rus have come under Our Sovereign exalted arm (protection)."⁵³ In this connection important changes were made in the title of the Tsar of Muscovy who thenceforth began to style himself the Tsar of "Great and Little Russia" — a formula aptly described by M. Hrushevsky as "the Ukrainian title" of the Tsar.⁵⁴ V. Prokopovych observes that this title was "as though presented to the Tsar by the Ukrainians."⁵⁵

In the opinion of Professor Yakovliv, at that time "a new idea began to manifest itself in connection with the treaty of 1654 . . . the conception of the return under the rule of the Muscovite Tsar of his 'ancestral patrimony which had been torn away — Kiev'.⁵⁶ In this connection the additional formula 'Grand Duke of Kiev and Chernihiv' appeared in the title of the Tsar.⁵⁷ This notion, in the minds of the autocrats of Muscovy, later replaced the idea of the treaty of 1654, the only historically correct basis of Muscovite-Ukrainian relationship."⁵⁸

Such are, indeed, the facts of the case; however, the idea of the "patrimony of Kiev" was by no means new in the dynastic state policy of Moscow. The Muscovite branch of the Rurik dynasty first laid their claim to the Ruthenian lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Polish Commonwealth (i.e., all the territories of the former Kievan State) in the time of Ivan III. In the 16th c. this idea

became the practical program of the Muscovite theory of the "Third Rome,"⁵⁹ although the "Smuta" (Time of Troubles) at the beginning of the 17th c. dealt a severe blow to this theory and the revival of the Ukrainian State in 1648 was even more dangerous to its realization.⁶⁰ The Pereiaslav Agreement opened new far-reaching prospects to the Muscovite policy and, what was of the utmost importance, offered real possibilities for attaining them. The Ukrainian and, before long, the Byelorussian territories of the old Kievan Empire passed under the rule of the Tsar of Muscovy. It was only little by little that Moscow put this project in a prominent position. The help of certain Ukrainian circles, particularly of some members of the Ukrainian Kozak gentry and of the secular clergy, considerably contributed to the success of this policy.⁶¹

Bohdan Khmelnytsky at first did not oppose this development since it furthered to a certain extent his main objective: to embroil Moscow with Poland, impair the power of the Polish Commonwealth and unite all Ukrainian (and, perhaps, even Byelorussian) territories under the rule of the Kozak Army.⁶² However, after some time he began to realize the danger of these Muscovite encroachments.

It was probably because of the unfortunate experience of the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance of 1654 that the Ukrainian government later paid more attention and attached more importance to the problem of titles. It was not without reason that in the Ukrainian-Swedish agreement of 1708 there was, according to Orlyk's "Exposition of the Rights of Ukraine," a reservation to the effect that the King of Sweden, the protector of the Ukrainian State, could not use either the title of the Duke of Ukraine or the coat of arms of the Ukrainian State (art. 5).⁶³

V. Prokopovych observed in his very valuable work "The Little Russian Seal" (unfortunately unfinished and till now unpublished)⁶⁴ that Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich used his new (Ukrainian) title only in documents dealing with Ukrainian matters (beginning with February 9, 1654). In the official documents of the Muscovite State as well as in his decrees to the people of all ranks in the Muscovite State the Tsar "obstinately and consistently adheres to the old formula 'Autocrat of all Rus' which was worked out as a result of centuries of usage." Thus, e.g., 'the order to the appropriate office in Moscow about the 'dismissal' of the Ukrainian envoys (19. 3. 1654) was issued in the name of the Tsar and Grand Duke of 'all Russia', but at the same time it was stated in the instruction to the Dyak of the Duma (State Secretary) Almaz Ivanov concerning the audience with the Ukrainian embassy that he "should introduce that embassy and greet on its behalf the Tsar as 'the Autocrat of all Great and Little Russia'." "A special seal of the Tsars of Muscovy which was used only in the intercourse between Moscow and Ukraine," Prokopovych writes,

“shows that Moscow treated the Kozak Army as a state organism separate from the Tsardom of Muscovy and that certain ties existed between Ukraine and Muscovy, just as separate seals used by Holy Roman Emperors in their intercourse with the kings of Hungary and Bohemia bear witness to the fact that these kingdoms enjoyed an independent existence within the Empire.”⁶⁵

It is a well known fact that Moscow's relations with the Hetman of the Kozak Army, like those with foreign monarchs, were conducted by the Posolsky Prikaz, the Muscovite Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, as Professor Okinshevych writes, “this intercourse was so frequent and its subject so special that Moscow soon decided to separate it from the apparatus of the Posolsky Prikaz and concentrate it in an office specially established for this purpose.” This was the Prikaz of “Little Russia” (later known as “Malorossiisky Prikaz”), established in 1663. Professor Okinshevych stresses that the Malorossiisky Prikaz “was not one of those Muscovite departments which controlled and managed certain territories (as, e.g., the Prikaz for Siberia, Smolensk, etc),” since “Russia could not directly govern Ukraine which had its own state apparatus.” In his opinion, “the Prikaz of Little Russia was actually another department in charge of foreign affairs which operated side by side with the Posolsky Prikaz,” but “was not subordinated to the latter.”⁶⁶ While this statement is essentially correct, we must add that the Malorossiisky Prikaz was not a substitute for the Posolsky Prikaz, but had its own special functions.⁶⁷ Diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Muscovy continued to be handled by the Posolsky Prikaz.⁶⁸ In our opinion, the Malorossiisky Prikaz could be described as the Muscovite ministry for Ukrainian affairs or as the chancery of the Tsar of Muscovy in his capacity as the Tsar of “Little Russia.” This distribution of functions between two offices, separate and independent from each other, was caused by the political and legal duality of Ukrainian-Muscovite relations in the second half of the 17th century.

V. Prokopovych stresses that the Great State Seal and red sealing wax were always used in Moscow's official correspondence with Ukrainian Hetmans, while the privy seal in black wax was usually affixed to the official letters to the Crimean Khan and the princes of South-East Europe. According to Prokopovych, “the pompous title” of the “Lord Keeper of the Tsar's Seal and Privy Councilor” which replaced that of the former “keeper of the seal,” “was created especially for intercourse with foreign monarchs and the Hetman of the Kozak Army.”⁶⁹

It is also very important that Ukraine continued to be separated from Muscovy by an international boundary and customs barriers. Muscovite merchants who arrived in Ukraine had to pay import duties like other foreigners, while Ukrainian merchants were not

allowed to trade freely in Muscovy and the Russians were forbidden till 1709 to acquire landed property in Ukraine.

In foreign countries the nature and importance of the Pereiaslav Agreement were interpreted correctly. Professor Yakovliv states that "foreign nations and monarchs treated Ukraine as a free and independent state, separate from Moscow, and its Hetman as an independent ruler; they regarded the Treaty of 1654 as a contract of alliance or protection which was, according to the conception of that time, purely nominal and did not prevent them from maintaining diplomatic relations with Ukraine as a competent subject of international law."⁷⁰ The vast documentary evidence collected by Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian students of the epoch of Khmelnytsky, in particular by M. Hrushevsky in the 9th volume of his "History of Ukraine-Rus," leaves no doubts as to the full independence of the foreign policy of the Ukrainian State after 1654 and of the independent and decisive part played by Ukraine in contemporary political events in Eastern Europe. The growth of the Ukrainian State, the consolidation of the authority of the Hetman and the increase in the stature of Bohdan Khmelnytsky both as a statesman and an individual furnished sufficient evidence to enable official foreign circles and public opinion to appraise correctly the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654.

This situation was probably best understood in Sweden. Charles Gustavus, the King of Sweden, wrote to Khmelnytsky on July 15, 1656: "We have been informed that a certain treaty has been concluded between the Grand Duke of Muscovy and the Kozak nation but that it was of such a nature that the freedom of the people has remained complete and inviolable . . . Relying upon this free condition of your (people), we wished to correspond with Your Serene Highness quite openly, even with the knowledge of the Grand Duke of Muscovy . . ."⁷¹ Very interesting in this respect are so-called "Swedish projects" (dating approximately from the end of 1655 and 1656) which deal with the future political status of Ukraine, its place in the system of East European states, and the future Ukrainian-Swedish relations. They give several possible variants of the future constitution of the Ukrainian State and all describe Ukraine as a "free and separate state" or "Kozak Republic," without even mentioning its alliance with Muscovy.⁷² The treaty of alliance with Sweden concluded at Korsun on October 6, 1657 (signed when Vyhovsky was Hetman but based on spade-work done by Khmelnytsky) recognized Ukraine as a "free nation, subject to nobody" ("pro libera gente et nulli subjecta").⁷³

This was the general opinion prevailing in Europe at that time. It was accepted in Austria, whose envoy, Archbishop Baron Parchevich, sent on a mission to Bohdan Khmelnytsky in 1657, called Ukraine a "renowned and martial Republic,"⁷⁴ in Transylvania, Prussia (Bran-

denburg), Moldavia, Walachia, Turkey, the Crimea, and other countries.

We know, thanks to the research of Professor Borshchak, that French official circles and public opinion appraised the Pereiaslav Treaty as a military alliance between Ukraine and Muscovy and were well aware of the fact that Khmelnytsky needed it only to get a temporary respite in his struggle against Poland.⁷⁵ The well-informed "Theatrum Europaeum" reported that Khmelnytsky's chief objective was to become the master of Ukraine and rule that country ("Indem er anderst nicht gemeynet als ueber die Ukraine selbsten ein Herr zu sein und darinnen zu dominiren"), that the Tsar wanted to seize all of Ukraine in defiance of the treaty of alliance and that this brought about a conflict between them and prompted Khmelnytsky to ask Turkey for its assistance.⁷⁶ In Poland, Khmelnytsky's desire to create a "separate state" in Ukraine was realized even more clearly and the Polish government warned the Hetman that "this way of changing 'protection' would not secure his independence."⁷⁷

The historical destiny of the Pereiaslav Agreement and the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance is a well known subject and we do not propose to deal with it in detail in this essay. While the immediate objectives of the agreement — both military and political — were realized somehow or other and the restrictions imposed upon Ukrainian sovereignty by the Muscovite version of the treaty were not put into effect, "further political objectives of both sides... were absolutely different" and therefore "both sides began to interpret the Pereiaslav Agreement differently, each in its own way."⁷⁸ The Ukrainian government firmly and consistently supported the principle of "actual statehood of Ukraine."⁷⁹ It was during the years following the Pereiaslav Agreement that the greatest successes in the building of the Ukrainian state and most remarkable achievements of its foreign policy took place, which made the Ukraine of Bohdan Khmelnytsky the decisive factor in contemporary events in Eastern Europe.

However, the Muscovite government pursued a policy of "incorporation of Kozak Ukraine and its transformation into an ordinary province of the Muscovite Tsardom."⁸⁰ This course was not perceptible at once, but it was bound, sooner or later, to bring the Pereiaslav Agreement to nothing. The most serious blow to the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance and an indisputable violation of the Pereiaslav Agreement was the treaty of alliance between Moscow and Poland, concluded in 1656 at Vilno and directed against Sweden, an ally of Ukraine. The Ukrainian envoys were denied admission to the Vilno negotiations; this affront aroused a storm of indignation in Ukraine and prompted the Ukrainian government to lodge a formal protest. The Vilno agreement was "formidable for Ukraine."⁸¹ It not only obstructed the realization of Khmelnytsky's desire to unite all Ukra-

inian territories under the rule of the Kozak Army but also frustrated the chief objective of the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance: to make impossible a common policy of Poland and Muscovy directed against Ukraine. In this respect the Vilno Agreement was the direct forerunner of the Andrusiv Agreement between Poland and Muscovy (1667), which proved fatal to Ukraine, and of the so-called "permanent peace" between these nations (1686).

An even more serious violation of the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654 (at least as far as the formal or legal side of the matter is concerned) was the falsification of the Pereiaslav Treaty by Moscow which took place in 1659, while a new agreement with Hetman Yurii Khmelnytsky was being negotiated. This problem was at one time extensively discussed by scholars,⁸² the majority of whom (both Ukrainians and Russians) is of the opinion that the so-called "Previous Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky," fourteen in number, which were promulgated at the Rada in Pereiaslav on October 17, 1659, by Prince Alexei Trubetsky (the former head of the Muscovite delegation during the March negotiations of 1654), were "a forgery, falsification of the authentic articles of the Treaty of 1654," designed to "bring about very important changes in the terms of that treaty, tending to restrict the rights and liberties of the Kozak Army."⁸³ A detailed analysis of this question in the works of Professor Yakovliv has proved this beyond any doubt.⁸⁴ This falsified text was misrepresented by Moscow as the authentic treaty of 1654 and thrust upon Hetman Yurii Khmelnytsky together with the "new articles" which restricted even more the rights of the Ukrainian State. For the sake of being on the safe side Prince Trubetsky was ordered to print in the Pechersk printing shop in Kiev the "old" (1654) and the "new" (1659) articles together and "send those printed books to all the Cherkass (Ukrainian) regiments so that those articles might become known in all regiments to the whole Kozak Army."⁸⁵ A protest by the Ukrainian government against the falsification of the Pereiaslav Treaty of 1654 was of no avail, but the recollection of this forgery was preserved for a long time in Ukrainian tradition.⁸⁶

Finally, after many violations of the Pereiaslav Treaty by Moscow in the 17th and 18th c., Empress Catherine II. "abolished (in 1764) the treaty of 1654, forced Hetman Kyrylo Rozumovsky by a threat of punishment for 'high treason' to renounce his office and, notwithstanding the protests of the representatives of the Ukrainian people elected to the 'New Codification Commission,' carried out a complete incorporation of Ukraine."⁸⁷ The Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance, concluded in 1654 by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, ceased to exist.

Let us sum up the historical evidence.

The Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654 was a treaty of military

alliance between two independent nations, Ukraine and Muscovy, guaranteed by the protection of the Muscovite Tsar over Ukraine and legalized by the new (Ukrainian) title of the Tsar.

However, the history of Ukrainian-Russian relations did not live up to the spirit of the Pereiaslav Agreement. The national and political interests of the two allies as well as their objectives and aspirations were too much at variance. The military and political alliance between Ukraine and Muscovy was gradually transformed into Moscow's domination over Ukraine. The Pereiaslav Agreement, concluded in order to secure the independence of Ukraine, actually proved to be its undoing. It marked the beginning of that tragic complex of Ukrainian-Russian relations which transformed the ties of a free alliance into the shackles of three centuries of servitude and enmity.

And yet the Pereiaslav Agreement was neither a tragedy nor a disgrace to Ukraine. A historian has to judge events by their causes and not by their consequences. The more Moscow departed from the spirit and letter of the Pereiaslav Treaty while persistently clinging to that handy springboard for the domination of Eastern Europe, the greater the importance was attached to it by the Ukrainian side. For the "Pereiaslav Constitution" (as it was dubbed by M. Mikhnovsky)⁶⁸ though falsified, disfigured, mutilated, and violated by Moscow, has remained forever, according to the words of a great Ukrainian patriot and statesman of the 18th c., "the strongest and most invincible argument and proof of the sovereignty of Ukraine."⁶⁹

NOTES ON THE APPRAISAL OF THE PEREIASLAV AGREEMENT OF 1654

1) Mykola Mikhnovsky came after a detailed analysis of the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654 (he uses the term "Pereiaslav Constitution") to the interesting conclusion that it had all the distinctive marks of a "union of states." (M. Mikhnovsky, *Independent Ukraine*, 1948 ed., p. 20; see also *ibid*, pp. 19-23).

2) L. Okinshevych, *Lectures on the History of Ukrainian Law*, Munich, 1947, pp. 33-34.

3) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, p. 67.

4) *Ibid.*, p. 68.

5) V. Lypynsky, *Ukraine at the Crossroads*, p. 67; see also *ibid.*, p. 121.

6) *Ibid.*, p. 30. D. Doroshenko (in his *Survey of Ukrainian Historiography*, Prague, 1923, p. 211) speaks of Lypynsky's "brilliant" analysis of the Pereiaslav Agreement.

7) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, pp. 68-69.

8) B. Halaychuk, *The Treaty of Pereiaslav in the Light of International Law*. Proceedings of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, Historical-Philosophical Section, vol. 1, New York-Paris, 1951, pp. 102-105 (an abstract of the author's more detailed work on this subject).

9) S. Ivanytsky, *The Pereiaslav Treaty of 1654*, 1954. See also "The Juridical Aspect of the Treaty of Pereiaslav (concluded in 1654 between Russia and Ukraine)" — Proceedings of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, vol. 1, pp. 106-108 (an abstract).

10) Prof. Yakovliv writes in one of his most recent publications on the Pereiaslav Agreement: "Only V. Lypynsky's appraisal of the Treaty of 1654 as a military alliance between Ukraine and Moscow tallied with developments both before and during the time when the treaty was being negotiated and its authentic text. I have also subscribed to Lypynsky's opinion and have merely added that the treaty showed some influence of the idea of the protectorate of the Tsar with certain signs of nominal vassalage (oath of allegiance, tribute)." (A. Yakovliv, "On the 300th anniversary of Khmelnytsky's treaty with Moscow," *Svoboda*, 1954, No. 75).

11) M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 2.

12) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, p. 55. See also *ibid.*, p. 61.

13) It is necessary to observe that the presence of Muscovite troops (garrison) in Kiev did not violate the sovereign rights of Ukraine. It was stated in the Tsar's order to the Muscovite voyevodas assigned for duty in Kiev (January 30, 1654) that the Tsar "according to the petition of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky... sent them (the voyevodas) to Kiev and ordered that soldiers should be with them in Kiev in order to protect (it) from the arrival of the Poles and various military men." (*ASWR*, X, 355).

14) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*.

15) *ASWR*, X, 709.

16) V. Lypynsky, *Ukraine at the Crossroads*, p. 203, see *ibid.*, 201-3.

17) See *Archives of South-Western Russia*, part 3, vol. 6.

18) M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 2, p. 1549.

19) D. Olyanchyn, "Two Letters of Hetmans Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Ivan Vyhovsky to Frederick William, the Elector of Brandenburg." *Khliborobska Ukraina*, vol. 5, p. 378. Vienna, 1924-1925.

20) M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 2, p. 1439.

21) I. Borshchak, "Exposition of the Rights of the Ukraine by P. Orlyk." — *Stara Ukraina*, Lviv, 1925, I-II, pp. 5-9.

22) *Archives of S.-W. Russia*, part 3, vol. 6, p. 363. In 1763, during a broadened assembly of the Council of Officers at Hlukhiv, one of the participants said: "Who could have expected that at the very time when we hoped to find our well-being, our peace and security through this subjection (to the Tsar of Muscovy — A. O.), there began our misfortune and the violation of our peace and prosperity." (*Proceedings of the Shevchenko Scientific Society*, vol. 159, p. 34. Munich, 1949).

23) M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 2, 1109.

24) *Archives of S-W Russia*, part 3, vol. 6, 333. See M. Hrushevsky, *History*, X, 63-66.

25) M. Hrushevsky, *History*, X, 354-367.

- 26) *Archives of S.-W. Russia*, part 3, vol. 6, pp. 368-369. See Appendix IV.
- 27) "We" — Ukrainian patriots of the time of Mazepa used to say — "always pray to God for Khmelnytsky's soul and bless his name."
- 28) *Readings of the Moscow Society of Russian History and Antiquities*, 1859, 1.
- 29) I. Borshchak, "Orlikiana", *Khliborobaska Ukraina*, vol. 4, 1922-1923. Vienna, (p. 366).
- 30) I. Borshchak, "Exposition of the Rights of the Ukraine by P. Orlyk." — *Stara Ukraina*, Lviv, 1925, I-II, pp. 5-9. P. Orlyk later obtained the restitution of the Pereiaslav Agreement (I. Borshchak, "Orlikiana," 353-354).
- 31) I. Borshchak, "Orlikiana", p. 368.
- 32) I. Borshchak, *Hryhor Orlyk*, Lviv, 1932, p. 146.
- 33) M. Vozniak, "The Commission of Bendery After Mazepa's Death." *Mazepa*, Warsaw, 1938, vol. 1, p. III.
- 34) *Readings of the Moscow Society of Russian History and Antiquities*, 1859, 1. 246, (article 2).
- 35) M. Kostomarov, *Ruthenian History in the Biographies of Its Principal Personages*, vol. 3, Lviv, 1877, p. 22, footnotes on pp. 22-23.
- 36) "Khan's Ukraine" — the territory in the south of Ukraine between the rivers Boh and Dnister. It was a part of the Crimean State and had its own Hetmans appointed by the Khan of Crimea.
- 37) *Moscow Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, "Little Russian Original Documents", 1692, No. 35/3.
- 38) See our article "Hryhory Pokas and his Description of Little Russia." *Symposium of Science of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.*, I, New York, 1952, pp. 67-69.
- 39) M. Hrushevsky, *The Pereiaslav Agreement Between Ukraine and Moscow in 1654*, Kiev, 1917, p. 22.
- 40) *Kievskaya Starina*, 1882, II, 342. An interesting formula was used in official documents of the second half of the 18th century: "Little Russian Service of Her Imperial Majesty" (1766).
- 41) *Istoria Russov*, Moscow, 1846, pp. 209, 210 passim.
- 42) N. Kostomarov, *Collected Works. Historical Monographs and Studies*, vol. 15. St. Petersburg, 1905, p. 537.
- 43) See O. Ohloblyn, *Sketches on the History of the Rebellion of Petro Ivanenko (Petryk)*, Kiev, 1929, p. 24.
- 44) *Moscow Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, "Little Russian Original Documents," No. 729/712.
- 45) *Records of the Statistic Committee of the Chernihiv Province*, vol. 1. Chernihiv, 1866, pp. 254-255.
- 46) I. Svit, An interesting Ukrainian monument in Peking, *Symposium of Science of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.*, I, New York, 1952, pp. 116, 117.
- 47) *ASWR*, X, 223.
- 48) *Ibid.*, 224.

- 49) *Ibid.*, 235.
- 50) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, p. 58.
- 51) See E. Borshchak, A little known French biography of Juras Khmelnytsky, *Symposium of Science of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.*, vol. III, No. 1 (7), 1953, p. 517. Prof. Borshchak quotes the opinion of Viefort, a well-known authority on international law in the 17th cent., *L'Ambassadeur et ses fonctions*, La Haye, 1680, livre II, part IV, §3.
- 52) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, p. 61.
- 53) M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 2, p. 850.
- 54) M. Hrushevsky, "Great, Little and White Rus," *Ukraina*, 1917, I, p. 11.
- 55) V. Prokopovych, "The Little Russian Seal," part 1, On the question of the authenticity of the "Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky" in the version of 1659 (manuscript).
- 56) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, p. 62.
- 57) On the strength of the decree of Sept. 3, 1655, the Tsar of Muscovy began to style himself also "the Grand Duke of Lithuania, White Russia, Volhynia and Podolia" (V. Prokopovych, "The Little Russian Seal" — manuscript).
- 58) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, p. 62.
- 59) See O. Ohloblyn, *The Moscow Theory of the Third Rome in the 16th and 17th cent.*, Munich, 1951.
- 60) *Ibid.*, pp. 38-41.
- 61) See, e.g., the speech by Hryhory Butovych, protopresbyter of Pereiaslav (Dec. 31, 1653) in M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 2, 732, or speech of Pavlo Teterya in Moscow on August 4, 1657 (M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 12-13).
- 62) See ASWR, X. 216-217.
- 63) *L'on n'innovera rien a ce qui a ete observe jusqu'a present au sujet des Armes et du Titre de Prince de l'Ukraine. S. M. R. ne pourra jamais s'arroger ce Titre ni les Armes* (I. Borshchak, "The Exposition of the Rights of the Ukraine" by P. Orlyk, *Stara Ukraina*, Lviv, 1925, I-II, pp. 5-9).
- 64) V. Prokopovych, The Little Russian Seal, part 1, On the question of the authenticity of the "Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky" in the 1659 version (in manuscript). An abstract of this work (Procopovich, "Pechat Malorossiyskaya — The Little Russian Seal) appeared in the *Proceedings of the Shevchenko Scientific Society*, I, 72-75. See also V. Prokopovych, *Sphragistical Anecdotes*, Prague, 1938, pp. 17-18.
- 65) V. Prokopovych, "The Little Russian Seal" (manuscript).
- 66) L. Okinshevych, *Lectures*, 46.
- 67) See *ibid.*, pp. 46-47.
- 68) See O. Ohloblyn, *New Material on the History of the Rebellion of Petro Ivanenko (Petryk)*. Augsburg, 1949, pp. 8-11.
- 69) V. Prokopovych, "The Little Russian Seal" (manuscript).
- 70) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, p. 63.
- 71) M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 2, p. 1280.
- 72) *Collected Materials on the History of South-West Russia*, vol. 1, Kiev, 1911, pp. 107-116. ("Documents of the Epoch of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, 1656-

1657," published by I. Kamanin). See M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 2, 1290-1294; V. Lypynsky, *Ukraine at the Crossroads*, 118-248, 270-272, 294.

73) *Archives of S-W. Russia*, part 3, vol. 6, 332-337. See M. Hrushevsky, *History*, X, 63-66.

74) M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 2, 1344.

75) "The Pereiaslav Council of 1654 and France," a paper read by Prof. I. Borshchak at the 1953 Session of the Shevchenko Scientific Society. (See V. Y., Scientific Session at Sarselles, America, 1953, No. 229).

76) M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 2, 775-776.

77) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, p. 62.

78) V. Lypynsky, *Ukraine at the Crossroads*, 30.

79) M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 2.

80) *Ibid.*

81) V. Lypynsky, *op., cit.*

82) See M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 2, 813.

83) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, p. 90.

84) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, pp. 71-92. See also "The Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky in the 1659 version" by the same author (UVAN Book of Homage to Academician M. Hrushevsky, vol. I, Kiev, 1928) and his "Ukrainian-Muscovite Treaties in the 17th and 18th cents." Warsaw, 1934.

85) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, p. 77. See V. Danylevich, "Little known Ukrainian incunabula" (*Memoires of the Historical-Philological Section of UVAN*, Kiev, 1929).

86) S. Velychko mentions interpolations in the "Articles of B. Khmelnytsky" in the 1659 version (see A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, p. 91). Hryhory Pokas in his "Description of Little Russia" (1751) writes: "If you should find in the negotiated and accepted articles of Hetman Zinovi Bohdan Khmelnytsky and his envoys . . . anything different from what they had actually been, . . . (it is because) these articles passed through many hands and perhaps did not escape those which were unfriendly to his (Ukrainian) people." (Symposium of Science of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S., I, p. 68). Evidently, Pokas was acquainted with the Lavra edition of the "Articles" (1659).

87) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, p. 8.

88) M. Mikhnovsky, *Independent Ukraine*, pp. 18, 20, 21, 22, 23.

89) *L'argument et la preuve la plus forte et la plus invincible de la souverainete de l'Ukraine* (P. Orlyk, Exposition of the Rights of Ukraine).

THE RUIN

SEQUEL TO THE PEREIASLAV AGREEMENT

By George KULCHYCKY

INTRODUCTION

While the rest of Europe lived in relative peace and stability, Ukraine suffered serious setbacks and defeats at the hands of the Mongol horde. Situated on the periphery of Europe, Ukraine was always a defence against the westward-moving nomads. When the Mongols were expelled from Europe, Ukraine had fallen under the rule of Lithuania. Shortly, however, through a marriage between Prince Jagajlo of Lithuania and Queen Jadwiga of Poland, Ukraine was transferred to the Polish crown.

Unlike Lithuania, Poland instituted cruel repressions against the Ukrainian people. Feudalism and the inquisition were introduced. People of the Orthodox faith were persecuted and churches were closed. While exacting much from the populace, the Poles were unable to protect their subjects from the attacks of Crimean Tartars and the Turks, who made periodic attacks on Ukraine.

In 1550 many Ukrainians who fled beyond the Dnieper cataracts (Zaporozhia) established the Sich, which became a haven for adventurers and fugitives from landlords. Being themselves of the Orthodox faith, they were soon regarded as the protectors of that faith. As warriors the Kozaks, as they were called, were second to none. They were able to frustrate Turkish plans and to harass their efforts in establishing Turkish supremacy in Ukraine. Adept horsemen, the Kozaks were able to fight and, in most cases, defeat the Turks and Tartars at a time when the rest of Europe was successfully being routed by the Ottoman Empire. Often the Turks and Tartars attacked Ukraine and procured from that area slaves for the slave markets of Turkey. The Zaporozhian Kozaks were able to curb many such raids by attacking Turkish fortresses and towns in Crimea as well as the mainland of Turkey and Istanbul. To curb the Kozak expeditions against the Ottoman Empire the Turks built two fortresses: Akerman near the Dnieper River, and Ochakiv near the Dnieper delta. In spite of this, the Kozaks still managed to continue their attacks against the Turkish fleet and the Ottoman Empire. In fast boats called "chaiky" or "baidaky" the Kozaks managed to rescue many of the Christian slaves from Turkish bondage.

By 1648, the time of the Ukrainian Kozak Revolution (War of Liberation), the Zaporozhians had become a formidable force. Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, wishing to free Ukraine from Polish rule, was able to drive the Poles out of Ukraine by using Zaporozhian Kozaks and Ukrainian mercenary Kozaks who defected from the Poles at the Battle of Zhovti Vody. Having expelled the Poles from Ukraine, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi tried to consolidate his power. One of his mistakes was that he prevented the Kozaks from completely annihilating Poland. It should be pointed out that Poland at this time was very weak and exhausted from wars with Turkey and neighbouring countries. She was able to recuperate within a short time and once again with the use of mercenaries and Tartar hordes, resume the invasion of Ukrainian lands.

Beset with these troubles, Khmelnytskyi now sought an ally that would help him establish a strong Ukraine. The most obvious choice was, of course, Russia. She not only had a large army and was an enemy of Poland, but she was also Orthodox, and thus regarded by Ukrainians as a "sister" nation. This "ally" eventually caused Khmelnytskyi and his followers to reappraise their ties with Russia, and eventually forced the Ukrainian Hetmans to seek help from Turkey, a non-Christian power.

FROM PEREIASLAV (1654) TO ANDRUSOVO (1667)

In 1654, the Ukrainian government under Khmelnytskyi approached the Tsar and signed the Treaty of Pereiaslav. By this treaty Ukraine in effect became the vassal state of Muscovy. Russia by this treaty permitted Ukraine to have an army of 60,000 Kozaks, collect its own taxes, pick its own Hetman, and have its own administration. In return the Ukrainians bound themselves to inform the Tsar of their foreign relations, to permit a Russian garrison in Kiev, and to guarantee Russian courts and government supremacy over similar Ukrainian institutions.¹

Russia, now, as "protector" of Ukraine, declared war on Poland. When the throne of Poland became vacant in 1656, the Poles offered the Tsar the crown. Khmelnytskyi, aware of possible implications from such an arrangement, now sought to break with the Russians. He became extremely sensitive to the danger that was looming in the person of the Tsar. In 1657, therefore, I. Vyhovskyi, Khmelnytskyi's successor, became vassal of the king of Sweden, who by now was planning a partition of Poland.²

Well versed in Ukrainian politics, Ivan Vyhovskyi pursued the course set by Bohdan Khmelnytskyi. He saw the danger that Russia

posed for Ukraine and approached the Poles with a proposition that Ukraine be admitted as a free state within the Polish Kingdom. By the Treaty of Hadiach (1658) Ukraine was to become the "Grand Duchy of Rus." It would have its own ministers and treasury, would be represented in the Polish Seim (General Assembly), Orthodoxy would be recognized on an equal basis with Roman Catholicism, and it would be allowed to maintain an army of 40,000 Kozaks.³

With the signing of this treaty the Ukrainians, allied with Poland and the khanate of Crimea, marched against Russia in 1659, soundly defeating the latter at the Battle of Konotop. Once the Russians were expelled from Ukraine, Vyhovskyi resigned because of the opposition of many Kozak leaders, who felt that signing the Treaty of Hadiach had been a mistake.

Once again the Kozaks elected Yurii Khmelnytskyi as Hetman of Ukraine. Sensing the unpopularity of the Polish alliance, Yurii once more turned to Russia. He and his advisor, Metropolitan Tukalsky of Kiev, hoped to keep Ukraine united, remove the Poles from Ukraine, and keep Russian influence in Ukraine at a minimum. The Russians, aware of his designs, captured Khmelnytskyi and made him sign the second Treaty of Pereiaslav (1659), by which he promised to be responsible to the Tsar, allow more Russian "voyevods" in Ukraine, and cede the lands of Byelorussia to Moscow.⁴ Having suffered such a humiliating setback, Yurii Khmelnytskyi became a monk, and was shortly interned by the Poles at the fortress of Morenburg together with Metropolitan Tukalsky.

Ukraine was now split into two banks, the Right Bank under Hetman Pavlo Teteria, and the Left Bank under Hetman Ivan Briukhovetskyi. Thus the Right Bank fell under the influence of Poland while the Left Bank was to an extent controlled by the Russians. Briukhovetskyi, Hetman of the Left Bank, in the Treaty of Baturyn (1663) agreed to supply the Russian garrisons with food and consented to prevent exportation of whiskey and other goods that were a Russian monopoly. Under Briukhovetskyi, Ukraine, as it can be seen from the next treaty signed in Moscow, became more subservient to Russia. He was the first of the Hetmans to go personally to Moscow to receive a Russian title. While in Russia he signed the Treaty of Moscow (1665), which stipulated that Ukraine was no longer allowed to keep its taxes, could not send envoys to foreign powers without the Tsar's consent, and had to accept a Russian as Metropolitan of Kiev.⁵

The year 1667 marks the turning point in Ukrainian politics. In this year the Poles and Russians signed the Treaty of Andrusovo which permanently divided Ukraine into areas of Polish and Russian influence. The Kozaks were not even allowed any representatives at the negotiation leading to the signing of this treaty. This forced even

a pro-Russian like Briukhoveskyi to re-examine his policies towards Russia and to seek a rapprochement with the Hetman of the Right Bank, who by now was Petro Doroshenko.

It may be seen from all the previously mentioned treaties and the developments that ensued that Russia was getting a stronger grip on Ukrainian affairs and on Ukraine. One can also note that, with the exception of Briukhovetskyi, all the previous Hetmans were for the weakening of Russian influence in Ukraine, and that there was definitely a certain consistency in their relations with Russia.

HETMAN P. DOROSHENKO, HIS PLANS AND STRUGGLE FOR POWER

Hetman Petro Doroshenko, grandson of the Zaporozhian Hetman, Mykhailo Doroshenko, was well versed in diplomacy and military science. Under Bohdan Khmelnytskyi he served as Secretary of Artillery in 1648, and later as an officer in the war in Moldavia. Living in Chyhyryn, at that time the capital of Ukraine, Doroshenko became acquainted with the methods and trends of Ukrainian politics. He was soon appointed envoy to Poland and Sweden and, after Pavlo Teteria died, Doroshenko was elected Hetman of the Right Bank Ukraine on the eleventh of January, 1666.⁶

Doroshenko ruled at a time when Russia wished to extend her influence into Ukraine. Russian encroachments on Ukrainian rights and the furthering of their influence worried Doroshenko and caused him to adopt a policy that had been propagated both by Khmelnytskyi and Vyhovskyi before him. He found himself in a dilemma, however. To choose Poland as an ally would mean earning the enmity of anti-Polish groups, which were strong at the time. On the other hand, to stay with Russia would mean further abrogation of Ukrainian rights and eventual collapse of the Ukrainian Kozak state. His plan, therefore, consisted in uniting Ukraine into one cohesive entity, forcing the Russian garrisons out of Ukraine and reconquering traditional Ukrainian lands from Poland.⁷

Hetman Doroshenko received his strongest support and inspiration from Metropolitan Tukalsky of Kiev and his two capable brothers, Andrii and Hryhorii. He buttressed his rule by aligning himself with the Tartars and, when the Treaty of Andrusovo became known, he began discussing with Istanbul the question of vassalage under the Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of Andrusovo divided Ukraine into a Polish and a Russian sphere of influence. The Zaporozhians according to this treaty were to serve both Poland and Russia whenever help was requested by either one. Doroshenko exploited this situation, which aroused the dissatisfaction of the people. Through his agents

he was able to spread the rumor that soon Poland, Russia, and Crimea would form an alliance to destroy the Zaporozhian Sich.⁸ Ukraine now expressed its discontent with the Russo-Polish machinations. Sirko, a leader of the Kozaks, led a revolt against Russia in 1668. In the same year the Zaporozhians killed the Russian and Tartar envoys to the Sich. This hatred against the Poles and Russians in effect diverted Ukrainian hate from the Turks and made rapprochement between Turkey and Ukraine possible.

Having set the stage for friendlier relations with Turkey, Doroshenko now wrote to Hetman Briukhovetskyi and asked him to join in a common effort against Polish and Russian encroachments. In his letter he reprimanded Briukhovetskyi's past behaviour and his pro-Russian activities in the following manner: "The type of leader that you are to your people, Ivan, should be put on trial before God and man. The nation which entrusted its fate to you lost an unmeasurable amount of blood for its liberty while you became rich. What kind of liberty does it have now?" In a further passage of his letter Doroshenko hints at an alliance with the Turks, "If you do not have the strength or the courage, and if there is no Christian justice, then you can try the help of infidels." Doroshenko compared Briukhovetskyi to a shepherd who held the cow while others milked it. He further stated: "I am ready to sacrifice everything for the nation, even my life, but I can not leave our people in bondage. I can not even bear to think of such an act."¹⁰

This seemed to have some effect on Hetman Briukhovetskyi, for in 1668, he dispatched General Secretary Stephan Hrechanyi to Crimea and Hryhorii Hamalia to Istanbul. Shortly Hetman Doroshenko also dispatched his envoys to Istanbul in the person of Chief Justice Bilohrud, Potianko and other Kozak leaders.¹¹

After the revolt of Sirko the Tsar decided to send 1,000 "streltzi" (Russian soldiers) into Ukraine.¹² This moved Hetman Briukhovetskyi into action. His officers and Kozaks now proceeded to kill Russian boyars and to expel their garrisons from Ukraine. Briukhovetskyi then exchanged loyalty oaths with the Nogai Tartars under Cheli-bey, who came to his assistance. After these developments, Doroshenko crossed over into the Left Bank and met Briukhovetskyi at Hadiach. However, once the armies were united, Briukhovetskyi was attacked and killed by his own officers who opposed his previous close co-operation with Russia.

For a while Doroshenko was able to unite Ukraine again. However, due to Polish agitation as well as Tartar unreliability, Ukraine once again became disunited. The Tartars now supported Sukhovyi, one time envoy to Crimea from the Zaporozhian Sich. Sukhovii had the aid of 100,000 Tartars under the command of Kalha-Saltan Krym Girey.¹³ A battle was fought between the pro-Doroshenko and pro-

Sukhovii forces in which the pro-Doroshenko army was victorious, due to the capable leadership of Doroshenko's brother Hryhorii and the last-minute assistance of the Zaporozhian Kozaks under Sirko.

When Doroshenko departed for the Right Bank he left Demian Mnohohrishny in charge of the Left Bank of Ukraine. Mnohohrishny, however, proclaimed himself Hetman of this area. This led to further complications, and Doroshenko once again was forced to enter into a fratricidal war.

The opportunism and the desire for self-advancement of certain adventurers led Ukraine to undergo a period called "Ruina" (ruin). During this time the Poles, Tartars and later Russians ravaged Ukraine. In spite of this, Doroshenko was able to overcome these difficulties and to lead Ukraine into closer relations with the Sublime Porte.

TURKISH INTERESTS IN UKRAINE

The Turkish thrusts into Ukraine marked the height of Turkish expansion. The Ottoman Empire by that time had virtually surrounded itself with vassal states which were very effective as buffer states against the newly emerging powers. The Sultan looked apprehensively at the developments in Ukraine and saw the danger of Russian expansion. During the war with Poland, Russia patrolled the Black Sea. The Ottomans regarded the Black Sea as a Turkish lake. They therefore hoped to contain Russia by separating Ukraine from Russian influence and thus cut them off from the Black Sea. Because the Ukrainian Kozaks were always the enemies of Turks and Tartars, and because they constantly harassed Crimea, a Turkish vassal state, as well as Turkey proper, the Ottomans hoped to win them over by supporting anti-Russian and anti-Polish feelings in Ukraine and thus diverting the Kozak attacks from herself and Crimea.

Prior to this, in 1667, the Turks dispatched a special naval expedition into Ukraine and demanded that the Tsar punish the Kozaks, who were causing havoc in the Ottoman-controlled areas.¹⁴ By 1668, after the Treaty of Andrusovo became known, however, their attitude was reversed and they now sought avenues by which they could cooperate with the Zaporozhians. The Treaty of Andrusovo, as it was already pointed out, divided Ukraine into two parts. With the end of Polish-Russian hostilities the Sultan feared a possible rapprochement between the two former enemies. Thus this treaty threatened Turkish plans of aggression in the west and in the north. Turkey now more than ever before needed a strong buffer state to separate her from Russia.¹⁵

When Doroshenko's envoys approached the Sultan with the proposi-

tion of accepting Ukraine under his protection, he was more than willing to do so. Mohammed IV saw the many advantages that could be gained from such an arrangement. He would not only create a buffer state against Russia, but he would also receive an ally who could provide troops, revenue, new converts to Islam, and, most important of all, could eliminate Kozak attacks on Turkey and Crimea.

Although Turkey was pleased with Doroshenko's overtures, the Crimean Tartars followed a policy of their own. Unlike Turkey they did not want to see Ukraine as a Turkish vassal state. They had hoped that Ukraine would pass under their influence. Once the arrangement between Ukraine and Turkey was worked out, however, Crimea had to submit to the wishes of the Sultan. This occurred only after the removal of several anti-Doroshenko Khans.

DOROSHENKO BECOMES THE VASSAL OF MOHAMMED IV

At the time that Doroshenko became vassal of the Sublime Porte he did not end discussions with either the Poles or the Russians. Moscow offered Doroshenko full backing and wished to extend her "protectorate" over Ukraine.¹⁶ Doroshenko realized, of course, what the Muscovites were attempting to do. He demanded that the Russians withdraw their garrisons and live up to their treaties. As is obvious, nothing came of these talks because neither was willing to yield. The Poles, however, did not lose hope. They were aware of the fact that since 1666 Doroshenko had had secret discussions with the Turks. In 1667, Zlotnicki and Lichoviezki, Polish envoys to the Porte, wrote: "Kozak envoys arrived in Bakchesarai in the person of Iarosh and a translator from Uman bringing letters from Doroshenko."¹⁷

Jan Sobieski, the Polish military leader, in his correspondence with Doroshenko urged him to join the Poles. Doroshenko suggested a plan in which he asked that the Poles return the old privileges of the Kozaks, recognize the Orthodox Church as equal with the Catholic Church, and grant other concessions. Being a diplomat, Doroshenko always gave both the Russians and Poles a faint hope that favourable terms could be worked out. After Briukhovetskyi's death Doroshenko wrote a letter to the Poles which gives one the idea that he is a protector of Polish interests. In this letter he stated:

In the meantime, in the name of God I am going against Moscow and will watch carefully so that we can expel the enemy from the King's lands and turn them over into the hands of the King.¹⁸

This letter was written after several conflicts had already taken place between the Poles and the Ukrainians. In 1668, one year before

Doroshenko became a vassal of Turkey, Sobieski was already aware of Doroshenko's designs. In one of his letters he wrote: "From the Kozaks we can expect no help because Doroshenko has already given himself under Turkish protection."¹⁹

After Doroshenko defeated Sukhovii, the Poles then elevated Khanenko, an opportunist, to the post of Hetman of Zaporozhia. As will be shown later, this caused Doroshenko to carry on a war with both Poland and Khanenko at the same time.

Since 1666, Doroshenko looked toward Wallachia and Moldavia and was impressed with the amount of freedom that they had as vassals of the Sultan. In 1668, therefore, Doroshenko sent a special envoy to Constantinople offering the Sultan his fealty and submission to his wishes. The envoy presented a draft of the terms under which Ukraine was to become a vassal state of Turkey. This draft was based on almost the same ideas that Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi formulated during the "War of Liberation."²⁰ Lukas Bukryevych and Colonel Bilohrud of Uman, vested with extraordinary powers, laid down before the Sultan the following formula:

1. The Ukrainian leaders and officers pledge themselves to fight the enemy of the Turks.
2. The Ukrainian Hetman will stand on the Sultan's side when asked to do so or when the situation warrants it.
3. Religion should not be sufficient reason for not fighting on the side of the Turks.
4. The Hetman promises to stop the attacks of the Zaporozhian Kozaks against Turkey and her vassal states.
5. Receiving the battle flag and the "bulava" (a sign of authority — just like a sceptre) from the Sultan does not mean complete subjugation to the Turks.
6. Tartar soldiers are to aid Kozaks under the command of the Hetman.
7. The Turks guarantee the safety of towns and villages from pillage.
8. The Orthodox religion will be respected and Mosques will not be built in Ukraine.
9. The Turk and Tartar armies are forbidden to obtain food supplies by force. The Hetman will designate the towns in which the Turks and Tartars can make their encampments.
10. Ukraine is permitted to have foreign relations with other countries.
11. No peace terms may be signed with Poland or Muscovy without the knowledge of the Hetman of Ukraine.
12. Hetman Doroshenko is to be guaranteed rule over Ukraine.

13. Ukrainian boundaries are to be extended to Visla in the west, to Putivil and Sivsk in the east, and to the Niman River in the north.
14. Elections of the Hetman are to be free, and the Turks pledge themselves not to remove the Hetman.
15. Guarantees of the freedom of religion, language, courts, and taxation.²¹

Upon the acceptance of these requests the envoys swore fealty to the Sultan before the Patriarch of Constantinople in the name of Doroshenko. The Patriarch declared that anyone fighting against Doroshenko or not listening to him would be excluded from the Orthodox Church.²² Mohammed IV then dispatched a force of 6,000 Janissaries into Ukraine under Islam Ekman.²³ Demetrius Centemer, a former prince of Moldavia, described the first meeting of Hetman Doroshenko and Sultan Mohammed IV in these words:

Among these was the Hetman himself, Doroshenko, whom the Sultan graciously receives, presents with a robe, and dismisses adorned with a Tug (horse tail) and Alem Sanjak in token of dominion, with a command to put an end to the robberies committed sometimes by the Kozaks even in the suburbs of Constantinople, to remain faithful to the Ottoman Empire, and turn their arms, hitherto very often pernicious to the Mussulmans, against their enemies. On the other hand, he promises, in case of war between them and the Poles or Muscovites, to assist them with all his forces and protect them from hostilities.²⁴

Thus with the exchange of pledges between Hetman Doroshenko and Sultan Mohammed IV, Ukraine and the Ottoman Empire entered into a hitherto unforeseeable alliance and proceeded to write a new chapter in the turbulent history of Ukraine.

THE FIRST PHASE OF THE WAR WITH POLAND (1667-1672)

The Turko-Ukrainian alliance at first was not as favourable as may be assumed. The alliance was entered into in 1669. Previous to this date Turkey had been afraid to embroil or commit herself in this part of Europe. At this time she was fighting a war with Venice, and there was a danger of Persian intervention.²⁵ She did, however, dispatch groups of Janissaries which were to aid Doroshenko in his anti-Polish campaigns. Prior to the alliance Doroshenko was beset with an internal power struggle between himself and leaders who were self-proclaimed Hetmans (Mnohorishny) or those who were supported by the Tartars (Sukhovii) or the Poles (Khanenko).

Aware of Doroshenko's motives, Poland started troop movements into Ukraine and attempted to strengthen her garrisons. She hoped to break up Turko-Ukrainian negotiations through promises of concessions. Little came of this, however; but after 1667, when Sukhovii gave up his rights as Hetman of Zaporozhia to Khanenko, the latter allied himself with the Poles in return for much smaller concessions than those demanded by Doroshenko or Mnohohrishny.²⁶

Now, before the actual fall of Sukhovii, Doroshenko allied himself with the Bilhorod Tartars and the Nogai Tartars, both of which paid direct allegiance to the Sultan. The Crimean Tartars, however, pursuing an independent policy, supported Sukhovii and dispatched a 100,000-man army to his assistance. Doroshenko for a while faced certain defeat near Zhovti Vody. Help arrived from an unexpected quarter, however. Sirko, the "Koshovyi" (commander of the Sich) of the Zaporozhian Sich, an ardent enemy of the Tartars, attacked them, and together with Doroshenko's brother Hryhorii, inflicted heavy losses on the Crimean Tartars.²⁷ Suchovii then laid down the "bulava" (symbol of power) and Doroshenko became Hetman of Zaporozhia.

After these developments Doroshenko wrote to the Sultan, with whom talks had already begun, and complained about the Crimean Tartar designs in Ukraine. The Crimean Tartars, as already pointed out, were not in favour of a Ukrainian-Turkish-dominated vassal state. They hoped that Ukraine would become a Tartar vassal state, or at least a no-man's land upon which Tartar hordes could enrich themselves as they had done in the past. The Sultan, upon receiving Doroshenko's letter, ordered Khan Adel-Girey removed for his attempts to negate Turkish policy in Ukraine.²⁸

In 1667, in Crimea there were two parties of "murzas." One group was led by Islam-Aga, the son of the former ruler Sefer-kasi-aga who supported a pro-Russian orientation. The other group, which was much stronger, was headed by the "murzas" of Shyryn-bey.²⁹ This group, after the murder of Muhamat-aga, the envoy to the Sich, urged a war against Russia and recognized Doroshenko as Hetman of Ukraine. Doroshenko, seeing the conflict between the two parties and a change of Tartar attitude, signed a treaty with them and thereby gained an alliance.

It must be recalled that at this time (1668) Briukhovetskyi and Sirko had revolted against Russian encroachments. After Briukhovetskyi's unfortunate death Doroshenko was able to unite Ukraine. This unity was lost, however, once he and his armies left for the Right Bank, where the Poles had already initiated an attack. The self-appointed Hetman Mnohohrishny of the Left Bank was dealt with in 1671, when Doroshenko, allied with the Silistrian Pasha, inflicted a tremendous rout on his supporters.

With the aid of the Tartars Doroshenko now proceeded to eject the Poles from Ukrainian lands. The Poles hoped to strengthen their positions in Ukraine and to carry out the provisions of the Treaty of Andrusovo. Their attempts were frustrated, however. After many encounters with the Poles the Ukrainians advanced into Galicia with an army of 24,000 Kozaks, 3,000 Janissaries, and many Tartars.³⁰ Field Marshall Sobieski was surrounded by the united armies near Pidhaici, but once again Sirko frustrated Doroshenko's plans. He made an attack on Perekop and northern Crimea and in this way created a diversionary action which enabled Sobieski to exploit this situation. The Tartars, who throughout history were very unreliable allies, now started independent peace negotiations with the Poles. This in effect put the Kozaks in a very unfavourable situation. They were therefore forced to sign the Treaty of Pidhaici, which stipulated that Doroshenko and the Kozaks were to remain under the Polish king, the Polish landowners were free to return to their estates, the Polish army was not to enter the Kozak territory, and the garrison of Bila Cerkva was to be reduced.³¹

This left Doroshenko very much dissatisfied with the Tartar alliance. He even thought of a rapprochement with Moscow, but since the Russians had suffered a setback in Ukraine they were unwilling to work with an independent leader such as Doroshenko, and instead gave their support to Mnohorishnyi.³²

Although the Treaty of Pidhaici was signed, it was never implemented. The Kozaks now laughed about the stipulation that the Polish landowners could return to their property. By this the Ukrainians made their point — that the Treaty of Andrusovo would not be carried out and that the Poles would not be permitted to set foot on Kozak land.³³

After 1669 and the Turko-Ukrainian alliance, Doroshenko continued his attempt to clear Ukraine of Polish and Russian influence. He defeated Khanenko and in 1671 destroyed Mnohorishnyi's army with the aid of the Silistrian Pasha. The Poles now began to feel quite insecure with Doroshenko's position as vassal of Turkey. Korowski, who in the middle of May of 1671 returned from a visit with the Pasha of Silistria, advised the following:

If you want peace with the Porte, and to protect yourself from Tartar attacks, you have to completely abandon Ukraine and the Kozaks, and you must stop regarding them as the Emperor's (Polish) serfs. Let not the foot of your armies tread there.³⁴

Now that Doroshenko became a vassal of Turkey he once more asked the Poles, who initiated the peace discussions, that they return confiscated Orthodox churches, return Braclav and Kiev, give back money that they got from Hetman Teteria, grant amnesty to the

Kozaks, and recognize Doroshenko. Sobieski urged the Polish Seim to accept Doroshenko's demands but the Poles refused.³⁵

The Turks, now regarding Ukraine as their vassal state, felt that the Poles were treading on Ottoman Sovereignty by setting foot in this part of the Ottoman Empire. Thus the ground was laid for a Turko-Polish War.

THE SECOND PHASE OF THE WAR WITH POLAND (1672-1681)

Now that Turkey's hands became free of other wars, Sultan Mohammed IV made the following declaration, in which he admonished the Poles for attacking the Kozaks who had taken refuge under the "shadow of our wings." He urged the Poles to: "Withdraw thy unjust hand from the Kozaks, recall your troops from their borders and beg our pardon." He further threatened them in the following manner: "Our law denounces against thee, death, against thy kingdom, devastation, against thy people, bonds."³⁶ Two years before this declaration, war had once again broken out between Poland and Ukraine. Doroshenko once more signed a treaty with the Crimean Tartars. Sirko, to prevent the union of the armies of the Khan and Doroshenko, with the aid of Khanenko attacked Crimea and made the Tartars pledge to forsake Doroshenko and work against him.³⁷ This event caused the Turks to remove Mahmed Girey from office.

Thus with the Crimean Tartars isolated, Doroshenko with 4,000 Turks and Tartars and 5,000 Kalmuks took the town of Uman. To provide security for the Crimean Tartars the Turks now built a fortress at Shah Kerman near the Dnieper River area. In 1671 Doroshenko, together with Crimean and Bilohorod Tartars, as well as 1,000 Spahis, together numbering 40,000 troops, battled the Poles at Lysanka.³⁸ The results of the battle, however, were inconclusive. In the same year in December, Doroshenko managed to secure a victory against the Poles in the Battle of Trostianets. In July of 1672, Doroshenko once again defeated the Polish army near Chetvertynsk. From there he marched to meet the Sultan, who was moving through Moldavia.

On August 27, 1672, the Turkish army reached the area of Kamenets-Podilskyi and there united with Doroshenko. Together the united armies numbered approximately 300,000 men.³⁹ The Turkish forces were commanded by Kaphan-pasha-Kalebi and the Tartars were led by Selim Girey. After the conquest of the fortress of Kamenets Podilskyi, the united armies occupied all of Podolia and exacted tribute from the besieged city of Lviv. The Sultan's armies soon reached Buchachiv and the Poles sued for peace.

By the Treaty of Buchachiv the Poles promised to pay 25,000 ducats, give up Podolia, abandon Polish fortresses and forty-eight

towns in Ukraine and to "account as friends the Kozaks under Doroshenko, and never more quarrel with them."⁴⁰ After this treaty was signed the Turkish army, convinced that the Poles would honour the treaty, left Ukraine. The Polish Seim, however, refused to honour this treaty and in 1673 hostilities were resumed. In that year a battle between the Poles and Turks took place but the results were inconclusive. In 1674 the Sultan dispatched yet another army under Kaphan-Pasha and captured the city of Khotyn. Doroshenko now advised the Turks to take the Zaporozhian Sich. Three thousand Janissaries were dispatched but the attempt proved to be a failure.⁴¹ In 1675 the Turks and Tartars were pushed out from the Lviv area, and in the same year the Russians advanced into the Right Bank. Sirko once again attacked Crimea. The pro-Doroshenko forces were weakened with the withdrawal of the Tartars, who once again retreated to the Crimea Peninsula.

In 1675 Doroshenko, with most of his army no longer behind him, withdrew to Chyhyryn, the capital of Ukraine, and continued to resist for three years. Sirko now approached Doroshenko and asked him to remain Hetman of Ukraine. Although most of the officers were for Doroshenko, the Tsar reprimanded Sirko and did not recognize the oath that Doroshenko had given Sirko and the Kozak officers.⁴²

With Doroshenko's capitulation the Turks were reluctant to see all their gains lost. In 1677 they therefore brought back Iurii Khmelnytskyi from the monastery in Constantinople and proclaimed him "Duke of Little Russia."⁴³ In this year they planned to take Chyhyryn so as to establish a base of operations, but this proved a failure. After suffering a defeat in this area at the hands of Hetman Samoilovych, who now ruled in place of Mnohohrishnyi, the Turks signed a treaty of peace with Russia in 1681. By this treaty they forced to give up their interests in western Ukraine.

CONCLUSION

To the very end Doroshenko retained the sympathy and support of the people who understood his intentions. It can be said that Hetman Doroshenko at no time retreated from his position. All through his rule he loyally followed in the footsteps of Hetman Khmelnytskyi and Vyhovskyi. Unlike his opponents Khanenko, Sukhovii, and Mnohohrishnyi, Doroshenko worked for the good of the country. Belatedly, even Sirko realized this and offered his support, but his realization and support came too late, for by his attacks on Crimea he was perhaps most responsible for the defeat of Doroshenko.

Another factor that caused the fall of Doroshenko was the Orthodox faith. The Ukrainian Kozaks could not reconcile themselves with

the Turks. It was beyond their comprehension that the "Defenders of Orthodoxy" could join the "Busurman" (infidel) in a struggle against fellow Christians. The havoc that was caused by the Turks and Tartars while in Ukraine was also partly responsible for Doroshenko's fall. The Turks, disregarding their promises, built mosques and committed atrocities. The Tartars dragged thousands of people into slavery. On their way back from the siege of Lviv, for instance, the Tartars burned thirty-six towns and took the whole population of these towns into bondage.⁴⁴

The defeat of Doroshenko and attempts to place Iurii Khmelnytskyi in his place by the Turks brought about more shedding of blood. In 1678 the Turks once again attacked Chyhyryn and at the order of the Grand Vizir burned it to the ground.⁴⁵ The fall of Chyhyryn became a symbol of the downfall of Kozak Ukraine to many contemporaries. One contemporary historian, Velychko, summarizes very well not only the destruction of Chyhyryn but also of Ukraine in the following lines: "And so fell and disappeared the beautiful Kozak Ukraine like unto ancient Babylon, the mighty city . . . because of their discord the Kozaks fell and all perished, having fought one against the other."⁴⁶

But it would be incorrect to maintain that any one factor was responsible for the destruction of the Ukrainian-Kozak State. Clearly, as one examines the events in Ukraine from 1648 up to the beginning of the 18th century, one notices that a prominent role in Ukraine is played by three of Europe's most powerful political entities: the Ottoman Empire, the Muscovite state, and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Thus Ukraine during this time was the crossroad of Empires. Each one of these states then saw to it that the political equilibrium that existed under B. Khmelnytskyi should not be restored. Deprived of Khmelnytskyi's strong leadership the Kozak Host vacillated between different political orientations. This vacillation was to the advantage of the above-enumerated powers who in singular combat against the Kozak army, Poland and Russia especially, could not withstand the elemental force unleashed by the Ukrainian War of Liberation.

It is of significance, if one examines the orientations and politics of the Hetmans of Ukraine, that most of them had pro-Polish or pro-Turkish sympathies. It is also significant that even the insignificant number of pro-Russian Hetmans, in most cases, abandoned and fought against the Russians.

Finally, it must be again pointed out that Russia gained the upper hand in Ukraine not because of the 1654 Pereiaslav Agreement, which remained a dead letter after the Andrusovo Truce of 1667 between Russia and Poland, but because it became the predominant military Power in this area after 1681.

NOTES ON THE RUIN — SÉQUEL TO THE PEREIASLAV AGREEMENT

- 1) Ivan Krypiakevych, *Ohlad Istorii Ukrainy*, (Kyiv: Vernyhora, 1919), p. 43.
- 2) *Ibid.*, p. 46.
- 3) *Ibid.*, p. 46.
- 4) *Ibid.*, p. 48
- 5) *Ibid.*, p. 49.
- 6) Ivan Krypiakevych, *Hetman Petro Doroshenko*, (Lviv: Dilo, 1925), p. 3.
- 7) Krypiakevych, *op. cit.*, p. 51.
- 8) O. M. Apanovych, *Zaporizska Sich u Borotbi z Turecko-Tatarskoiu Agre-sieu* (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo Akademii Nauk Ukrainskoi R.S.R., 1961). p. 208.
- 9) Georgi Konyskyo, *Istoria Rusiv*, (New York: Vydavnytstvo "Visnyk" OCSU, 1956), p. 224.
- 10) *Ibid.*, p. 224.
- 11) *Ibid.*, p. 226.
- 12) *Ibid.*, p. 224.
- 13) Apanovych, *op. cit.*, p. 218.
- 14) *Ibid.*, p. 212.
- 15) *Ibid.*, p. 216.
- 16) Krypiakevych, *Ohlad Istorii Ukrainy, op. cit.*, p. 52.
- 17) Oleh Cylevych, *Prychynky do Znosyn Petra Doroshenka z Polshcheiu w 1670-2*, (Z.N.T.S. 1898), p. 7.
- 18) *Ibid.*, p. 9.
- 19) *Ibid.*, p. 10.
- 20) Dmytro Doroshenko, *History of the Ukraine*. (Edmonton, Canada: The Institute Press Ltd., 1939), p. 308.
- 21) Apanovych, *op. cit.*, p. 228.
- 22) Konysko, *op. cit.*, p. 228.
- 23) Demetrius Centemir, *The History of the Growth and Decay of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1683*, (London: James. John and Paul Knopton, 1734), p. 263.
- 24) *Ibid.*, p. 228.
- 25) Apanovych, *op. cit.*, p. 227.
- 26) Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, p. 10.
- 27) Apanovych, *op. cit.*, p. 218.
- 28) *Ibid.*, p. 234.
- 29) Krypiakevych, *Hetman Petro Doroshenko, op. cit.*, p. 6.
- 31) Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, p. 303.
- 32) Apanovych, *op. cit.*, p. 273.
- 33) Krypiakevych, *Hetman Doroshenko, op. cit.*, p. 7.
- 34) Cylevych, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
- 35) *Ibid.*, p. 24.
- 36) Centemir, *op. cit.*, p. 264.
- 37) Apanovych, *op. cit.*, p. 241.

38) *Ibid.*, p. 250.

39) *Ibid.*, p. 253.

40) Centemir, *op. cit.*, p. 264.

41) Apanovych, *op. cit.*, p. 260.

42) *Ibid.*, p. 274.

43) *Ibid.*, p. 275.

44) V. A. Holobucky, *Zaporozhskoe Kozachestvo*, (Kiev: Hosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo politicheskoi literatury U.S.S.R., 1957), p. 319.

45) Apanovych, *op. cit.*, p. 312.

46) Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, p. 312.

47) *Ibid.*, p. 321.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF EVENTS

- 1482 — First great raid of the Crimean Tartars against Ukraine
- 1497 — Crimean Tartars become vassals of Ottoman Turkey
- 1510 — The seizure of Pskov by Muscovy
- 1514 — The conquest of Smolensk by Muscovy
- 1517 — Muscovy annexes Ryazan
- 1552 — Muscovy seizes Kazan
- 1556 — The Muscovites take Astrakhan
- 1569 — Union of Lublin between Lithuania and Poland
- 1591-1593 — Revolt of Khrystofor Kosynskyi against Poland
- 1604-1608 — Kozak Revolts against Poland
- 1606 — Kozaks take Varna, Bulgaria
- 1614 — Kozaks destroy Trebizond and Sinope
- 1615 — Turkish Danubian fleet destroyed by Kozaks
- 1615 — Kozaks destroy suburb of Istanbul
- 1616 — Kozaks take Kafa, a slave center
- 1633 — Mohyla Academy founded in Kyiev
- 1637 — Pavliuk's Revolt against Poland
- 1648-1654 — Ukrainian War of Liberation
- 1648 — Battle of Zhovti Vody: Kozaks defeat Poles
- 1648 — Battle of Korsun; Khmelnytskyi defeats Polish forces
- 1648 — Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi first contacts the Muscovite Tsar
- 1651 — Battle of Berestechko
- 1651 — The Bilocerkiivskyi Agreement
- 1654 — Treaty of Pereiaslav
- 1654 — March Statutes: The Tsar confirmed the Pereiaslav Agreement
- 1656 — Khmelnytskyi seeks Swedish alliance
- 1656 — Vilno Agreement, forerunner of the Andrusovo Truce
- 1657 — Death of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi
- 1657 — The Korsun Agreement between Sweden and Ukraine
- 1659 — Battle of Konotop. Hetman I. Vyhovsky defeats the Russian Army
- 1659 — The Second Treaty of Pereiaslav: A falsification of the first
- 1661 — Hetman Iurii Khmelnytskyi defeats Russian army near Buzhyn

- 1663 — Iurii Khmelnytskyi abdicates and becomes a monk
- 1663 — Pavlo Teteria elected Hetman of Right Bank Ukraine
- 1663 — Treaty of Baturyn
- 1663 — Little Russian Prikaz established
- 1663 — Ivan Sirko leads revolt against Russia
- 1665 — Treaty of Moscow
- 1666 — Pereiaslav Revolt
- 1666 — Petro Doroshenko elected Hetman of Right Bank Ukraine
- 1667 — The Andrusovo Armistice
- 1667 — Hetman Doroshenko seeks alliance with Ottoman Turkey
- 1667-1681 — Ukrainian War against Poland
- 1668 — The Pereiaslav Revolt
- 1668 — The Hadiach Agreement signed between Ukraine and the Polish Commonwealth
- 1669 — Ukraine becomes a vassal state of Turkey
- 1670-1671 — Revolt of Stenka Razin against Russia
- 1671 — Battle of Trostianets. Poles defeated by Doroshenko
- 1672 — Battle near Chetvertynsk. Poles defeated by Doroshenko forces
- 1672 — Fall of Kamenets Podilsky to Doroshenko
- 1672 — Treaty of Buchach
- 1675 — Muscovites move to Right Bank Ukraine
- 1676 — Ivan Samoilovich becomes Hetman of the Right and Left Bank
- 1677 — Iurii Khmelnytskyi becomes “Duke of Little Russia” under Turkish protection
- 1681 — Turks abandon their plans in Ukraine
- 1681 — Iurii Khmelnytskyi executed by Turks
- 1683 — Kozaks take part in defeating Turks near Vienna
- 1686 — Eternal Peace between Poland and Muscovy
- 1687 — Samoilovich’s Campaign against Crimea
- 1687 — Mazepa elected Hetman of the Left Bank Ukraine
- 1689 — Mazepa’s Campaign against Crimea
- 1692 — Treaty of Alliance between the Crimean Tartars and Petryk Ivanenko
- 1696 — Muscovy takes Azov with Kozak aid
- 1700 — Russia gets Azov by Treaty of Constantinople
- 1704 — Mazepa regains Left Bank Ukraine
- 1707 — Revolt of Bulavin against Moscow

- 1708 — Alliance between Sweden and Ukraine
- 1709 — Peter's Ukaz on the Ukrainian language
- 1709 — Polish-Ukrainian Alliance
- 1709 — Battle of Poltava
- 1710 — The Bendery Constitution
- 1710 — Pylyp Orlyk becomes Hetman after Mazepa's death
- 1713 — Peter I officially renames Muscovy by adopting the name Russia for his Empire
- 1739 — Treaty of Belgrade — Russia gains Black Sea coast
- 1740-1748 — Censuses taken in Ukraine reveal high degree of learning in that area
- 1754 — University of Moscow founded
- 1764 — The Ukrainian Hetmanate abolished by Catherine II
- 1768 — Koliivschyna — revolt against Poland in Right Bank Ukraine; crushed by Russian troops
- 1772 — First Partition of Poland
- 1773-1774 — The Pugachov Uprising
- 1775 — Zaporozhian Sich destroyed
- 1776 — American Revolution
- 1781 — Ukraine incorporated into the Russian Empire
- 1783 — Legal confirmation of serfdom in Ukraine
- 1786 — Russia annexes Crimea
- 1793 — Second Partition of Poland
- 1795 — Third Partition of Poland
- 1799 — Revolt against Moscow in Katerynoslav
- 1801 — Russia begins conquest of the Caucasus
- 1804 — Ukaz forbidding teaching in the Ukrainian language
- 1807 — Revolt against Russia in Kyiev
- 1809 — Russia conquers Finland
- 1812 — Russia annexes Bessarabia
- 1814-1833 — Revolt of Ustym Karmaluk
- 1821 — Greek Liberation War
- 1815-1855 — Austria becomes the Gendarme of Europe
- 1831-1833 — Polish Insurrection
- 1840 — Peasant Rebellion against Russia
- 1848 — Peasant Revolt against Russia
- 1849 — Hungarian uprising crushed by Russia

- 1859 — Surrender of Shamil ends the Russian conquest of the Caucasus
- 1861 — Emancipation of Peasants in the Russian Empire
- 1863 — Valuiev Ukaz denies existence of Ukrainian language
- 1863-1864 — Revolt in Poland
- 1876 — Emsky Ukaz forbade Ukrainian Sunday schools
- 1897 — Census discloses that Ukrainians are most illiterate in the Russian Empire
- 1905 — Revolution in the Russian Empire
- 1913 — Meeting of the Fourth State Duma
- 1917 — February Revolution in the Russian Empire
- 1917 — October Revolution
- 1917-1921 — Ukrainian War of Independence
- 1918 — January 22 — Ukraine proclaims its independence
- 1919 — January 22 — Union of Western and Eastern Ukraine into one independent republic
- 1922-1928 — The New Economic Policy coincides with Ukrainization in Ukraine
- 1932-1933 — The “Stalin Famine” in Ukraine. 6 to 8 million starve
- 1941-1945 — The Great Fatherland War (W. W. II)
- 1947 — Decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (bolshevik) of Ukraine declared the history of the peoples of the USSR a unified process
- 1954 — Several of Taras Shevchenko’s poems forbidden
- 1954 — 300th Anniversary of the signing of the Pereiaslav Agreement
- 1956 — XX Congress of the Communist Party — Destalinization
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G L O S S A R Y

- AN-Ukr. SSR** — Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
- Bendery Constitution** — Constitution promulgated by the exiled successor of Mazepa Hetman Pylyp Orlyk in 1710 in Bendery.
- bourgeois** — a person of middle rank or class in society. Among communists, a person with private property interests.
- boyar** — a nobleman, magnate or lord. This title was originally used in the ancient Ukrainian-Rus state and later by the Russians.
- bulava** — mace; staff of power used by the Hetman of Ukraine.
- busurman** — refers to Moslems and was a derogatory term meaning infidel. It is a corrupt form of the word Musulman or Moslem.
- CCCP(b)U** — Central Committee of the Communist Party (bolshevik) of Ukraine.
- Central Rada** — Ukrainian government established after the February Revolution and overthrow of the Tsar.
- Chaika** — a Kozak boat used extensively in sea raids against the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Tartars. The name of the boat originates from the seagull.
- chauvinism** — a sick form of patriotism or jingoism.
- chern** — the black or common people; peasants who participated in the War of Liberation (1648-1654) and were not part of the Kozak Army.
- Crimean Tartars** — Tartars settled on the Crimean Peninsula who after breaking away from the Golden Horde became vassals of Ottoman Turkey. After W. W. II they were resettled into the interior of the Soviet Union for betraying the "fatherland."
- CPSU** — Communist Party of the Soviet Union
- cult of the individual** — term used for that period of time during which Stalin dominated politics and policy in the Soviet Union. The term gained prominence after Stalin's death and the XX Congress of the Communist Party in 1956.
- Don Kozaks** — Kozaks who reside on the Don River and who initiated several large uprisings against the Russian Empire.
- duma** — Kozak ballads sung by troubadors known as kobzars.

feudalism — a political system which evolved in Medieval Europe and depended upon the interrelationship between lord and vassal. Feudal lords were powerful land magnates who for all practical purposes were independent of the king and central authority and exacted duties and obligations from peasants living on their estates.

gubernia — a province in Imperial Russia.

Halychyna — the proper Ukrainian name for Galicia, an area in Western Ukraine.

Janissaries — a body of Turkish soldiers, at first recruited from slaves, who made up the best fighting units in the Ottoman army.

Kalmuks or Kalmyks — a Tartar people who in the 17th century defeated the Nogai Tartars.

Khan's Ukraine — territory in southern Ukraine between the Boh and Dnister rivers. Part of the Crimean Khanate, the area had its own Hetman who was appointed by the Khan.

Koliivschyna — Revolt of Ukrainian peasants against Poland in 1768. Beginning in the Uman area the revolt subsequently spread to Russian territories. The Tsarist government co-operated with Poland in destroying the insurgents. The term Koliivschyna originates from the word *kolii*, weapons used by the peasants.

Koshovyi — chief of the Zaporozhian Kozaks. Kish was the military encampment of the Kozaks and thus the leader was called Koshovyi.

Kozaks — Ukrainian warriors who settled on the Left Bank of Ukraine and fought against Polish, Muscovite and Turko-Tartar oppression. The word *kozak* has its origins in the Turkic language and means "a free person."

Kyievan Rus — The ancient Ukrainian state with its center at Kyiev, presently the capital of the Ukrainian SSR.

latifundia — a large landed estate.

manor — a small area of land, usually an estate, peopled mainly by serfs. This was a system by which medieval man obtained economic subsistence.

Mazepynovites — originates from the name of Hetman Ivan Mazepa who allied with Sweden against Russia. The term was used to describe a person who wished to liberate Ukraine from Russia.

mercantilism — the system of public economy developed in Europe upon the decay of the feudal system, the policy of which was to secure a favourable balance of trade, to develop agri-

culture and manufactures, to create a merchant marine, and to establish foreign trading monopolies.

messianism (Russian) — a conviction that Providence had chosen the Russian nation to play an important (almost redeeming) role in history.

mischanin (meschanyn in the text) — urban dwellers; petty-bourgeois.

Muscovy — the old name for Russia prior to the reign of Peter the Great. It was Peter who first decreed that the name Russia be used in place of Muscovy. Out of this change comes the semantic confusion which treats Rus and Russia as being one and the same political entity.

Musulmans — adherents of Islam; Moslems.

narod — nation, people or populace. Under communism the word is primarily used to mean toiling masses or peoples.

Nationalist-bourgeois — those elements in any society, according to Soviet sources, who aspire to create a national state whose economy is based on capitalism.

N.E.P. — New Economic Policy (1921-1928) adopted by Lenin after the Kronstadt Rebellion and peasant resistance to communism.

Nogai Tartars — emerged as an independent group after the collapse of the Golden Horde. Established an independent state near the Volga River, the Caspian, and the Ural Mountains. Often, like the Crimean Tartars, raided Ukrainian territories.

“onto the shield” — Originating in Sparta, the term was used to describe the honours accorded dead Spartan warriors. Brave warriors and heroes killed in the battle were brought from the battlefield on their shields.

peredyshka — breathing space. Usually used to describe a temporary retreat from the avowed goals of communism.

pokozachennia — a word describing the transformation of lower classes, usually peasants, into the Kozak ranks or class.

polky — military regiments as well as administrative districts in Ukraine after the War of Liberation.

Porte — The government of the Turkish Empire, officially called the Sublime Porte, from the gate (port) of the Sultan's palace at which justice was administered.

Prison of Nations — term first used by Lenin to describe Imperial Russia.

proletariat — the industrial working class.

pryiednannia — annexation.

- Rada** — a legislative or deliberating body.
- radianska** — originating from the Ukrainian word “rada” or council. The word is equivalent to the Russian term “soviet.”
- reactionary** — one who wishes to return to an older order. One who favours reaction, especially in politics or policy.
- registered Kozaks** — organized in Ukraine by the Polish government to defend the Commonwealth from Turko-Tartar invasions. Ukrainians serving as registered Kozaks were freed from feudal obligations, elected their own officers, and had their own courts. They served the state at their own expense. Usually the registry was limited by the Polish government to 20 or 30 thousand men.
- Ruin** — the period in Ukrainian history encompassing the span of time from the death of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi in 1657 up to 1681 and the end of Turkish designs on Ukraine.
- Ruthenia** — Ancient name for Rus-Ukraine.
- samoderzhets** — an autocratic ruler; an absolute sovereign.
- shliakhta** — Polish aristocracy.
- sloboda** — an area settled by Ukrainian peasants and Kozaks. These settlements and their residents were for a time freed from feudal and other obligations.
- Social Democrats** — Those adhering to the teaching of Karl Marx.
- Spahi** — Turkish cavalry.
- starshyna** — collective name for military officers of the Kozak army and those who eventually held power in Ukraine after the War of Liberation.
- surplus value** — the term used by Karl Marx meaning profit.
- Ukrainianization** — a policy of retreat pursued by the Communist Party after its programs failed in Ukraine. This policy coincided with the N.E.P. in Russia proper (1921-1928).
- universal** — manifesto, decree, or proclamation.
- vassalage** — a territory held in political dependence. The Turks especially resorted to the vassalage system which provided autonomy to an area in return for homage and services. Several Balkan states as well as the Crimean Tartars were vassals of the Ottoman Empire.
- voievoda** — palatine; governor of a town or province. Could also refer to the chief of an army.
- volost** — a district including several villages.
- vozziednannia** — reunification.
- Zaporozhia** — the area beyond the Dnieper cataracts. Thus the Kozaks of this area are known as the Zaporozhian Kozaks and their center the Zaporozhian Sich.

APPENDIX I

UKRAINIAN DRAFT TREATY OF 1654.¹

A BYELORUSSIAN COPY OF THE ARTICLES SENT BY THE COSSACK ENVOYS SAMOYLO BOHDANOW AND PAVLO TETERYA ON THE 14th DAY OF MAY 1662 (A. D. 1654)

To Alexei Mikhailovich, by the grace of God Great Sovereign and Grand Duke, Autocrat of all Great and Little Russia, and the Sovereign and Ruler of many states:

We, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Hetman of the Cossack Army, the whole Cossack Army and the whole Christian Russian world humbly petition Your Tsarist Majesty.

We have been greatly pleased with the great reward and countless favours which Your Tsarist Majesty deigned to bestow upon us. We greet most humbly you, our Sovereign, and will serve forever Your Tsarist Majesty in all matters according to your orders. We only beg most earnestly, as we did in our letter, that Your Tsarist Majesty deign to grant us and show us His Sovereign favour in everything that our envoys will petition.

1. At the beginning deign, Your Tsarist Majesty, to confirm the rights and liberties which have been enjoyed from ancient times by the Cossack Army, including trial according to their own laws and privileges as to property rights, so that no voyevoda, boyar, or steward should interfere with their army courts and that they should be tried by their elders: where there are three Cossacks, two of them shall try the third one.

2. That the number of the Cossack Army should be fixed at 60,000, to be always at full strength.

3. That those of the gentry in Russia who have taken the oath of allegiance to you, our Great Sovereign, to Your Tsarist Majesty, according to Christ's immaculate commandment, retain their liberties and elect their elders to serve as officials with the courts and enjoy their properties and privileges, as they did under the Kings of Poland, so that other (peoples), seeing such favours of Your Tsarist Majesty, may also submit under the rule and under the exalted and mighty arm of Your Tsarist Majesty, together with the whole Christian

1) The "23 Articles" are the Ukrainian draft of the treaty with the Tsar of Muscovy; therefore they are reproduced here without the resolutions of the Boyarskaya Duma which are included in the Muscovite copy of this document. Also omitted is the final note of the Boyars concerning the return of Muscovite refugees.

- Rada** — a legislative or deliberating body.
- radianska** — originating from the Ukrainian word “rada” or council. The word is equivalent to the Russian term “soviet.”
- reactionary** — one who wishes to return to an older order. One who favours reaction, especially in politics or policy.
- registered Kozaks** — organized in Ukraine by the Polish government to defend the Commonwealth from Turko-Tartar invasions. Ukrainians serving as registered Kozaks were freed from feudal obligations, elected their own officers, and had their own courts. They served the state at their own expense. Usually the registry was limited by the Polish government to 20 or 30 thousand men.
- Ruin** — the period in Ukrainian history encompassing the span of time from the death of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi in 1657 up to 1681 and the end of Turkish designs on Ukraine.
- Ruthenia** — Ancient name for Rus-Ukraine.
- samoderzhets** — an autocratic ruler; an absolute sovereign.
- shliakhta** — Polish aristocracy.
- sloboda** — an area settled by Ukrainian peasants and Kozaks. These settlements and their residents were for a time freed from feudal and other obligations.
- Social Democrats** — Those adhering to the teaching of Karl Marx.
- Spahi** — Turkish cavalry.
- starshyna** — collective name for military officers of the Kozak army and those who eventually held power in Ukraine after the War of Liberation.
- surplus value** — the term used by Karl Marx meaning profit.
- Ukrainianization** — a policy of retreat pursued by the Communist Party after its programs failed in Ukraine. This policy coincided with the N.E.P. in Russia proper (1921-1928).
- universal** — manifesto, decree, or proclamation.
- vassalage** — a territory held in political dependence. The Turks especially resorted to the vassalage system which provided autonomy to an area in return for homage and services. Several Balkan states as well as the Crimean Tartars were vassals of the Ottoman Empire.
- voievoda** — palatine; governor of a town or province. Could also refer to the chief of an army.
- volost** — a district including several villages.
- vozziednannia** — reunification.
- Zaporozhia** — the area beyond the Dnieper cataracts. Thus the Kozaks of this area are known as the Zaporozhian Kozaks and their center the Zaporozhian Sich.

APPENDIX I

UKRAINIAN DRAFT TREATY OF 1654.¹

A BYELORUSSIAN COPY OF THE ARTICLES SENT BY THE COSSACK ENVOYS SAMOYLO BOHDANOW AND PAVLO TETERYA ON THE 14th DAY OF MAY 7162 (A. D. 1654)

To Alexei Mikhailovich, by the grace of God Great Sovereign and Grand Duke, Autocrat of all Great and Little Russia, and the Sovereign and Ruler of many states:

We, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Hetman of the Cossack Army, the whole Cossack Army and the whole Christian Russian world humbly petition Your Tsarist Majesty.

We have been greatly pleased with the great reward and countless favours which Your Tsarist Majesty deigned to bestow upon us. We greet most humbly you, our Sovereign, and will serve forever Your Tsarist Majesty in all matters according to your orders. We only beg most earnestly, as we did in our letter, that Your Tsarist Majesty deign to grant us and show us His Sovereign favour in everything that our envoys will petition.

1. At the beginning deign, Your Tsarist Majesty, to confirm the rights and liberties which have been enjoyed from ancient times by the Cossack Army, including trial according to their own laws and privileges as to property rights, so that no voyevoda, boyar, or steward should interfere with their army courts and that they should be tried by their elders: where there are three Cossacks, two of them shall try the third one.

2. That the number of the Cossack Army should be fixed at 60,000, to be always at full strength.

3. That those of the gentry in Russia who have taken the oath of allegiance to you, our Great Sovereign, to Your Tsarist Majesty, according to Christ's immaculate commandment, retain their liberties and elect their elders to serve as officials with the courts and enjoy their properties and privileges, as they did under the Kings of Poland, so that other (peoples), seeing such favours of Your Tsarist Majesty, may also submit under the rule and under the exalted and mighty arm of Your Tsarist Majesty, together with the whole Christian

1) The "23 Articles" are the Ukrainian draft of the treaty with the Tsar of Muscovy; therefore they are reproduced here without the resolutions of the Boyarskaya Duma which are included in the Muscovite copy of this document. Also omitted is the final note of the Boyars concerning the return of Muscovite refugees.

world. Rural and town courts should be directed by officials chosen voluntarily by themselves, as before. Also those of the gentry who invested their money in leased property should either have their money returned or be allowed to use the properties till the lease expires.

4. That in towns the officials be chosen among our people who are worthy of it and who shall direct and rule the subjects of Your Tsarist Majesty and collect due revenue for the treasury of Your Tsarist Majesty honestly.

5. That the district of Chyhyryn, which was assigned to the Hetman's mace with everything that belongs to it, should now remain under its authority.

6. In case the Hetman should die (which God forbid) — for all men are mortal and this is inevitable — that the Cossack Army be allowed to elect (a new) Hetman among themselves and by themselves and notify His Tsarist Majesty and that he take no offence since this is an ancient custom with the Army.

7. That the properties of the Cossacks be not taken away from them and that those who own the land and its produce receive titles to these properties. That the children of the widows left by the Cossacks keep the liberties of their ancestors and fathers.

8. That the Secretary of the Army be assigned through the kindness of His Tsarist Majesty 1,000 Zloty (gold coins) for his clerks and a mill for their sustenance, since he has great expenditures.

9. That a mill be assigned for each colonel since they have great expenditures and, if such be the kindness of Your Tsarist Majesty, even more than that, according to the discretion of Your Tsarist Majesty.

10. That the justices of the Army should also be each assigned 300 Zloty and a mill, and the secretary of the court, 100 Zloty.

11. We also beg Your Tsarist Majesty that the essauls of the Army and those of each regiment, who are always busy in the service of the Army and cannot till land, be assigned a mill each.

12. Concerning the artillery of the Army, we beg Your Tsarist Majesty graciously to provide for the winter quarters and food of the cannoners and all the artillery workers; also 400 Zloty for the quartermaster (of the artillery).

13. That the ancient rights granted to both clergy and laymen by dukes and kings be not violated in any respect.

14. That the Hetman and the Cossack Army be free to receive the envoys who come to the Cossack Army from foreign countries with good intentions and that His Tsarist Majesty take no offence because of this; and in case there should be something adverse to His Tsarist Majesty, we should notify His Tsarist Majesty.

15. We should prefer that, as it is done with regard to tribute in

other countries, a specified amount be paid by those who belong to Your Tsarist Majesty; if, however, it cannot be done otherwise, then no voyevoda should be allowed to deal with these matters. (We suggest) that a voyevoda should be chosen among natives, a worthy man, who would deliver all that revenue honestly to His Tsarist Majesty.

16. Our envoys have been instructed to talk over this matter, because if a voyevoda should come and violate their rights and introduce (new) customs, it would be a great annoyance to them since they cannot soon grow accustomed to a different law and bear such burdens; and if officeholders should be natives, they will rule in accordance with local laws and customs.

17. Formerly the Polish Kings did not persecute our faith and oppress our liberties and all of us always enjoyed our liberties and therefore served (the King) faithfully; now, however, because of the violation of our liberties we have been forced to submit under the mighty and exalted arm of His Tsarist Majesty and our envoys have been instructed to beg earnestly that His Tsarist Majesty give us privileges written on parchment, with suspending seals, one (charter) for the liberties of the Cossacks and another one for those of the gentry, so that they remain inviolable forever. Having received these (charters), we shall ourselves check (the register) and whoever is a Cossack will enjoy Cossack privileges, while peasants shall fulfill their duties with respect to His Tsarist Majesty as before. Also (it should be stated) concerning all those who are subjects of His Tsarist Majesty what their rights and privileges should be.

18. They have to mention during the negotiations that the Metropolitan (of Kiev) and our envoys received oral instructions concerning this matter.

19. Our envoys have also to entreat His Tsarist Majesty that His Tsarist Majesty deign to send his army to Smolensk at once without any delay in order that the enemy should not prepare themselves and be joined by others because the troops are now ill-prepared. They should not believe any (enemy) blandishment if (the Poles) make recourse to such.

20. It is also necessary that soldiers be hired, about 3,000 or even more, at His Tsarist Majesty's will, to protect the Polish frontier.

21. The custom exists for the Cossack Army always to receive a salary; and now they beg His Tsarist Majesty that he should appropriate to the colonels 100 thalers each, to the regimental essauls, 200 Zloty, to the army essauls, 400 Zloty, to the captains, 100 Zloty, to the Cossacks, 30 Zloty.

22. In case the horde should invade (Ukraine), it would be necessary to attack them from Astrakhan and Kazan; likewise the Don

Cossacks should be ready, however, the peace with them should not yet be discontinued and they should not be provoked.

23. That His Tsarist Majesty would now graciously supply food and powder for the guns at Kodak, a town built on the Crimean frontier, where the Hetman permanently keeps a garrison of 400 men, providing them with everything. That likewise, His Tsarist Majesty would graciously provide for those who guard the Cossack's Headquarters (Kish) beyond the cataracts, since it cannot be left without a garrison.

(Acts pertaining to the History of Southern and Western Russia. Vol. X, Document XI., pp. 446-452).

APPENDIX II

THE TSAR'S CHARTER GRANTED TO HETMAN BOHDAN KHMELNYTSKY AND THE COSSACK ARMY MOSCOW, MARCH 27, 1654 (7162)

By the grace of God We, the Great Sovereign, Tsar and Grand Duke Alexei Mikhailovich, Autocrat of all Great and Little Russia, have granted (this) to Our Tsarist Majesty's subjects, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Hetman of the Cossack Army, and the Secretary Ivan Vyhovsky, and the Justices of the Army and the Colonels, and the Captains, and to the whole Cossack Army that in this year 7162 by the grace of God, he, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Cossack Army have come under Our exalted Sovereign's arm and have sworn an oath of everlasting allegiance to Us, the Great Sovereign, and to our children and Successors. And in the month of March he, the Hetman, and the whole Cossack Army sent to Us, the Great Sovereign, to Our Tsarist Majesty, their envoys, the Judge of the Army Samoylo Bohdanov and Pavlo Teterya, the Colonel of Pereiaslav; and in their letter to Us, the Great Sovereign, to Our Tsarist Majesty, the Hetman wrote and his envoys begged humbly that We, the Great Sovereign, grant our favour to him, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and the whole Cossack Army and confirm all their former rights and the liberties of the Army which had been established from ancient times under the Grand Dukes of Russia and the Polish Kings and their liberties and property rights in the courts, so that they might be tried by their elders without any interference with their Army courts; and that (we) confirm and do not violate their former rights which had been granted to clergy and laymen by the Grand Dukes of Russia and the Polish Kings, and grant them a charter of confirmation of those rights with our sovereign seal; and that the number of registered Cossacks should be fixed at 60,000, and that this quota be always at full strength. And if the Hetman should die by God's judgment, We, the Great Sovereign, (were asked to) allow the Cossack Army, according to the old custom, to elect the Hetman among themselves and by themselves and to notify Us, the Great Sovereign, as to who shall have been elected; that (we) order that the Cossack properties and lands which they use for their livelihood not be taken from them and that the children of the widows left by the Cossacks keep the rights of their grandfathers and fathers. And We, the Great Sovereign, Our Tsarist Majesty, have granted our favour to our subject, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the Hetman of the Cossack Army, and to the whole Cossack Army of Our Tsarist Majesty and have

ordered them to be under the exalted arm of Our Tsarist Majesty, according to their former rights and privileges which had been granted to them by the Polish Kings and the Grand Dukes of Lithuania; and We have ordered that these rights and privileges must not be violated by any means and that they should be tried by their elders, according to their former rights; and We have decreed that the number of the Cossack Army should be fixed at 60,000, according to their own petition, and that (this quota) be always at full strength. And if the Hetman should die, by God's judgment, We, the Great Sovereign, have allowed the Cossack Army to elect a Hetman, according to their former customs, by themselves and from their own ranks, and to write to Us, the Great Sovereign, who shall have been elected; and the newly elected Hetman shall swear an oath of allegiance and loyalty to Us, the Great Sovereign, before the person whom We, the Great Sovereign, shall appoint. We have also forbidden the Cossacks, their widows and their children to be deprived of their properties and lands which they use for their livelihood and (have decreed) that they should be left to them as before. And through Our Tsarist Majesty's graciousness the subjects of Our Tsarist Majesty, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the Hetman of the Cossack Army, and the whole Cossack Army of Our Tsarist Majesty should be under the exalted arm of Our Tsarist Majesty, according to their former rights and privileges and all the articles which have been written above, and they should serve and be loyal and wish everything good to Us, the Great Sovereign, and Our son, the Lord Tsarevich, Prince Alexei Alexeivich, and Our Successors, and whenever We should issue our sovereign order, they should go to war against our enemies and fight them, and obey Our Sovereign will in everything forever. And concerning those other articles which the above-mentioned envoys Samoylo and Pavel in the name of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the Hetman of the Cossack Army, have presented to Us, the Great Sovereign, to Our Tsarist Majesty, and submitted to the privy boyars of Our Tsarist Majesty, the Boyar and Governor of Kazan, Prince Alexei Trubetskoy, the Boyar and Governor of Tver, Vasili Vasilyevich Buturlin, the Okolnichy and Governor of Kashira, Peter Petrovich Golovin, and to the Dyak (state-secretary) of the Duma (privy council) Almaz Ivanov, We, the great Sovereign, have listened to those articles with favour and ordered to write under each of those articles what we have decreed with regard to each, and have commanded that those articles with the decree of Our Tsarist Majesty be handed to the same envoys Samoylo and Pavel, and it is Our desire to keep Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Cossack Army in Our Tsarist Majesty's gracious favour, and they shall trust in Our Sovereign favour."

(Complete Collection of the Laws of the Russian Empire, vol. I, pp. 325-327).

APPENDIX III

THE MOSCOW "ARTICLES" OF MARCH 27, 1654 (7162)

"His Tsarist Majesty's subjects, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the Hetman of the Cossack Army, and the whole Cossack Army, and the whole Christian Russian world, most respectfully beg the Great Sovereign, Tsar and Grand Duke Alexei Mikhailovich, the Autocrat of the whole of Great and Little Russia and the Sovereign and Ruler of many states that His Tsarist Majesty may grant them what their envoys will petition, and they will serve His Tsarist Majesty, according to his sovereign orders, forever. His Tsarist Majesty's resolutions concerning each article are written after each one.

1.

That in towns the officials be chosen among the natives who are worthy of it and they shall rule the subjects of His Tsarist Majesty and collect revenue for the Tsar's treasury honestly. (This is) for the reason that if a governor of His Tsarist Majesty should come and begin to violate their rights, it would be a great annoyance to them; and if the natives themselves should be officeholders, they would rule in accordance with their rights.

And concerning this article His Tsarist Majesty ordered that it should be according to their petition: there shall be officials in towns, mayors, bourgomasters, councillors, assessors, and they shall collect for His Tsarist Majesty sundry taxes in money and grain and pass them over to his sovereign treasury through the persons sent by His Tsarist Majesty; and the persons sent by His Tsarist Majesty for receiving the money shall supervise the collectors so that they act honestly.

2.

The Secretary of the Army is to receive through the kindness of His Tsarist Majesty 1,000 Polish Zloty (gold coins) for his clerks, and 300 Polish Zloty for the justices of the Army, and 100 Polish Zloty for the secretary of the court, 50 Zloty for the secretary and for the standard bearer of (each) regiment, 30 Zloty for the standard bearer of each hundred, 50 Zloty for the master of the Hetman's insignia.

His Tsarist Majesty has graciously ordered according to their petition; and the money should be appropriated from the local revenue.

3.

That a mill be assigned for the sustenance of the Secretary, the two justices of the Army, for each colonel, for the essauls of the Army and those of each regiment, because they have great expenditures.

His Tsarist Majesty has graciously ordered according to their petition.

4.

That concerning the artillery of the Army His Tsarist Majesty would graciously provide for the winter quarters and food of the cannoneers and all the artillery workers; also 400 Zloty for the quartermaster of the artillery and 50 Zloty for the standard-bearer of the artillery.

His Tsarist Majesty has graciously ordered that this amount should be appropriated from local revenue.

5.

That the Hetman and the Cossack Army should be free to receive envoys who for many years have come to them from foreign countries in case they have good intentions; and that only in case there should be something adverse to His Tsarist Majesty should they notify His Tsarist Majesty.

Concerning this article His Tsarist Majesty has ordered that the envoys who come on right business should be received and dismissed and it should be written truly and immediately to His Tsarist Majesty on what business they came and with what they were dismissed; if the envoys should be sent by some (foreign ruler) on business detrimental to His Tsarist Majesty, those ambassadors and envoys should be detained by the Army and it should be written about them immediately to His Tsarist Majesty for his decree; and they should not be dismissed without His Tsarist Majesty's decree; and there should be no (diplomatic) relations with the Turkish Sultan and the Polish King without a decree of His Tsarist Majesty.

6.

Concerning the Metropolitan of Kiev the envoys were given an oral instruction; and the envoys begged in their speeches that His Tsarist Majesty graciously grant a patent for his possessions.

His Tsarist Majesty graciously granted his patent to the Metropolitan and all clergy for the estates which they now possess.

7.

That His Tsarist Majesty deign to send his army to Smolensk at once without any delay in order that the enemy should not prepare themselves and be joined by others because now the troops are ill-prepared. They should not believe any (enemy) blandishment of (the Poles) or make recourse to such.

His Tsarist Majesty has graciously decided to set forth personally against his enemy, the Polish King, and to send his boyars and voyevodas with many troops as soon as the roads will be dry and there will be forage for horses.

8.

That soldiers be hired, about 3,000 or even more, at His Tsarist Majesty's will, to protect the Polish frontier.

His Tsarist Majesty's soldiers are always on the frontier for the protection of the Ukraine and will be stationed (there) permanently.

9.

The custom used to exist for the Cossack Army always to receive a salary; and now they humbly beg His Tsarist Majesty that he should appropriate to the colonels 100 thalers each, to the regimental essauls, 200 Zloty, to the army essauls, 400 Zloty, to the captains, 100 Zloty, to the Cossacks 30 Zloty.

The following note follows after this article:

In previous years Hetman Khmelnytsky and the whole Cossack Army had sent (envoys) to His Tsarist Majesty and begged many times that His Tsarist Majesty show them favour for the sake of the Orthodox Christian faith and the holy churches of God and intercede for them and accept them under his exalted arm and help them against their enemies. And in that time our great Sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, was unable to accept you under his protection since there was a permanent peace between His Tsarist Majesty and the Polish Kings and the Grand Dukes of Lithuania. And whereas on the part of the Kings many insults and offences were committed with regard to the father of His Tsarist Majesty, the Great Sovereign Tsar and Grand Duke Mikhail Fedorovich, autocrat of all Russia and ruler and possessor of many states, of blessed memory, and with regard to our Sovereign's grandfather, the Great Sovereign and holy Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia Filaret Nikitich, of blessed memory, and with regard to our Great Sovereign, the Tsar and Duke Alexei Mikhailovich, autocrat of all Russia, His Tsarist Majesty expected an apology for all (these insults) in accordance with the King's letters and the Diet's resolutions and constitution and the

treaties; and (the Tsar) desired to reconcile Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Cossack Army with the Polish King through his ambassadors in the following way: in case King Jan Kazimierz should make peace with them, according to the Zboriv treaty, and would not persecute the Orthodox Christian faith and would remove all the Uniates, in that case His Tsarist Majesty was ready to grant amnesty to those who, by insulting his sovereign honour, deserved capital punishment. And in this matter (the Tsar) sent to King Jan Kazimierz his great and plenipotentiary ambassadors, the boyar and Governor of Great Perm, Prince Boris Alexandrovich Reprin-Obolensky with associates. And those great plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty spoke to the King and his Lords in Council about that peace and actions offering various ways (of settlement). And King Jan Kazimierz and his Lords in Council did not accept any proposal and thus brought this great thing to naught, dismissed those great and plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty without any result. And our Great Sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, in view of such numerous instances of incorrectness and rudeness and falsehood on the part of the King, and because of his desire to protect the Orthodox faith and all the Orthodox Christians from the persecutors aiming at the destruction of God's churches and the annihilation of the Christian faith, the Latins (Roman Catholics), has accepted you under his exalted arm.

And now Our Great Sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, having collected numerous Russian, Tartar, and German troops for your protection, is setting forth in person against the enemies of Christianity, and is sending his boyars and voyevodas with many troops as well and for the organization of these armies, according to his sovereign decree, large sums have been distributed; therefore they, the envoys, seeing the graciousness of His Tsarist Majesty for the sake of their protection, should not now mention the matter of payments of the Cossack Army. And when the Sovereign's privy boyar and Governor of Tver, Vasili Vasilevich Buturlin, visited Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky with his colleagues, the Hetman talked with him concerning the quota of the Cossack Army (and suggested) that it be set at 60,000; (he also said) that even if this number should be increased, the Sovereign would not incur losses since they would not ask for pay from the Sovereign; and they, Samoylo and Pavel, and other persons who at that time were with the Hetman, know about this; of what concerns the revenue from the cities and towns of Little Russia, His Tsarist Majesty does not know anything, and our Great Sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, is sending his nobles to tabulate the revenue; after they have tabulated and computed various revenues, a decree will be promulgated as considered by His Tsarist Majesty concerning the salary to the Cossack Army. And now His

Tsarist Majesty, showing his favour to the Hetman and the whole Cossack Army, intends to send a salary to the Hetman and the whole Cossack Army in gold coins, according to the old custom of his ancestors, the Great Sovereign, Tsars, and Grand Dukes of Russia.

10.

In case the Crimean Horde should invade (the Ukraine), it would be necessary to attack them from Astrakhan and Kazan; likewise the Don Cossacks should be ready; however, the peace with them should not yet be discontinued and they should not be provoked.

The decrees and order of His Tsarist Majesty have been sent to the Don Cossacks; if there should be no provocation on the part of the Crimean people, it is not allowed to attack them and provoke them; in case, however, the Crimean people should be stirred up, His Tsarist Majesty would then issue orders for a campaign against them.

11.

That His Tsarist Majesty would now graciously supply food and powder for the guns at Kodak, a town on the Crimean frontier, where the Hetman permanently keeps a garrison of 400 men, providing them with everything; that, likewise, His Tsarist Majesty would graciously provide for those who guard the Cossack's Headquarters (Kish) beyond the cataracts, since it cannot be left without a garrison.

With regard to this article His Tsarist Majesty's decree will be issued in the future after it is established what quantities of what supplies used to be sent to these localities, and how much revenue will be collected for His Tsarist Majesty.

And concerning (the matter) which has been mentioned in your petition: as soon as our Great Sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, will grant to Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Cossack Army his Sovereign charters of your liberties, you must muster your men (and determine) who will be (registered) as a Cossack and who will be (counted) as a peasant. And with regard to the 60,000 quota for the Cossack Army, the Great Sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, has accepted and decreed it. As soon as your envoys come back to Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, you are to inform him that he is to muster the Cossacks immediately and make the lists of their registration and send the lists certified by his signature to His Tsarist Majesty."

(Complete Collection of the Laws of the Russian Empire, vol. 1, pp. 322-325).



УКРАЇНЬКА ГРОМАДА
БІБЛІОТЕКА
ВІКТОРІ, ЕССЕНДОН

INDEX

- A**
"absolute good formul's," 14
Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, 7, 8, 62
Adel-Girey, Khan, 106
Administrative Commission of 1937, 12, 15, contest, 35, 43
Akerman, fortress, 97
Akhundov, 33
Alexander II, Tsar, 76
Alexis Mikhailovich, Tsar, 26, 38, first contact with Khmelnytskyi 46, 50, 83, 87, 91
American colonies, 24
Andrusovo, Armistice of, 39, 53, 54, 91, 99, 72, 74, 84, 91, 99, 100, 102, 107, 110
Annexation (pryednannia), 11, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, benefits of, 31, 34, of non Russian nations, 35, of Ukraine to Russia, 48, 52, 55
Armenia, 15, acquisition by Russia, 37
Astrakhan, Khanate of, 35
Austria, literacy, 32, Gendarme of Europe, 38, 89
"Autocrat of all Rus."87
Azerbaijan, 15, 16, 35
Azov Sea, 38
- B**
Bagirov, M., 16, 17, 20
Bahalii, D., historian, 61
Bakcheserai, 103
Balkans, 75
Baltimore, 8
Baturyn, Treaty of, 99
Baturyn, city, 28, Treaty of, 99
Bashkirs, 34
Belgium, 21
Belgrade, 64
Belinskii, V. H., 31, on Ukraine's future with Russia, 32, appraisal of, 33
Bendery Constitution, 83, 84
"beneficiality thesis," of Russian colonial policy, 34
Beria, 16, 20
Berestechko, Battle of, 44, 69
Berezivskiy, M., composer, 35
Bila Cerkva, 107
Bilhorod Tartars, 106, 108
Bilocerkivsky Agreement, 45
Bilohrud, Colonel of Uman, 104
Black Sea, 34, acquisition of its shores 38, 70, 71, 102
Bobrynsky, 38
Bohemia, 88
Bohun, 43
Boiko, I. D., on pauperization of Ukrainian peasants, 40, 67, 68
Bolshevik, 65, 66, 74, 75
Borovykovskiy, V., artist, 35
Borschak, I., historian, 78, 90
Bortnianskyi, D., composer, 35
"bourgeois nationalism," 9, 10, 23, 61, 62, 63
Bourgeois West, 14, revolutions, 22
Braichevskiy, M. I., 7, 9, 61, 63, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 73, 74, 75, 77
Bratslav, 81, 107
Brezhnev, L., 7, 64
Briukhovetskyi, Ivan, 19, 49, revolt of, 54, 99, 100, 101, 103, 106
Buchachiv, Treaty of, 108
Bukryevych, Lukas, 104
Buturlin, Russian envoy in Ukraine, 45, 85
Byelorussia, 62, 67, 87, 99
Byzantine Empire, 64
- C**
Canada, 8
Catherine II, 91
Caspian Sea, 34
Caucasian, 15, 25, 28, colony of Russia, 31, conquest of, 37, 38
CCC(b)U, 9
Centemer, Demetrius, 105
Central Asia, 15, Russian dependency, 31, 34, 35
Central Rada Government, 65
censuses of 1740 and 1748, on literacy in Ukraine, 32
census of 1897, reveals lowest level of Ukrainian literacy, 33
Chaplinski, 44
Charles XII, King of Sweden, 37
Cheli-bey, 101
Cherkassians, 25, 91
Chernikhiv, principality, 32, 33, 80
Chernishevskii, 33, 64
Chetvertynsk, Battle of, 108
Chetvertynsky-Sviatopolk, Stepan, 81
China, democratic movement, 38
Chyhyryn, city, 100, 109, 110

Codification Commission, 91
Constantinople, 104, Patriarch of, 105
Commonwealth of Poland, 36, 44, 45,
47, defense of, 48, 69, 70, 72, 83,
86, 87, 110
Communist Party, 62, 63
Crimea, Khanate of, 30, weakening
of, 37, Turkish dependency, 38,
Khmelnysky seeks alliance, 46,
overtures to, 47, 70, 72, 79, 85, 88,
97, 99, 101, 102, 103, 106, 108, 109
"cult of the individual," 9, 11, 13, 20,
61
Czechoslovakia, 64

D

Danube River, 72
Declaration of the Rights of the
Peoples of Russia, 65
Decree of the CC-CP(b)U 1947, 13, 17
Diakonow, M., historian, 78
Divovyeh, Semen, author of "Discourse
Between Great Russia and Little
Russia," 85
Dnieper River, 20, 37, cataracts, 71,
97, 108
Dobroliubov, 33
Don Kozaks, 48
Doroshenko, Hryhorii, 102, 106
Doroshenko, M., Hetman, 100
Doroshenko, Petro, Hetman, 19, 49,
revolt of, 54, 72, mercantalism,
74, 100, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109
Dzunaidkhan, 22

E

Emsky Ukaz of 1876, 55, 76
Engels, 15, letters to Marx, 33
England, 8, 15, 16, 24, 26, colonial
policies, 30, 35, blow to, 37
Eternal Peace of 1686, 39, 54
"Exposition of the Rights of Ukraine,"
Manifesto of Hetman P. Orlyk
1712, 83

F

Famine in Ukraine, 1932-1933, 74
February Revolution of 1917, 21, 22
feudal, 22, feudalists, 23, class, 29,
feudal order in Ukraine, 39, land
holdings, 40, antithesis, 41, 50, 51,
52, restored, 54, soviet definition,
68, 73, 74, 77, 97

Finland, 21, 66
Frederic William, Elector of Branden-
burg, 81
French, 16, 26, colonial policies, 30, 90

G

Gdansk, 30
Gendarme of Europe, Austria, 38
Georgia, 12, 15, 28, annexation of a
lesser evil, 35, 37
Germans, 70, 74
Golden Horde, 70
"Great Fatherland War," 13, elevation
of Khmelnyskyi as a national
hero, 43
Greek, 24
Gustavus Adolphus, 89
Gufarov, 31

H

Hadiach Agreement of 1658, between
Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine,
14, 36, 50, 53, 82, 99
Halaychuk, B., historian, 78
Halychyna (Galicia), 21, 107
Hamalia, Hryhori, 101
Herodotus, 77
Hetmanate form of Ukrainian Kozak
government, 32, attack on, 36, 37,
45, 46, treason of, 49, 52, abolished,
55, 74, 80, hereditary, 81, 82, 85, 86,
88, 89, 98, 100
Hohol, Mykola (Gogol), 55
Hladky, 45
Hlynka, Mykhailo (Glinka), 55
Holland, 26, colonial policies, 30
Holy Roman Empire, 88
Hordienko, Kost, 19, 49
Hrechanyi, Stepan, 101
"Hromada," 76
Hrushevsky, M., historian, 62, 67, 78,
86, 89
Huslysty, K. H., historian, 67

I

Iarosh, 103
Iavorskyi, M., historian, 61
Iavorskyi, St., 34
Ielovynetskyi, Ieypyfanii, Scholar, 34
India, 26
inquisition, 97
Institute of History of the Academy
of the Ukrainian SSR (AN-Ukr.
SSR), 9, 17
Islam, 103

Islam-Aga, 106
Islam Ekman, 105
Istanbul (Constantinople), 71, suburbs
 attacked, 72, 97, 100, 101
"Istoria Rusov," 85
Ivan III, 86
Ivan the Terrible (IV), 70
Ivanov, Almaz, 87
Ivanytsky, S., historian, 78

J

Jadiviga, Queen of Poland, 97
Jagailo, Prince of Lithuania, 97
Janissaries, 105
Jesuit, 35
just and unjust wars, 21, 22

K

Kafa, slave center, 72
Kaganovich, 9, 10
Kalebi, Kaphan-pasha, 108
Kamenets-Podilskiy, 108
Kaphan-Pasha, 109
Kapnist, V., Ukrainian scholar, poet,
 activist, 34
Kasimov, Kenesary, 15, 22
Katerynoslav Gubernia, 32, 73
Kazakhstan, 15, 76
Kazan, Khanate of, 35
Kazimierz, Jan, king of Poland, 85
Kobzar, 20
Khanenko, 49, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108,
 109
Kharkiv Gubernia, 32
Khlopov, Kyril, Voyevoda, 86
Khmelnyskyi, Bohdan, 12, 23, 27, 36,
 class position, 39, feudal ten-
 dencies, 42, idealization of in
 soviet historiography, 42, his
 treatment of revolts, 43, appraisal
 of in the 1930's, 43, Order of, 43,
 adulation of, 44, avoids contact
 with Russia, 46, letter to the Tsar,
 47, 50, 51, desires to maintain
 liberties, 53, 68, 69, 70, negotiates
 with Swedes, 72, 73, mercantalism
 of, 74, 79, disregards Pereiaslav
 Agreement, 80, titles used, 81,
 concludes military convention with
 Sweden, 82, 83, 84, 86, 89, 90, 98,
 100, 104, 109
Khmelnyskyi, Iurii, 19, 99, 109, 110
Khotyn, 109
Khotyzk, 46
Khrushchev, N. S., 76

Khrushchev's Secret Speech of 1956, 61
Koliivschyna, peasant revolt, 73
Kochubei, Vasyl, 19, 20
Kompan, O. S., on feudalism in
 Ukraine, 39
Koniecpolski, 44
Konotop, Battle of, Ukraine defeats
 Russia, 11, 14, 53, 99
Korniichuk, playwright, 43
Korsun Agreement 1657, between
 Sweden and Ukraine, 82, 89
Korsun, Battle of, 46
Kosiv, Sylvester, Metropolitan, 81
Kostomarov, M., Ukrainian Historian,
 43
Kosygin, A., 7
Kosynskyi, Khrystofor, kozak chief-
 tain, revolt, 41, revolt of, 71
Kozelskyi, Ia., scholar, 34
Kozak, 27, 28, type, 40, origins, 71,
 servitude, 73
Kozak General Council, 71
Korkunow, historian, 78
Korowski, 107
Krym Girey, Kalha-Saltan, 101
Krypiakevych, I., historian, 78
Kutuzov, 70
Kyiev, 7, 14, 46, seizure by Tatars, 70,
 protest in, 73, independence
 proclaimed, 74, 80, 84, 86, 91, 107
Kyievan Academy, role in educating
 Russia, 34
Kysil, Adam, Palatine of Kyiv, 46,
 letter to, 47

L

Liaschenko, R., historian, 74, 78
Left Bank of Ukraine, 19, 56
Lenin, V. I., 14, 17, 21, 22, 23, on
 prison of nations, 25, on national
 alienation, 27, on foreigners and
 oppression, 28, speech before the
 State Duma, 31, on literacy of
 Slavs in Russian Empire, 32, cites
 Paul of Aleppo, 32, 33, about self
 determination, 36, on Russia's
 expansion, 38, 61, 65, 66, 74
Lesczynski, Stanislaw, Polish king
 during the Northern War, 37
"lesser evil" formula, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18,
 35, 36
Levytskyi, D., artist, 34
Lichoviezki, 103
Lisnyskyi, Hryhorii, 19
Lithuania, 30, Grand Duchy of, 36, 53,
 54, 56, 70, 71, 82, 86, 97

Little Russia (Ukraine), 31, 37, 76, 80,
84, 85, 86, Prikaz of, 109
London, 8
Losenko, A., Ukrainian artist, 34
Lviv, 108, 109, 110
Lviv Brotherhood, 75
Lypynsky, V., historian, 78, 79
Lysanka, Battle of, 108
Lytvyn, K., 62

M

Mahmed Girey, 108
Manifesto of the Ukrainian Govern-
ment to the Nations of Europe,
1658, 81
March Statutes of 1654, 36, basis for
45, 51
Martos, I., sculptor, 35
Marx, K., correspondence from Engels,
33, bourgeois epoch, 40, on Zapo-
rozhian Sich, 41, economic laws,
64
Marxist, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 24, class
approach, 49, 61, 62, 63, 77
Marxist-Leninist, 7, 9, 12, 22, aban-
donment of, 45, 63, 66, 69
Maslovy, 44
Mazepa, Ivan, 19, 20, 24, palatinates
of Polotsk and Vitebsk, 37, 49, 73,
mercantalism of, 74, statesmen of,
82, 84, 85
Mazepynovites, 19
Mengli Geray, 70
mercantalism, 74
messianic role of Russia, 14, 25, 64
Mikhnovsky, M., 92
Mikoian, Anastas, 63
Minin, Kuzma, 70
Ministry of Internal Affairs (Russia),
32
Mnohohrishny, Demian, 73, 84, 102,
105, 106, 107, 109
Mohammed IV, Sultan, 103, 105, 108
Mohyla Academy (Kyiv), 75
Moldavia, 30, annexation of, 38, 100,
104, 105, 108
Mongol, 64, 97
Monomakhus, 48
Morenburg Fortress
Moscow, 29, 45, revolt in, 46, 50, nego-
tiations in, 52, centralizing ten-
dency, 53, 64, 66, 67, 74, 79, 82, 87,
88, 99, 103
Moscow, Treaty of, 99
Moscow University, 34
Mozyr, 45

Muhamat-aga, 106
Muridism, 25
Muscovite, 12, scholarly dependence
on Ukraine, 34, anecdote, 45,
Muscovites ready to aid Poles
against Ukraine, 46, idealization
by Soviet historians, 47, protec-
tion of borders, 48, restoration of
feudalism, 48, 53, spheres of
control, 54, 64, 70, 72, 78, 79, 80,
81, Duke of, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88,
89, 92, 98, 110
Mussulmans, 105
Myakotin, V., historian, 78

N

Naperski, Kost, 52
Napoleon, 65
National Liberation War, (Ukrainian),
11, 14, Movement, 20, 21, 22, 23, 32,
scholarship prior to 34, social
economic state, 40, 42, Khmel-
nytsky as leader, 43, 44, Khmel-
nytsky's intentions, 45, 50, 51, 52,
53, achievements destroyed, 55, 63,
66, 68, 69, 71, 82, 98, 104, 110
national wars of liberation and
movements, 23, 24
nationalism, 17, 24
"nationalism inside out," 17
Near East, 37
Nechai, Colonel, 43
New Economic Policy (NEP), 61, 75
Niekchina, M., 15
Nikolai II, 21
Nineteenth Congress of the CPSU, 16
Nizhyn, district,
Nogai Tartars, 101, 106
Nolde, B. Baron, historian, 78
Non-Russian Nations, 30, Tsarist
policy to 31, annexation of, 35, 66
Northern War, 37
Novhorod Siversky, 54, 85
Novi Dni, 8

O

Ochakiv, 97
October Revolution, 17, depreciation
of, 29, 61
Odynets, D., historian, 78
Ohloblyn, Oleksander, historian, 63
Okinshevych, L., historian, 78, 79, 88
Orlyk, Hryhor, author of "Memoirs,"
83, "Remarks on Ukraine and the
Kozak," 84

Orlyk, Pylyp, Hetman, 19, 49, 81, 83, 87
Orthodox Church, 40, rights of, 45, defenders of, 70; 72, 81, 97, 98, 99, 104, 107, 109, 110
Ostrow Academy, 75
Osyrov, K., 43
Ottoman Empire, 70, 71, Ukraine becomes vassal of, 72, 97, 100, 102, 105, 108, 110

P

Pan-Slavism, 64
Parchevich, Archbishop, 89
Paul of Aleppo, Archdeacon on literacy in Ukraine in 1652, 32, 55
Pechersk, printing shop, 91
Peking, 64
people (narod), 26, 27
Pereiaslav Agreement, 11, 12, 18, 26, 300th Anniversary of, 27, negative influence on economy, 30, convocation, 34, 36, clarifications of, 39, first positive soviet appraisal, 43, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, lasts for 13 years, 54, abrogation of, 55, 61, 66, 72, consequences of, 73, breach of, 74, 77, 78, appraisal uniform, 79, discrepancies, 80, ignored by B. Khmelnytskyi, 80, contemporary appraisal, 81, Orlyk's analysis, 83, 85, 86, 87, 89, interpretation of, 90, falsification of, 91, 92, 98, Second Treaty of, 99, 110
Pereiaslav Revolt of 1666, 48
Perekop, 107
Persia (Iran), 13, 16, 26, 35, 37, stifling of democratic movement, 38, 105
Peter I, 15, 20, 49, 70, uses of kozaks to construct St. Petersburg, 73
Petryk, Ivanenko, Petro, 24, 84, 85
Picheta, V. I., Byelorussian historian, 67
Pidhaici, Treaty of, 107
Podgorny, M. V. (also Pidhirnyi), 8, 9, 10
Podolia, 32, 108
Pokas Hryhory, author of a "Description of Little Russia," 84
Pokrovsky, M., historian, 78
Poland, 11, 12, 13, 25, 28, 35, Kingdom of, 36, weakening of, 37, 38, aristocracy, 42, liberation of Ukraine from, 44, overtures to, 47, 49, 53, 54, 56, 69, Seim, 69, 70, 74, revolt in, 76, 79, 80, 81, 84, 85, 90, 97, 100

Poletyka, Hryhory, 84
Polianskyi, Iaroslav, 11
Polotsk, polatinate, 37, 54
Poltava Gubernia, 32
Popes, 72
Popov, O., historian, 78
Portugal, 26
Posolsky Prikaz
Potianko, 101
Pozharsky, Prince, 65, 70
"prison of nations," 25, 29, 66
Prokopovych, F., scholar, 34, 86, 88
Presniakov, A. E., Russian historian, 67
"Previous Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi," 91
Prussia, 89
Pskov, 48
Purishkevich, 38
Pushkar, M., 52
Putivl, 46

R

Rational Scheme of Ukrainian History, 67
Razin, Stepan, 53
Rebellions of 1840 and 1848, 73
Regular Scheme of Ukrainian History, 61
Red Army, 76
Repin, Illia, 55
Revolt of Bulavin in 1707, 48
Revolt of 1668, 48
Revolt of 1687, 73
Revolution of 1905, 76
reunification (voziednannia), 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 20, 27, Belinskii on, 32, benefits of, 34, international repercussions, 38, Khmelnytskyi and, 45, 50, 55, 61, 62, 63, 67, 72
Revolt of Ustym Karmaluk, 73
Right Bank of Ukraine, 85
Riza-Pasha, 25
Romanov, 38
Rosenfeld, I., historian, 78
Rozumovskyy, K., Ukrainian president of Russian Academy of Sciences, 34, Hetman, 91
RSFSR, 7
Ruina (the Ruin), 102
Rus, 7, 12, 14, Grand Duchy of, 36, 48, 61, 62, 63, 64, 67, 68
Russian Imperial Academy, 67
"Russian Yearly," Organ of the Ministry of Interior, 32
Ruthenia, Ukraine, 80, Grand Duchy of, 82, people, 83, 85

S

Samoilovich, I., 73, 85
 Samvydav (Samizdat), 7, 8
 Savchenko, I., film producer, 43
 Scholarship, Russian, distortion of, 37
 Second Fatherland War, 65
 Sefer-kasi-aga-, 106
 self-determination, 65, 66
 Semyhoroddia, 30
 Sepoy Revolt in India, 24
 Serbians, 64
 Serheyevykh, V., historian, 78
 Sevsk, 46
 Shah, 13
 Shah Kerman, fortress, 108
 Shamil, 15, 22, 25
 Shavchenko, F. P., Ukrainian Soviet Historian, 45
 Shevchenko, Taras, 20, 33, on Khmelnytskyi, 44, 56
 Shyryn-bey, 106
 Siberia, 31, 88
 Silistrian Pasha, 106, 107
 Sinope (Asia Minor), taken by Kozaks, 72
 Sirko, Ivan (Koshevyi), 19, revolt, 54, 101, 102, 106, 107, 108, 109
 Skaba, A., 8
 Slabchenko, M., historian, 78
 Slav, 7, 12, peoples, 50
 "sloboda," 40
 Smila, city of, 52
 Smolensk, 48, 54, 88
 "Smoloskyp," 8
 Sobieski, Jan, 103, 104, 107, 108
 Social Democrat, 21, 36
 socialist, 14, 22, 24, 65, 66
 Sokolsky, historian, 78
 Soloviov
 Soviet Fatherland, 64
 Soviet peoples, 16, 64
 "Soviet Scheme of History," 67
 Soviet Union, 7, 8, 14, 15, 61, 62, 63, 64, linguistic policy, 76
 Spahis, 108
 St. Petersburg (city), 73
 Stalin, 9, 12, 13, 16, 61, 63, 70, 75
 Stanivskyi, Arsenii, Ukrainian scholar, 34
 Starodub, 86
 State Duma, 31, 87
 Stolypin, Minister of Interior, 76
 Straits, (Bosphorus and Dardanelles), attempt to control, 37
 Suvorov, 15, 65, 70
 Sublime Porte, 102, 103

Sukhovii, 101, 104, 105, 106, 109
 Swedes, 19, orientation on, 36, alliance with Mazepa, 37, overtures to, 47, and Khmelnytsky, 72, 82, 84, agreement with, 87, 89, 90, 98, 100
 Szebeszy, envoy of Transylvania, 81

T

Tadjikistan, 31
 Takelyi, General, destroys Sich, 48
 Taneev, Muscovite envoy, 84
 Tarasevych, L., Ukrainian artist, 34
 Tatar, 11, 28, Mongolian, 29, influence of Russia on, 34, attacks, 48, 69, 70, attacks, 71, 72, 79, 97, 98, 100
 Teteria, Pavlo, 19, 49, 52, 68, 99, 100, 107
 "Theses of the CC-CPSU of 1953," 10
 "Third Rome," 64, 87
 "Time of Troubles," 87
 Tkachov, 64
 toiling masses, 28, 29
 Toronto, 8
 Transylvania, 89
 Trelizond (in Asia Minor), taken by Kozaks, 72
 Tretiakov, P. M., 17
 Trostianets, Battle of, 108
 Trotskyites, 61
 Trubetsky, Alexei, Prince
 Tsarist Russia, 13, 14, 15, 22, 25, colonial policy, 28, prison of nations, 29, economic development-exploitation, 30, 31, "civilization," 33, backwardness, 33, literacy in XVIII century, 34, pretender bandits, 35, straits question, 37, intrusion in the Polish-Ukrainian conflict, 39, diplomatic play, 46, Russia potential enemy of Ukraine in 1648, 46, idealization in soviet historiography, 47, attempt to transform Ukraine into a province, 50, agreement with the Ukrainian officers, 51, protection of kozak rights, 51, revolt in, 52, bans on Ukrainian language reaffirmed, 55, occupation of Ukraine, 56, 62, 68, 77, 80
 Turbai, 28
 Tukalsky, Metropolitan, 99, 100
 Turkish Sultanate (Turkey), 12, 13, 15, 16, 24, 25, 26, dependencies of, 30, 35, weakening of, 37, 38, overtures to, 47, 49, protectorate over Ukra-

ine, 50, 69, 70, kozak attacks, 71, fleet defeated, 72, 79, 80, 97, 98, 101, 102, 103, 104
Turkmeniia, 15
Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party, 63
Twenty second Congress of the CPSU, 9

U

Ukaz of 1709, passed by Peter I, proscribed learning in Ukraine, 55, 75
Ukaz of 1763 (Valuiev), 75
Ukaz of 1804, firdids teaching in Ukraine, 32
Ukraine, colonial status of, 31, Little Russia, 31, literacy under Tsarism, 32, censuses of 1740 and 1748, on education, 32, Ukaz of 1804, 32, census of 1897, annexation a "lesser evil," 35, reality of independence, 36, pro-Polish and pro-Turkish parties, 36, rights and liberties guaranteed by Swedish alliance, 37, stifling independence, 38, population breakdown, 40, formation of new stage of development, 41, independence from Poland, 44, government, 45, last 1½ centuries, 53, autonomy done away with, 55, 68, in United Nations, 70, attacks by Tartars, 71, Pereiaslav consequences, 72, 1781 incorporated into Russian Empire, 74, man made famine, 74, National Republic, 74, Soviet Republic founded, 75, 76, independent of Moscow, 79, Ruthenia, 80, Grand Duchy of Ruthenia, 82, Estates of, 83, 84, 85, Swedish Alliance, 87, 89, 90, 91, vassal, 98, Right and Left Banks, 99, vassal of Turkey, 104
"Ukrainian Front," 70
Ukrainian national movement, Lenin on, 22
Ukrainian nationalists, 14
Ukrainian SSR, 7, 9
Ukrainian War of Independence, 1917-1921, 63
Ukrainization, 61
unification (obiednannia), 12
United Nations, 70
USSR, peoples of, 17, 18

Ushakov, D. M., 12, 15

V

Varna (city in Bulgaria), captured by kozaks, 71
Vasylenko, M., historian, 61
Valuiev, Ukaz of 1863, 55, 75
Velychko, 110
Venice, 105
Vienna, Battle of, kozaks participate, 72
Vilno, Treaty of, 90
Vitebsk, palatinate, 37
Voievods, 19
Volga, 15, 35
Voluntarism, 64
Volunteer Armies, Whites, 74
Volyn Gubernia, 32
Voprosy Istorii, 15, 16
Vyhovskiy, Ivan, 11, 19, 24, 49, 52, declares war on Russia, 53, aligns with Sweden, 72, 73, 81, 89, 98, 100, 109
Vyshnyvetskyi, Dmytro, 71
Vyzvolnyi Sliakh, 7, 8

W

Wallachia, 30, Hospodar of, 81, 90, 104
West Germany, 10
Wilhelm II, 21
Wladislaw IV, King of Poland, 45, death of, 47, 69

Y

Yakobson, Sergius, scholar, 77
Yakovliv, historian, 78, 79, 86, 89, 91
Yukhiniv, village, 85

Z

Zaporozhian Kozaks, 19, destruction of, 28, Army, 37, Sich, 41, extension of, 42, 47, shield against Turko-Tatar invasions, 48, Army, 51, 52, 53, destroyed, 55, 69, emergence of, 70, 71, 73, 74, 80, 81, 82, 83, 86, 88, Republic, 89, 91, 97, 98, 100, 101, 102, 104, 106, 109
Zarudnyi, S., 52
Zazulich, Vera, 64
Zbarazh Agreement, 45
Zemsky Sobor, 50
Zhovti Vody, Battle of, 98, 106
Zlotnicki, 103
Zolotarenko, I., 52

