

THE
BLACK
DEEDS
OF THE
KREMLIN
& WHITE
BOOK

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HUNGER, DESPAIR, DEATH IN UKRAINE AGONY



Through the hunger-stricken Ukraine, reports that some millions live in poverty and death. This man was seen in a village in 1931. He is a black head-bearer, a Ukrainian, but his face has changed.



Many of the struggle's victims are in the Ukraine, where death and disease stalk. This baby, perhaps a few weeks before death, looked like this.



Thomas Walker took this photograph of a woman at the end of a long day. Her face has changed since 1921. (AP Photo Collection)

Soviet Starving Tell Own Stories; Jailed for Eating Dogs

STARVATION made known the horror within of Soviet Russia, having already told of death and agony. The Russian people are now telling their own stories. The tale continued in the acts of eating, or eating dogs in the case of Thomas Walker, an American newspaperman, who is jailed in Leningrad, on the day of his life.

When Mr. Walker entered Russia for "Living Hell," he found a country where the people are dying of hunger. He was arrested for eating a dog, and was sentenced to a year in prison.

For many and when in the winter of 1931, the people of Russia were told that they were to be starved to death. The people of Russia were told that they were to be starved to death. The people of Russia were told that they were to be starved to death.

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DIE OF STARVATION, THEIR BODIES ROBBED



The picture was taken in a village in the Ukraine. It shows the bodies of those who died of starvation. Their bodies were robbed of their last remaining strength.



Such a handful of food remains were found in the graveyards in the Ukraine. The bodies were robbed of their last remaining strength.

They were told that they were to be starved to death. They were told that they were to be starved to death. They were told that they were to be starved to death.

Starving People Starve
Chicago News Features

SIX MILLION PERISH IN SOVIET FAMINE

'Peasants' Crops Seized, They and Their Animals Starve



Like hundreds of thousands of peasants, this woman and her horse are in a state of starvation. They wait for the next day's ration of grain. The woman's horse is a gift of the government.

Likewise, the government has seized the crops of peasants, and now has seized the animals. The woman was fortunate in getting a horse to look after her.

Starvation has killed thousands of horses, the world's best and most of the best of the world. The woman's horse is a gift of the government.

The official death toll is a few million. But the actual number is many times as high. Peasants waiting for the next day's ration of grain are in a state of starvation.

Reporter Risks Life to Get Photographs Showing Starvation



DELIBERATE STARVATION OF PEASANTS



Villages Depopulated by Hunger in Ukraine as Soviet Punish Their Opponents

STARVATION rages through the Ukraine as the Soviet government punishes its opponents. The villages are being depopulated by hunger. The peasants are being punished for their opposition to the government.

The government has seized the crops of the peasants, and now has seized the animals. The peasants are in a state of starvation.

The official death toll is a few million. But the actual number is many times as high. Peasants waiting for the next day's ration of grain are in a state of starvation.

BY THOMAS WALKER.


F. U. P.
The World Federation of Ukrainian Former Political
Prisoners and Victims of the Soviet Regime

THE BLACK DEEDS OF THE KREMLIN

A WHITE BOOK

Vol. 2

**THE GREAT FAMINE
IN UKRAINE IN 1932-1933**



The Democratic Organization of Ukrainians
Persecuted by the Soviet Regime in U.S.A.

Detroit

1955

U.S.A.

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FUP

**The World Federation of Ukrainian Former Political
Prisoners and Victims of the Soviet Regime**

EDITORIAL BOARD

V. I. Hryshko, P. P. Pavlovych
S. O. Pidhainy — Editor-in-chief

P R E F A C E

The second volume of "The Black Deed of the Kremlin, a White Book" is devoted to solely one theme, the preparation and realization of a terrible famine in the Ukraine in the years 1932-1933, the so-called organized famine. The term "organized famine" did not originate with us, the former victims of the Bolshevik terror, but with the well-known American journalist W. H. Chamberlin who witnessed this terrible form of terror, the tragedy lived through by the Ukrainians during the years 1932-1933.

The second volume is being published by The Democratic Organization of Ukrainians Formerly Persecuted by the Soviet Regime — DOBRUS, in the USA. The first volume of this work was published in Canada by The Ukrainian Association of Victims of the Russian Communist Terror, SUZERO.

DOBRUS and SUZERO are organizations with identical aims and are part of the World Federation of Ukrainian Former Political Prisoners and Victims of the Soviet Regime, FUP, together with a number of other organizations in every part of the world which desire to supply first-hand information on the theory and practice of Communism in the Soviet Union.

The first volume of "The Black Deeds of the Kremlin" was highly thought of by the public and was accepted as documentary evidence by the Committee on Communist Aggression, headed by Representative Charles J. Kersten of Wisconsin.

We hope that the publication of studies and of a mass of documents dealing with this crime committed by the Moscow clique will help to open a window for those who wish to know the true face of Communism.

The great work of Dr. Ivan V. Dubynets (Dubyna), who died so tragically (see below) forms the basis of this volume. The introduction is the work of Dr. Petro Dolyna, commissioned and financed by the Research Group of the UHVR.

The illustrative materials came from the archives of

SUZERO and of DOBRUS, from Mr. K. Lysiuk, director of the Ukrainian National Museum in California, USA and from Mr. O. Kalynyk, the author of "Communism, the Enemy of Mankind," published by the youth organization SUM.

The costs of publication of the second volume, like those of the first one, are being borne by Ukrainian patriots, especially, the former victims of Communist tyranny who, workers and farmers, not only contributed their testimonies and materials but also made generous contributions from their hard-won savings. The list of those donating \$ 100 or more will be found at the back of the book.

On behalf of the World Federation of Ukrainian Former Political Prisoners and Victims of the Soviet Regime, FUP, and of the Editorial Board, I find it my pleasant duty to express thanks to all the contributors and to all those other persons and organizations who have helped to fulfil this work.

S. O. PIDHAINY

INTRODUCTION

In the communists' political warfare against the West, they constantly attack the Free World for its "colonialism". Unfortunately, the West has been on the defensive with regard to this issue as Kremlin leaders cavort through Asia charging us with "imperialism" and "colonialism".

The communists are mortally vulnerable on the charge of "Red Colonialism". They are therefore greatly concerned that the West will turn the spotlight into the Soviet orbit to show where the real colonialism of today actually exists. The communists are very sensitive on this issue.

That is why this book is very important in showing the Russian communist enslavement of Ukraine, a civilized nation entitled to its independence and freedom and in deadly struggle to maintain its existence against the Russian communist oppression that seeks to exterminate its traditions, culture and all the national characteristics of a great people.

The struggle between the forces of life and death in the Ukraine has continued through the years because the people of the Ukrainian nation love their land. They are close to their land which God has endowed with a richness to produce the fruits of the earth. Being close to their land, they know the eternal truths. They know the Creator. They know the spiritual as well as the material. Stalin was sincere when, during the war, he said he was having more trouble with the peasants in the collectivization program than he was having with Hitler. The casualties of the man-made famine in the Ukraine are grim testimony of the deadly nature of the struggle between Russian communist imperialism and the independent

Ukrainian farmer. As yet the world knows very little of the intensity of that struggle which still goes on. It is very hard to kill the human spirit.

When an historian of the 21st Century looks back to find the basic cause of the breakup of communist imperialism, he will very likely look upon the resistance in the Ukraine as a major factor. This book documents much of that resistance and will be valuable to the historian of the future to ascertain why communism failed.

CHARLES J. KERSTEN.

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FAMINE AS POLITICAL WEAPON

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P E T R O D O L Y N A

FAMINE AS POLITICAL WEAPON

FOREWORD

The author witnessed the catastrophic famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine. Immediately after the end of World War II in 1945, and up to the time of his departure to the United States in 1949 he collected material among displaced persons living in UNRRA and IPO camps in the Western Zone of Germany who had been eyewitnesses of the famine.

For obvious reasons the author is unable to cite the full names of all those persons who furnished diverse material, and therefore confines himself to listing their initials and professions.

The author hereby expresses his thanks to all of them, and in particular to Mr. I. V. Dubynets, who provided substantial material from his collection of documents, and permitted the use of his name.

In its time, the famine of Ukraine drew the attention of a good part of the world, and was written about extensively. But to this day there is no work that analyzes the famine, not as an isolated occurrence, but completely i. e. in the strictest relation with the political events in the USSR at that time.

The author realizes that this work does not completely cover the complex events connected with the famine of 1932-33. Such was, however, not his intention. His task was much more modest: to present an idea of its origin and record the most significant facts and events which took place in Ukraine in connection with the famine.

INTRODUCTION

a) UKRAINE'S PLACE IN THE WORLD

Ukraine's natural resources, her geographic position, soil, climate, and mineral wealth have a decisive influence upon her history: these have conditioned not only her economic development and external appearance, but have also had a direct influence upon her political history. Thus, nature herself is a factor in Ukraine's historical development.

Ukraine is situated in the Southern part of Eastern Europe, lying directly north of the Black Sea, which is the geographic, political and economic base of Ukraine. The Black Sea characterized the beginnings of Ukraine's appearance upon the arena of history, inasmuch as commercial and cultural relations with Mediterranean lands traversed the Black Sea. Ukraine's position along the Black Sea has not only an economic meaning (ports of the Black Sea), but is also strategic.

The rivers Dnieper and Dnister were and are central pivotal geographic lines of the Ukrainian settlement. The rivers of Ukraine: Dnieper, Don, Dnister, Buh, Kuban, are not only important as means of communications and life-lines in the national economy, they are also a source of hydro-energy, which is rated at nine million kilowatts.

Ukraine possesses excellent soil. The French Marshall, Marmon, who visited Ukraine in 1831, remarked that: "the wealth of Ukraine is known to all: it is the most fertile land in the world. The agricultural soil, being black and deep, has remarkable fertility." And truly, this black soil is one of the most productive in the world. About three-quarters of all Ukrainian land lies in the black soil belt.

To this must be added the very good and temperate climate, with adequate light, heat, precipitation and optimal temperature, which favors the cultivation of all plants typical of the temperate zone.

The soil and climate have, since long before the first world war, made Ukraine, with her 20 per cent of world grain exports, "the granary of Europe."

For many centuries agriculture was the exclusive occupation of Ukrainians, and the foundation of their national wealth. It appealed to them because of the favorable conditions: the availability of free land, the small percentage of unproductive soil, the fertility of the soil, and the open, flat nature of the land. These circumstances conditioned on the one hand, an extensive form of colonization of new lands for agriculture, but on the other hand, halted the development of cities, and of the higher forms of economic life to be found there.

Ukraine possesses unlimited natural resources. The Englishman Joseph Marshall, who travelled in Ukraine from 1769 to 1770, noted that "Ukraine, with respect to the treasures of nature, is the most important province of Russia." It is noteworthy as a general remark, that Ukraine was not only to his liking, but greatly impressed this demanding Englishman. He wrote that "the Ukrainian peasants are the best agriculturists of all Russia." Comparing the level of agriculture in Ukraine with that of England, he emphasizes that "he had seen no other country that so much resembled the best farm-land of England."

Coal deposits in the Donets basin are estimated at 79 billion tons, of which 30 per cent is anthracite. There, coal can be found at a depth of 430 feet, while that of the Ruhr is at 1950 feet, and in England at an average of 1000 feet. Among other coal basins of the world, Donbas takes seventh place. In Europe, only the Ruhr and Saar basins come before it.

The deposits of iron ore in Kryvy Rih are estimated at 1,5 billion tons, or 600 millions tons of pure iron which would equal about 9 per cent of the world's total. The thickness of the ore layer is from 30 feet to 100 feet, and in some places from 300 feet to 400 feet. Deposits of a lower grade of ore near Kerch are estimated at 2.7 billion tons. Deposits of iron quartzites, (a reserve for iron), which are found near Kremenchuk, Kryvy Rih, and other places are roughly estimated at 100 billion tons.

Manganese ore, found near Nikopol, which is of the utmost importance in the manufacture of steel, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, is estimated at 500 million tons, or 190 million tons of the pure metal. This is about 40 to 50 per cent of the whole

world's supply. World production of manganese in 1937 was 1.68 million tons, of which Ukraine produced 1.3 million tons.

Ukraine has also soft coal, peat and natural gas. Mercury is plentiful, estimated at 4.3 million tons. Deposits of a variety of salts and minerals, estimated at over 100 billion tons, constitute unlimited raw material supplies for chemical industries. There is oil in Pre-Caucasia, the Kerch peninsula, Poltava and Drohobych. Ukraine is rich in phosphorites and graphite. There are some supplies, although relatively smaller, of copper, lead, tin and silver.

Besides this, Ukraine has an adequate supply of structural stone, marble, clay and kaolin. There are plentiful raw materials for cement production in supplies of lime mortars and chalk. Only ores of colored metals are relatively scarce.

The natural resources of Ukraine offer unlimited opportunities for economic development.

By combining Donets coal with Kryvy Rih and Kerch ores, Ukraine can create a gigantic metallurgical industry, which is the foundation of all forms of machine industry. Having within her lands adequate raw materials of all forms, she can develop varied industries, which would guarantee all-round and harmonious industrial growth.

Her possession of the best soil in the world is a basis for the development of intensive agriculture and animal husbandry. This would take care of all the food requirements of the rural and urban population, and would still provide the necessary raw material for the development of the food industry, and such light industries as are necessary, especially textiles.

Cultivation of sugar-beets, sunflowers, corn and potatoes, gives not only sugar, oil, etc. but also raw materials for a whole series of industries.

Cultivation of flax, hemp, sisal and cotton provides the basis for a textile industry.

Intensification of animal husbandry would aid in the development of meatpacking, dairy, and milk products and canning.

The intrinsic combination of soil, climate and an industrious population constitute an exclusive natural, and at the same time economic, complex. In other words Ukraine, due to natural circumstances, could be a completely independent territorial-

economic body, the harmonious development of which would satisfy all the needs of the population in full.

Not all these natural factors have played a positive role in Ukraine's history. From the viewpoint of Ukraine's interests, the fact that a major part of the profitable mines are situated on her borders, is definitely a detriment. The absence of natural frontier barriers has had a particularly tragic meaning in her history. True, the open and even features of the land favored the spread of colonization, which reached the Black and Azov Seas in the 18th century, but, on the other hand, turned Ukraine into a field for economic and political expansion on the part of a series of peoples and nations in the course of history.

The history of the Ukrainian nation is the struggle of its people for the right to live in a state of their own, a struggle gained and lost several times. At those times, when the entire energies of the people would be directed toward the reconstruction of their own state, other, alien nations would attempt to destroy all such manifestations of a separate national life. From about one thousand years ago, down to our own times, it has been conducting a fight for national existence. Alternating with the tide of Tatar hordes under Mongolian leadership of the 13th century, there later came Turks, Poles, and Russians. The years of the existence of Ukraine as an independent state alternated with periods of occupation and enslavement by other, hostile nations. The last, and most sanguine struggle for Ukraine between Nazi Germany and bolshevik Russia, caused all Ukraine to fall into the hands of the Soviets, lands which had heretofore been torn among Poles, Czechs, Roumanians and Russians. The Ukrainian people, once more became occupied, enslaved and exploited.

The struggle for Ukraine is primarily caused by the desire to profit from the immense natural wealth with which she has so richly been endowed.

b) UKRAINE'S PLACE IN THE SOVIET POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM

The overthrow of tsarism in Russia in 1917 after the February revolution, and the subsequent assumption of power by the bolsheviks towards the end of 1917, predetermined the course of events, which had fatal repercussions upon Ukraine.

1. PERIOD OF ARMED CONFLICT (1918 — 1920).

As is known, the armed conflict between the Ukrainian National Republic, constituted in 1917, and bolshevik Russia continued from the beginning of 1918 until 1921.

During the time of this conflict, the policy of the Soviet government toward Ukraine was visibly directed against the interests of the Ukrainian people in the most general aspect.¹

As is also well known from the middle of 1918 until the spring of 1921, there came into being a specific economy order, which was later called "war communism."

A policy of requisitioning was the pivot of this economic policy at that time. An introduction of "bread monopoly" and requisitioning took away all grain surplus (so-called) from the peasants and delivered it into the hands of the government. Commerce in grain was prohibited.

All industry, not only large and medium, but even small businesses were nationalized, and its management centralized and bureaucratized to a fantastic degree.

All banks were nationalized, too. A definite course was taken towards the establishment of an economy that would function without money. With the disappearance of banks, taxes in money disappeared also. The state instituted the principle of services without compensation. Finally, early in 1921, taxation in money was completely abolished. Domestic commerce underwent a complete change, and the cooperative movement was liquidated.

The centralization of economic processes and of state government predicated appropriate changes in the sector of the organization of human labor, with the introduction of compulsory labor service. Workers and clerks lost the right to change employment on their own initiative. "Unproductive elements" were forcibly drawn into "productive activity," which consisted of shovelling snow, chopping wood, and all kinds of earth-moving and ditching operations.

The era of "war communism" resulted in the exclusion of markets and marketing operations from economic life, elimination of all stimuli and initiative that would lead to more profitable yields of labor, a primitivization of economic con-

¹ The bolsheviks occupied Ukraine for a time early in 1918, then again partially in 1919, and finally in 1920 — 1921.

ditions achieved by way of strict regulation of the economy through powerful bureaucratic institutions.

This is a general characteristic of the era of "war communism." This entire period, as has been noted, was a time of resolute struggle by Ukraine for an independent national existence.

The armed conflict between Soviet Russia and Ukraine between 1917 and 1920 was a war for the political and economic mastery of Ukraine. For this reason Moscow's policy of "war communism" had in Ukraine all the features of a policy of armed occupation and plunder, which continued for some months after the NEP policy had been introduced in Russia.

The struggle was primarily for Ukrainian bread. Lenin emphasized at that time that "we cannot hold out without Ukrainian bread," and that "the struggle for bread is the struggle for socialism." According to decrees on requisitioning, peasants had to surrender all their so-called grain surplus, with the exception of very limited rations for personal consumption.

In point of fact, everything was taken away from the peasants that could be taken. They, in turn staged all forms of resistance, refusing to surrender bread without pay. The communist party then, in the words of Lenin, organized "a crusade for bread." A dictatorship of supply was established by decree, and the Peoples' Commissariat of Supply was given extraordinary powers to effect grain collection. Special delegates were dispatched to the countryside to put the plan to work. Laborers from the Moscow area were mobilized into special requisitioning detachments, which were sent armed into Ukraine to perform the task of collecting bread reserves.

During the second bolshevik Russian occupation of Ukraine in 1919, special so-called "committees of the poor" were formed of declassed and russified elements, whose task was to take away everything from the peasants that they could lay their hands on, ostensibly for the execution of official plans. Special armed detachments were put in charge of all railroad stations in Ukraine, to prevent any kind of traffic in bread within the borders of Ukraine.

It was real war. PRAVDA wrote in March of 1919: "after hard and bloody battles, the Red Army has opened the road to bread, because it has taken Ukraine. It has paved the way to

coal, having restored to the working class three fourths of the Donets basin.”¹

Shlikhter, one of the commissars Moscow ordered to Ukraine to put grain collecting into effect, gave a precise summary of the situation which then prevailed. At a meeting of the Moscow council of workers' delegates on March 22, 1919, he said: "You all remember when Ukraine was becoming Soviet, every day's forward movement of the Red Army brought us and you relief: Ukraine, full of wealth and bread is ours!.. We have four central military departments of supply. All our hopes are on them! We have a mass of dispatched (from Russia to Ukraine) workers, who will know how to take over Ukrainian villages. We always remember that the eyes of the proletariat of Russia are all turned toward Ukraine.”²

An idea of how Russian troops behaved in Ukraine can be had from what the newspaper of the Ukrainian Communist Party (opposed to RCP and CP(b)U), CHERVONY PRAPOR (Red Banner) wrote in its issue of February 28, 1919: "The point is that bread is being taken without any plan, without control, and mostly without money. Everybody takes bread, including government agents, but it is all seized, there is no organization and this has such an effect on the peasants that it cannot be expected to last very long. And we must remark in general that by terror and force one cannot take much from our peasants." And further: "Detachments are sent from Kursk to Kiev, to defend us here. They also order us to have the railroad rolling stock sent to Kursk. And they write in Moscow that Ukraine must supply Moscow not only with bread, but also with raw materials."

Stated briefly, the Ukrainian peasant was compelled to surrender not only grain and fodder, but, also potatoes, cattle, meat, poultry, butter, fruit, honey and mushrooms, in fact everything edible.

Bolshevik Russia considered Ukraine a colony. Economic exploitation went hand in hand with complete denial of Ukrainian culture. All cultural manifestations were labelled as counter-revolutionary and destroyed without mercy. Ukrainian newspapers were prohibited, Ukrainian printing plants confis-

¹ V. Vynnychenko, *Vidrodshennya natsiyi*, part III. Kiev—Vienna, 1920, p. 303.

² Dmytro Solovey, *Helhota Ukrayiny*. Winnipeg, 1953, p. 22.

cated and schools closed. Those who spoke Ukrainian were taken off the streets and, if not put before firing squads immediately, made dangerously suspect of participating in counter-revolution.

Small wonder, therefore, that the chief of the Soviet Government in Ukraine declared openly at a council of workers' deputies on February 13, 1919: "Decreeing the Ukrainian language to be the official language is a reactionary measure. Who needs this? This improvised intelligentsia and bureaucracy which has been produced by independent Ukraine?"

Another, no less flagrant incident: the Commissar of the Chief Military Sanitation Command wrote a letter (No. 3453, February 10, 1919) to the Commissar of the Chief Commandant's Office. He wrote in the language of the Ukrainian State, i. e. in Ukrainian. The Aide of the Chief of the Kiev Garrison wrote the following memorandum on this letter to the Commissar. "In Soviet Russia only the Russian language is used. It is not permissible to spend public money to hire translators. Please write in Russian. Signature."

The Ukrainian peasants and the Ukrainian people in general regarded the bolshevik rule in Ukraine as hostile and alien, and staged merciless opposition against it. According to Kh. Rakovsky, then chief of the government which Moscow had designated for Ukraine, **THERE WERE 328 UPRISINGS IN UKRAINE**, during a period of only three and one half months of the spring and summer of 1919. Of this number:

from April 1, to May 1, 1919 = 93 uprisings

" May 1, to May 15, 1919 = 28 "

" June 1, to June 19, 1919 = 207 " *

All these uprisings against bolshevik Russia were conducted under slogans of an independent Soviet Ukraine, under the leadership of communists-borotbists and Ukrainian left-wing social-democrats.

A secret Soviet publication of 1921 gives the following illustration of conditions in that period: "During the years 1919 and 1920, more than one million insurgents took up arms against us in Ukraine, at various times and in various places. During this time the insurgents and partisans killed forty thousand Red

* V. Vynnychenko, *op. cit.*, p. 310.

* *Ibid.*, pp. 309, 310.

* Dmytro Solovey, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

Army soldiers, Chekists, communists, and workers in grain collective agencies and detachments. Che-Ka (extraordinary commissions for the suppression of counter-revolution, abbreviated Che-Ka) and special military units, according to official reports executed over four hundred thousand insurgents and their adherents, and in spite of that, with the spring of 1921 there was a new wave of uprisings...".

The economic policy of that time, as is well known, brought about a complete disintegration of the national economy of Russia and other national republics.

Faced with requisitioning contingents, the peasants reduced the area of cultivation to the minimum required for their own subsistence. This resulted in the harvest of grain for 1920 being only about 63 per cent of that for 1913.⁹

The position of industry was much worse. It consumed its own reserves, and could barely stay alive. Production figures of the large industrial establishments in 1920 fell to one seventh of their pre-war level. A majority of plants and factories stood idle. Coal mines and ore pits were flooded. The land was in the midst of an acute fuel crisis. Transportation was completely ruined: carloadings were down to 20 per cent in 1920 compared with 1913.¹⁰

The people suffered an acute shortage of all essentials; bread and other cereal products, meats, sugar, clothes, shoes, matches, salt, soap, kerosene, fuels, metals etc.

Inflation reached exceptional proportions. The Soviet rouble was falling with catastrophic speed. As of July 1, 1921 the nominal sum of money in circulation had increased 119 times, and prices of goods had increased 7,918 times, or 66.5 times the increase of printed money.¹¹

Nutrition in the cities deteriorated considerably. The population was really half-starving. Town and city housing, following its nationalization, was without a landlord. Nobody cared for dwellings, there was no maintenance and gradual de-

⁹ *Ukrainsky politicheski banditizm. (Yego prychny, formy i borba s nim). Izdaniye OO KBO, 1921. Cited from Yuriy Horlis-Horsky Spohady, Lviv, 1935, p. II.*

¹⁰ L. Krytsman, *Gerolicheski period velikoy ruskoy revolyutsii*, 2nd ed. Moscow—Leningrad, 1926, p. 155.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 163.

¹² L. Krytsman, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

¹³ E. Hlovisky, *Finansy USSR*, Warsaw, 1939, p. 26.

terioration followed. Public utilities, such as water, sewers, power plants, and gasworks, functioned under insurmountable handicaps due to lack of fuel. Dwellings went unheated. Epidemics of typhus and typhoid became widespread. A lowered standard of living, insufficient food and clothing and unheated homes helped spread these epidemics.¹² The urban population began seeking safety in the villages, and this brought about a decrease in the urban population of more than 35 per cent between 1916 and 1920.¹³

Illustrative of the characteristic conditions of life during that period is the fact that even in Russia proper there were many uprisings and rebellious movements the most significant of which were that of Kronstadt and a peasant uprising in the Tambov gubernia.

Briefly stated, the policy of wartime communism led to the complete disintegration of economic life. As a result of this policy a great famine broke out in the Soviet Union in 1921. A thorough change in this policy was the order of the day.

2. PERIOD OF THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY (1921 — 1928)

In March 1921 a decree was issued changing the system of requisitioning contingents into a tax in farm products. This was the beginning of a new economic policy, which acquired fame as NEP.

THE HISTORY OF THE ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY gives the following explanation of change in economic policy: "War communism was an attempt to storm the fort by frontal attack. In this attack the party went too far, ahead, risking disruption from its base. Lenin proposed that they should retrench for a while, so that later they could marshal their forces for a new attack."¹⁴

The meaning of this decree lay not only in the fact that the amount of taxes was lowered and that news of this must reach the peasants before the time of spring planting. The main meaning

¹² There were 8,312,000 cases of disease in the USSR in 1920, out of this figure: 3,303,000, typhoid 627,000, paratyphoid 1,406,000 etc. See L. Krytsman, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

¹³ L. Krytsman, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

¹⁴ *Istoriya Vsesoyuznoy Kommunisticheskoy Partii (b.) Kratki kurs. Gosudarstvennoye Izdatelstva Politicheskoy Literatury, 1945, p. 245.*

of this decree was that after fulfilling his tax duties to the government, the peasant would be in full ownership of all his produce. The peasant was given the right to sell all his surplus at current prices on the free market. This made him interested in improving his farm methods, and increasing production, because he was the unrestricted owner of the fruits of his labor.

Understandably, the decree on taxation which repealed the monopoly of the state to deal in farm products, became the foundation of a series of other phenomena, which were instrumental in effecting a basic change in economic conditions in the USSR.

Freedom of commerce was introduced gradually. In June 1921 all restrictions on monetary transactions were discarded, as well as ceilings on private money holdings. A whole series of small industrial enterprises became de-nationalized. Central management of the national economy was abolished. All restrictions which had made labor compulsory were repealed. Instead of getting paid in rations and ration-cards, workers were paid in money. Taxes in money and payment for services made their reappearance. A currency reform was effected in 1924, and a system of credits and a network of banks were re-established.

Briefly, the economy was now being developed through private initiative and the widening of markets.

Even during the third occupation of Ukraine (1920—1921), bolshevik Moscow, faced with an opposition embracing all of Ukraine, came to realize that it was imperative to conform to existing conditions, as the only means of mastering this land.

With the changeover to a new economic policy, there was also a change in policy towards Ukraine. Now the conquest of Ukraine was conducted by peaceful means, as an "equal" Union republic. A necessary precondition for this was the creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1922.

As in the time of the tsars, Moscow continued to treat Ukraine as an object of colonial exploitation and plunder. But this policy as conducted by Soviet Moscow was more treacherous, more subtle and more thorough. It was based on entirely different political principles.

Tsarist Russia refused to admit the existence of Ukraine, but communist Russia, having conquered the Government of the Ukrainian People's Republic by force of arms, established an allegedly separate Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, which,

according to the constitution "exercises state authority independently," and accordingly "reserved the right freely to secede from the USSR."¹⁵

With the establishment of the USSR at the end of 1922, a Ukrainian, V. Chubar, was made head of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR, and another Ukrainian, H. Hrynko, its Commissar of Education.

Changing conditions under NEP, more Ukrainians in the Government of Ukraine, and a generally more favorable Ukrainian course of policy, gave her more autonomy than heretofore, although constitutionally she was more tightly bound to Moscow than before. Terror diminished with the initiation of the New Economic Policy. Former Ukrainian soldiers and partisans received an amnesty. Bolshevik Moscow realized that the basic power of Ukraine lay in the villages, and in the peasants, as they were the ones who most obstinately opposed the regime. The bolsheviks therefore, in their desire to hold on to power, had to turn their policy to the needs of the peasants. This was the origin of the banner-phrase of "unity of city and village," which led irresistably to the institution of a Ukrainian course (of policy) and under prevailing conditions found its expression in Ukrainization.

Pro-Russian elements, headed by the Secretary-General of the communist party of Ukraine, Lebed, were decidedly opposed to the course of Ukrainization. They brought out the slogan of "a struggle of two cultures," which in turn unified all Ukrainian communists. The latter considered it imperative to root out all influence of Russian culture. One of them, O. Shumsky, emphasized that the struggle between the Ukrainian and Russian cultures would cease only on condition that the latter granted the former those "rights of citizenship," which it did not have.

The argument ended with the defeat of Lebed's concept, and by 1925 Ukrainization was put into effect, pursuant to a decree adopted on August 1, 1923.¹⁶

¹⁵ Parts of art. 15 and 17 in: *Konstitutsiya (osnovnoy zakon) SSSR. Konstitutsii (osnovnye zakony) sovyuznykh sovetskikh sotsialisticheskikh respublik*, Moscow, 1951, pp. 67,68.

¹⁶ "The Government of Workers and Peasants deems it necessary... as quickly as possible to center the attention of the state on the dissemination of the Ukrainian language. ..The formal equality between the two most prevalent languages in Ukraine, the Ukrainian and Russian, as heretofore

Ukrainian culture was thus conceded to be a national culture, and under the tutelage of the Ukrainian SSR.

All concessions in the sector of Ukrainization were exacted by force, and were made with the sole objective of pacifying the tempestuous tide (mainly peasant) and of turning the peasants' attention away from an orientation on the government of the Ukrainian People's Republic, which was in exile.

After the Lebed argument was over, the Ukrainians, attempting to ignore and insulate themselves from sovietism, began to spread the idea of the possibility of working within the framework of the Soviet regime, and of utilizing legal methods of struggle for independence of Ukraine, particularly in culture and economics.

As a result of the proclaimed amnesty, hundreds of former active participants in the Government of the Ukrainian People's Republic began to return from exile at this time, in order to take part in the national and cultural renaissance of Ukraine. Thousands of Ukrainians from Galicia, then under Polish rule, came along with them. The Ukrainians joined the communist party and soviet institutions en masse, gained a majority in many of them, and were able to give their work a Ukrainian content.

Ukrainian communists favored the Ukrainization of cities by absorbing Ukrainian peasant elements in them, and in this manner filled the ranks of workers and government employees with Ukrainians.

Denationalized elements returned to their national consciousness, by education, entertainment, the press, literature and radio, i. e. by providing them with favorable surroundings.

Much was accomplished in a relatively short period of time: all education, including higher, was Ukrainized, Ukrainian science, literature and art achieved great success; the publishing field was signally successful (numerous editions of all the works

observed, is insufficient. As a result of the general development of Ukrainian culture in lesser degree, the lack of proper text-books, and insufficient education of personnel, life itself, as shown by experience, causes a factual preponderance of the Russian language... In order to do away with this inequality, the Government of Workers and Peasants employs a series of practical measures which, observing the equal rights of all nationalities in Ukrainian territories, must assure the Ukrainian language of a place commensurate with the number and specific weight of the Ukrainian people in the territory of the Ukr. SSR." See S. Nykolyshyn, *Kulturna polityka bolshevykiv i ukraïn'sky kulturny protses*, p. 22.

of Ukrainian literature came out, as well as many fine translations of the classics of world literature); Ukrainian cities, Russified for centuries were now being Ukrainized, as mentioned above. This was done systematically, and with great perseverance; all Government correspondence was completely Ukrainized. A Red Army officers' school was established at that time for the purpose of educating a Ukrainian officer class.

Mykola Skrypnyk, at that time Peoples' Commissar of Education, said in 1927: "During the period of the revolution we have published more Ukrainian books than during the entire 130 years of the existence of Ukrainian literature. Ukrainian culture is growing, the circle of publications is widening..."¹⁷

There were 30 per cent Ukrainians in "VUZ" (Institutions of Higher Education) in 1924, and 55 per cent in 1933. Secondary technical schools had 57 per cent Ukrainians in 1924, and 68 per cent in 1933.¹⁸

No less impressive are the statistics on the Ukrainization of the cities and of the working class.

The percentage of Ukrainians in some cities was:¹⁹

	1923	1926	1933
Stalino	7	26.0	31.0
Zaporizzhya	28	47.0	56.0
Voroshilovhrad	21	43.0	60.0
Dnipropetrovsk	16	36.0	48.0
Kharkiw	37.9	38.3	50.0

Among the industrial workers in the cities there were 41.6 per cent Ukrainians in 1926 and 48 per cent in 1929. The average percentage of Ukrainians among the membership of labor unions increased during this same period from 49.9 per cent to 57.2 per cent.

During this period (1926 to 1929) the percentage of those who spoke Ukrainian in the workers' families increased from 33.2 per cent to 43.9 per cent, and Ukrainian literacy among the workers increased from 40.2 per cent to 58.2 per cent.²⁰

The process of the Ukrainian national renaissance had to conform to the Soviet order of things, but there were visible attempts, some not unsuccessful, to substitute the "national form with socialist content" with "socialist form with national

¹⁷ M. Skrypnyk, *Statti i promovy*, v. V, Kharkiw, 1930, p. 59.

¹⁸ *Pravda*, December 2, 1933.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Pravda*, No. 74, 1931.

content." Coupled with national culture there was an increase in the national consciousness of a people.

The course of Ukrainization met with greater opposition on the part of Russian elements, who were quite open in their opposition. This met with a sharp rebuttal on the part of Ukrainian representatives at the 2nd Session of the 3rd meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR in 1926.

The chairman of the Council of Ukrainian Peoples' Commissars, V. Chubar, said: "Ukrainian workers and Ukrainian peasants have a right (a right won in the revolution and confirmed by Soviet law) to satisfy their needs in the Ukrainian language. Therefore all complaints, all foolish talk about Ukrainian chauvinism, as expressed by Ukrainization is absolutely groundless."²¹

H. Hrynko said the same thing, emphasizing that all proposals against Ukrainization "prevent backward and formerly oppressed nations from moving along the great way of real national rebirth."²²

The declaration of H. Petrovsky, chief of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee was very significant. He said: "Does the Ukrainian Government really conduct a policy of oppressing the Russian population of Ukraine? Permit me to admit a great injury to the Ukrainian population: we are at fault for not having realized the directives in the matter of the nationalities policy with enough speed and firmness. It suffices to recall that the congress of the Ukrainian communist party was conducted almost exclusively in Russian. This highest party institution determines the entire cultural and economic policy of the land. Let us not forget that we are already in the 9th year of the existence of Soviet authority, and that it is time to push to the forefront in this land, where tsarism oppressed everything, Ukrainian cultural and national forces... The Plenum of the Central Committee of the communist party is conducted in Russian... and in our Peoples' Commissariats, the language is also Russian."²³

Influenced by the rebirth of the Ukrainian nation, which took place as a result of the economic and cultural development

²¹ Tsentralny Ispolnitelny Komitet. Stenograficheski Otchet 3-vo soziva, 2 sessiya, 1926 g. Moscow, 1926, pp. 404, 405.

²² Ibid. pp. 473 — 474.

²³ Ibid. pp. 499 — 500.

of Ukraine, a number of Ukrainian communists went over to positions of uncompromising patriotism. Under such circumstances, Moscow's centralist policy, which assumed a more visible form, inevitably gave birth to an opposition within the Central Committee of the CP(b)U.

O. Shumsky was the leader of this opposition.²¹ But even earlier, under the leadership of M. Khvylovy, the so-called literary discussion made its appearance, which was in reality an attempt by Ukrainian communists to take a stand for independence, against bolshevik Moscow.

A certain segment of Ukrainian emigre's, former leaders of the Ukrainian People's Republic, who were then in exile, put much faith and hope in the national opposition within the CP(b)U. In this connection one of them, M. Shapoval, gave the following advice: "At this historical moment for us in soviet Ukraine, to boycott the Russian elements and to separate the Ukrainians in distinct organizations all down the line is more expeditious. The fact that a national Ukrainian communist opposition has come into being within the CP(b)U is of great importance. All Ukrainian elements should support this opposition, and in no case should they come up with separate programs. In order to increase the influence of the Ukrainian communist opposition we must all conduct ourselves in such a way that this opposition be considered the expression of the will and interest of Ukrainian workers and peasants... The Ukrainian intelligentsia should openly recognize and defend the Soviet system of government, but stress that this government must be elected by peasants and workers of Ukraine. Moscow's rule in Ukraine can be undermined and finally destroyed, not by introducing separate programs and constitutions, but by demanding that the rule of peasants and workers be realized. Leninism can only be conquered with Leninism. This paradox must be understood by all those who wish to destroy Moscow's dictatorship. Moscow destroyed us by conceding 'Ukrainian independence', i. e. by the very thing for which we were fighting."²²

²¹ The Politburo of CC CP(b)U decisively condemned "Shumskism" in April 1927. He was demoted from the position of Peoples' Commissar of Education of the Ukraine, transferred to Moscow, and later died in exile.

²² A. Khvylya, *Vid ukhlyu u prirvu*. Derzhavne Vudavnytstvo Ukrayiny. 1928, pp. 50-51.

What was most significant in the concept of M. Khvylovy and his adherents in this discussion?

From the viewpoint of M. Khvylovy, "Ukrainization on the one hand is the result of the unconquered will of a nation 30-odd million strong, and on the other hand, it is the only means by which the proletariat can take over the cultural movement."¹⁸ M. Khvylovy maintained that Ukrainization "is opening our nation's door wide to the world."¹⁹

And further he wrote: "To the extent that our literature is finally embarking upon its own path of development, we are faced with this problem: "On which of the world's literatures should it model itself?", and he answers: "In any event not on the Russian. This is definite and without any qualifications... From Russian literature and its type Ukrainian poetry must escape as fast as possible... The trouble is that Russian literature has been weighing upon us for centuries, like a master who has taught our psyche servile imitation. Therefore to educate our young art upon it, would mean to halt its growth. Proletarian ideas we know without Russian art; on the contrary, these ideas can be felt by we representatives of a younger nation more readily, and we shall more readily pour them into appropriate images. Our orientation is on Western European art, its style and its accepted form."²⁰

Hence Khvylovy's slogan of orientation on Europe. Because: "Europe today is the result of the experience of many centuries. It is not the Europe which Spengler proclaimed to be in decline'... It is a Europe of grandiose civilization, the Europe of Goethe, Darwin, Byron, Newton, Marx, etc... It is that Europe, without which there can be no vanguard of an Asiatic renaissance."²¹

As if in premonition of the condemnation of this slogan, Khvylovy stressed that "union is nevertheless union, and Ukraine an independent unit... Little Russia has gone into the land

¹⁸ M. Khvylovy, "Apolohety pysaryzmu (do problemy kulturnoyi revolutsiyi)." Originally published in 1926... See *Nashi pozysiyi*, No. 2, 1948, p. 60.

¹⁹ M. Khvylovy, *Dumky proty techiyi*. Derzh. V. Ukr. 1926, pp. 19, 20.

²⁰ M. Khvylovy, "Apolohety..." pp. 62, 63... That is why Khvylovy accused the Ukrainian intelligentsia of "being unable to think ...without a Russian conductor." See his *Dumky proty techiyi*. Pamphlets. Derzhavne Vydavnytstvo Ukrayiny, 1926, pp. 51, 52.

²¹ M. Khvylovy, *Kamo hryadeshy*, pamphlets, *Knyhosplika*, 1925. p. 42.

of shadows... Is Russia an independent nation? Independent! But, we are also independent."²²

Shumskism-Khvylovism was a determining factor in the development of the Ukrainian historical process. It originated in a concept of the universal development of national cultures, national economies and national states. Khvylovy maintained: "Inasmuch as the Ukrainian nation sought its liberation for centuries, we take that to signify its unconquerable will to reveal and fulfill its national (not nationalist) image."

"This national image appears in a culture under the conditions of free development... and this integrity and will is the cause of catching up with other nations, as we have observed, for example, among the Romans who, in a comparatively short period, were able to get very close to Greek culture. This national essence must also find fulfillment in art."²³

Subsequently M. Volobuyev developed the economic concept of Shumskism-Khvylovism in his work "Dó problemy Ukrayinskoyi Ekonomiky" (The Problem of the Ukrainian Economy), published in BILSHOVYK UKRAYINY, the organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine, in 1928. The author stressed in this work that pre-revolutionary Ukraine was "a colony" in relation to Russia.²⁴

Discussing Soviet Ukraine, Volobuyev cited a number of examples from the field of economics which attested to the colonial position of Ukraine in relation to Moscow. Hence his desire "to introduce some clarity into the problem of mutual relations between the Russian and the Ukrainian economy since the revolution". He further pointed out that "Ukraine did not join the USSR as a colony, but as an equal republic."²⁵

"Since the revolution," wrote Volobuyev, "the Ukrainian economy has ceased to be supplementary to that of Russia. It is now on equal terms." But, "to the professional dyed-in-the-wool Russian the problem does not exist... he will not consider that Ukraine is not a province of Russia."²⁶

As can readily be seen from the above, M. Volobuyev and

²² M. Khvylovy, "Apolohety..." in "Kultura i pobut", Visti VUTsVE, 1926.

²³ M. Khvylovy, *Dumky proty techlyl*. Pamphlets. Derzhavne Vydavnytstvo Ukrayiny, 1926, pp. 48-49.

²⁴ Bilshovyk Ukrayiny, No. 2, 3, 1928.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Bilshovyk Ukrayiny No. 3, 1928.

other Ukrainian communists assumed the same "away from Moscow" position as M. Khvylovy, but their point of view was predicated on facts of economics. Hence his requirement that "Ukrainian economic centers be confirmed in the rights and opportunities of managing the entire national economy without qualification."²²

Hence also his assertion that "the liquidation of the provincial status of our language, literature and culture in general will be possible only as a result of enabling Ukraine to develop her productive forces without hindrance, and recognizing her as a formulated and finished national-economic organism, which will in turn become possible when she ceases to be regarded simply as a sum total of some regions of a single, indivisible economy."²³

The article ended with these words: "we must not forget that Ukraine is not merely the 'South of the USSR'," we must never forget that she is also Ukraine."²⁴

Other Ukrainian communists wrote in the same vein, not as openly, and with more caution.

The achievements of Ukrainization worried Moscow, because right in front of their eyes there was a cultural movement growing into a political tide.

The struggle going on within and without the CP(b)U, conducted by Ukrainian communists for Ukrainian independence, explains Stalin's nervous reaction to the so-called "literary discussion" in Ukraine. In his letter to L. Kaganovich and other members of the Ukrainian Politburo C.C. CP(b)U in the matter of O. Shumsky, Stalin wrote that "the struggle for the Ukrainian cultural movement assumes the proportions of a general struggle against Moscow, against Russians in general, and against Russian culture and its highest achievement — Leninism... Yes, the danger in Ukraine is becoming more and more real... At a time when Western-European proletarians and their communist parties are full of sympathy to Moscow, the Ukrainian communist Khvylovy is unable to say anything, except to call upon Ukrainian leaders to run away from Moscow 'as fast as possible'.²⁵

L. Kaganovich, sent down from Moscow as Secretary-Ge-

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ This was the name applied to Ukraine under tsarism.

²⁵ Bilshovyk Ukrayiny No. 3, 1928.

²⁶ J. V. Stalin, *Sochineniya* VIII, Moscow, 1948, pp. 152, 153.

neral of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine wrecked Shumskism-Khvylovism. O. Shumsky and H. Hrynko were deported from Ukraine. M. Volobuyev and his doctrine were condemned by a special resolution of the party central committee. The NKVD initiated a wide action against the so-called Ukrainian "bourgeois nationalism."

Early in 1930 the court trial, staged against SVU (Spilka Vyzvolennya Ukrayiny — Association for the Liberation of Ukraine), gave the bolsheviks an opportunity to liquidate savagely many worthy Ukrainian leaders in the field of culture; academicians, professors and civic leaders.

This trial allowed the Soviets to conduct through courts, and often without, mass repression against all segments of Ukrainian nationally conscious elements; the intelligentsia, peasants and workers. The Ukrainian Autocephalic Church was also liquidated at that time, and a series of trials were staged, for example of agronomists,⁴² forestry workers, and others.

Stalin saw clearly in the early 1930-s after the liquidation of NEP and the forcible collectivization of agriculture that Ukraine was very far from being submissive to his imperial interests. This complicated the situation and necessitated changing his nationality policy toward Ukraine, which took the form of dispersal of the forces of the Ukrainian renaissance, liquidation of the Ukrainization policy and institution of total terror against all segments of the Ukrainian nation.

3. THE BEGINNING OF FORCED COLLECTIVIZATION.

The beginning of the new stage did not find the Ukrainians giving up their struggle for autonomy, although the struggle assumed a different form in the early 1930-s.

The main purpose of the forced collectivization of agriculture was, as is well known, to develop a strong industry at the expense of the peasants, and thus increase the Soviets' war potential, which in turn was necessary to reach their chief objective: the overthrow of governments and the installation of communism throughout the entire world.⁴³

⁴² *Pravda*, March 20, 1930.

⁴³ During the period from 1926-27 to 1936-37 the Government's grain reserves increased in proportion to the total grain harvested from 17.8% to 49.7%. See S. N. Prokopovich, *Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR*, v. 1, New York, 1952, p. 213.

Nowadays nobody believes that the peasants joined the collective farms of their own volition. "The best evidence of this point is the fact that less than 2 per cent of the peasant households entered collective farms during the years of the New Economic Policy, between 1921 and 1929, when the choice between individual and collective farming was genuinely free."⁴¹

As is known, the compulsory establishment of collective farms proceeded simultaneously with the liquidation of the so-called "kurkuls" as a class. The "de-kurkulization" was an extremely painful operation. "There has been a huge "liquidation" of the more well-to-do and incorrigibly individualistic peasants loosely and conveniently dubbed "kurkuls". They have been packed off in hundreds of thousands, if not in millions, for forced labor in timber camps, on canals, and in new construction enterprises."⁴²

This was open, unconcealed oppression by the government against the most cultured wealthier peasants, the aim of which was to show the remainder what kind of fate lay in store for them if they resisted collectivization. In spite of this, the Ukrainian peasants, well aware of the reason why the collective farms were being established showed no desire to enter them, not wishing that the results of their labor be taken by the authorities without compensation.⁴³

The peasants opposed collectivization fiercely. In 1930, during the first stage of compulsory collectivization, there was a number of uprisings in various regions of Ukraine, which were cruelly suppressed by the government.

Unable to fight any other way, and being weakened by privation, the peasants fought passively, but in united mass opposition.

The bulk of the peasants remained in the countryside. Collectivization brigadiers went through the streets every morning, driving the peasants out to work. They went only under compulsion, taking a long time to get ready and starting work late. They invariably brought something back home, some

⁴¹ W. H. Chamberlin, *Russia's Iron Age*, Boston, 1934, p. 66.

⁴² *Ibid.* p. 67.

⁴³ According to Otto Schiller, in many cases in 1931 the collective farm workers got for a year's work hardly enough income to buy a pair of boots, and in some cases they received absolutely nothing. See Dr. Otto Schiller, *Die Krise der Sozialistischen Landwirtschaft in der Sowjetunion*, Berlin, 1933, pp. 62, 63.

ears of grain in a pocket or bag, knowing well that they would get little or nothing for their official working day.

The industrious Ukrainian peasant, who had tilled his own plot of land from sunrise to sunset, lost all zest for work when he was on the collective farm. He saw the general disorder, the ignorance of collective farm managers who, as a rule, know nothing of farming, being either communists sent down for the job, or ne'er-de-wells with party cards in their pockets.

From its beginning in 1929, and over a period of three years, the peasants fought collectivization with the greatest obstinacy. The struggle found repercussion in the press and at party meetings. It permeated all the life of that period. The stiffest opposition was in Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus.

Some examples:

"They are not making satisfactory preparation for the harvest campaign in Ukraine. We must break opportunism, mobilize the masses and get to work."⁴²

In the material quoted at the third All-Ukrainian Party Conference in July 1932, it was stressed that during the harvesting campaign of 1931, losses amounted to between 30 and 40 per cent, and were generally estimated to run between 2,400 and 3,200 thousands tons of grain.⁴³

In an editorial of October 7, 1931, PRAVDA wrote: "the majority of the regions of Ukraine and of the Northern Caucasus did not start the September grain collection campaign in a bolshevik manner."⁴⁴

After this the matter of grain collections was never off the pages of PRAVDA. "The surrender of bread is particularly behind in Ukraine"⁴⁵; "Ukraine is the most decisive area of bread collection in the entire Union"⁴⁶; "The Party is expecting the CP(b)U to give an exemplary performance in the matter of bread"⁴⁷; "Ukrainian bolsheviks have not made a break-through on the bread front"⁴⁸; and finally early in March PRAVDA admitted that "Ukraine is far behind in the completion of grain collections (86 per cent)."⁴⁹ Wits such a balance was the

⁴² Pravda, May 23, 1931.

⁴³ Pravda, July 7, July 9, 1932.

⁴⁴ Pravda, October 7, 1931.

⁴⁵ Pravda, December 31, 1931.

⁴⁶ Ibid., January 6, 1932.

⁴⁷ Ibid., January 13, 1932.

⁴⁸ Ibid., January 28, 1932.

⁴⁹ Ibid., March 6, 1932.

agricultural year 1931 ended, the second year of the collectivized farms.

The next year showed that conditions of the agricultural affairs became even worse.

In March PRAVDA emphasized that "Ukraine is in the last ranks of grain collection" and that "Ukraine is disgracefully behind."⁸⁸

PRAVDA of March 8, criticized the accomplishments of the Northern Caucasus very sharply, stressing at the same time that "in Ukraine the situation is even worse."⁸⁹

"The party expects the Ukrainian organization to conduct a bolshevik struggle for the success of the sowing campaign,"⁹⁰ and a little later PRAVDA wrote that "the course of sowing in Ukraine is still unsatisfactory."⁹¹ Finally the Third All-Ukrainian Party Conference admitted that "the summing up of the sowing campaign in Ukraine showed it be unsatisfactory."⁹²

The harvest fared no better. According to conditions as of July 15, 1932, harvesting proceeded poorly all over the USSR. PRAVDA stressed that "this applies primarily to Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus."⁹³

PRAVDA commented on this matter many times. It emphasized that in comparison with the previous year, on the same date there were 5.1 million hectares less reaped in Ukraine, and 2 million less in the Northern Caucasus.⁹⁴

As of November 1, 1932 Ukraine had fulfilled for the year 1932: plan of grain collections 41 per cent, threshing 64 per cent, winter grain sowing 86 per cent, sugar-beet harvesting 69 per cent, and and sugar-beet deliveries 60 per cent.⁹⁵

Is it any wonder that during the gathering of the harvest in Ukraine in 1932 there was a loss of grain amounting to between 3,360,000 tons and 3,250,000 tons.⁹⁶

All indications pointed to Ukraine being on the threshold of great and epoch-making events.

⁸⁸ Ibid., March 2, 1932.

⁸⁹ Pravda, May 24, 1932.

⁹⁰ Ibid., March 8, 1932.

⁹¹ Pravda, July 15, 1932.

⁹² Pravda, May 18, 1932.

⁹³ Pravda, July 21, 1932.

⁹⁴ Pravda, July 26, 27, 28 and 30. The harvesting brigade of the collective farm "Chervona Armiya" in Ukraine was composed of 29 workers, they started work at 7.30 in the morning and worked until late at night, but actual working time was 2 hours and 14 minutes, during which they cut 2.5 hectares of rye. Pravda, July 31, 1933.

⁹⁵ Pravda, November 24, 1933.

⁹⁶ Pravda, August 22, 1933.

CHAPTER I.

1

PLANNING AND PREPARATION OF THE FAMINE

The All-Ukrainian Party Conference of July 1932. Participation of Molotov and Kaganovich. Preparatory activities towards organizing the famine. Decree of August 7, 1932 on dealing with thieves of socialist property, its contents and practical application. Decree of August 22, 1932 on dealing with speculators.

At the very beginning of compulsory collectivization the peasants of Ukraine assumed an attitude of decided opposition to the government and systematically refused to carry out its orders in the farming sector. A similar situation prevailed in the Northern Caucasus.

The Third All-Ukrainian Party Conference was called early in July of 1932, with just one problem up for discussion; the agricultural economy of Ukraine. The problem was formulated thus: "A summary of the spring planting campaign, preparation of grain reserves, a harvesting campaign and the task of an organizational strengthening of collectives." A poignant criticism of the work of the Ukrainian Party organization was delivered by representatives of Moscow, Politburo members V. Molotov and L. Kaganovich.

L. Kaganovich emphasized in his speech, that "we, the representatives of the central committee, are here to criticize the Ukrainian Party organization and its mistakes in the practical application of agricultural economies, which cannot be deemed satisfactory" (PRAVDA, July 14, 1932).

The conference itself, and speeches by delegates and facts and examples quoted by them, furnished conclusive proof that the peasants of Ukraine did not wish to join the collectives. Those who were forcibly put in collectives sabotaged the work and refused to work. The land taken away from the peasants for collectivization was not tilled properly, a lot of grain was wasted during harvesting, cattle were dying for lack of attention, and individual peasants were attempting to fend for themselves

by concealing part of the crops and directing their main efforts towards uncollectivized lands. The government could not doubt that the peasants had gone out on strike, assuming an attitude of opposition to its plans.

This anti-collective strike in Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus (Don and Kuban) put Moscow in a very awkward position, paralyzing the various stages of five-year-plans aimed at strengthening Moscow's military position. The result was an All-Union crisis, officially called "difficulties of the USSR" and its basis was the falling out of Ukraine from the planned system, Ukraine being the most important source of produce and war materials of the entire Soviet Union.

Moscow was well aware of the part played by Ukraine in providing grain reserves during the First Five-Year Plan initiated in 1928. During the first two years of the plan Moscow estimated that "Ukraine played an exceptionally important part in averting a food crisis... While at the beginning of 1928 these difficulties constituted a direct threat to the realization of the building of socialism for the entire Union, the Ukrainian party organization succeeded in effecting a quick mobilization, and in reality carried the whole load of the campaign of 1928 (jointly with the Northern Caucasus and Siberia). In the summer of 1929 the Ukrainian organization was eminently successful in realizing plans of agriculture, and finally in the fall of 1929, notwithstanding the loss of winter crops, Ukraine was the first in the entire Union to complete the very strenuous task" (PRAVDA, November 29, 1929).

Sabotaging the government's plans in agriculture by the peasants during the compulsory collectivization in the early 1930-s and Ukraine's falling behind in the execution of plans for these years created a mass of problems for Moscow. Thus Moscow turned full attention to Ukraine. To quote Pravda of August 31, 1931: "In the agricultural planning of the USSR Ukraine occupies the first place. One third of all the food for the entire country must come from there."

The problem arose of taking appropriate measures against the striking peasants. Moscow decided, without qualms about using the most cruel methods, to break the anti-collectivization strike of the Ukrainian peasants and by forcing them into collectives to compel them to work. Moscow took steps to realize the plan of starving the Ukrainian peasants, thus bringing

them to their knees, and ending forever all ideas of small holdings and individual ownership. As we shall point out later, the plans to obtain the desired result by causing a famine were effected by taking away from the Ukrainian peasants all food reserves, first of all grain as the most essential commodity.

In order to carry out the planned famine, as part of the campaign, a whole series of decrees and measures were put into effect in the latter part of 1932 and early 1933.

As early as the Seventeenth Conference of the All-Union Communist Party in the spring of 1932, such statements were made as: "the existence of petit-bourgeois hesitation and disorder, lack of discipline, and an anti-social attitude to the efforts of some workers on collectives... pose the problem of a decided and firm action against it..."

The Second Five-Year-Plan was primarily aimed at "liquidation of small-holders' ideology of amassing private property, which is directly traceable to generations of small-holders."

A series of laws enacted at that time were formally directed against the peasant class of the USSR as a whole. But in effect, as events progressed and showed, their point was directed against the Ukrainian peasants. This was a logical consequence not only of the new course set by Moscow against Ukraine in the 1930's in connection with the development of imperialist tendencies by Moscow, but also of the obviously tough opposition to collectivization by peasants of Ukraine, regardless of their territorial location.

Planning the famine, the government was well aware that starving peasants would in desperation, and in order to survive, go after collective property, mainly food products. Therefore, well in advance, on August 7, 1932, a decree was issued on the protection of socialist property.

The main idea of this decree was that "common property, i.e. government, collective or cooperative property is sacred and that people who are tempted to take such property are to be considered common enemies; therefore it is the prime duty of the government organs of the Soviet authorities to lead in a firm fight against pilfering." (PRAVDA, August 8, 1932).

On the basis of these principles the Central Committee of

¹ XVII konferentsiya vsesoyuznoy kommunisticheskoy partii (b). Stenograficheski otchet, Moscow, 1932, p. 243.

² Ibid., p. 250.

the Party and the government decided: "To identify in point of importance collective property with government property and augment the protection of this property from malefactors. Applying different standards of court procedure and law against the theft of collective and cooperative property by reason of social necessity — execution by firing squad and confiscation of all property, with an alternative, under mitigating circumstances, of no less than 10 years penal servitude and confiscation of property. No amnesty would apply to felons convicted of theft of collective or cooperative property" (PRAVDA, August 8, 1932).

This decree raised the wave of terror to unheard of heights. Everyone fell under the persecution. A railroad employee would be found guilty for just picking up a few grains scattered on the ground outside the tracks leading to a warehouse, a boy for breaking off one head of cabbage, a laborer who inadvertently took home in his pocket a minor tool, a clerk who unknowingly put a pencil in his coat pocket, and so ad infinitum. But the harshest blow fell upon peasants and workers on collective farms. Not only the cutting of pods,³ but even gathering scattered grain on fields after harvesting, was considered the gravest offense against the state, and children as well as adults were subject to the same kind of severe punishment.⁴

In the process of putting this decree into effect, needless and inexcusable cruelties were perpetrated upon the peasants. Some of them were admitted by Vyshinsky, then Chief Prosecutor of the USSR. The courts went to such extremes, that hitting a pig with a rock was found to be "ambushing communal property." The law protected not only the physical untouchability of kolhoz-owned pigs, but even their nerves. A young collective worker was given a 10 year term in jail for "joking with a girl in

³ The practice of cutting off pods in the fields before harvest-time became common in Ukraine in June 1932, because many peasants were then already starving as a result of heavy grain deliveries in 1931. This practice was one of the reasons for the new decree. V. Molotov in his speech at the Third Ukrainian Party Conference in July, 1932, said, "the problem of combatting pilfering of grain during and after its harvesting is of great importance in influencing grain reserves and (next season's) sowing campaign." (Pravda, July 14, 1932).

⁴ In the Northern Caucasus, a 65 year old peasant by the name of Dorokhov was sentenced to 10 years for picking 12 kilograms of pods. Similarly 2 men, Kravchenko (66 years) and Rudenko (60 years old) were each sentenced to 10 years for possessing 2 kilograms of picked pods. A. Ya. Vyshinsky, *Revolutsionnaya zakonnost na sovremennom etape*, Moscow, 1933, p. 104.

a pigpen thereby disturbing the peace of the collective hogs" (the quotation is from the court sentence.)

In order to expedite the fight against all enemies of the "collective order" and to combat theft of "socialist property," the Commissariat of Justice (Moscow) created the new post of Prosecutor of the USSR, "for the purpose of unification of the activities of prosecutors of the union republics," and with the object of "strengthening socialist justice and providing the proper protection for communal property in the USSR against the greed of anti-social elements."

The issuance of this last decree was a manifestation of Moscow's lack of confidence in local or provincial functionaries, in this case the Union Republics' Prosecutors' Offices. Dr. Ewald Ammende in his book *HUMAN LIFE IN RUSSIA* (London, 1936, p. 124) has this to say about the above decree: "Thus, by this decree the entire judicial system and even the fate of the individual Ukrainian State officials was made to depend directly on Moscow."

Among the measures enacted against the Ukrainian peasants, there is a significant decree of August 22, 1932. "On combating speculation in goods for general consumption." The importance of this measure lay in the fact that peasants living in the villages were permitted to purchase their essential necessities in official stores only on fulfilment of their full quotas of surrendered crops and produce (grain, meat, butter, eggs, fruit etc.). Any person who was behind in his quota was automatically deprived of the right to buy salt, sugar, kerosene, matches, textiles, etc. It was only natural that those who were not granted the privilege of trading with the official local store, would absent themselves from work on collective farms and walk to the cities in search of these goods. This decree classed them as speculators and provided sentences of from 5 to 10 years confinement in concentration camps, without the right to any amnesties.*

A very large number of peasants working on collective farms were punished under the provisions of this decree.

* *Ibid.*, pp. 102-103. The same book and pp. refer to the sentencing of a whole family for catching fish in a river which flowed near the collective farm.

* *Pravda*, June 21, 1933.

* *Osnovnye direktivy partii i pravitelstva po khozyayennomu stroitelstvu 1931-1934 gg.*, Moscow, 1934, 2d ed.

* *Ibid.*, p. 40.

The struggle between the peasants and the government for bread in Ukraine. Confiscation of food from peasants during the food reserves campaign of 1932-1933. The technique and practice of taking away food from peasants. V. M. Molotov's trip to Ukraine towards the end of 1932. The organization of political branches attached to machine tractor stations and their role in the famine. A purge in the party.

The summer of 1932 in Ukraine was notable for the sharp conflict between the authorities and peasants for bread. The government tried to get as much food out of Ukraine as possible, the peasants, on the other hand, did everything in their power to prevent this and to keep as much as possible for themselves.

The All-Ukrainian Party Conference of July 1932 adopted a resolution, stressing that "the grain collection plan for Ukraine set at the figure of 57 million cwt. is accepted by the conference as an absolutely essential measure" (PRAVDA, July 15, 1932).

In order to emphasize that the plan was not exaggerated, Molotov said in his speech: "on the basis of previous estimates, the collection of grain (for the entire USSR — author's remark) should exceed the previous year by 80 million cwt." Molotov ended his directive thus: "no backtracking or any wavering from the tasks to be accomplished as set forth by the party and soviet government" (PRAVDA, July 14, 1932).

In practice the estimates of the conference were never realized. "As of August 1, in Ukraine 8,196 hectares were harvested, or the equivalent of 51.9 per cent of all winter and early spring sowings" (PRAVDA, August 7, 1932).

The peasants were handed their quotas for the surrender of food products in July (these included not only grain, but meat, milk, butter, eggs, wool, etc.). In point of fact during the first five-day period of food surrender in August the plan was executed in Ukraine to the extent of 2.6 per cent and in the Northern Caucasus 2.5 per cent.¹

¹ Pravda, August 10, 1932.

Some of the collective workers, individual farmers and collective farms completed their quotas in full. But in general the majority of Ukrainian peasants did not fulfill the plan and used all possible means to evade it.

The government then embarked upon forcible collection of food from the collectives, collective farmers and individual peasants who had not given up their quotas. According to the central directives, it was proposed that every village should, depending on its size, be divided into a number of subdivisions (hamlets, etc.) and to each of these a special brigade was attached, whose task it was to complete the plan of collection.

As a rule such a brigade consisted of a member of the presidium of the village soviet or a party representative, and two or three local "activists" (this latter group would include former red partisans, former hoboes, ex-convicts and such), and there would also be an additional member from the board of the local co-operative. Depending on local conditions the composition of the brigade would sometimes differ; if the quotas were large and poorly executed, they would include a larger number of party representatives from the regional, district or central offices. Quite often teachers, students, clerks from village and district offices would be compelled to join. The groundwork of the organization of such brigades was laid in 1930 and 1931 and they were constantly improved upon. As a rule the man in charge would be an outsider, a special functionary dispatched from the region, district or center. Every brigade had at least one "specialist" charged with uncovering hidden foodstuffs with the aid of long sharp-pointed steel prong.

These brigades went from house to house, day after day, looking for hidden food. They searched homes, attics, cellars and all farm buildings, barns, stables, pens, and stacks. They would measure the thickness of the wall under the oven, to find if there was grain concealed in the foundation. They knocked on floors and walls and whenever the sound was dull they would pry the place open. Sometimes whole walls were pulled down, ovens wrecked, and the last grain taken away when anything was found. The collection was characterized by acts of wanton destruction and extreme cruelty. Every brigade had its headquarters, manned by a special staff. Peasants were hauled to headquarters and there subjected to all-night interrogations with beatings, water-treatment, and semi-naked confinement in

cold cells. Many instances of torture were noted at this time.

The methods employed were many and varied. A former scientist of Kharkiw University C.R. (who is now in the United States) received the following description of an action from his father, a local peasant of Lysiache, Karliw region near Poltava: "My son-in-law did not join the collective, so in the fall of 1932 a production-tax of 100 puds of grain was levied on him. He paid this in full. Then, just before Christmas, an additional 200 puds was levied. He did not have the 200, he did not even have 20, so he was threatened with jail for failing to pay. He sold a cow, a horse and some clothes, bought the necessary 200 puds and paid the tax. Then in February, 1933, the local authorities notified him that he had to surrender another 300 puds. He refused to pay this third assessment, because he had nothing left and was himself starving. A commission then came to his house to look for food. Of course they did not find anything except a little bag of inferior grain and a pot of beans, which they took. The only thing he had left was a sack of potatoes.² This last food went fast, and then....."

Local activists who took part in the search for food for confiscation naturally by-passed their own homes, and thus succeeded in keeping some small reserves for themselves. The emissaries sent down to collect grain from the larger centers then changed their method of operation so that brigade members would not work in their own villages. Thus when working among strangers they would be more thorough and not let one house get by without search. This explains why even many activists died as a result of famine in the spring of 1933. Their food had also been taken away from them.³

Eyewitnesses from all parts of Ukraine tell similar stories about food collections conducted in the fall of 1932 and the spring of 1933. "All edible products were requisitioned" — village of Zorich, Orzich region, Poltava district. "They took away everything that could be eaten" — village of Veprik, Hadyach region, Sumy district. "All bread was requisitioned, and even peas, down to the last kilogram" — village of Uspenivka, Khmiliw, Mikolayiw district. "They took grain, potatoes, and

² This entire family of five (father, mother and three children) died as a result of famine. Material collected by D. Solovey, *Stezhkamy na Holhotu*, Detroit, 1952, p. 56 and 57.

³ See chapter VIII, *infra*.

beets almost to the last kilogram" — village of Sofievka, Novo-Mirhorod region, Odessa district. "Everything, literally everything was taken, they did not leave one kilogram of bread" — village of Strizavka, Rzhyshev region, Kiev district.

There are known cases where, in the winter of 1932-33, commissions charged with confiscating grain from the peasants examined human fecal matter in order to establish what the people were eating, because although people were swearing that they had nothing to eat, yet they were staying alive! People who, in this manner were proved to have been consuming grain bread had to flee in order to escape prosecution.

Conditions under which the plans for grain collection were being executed in 1932 can best be illustrated by the fact that the single Pavlohrad region near Dnipropetrovsk, consisting of 37 village soviets and 87 collective farms, had a team of 200 collectors sent down from the regional party committee, and almost a like number from the regional komsomol committee.*

Assuming conservatively that other sections of Ukraine were visited by only half the proportionate number of collectors as the Pavlohrad region, their total number all over Ukraine would reach well-nigh 100,000 men, and this does not include special emissaries from districts and centers, whose number was steadily growing in connection with collection "difficulties" and a general deterioration of the political-economic situation.

The central press emphasized in September 1932 that "Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus have not carried out their fall sowing" (PRAVDA, September 12, 1932). And one month later — "As of October 1, 1932 the plan of fall sowing in Ukraine has been executed to the extent of 47.7 per cent, where last year at the same time 2.261 thousand hectares more had been sown" (PRAVDA, October 8, 1932). An editorial in the same issue of PRAVDA, "Fall Sowing in Ukraine," ended with these words: "The work of the Ukrainian Party organization has the attention of the entire party."

More and more emissaries were dispatched from the center to expedite the work of food collection, among them the most responsible representatives of the party and government. An eyewitness, P. B., who was employed by a regional organization in the Kozelshch region of Poltava district, describes the arrival

* Pravda, August 24, 1932.

of Molotov in his region in November 1932. "A meeting was called at Kozelshch of inter-regional party heads, secretaries of party committees, representatives of the central committee, and other delegates of the government of the republic charged with grain collection. After this meeting there was increased activity all over the regional institutions. Soon thereafter, one day around 10 a.m., a work-train arrived and stopped opposite the village of Kozelshchina. A crew of laborers got off and within half an hour laid a spur-track. This train departed in the direction of Kremenchuh. Half an hour later a passenger train arrived and stopped on the spur. All other railroad traffic ceased. The train consisted of a locomotive, a platform car with passenger automobiles on it, and three parlor-cars. The train was surrounded by a military guard of GPU of men. Through the rear platform of the last car, guarded by two additional sentries, two people would go in at a time, spending between 10 and 15 minutes inside. They were undoubtedly regional delegates and party secretaries. V. Molotov did not even leave his car. The train stood there for an hour and a half and then left in the direction of Poltava. The work-train then returned and the spur-track was taken up.

That very same day a delegate and a party secretary of the regional party committee of Kozelshch region disappeared. I do not remember their names. The next day new leaders took the places of those deposed, and many new brigadiers arrived. The apparatus set in motion by Molotov went berserk though the countryside. Total searches were made and everything was taken away, including bags of vegetable, seed, baked bread, and even meals already cooked."

Molotov paid Ukraine another visit later.

Mr. C. (an engineer) points out that towards the end of 1932 when the peasants of Zaporozhe were already starving, special commissions went from house to house and took away everything that was edible. Anything they could find: one or two kilograms of grain, or poppyseed, even bread baking in the ovens. One such commission in the village of Fedoronka included Molotov himself, then chief of the council of ministers of the USSR.

During this campaign in villages and regional centers a most detailed account was kept of all stocks found in individual homes.

Light can be shed on the general situation in villages during

the campaign by quoting the report made by experts in the Kri-nichan region of the Dnipropetrovsk region, as of January 1, 1933. (Published in CHAS No. 21, 1949).

Name	quota set by center	amount in cwt executed	remarks
Village of Aull.			
Horbonos, Kuzma	27	6.5	auctioned ²
Horbonos, Panas	12.3	16.83	full compliance
Makarenko, Palaska	16.0	6.85	auctioned
Zelenko, Korny	10.0	—	auctioned, works in bldg trade
Khorsun, Stepan	17.0	—	auctioned, man sent to Solowky
Village of Romankovo			
Suchy, Jaky Fedorovich	14.0	—	auctioned 1931 sentenced 1932
Karaul, Dmytro Ilich	13.5	—	property confiscated 1931.
Bondar, Fed. Fed.	20.0	4.6	auctioned
Bluseyk, Jakob Fed.	9.5	3.0	property confisc. 1931
Pivnenko, Mavr. H.	6.5	2.0	
Village of Novoseliwka			
Kirpa, Mikola	22.34	19.88	cannot be found
Bondar, Zachar	20.17	15.15	
Village of Mikolayiwka			
Konik, Ivan	7.9	—	escaped
Tiahnyriadno, Feod.	3.8	—	escaped

In many instances the job of extracting grain from the peasants was turned over to municipal police authorities. This applied in particular to cities in whose immediate neighborhood agriculture prevailed, and whose population had close ties with the peasants, in the surrounding villages.

The militia command of the city of Kamiansk, district of Dnipropetrovsk reported by letter on February 24, 1933, No. 721 to the Chief of the City Council, the Secretary of the Party Committee, the Chief of the city division of the GPU, and the City Attorney, on grain collections up to February 23, 1933. This official letter is reproduced below: (CHAS No. 20, 1949).

² If a peasant did not surrender the quota of grain levied on him or other food products, his property was auctioned off for "debt" the debt being the unfulfilled quota.

Totals collected:

in the city:
grain — 304 kilograms

in the villages:
grain — 4,134 kilograms

CITY OF KAMIANSKE:

CONCEALED — Soroka, Ivan Oleksiovich, worker living in the city of Makianske, concealed in his home grain brought to him by his sister who took it from the village. As a result of a search, 119 Kg. wheat, and 50 Kg. other grain taken away.

Investigation ordered.

VOLUNTARY SURRENDER 6 persons surrendered all kinds of grain 87 Kg.

VILLAGE OF KRINICHKI:

VOLUNTARY — Afanasieva Hanna, residing in the 4th quarter, opened a pit in her garden and surrendered to the government 150 Kg. of barley. Social class — middle.

VOLUNTARY — Solonaya, Maria Martinovna, residing in the 3rd quarter opened a hole under the oven and gave up 54 Kg. rye.

VOLUNTARY — Chernenko, Oleksy Matviyovich, residing in the 8th quarter opened a pit in the horse-stable and surrendered rye — 10 cwt.

VOLUNTARY — Kirsan, Kharlampy, residing in the 1st quarter, dug up and surrendered miscell. grain 135 Kg.

VOLUNTARY — Zawhorodny, Fedir Hrihorovich living in the 4th quarter, dug up and gave 35 Kg. rye. Social class: individual farmer. middle.

VOLUNTARY — Hlukhy, Semen, living in the 4th quarter, individual farmer, middle class. Dug up and gave mixed grain (surzik, consisting of rye, wheat, oats) 330 Kg.

VOLUNTARY — Zaychenko, Cyprian, member of the collective, dug up and gave miscell. grain 132 Kg.

VOLUNTARY — Kirsan, Feodosy, middle cl. dug up and gave rye 152 Kg.

- VOLUNTARY** — Kuzhenko, Ivan, soc. cl. middle, opened pit and surrendered grain 250 Kg.
- VOLUNTARY** — Ribka, Andrey, soc. class: poor. Dug up and gave 123 Kg. of SURZIK (a mixture of rye, wheat, oats and barley).
- CONCEALED** — Litovchenko, Maria Martinovna, soc. class middle, residing in the 3rd quarter. Found buried and taken away 600 Kg. barley.
- CONCEALED** — Drobny, Serhiy Arsentovich, soc. cl. middle, concealed grain. Found in pit and taken miscel grain 221 Kg.
- CONCEALED** — Lebid Akulina, sec. cl. poor, residing in 4th quarter, concealed grain. Found and taken barley 70 Kg. other 88 Kg.

VILLAGE OF KARNAUKHIWKA:

- CONCEALED** — Nazarenko, Mykola, soc. cl. middle. In the yard, under cornstalks, found corn which when cleaned yielded 320 Kg. corn, 50% rotten. Investigation ordered.
- CONCEALED** — Zinenko, Konstantin, soc. cl. middle, worker in the Petrovsky factory, concealed grain. Different grain found amounts to 240 Kg. Found in oven. Zinenko is a candidate for membership in the communist party of Ukraine.
- CONCEALED** — Shulha, Kalistrat, soc. cl. middle, works in the Petrovsky factory, hid grain. Found in oven, different grain 96 Kg. Investigation ordered.

Chief Command of the City Militia of Kamianske (Hrabchenko)
 Chief of Operations Department (Malovnik)

The authorities and their local representatives knew that when they took food away from the peasants, they were condemning them to death by starvation. Towards the end of 1932 it was no longer a secret that there were many cases of death by starvation. But collection of food proceeded regardless. The demands of Ukrainian peasants that after complete or partial fulfillment of quotas they should be permitted to keep some part in order to survive, were deemed by Moscow to be the opposition

of class enemies to the government's task. The enemy must be conquered at all cost, because "revolutionary diligence and readiness to break the class enemy must be the first commandment of a communist."⁴

In accordance with this decision a whole system was set up to handle the peasants, with the objective of starving them. It was decreed in January 1933 that political departments were to be established, attached to all machine-tractor stations and Sovkhozses, "their primary task being the safeguarding of an absolute and timely execution by collective farms and collective farmers of all duties imposed on them by the government, and first of all relentless fight against the theft of collective property and any attempts to sabotage the endeavors of the party and government in regard to collection of grain and meat products from collective farms."⁵

Chiefs of political branches were commended to "secure unshrinking, regular and timely application of the laws of the Soviet Union in the matter of administrative and penal measures against organizers of theft of common property and sabotage of endeavors of the party and government in the matter of agricultural economics" (OP. CIT. above p. 776). A total of 3368 political divisions were established attached to machine-tractor stations, 643 of them being in Ukraine.⁶

This decision in fact required those in charge of machine-tractor stations to terrorise the peasants, so that some of the masses of workers on collective farms would become more docile.

These political divisions undertook their activity on a wide scale. According to the reports of the 600 or more political divisions attached to machine-tractor stations they fired and purged 50 per cent of all chiefs of collective farms, more than 31 per cent of collective brigadiers, 47 per cent of the men in charge of farms, 24 per cent of horse breeders, 32 per cent in charge of cattle ranches, 25 per cent of the bookkeepers and accountants

⁴ From a decision by the joint plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik) of January, 1933. *VKP(b) v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh sesdov konferentsii i plenumov (1898—1932)*, Part II (1924—1933), Moscow, 1933, p. 769.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 776.

⁶ *Borba partii bolchevikov za kollektivizatsiyu selskogo khozaystva v gody pervoy stalinskoy pyatiletki*. Moscow, 1951, p. 207; see also *Pravda*, November 24, 1933.

and 40 per cent of the collective farm warehousemen.*

This same plenum decided to conduct a purge of the party in order to "clean out all doubtful and unreliable elements."¹¹

The purge of the party was designed to leave within the party ranks only those who, disregarding everything else, would be ready to support actively all the undertakings of the party and government, especially those measures directed against the peasants who refused to work on collective farms.

* XVII s'ezd vsesoyuznoy kommunisticheskoy partii (b), Stenograficheski otchet, Partizdat, 1934, p. 139.

¹¹ VKP(b) v rezolutsiyakh... pp. 782-83.

Intensification of repressive measures by Moscow against Ukraine. . . Resolution of December 14, 1932 on the subject of "mistakes" made during the period of Ukrainization. . . Resolution of December 24, 1933 on non-fulfillment of grain plans collection in Ukraine. . . P. Postyshev's arrival in Ukraine. . . His attempts to fulfill grain collection plans and measures against "nationalist deviationism." The suicides of M. Khvylovy and M. Skrypnyk. . . Malcolm Muggeridge on events in Ukraine.

The situation which developed in Ukraine toward the end of 1932 resembled a real war against the peasants, and it was clearly being extended to a war against all Ukrainians.

Moscow considered the results of the grain collection in Ukraine unsatisfactory. The dissatisfaction was not surprising, especially in view of the fact that at the beginning of 1932, the secretary-general of the Communist Party of Ukraine (bolshhevik), S. Kosior, promised that Ukraine would, in a very short time, be able to deliver 160 million cwt. of grain as part of the government plan.

For a better understanding of Moscow's measures against Ukraine, it would be well to review the international situation of the period. It was clear in the summer of 1932 that the National Socialists with their unconcealed plan of severing Ukraine from the USSR and annexing her to Germany would come to power in Germany soon. A national-socialist and militarily strong Germany would constitute a double threat to Moscow, a threat to the entity of the USSR and to Ukraine separately.

The forces of fascism, clearly pointing against Moscow were then being activated everywhere, and this made Moscow apprehensive.

It is equally important to realize that Moscow was well

¹ XVII konferentsiya vsesoyuznoy kommunisticheskoy partii (b), Stenograficheski otchet, Moscow, 1932 pp. 188-89.

The greatest bumper crop ever produced by Ukraine was 227.7 million cwt. of grain in 1937. Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya, Moscow, 1948. Vol. LV, p. 810.

aware of the development of Ukraine. During the period of Ukrainization, which, admittedly, was a forced measure, the idea of independence developed and took hold in Ukraine. This idea prevailed in the realm of national and cultural separateness, a different national ideal and honor and, coupled with it, a Ukrainian feeling of prestige, bordering on, and developing into pride. It was but a short step to the idea of economic, political and cultural emancipation, and a desire for a national life in accordance with the existing constitution, which included the right of secession from the Soviet Union.

Under these circumstances, Moscow could not overlook conditions in Ukraine, because the threat had become very real. Millions of people had been reduced to beggars as a result of the forced collectivization. Ukraine as a whole, encouraged by events in the outside world was becoming dangerous to Moscow. It was clear to the rulers in Moscow that the economic difficulties which had developed in Ukraine were rooted in deep political and national causes. Looked at from any angle, the situation could make Moscow apprehensive.

It was no longer possible to effect a reconciliation with these conditions. Any delay would allow the initiative to pass into the hands of Ukrainians. The decision was therefore made to keep the initiative in Moscow, and the ironclad logic of this resulted in a whole series of measures which would bind Ukraine tighter into the monolithic process of an economic, cultural and political consolidation of the Soviet Union.

That is why there was a general war against Ukraine. The waging of this war was a deliberate act on the part of Moscow. A factor not to be overlooked as influencing this decision was the growing military strength of Moscow as a result of the First Five-Year-Plan. It was no longer necessary to seek anyone's approval inside the Soviet Union when setting the new course against Ukraine. The new Ukrainian political course was formally opened in 1932, but its beginnings went back to the compulsory collectivization of farms and the trial of Ukrainian leaders who were members of "The Association to Free Ukraine."

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party and the Council of Peoples' Commissars carried a resolution on December 14, 1932, which reads: "Serious attention should be paid to the proper conduct of Ukrainization, its mechanical

execution should be terminated, Petlurist and other bourgeois-nationalist elements must be removed from party and soviet organizations." Hence: "parallel to the fight for bread a determined fight against the nationalities, their rights and their cultural individuality, has been carried on for some time. This struggle, too, may be regarded to a certain extent as a consequence of the famine."¹

Moscow's point of departure was that the entire complex of events taking place in Ukraine stood in direct relationship to the policy of Ukrainization which had, according to Moscow's viewpoint, been at the root of nationalist deviation with the Communist Party and had produced economic difficulties. S. Kosior said on this subject: "Speaking of Ukraine, one must stop to consider the nationalist deviation in the Communist Party of Ukraine (bolshevik), which played an exclusive part in causing and deepening the crisis in agriculture. In Ukraine.... the national flag is of prime importance to the class enemy. One could say more — the dominating tinge of the class enemy, his camouflage, is the national flag, nationalist garments.... They are attempting to do their work of destruction under the flag of Ukrainization."²

The resolution of December 14, 1932, later became a turning point in the existence of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, although at first the resolution did not change anything, and its full meaning was not realized until later, upon the arrival in Ukraine of P. Postyshev.

"According to a later statement by Postyshev, this resolution of December 14 was the beginning of the ten months' struggle carried on by Moscow in Ukraine — not only in order to bring in the harvest, but also to crack local nationalism."³

The end of 1932 and the beginning of 1933 were notable for the speeding up of grain collections. PRAVDA of December 4, 1932 stressed the "shameful dilatoriness of Ukraine during this year" and counselled "apply to the kurkuls and semi-kurkuls the harshest methods of persuasion."

Again on December 8, 1932 the same PRAVDA called for

¹ *Chervony shlyakh*, No. 8-9, 1933, p. 248.

² Dr. Ewald Ammende: *Human Life in Russia*, London 1936, p. 104.

³ *XVII s'ezd vsesoyuznoy kommunisticheskoy partii (b)*... p. 199.

⁴ Ewald Ammende, *Human Life in Russia*, London 1936, p. 114.

"a decisive fight against the remnants of kulaks, especially in Ukraine and in the Northern Caucasus."

On December 24, 1932 the Central Party Committee (Communist Party of Ukraine) removed "ten men in charge of grain-collection in Ukraine for inactivity, and in particular for not taking the proper measures to break the opposition of kulak sabotage of the grain collection." The case against these ten men was presented for further consideration by the Central Committee as to the advisability of keeping them in the party.*

A month later two new resolutions were carried which had much significance in worsening the famine in Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus.

S. Kosior was not a very good prophet when he said, at the beginning of 1932, that "the kurkuls were at present in such a state of defeat and liquidation, that there was no chance of their ever emerging and turning us back."

In the first resolution about undertakings in the matter of spring sowing in the Northern Caucasus stress was laid on the prime duty of party organizations "to break all opposition of the kurkuls, their sabotage and wrecking, which may be repeated during seed distribution and during the sowing period. Any kind of laxity towards sabotage will be considered as aiding the enemy (kurkul) who is a counter-revolutionary."

The sowing campaign was entrusted to a special committee having unlimited powers. It consisted of political leaders of the Northern Caucasus and its orders were binding upon all institutions and authorities of the Northern Caucasus and were not subject to appeal to any higher authority. In real charge of the entire campaign was L. Kaganovich, member of the Politburo, who with a staff of aides, travelled from place to place. Tens of thousands of the population of this section were at that time deported to Siberia, among them entire villages, as for example Poltavaska Stanytsia with a population of ten thousand.*

* Pravda, December 24, 1932. All these men were employed in the three most important parts of Ukraine: Kharkiw, Odessa and Dniepropetrovsk.

* XVII konferentsiya..., p. 221.

* Pravda, January 24, 1933.

* Sheboldayev, the Party boss of the Northern Caucasus said in his speech at the XVII Party Congress: "The kurkuls, again in 1932, this time from the base of collective farms tried to fight us about bread... But we did not understand it... That is why the Central Committee undertook a series of measures and dispatched a group of Central Committee members under comrade Kaganovich to us, to help us correct the situation." XVII s'ezd vesoyuznoy kommunisticheskoy partii (b)... p. 148.

Simultaneously, on January 24, 1933 the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (b) resolved that "it is considered a proven fact that the party organizations of Ukraine did not fulfill the duties imposed on them in the matter of grain deliveries and execution of the food plan" (PRAVDA, February 15, 1933). Moscow thus accused the entire Communist Party of Ukraine of non-compliance with the execution of food plans. Moscow then dispatched its special representatives to Ukraine in the following persons: P. Postyshev as first secretary of the Kharkiw Committee and as second (organizational) secretary of the Central Party Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (b), M. Khatayevich as secretary of the Dnipropetrovsk Obkom and E. Vecher as secretary of the Odessa Obkom. They were charged with extracting all the grain deficiencies. The Ukrainian NKVD was put under the new arrival, Balitsky. P. Postyshev was the virtual dictator of Ukraine. The biography of Postyshev is full of omissions, but it is certain that he was a Russian, came from a working-class family, and during the revolution occupied the minor post of political commissar attached to an army unit in Siberia. His ascent to power began during the time L. Kaganovich was secretary-general of the Communist Party of Ukraine. At that time, around 1927, L. Kaganovich transferred Postyshev from Kiev to the position of the Kharkiw district party organization, which automatically carried with it the fourth secretaryship of the Communist Party of Ukraine and a member of its politburo. At the next party congress he rose to membership in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (b).

Those were the days when Ukrainization was making great strides and had captivated the minds of the urban masses in ever increasing circles. It was at this time, and in matters of Ukrainization policies that a conflict arose between M. Skrypnyk and P. Postyshev. The solution on the conflict could at that time not have been other than it was; P. Postyshev was recalled from Ukraine in 1928 and made one of the secretaries of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (b) in Moscow.

Changes which took place in the nationalities policies, and the special goals set by Moscow vis-a-vis Ukraine, made Postyshev the best candidate as the personal representative of Stalin.

It is noteworthy that, among the aides coming to Ukraine

with Postyshev in January 1933, there were some who had left there with him five years before.

Conforming with a resolution adopted by the joint plenum of the Kharkiw Party Obkom following a speech by P. Postyshev, right after his arrival in Ukraine, the party organization was given the task of making good two of its gravest errors, i. e. "lack of bolshevik fight against Petlyurist elements" and "manifestations of rotten liberalism toward party decisions in the matter of grain collection" (PRAVDA, February 6, 1933.). As has already been pointed out at the time of Postyshev's arrival in late January 1933 a great number of peasants were already starving, and a mass death by famine was on the march. Many collective farm workers had even those products which they had earned on their own time taken from them. Individual peasants, i. e. those unconnected with collective farms, were in an even worse plight, because it was a rule to take everything found in their homes when a search was made. They could only keep what they could successfully conceal from the search brigades and commissions. This required not only ingenuity, but also luck, for in the testimony of foreigners, "the grain collections in Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus had been carried out with such ruthlessness and brutality that the peasants were left completely without food. Thousands were expelled, and in some instances the entire population of a village was sent to do forced labor in the forests of the north."¹⁰

Up to December 1, 31.2 million cwt. of grain¹¹ was extracted from all the peasants, which constituted 54.8 per cent of the quota of 57 million cwt. set by the government.

It is very difficult, if not impossible to estimate the amount of bread taken from the peasants during the period from December 1, 1932 up to the start of sowing campaign in the spring of 1933.

Some indication of the amount taken from collective farms, collective farm workers and individual peasants during this period can be obtained from the fact that even seed grain was taken away. At first a separate count of seed grain was kept, but later in many instances they were charged to the account of straight grain collections. This was considered normal procedure. P. Postyshev thus emphasized this matter: "the policy

¹⁰ Ewald Ammende, *Human Life in Russia*, p. 56.

¹¹ XVII svezd vsesoyuznoy kommunisticheskoy partii (b)...., p. 68.

of establishing and keeping separate seed accounts., before completion of grain collection quotas was entirely responsible for the weakening of our position in fulfilling the plan of grain collections" (PRAVDA, February 15, 1933).

It was precisely for his wavering attitude in these matters that P. Postyshev sharply criticized his predecessor as Kharkiv secretary of the Obkom, Terekhov, who in a speech of December 23, 1932 addressing the Kharkiv district conference on the question of the permissibility of taking seed reserves and putting them in the account of grain collections, stated: "Seed reserves may be taken for the account of grain collections. It is self-evident that records have to be kept. We must not lose sight of the sowing campaign and the difficulties connected with it. Our approach to this matter of seed must be flexible. We do not now wish to be put on record as saying that seed grain has to be taken, but we also do not wish the record to state that the seed is not to be taken" (PRAVDA, June 22, 1933).

In one instance P. Postyshev condemned the practice of carrying away seed reserves; that was when seed was taken from "such collective farms as had complied with their quotas in full and on time." (PRAVDA, *ibid.*). The extent of the disorganization in 1932 can be seen from V. Molotov's speech at the Second All-Ukrainian Party Conference, where he said: "very often, regions and collectives that had fulfilled the plan of grain collection received orders for new quotas, and sometimes this would be repeated three and four times" (PRAVDA, July 14, 1932).

Thus stood the matter of seed reserves. Many collective farms had none, because they had been taken away and credited to the account of grain collections. Government farms (Sovkhozes) were sometimes subjected to the same treatment, (PRAVDA, February 26, 1933).

From the time of Postyshev's arrival in Ukraine, the chief attention was given, not to grain collections, but to seed grain collections. Officially, the grain collection campaign was halted on February 15, 1933¹² although not because the peasants were dying for lack of food. This did not in the least perturb the authorities, but they were disturbed by the lack of seed grain for the next sowing campaign.

¹² Pravda, December 16, 1933.

In his speech to the joint plenum of the Kharkiw Obkom and city party on February 4, 1933 Postyshev said that "to begin with we must undertake the collection of seed funds; we must explain to the masses of collective farm workers that there can be no thought of seed aid from the government, and that seed grain must be collected and stored in warehouses by the collective farms, workers and peasants themselves" (PRAVDA, February 8, 1933).

Knowing in advance how difficult it would be to collect seed grain from the starving peasants, P. Postyshev said that "we shall have to use the grain collecting method. And just as it is naive to think that seed grain will be all ready and waiting in storage, it is therefore imperative to start the fight for the return of seed grain to the reserves which were stolen or illegally distributed for food."¹²

From the time of Postyshev's arrival, starving of the Ukrainian peasants was carried out under the guise of seed grain collection. PRAVDA of February 5, 1933 demanded "severe punishment of the peoples' enemies who sabotage the collection of seed grain." "Seed funds must be collected immediately and at all cost, the collective farms of Ukraine must become collective farms of bolshevism," PRAVDA, March 22, 1933.

The oft-cited HUMAN LIFE IN RUSSIA thus describes the condition and feelings prevailing in Ukraine at that time: "It is hard to believe, that in a time of the most acute distress, when the whole world was already beginning to be aware of the calamity, the emissary of Moscow in the Ukrainian capital could make a declaration amounting to a strict order to his subordinates to set aside all human emotions in collecting the grain."¹³

Notwithstanding the methods used to extract the remaining bread in order to supplement seed funds, as of March 20, 1933 only 90.5 per cent of the absolute minimum of necessary seed had been collected in Ukraine. (PRAVDA, March 26, 1933). And

¹² Pravda, February 8, 1933. "Illegally distributed bread" seems to be the food which workers earned on their own time. The same kind of seed grain collecting was conducted in the Northern Caucasus. "In almost all regions of the Northern Caucasus the collection of grain for seed from international resources has diminished.... in the Northern Caucasus and Ukraine the collective farm workers declared that a large amount of grain belonging to the collectives had been stolen by kurkuls, hoboos, thieves, speculators etc." Pravda, March 11, 1933.

¹³ Ewald Ammende, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-60.

this, according to PRAVDA included government aid to collective farms in Ukraine to the amount of 2,796 cwt. of seed grain. As of April 20, 1933 the collective farms of the Soviet Union had been provided with 103 per cent of the needed seed, but in this figure Ukraine showed the much lesser percentage of 94 (PRAVDA, April 30, 1933).

One can imagine the conditions in Ukraine, among the peasants from whom bread was being extracted by force, from reading the Soviet press of that period. The daily newspapers at the regional, district and central levels carried such slogans with repetitious monotony: "we shall smother the opposition of the kurkuls," "let us punish severely those who sabotage the collection of seed," "yield no quarter to the class enemy who has a party ticket in his pocket," "beat the kurkul, but don't forget the semi-kurkul."

In many regions of Ukraine chiefs of regions and collective farms were put on trial. An example of the preparation of public opinion for such a trial is to be found in newspaper reports of the daily BOLSHEVIK OF BOHUSLAV of March 23 to 25, 1933: "The defeated, but as yet not completely eradicated class enemy, the kurkul, is using widely different methods of waging war against the collective farms. There are collective farms whose chiefs carry a party ticket in their pocket but in reality they have lost all class consciousness and have allied themselves with kurkul-Petlyurist stragglers, aiding the latter in wrecking collective farms. In order to wreck the plan of grain collection and continue their marketing of bread, party traitors Medvedev and Hohula organized sabotage. They used all possible means to cheat the regional organizations and to prove that **IMPOSED QUOTAS OF GRAIN COLLECTIONS WERE UNREALISTIC**. Twice did those two-faced men succeed in getting a reduction of quotas, but they did not fulfill even those. The whole damaging scheme of those sworn enemies of the soviet authorities and of collectivization has been exposed, and the saboteurs themselves put under arrest. The investigation has been completed, and within a few days an assize session of the Kiev court will fly them in Medvin."¹²

There were many analogous cases in other regions, although not all of them came to trial. In his speech before a plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (b) of

¹² *Bilshovik Bohuslavshchiny*, March 23-25, 1933.

June 1933 Postyshev mentioned the regional bosses of Orikiw, Kobelyaky and Soloniansko, accusing them of trying to convince the central authorities that the grain-collection plans were grossly exaggerated, and warned that "the execution of such plans might lead to serious complications" PRAVDA, June 22, 1933).

Regional chiefs employed still different methods in order to circumvent central orders concerning grain collection. P. Postyshev was particularly incensed when telling of an unusual and flagrant example to the Seventeenth Party Congress: "Comrade Zatonsky" came to the Novo-Ukrayina region of the Odessa district in January 1933. Grain collection was in poor shape. Comrade Zatonsky proposed to pick out one objective, conduct a mass campaign of lectures and to follow it up by getting out the concealed grain, thus breaking the stale-mate. They decided to use the farm "First of May" which had to deliver 360 cwt. of grain. Hardly had comrade Zatonsky left the region, when the local regional chief of the GPU, conniving with the regional command, went to the Soviet farm "Red Meadow" and compelled the director to give up to their grain elevator 360 cwt. After this the regional command informed comrade Zatonsky and the authorities that they had used the methods recommended by comrade Zatonsky, and had broken the stale-mate.

A majority of the regional bosses, the so-called regional command, as well as the higher ranks of Soviet and Party organizations in Ukraine, who were Ukrainians (members of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, Executive Committees, etc.) were in opposition to the grain collection quotas set by the government.

"Future historians will have to admit that in its campaign against the Ukrainians during the spring and summer of 1933, the Soviet regime was faced by a united people, a solid front, including everyone from the highest Soviet official, down to the poorest peasant."¹⁷

Without openly showing their hand, such officials proceeded discreetly, and by perfectly legal methods, to make Moscow the relentless execution of the prepared plan. This was precisely

¹⁷ E. Ammende, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

¹⁸ Zatonsky was a high-ranking communist. He became Ukrainian commissar of Education after the suicide of Skrypnyk. Subsequently purged, too.

the reason for the issuing of the resolution of January 24, 1933 accusing the Ukrainian communist party of non-compliance with grain-collection plans. The situation in Ukraine underwent a radical change with the arrival of P. Postyshev. He immediately demanded the removal of V. Chubar from the position of Chief of the Government of Ukraine, and replaced him with Panas Lyubchenko, who was less influential, but ambitious and obedient. The resistance of certain regions had been broken. In a short time the following were removed from office: 237 Ukrainians, secretaries of regional party committees, 249 Ukrainians, Communist party members and chiefs of regional executive committees, 158 Ukrainians, communist party members, chiefs of regional control committees. Executive jobs in the various regional centers were assigned to 1,340 men specially appointed.

The fight against class enemies in the collective farms themselves was no less determined. In order to break the opposition 10,000 men were appointed as chiefs of collective farms local party secretaries and others, of whom no less than 3,000 exercised executive power.

Party members, apprehensive, and intimidated, followed the directives of the central authorities blindly, not daring to waver, doubt, nor delay. Any deviation from the "general line" was persecuted cruelly and punished by means at the disposal of the courts and party authorities."

Figures cited by PRAVDA (November 24, 1933) are an indication of the extent of such conditions within the party in Ukraine. Thus, as of October 15, 1933 from among 120,000 party members and candidates for membership who had been investigated 27,500 were purged."

Of the entire Ukrainian communist party organization, there was one man and his group who openly opposed the policies of P. Postyshev. "When conditions became more and more terrible and men began to die in multitudes, the inevitable happened: Skrypnyk and the Ukrainian Communists protested openly. They stepped vigorously into the breach on behalf of their dying countrymen against the fearful injury wrought by collectivization; they demanded that the bread produced by the

" Pravda, November 24, 1933.

" Pravda, November 24, 1933.

Ukrainian peasantry should be used first to safeguard their own lives, and only the surplus should be handed to Moscow and the rest of the Soviet Union."¹⁹

The original text of Skrypnyk's speech was never printed, but after his suicide rumors about it were widely circulated. Along with the party purge, a general purge of the soviet bureaucratic apparatus was initiated under the old and tried slogan of the "fight against Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism." It was an attack on all manifestations of Ukrainian life, on all strata of the people in the country and city. It was directed against Ukrainian cultural, economic, political and national life. P. Postyshev re-emphasized that the resolution of December 14, 1932 was all-important in regard to a proper method of Ukrainization and the need for expelling Petlyurist and other bourgeois-nationalist elements from party and soviet organizations.²⁰

"Counter-revolutionary elements have built whole nests under the protective flag of Ukrainization... nests of counter-revolutionaries in the Peoples' Commissariats (Education, Agriculture, Justice) in scientific institutions (The All-Ukrainian Institute of Marxism-Leninism, The Academy of Sciences, Agricultural Academy, Institute of Shevchenko Studies) and even in the party management of regions."²¹

Somewhat later, at the Seventeenth Party Congress, S. Kosior declared: "Nationalist and counter-revolutionary elements in Ukraine have not only penetrated a series of soviet and cultural institutions, whole swarms of them have crawled into the party. This has made their counter-revolutionary activities more simple, and our task of breaching the crack in agriculture more complicated."²²

P. Postyshev particularly disliked the thesis that "Ukraine, for all her contacts with Asia, has from remote antiquity down to the present day maintained the cultural position of a corner of Europe, therefore it is impossible to comprehend the culture and art of Ukraine without the ties with the art of Europe. Ukrai-

¹⁹ Ewald Ammende, *Human Life in Russia*, p. 113.

²¹ *Chervony shlyakh*, No. 8-9, 1933., p. 246 and *Pravda*, December 6, 1933. November 27, 1933.

²² From a resolution following a speech by S. Kosior at a joint plenum of the Central Committee adopted November 22, 1933. *Pravda*, November 27, 1933.

²³ *XVII s'ezd vsesoyuznoy kommunisticheskoy partii (b)*,.... p. 199.

nian art is part of the general European evolutionary process."²²

"Does this much differ" — Postyshev asked with pathos "from the so-called 'counting on Europe' of Khvylovy, who preached together with Shumsky the orientation of Ukrainian culture on the European West, as against Asiatic Moscow."²³

Nationalist deviation was charged to M. Skrypnyk, once a personal friend of Lenin and a man of extraordinary influence in Ukraine, who at that time was at the head of the Peoples' Commissariat of Education. Now came the time for Postyshev to settle his accounts with him, to remind him of the part he had played in removing Postyshev from Ukraine in 1928. Skrypnyk was reminded that "the literary group "Vaplite" (Free Academy of Proletarian Literature), created by Shumsky and supported by Skrypnyk, had tried to sever Ukrainian literature, art and all culture from the proletarian culture of the working classes, and in the direction of orientation toward the bourgeois capitalist West."²⁴

Thus, a sign of equation could be placed between the events of the middle 1920's and those of the early 1930's, because "the nationalist deviation headed by Skrypnyk was a direct continuation of Shumsky's deviation in 1927. Both Shumskism and Skrypnyk's deviation were nourished by the same roots. Each worked towards detaching Ukraine from the Soviet Union... each wished to be far from Moscow, the center of the proletarian revolution."²⁵

P. Postyshev gave credit "to the Ukrainian party organization under the leadership of L. M. Kaganovich.... for detecting Shumskism as an agency of the class enemy, and for expelling the Shumskys, Solodubs and Maksimoviches from Ukraine," and then conversely accused this organization of "overlooking the nationalist deviation of Skrypnyk during a period of acute class warfare."²⁶

The destruction of the Ukrainian intelligentsia continued without interruption, and was carried out in certain stages, of which Postyshev's sojourn in Ukraine was one. Postyshev sub-

²² From a scientific paper of the chair of Ukrainian culture of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, 1930. See *Pravda*, December 6, 1933.

²³ From a speech by Postyshev at the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (b). See *Pravda*, December 6, 1933.

²⁴ *Pravda*, November 22, 1933.

²⁵ *XVII s'ezd vsesoyuznoy kommunisticheskoy partii (b)*.... p. 70.

²⁶ *Pravda*, July 3, 1933, and December 6, 1933.

sequently disappeared, but the acute battle of Moscow against all manifestations of Ukrainian national life has continued to this day under the slogan of combatting all signs of "bourgeois nationalism." Postyshev was removed from the post of second secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine in 1937. There were rumors that he was executed during the Yezhov period.

The results of Postyshev's work in Ukraine are well-known.

Khvylovy committed suicide in May of 1933, Skrypnyk in July.

Postyshev proclaimed the results of his work to the re-staffed plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (b) on November 19, 1933 in these words: "The discovery of Skrypnyk's nationalist deviation gave us the opportunity to rid the structure of socialism, and in particular the structure of Ukrainian socialist culture of all Petlyurist, Makhnovist and other nationalist elements. A great job was done. It is enough to say that during this period we cleaned out 2,000 men of the nationalist element, about 300 of them scientists and writers from the Peoples' Commissariat of Education. Eight central soviet institutions were purged of more than 200 nationalists, who had been occupying positions as department chiefs and the like. Two systems, that of co-operatives and grain reserves, have according to my personal knowledge been purged of over 1,000 nationalists and white-guardists."²⁸

Among the dozens executed, the more notable were: Ozersky, Richytsky, Pylypenko, Konik, Badan, Yersteniuk, Yavorsky. Thousands were deported. The times became such, that Ukrainians in their own independent republic were afraid of using their native tongue, and of reading Ukrainian books, because this alone was dangerous as bordering on a criminal offence.

The words of an investigating judge thrown at S. Pidhayny in 1933 — "we do not have to look for Ukrainian nationalists, it is enough to take a list of the subscribers to UKRAYINA, LIFE AND REVOLUTION, PROLITFRONT or LITERARY BAZAAR and I shall not hesitate to arrest them all" — these words

²⁸ S. Nykolyshyn, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

were not an empty threat, and this incident was neither isolated nor fatuous.²⁸

An Englishman, Malcolm Muggeridge, wrote about the situation in Ukraine in the spring of 1933: "On a recent visit to the Northern Caucasus and the Ukraine, I saw something of the battle that is going on between the government and the peasants. The battlefield is as desolate as in any war and stretches wider; stretches over a large part of Russia. On the one side, millions of starving peasants, their bodies often swollen from lack of food; on the other, soldier members of the GPU carrying out the instructions of the dictatorship of the proletariat. They had gone over the country like a swarm of locusts and taken away everything edible; they had shot or exiled thousands of peasants, sometimes whole villages; they had reduced some of the most fertile land in the world to a melancholy desert. The conquest of bread, like the conquest of glory seemed a vain pursuit."²⁹

²⁸ S. Pidhayny, *Ukrayinska inteligentsiya na Solovkakh*, 1948, p. 23. The author is now living in Canada.

The periodicals mentioned were the most popular among the educated Ukrainians. They were discontinued after Postyshev came to Ukraine.

²⁹ "The Soviets' War on the Peasants," *The Fortnightly Review*, London, May 1, 1933, pp. 564 ff.

Famine as a social phenomenon. Causes of famine. Famine in pre-revolutionary Russia. Moscow's Ukrainian policy during the famine of 1921-1922. Foreign opinion on that policy. Famine as an elementary disaster and as an instrument of policy. Genesis of the famine of 1932-1933 according to M. Kalinin. Foreign estimate of the Ukrainian famine of 1932-1933. The harvest in Ukraine of 1932 precluded famine.

Famine as a social phenomenon is a disaster which has at its source a complete or partial lack of food for humans. Mankind has been familiar with this calamity during the entire course of history. In ancient times famine was caused by the inadequate development of the productive potential of agriculture. Due to primitive methods, crops were entirely dependent upon meteorological conditions. This was the main cause. One poor year was sufficient to create a scarcity of food, two in a row brought great famine, with all its negative consequences. Another cause was war, which was, as a rule, accompanied by the plunder of farms and destruction of crops.

In modern times famine is also often caused by the low productive level of agriculture in some parts of the world, and overpopulation in others. In China, territories with a population of 9 million were engulfed by famine in 1927; 57 million Chinese were exposed to famine in 1928, and 32 million in 1929. During the famine of 1918-1919 a total of 13 million persons died of starvation in India.

In tsarist Russia, which included Ukraine, famine was a recurrent phenomenon. Instances of cannibalism were quite common from 1601 to 1603. There were 34 "hungry" years in the eighteenth century, and almost 40 in the nineteenth (the worst famines were in 1833, 1845/6, 1851, 1855, 1872 and 1891-1892). The lean years of the twentieth century were 1901, 1905, 1906, 1907 and 1911/12. The areas encompassed also grew larger. During the period of 1880-1890 the number of gubernias (provinces) subject to famine varied from 6 to 18, and during 1890 to 1900 grew to from 9 to 29, then in 1901-1910 to 19 to 49

gubernias, and finally the famine of two years duration (1911-1912) spread over 60 gubernias.¹

Famine in tsarist Russia was caused not only by primitive farm methods, erosion of soil, overpopulation, but primarily by the servitude of peasants, high taxes levied against them, and their generally low standard of living.

The first famine under the Soviet rule took place in 1921-1922. It was caused by bolshevik policy during revolutionary warfare for the establishment of communism. This famine spread over an area of 35 gubernias with a population of about 90 million, of whom at least 40 million actually suffered hunger. Out of Ukraine's 12 gubernias² 5 were starving: Zaporozhe, Katarinoslav, Mikolayiw, Odessa and Donets, and some counties in the regions of Kharkiw, Poltava and Kremenchuh.³

In all of Ukraine the harvest of 1921 yielded 56 million cwt. of grain, which constituted hardly 35 per cent of the normal figure.⁴

An emissary of Dr. Nansen wired the Nansen Committee in Geneva the following report on famine conditions in Ukraine on February 22, 1922: "Eight million people are starving in Southern Ukraine. Of those, 2½ millions have absolutely nothing to eat, another 2½ million have only such substitutes as hay or beets but no regular food; 3 million will soon join the first and second category! It is to be expected that these two categories will comprise 7 million by the end of April."

The famine grew in area and intensity from day to day, and its terror gripped an ever increasing number of people. The Nansen emissary quoted above, wrote: "when they describe wars, revolutions and other catastrophes, they are all insignificant compared with the dread reigning in the villages of Zaporozhe and of Ukraine in general.... you hear about cannibalism all around you, and soon see proof of it. But not only cannibalism, there is necrophagy as well. You are forced to talk to people who have eaten their own families."⁵

¹ *Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya*, Moscow, 1930, XVII, pp. 452-53.

² During normal times one person of the agricultural population required between 368 and 400 kilograms of grain per annum (this includes grain used for cattle fodder). During the famine, in the afflicted areas the total harvested amounted to 80-112 Kilograms per person.

³ *O golode* (A collection of articles edited by Professor K. N. Georgievsky, Dr. V. M. Kogan and Professor A. V. Paladin.) Kharkiw, 1922, p. 53.

⁴ I. Herasymovych, *Holod na Ukrayini*, Berlin, 1922, p. 66.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 88, 154.

Because of such conditions, it is obvious that A.R.A., the American organization established to aid the people starving in Soviet Russia in 1921-1922 made all efforts to establish contact with starving Ukraine. But, as H. H. Fisher reports, "from the beginning the Moscow government had discouraged all proposals which tended to bring the A.R.A. into contact with Ukraine."

Moscow endeavored to conceal the real conditions of famine in Ukraine and tried to divert all aid coming from abroad into the hungry areas of Russia. In his book H. H. Fisher emphasizes that Moscow assumed the position that A.R.A. should "not split its forces, but concentrate them entirely on the Volga area."

As a result, the A.R.A. did not start its relief action in Ukraine until April-June 1922, while it had already been active in Russia since September 1921.

According to M. Kalinin, American aid came "to Ukraine and the Crimea at the height of the famine, when thousands were already dying, and other thousands resigned to death."

Representatives of the A.R.A. could not comprehend many of the things which they witnessed during their relief activities in Ukraine: "It is astonishing enough that these trainloads of food should have been loaded in Kiev and Poltava and sent hundreds of miles to the hungry along the Volga instead of being transported a score or so miles across the gubernia line to Odessa or Mykolayiw, where a first class famine was in swing."

The All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee organized a commission for the relief of the starving in the summer of 1921, but its "main attention was turned towards aiding the Volga area.... for this purpose, four Volga gubernia were attached to Ukraine in 1921: Samara, Saratov, Ufim and Tsaritsin.... these gubernias, as well as the Central Committee for relief of the starving in Moscow received 1,127 carloads of food according to a report of August 1, 1922.... The All-Ukrainian Central Commission for Relief assumed the task of feeding 500,000 people in Ukraine and 1,200,000 people in the Volga area."

Disregarding the famine raging in Ukraine, during the

* H. H. Fisher, *The Famine in Soviet Russia 1919-1923*, New York, 1927, p. 252.

† *Ibid.*, p. 248.

‡ *Itogi borby s golodom v 1921-1922 g.*, Moscow, 1922, pp. 4, 335.

§ Fisher, *The Famine*.... pp. 262-63.

¶ *Itogi borby*...., pp. 258, 260.

period of August 1, 1921 to August 1, 1922 a total of 10.6 million cwt. of grain was taken from Ukraine in compliance with a tax assessment.¹¹

H. H. Fisher formulated his observations on the policy of Moscow regarding the catastrophic famine of Ukraine in 1921-1922 in the following words: "The policy of the Communist Party with respect to the Ukraine famine presents many curious aspects. Not only did the Moscow government fail to bring the Ukrainian situation to the knowledge of the A.R.A., as it did other regions much more remote, but it actively discouraged, as has been noted, anything likely to bring the Americans in contact with the Ukraine. Up to the time the A.R.A. began its activities (January 1922) neither the Central government at Moscow nor the Ukrainian at Kharkov had made any serious move to relieve the South."¹²

From the remotest past down to the present day, people have perished from famine in the world, but it has always been an elementary evil, unpredictable.¹³

The famine in Ukraine of 1932-1933 occupies an entirely different category. At the second congress of collective workers of the Gorki region, M. Kalinin said on June 15, 1933: "Every farmer knows that people who are in trouble because of lack of bread, are in that predicament not as the result of a poor harvest, but because they were lazy and refused to do an honest day's work."¹⁴

In spite of his careful weighing of words, Kalinin in the above statement not only admitted the existence of famine, but

¹¹ This tax was introduced in March of 1921 during the transition into the NEP period. See: *Oktyabrskaya revoliutsiya: pervoye pyatiletie*, Kharkiv, 1922, p. 394.

¹² Fisher, *The Famine*...., p. 261.

¹³ At least 5 million people died from and in consequence of the famine of 1921-1922. *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*. Vol. 17, p. 463. Of this number about 2 million were Ukrainians. Thanks to the aid in food and medicine supplied by the A.R.A. to Soviet Russia in 1921-1922 millions of people were saved from death. "Soviet Russia will never forget this help, given in the greatest hour of need." See *Itogi borby*...., p. 335. Subsequent changes of policy and attitude produced the following comments on this particular subject in the latest edition of the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* (2nd ed. Vol. II p. 624): "In their continued fight against the Soviet Republic the American Imperialists utilized A.R.A. This organization, under the guise of aid to the starving conducted a campaign of espionage and diversionism, and created a conspiracy with the object of overthrowing the Soviet government."

¹⁴ *Pravda*, June 24, 1933.

unknowingly stressed its peculiarity — that people were starving although there had been a good harvest.¹⁵

Ever since its assumption of power, the main objective of the Soviet government's policy toward the peasants has been an attempt (except for the short period of NEP) to extract all the results of their labor from them. During the first period this was achieved by various tax assessments, later by grain collections coupled with direct action against the peasants. The introduction of obligatory collectivization of farms, and the subjection of all agricultural production to the government and its agents, most certainly simplified the operation of extracting bread from the peasants, and became responsible for the anomalous situation under which the peasantry starved regardless of the amount of crops gathered.

As an observant foreigner put it: "Every available pound of food is swept up from the countryside. A nominal subsistence minimum is supposedly left to the peasants, but in many cases they are left practically without grain or flour. If the harvest fails in a given section of the country the peasants must shift for themselves, in spite of the fact that their surplus grain went to the state the previous year."¹⁶

Thus, to quote another Western author: "Famine was quite deliberately employed as an instrument of national policy, as the last means of breaking the resistance of the peasantry to the new system where they are divorced from personal ownership of the land and obliged to work under the conditions which the state may dictate to them and deliver up whatever the state may demand from them."¹⁷

Official Soviet sources of information on results of the economic years 1932-1933 furnish adequate proof that the famine in Ukraine had been deliberately organized and executed by Moscow.

According to meteorological data, 1932 was in no way an exceptional year, as, for example, 1921 had been.

Precipitation was low in certain areas in 1932, and some sections had a drought, although others had sufficient rain. In

¹⁵ "Difficulties resulting from the lack of bread" and "food difficulties" are the official soviet designations of famine.

¹⁶ Calvin B. Hoover, *The Economic Life of Soviet Russia*, New York 1931, pp. 328-329.

¹⁷ Chamberlin, *Russia's Iron Age*, Boston 1934, pp. 88, 89.

any case, nothing catastrophic occurred on the part of the elements.

As regards the area under cultivation, it was larger than the area in 1928 and 1927 by one million hectares, and the same as during the years following 1932, or around 26 million hectares. The area allotted to grain was smaller than normal, being 18.124 million hectares, as against a normal 20 million.¹⁸

The grain yield of 1932 was not low. One hectare yielded an average 8.1 cwt. of grain, broken down as follows: winter wheat 8.5, rye 8, spring wheat 5.7; the total grain crop of 1932 amounted to 143 million cwt.¹⁹

The last figure is lower than the normal average of grain crops of Ukraine, which varied between 160 and 175 million cwt. We must note, however, that because of a partial drought in 1924 the crop was much lower at 104.2 million cwt., and in 1928, when 5 million hectares of winter wheat were destroyed by frost and had to be sown over with grains yielding a lower figure, the total crop was also lower, at 128 million cwt.²⁰

Yet nothing even remotely resembling 1932 happened as a result of the poorer harvests of these earlier years.

stvo Ukrayiny, Kharkiv, 1929.

In 1932 the harvest brought in was quite sufficient to take care of the next sowing and to feed the population of Ukraine, as appears clearly from the following analysis:

total grain crops harvested	143 million cwt.
seed grain (20 million ha. at 1.28 cwt. per ha.)	25.6 " "
left after seed reserves	117.4 " "
per person of population per annum	3.7 cwt.

Alloting 2 cwt. per person per annum to the population of the cities, this would leave an average of 4.2 cwt. per person of the rural population.²¹

It is quite obvious that such a quantity would be more than adequate to take care of the population and livestock, and it could not create a condition even resembling hunger.

But bread had been taken away from the peasants of Uk-

¹⁸ Narodne gospodarstvo URSR, Kiev, 1935.

¹⁹ USSR v tsyfrakh, Kiev, 1936.

²⁰ Zbirnyk statystyko-ekonomichnykh vidomostey pro silske gospodar-

²¹ The population of Ukraine on January 1, 1933 was 31,902,000 urban: 7,159,000 and rural 24,743,000 See: SSSR — strana sotsializma, Moscow 1936, p. 189.

raine. Up to December 1, 1932, as has been indicated before, the amount taken was 31.2 million cwt. Unfortunately, it cannot be computed how much more was taken between December 1, 1932 and the end of April 1933. But it is well known that in many instances grain was being taken away from those who were already starving.²⁷

The most outstanding feature of the famine in Ukraine of 1932-1933 is that it appeared in one of the greatest agricultural countries, and in a period of normal, natural conditions, without even a trace of crop failure. It happened only because food had been confiscated from those who produced it.

"This famine may fairly be called political because it was not the result of any overwhelming natural catastrophe or such a complete exhaustion of the country's resources in foreign and civil war as preceded and helped to cause the famine of 1921-1922. The government was determined to "teach the peasants a lesson" by the grim method of starvation to force them to work hard in the collective farms."²⁸

²⁷ See chapters III, V and VII, *infra*.

²⁸ W. H. Chamberlin, *The Ukraine, a Starving Nation*. New York, 1944, pp. 59, 60.

CHAPTER II.

ORGANIZING THE FAMINE

1

The beginning of the famine. Sections engulfed by famine. A clinical picture of famine. The Ukrainian village under famine. What did starving people eat. Cannibalism in the villages. Dying Ukrainian villages. The starving try to save themselves; wandering for bread to the cities in Ukraine and to neighboring republics. Conditions among starving peasants in the cities. Starving children. Deterioration of standards of nutrition in cities. The "Torgsin" and its role during the famine. Groups unaffected by famine. Community feeding in the villages in the spring of 1933.

Nutritional difficulties existed in some regions of Ukraine as early as the spring of 1932. There were a number of instances of death by starvation; however, these were sporadic.¹

The grain collection campaign of 1932-33, with the establishment of special brigades, thorough searches of homes and confiscation from peasants of all food supplies, as described in chapter III, conditioned the mass starvation of the rural population of Ukraine, which began in the fall of 1932 and turned into mass famine early in 1933.

What sections of the USSR were subject to famine? "The famine area, so far as I could observe and learn from reliable information, included Ukraine, the North Caucasus, a number of districts in the middle and lower Volga, and considerable sections of remote Kazakhstan in Central Asia," reported W. H. Chamberlin.

Another foreigner, who witnessed the famine at first hand, mentions the same areas: "some of the most fertile, notably the North Caucasus, the Ukraine, and the Volga district, are entirely without bread; the population is, in the most literal

¹ In the village of Shamrayiwka, Velikopolovets regions (Kiev) during the grain collection campaign of 1931-32, even small grain used for chicken-feed was taken away, the commissar in charge Ivakhin stating that it would go into "seed reserves".

² W. H. Chamberlin, *Russia's Iron Age*, Boston 1934. p. 88.

sense, starving; even in the large towns the food shortage is acute, and every day grows worse."²

Any statement, therefore, that the famine of 1932-33 was general, and spread throughout the entire territory of the USSR is not borne out by the facts. There was no trace of famine in other republics. Famine was confined to areas that opposed collectivization, which is tantamount to stating that famine was organized on Ukrainian ethnographic territories, i. e. Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus with a predominantly Ukrainian population. For example: the Western part of the Northern Caucasus (Kuban) had 93.8 per cent Ukrainians, the regions of Kursk and Voronizh 64.2 per cent, and lesser percentages of Ukrainians in the lower and middle Volga regions and Kazakhstan.

Truly Russian lands knew no famine. The neighboring Byelo-Russian S.S. Republic was not affected either.

The clinical picture of famine is well-known. It ruins the energy-producing resources of the human system, advancing as the necessary fats and sugars are withheld. The body withers. Thin skin assumes a dust-grey tinge and folds into many creases. A person ages visibly. Even small children and infants have an old look. Their eyes become large, bulging and immobile. The process of dystrophy sometimes affects all the tissues and the sufferer resembles a skeleton covered with tightly-drawn skin. But a swelling of the tissues is more common, especially those of the hands, feet and face. Skin erupts over the swelling and festering sores persist. Motive power is lost, the slightest motion producing complete fatigue. The essential functions of life — breathing and circulation — consume the body's own tissue and albumen, the body consumes itself. Respiration and heartbeat become accelerated. The pupils dilate. Starvation diarrhea sets in. This condition is already dangerous, because the slightest physical exertion induces heart failure. It often takes place while the sufferer is walking, climbing stairs, or attempting to run. General weakness spreads. The patient now cannot get up, nor move in bed. In a condition of semi-conscious sleep he might last about a week, whereupon the heart stops beating.

Whoever had an opportunity to see the Ukrainian countryside before the famine, would be paralyzed with fear when

² Malcolm Muggeridge, *op. cit.*, p. 558.

beholding it during the famine. Vegetable gardens were overgrown with weeds; these would take over and grow right to the door of the house, and almost as high as the door itself. No voices were heard in the evening, nor laughter. No dogs barked, because they had already been consumed. Roads unused and untravelled now, were completely overgrown. Walking singly or in pairs became dangerous, as robbery and kidnapping for cannibalism often occurred.*

The once famous bazaars of Ukraine, overflowing with food, had undergone a radical change. An eyewitness thus describes them in early 1933: "in the center of the village, close by the ruins of the church, which had been dynamited, is the village bazaar. All the people one sees have swollen faces. They are silent, and when they talk, they can hardly whisper. Their movements are slow and weak because of swollen arms and legs. They trade in cornstalk, bare cobs, dried roots, bark of trees and roots of waterplants. This assortment of trade constituted these peoples' diet, a diet that was incapable of saving them from death, but merely extended their suffering a little longer."

Dogs and cats were sold at the bazaars, and their meat was considered a real delicacy. Starvation relaxed moral restraints, and homicide and suicide were on the increase. The degradation of humans to the level of animals proceeded rapidly. "M.P.", an engineer tells of an incident on a train between Kazatin and Uman on February 13, 1933, when "some thirteen people, adults who were collective farmworkers and looked quite exhausted, mobbed a 12 year old boy who had a half-pound piece of bread. They crushed the bread in their frenzied attack and then proceeded to pick the crumbs off the dirty floor."

Theft and other crimes against property became so prevalent in 1932-33 that it was useless to try and do anything about them. Things were being stolen that people had never dreamed of stealing before — food from ovens. Smoke coming from the chimney of a house would give the owner away as cooking something, and such a house would become the objective of thieves, who were only after one item—food. Fruits and vege-

* W. H. Chamberlin, (*Russia's...*, p. 87) says this about surveying a village in the company of the secretary of the village council of Cherkasy: "Mr. Fishenko found abundant confirmation in the stories of the famine survivors and in the grim mute evidence of the numerous abandoned houses with their weed-grown gardens and gaping doors and windows."

tables were picked by thieves long before they had any real nutritional value.

The militia did nothing against this kind of thievery; the people therefore resorted to self-defence and lynchings. Here are examples from the village of Khorsik, Chornoukhiw region Poltava district, as told by witness N. L. "In the village of Khorsik, birthplace of the famous philosopher Skovoroda, a peasant woman, Martha Prykhodko, was picking young potatoes from the garden of a government employee, Lohinov. The woman was pregnant. Lohinov caught her and beat her so severely that she died on the spot. Lohinov was never punished.

A young girl, Talya Pokidko, daughter of Odarka of Chornoukhiw, crawled into the garden of Havrilo Turka, accountant of the collective farm, where she picked a few garlic plants. Turka beat her so hard that she crawled back to her home and died. Turka was not punished.

Ivan Orel, who worked as a guard of the collective warehouse, tried to pick something from the garden of Athanasy Brekalo. Brekalo beat him so severely that he died the next day. Brekalo was not punished.

There was much stealing of cows, hogs, goats etc. in the village of Chornoukhiw and the thieves were Sizon Timoshchik and Khvedir Verteletsky. Following another in the long series, the peasants, under the leadership of communist Cyril Kostevich Herasymenko (he was later judge in this region), lynched Timoshchik and Vertetsky, killing them in their own homes in the presence of their wives and children. There was not even an investigation in this case..."

In all Ukrainian lands, where Moscow had organized the famine, its course was standardized and almost identical. A comparison of diet in widely different sections of Ukraine furnishes ample proof of this:

name of place	region	district	diet
Veprik	Hadyach	Sumy	poppy, bark, weeds, leaves, bare cobs of corn ^a
Hermaniwka	Obukhiw	Kiev	dogs, cats, crows, bark
Uspeniwka	Khmeliw	Mikolayiw	leaves, dogs, children
Viskowe	Solomen	Dnipropetrovsk	dead horses, cats, rats, dogs, grass, bark

^a Leaves were very popular as food in Ukraine, those of acacia and linden were the best.

Sentowe	Kirovohrad	weeds, bark, anything
Pashkiwske	Krasnodar	acorns, bark, dogs, cats
Starominske	Kuban	cats, dogs, hedgehogs, carrion, roots
Parkhomiwka	Krasnokut	hay ground with added beet juice, offal, cats, dogs, human flesh.

The variety of food used through necessity in Ukraine was really much greater than indicated above. Villages on the banks of brooks or rivers had advantages in providing extra food for their inhabitants. Hard, and normally inedible, crabs were boiled and their broth gave good nutriment. Then the hard shells would be ground up, mixed with leaves or bark and baked. The product could not be chewed but had to be swallowed, yet many a life was saved by the nutritious content of these shells.

When spring came mushrooms were picked without discrimination, with many cases of poisoning.

In some villages in the South of Ukraine people tried to eat cottoncake, usually with tragic results; the undernourished system could not manage to digest it, a rash appeared all over the body, and then death ensued by poisoning.

A bread known as "motorfuel" was in widespread use. It consisted of ground bark, leaves, corn-cobs, an occasional rotten potato or other such delicacy. In the Salsk region of Kuban, people moved into the steppes, where they subsisted on marmots and other small animals. Thousands survived in this manner. The people of Zavitne, a large village of a thousand houses, lived on marmots for six months and had reserves of lard from these and other animals. There were similar methods of subsistence in the southern regions of Ukraine between Novo-Oleksievka and Kakhovka.

"Here and there one heard dark stories of cannibalism; in Poltava it was said that a trade in human flesh had been going on until the authorities discovered it and shot the participants,"^{*} reports Chamberlin.

A witness from the village of Sofievka, in the Odessa district said "a lot of human flesh was eaten, but nobody tried to stop it."

There were in fact many cases of cannibalism recorded in Ukraine. As a rule dogs, cats and horses would be eaten first.

* W. H. Chamberlin, *Russia's...*, pp. 87-88.

Then in the spring came frogs, grass and anything that could be eaten. Human flesh came at the very end.

In the village of Kishenki in the Poltava district, the wife of the peasant, Yakiw Onufrienko, ate her child in April 1933. The Terenkov couple of Sentovo in the Kirovohrad district, ate their two children, and Denis Litvinov of the same village ate his wife, Zina Litvinova. In Monastirishche, near Kiev, a woman, Lashenko, ate her own two infant children. In Parkhomiwka in the Kranokut region, district of Kharkiw, a woman, Palazka Sokirna, devised a system of hunting for children: she lured them into her house, strangled them, and then hid the salted-down meat in her cellar, thus supplying her food needs. In Ahaymany village, Ivaniw region, Zaporozhe district, a woman, Huzenko, ate her own child.

Similar cases were reported from the Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolayiw, Sumy and other districts of Ukraine. Most people committing such acts had already become mentally deranged from hunger. Professor M. M. a psychiatrist tell of this case: "In the village of Surmachiwtsi, Hlinsky region, district of Chernihiw, a hungry mother made a fire in the oven, called in her 10 year old son and started tying his arms, admonishing him to be quiet, or the people would hear. She could not manage him, however, and he escaped and called neighbors for help. When arrested she did not deny what her intentions had been. She cried and howled, and from this could be gleaned a whole scale of emotions: remorse and pity, and perhaps regret for not having accomplished what she intended, dictated by pathological manifestations of hunger."

But not only those who had become insane killed humans for meat. In Chernin, Dubechan region, Kiev district, in May, 1933, a woman who had an eight year old child lured two strange children to her house, and slaughtered them, salting the meat.

In Stara Pryluka near Vynnytsya, the father and two grown children died of hunger; then the mother killed the remaining seven year old daughter, whose meat was later found in pots. When asked why she had done it, she replied: "She would have died anyway."

In Shyroka Balka, Dniepropetrovsk district, people, deciding that it was hopeless to carry on, would make a fire in the oven,

close the chimney, seal doors and windows, and die in groups of carbon monoxide poisoning.

Proof as to how widespread cannibalism had been in Ukraine at that time can be furnished by such facts as these: in the Lukianowka jail in Kiev they had a separate building for "maneaters." Among the prisoners in the Solowky Islands in 1938 there were 325 cannibals of 1932-1933, of whom 75 were men and 250 women.⁷

The marketing of human flesh and sausages made of it, was noted in several instances.

J. P. Muzyna, an eyewitness, now residing in Detroit, tells of the case mentioned by W. H. Chamberlin. "I witnessed the discovery of a slaughterhouse of children in Poltava. It was a small building in the center of the city. Right next to it were: railroad cooperative store No. 1, a railroad first-aid station, a pharmacy and a building for the homeless. A band of criminals lured small children, killed them, salted the meat in barrels and sold it. Refuse was dumped into an open sewer, whose banks were overgrown with high weeds, and they floated away. One day thousands gathered here to watch the GPU (secret police) load a lot of childrens clothes, shoes, schoolbags and other things on trucks. They had been stored in the attic, the criminals probably having no way of getting rid of them. All attempts of the GPU to disperse the mob of unfortunate mothers, who had come to look for their lost children were of no avail. They had to resort to a threat of arms."⁸

Such slaughterhouses were discovered, apart from Poltava, in Likhivtsi, Dnipropetrovsk district, Pashkiwsko of the Sever region, Krasnodar district and at other points.

D. P., a doctor who had observed the famine at close range, emphasized that he was personally most shocked by cases of mothers eating their own children, and by the traffic in sausages made of human flesh in open bazaars.

Agricultural agent A. O., who stayed in the villages of Izbinske and Starytsa, Viwchan regions, Kharkiw district, from March 15, 1933, wrote: "Dozens of people died every day; the bodies were left in the homes for days at a time, because there were few people strong enough to bury them. Grave-digging was

⁷ S. Pidhayny, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

⁸ There are a few eyewitnesses of this case, who are at present residing in the United States.

a very difficult task, so mass graves were dug. Corpses were piled on cars, like wood, brought to the edge of the pit, and tipped over, falling in a heap and presenting a ghastly sight. The undertakers of today were the corpses of tomorrow. There was an incessant wail and lament coming from the two villagers; one could hear repeated just one word in a long, drawn-out tone "l-o-o-o-st." A record, stating only the undisputedly true facts of events in Ukrainian villages would be disbelieved by even the most ardent Ukrainians; small wonder then, that foreigners are skeptical about them."

There are cases on record where the authorities would not permit the burial of corpses until they had obviously started to decompose; thus, the digging up of recently buried bodies and using them for food was prevented.

Special burial brigades were set up and attached to each collective farm. But often they could not cope with the amount of work, and corpses would be dragged away by dogs gone wild. In the village of Stepaniwka near Vynnytsya, a widow carried her dead children in a sheet to the cemetery, and there died herself. In the same village, a woman died, leaving two small children. The wagon came, took the body away, and the children were left in an empty house, without food or help.

In Parkhomiwka Krasnokut region, Kharkiw district, the following took place in the spring of 1933: "The wagon which collected corpses stopped at the home of a peasant named Koval. He was alive, but the undertakers started dragging him away. Koval pleaded with them with some difficulty, being weak — 'don't drag me, give me something to eat, I am alive;' but the undertakers replied: 'we are busy, we won't come for you again, and you are going to die anyway.' And so the living Koval was thrown into a common grave. At night he crawled out from among the corpses and made his way from the cemetery to the nearest house. Some relatives brought him the boiled meat of dead animals and he slowly recovered. He was still alive in 1941. His friends gave him the nickname "Pylyp Koval, the immortal."

How many persons were buried alive? Some facts told by witnesses: In the village of Fursa near Kiev, the teamster who carried corpses away in his wagon was paid 5 grammes (about 1/5 of an ounce) of grain for every corpse. Once he brought a stack of bodies to the cemetery and as he was unloading them

from the wagon into the pit, one of the "corpses" got up and started walking away. The teamster grabbed him, and wanted to throw him back in, fearing the loss of pay for one body. After some bargaining they grew friendly, and finally the "corpse" rode back with him to town. This man was also still alive in 1941.

People report that it was a rule of the burial brigades attached to collective farms to avoid the homes of those peasants who were not members of the collective. In this connection there was a tragi-comic occurrence in the village of Hermaniwka, near Kiev: "Corpses were being brought to the cemetery since morning and were stacked up at the edge of a common grave. When there are about 60 bodies, they were thrown into the pit, like so many pieces of wood. The chief of the village soviet, Nikiforov, came to inspect the place at noon. He was known as an eager "collectiviser," and when he saw the dead body of an "indus"^{*} he ordered that the body be thrown out of the common grave, remarking that he was not worthy of being buried alongside members of the collective farm. Nikiforov's orders were carried out; a man was lowered into the pit with a rope which he tied around a leg of the unworthy corpse, and it was pulled out and left lying unburied for about a week, until the chief of the village soviet relented and permitted burial in a grave for "individualists."

In Shulhiwka, Petrykiw region, Dnipropetrovsk district, moats and wells were filled with corpses in the spring of 1933, as there were not enough live people to bury them.^{**}

The Ukrainian peasantry tried everything possible to survive the terrible famine into which it was being pushed. In the spring of 1933, the youngest and most versatile elements of the peasant class chose escape as the best means of survival. They escaped from the countryside without the essential travel documents, but were sometimes provided with the proper papers by the village soviet. The hard core of the peasantry, i. e. the older folk and children, stayed at home. But many of these, with emaciated bodies, swollen faces, wild looks in their eyes,

^{*} This nickname "Indus" is taken from "individual" applied to peasants who were not members of collective farms, preferring to remain and die as individuals.

^{**} It was common practice to bury bodies in gardens, moats, sewers and similar places.

surged toward the towns and cities in search of a piece of bread or at least potato peelings.

"Travelling through the countryside was like running the gauntlet: the stations were lined with begging peasants with swollen hands and feet, the women holding up to the carriage windows horrible infants with enormous wobbling heads, stick-like limbs, swollen, pointed bellies. You could exchange a loaf of bread for Ukrainian embroidered kerchiefs, national costumes and bedcovers."¹¹

Beginning with the spring of 1933 mobs of terrifying, swollen apparitions, pasty-faced men, women and children filled the streets of the larger cities. The greatest number could be seen queued up for "commercial" bread. The key to this situation lay in the fact that early in 1933, at the height of the famine in Ukraine, all over the USSR in the large cities, stores were open where it was possible to buy bread without any ration cards, but at so-called commercial prices, i. e. 4 roubles for a 2½ lb. loaf of white, and 3 roubles for the same loaf of dark bread. It is noteworthy that in compulsory transactions with the governments, the peasant was paid 90 kopeks for 16 Kg. (40 lbs.) of wheat. As a rule, the peasants would line up in the evening and wait until next morning for the stores to open.

B. L., an engineer, related that his brother, whom his father brought to the city to save from starvation, was wont to stand in front of the stores when bread was being delivered, and said that it was his fondest dream to be able to get a pound of bread every day.¹²

P. O., an agronomist, wrote that "it was heartbreaking to see starving people, especially women and children begging for bread and on being refused, looking for scraps and swill—anything to eat."

The bazaars in the cities were full of peasants from the surrounding countryside. I. D., an engineer, thus describes some of the famous Kiev bazaars: "Such bazaars as the Rye on Podole, Lukianiwsky, Sinny, the Jewish (or Galician), Besarabka, Troitsky, Volodimirsky, Solomiansky and Demievsky were

¹¹ Artur Koestler, *The Yogi and the Commissar*. New York, 1946, p. 137. The author lived in the capital of Ukraine, then Kharkiw, in the winter of 1932-1933.

¹² Allotments of bread were given to all those who had bread ration cards, i. e. employed workers and their dependents.

open all day, as usual. Trading women sat at their stands or on the ground, and sold all kinds of grain by the glass: wheat, rye, barley, corn and other cereals, also baked goods, pancakes, bliny, pirozhoks and other ready-to-eat products. Prices were high, in roubles only. Bread was sold "under the counter," sometimes by the loaf, but mostly in slices. Meat was offered in secret—mostly horsemeat, and of dubious quality at that. Vegetables, such as potatoes, beets, carrots, and milk and dairy products did not reach the Kiev markets in great quantities and were very high-priced. Besides such food products, these bazaars handled great quantities of articles from the villages, such as family heirlooms and mementoes, handiworks of art, women's coral beads which had been passed on from generation to generation, embroidered towels, shirts, tablecloths, rugs and carpets. Peasants brought all these prized possessions from all over the country to Kiev, and sold them for a song, or bartered them for a few glass measures of grain, to save themselves and their families from starvation.

There were three categories of buyers at the bazaars. The first, and most despicable were the wives of communist party members and "speedup" workers. They were secretly given large food rations in official stores, and were able to bring to market their surplus food, which they exchanged for the most valuable articles offered: embroideries, rugs, etc., usually driving very hard bargains.

The second were wives of workers and minor officials, who visited bazaars in order to supplement the poor diet of their families. They were not interested in embroideries, but looked for a chance to buy milk or vegetables.

The third and largest group were the peasants, in rags and swollen with hunger, who came only to get some food. They always had something to offer in exchange for a measure of grain. Often a richly embroidered tablecloth would go for a 4 lb. loaf of bread, and an expensive full sized carpet for a few such loaves.¹³

But by far the group outnumbering all others were the older peasants and children, who came with nothing to sell, and

¹³ People who brought things to the bazaars were not always successful in selling them. V. K., a lawyer, remembers how a widow with children brought all their possessions to market: pillows, blankets, sheets, etc. stood there all day, and had to carry it all back home, still hungry. She cried all the way.

no money to buy. They came to Kiev so as not to have to go back to their villages. They wandered around with outstretched hands and pleaded: "Give! don't let me perish." They poked among the garbage of bazaars, picking peels, sucking on discarded cobs and kernels. But there was not enough to go around to aid the starving and provide alms. Those hungry peasants had nowhere to go at night, and slept right there in the bazaars."

Peasants from the surrounding countryside, women and children, were dying of hunger every day in the streets of Kharkiw, Kiev, Dnipropetrovsk, Odessa and other cities of Ukraine. A starved corpse in the street of a city was an everyday sight in those days. A foreigner reports about Kharkiw and Kiev: "In the streets and the courtyards scenes were often witnessed which are hardly creditable by European standards."¹⁴

The government authorities exerted all their efforts to remove the corpses from public view with haste. Dr. Ammende, cited above, writes: "The number of corpses was so great that they could only be removed once a day. Often, no distinction was made between the corpses and those not yet quite dead; all were loaded on to trucks, to be flung indiscriminately into a common grave. This burial work was done by convicts from the local prison. From morning until evening they were busy digging the graves. Fifteen bodies were usually buried in one grave, and the number of graves is so great, these famine cemeteries often recall a stretch of sandhills."¹⁵

Very often, the dead and dying peasants, being picked off the streets, dumps, and bazaars, by trucks under police supervision would be hauled away into uninhabited parts, and dumped into ravines without even a thin layer of earth on top.

V. D., a philologist, stated that he personally knew a Russian peasant woman who fainted from hunger in the street, and was loaded along with twenty other half-dead people onto a truck operated by the militia. They were taken about 10 kilometers outside the city and dumped in a desolate spot, most of them dying there, but she succeeded in crawling back to relatives in town.

Sometimes these people would be taken to hospitals to die. Professor P. wrote that "In the garages of the October Hospital

¹⁴ Ewald Ammende, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 61, 62.

in Kiev, near the Besarabka covered market, a doctor showed me frozen corpses, stacked in rows, like wood, and occupying a space of 150 square metres."

The collection and disposal of the corpses of those who died of starvation in and around railroad stations was organized in a thorough and different manner.

This is described by M. D., an engineer who worked on the railroads in the Northern Caucasus:

"Early in 1933 from Kavkaz station in the Northern Caucasus, every morning at a fixed hour before dawn two mysterious trains would leave in the direction of Mineralni Vody and Rostow. The trains were empty and consisted of 5 to 10 freight cars each. Between 2 and 4 hours later the trains would return, stop for a certain time at a small way station, and then proceed on a dead-end spur towards a former ballast quarry. While the trains stopped in Kavkazka, or on a side track, all cars were locked, appeared loaded and were closely guarded by the NKVD. Nobody paid any attention to the mysterious trains at first, I did not either. I worked there temporarily, being still a student of the Moscow Institute of Transportation. But one day, conductor Kh., who was a communist, called me quietly and took me to the trains, saying: "I want to show you what is in the cars." He opened the door of one car slightly, I looked in and almost swooned at the sight I saw. It was full of corpses, piled at random. The conductor later told me this story: "The station master had secret orders from his superiors to comply with the request of the local and railroad NKVD and to have ready every dawn two trains of empty freight cars. The crew of the trains was guarded by the NKVD. The trains went out to collect the corpses of peasants who had died from famine, and had been brought to railroad stations from nearby villages. Among the corpses were many persons still alive, who eventually died in the cars. The corpses were buried in the remote section beyond the quarries. The whole section was guarded by the NKVD and no strangers were permitted nearby."

Thousands of peasants tried to obtain work with the larger government-owned agricultural enterprises, A. B., an agronomist for such an institution says: "While inspecting an experimental field near Poltava, I noticed many people lying around a large stack of straw. In reply to my question as to who they were and what they were doing, the man in charge of the experimental

field, who was not a Ukrainian, said that they were peasants from the neighborhood, who had come in thousands applying for jobs, and also expecting to get food. 'The farm hired only the strongest and the rest were sent away. They had nothing to go back to, so they stayed here, where many of them died. And pointing with his finger at some fresh mounds, he said that was where these individualists were buried. 'You cannot imagine how much trouble the government farm has with those Ukrainians', he concluded."

D. Z., an economist, tells of another case: "Near Stanytsya, station, near Vynnytsya, there was a government farm 770 hectares in area, dedicated to intensive truck farming (onions, parsnips, celery, tomatoes, cucumbers, cabbage etc.) and the products were to be canned on the farm. In order to manage such a huge gardening enterprise, there was a daily requirement of 2 to 4 thousands workers. It was announced in the villages that unlimited jobs were open at the wage of 1 kilogram bread, a hot meal and 2 rb. per day. Thousands came to the kitchen for the hot meal; more than half of them were so exhausted, however, that they were incapable of work. Every day, between 10 and 20 peasants, after eating a meal on a starved and exhausted stomach, died right there near the kitchen. There was no test, nobody knew who would survive a meal, and who would not. People begged food, ate and died, without starting on their jobs."

Many peasants undertook long voyages in search of food. They went to Byelo-Russia, the Caucasus, the Moscow region and farther north. As a rule they went illegally, without travel permits, since leaving one's own village was not permitted. Only the very lucky ones obtained papers which entitled them to purchase railroad tickets. These long trips often had a tragic ending. Professor O. O. tells of a case, which he himself witnessed: "In March 1933, at the railroad station of Vladikavkaz (Caucasus), a great number of Ukrainian peasants, with bags across their shoulders, were waiting for a freight train. Agents of the NKVD stopped them and took away their bread. Their joint and individual pleadings to be allowed to keep the bread were of no avail. Then one of the 'rabbits' (those who travelled the railroads without tickets were called 'rabbits') climbed a tall tree near the station, and started talking to the crowd about the terrors of famine in Ukraine. He cursed the

communist party, the government and its leaders, the NKVD, and all the living and dead. The crowd grew in size quickly and NKVD agents ordered the mob to disperse, threatening arrest. They ordered the orator to come down, on the threat of life imprisonment. He would not listen, and the fervor of his eloquence mounted. The NKVD then called the firemen and ordered them to play hoses on the man to force him down. He still refused, and when the sharp jet of water began to rip the bark off the tree he climbed to the topmost branches and jumped. The NKVD ordered the firemen to pick up his body and they took it away in an unknown direction. Two peasants covered the pool of blood with earth, so that the dogs would not lap up Christian blood. Then they asked the NKVD men to show them where their comrade would be buried. The agent looked angry and, not answering, looked at one of the pleaders, then at the other. Then he ordered briskly: 'Come with me, and you will find out.' Nobody knows what happened to those two."

The plight of children during the famine was particularly pathetic. A foreign observer writes: "It was beyond my comprehension.... at Kharkiw I saw a boy, wasted to a skeleton, lying in the middle of the street. A second boy was sitting near a keg of garbage picking egg-shells out of it. They were looking for edible remnants of food or fruit. They perished like wild beasts... When the famine began to mount, the parents in the villages used to take their children into the towns, where they left them in the hope that someone would have pity on them."¹⁸

Professor M. M. emphasizes that the "NKVD set up a huge concentration camp for children, ('barracks of death' it was called in whispers among the peasants) where about ten thousand children rounded up in the city of Kharkiw were placed. The mortality rate among them reached 40 per cent."

Thousands of children came to the cities alone, without parents or adults and various stages of nervous and psychic disorders were noticeable among them. The professor cited above, Dr. M. M., quotes typical answers given by children put under observation in the psychiatric clinic during the famine. In reply to the question as to what had brought him to the city, a 7 year old boy said: "Father died, mother swelled up and could not get out of bed. She said to me 'Go and look for bread yourself,' so I came to the city." An 8 year old boy said: "Father and mother died,

¹⁸ Ewald Ammende, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

some brothers were left, but there was nothing to eat and I ran away from home." A boy 9 years old said: "Mother said, 'Save yourself, run to town.' I turned back twice, I could not bear to leave my mother, but she begged and cried, and I finally went for good." Another 8 year old boy said: "Father and mother were lying all swollen, so I ran away from home." Children were often left lying on sheets near police stations.

It must be noted that the urban population was also under the handicap of curtailed bread rations, which had been reduced for those not working to 200 grammes per day. Of course, the cities did not suffer anything even remotely approaching the famine of the villages. There were also the aforementioned "commercial" stores selling unrationed bread, but they were out of reach of the majority of the urban population because of high prices. All other rationed products, such as fats, sugar, flour etc. were either unavailable, or to be obtained only with difficulty, and in very small quantities. I. K., a lawyer, relates what he saw in July 1933 in the city of Chernihiv: "I was walking near the cemetery. It was a hot day. Almost naked children, emaciated from hunger, were playing in the sand. I saw someone throwing sand out of a pit, with hands shrivelled like a mummy's. I came closer and saw a woman, about 30 years old, dishevelled and in rags. I asked her what she was doing. "Am I doing anything that is not permitted?" she replied. I, in turn asked her what she meant. She replied in a bare whisper, as if from a grave: "I am digging a grave for myself, perhaps my children, who are playing here, will cover me up, and then someone might take pity on the orphans. I can no longer bear to look at them going hungry."

Arthur Koestler who, as indicated above, lived in Kharkiv at that time, gives a pretty good idea of general conditions in the cities: "Under my hotel room window in Kharkov, funeral processions marched past all day. The electricity supply in Kharkov had broken down. There was no light in the town, and trams functioned only for an hour or so a day to take workers to the factories and back. There was also no fuel or petrol in the town and the winter was hard even for Ukraine, with temperatures of 30° below zero. Life seemed to have come to a standstill, the whole machinery on the verge of collapse."¹⁷

¹⁷ Arthur Koestler, "The Yogi and the Commissar" New York 1946., p. 137.

There are other indications, proving that the urban population of Ukraine, workers, clerks, and professionals were also half-starving. As is well known, during the famine the government opened stores under the name "Torgsin," from the Russian words, "trade with foreigners."

These stores were opened in all towns and in regional centers of the village type. In these stores unlimited quantities of the products of industry and foodstuffs were available, but only against payment in gold, silver, or "valuta," the latter being mostly American dollars. It was maintained formally that the stores functioned for the convenience of foreigners. But in point of fact, they were counted upon to extract from the population whatever they had left of valuables, or foreign currency. Valuables which were brought to the "Torgsins" were carefully scrutinized, entered into ledgers together with the passport number, name and address of the seller, and scrip was issued according to determined price lists, entitling the seller to make purchases at the 'Torgsin' stores. It was the planned objective of 'Torgsin' not only to extract valuables from the people, but to find out at the same time who had them. People brought to 'Torgsin' not only objects of gold and silver but also old gold coins. The government calculated that formerly rich people had kept since tsarist times gold coins, buried or well concealed against a rainy day. The rainy day had now come, and they were compelled to bring this dead capital out and offer it to 'Torgsin.' The ledgers of 'Torgsin' were strictly supervised by the GPU. The political police copied the names of people who traded with 'Torgsin,' supplemented them with their own data, and then proceeded to take action against its chosen victims.

As was customary, arrests were made between 2 and 3 in the morning. A careful search would be made. If no gold were found, the victim would be taken away. Those picked were mostly older people, former merchants, professionals and so on. If they would not confess and refused to surrender valuables, they would be given "the treatment." Jails were packed as tight with people as herrings in a barrel; the cells were filthy and stinking. Eventually they would be called out for interrogation by the GPU. The stay in the GPU jail would last either a few days, or weeks. The interrogation itself would take 24, and even 48 hours, with interrogators taking turns and bringing the victim to the brink of insanity. Besides the usual threats, blackmail and beatings, there was a wide variety of more refined methods

to bring out the desired confession from the chosen victim: — no food, no sleep, and the constant glare of very strong electric light. The guards wore dark goggles and would not allow the prisoner to sleep nor even close his eyes against the glare. In turn the prisoner would be put in a small, cold damp cell. They also used tricks and subterfuge. If the prisoner had a wife at home, they would go to her and inform her that he had told them where he kept the gold, and she had better give it up avoid trouble for herself. And vice versa the prisoner would be told that his wife had confessed after being arrested.

The peasants, as a rule, did no business with "Torgsin" for the simple reason that they had nothing to offer in the way of valuables, coins or currency. As indicated in the preface, the author gathered the core of his data on the famine among the displaced persons in Germany in 1947 and 1948, naturally among those D.P.'s who had seen and lived through the famine. In the course of this research 119 persons were asked whether they did business with "Torgsin" in 1932 and 1933. Those questioned were mostly educated people, among them about 50 professors of higher institutions of learning. The following table gives the trend of replies to this question:

Question	What was taken to Torgsin?	questioned	
		Number of people	per cent.
1.	nothing, had nothing to offer	31	25.9
2.	" did not need anything	12	10.1
3.	no answer	11	9.4
4.	gold teeth and gold crowns	16	13.4
5.	" wedding rings	4	3.4
6.	personal medallions, crosses	6	5.1
7.	gold from icons, pictures	2	1.7
8.	silverware	9	7.6
9.	other valuables	28	23.4
		119	100.0

The item "other valuables" included: earrings, chains, watches, old coins, cigarette cases, brooches, spoons, etc. I. P., an educator, took a silver dollar to "Torgsin" and in exchange obtained "50 grammes of sugar, one cake of soap and 200 grammes of rice."

The majority of educated people, and the highest ranks at that, were compelled to trade with "Torgsin" — in fact 54.6 per cent of them. V. E., a singer-composer, says that he took everything of value he had to "Torgsin", crosses, wedding rings, and spoons, leaving only the cross with which his son was baptized.

Almost 26 per cent of those questioned did not take anything to "Torgsin" because they had nothing to sell. Only 10 per cent of them were so well situated that they did not need to trade with "Torgsin." Of the total number of 119 persons interrogated, 41 were asked whether anyone in their family had died of famine in 1932-1933 in the villages. 15 answered in the negative. 26, or 63.4 per cent answered yes. Among those who died were parents, brothers and sisters. These facts prove that the Ukrainian professional intelligentsia was unable to aid relatives in the villages by sending them bread; thus they could not save members of their immediate families from death by starvation.

This brings us to the question: who did not starve in Ukraine in 1932-33?

In the cities and villages the only people adequately supplied with food and other products were the higher ranks of party and government workers. A regional village center would usually have about 30 persons belonging to such key personnel — the regional party committee, the NKVD, those in charge of treasury, agricultural and judicial offices. For the purpose of providing such people with food, special secret stores were established, where everything was available at fixed government prices. The lower rural authorities were also provided for; the heads of the village soviets, party secretaries and such. Sometimes "activists" would be included in the privileged group. Within the collective farms those who "carried the keys," i. e. chiefs, accountants, warehousemen and brigade workers were usually in a better position than the rest."

It is obviously almost impossible to relate all the combinations of circumstances which would allow a peasant family or at best, some of its members to avoid death from the famine.

The most important factor was one of the many devious ways of concealing food reserves within the household.

According to observation by U. M., an agronomist, those families of peasants who had a close member working in a city had a good chance of survival. This can be taken as a general statement, with reservation that those who lived in cities did not always have the means of aiding their rural families.

Some people, realizing that only those who had gold or

* Ewald Ammende, (op. cit., p. 56) says: "only the military and the GPU, i. e. those engaged in the forcible collection of grain had enough to eat. All the rest had to go hungry."

silver could be sure of food, began to dig up the old graves of wealthier people who had died decades before. Graves of the clergy were especially sought after, as they were usually buried with a large gold or silver cross. As related by H. L., in Chornoukhy near Poltava, in the Pokrovsky cemetery the graves of former merchants, colonels and priests were robbed. In general, very few graves of formerly wealthy people were left intact.

The grave-robbers were very often unable to agree on a division of the loot, and arguments ending in murder frequently resulted — thus in Chornoukhy, Ivan Stadnichenko, refusing to share gold robbed from graves with his partner, Yevdokim Timoshchuk, killed the latter with a knife.

Ownership of a goat by a peasant family usually assured a better chance of survival. The goat would, as a matter of course, be kept in the house, together with the family.

It was noted that peasants who drank spirits during the famine had a better chance of survival than those who did not touch alcoholic beverages.¹⁹

There were isolated cases of very unusual and lucky circumstances saving people from starvation. As reported by D. M., an agricultural official: "Some peasants evaded death from starvation by discovering hoards of grain in the fields, built into small earth-covered mounds by field-mice."

In the spring, with the start of the sowing campaign, many collective farms were provided with food for the establishment of communal kitchens for their workers. Sometimes chuckwagons would go out into the fields to feed those who were able to work. The general practice of collective farms was to issue a ration of meal, from 100 to 300 grammes per day for each worker, and a like quantity for members of his immediate family. In the case of communal kitchens, a kind of paste made of flour would be boiled in water, and this soup served hot twice a day.

The following table gives a general idea of the scope of communal feeding in Ukrainian collective farms, as compared with those of Russia and Byelo-Russia in May of 1933.²⁰

¹⁹ Alcoholic beverages were the only product which was always available in government stores in unlimited quantities throughout the famine.

²⁰ Data in the table are from the following sources: *Obshchestvennoe pitanie SSSR v 1933 g. Itoqi perepisi*, Moscow, 1934, pp. 253-55. Also: "Soobshchenie gosudarstvennoy planovoy komissii Soyuza SSR ob itogakh vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya," *Izvestiya*, June 2, 1939.

Republics	percentage of rural population attached to communal kitchens in proportion to total rural pop. according to census of Dec. 17, 1926.	Mean value of 1 meal in kopeks	
		Motor tractor stations	Collective farms
Russian RSFSR	3.3	36.6	23.9
Byelo-Russian Soc. Sov. Rep.	0.2	38.3	23.2
Ukrainian Soc. Sov. Rep.	9.2	30.2	11.6
The USSR as a whole	3.9	35.3	18.1

In the number of the rural population incorporated in the communal feeding system, Ukraine held first place. In the quality of the food served, Ukraine held the last place. It is a significant fact that the quality of the food provided by Machine-Tractor Stations was double that of collective farms in the Soviet Union taken as a whole, and almost triple those in Ukraine.

Conditions in the villages in the spring of 1933 are described by M. Sh., a student of the Poltava Institute of Technology, who, together with other students and members of the faculty had been despatched to the collective farm at Morianivka near Poltava, to help in the spring sowing campaign.

Party leaders at the Institute set the student to preparing the collective farm workers for a mass shock job in the fields on May 1. The teachers and students were divided into groups of 3 to 5. All were told to take a supply of food with them. The students were mostly reluctant to go, but no excuses were accepted. We started in the morning of April 28, first by train, then followed by a 14 kilometer walk from the station to Morianiwka. It was a beautiful morning. The sun was generous with its golden rays. Nightingales were to be seen above. It was quiet walking the paths through the fields. The grass was green. In the village the straw of the thatched roofs was ripped from buildings, walls looked chipped, doors were missing, fences looked trampled and uncared for. Not a living soul was in sight. The students hung their heads, looking sullen. Conversation was difficult.

We came to the common. Two huge pots were suspended over a fire. Three men and two women were cooking and tending the fire. We started in their

direction. Then we stopped and looked around; the sight froze the marrow in one's bones: hundreds of pairs of human eyes were staring at the pots from behind fences, trees and bushes. The owners of the eyes were all human skeletons, men, women, children, infants. Some stood, some knelt, and some lay on their stomachs. We came closer to the fire and greeted the small group working around the pots. We found out that they were the local bosses and their wives. They were carrying out the orders of the regional communist party committee which read: "Make sure that the collective farm workers go out into the fields on May Day, the day of proletarian solidarity. Use your own local resources." They were cooking grist, procured from the local grist-mill, to feed the people before sowing-time. The crowd of members of the collective farm had gathered early, since it had been announced that those who took part in the sowing campaign would from then on get a meal from the collective kitchen. The grits were finally ready. The chief of the village council banged on a rail and announced that dinner was ready, and the two women stood with ladles ready in hand to serve. Everybody surged forward, some walking, some crawling on all fours, the women loaded down with children. They all stretched out arms holding plates, pots, tins. The chief stood by the pots of grits and gave curt orders to the serving women: "Pour," "Don't pour." Only those who looked as if they would be able to work were given food, those who could stand on their two feet. Even towards the end, the very old and the children were given nothing, the organizers holding strictly to the maxim: "Those who don't work, don't eat." Many of those who received a ration, particularly the women, did not eat it themselves, but gave it to the children.

Other preparations for going out in the fields were being made at the same time; harrows were set, horses fed. It had been decided not to use sowing machines, because the horses were too weak to pull them. The sowing would be done by hand.

That same day the student brigade, accompanied by the local authorities inspected the horse-stables. The collective farm had 106 horses, of which only 9 could stand on their legs, the rest were "hung." Horses in such condition as those had to be kept suspended otherwise, if permitted to lie down, they did not have the strength to get up. Those in charge of the horses were also too weak to be able to lift them. So, an invention was devised. Two ropes were strung under the horses' bellies by the front and hind legs, tied to posts, and in this way they would be kept standing. Their only fodder was straw from thatched roofs, cut and steamed.

They left for the fields on May 1. Only 4 of the 39 horses that started reached the place of work. Of 30 people from the collective farm, only 14 reached the field.

The horses were not strong enough to pull harrows and people had to help them. A man could not carry the sack of seed for long either, so people changed places often. They somehow pulled through until about 4 in the afternoon, and then the horses gave in. They stopped, and the people had to stop, too. Finally, the chief of the collective farm said that enough work had been done for the day and the student brigade returned to the village, leaving the workers and horses in the field.

Moscow's denial of the famine. Statements about the famine by M. Kalinin, M. Litvinov and E. Herriot. A series of administrative measures by the Soviet government tending to make the famine more effective

- a) order to medical authorities to conceal the real causes of death of the population;
- b) treatment of starving peasants as "class enemies, kurkul, saboteurs and idlers," the peoples' reaction to the starving;
- c) lack of any aid to the starving peasants from the government and intensification of grain exports;
- d) refusal of proposed foreign aid of charitable organizations;
- e) commercial blockade of rural areas;
- f) increased protective measures and guarding of collective farmlands and the effect on the starving population.

"What has the Soviet government done in the face of the catastrophe within its borders? It has simply denied the existence of the famine."¹

Moscow, guilty of organizing the famine, denied it even existed. Arthur Koesler's statement, that "today the catastrophe of 1932-1933 is more or less frankly admitted in Soviet circles" is not borne out by subsequent statements of the Soviet government.²

Now, as then, the Soviet press maintains a silence on the subject of the extermination of the Ukrainian peasant population by means of famine. It was altogether taboo as a subject of conversation and writing. Officially they not only denied its existence, but even sporadic malnutrition would not be admitted. "At the time, not the slightest allusion to real conditions was allowed to appear in the Soviet press, including the newspapers of the Ukraine itself."³

Arthur Koestler, who spent the winter of 1932-1933 in Kharkiw, writes: "Each morning, when I read the Kharkov **KOMMUNIST** I learned about plan-figures reached and passed,

¹ Ammende, *Human Life in Russia*, p. 150

² Arthur Koestler, *The Yogi and the Commissar*, New York 1946, p. 137

³ *Ibid.*

about competitions between factory shock brigades, awards of the Red Banner, new giant combines in the Urals, and so on; the photographs were either of young people always laughing and always carrying a banner in their hands, or of some picturesque elder in Uzbekistan, always smiling and always learning the alphabet. Not one word about the local famine, epidemics, the dying out of whole villages; even the fact that there was no electricity in Kharkov was not once mentioned in the Kharkov newspaper. It gave a feeling of dreamlike unreality; the paper seemed to talk about some quite different country which had no point of contact with the daily life we led; and the same applied to the radio. The consequence of all this was that the vast majority of people in Moscow had no idea of what went on in Kharkov, and even less of what went on in Tashkent, or Archangel or Vladivostok twelve day's train journey away, in a country where travelling was reserved for government officials; and these travellers were not of a talkative nature. The enormous land was covered by a blanket of silence and nobody outside the small circle of the initiated could form a comprehensive picture of the situation."¹

In spite of all the precautions taken by the government to conceal the fact of the famine, rumors of it reached the outside world as early as the fall of 1932. The foreign press paid more and more attention to it, but all this was quite naturally ignored by the Soviet press. Finally, in the summer of 1933, PRAVDA published the following comment: "The official Austrian newspaper, 'Reichspost', has printed on its first page an article entitled 'Mass Death Stalks Russia' in which it is stated that millions of Soviet citizens in the Volga regions, Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus have died of starvation. This vulgar slander, dirty invention about famine in the USSR has been cooked up by the editors of 'Reichspost' in order to divert the attention of their own workers from their hard and hopeless situation."²

This reproof was, of course, directed at the outside world, for, as reported by W. H. Chamberlin: "While it was easy to tell credulous tourists in Moscow that there had been no famine, it was impossible for local officials to make any such assertion when every peasant with whom we talked was mentioning friends and relatives who had perished, either from outright

¹ Ibid., pp. 137,138.

² Pravda, July 20, 1933.

hunger or from typhus, influenza and other diseases that always ravage a famine-weakened population.”

Continuing to deny the existence of famine categorically, Moscow made careful note and gave publicity to the favorable utterances of those foreigners who sided with Moscow directly or indirectly. A lot of publicity was particularly given to statements made by Edouard Herriot, then Premier of France, who visited the USSR officially in August and September of 1933.

PRAVDA of September 13, 1933, published the following news item from abroad: “E. Herriot told representatives of the press that everything he saw in the USSR was wonderful. He categorically denied the lies of the bourgeois press about a famine in the Soviet Union.”

Herriot's declaration proves that he was deceived. It is obvious that he could not then know or be in a position to find out that everywhere he went, to Odessa, Kharkiw, Kiev, careful preparations were made for his reception. What stage-directions were undertaken is attested to by the following statement of a foreign correspondent: “We were staying at Kiev when the French delegation was expected, and thus became witnesses of the camouflage practised at that time. On the day before the arrival of the delegation the entire populace was mobilized at two A.M. to clean the streets and decorate the houses. Tens of thousands were feverishly giving the dirty and neglected city a European appearance. Food-distributing centers, co-operative shops, etc. were closed. Queues were prohibited, “bezprizornie” (i.e. the hordes of neglected children), beggars and starving people suddenly vanished. At the crossings mounted militiamen were stationed on well-groomed horses whose manes were decorated with white ribbons, a sight never before and never again witnessed in Kiev. The guests arrived, inspected with visible satisfaction, entered their names in the city's roll of visitors, and went away. That evening the decorations were taken down, the militiamen vanished, the food distributing centers opened and the queues of weary and despondent Soviet citizens formed up afresh..... I happened to be sitting in the company of a number of Soviet officials, directors and members of the party, at the

* W. H. Chamberlin, *The Ukraine, a Submerged Nation*, New York 1944, p. 60.

† *Pravda*, September 13, 1933.

‡ Ammende, *Human Life in Russia*, pp. 230, 231.

moment when the papers were containing M. Herriot's interview, in which he stated that he had seen no trace of a famine in Russia. One should have seen the faces and heard the angry, bitter laughter when this interview was read."

Another witness, M. D., who now lives abroad, relates in detail what preparations were made to receive E. Herriot at the collective farm "October Revolution" in Brovary, near Kiev'

A special meeting of the regional party organization was held in Kiev for the purpose of transforming this collective farm into a "Potemkin village." An older communist, an inspector attached to the Commission of Agriculture, was appointed temporary chief and experienced agronomists were made into brigade members of the farm. It was thoroughly scrubbed and cleaned, all communists, komsomols and activists having been mobilized for the job. Furniture from the regional theatre in Brovary was brought, and the clubrooms beautifully appointed with it. Curtains and drapes were brought from Kiev, also tablecloths. One wing was turned into a dining-hall, the tables of which were covered with new cloths and decorated with flowers. The regional telephone exchange and the switchboard operator, were transferred from Brovary to the farm. Some steers and hogs were slaughtered to provide plenty of meat. A supply of beer was also brought in. All the corpses and starving peasants were removed from the highways in the surrounding countryside and the peasants were forbidden to leave their houses. A mass meeting of collective farm workers was called, and they were told that a motion picture would be made of collective farm life, and for this purpose this particular farm had been chosen by a film-studio from Odessa. Only those who were chosen to play in the picture would turn out for work, the rest of the members must stay at home and not interfere. Those who were picked by a special committee were given new outfits brought from Kiev: shoes, socks, suits, hats, handkerchiefs. Women received new dresses. The whole masquerade was directed by a delegate of the Kiev party district organization, Sharapov, and a man named Denisenko was

his deputy. The people were told that they were a movie director and his assistant. The organizer's decided that it would be best for M. Herriot to meet the collective farm workers while they were seated at tables, eating a good meal. The next day, when Herriot was due to arrive, now well-dressed workers were seated in the dining-hall, and served a hearty meal. They were eating huge chunks of meat, washing it down with beer or lemonade, and were making short work of it. The director, who was nervous, called upon the people to eat slowly, so that the honored guest, Herriot, would see them at their tables. Just then a telephone message came from Kiev: 'Visit cancelled, wind everything up.' Now another meeting was called. Sharapov thanked the workers for a good performance, and then Denisenko asked them to take off and return all the clothes that had been issued to them, with the exception of socks and handkerchiefs. The people begged to be allowed to keep the clothes and shoes, promising to work or pay for them, but to no avail. Everything had to be given back and returned to Kiev, to the stores from which it had been borrowed.

A little later, PRAVDA reprinted from the English press part of the letter written by an Englishman, John Jager, on his impressions of his visit to Kiev. He wrote: "I was present at the Olympiade, in which 20,000 people participated. All the workers wore sports garb. If these people were suffering from hunger, it would have been hard for me not to notice it. I was at a meeting in the Palace of Labor, where 2,000 workers were listening to a lecture by a delegate of the Peoples' Commissariat of Supply. Even there I did not hear one word mentioned about the famine, and did not see any sign that would indicate malnutrition of the people. On the contrary, I dined with workers in their communal kitchen in Kiev, and found the food served to be very good."

Finally, towards the end of December, Kalinin, speaking to the 4th Session of the Central Executive Committee of the

* Pravda, September 23, 1933. Every phrase used in this letter merits careful attention. Particularly the words "there was not one word about the famine," and that food in the communal kitchen "was very good."

USSR, on the subject of a campaign going on abroad about possible aid to starving Ukraine, angrily declared: "Political cheats propose to aid starving Ukraine.... only the most decadent classes are capable of producing such cynical elements."¹⁰

The foreign secretary, M. Litvinov, was no less emphatic in his denials of the existence of a famine in Ukraine.

The community of Ukrainians in the United States, well-informed on the conditions in Ukraine, undertook active protests and publicity, and drew sympathizers from among prominent American statesmen and politicians. Representative Herman E. Koppelman of Connecticut, was one of those who collected Ukrainian protestations and transmitted them to Litvinov. Speaking in the name of the Soviet government, Litvinov denied all the facts about the famine in Ukraine.

In his reply to Congressman Koppelman of January 4, 1934, Litvinov wrote: "I am in receipt of your letter of the 14th inst., and thank you for drawing my attention to the Ukrainian pamphlet. There are a great number of similar pamphlets, full of lies, circulated by counter-revolutionary organizations abroad, which specialize in work of this kind. There is nothing left for them to do but to spread false information or to forge documents... Yours truly, M. Litvinov."¹¹

The denials on the part of Moscow are the best proof that the famine was deliberately organized. For if the famine had been the result of natural causes such as drought, locusts, hail or other calamities of nature, there would be no reason to conceal such a fact from the world. On the contrary, it would have been publicized, and Moscow would have asked for international aid for the starving population, just as it did in 1922-1923.¹²

Since the famine had been artificially created in order to break the opposition of the peasants to collectivization, it became necessary to conceal it, and concealed it was. At the same time measures were undertaken to make this gigantic act of terror against the people of Ukraine as effective as possible.

¹⁰ *Pravda*, December 29, 1933.

¹¹ D. Solovey, *Holhota Ukrayiny*, New York 1953, p. 5.

¹² A delegation was sent to Europe at that time, which conducted propaganda about imperative need of aid for the starving population of Soviet Russia. A number of foreign charitable organizations worked inside Soviet Russia, bringing aid in the amount of 32 million puds of food, valued at 100 million gold roubles. About 11 million people were thus helped. *Pro borbu s golodom*, p. 7.

O. H., a physician, stated that medical institutions were given secret orders that doctors were forbidden, under threat of heavy penalties, to make any mention of death by starvation in any reports or death certificates. They were to indicate that death was caused by "BBO," an abbreviation (Russian) for non-albuminous secretions. Cause of death was often listed as "weakness" of old age or of youth, according to the age of the person, sometimes as heart failure, diarrhea, etc. The true cause of death was in all cases exhaustion from hunger.

As has been mentioned before, officially the existence of famine was denied, and for this reason no mention of it could be found in the Soviet press. Unofficially, the government offered as an excuse for the cruel treatment of the Ukrainian people, their alleged subversion, branding and treating them as "class enemies." The authorities called the starving peasants idlers, who refused to work, "kurkuls and semi-kurkuls, who refuse to join the collective farms," and "anti-social and anti-government elements." An agronomist, O. S., was told by a chief of a political department that those who were dying, were "kurkuls, who have been sabotaging the Soviet authorities."

In the countryside, at brigade meetings of shock-workers and grain collectors, government aides were wont to say that the class enemies, the kurkuls, were hiding grain and wrecking grain-collection plans, and the enemies of the people were spreading provocative lies about starving peasants, while as a matter of fact, only the slothful idlers who refused to work and were constantly engaged in sabotage were not starving and dying.

The same was said of peasants who came to the cities, in search of work and bread, and were dying of starvation on city streets and markets. Meetings of clerks and workers were called in factories and institutions at which they were ordered not to pay any attention to these peasants. It was sometimes added, with cynicism, that kurkuls came to die in the cities in order to arouse the city proletariat against the Soviet government.

Regardless of where they were dying, in the villages or in the cities, from the viewpoint of the government they were invariably "class enemies." V. A., an engineer, says: "During the October festivities of 1932, I was walking along a highway and noticed a man lying in a ditch. He was about 50 years old, with a long grey beard, dressed in rags, from under which an embroidered Ukrainian shirt was showing. I came closer to

him. 'Please give me something to eat' he begged, stretching out his hand. Within a short time a crowd of perhaps a hundred workers had gathered around the man. In a few minutes a party organization man appeared, and ordered in a piercing voice 'Form columns, and march, don't pay any attention to a counter-revolutionary kurkul, let him die like a dog'."

The people themselves assumed an entirely different attitude towards those who suffered from hunger. This is what R. B., an agronomist who travelled over Ukraine from Kiev to Donbas in March of 1933, says on the subject: "I made careful observation of everything that could be seen from the railroad. At the major junction stops, such as Hrebinka, Romodan, Poltava, Kharkiw, Lozova, Sinelnikove, Chaplyne, one could not help noticing many peasants swollen from hunger who were trying to sell all sorts of things: clothes, kerchiefs, towels, blankets, linen etc. anything that they could scrape up from their storage chests. They offered all those things practically for nothing, but there were no buyers. They wished to raise some money with which to buy a ticket to get away. Two peasant women boarded our car at the Hrebinka station. They looked frightened, but they got in with their children and stood in the corridor. This was an express train from Shepetiwka to Baku, which made only the major stops. For that reason, and also because it had already been filled in Kiev, so far no starving peasants had boarded our car. Although it was quite crowded, people in our compartment squeezed a little tighter and made room for the new passengers. They came in and sat down, holding their children's hands. They had no baggage, except a very small bundle in the hands of each woman. In reply to our questions they told us with some hesitation that they were going to the Donbas, where there were some people from their village, and they expected to get bread and possibly work with their aid; but they feared for the fate of their children. A little boy, about four years old, who had been sitting in his mother's lap, now said "Mother, I want something to eat." The woman looked at him with pity and started untying her small bundle, from which she pulled out a piece of something black, resembling bread. She broke it up and divided it among the children. The passengers now got busy, each pulled something out of his bag and gave it to them. "Mother, look, real bread" cried the little girl, when she had a piece of standard rationed Soviet bread from one of the

passengers. The children scrambled all over each other, as if each wanted the other's piece of bread. Their eyes were glowing, like those of hungry animals. This lasted only a short while. Soon passengers from other compartments began coming in and bringing all sorts of food for the women and children. Somebody remarked that it was not good for them to eat a lot at first. The mothers then held the collected goods in their laps. Tears streamed down their faces; then the children cried, too, and all the other women in the compartment. Many men turned their faces away, unable to conceal their tears. Some spell had been broken. That which hitherto people could only imagine now confronted them as grim reality. The whole railroad carriage was moved by one emotion. The women finally calmed down, and one of them told a typical, frightful tragedy. The GPU took her husband. All winter they stayed in an unheated house and ate cucumbers, cabbage and beets. They mixed chaff with beets and baked a kind of bread. They began to swell; in the last two weeks her parents and three children had died. There was no strength left to bury them, so she just put them in the garden and covered them with a little earth. There were houses in the same street whose occupants had all died, and the corpses were still lying there. Realizing that her days were numbered, she took the children and went to the railroad station. She had a little money but they would not sell her a ticket, demanding a permit from the village soviet. She felt all her strength ebbing and was sure she was going to die there at the station. But by a near-miracle, a railroad man whom she knew brought her some bread, gave her a ticket and put her on this train.

I do not know who the other passengers in the car were. But I do know that this event created an unusual situation, where all were able to shed the compulsory mask of loyalty to the Soviet regime. People did not conceal their anger at the fact that one could see people dying of hunger, while at the same station huge amounts of grain were being loaded, grain produced by the very same people who were now dying for lack of it."¹²

The artificial and deliberate nature of the famine of 1932-1933 is best borne out by the fact that the government did not

¹²Material gathered by the Democratic Association of Former Repressees of the Soviets (DOBRUS) in Great Britain. See: M. Verbytsky, *Naybilshy zlochyn Kremlya*. London, 1952, pp. 83-85.

furnish any food aid to the peasants whatsoever. At the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (b) on June 10, 1933, some lesser party official very guardedly expressed a desire for government aid to the starving peasants. P. Postyshev was firmly opposed to it. He severely condemned a resolution of the Odessa district party committee which, at the start of the collection campaign of 1932, in the words of Postyshev "made a plaintive call—to divert each first hectare of crops to communal feeding." Postyshev continued: "Do we really have to consider how damaging this resolution is? This directive places the task of collecting grain for the government in second place, and communal feeding in the first. Is this not a flagrant example of some district party committees being pushed around by the greedy tendencies of collective farm workers, who are in turn being utilized by the class enemy and against the interests of the proletarian state."¹⁰

"Since Postyshev made this speech, the nature of the famine now prevailing in the Ukraine..... has been admitted by the Bolsheviks."¹¹

Postyshev's directive had repercussion on the practical application of policies in the countryside in the spring and summer of 1933. The harvested grain was immediately sent to grain elevators, and only those workers who actually worked on collective farms would get a certain amount of grain on account. Those who could not work because they were exhausted by hunger did not get any bread from the new harvest, and continued to starve until they died.

There are eyewitness accounts attesting to the accuracy of the above statement. V. K., a scientist, who, along with students and scientists from Kharkiw, was sent to the village of Blahodatne near Kharkiw to help furrow beets, the peasants being too weak to do it themselves, says: "When our column approached the village, we were struck by the complete silence of the place and the absence of any people. As we found out later, two-thirds of the inhabitants had died. We were given living quarters in the school building. We had brought a sufficient amount of food with us, but the collective farm had received orders to greet us with a supper. The hungry peasants cooked a meal of paste in water (thin flour paste). When we

¹⁰ *Pravda*, June 22, 1933.

¹¹ *Ammende*, *op. cit.* p. 61.

came to eat, a crowd of hungry children had gathered from all over the village, begging us for food. The students, shocked by the appearance of these children, distributed the food received from the village and also their own bread among the hungry. Conversation was struck up, but those in charge of the student brigade saw danger in too close contact with the peasants and ordered that no-one should engage in conversation or distribute bread! A half hour later, the children who had eaten after a long period of starvation began falling down with severe cramps in their stomachs. The girl students went into hysterics at this sight, and then our bosses ordered all of us into the school building, and the children to be carried to their homes in the village. The next day we went to look around the village. We met a wagon piled with dead bodies. It stopped at every house and the man asked if there were any bodies. If there were, some men would take them out and put them on the wagon. Because the weakened peasants were unable to dig graves, the wagon stopped by the cellar of a house, filled it with corpses and then piled earth on top. There was no sign of mourning. The peasants' faces showed a complete indifference to what went on around them. But the students were impressed and deeply shocked, so they were again given orders not to walk around the village, and not to contact the villagers! We went to weed the furrows of sugar-beets. City-folk, unused to this kind of work, soon tired, and the work was not very effective, either. The collective farm chiefs attached a local peasant to our student brigade, whose job was to sharpen our hoes. He worked in silence until the noon meal, when the students, out of the goodness of their hearts, shared their food with him, and he had a big meal. The result was tragic and unforeseen by the students: the man died before their eyes about half an hour later.

On our way back from the fields we saw some girls who were hoeing and looked hungry. The students surreptitiously gave them some bread. The girls hid the bread and asked: "What did you come here for? Give us food and we will do a much better job than you."¹⁴

R. B., tells: "During my stay in a village helping with the

¹⁴ Material gathered by D. Solovey *op. cit.*, Detroit, 1952. pp. 49-51.

harvest," I entered a house. When my presence was noticed, hands were stretched out to me, and then I saw the hungry eyes of a woman and two children. They were swollen and apparently breathing their last."

Mr. and Mrs. Stebalo, Americans of Ukrainian birth, who had migrated to the United States in 1913, revisited their native village in July 1933. THE NEW YORK TIMES of August 29, 1933 published the following report of this visit: "When the news spread that the Americans had arrived, the pair were surrounded by inhabitants and conducted to Stebalo's mother. Like the others, she was swollen with hunger, and her body was covered with sores. But when she finally grasped that her children had arrived, she wept without uttering a word. For two years she had received none of the money that was sent to her. When the Stebalo's had distributed bread among the inhabitants, the latter became talkative, though terribly afraid of being denounced. They told how hunger compelled them to eat the leaves of the trees and the most loathsome refuse just to have something inside them, and said that the whole population of the village would probably die, and they could not touch the harvest in the fields, for these were guarded by an armed detachment."¹⁷

Moscow deliberately refused to help the peasants in their plight because any aid would have been contrary to her plans.

W. H. Chamberlin has the following to say on this subject: "The Soviet government could easily have averted the famine from its own resources if it had desired to do so. A complete cessation of the export of foodstuffs in 1932 or the diversion of a small amount of foreign currency to the purchase of grain and provisions would have achieved this end. The Soviet attitude was pretty adequately summed up by Mr. Mezhuév, President of the Poltava Soviet, who said to me: "To have imported grain would have been injurious to our prestige. To have

¹⁷ In the summer of 1933 there was a lack of workers in the villages to bring in the harvest because so many had died of hunger. P. Postyshev therefore ordered hundreds of thousands of city workers and clerks to go out and help with the harvest.

¹⁸ See also Ammende, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

let the peasants keep their grain would have encouraged them to go on producing little'.¹⁹

In point of fact the USSR exported 17,600 cwts of grain in 1932, and 17,175 cwts in 1933.²⁰

These figures indicate that grain exports during the famine years of 1932 and 1933 were five times greater than during 1928, when only 3,440 cwts of grain went abroad.²¹

"By exporting part of the grain wrung from the peasantry, Moscow has contributed to the increase of the number of victims of the catastrophe."²²

The death rate of starving peasants was continually on the increase, due to the lack of any aid from the government as supplies became exhausted. "In Kuban, at the Kazakanska Stanitsa, according to a statement made by the chief of the village soviet, Nemov, people were dying at the following rate:

January (1933)	21 persons
February "	34 "
March "	79 "
April "	155 "

This upward tendency most probably continued during May and early June, until early vegetables provided some relief.²³

During the time when the starving population of Ukraine was dying of hunger at railroad stations, at these same stations grain elevators and warehouses were full of food products. An American newspaperman, H. Lang, correspondent of the New York JEWISH DAILY FORWARD, wrote: "Travelling across the limitless fields of Ukraine... we saw huge pyramids of grain, piled high, and smoking from internal combustion. We noticed hundreds of carloads of grain and other food products, forgotten and left on side-tracks."²⁴

PRAVDA printed in the summer of 1933 a series of open letters of protest from collective farms in the German Volga Republic, in which the writers stated that: "The so-called aid

¹⁹ W. H. Chamberlin, *Russia's Iron Age*. Boston 1934, p. 89.

²⁰ S. Bakunin and D. Myshustin, *Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR za 20 let: 1918-1937*, Moscow, 1939, pp. 34-35.

²¹ *Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR k XVII sesdu partii. Sbornik statey i materialov pod redaktsiey Ya. D. Yansona*, Moscow, 1934, p. 92.

²² Ammende, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

²³ W. H. Chamberlin, *Russia's Iron Age*, p. 85.

²⁴ *Sotsialisticheski Vestnik* No. 19, 1933, p. 15.

²⁵ From a letter of the kolkhozniks from Kolkhoz "New Hope," *Pravda*, July 14, 1933.

for the starving in money and goods had better be applied to Germany proper, where the peasants are ruined, and the unemployment and hunger of the workers is on the increase."²⁸ The next day a letter from another collective farm said that: "We live as no working peasants have ever lived in history."²⁹

Particularly convincing must have been the letter addressed to the peasants of Germany, which stated in the name of German, collective workers, that "after harvesting our crops we shall carry out the slogan of Comrade Stalin, that no collective farm worker is to be without a cow."³⁰

While such letters of protest were being written and published, real German collective farm workers, who lived on the left bank of the Dnister river in Ukrainian Bessarabia, were dying of hunger within sight of their kinsmen, also Germans, who lived on the right bank of the Dnister, in the part of Bessarabia which was part of Rumania.³¹

"Under the eyes of the Germans in Bessarabia — the houses and people on the Russian bank can easily be seen across the Dnister — their friends and brethren starve to death in Soviet territory. The Germans had a surplus of grain, fruit and other food. In the summer of 1933 they raised twenty truckloads of grain to place them at the disposal of a relief organization for their countrymen across the frontier but in vain, — their help was declined. They had to go on watching their kinsmen perish across the Dnister."³²

The Ukrainians beyond the Soviet border organized relief committees to aid starving Ukraine. In Lviv a 'Ukrainian Citizen's Committee to Save Ukraine' was established. Parallel with this, a series of county committees was formed, collaborating with the Lviv center. Similar civic committees for the relief of Ukraine sprang up in Prague, Paris, Berlin, Brussels, Warsaw, Chernivtsi (Bukovina, then under Rumania), and in New York. All the committees recognized the leadership of the Lviv committee, which thus became the center of all relief activities.

²⁸ From a letter of the kolkhozniiks from Kolkhoz "Ajhorkalt," *Pravda*, July 15, 1933.

²⁹ From a letter of the kolkhozniiks from Kolkhoz "New Path," *Pravda*, July 12, 1933.

³⁰ In June of 1940 that part of Bessarabia which belonged to Roumania was incorporated into Soviet Ukraine, along with Bukovina. Another part of Bessarabia was made part of the Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic.

³¹ This and other similar facts were widely published in the press of the world. See also Ammende, *op. cit.*, pp. 69, 70.

Regardless of how much the government refused to accept aid for the starving and denied the existence of famine, the significance of the Ukrainian Relief Committees lay in the opportunity they had of informing the world of the origins of the famine in Ukraine, its scope and consequences.

In order to make the famine more bitter Moscow organized a blockade of the Ukrainian countryside. "Villages which did not fill the grain quotas that were demanded from them were 'blockaded' in the sense that no city products were allowed to reach them."²²

In this manner the villages were deprived, as a consequence of the blockade, of a number of necessities, indispensable in any normal rural life, such as salt, kerosine, gasoline, matches, sugar, shoes, clothing, etc.

But even worse was the need of the villagers for bread and food, and this, as has been noted before, compelled the peasants to try and find salvation by escaping to the cities. In order to halt this mass exodus of peasants towards the cities, Moscow prohibited the sale of railroad tickets to peasants. A railroadman, S. K. says:

I worked as senior conductor at Osnova near Kharkiv in 1933. On May 25, dispatcher Peter Shaposhnikov gave me orders to take over a passenger train at the Osnova station and take charge of it between the stations Kharkiv-Levada and Balaklea. Then chief conductor O. Onopko gave me an order, authorizing me to issue tickets only to employed workers and only to those peasants who had travel permits from their government and collective farms, signed by the chiefs of such institutions or the chief of the regional executive committee, and only when the purpose of their trip was to get spare parts for tractors. No other trips by peasants were permitted. Peasants who did not have such special permits could not buy tickets at the railroad stations, nor from conductors on trains. This order originated in the Peoples' Commissariat in Moscow, and its execution was carefully watched by our third department in Osnova, headed by com. Bayov. Before proceeding on our tour of duty, O. Onopko called all the seniors together.

²² W. H. Chamberlin, *Russia's Iron Age*, p. 86.

read the order to us and asked us whether we were familiar with its contents and would carry it out. At the station of Balaklea, (where we arrived in the evening and stood until 4 A.M.), we saw masses of hungry and swollen people. Many women had children in their arms, in the same condition. They all wanted to board our train in order to go to the city of Kharkiw, where they hoped to get bread and other food stuffs. Tickets were not sold to these people and they were not permitted on the train. The people begged and pleaded to be allowed in. It was three A.M. and the other conductors were asleep in the forward car behind the locomotive. I could not refuse them, and let them in but told them to keep quiet and not tell anyone about it.

When I returned to Osnova, O. Onopko and chief of the workers committee Peter Sviniarov knew what I had done. I was called before a so-called Workers' Court and accused of disorganizing railroad transportation, carrying 75 per cent of the passengers without tickets and refusing to carry out the specific orders of the Peoples' Commissariat. Luckily, I was merely fired from the job.

Some time before, in 1932, a unified passport system had been introduced for the entire USSR,²¹ the object of which was to clean out the cities from kurkul, criminal and other anti-social elements.

Officially, this decree included among the so-called undesirable elements all persons "not connected with production, or employment in schools or institutions, or not engaged in useful work."²² Accordingly therefore, the peasants were prohibited from living in the cities without a special dispensation.

The decrees of the government were specifically directed against the peasants who were starving, the main objective being not to allow them into the cities at all. The authorities were also particularly careful not to let them go beyond the borders of Ukraine. A former railroad employee, M. D. says: "The then Peoples' Commissar of Roads, A. A. Andreyev,

²¹ *Osnovnye direktivy partii i pravitelstva po sel'skomu khozyaystvu 1931—1934 gg.* Moscow, 1934, 2nd ed., p. 41.

²² Pensioners and disabled war veterans were exempt.

issued a secret order in the spring of 1933 when railroad travel by hungry peasants had assumed catastrophic proportions: 'Peasants are not to be permitted to travel from Ukraine to Moscow. Tickets to be issued only against special permits'. Some peasants were fortunate enough to be able to obtain these permits and thus circumvented A. A. Andreyev's directive. Commissar Andreyev was then compelled to issue a supplementary secret order: "Travel permits are to be controlled by central offices and issued only for official travel." To assure compliance with this order, an augmented detachment of the NKVD was placed on the border of hungry Ukraine and well-fed Russia, especially between the stations of Mikhailiwka (Ukraine) and Zernovo (Russia), where all trains proceeding from Ukraine to Moscow were carefully checked. The hungry people managed to get around all this, too. They would take a train to Konotop or Tereshchenkovo and from there proceed on foot. Women with children would often walk 80 to 100 kilometres, avoiding main highways, going through fields and woods until they would reach Zernovo or Nalva, well within the Russian Soviet Republic, and there board trains for Moscow or points beyond Moscow. This decree was not repealed by the next Commissar of Transportation, L. Kaganovich, until towards the end of 1934."

Another witness, B. A., an engineer relates: "In Homel, (Byelo-Russia) I saw the militia check all passengers' baggage on the train from Leningrad, and take away all bread. When I was going to see my parents in Ukraine in the summer of 1933, I had with me two trunks of bread. Because I had a student ticket and vacation travel documents which I showed to the guards, I was able to have my baggage passed without inspection. In this manner I smuggled bread from the poor North to rich Ukraine, where the grain for this bread was originally produced. This was the best present I could bring my old mother, my brothers and sisters. When my brother came to meet me at the station and I opened a trunk of bread, I saw the look of suffering on his face when he said: 'Before, you used to come home to rest up and get fed, and now we are hungry and you bring baked bread to the village!' He cut a piece, and munched it with the greatest relish, tears streaming down his cheeks."

In consequence of the travel-restricting decrees, the number of peasants who were able to come to the cities, and especially

of those who could remain there, diminished greatly, as can be seen from the following statistical data.

Arrival, departure and settlement of population in the cities of the USSR between 1928 and 1933 (in thousands)

	arrived	departed	net increase
1928	6,477	5,415	1,062
1929	6,958	5,566	1,392
1930	9,534	6,901	2,633
1931	10,810	6,710	4,100
1932	10,605	7,886	2,719
1933	7,416	6,644	772 **

Finally, in the spring of 1933 at a time when famine was at its height and whole villages were dying, towers were erected in the fields and guards kept watch lest the hungry people should pick the tops of grain from the fields. These people were nicknamed "barbers," because they cut the whiskers off growing grain.

I. D., an engineer, thus described these watchtowers: "When I was going through the villages of Pervomaiske, Olshanske, Harbuzinske, Blahodatnivske, Dobrovelichkiwske and other regions of the northern Odessa district in the spring of 1933, I saw towers throughout the fields, wherever grain was growing. The towers were erected according to a decree of July 2, 1932 'On protection of socialist property.' They looked just like those that stand guard around concentration camps. If the field was plain and clear, the tower consisted of four tall posts with a small hut of wood or straw on top. The top was reached by a high ladder. If there was a tall tree in the field, then a couple of posts would be dug in under the tree to support a hut built among the branches of the tree. Similar towers were built on the fringes of woods. An old oak or other big tree would support the hut without any props.

The towers were always manned by guards armed, as a rule, with shotguns. These guards were activists or guards delegated from other duties. In the early spring, just after sowing or planting they watched lest hungry people should dig up sown grain or planted potatoes. Later, they guarded the field from being plucked of grain. People caught digging for food in the

** SSSR v tsifrah, Moscow, 1935, p. 205.

field or plucking were shot at, often with fatal results."

In some villages detachments of "light cavalry" were formed, composed of komsomols and party members, who went hunting the aforementioned "barbers." In the village of Horodsi, Slavichan region, Zhitomir district, such "light cavalry" killed the peasants Palazka Tatiuk, Platon Khepchitsa, Myron Andrakhovich, Dmytro Koyan and others. 1

In the village of Mala Berezanka, Tarashchan region, district of Kiev, the head of the village soviet, Pavlo Tereshchenko, a candidate for membership in the communist party, personally shot and killed the following seven people in the act of plucking grain from the fields: Denis Parubochy, 28; Ivan Parubochy, 15; Maria Smovna, 14; Mykhailo Piznichenko, 15; Makar Ratushny, 35; Iryna Ratushna, 30; Ivan Sirenko, 29. The majority of those killed were minors, and it is noteworthy that, perhaps for this reason, the murderer was sentenced to 5 years hard labor.

P. Postyshev made it a point to stress that tens of thousands of children and young pioneers had been mobilized to fight for the protection of collective crops. "Suffice to say, that in 25 regions of Ukraine 540,000 children were engaged in the protection of crops and picking fallen grain, and 10,000 children in the fight against wreckers."²

Such were the measures undertaken by Moscow to make the artificially created famine more painful and more efficient.

² From a speech by P. Postyshev delivered at a plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (b), November 19, 1933, *Pravda*, November 24, 1933.

World opinion on the famine in Ukraine (France, Belgium, England, United States, League of Nations). Secondary admission of the famine by the Soviet regime:

- a) foreign correspondents prohibited to travel to Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus;
- b) the famine as a means of fighting "the class enemy," declarations of Kosior, Postyshev, Khatayevich;
- c) the famine as a means of breaking the peasants' opposition to government measures: declarations of Yakovlev, Kalinin, Sheboldayev;
- d) "The Drabiv Case";
- e) revocation of the census of 1937, promulgation of a decree against abortions. End of the famine.

The tragedy of famine through which the Ukrainian nation lived in the years 1932 and 1933 became well known throughout the world. The press of the world was filled with reports concerning it.

A few examples: the Paris daily, *LE MATIN*, of December 31, 1933, in an article titled "Famine in Ukraine" said: "The systematically organized famine has as its objective the destruction of a nation, whose only crime is that it is striving for freedom . . . Ukraine has come under the impervious rule of Moscow and the communist regime against her will. . . This regime has quickly managed to reduce the land to its present situation. People have started killing cats and dogs for food . . . Dead horses have been taken away by the government, and to prevent epidemics, disinfectants and lime were poured over them. People would dig them up at night, wash and dry them and then eat the horsemeat. There are no more horses today. Sometimes over a few houses in a village a black flag is seen waving; this is a sign that there is nobody left in the village all having died of starvation."

The Belgian daily *LA FLANDRE LIBERALE* had an editorial in the September 2, 1933 issue, entitled "On the Occasion of Ukraine's Misfortune," reading thus: "So Ukraine is dying. The Ukrainians are dying of hunger. This is a great calamity not

only for Ukraine and the Ukrainians, but for the culture of Russia, Europe, and even the whole world. For this dying land was once a great production centre of agriculture. There, where today people are dying exhausted by famine, lush harvests supplied not only the people of Ukraine with enough bread, but also all the inhabitants of Central Europe. The soil has not changed, only the people. This is where we have to look for the causes of the great drama, in which a whole nation has become a sacrificial victim."

The British DAILY TELEGRAPH wrote on September 9, 1933:

"Pilate took water and washed his hands... Is this the attitude the British people are to take, when they are told about things they find hard to believe in the year 1933? The famine started when the authorities took all the grain away from the people. Children under 14 were the first to feel the pangs of hunger. Only the strongest are managing to exist, the majority are dying. It is a long time since there have been dogs, cats, not to mention poultry in the villages. When a cow dies, it is consumed immediately . . . The fields are overgrown with weeds, the roads too, as very few people travel, fearing robbery...".

An American journalist, G. Lange of the NEW YORK JEWISH DAILY FORWARD wrote in this paper after his return from the Soviet Union: "When we were in Russia, we did not know that so much was being written abroad about the famine in Russia, and we thought that after we came back we should have to make no end of explanations about it. But here we see they know a great deal. We can only confirm all this. Yes, in huge areas of Russia — we saw it with our own eyes in Ukraine — real, unrestrained famine ravaged and does to this day, along with hunger typhus, swollen, naked corpses, empty villages whose inhabitants have been deported, died, or run away, and with cannibalism that has ceased to be a punishable crime."

Newspapers of New York, Chicago, Germany, Switzerland and other countries gave accounts of the famine in Ukraine.

Finally, the matter reached the chairman of the 76th Session of the League of Nations, Mr. Mowinkel, Norwegian Foreign Minister.

¹ Using the term "Russia" the author (Mr. Lange) obviously has in mind Russia in its pre-revolutionary meaning. What he means is the USSR in its boundaries of the period.

In an interview given to the correspondent of the Paris daily "LE MATIN," published on October 1, 1933, M. H. Koraba stated:

"It would be easiest to do nothing, because it concerns a country that has not expressed its wishes and is not a member of the League of Nations. I would comply literally with all accepted rules, if I were to throw the moving documents which I have received in the wastebasket. I do not think, however, that I have a right to get rid of the matter in such a bureaucratic way. It concerns my conscience, as it is not political, but only a humanitarian act, which as related to me by some of my informants, concerns the lives of millions. Every day I receive letters and telegrams from all corners of the world, from different societies and organizations, which describe particular instances and add up to a full picture of the situation. For this reason I cannot remain silent. I know that any action will be difficult from the legal and political angle. But perhaps we could approach the Moscow government with a friendly inquiry—whether it might not consider it indicated to permit an international mission to visit the territory of the disaster for the purpose of fact-finding and aid".

A confidential meeting of the League Council, according to "Le MATIN," at which Mowinkel tried to convince his colleagues of the need of any kind of gesture of aid to Ukraine, lasted a long time. In the discussion the participants became keenly interested in the catastrophe. Nevertheless, the League Council was of the opinion that it could not act directly. For this reason it transferred all material to the International Red Cross and requested Mr. Mowinkel to inform the Soviet government personally of this. Thus Geneva encountered insurmountable obstacles in procedure. But at the same time the tragic fact of famine in Soviet Ukraine became to be juridically acknowledged and the 7th Session of the League of Nations confirmed it in practice."

The world's attention was turned to the famine in Ukraine once again on the occasion of the trial of an 18-year-old student, member of a secret organization of Ukrainian nationalists, who, on October 26, 1933, assassinated the Soviet Consul in Lviv.

Coming to the Soviet Consulate, and declaring that he wanted to go to the Soviet Ukraine, Mykola Lemyk was admitted to the office of Mayorov, then Soviet Vice-Consul. There, while ostensibly pulling documents out of his pocket, he drew a gun, and as related by his friends, shouted: "For the death of millions of brother Ukrainians, starved, tortured and executed by you"! He shot and killed Mayorov.

Mykola Lemyk surrendered to the Polish police in order to be tried, and thus broadcast the motives of his deed to the world.

In open court, in the presence of diplomatic representatives of many governments and correspondents of newspapers from all over the world, Lemyk unfolded a substantiated indictment of Moscow, explaining his act as retribution against the occupants of his land for their inhumanities in Ukraine, and as a means of drawing the world's attention to the tragedy going on in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic.²

In spite of the precautions taken by Moscow to deny existence of the famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933, a whole series of facts prove the contrary. Without admitting the existence of the famine directly, Moscow nevertheless admitted it indirectly by a whole series of acts and declarations on the part of its outstanding representatives.

At the Third All-Ukrainian Party conference of July, 1933, V. Molotov declared: "In a number of regions (of Ukraine), as a result of mistakes made during the campaign of grain collection, difficulties in food supplies have arisen. In many collective farms great difficulties in food supplies exist to this day."³

The NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE of August 21, 1933, carried the following dispatch from its Moscow correspondent, P. B. Barnes: "New censorship measures exclude accredited foreign correspondents from those regions of the USSR where conditions are unfavorable". Ukraine, and the Northern Caucasus, where a great famine was known to have raged during the winter and spring, are now closed to individual trips by correspondents. Today, the Soviet government has forbidden the permanent correspondent of the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MON-

² D. Solovey, Winnipeg, 1953, p. 221.

³ Pravda, July 14, 1933. It has been explained in chapter IV, supra, that statements like "difficulties in connection with lack of bread," "nutritional difficulties," "a difficult supply situation," are synonymous with Soviet names for famine, employed without actually using the word "famine".

ITOR, Mr. W. H. Chamberlin, who has lived in Moscow for 11 years, to go to the Kuban, Poltava and Kharkiw regions, although until recently he was free to travel to all parts of the Soviet Union."

The famine as a means of fighting the so-called class enemy is the most outstanding characteristic of the famine in Ukraine during 1932 and 1933. There was nothing accidental, unforeseen or elemental about it. Everything was decided, foreseen and properly planned.

The authorities knew that all the measures aimed at collectivization were violently opposed by the peasantry, especially by the peasantry of Ukraine. This opposition was considered to be that of a "class enemy," against whom all means of combat are justified. In "KOMMUNIST," the official organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, an editorial of June 2, 1933, declared: "A number of grave defects in the work of the party in the Ukraine, most convincingly related by Stalin at the session of the Central Committee in January, are clear proof that the chief fault of the Ukrainian party organization consists in a relaxation of Bolshevist zeal in dealing with the class enemy."

As far as Moscow was concerned, the famine was merely one stage in the fight against the peasants.

Moscow approached the problem of the artificially created famine—not from an ethical, but from an economical viewpoint, in accordance with the motto "the end justifies the means." At the Seventeenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party, which took place after the famine had ended, Kosior declared: "During the time between the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Congresses of the Party (1930 to 1934), the Party has achieved great victories in the cruel class warfare against the remnants of capitalist elements. The fight was relentless . . . for at the time the problem of the socialist reconstruction of the villages was at stake . . . therefore the fact that we went about the task with deliberation decided our success of 1933."

The then dictator of Ukraine, P. Postyshev, had the same

* This is mentioned in W. H. Chamberlin's *Russia's Iron Age*. Boston, 1934, p. 82. Later, towards the end of 1933, he did manage to visit these areas, as mentioned in subsequent chapters of the book.

• *Ammende*, p. 119, *op. cit.*

• XVII Sezd Vsesoyuznoy Kommunisticheskoy Partii (b). *Stenograficheskiy otchet*, pp. 197, 199. Partisdat, 1934.

thing in mind, when he asked: "What determined the liquidation of the crisis in the rural economy of Ukraine?" and answered: "a decisive battle, joined with the class enemy."

In this fight: "the government had in reserve and was prepared to employ the last, sharpest weapon in the armory of class warfare: organized famine."

A member of the Politburo of the CP (b) of Ukraine, Khatayevich, sent to Ukraine along with P. Postyshev, had precisely this period of sharp warfare by Moscow against the Ukrainian nation in mind, when he declared at the Seventeenth Party Congress: "The whole country, the whole party and the whole working class have been watching with great attention and anxiety what has been going on in Ukraine during the last 1½ to 2 years."

After millions of the population of Ukraine had died from famine,⁷ the then secretary general of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (b) and member of the All-Union CP Politburo, S. Kosior, painted the following picture of "achievements" of the communist party in Ukraine at the Thirteenth Congress of Soviets of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, January 17, 1935: "Acknowledging the great amount of work put in during 1933-1934 into the fight against Ukrainian nationalist and other counter-revolutionary elements, work which has not ceased and which shall not cease, we must say that of course we gave the nationalists a beating, a good one, and as the saying goes, we hit the spot . . ."

Postyshev addressed the Seventeenth Congress of the All-Union CP in 1934 on the same theme: "We have annihilated the nationalist counter-revolution during the past year, we have exposed and destroyed nationalist deviationism, headed by Skrypnyk."⁸

In this manner both bolshevik dictators of Ukraine, S. Kosior and P. Postyshev, admitted openly that the artificially created famine in Ukraine of 1933 had been the deadly weapon with which Moscow beat the nationalists hard, and "hit the spot."

Any comments on this would be superfluous.

"The famine was a means of fighting the class enemy, and

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

⁸ W. H. Chamberlin, *Russia's Iron Age*, p. 89.

⁹ *XVII sess . . .*, p. 77.

¹⁰ See Chapter VIII — *Infra*.

¹¹ *XVII sess . . .*, p. 71.

at the same time of breaking their opposition." A. Yakovlev, the Peoples' Commissar of Agriculture, said of this matter, addressing the All-Union congress of collective shock-workers in February, 1933, at the time the famine was ravaging Ukraine: "Last year they (the collective farm workers of Ukraine) fell short in sowing wheat, oats and barley. Thus, they brought damage upon the governments and themselves. What is more, they did not harvest it properly and occupied the last place of all the regions of our land in doing their duty to the government . . . By their poor work they punished themselves and the government... Then let us, comrade Ukrainian collective workers conclude from this: now is the time of reckoning for the bad work of the past."¹²

The same matter was the subject of M. Kalinin's speech to the Second Congress of Collective Shock-workers of the Gorky Land in June, 1933. Mentioning Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus he stated: "The masses of collectives went through a good schooling this year. The school was quite cruel to some."¹³

"In this cryptic understatement President Kalinin summed up the situation in Ukraine and the North Caucasus from the Soviet viewpoint. The innumerable new graves in the richest Soviet agricultural regions mark the passing of those who did not survive the ordeal, who were victims of this 'ruthless school'.¹⁴

Hence, "there can be no doubt, famine which brings death in its most painful forms, was an effective means of breaking any tendency on the part of the peasants to indulge in passive resistance or 'sabotage'. There was general testimony that work in the collective farms proceeded at a much faster pace in 1933 than in preceding years, even when the collective farm members were weakened by hunger."¹⁵

Slikhner, representing Ukraine at the Seventeenth Congress of the All-Union CP., said "that the year 1933 was the first year of a decisive break in the agricultural economy . . . we have sufficient grain deliveries, and in such quantities that they surpass the previous year by 16.7 million cwts. This fact proves a

¹² Pravda, February 19, 1933.

¹³ Pravda, June 24, 1933.

¹⁴ W. H. Chamberlin, *Russia's Iron Age*, p. 89.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

deep change in the attitude of the core of the masses of collective farm workers towards the duties owed to the proletarian government."¹⁰

Sheboldayev, representative of the Northern Caucasus, also emphasized that "we have today undoubtedly some initial success in liquidating the crisis which had developed in agriculture in the Caucasus."¹¹

PRAVDA published the following data in December 1933:

Grain quotas for 1933

	Deadline set by the government	date of completion	date of ending collections in 1932/33
Ukraine	Jan. 1, 1934	Dec. 5, 1933	March 15, 1933
North. Caucasus	Jan 1, 1934	Dec. 10, 1933	Feb. 15, 1933

"The collective farms and individuals have fulfilled their obligations to the government without any mass repressions."¹²

The end of the paragraph about "mass repressions" fully attests to the fact that the artificially created famine in the previous year was precisely the repression referred to.

That the opposition of the peasants had been broken is borne out not only by the fact that more grain was obtained from the Ukrainian peasants and within a shorter term. There are other indications of the same facts. As of November 1, 1933, in Ukraine 84 per cent of the grain had been thrashed (64 per cent the year before), winter sowings 97 per cent (86 per cent the year before), beets harvested — 84 per cent (69 per cent the previous year), beets delivered—65 per cent (60 per cent the previous year).¹³ 60 per cent of all the collective farms of Ukraine had worked 300 to 500 work-days, while those that had 75 workdays or less comprised only 6 per cent of the farms.¹⁴

In the Caucasus the number of work-days per able-bodied collective farm worker increased from 139 days in 1931 and 140 in 1932 to more than 200 days in 1933.¹⁵

"The Drabiv Case" which came to trial in June and July

¹⁰ XVII sezd . . . p. 86.

¹¹ XVII sezd . . . p. 148.

¹² Pravda, December 16, 1933.

¹³ Pravda, November 24, 1933.

¹⁴ XVII sezd . . . p. 87.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 148.

1933," gives an idea of the methods employed by government agents in taking bread away from the peasants, which brought about the famine. The trial of the bosses of the Drabiv region had as its objective the shift of blame from the central government, where it properly belonged, to local organs of the government, for all the misdeeds committed during grain collections in Ukraine in 1932 and 1933.

In order to comply with the strict demands of the center in the matter of grain collections the regional bosses began to act according to the slogan "Take the bread where it's easiest to get, no matter from whom and by what method." Methods of coercion of the peasants were thus used on a wide scale.

Thirty defendants,²² were accused of:

1. Hiding and ignoring all complaints of the peasants against misdeeds and acts of terror in collecting grain.
2. Suppression of all self-criticism. (Hold your tongue because this will wreck grain collection).
3. Forced fabrication of kurkuls out of poor and middle class peasants, and even out of party members.
4. Licentiousness, coercion, robbery.
5. Disposal of all sowing supplies on the direct orders of Shirokov and Shopenko.
6. Employment of convicted criminals in collecting grain.

All the accused were found guilty and sentenced to 2-3 years imprisonment.

It should be noted that during the trial not one word was mentioned about the removal of all bread from peasants of the Drabiv region, nor about their starvation, nor of the deaths as a result of famine. Thus, the trial was staged in order to discredit the local authorities for their grain collection work in 1932-33, and not to punish them for taking bread away from the peasants, which was the cause of many deaths.

Cancellation of the 1937 census is an oblique admission of the artificial creation of the famine of 1932-1933.

The 1937 census, or rather its results, were declared void because it revealed great deficiencies in the population of Ukraine.²³

²² Village of Drabovo, Drabiv region, Poltava district.

²³ Among them: regional party secretary Bodan, chief of the regional executive committee Shirokov, chief of KKRSI Shopenko and a number of regional bigwigs.

²⁴ *Visti*, June-July, 1933.

The world should, for obvious reasons, not know about this. Therefore, in order to get out of the difficult situation, it was resolved that "wreckers" had deliberately reported smaller numbers of people for the census, results were made inaccurate, and should not be used. There were even rumors to the effect that the Chief of Planning of the USSR, Kuybyshev, paid with his life for these results of the 1937 census which were unfavorable to the Politburo, and for his incautious use of them in the inner circle of the party and government.

Another oblique admission of the famine, or rather its results, was the promulgation of a decree in 1936 prohibiting abortions. The Soviet government attempted to show an increase in population in this manner, and at least partially regain the population lost through the famine.

The decree against abortions did not produce the desired results, but only increased the number of unauthorized or "underground" abortions, without doctors, under insanitary conditions, and hence productive of a larger number of female hospital cases. The trend of a diminishing birth-rate was not halted.

Another indication of population deficiency was the decree providing for prizes and premiums for mothers with many children, which included better jobs, medals, etc.

Following the gathering of the harvest in Ukraine in the summer of 1933, the peasants working on collective farms were issued rations sufficient for existence. Mass starvation had ceased. The work on collective farms began to recuperate gradually from the shocks of 1932-33. The deficiency of the workers was partially compensated by more efficient work, partially by an increase in the number of people working in the collectives, at the expense of individual farms.

With a curse in his heart and bitterness in his soul—against the regime and against its collective farm system—the Ukrainian peasant had to admit defeat, and went to join the collective farm.

Thus ended one of the stages of the war of communist Moscow against Ukraine.

CHAPTER III.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAMINE

Changes in number of population as result of the famine. Discontinued or improper vital statistics in the villages. Estimate of number of deaths from famine deduced from examples in given villages located in different parts of Ukraine. Villages completely wiped out by famine. The death rate among collective farm workers and individual peasants. Foreign estimates of the number of deaths by famine in Ukraine. An attempt to compute the number of deaths according to the census of January 17, 1939. Reduction of the number of Ukrainians in the USSR as a result of the famine. Evaluation of this fact by Dr. Frank Lorimer. The famine mirrored in Ukrainian folklore of the period.

It is well known that the register of documents and materials classified as secret since the 1920-s is ever increasing, and that today all data pertaining to economic, cultural, political and social life are so classified. Vital statistics, such as births and deaths, are kept secret with particular care.

It is not difficult to accept a priori that compulsory collectivization of farms, the famine which was artificially created, and in general the entire complex of events connected with the period of Five-Year-Plans had a catastrophic influence on population movements in the USSR as a whole. This supposition finds support in Soviet sources.

According to the second Five-Year-Plan, the anticipated increase of population of the USSR was to be from 165.7 million on January 1, 1933 to 180.7 million on January 1, 1938. Or a mean figure of 3 million people per annum.¹

If another anticipated annual figure of increase is added for 1938 of 3 million, then the total population of the USSR at the beginning of 1939 should have been 183.7 million, but in reality, according to the census of January 17, 1939, the number was only 170.5 million.²

¹ Vtoroy Pyatiletniy plan rozvitiya narodnogo khozaystva SSSR. Moscow, 1934, V. I. p. 503. ,

² "Soobshchenie gosudarstvennoy planovoy komissii soyuza ob itogakh vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya SSSR." "Izvestiya" June 2, 1939.

Therefore the total population deficiency of the USSR as of January 17, 1939, compared to anticipated figures of the second Five-Year-Plan, has to be estimated at 13.2 million people, caused by a reduced number of births and increased number of deaths.

Different authors have come up with different estimates of the number of deaths caused by the famine of 1932-1933. It is to be remembered, however, that they are only rough estimates. "No one will probably ever know the exact toll of death, because the Soviet Government preserved the strictest secrecy about the whole question, officially denied that there was any famine, and rebuffed all attempts to organize relief abroad."³ The total number of deaths caused by famine is estimated by W. H. Chamberlin at 5 to 6 million.⁴

Another foreign observer writes: "To arrive at exact figures is, of course, impossible; this can be done only in the future after careful investigations have been made locally. But it is possible to make an estimate of the losses. In principle, it may be said, from the point of view of the relief work for the benefit of those threatened with starvation in Russia, it does not matter whether the number of dead is 5, 6, 8 or 10 millions: it is enough to show that figure runs into millions."⁵

According to an analysis by Professor S. N. Prokopovich, close to 9 million people died of famine in the USSR.⁶

We are concerned, in this work, about the number who died of starvation up to January 1, 1939 in the Ukrainian SSR. Huge losses of population in Ukraine as a result of the 1932-33 famine surprised even Moscow. In our estimation that is the main reason why the Soviet government annulled the census of the USSR for 1937. As has been indicated in preceding chapters, the census was not voided because it disclosed a large deficiency of population, chiefly in Ukraine, but for the ostensible reason that "class enemies" had penetrated the ranks of the census takers, and had conducted the census in a "wrecking" manner.

We feel that it would not be an easy task even for those in authority to arrive at an approximately accurate figure of the

³ W. H. Chamberlin, *Russia's Iron Age*, p. 88.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Human Life in Russia*, p. 96.

⁶ S. N. Prokopovich, *Narodnoe Khoziaystvo SSSR*, New York 1952. Vol. 1, p. 99.

number of dead through famine, since vital statistics were, in many localities, conducted in a haphazard manner, and in some instances discontinued entirely. Even well organized and faultlessly conducted vital statistics, watched over by the NKVD, could not manage to include the magnitude of the number of deaths, a large proportion of which occurred outside of the village limits: on highways, in forests, at railroad stations, on trains, on city streets or within the boundaries of other Soviet Republics.

A number of village councils made attempts, in 1934, to add up the toll of the famine in their own villages. This kind of operation would not give a true picture, however, because they would usually include among the dead, all those who were absent from the village at the time the count was taken. But in reality, not all those who left the villages in 1932-1933 and never returned, even after the famine had ended, had necessarily died.

Some managed to survive by getting jobs in industry, on government farms (radhosps), or in soviet institutions.⁷

As has been pointed out in previous chapters, the famine had been organized throughout the Ukrainian ethnographic territories, but its course did not have a uniform intensity, as can be seen from the following table:

Cons. No.	Village	Region	District	Population before famine	dead by famine	% dead by famine
1.	Rudovka	Melo-Devicky	Chernihiv	6,700	700	10.4
2.	Zitniki	Preshetilov	Poltava	4,600	1200	26.0
3.	Zarich	Orazenetz	Poltava	3,500	500	14.3
4.	Ivankiv	Borispol	Kiev	8,000	2000	25.0
5.	Pashkivske	Sever	Krasnodar	7,000	3500	50.0
6.	Veprik	Hadiach	Sumy	250	25	10.0
7.	Sivash	Sivash	Dnipro- petrovsk	5,000	1500	30.0
8.	Sofiyivka	Novo-Mirhor	Odessa	4,000	800	20.0
9.	Uspenivka	Khmeliv	Mikolaev	2,000	800	40.0
10.	Dmitrovka	Petrovsk	Kharkiv	330	60	12.1
11.	Snizkivka	Balkiv	Kharkiv	425	63	14.8
12.	Kislek	Haysin	Vinnitza	6,000	1800	30.0

W. H. Chamberlin remarked that "every village I visited reported a death rate of not less than ten per cent. This was

⁷) The author was personally acquainted with some people, who escaped the famine in the fall of 1932, by obtaining jobs in the cities as night watchmen, furnacemen, etc. (with institutions, schools, apartment houses).

not an irresponsible individual estimate, but the figure given out by the local Soviets."*

The death rate within the different villages was subject to great variations. In Kuban, the head of the village council of Kazansuy Stanitsa, Nemov, told Mr. W. H. Chamberlin that of "7000 to 8000 people, about 850 died and another 150 were deported because they sabotaged the government's program of the grain collection."*

The death rate in the figures here cited equals about 12 per cent. And in the village of Sherkasy near Bila Tserkva in Ukraine, 600 died of hunger out of 2,000, or 30 per cent. The secretary of the village council, who gave Mr. Chamberlin this information emphasized that "hundreds of others had fled."*

M. Z., an artist-painter says: "In October 1933, the Peoples' Commissariat of Education of the Ukrainian SSR commissioned me to work out a project for a memorial museum to be erected at the grave of Taras Shevchenko in Kaniw. On the right bank of the Dnieper, about 6 kilometres from Shevchenko's grave, the large village of Pekary stretches out, numbering about 2,500 houses. There were two churches in this village. When I, trying to get acquainted with the place, visited it one evening, I managed to count only 16 houses with lights in them, where people were still living. The rest stood empty, like a huge cemetery, cold dark, and silent. All life had ceased there. I encountered the same picture in the village of Prokhorivka, the former home of the first Rector of Kiev University, Professor Maksymovich. There, 85 per cent of the peasants had either died or gone away."

In Southern Ukraine, in villages that had been established under the Stolypin reforms following the revolution of 1905, according to testimony by K. T., an agronomist, three-fourths of the population had died in the villages of: Ahaymany, Sirohoza, Ivaniwka, Shopiwka, Nova-Troitske, Sofiyiwka, Chaplynka, Oleksiewka, Hromiwka. On the other hand, there were villages in different sections of Ukraine where the percentage of deaths by famine was quite insignificant. In Cornostayni, Chornobil region, near Kiev, only a few individuals perished out of

* W. H. Chamberlin, *The Ukraine, a Submerged Nation*, New York, 1944, p. 60.

* W. H. Chamberlin, *Russia's Iron Age*, p. 85.

*)Ibid.

its 3,500 villages whose inhabitants were wiped out completely. For example: Sukachi, Ivankiv region, Kiev district; Ovsiuky and Rudky, Orzenets region, Poltava district; Bashtany and Slobidka, Khmiliw region, Mykolaiyw district; Berzulovo, Idessa district, Chernetchina, Nekhvoroshchan region, Dnipropetrovsk district; Hysin Manor, Hysin region, Vynnytsya district, and many, many others. The greatest number of villages to disappear was around Katerynoslav and in Kuban.

Black banners, hoisted above some houses, were a sign that there was nobody left in a village."

The authorities responsible for organizing the famine, as has been pointed out before, considered the starving and dying peasants of Ukraine to be "idlers" who would not work on collective farms, "anti-social and anti-government elements" who refused to join the collectives; "kurkuls and semi-kurkuls" who were sabotaging the efforts of the government. This treatment of the peasants on the part of the authorities indicates that no distinction was made between members of collective farms and individual farmers: both were considered "class enemies". The former because of their poor work on collective farms, the latter because they would not join the collective farms!

The above is borne out by an analysis of the status of those who died of starvation in the village of Budionowka, Vilshan region, Kharkiw district. Two natives of this village who survived the famine, and are at present living abroad, have compiled a register of people who died because of famine in this village in 1932-33. The register contains only the names of persons, members of 49 families, constituting about one third of the village at the end of 1932. The register lists the property status of those contained therein on the eve of the 1917 revolution, and their social status at the end of 1932. The following table is taken from this register: ")

¹¹) In this connection, there was a noteworthy incident in Ukraine towards the end of 1941, during the Second World war: the German Army could not find a trace of the village of Rakitne, Kremenchuh region, Poltava, although they saw it plainly on their maps. People from the neighboring countryside explained to the Germans that the village had ceased to exist during the 1932-1933 famine.

¹²) Dmytro Solovey, *Golgotha of Ukraine*, New York, 1953, pp. 41-43.

Property status before the Revolution			This includes		
groups of dead	Number of dead		Social Status of those dead from starvation		
	absolute	%	members of collective	individual members	expelled from collective
Poor	31	33.7	24	7	—
Middle	53	57.6	33	20	—
Wealthy	8	8.7	—	6 x)	2 xx)
Total	92		57	33	2
Percentage total	100	100	61.9	35.9	2.2

As can be seen from the above, peasants who were dying of starvation in 1932-1933 had been poor middle class farmers before the revolution. The percentage of the formerly wealthy among them is quite small—8.7. On the other hand, the relation between the dead members of collective farms (61.9 per cent) and individual farmers (35.9 per cent) corresponds with the level of collectivization of farms in Ukraine during that period, 13. The above data substantiate the thesis that the famine was directed against the peasant class as a whole.

There is room for conjecture that during the famine the chances of survival were relatively better for the peasants who were individual farmers, than for those who had joined the collective farms. The individuals had more opportunity to move around freely. They picked turtles and frogs, caught fish (those who lived along rivers), hunted ravens and crows with sticks and rocks, gathered the eggs of wildfowl in remote places, went bartering to towns and cities, and so on. The members of collectives, in the meantime, had to work from dawn to dusk for 100 grammes of a bread substitute and a bowl of nondescript liquid made of nettles and weeds, and going under the name of soup. Their families obtained nothing, and that was true of the workers' own children, too. So the working parents would share

x) Their property was auctioned for failure to comply with grain collection quotas.

xx) Expelled from the collective farm, and their property auctioned.

¹³⁾ The plan for Ukraine called for the collectivization in 1931 of 80 per cent of farms in the steppes, and 50 per cent in woodland steppes. See: VKP (b) rezolutsiyakh, reshenyakh sez dov, konferentsii y plenumov (1898-1932), part II, Moscow, 1933, p. 678.

their scant rations with their children, and then both parents and children would starve and die. All observations indicate that a proportionately greater number of men died, than women. Some biological factors obviously underline this phenomenon. This might probably explain the increase in the proportion of women over men who, according to the census of January 1, 1939 outnumbered the men 7,137,000 in the entire USSR."

A careful analysis of material dealing with peasants who died of starvation, indicates that a proportionately higher percentage were from among those who, prior to the revolution had been poor, or landless. An illustrative example from the village of Medvin, near Kiev: the family of Ilko Savich Zamriy and his wife Ulita Mikhailovna. They had 9 daughters, and the tenth child was a son, Trokhim. Zamriy belonged to the poor peasantry before the revolution. During the famine the entire family died, (with the exception of the two eldest daughters, Ulita and Hanaska, who disappeared and were probably shot,) after human flesh was found cooked in their house and in the cellar the pickled meat of an old woman, Smilichka. In the Plaksun family, all of whom were shoemakers, the families of the brothers Semen, Kost, Zachar and Mikita all died. The family of Timofy Stupka, who had been to the United States and returned in 1922, all died. The following families also died: Stepan and Omelko Dubyn, Mytay Yavtukh (a good blacksmith and mechanic), the Sobkos, Polovianys, Barsuks, Markelikos, Radzikhovskys, Khamlenkos, Sukhonos, Shabaturenkos. Only a very few individuals, mostly women, survived. This shows that for the most part death reaped its greatest toll among the poorer peasants, the village communist proletariat, the uneducated, those who stood apart from the social and political life of the villages, and had no ties with towns or industrial centers, whence some villagers received aid during the acute stages of starvation.

It must be emphasized however, that active participation in the political life of the community did not always provide a guarantee against death by starvation. The recorded number of deaths of "activists" is not so small, usually occurring after

¹¹⁾ According to the census of December 17, 1926 the USSR had 4,941,000 more women than men. See: "Soobshchenie gosudarstvennoy planovoy komissii Soyuzu SSR ob itogakh vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya SSSR," *Izvestiya*, June 2, 1939.

their rations had been stopped following the conclusion of the grain collection campaign early in 1933. In some villages, as for example the village of Huhymowka, Lebedin region, Sumy district, or in Zelenky, Moroniw region, Kiev district, they (the activists) did not all die. In the last-named village Ovrarn Bezshchany survived, a cannibal. In other villages, such as Veremiyiwka, Krasilov region, Podillya district, all the activists died.

According to witnesses, in the village of Stepaniwka, near Vynnytsya, the activist Denys Andrusyak was a determined "bread-searcher".¹³ He grew famous through his ability to find grain which had been concealed at the bottom of a river. In the spring of 1933 he was taken to hospital but conditions were so bad that he left, and on the way home stumbled into a ditch and died there.

The question of how many people died of famine in the Ukrainian SSR in 1932 and 1933 cannot be answered with any accuracy, if at all.

According to estimates of the then United States Ambassador to Moscow, William C. Bullitt, between 3 and 5 million people died of hunger in the Ukrainian SSR.¹⁴

W. H. Chamberlin believes that the number of dead as a

¹³) The sobriquet "bread-searchers" was applied to those peasants who as members of grain collection brigades, took grain away from their own folk.

¹⁴) This information was cited by Congressman J. E. Rankin in his speech of March 11, 1952 in connection with the investigation of the Katyn massacre. Rep. Rankin further proceeded to quote from the record of his examination of Mr. Bullitt before the Un-American Activities Committee a few years before:

Mr. Rankin. The people in the Ukraine are among the best people in Europe?

Mr. Bullitt. That is right.

Mr. Rankin. Yet, they went in there and took everything they made and starved, you say five or six million of them to death?

Mr. Bullitt. Three to five million.

Mr. Rankin. Men, women and children starved to death eating in their frantic misery the bodies of their own children, of their own families: that is correct is it not?

Mr. Bullitt. I am extremely sorry to say that I actually have two photographs which were taken of a mother and the skeleton of the child they had eaten, in the Ukraine.

Mr. Rankin. Yes; that is what I am trying to bring out.

Mr. Bullitt. I still have the two photographs. There is nothing more horrible.

Congressional Record, Vol. 98-par.2

p. 2110. Washington, D.C. 1952.

result of the famine in Ukraine "can scarcely have been less than three or four million."¹⁷

Our estimate must be considered as one of the first attempts to give, if not a perfect, then at least a credible answer to this extremely important question.

Several factors must obviously be involved to bring about the change occasioned by natural causes, such as births and deaths. A further factor is migration, emigration, or departure of people from Ukraine to points beyond the borders, and immigration, or arrival of people into Ukraine. We presume these to have been more or less even. Thus, the remaining factor responsible for the change is the natural one.

The average population increase of the Ukrainian SSR for the year 1924 to 1927 incl. was 2.36 per cent.

This percentage figure is our point of departure in the estimates below. As of December 17, 1926 (census figures) Ukraine had a population of 29,042,934 people.¹⁸

Taking the natural population increase to be 2.36 per cent, and proceeding according to a compounding formula, Ukraine should have had 38,426,000 people on January 1, 1939. In reality, the figure was only 30,960,221, for all Ukraine as of January 17, 1939, in accordance with the census taken that day.¹⁹

The conclusion is, therefore, that there was a population deficiency in Ukraine of 7,465,000 people as a result of the famine of 1932-1933. This does not mean, however, that all the 7.5 million perished in the famine of 1932-1933. The loss figure of 7.5 million consists of those who actually died of famine in 1932-1933, as well as of a decrease in the birth-rate of the population that was left.

Considering that in 1933 and 1934 there was no increase in population at all,²⁰ and from 1935 to 1938 the percentage of

¹⁷) W. H. Chamberlin, *Russia's Iron Age*, p. 88

¹⁸) *Zbirnyk statystrychno-ekonomichnykh vidomostey pro silske hospodarstvo Ukrayiny*. Kharkiv, 1929.

¹⁹) "Soobschchenie . . . *Izvestia*, June 2, 1939.

²⁰) In the village of Cherkasy, which had a population of 2,074 before the famine, during the period from September 1932 to September 1933 "there had been one marriage . . . six children had been born, and of these one had survived. 'It is better not to bear children than to have them die of hunger,' said the women in the office of the soviet. 'No,' argued a boy, 'if no children are born, who can till the land?'" See: Chamberlin, *Russia's Iron Age*, p. 369.

natural increase was lower and hardly equalled 1.5 per cent due to the lowered standard of living, proceeding according to the compounding formula, and taking as a basis this time the figures of the 1939 census, estimate the number of population at the end of 1939, i. e. when the famine was over. The figure gathered from this procedure is 29,169,000 people.

In spite of the bolsheviks' denial of the existence of famine in Ukraine, two official sources contain population figures as of January 1, 1933. The figures prove the fact of loss by famine of a large number of the population, and at the same time give us an opportunity to determine how many people perished in 1932, and how many in 1933.

The first source puts the population of Ukraine at 32,548,000 as of January 1, 1932.²¹

The second source fixes the population of the Ukrainian SSR for January 1, 1933 at 31,902,000 people.²²

The two figures, when carefully analyzed, permit the conclusion that by the end of 1932 Ukraine had lost 1,504,600 people by famine (the difference between the data given for Jan. 1, 1932 and Jan. 1, 1933 is 646,000, and the normal population increase 858,000, or a total of 1,504,600), plus a loss of 3,317,000 in the first half of 1933. The latter figure is arrived at by adding to the given figure for Jan. 1, 1933 the normal expected increase of population. Thus on January 1, 1934, the population should have been 32,486,000, but it was actually only 29,169,000 at the beginning of 1932. The difference then is 32,486,000 less 29,169,000 or 3,317,000 who died because of famine in 1933.

The conclusion therefore, at which we have arrived by an analysis of official sources is this: of a total population deficiency figure of 7.5 million, 4.8 million died because of famine (1.5 million in 1932 and 3.3 million in 1933) and 2.7 million is the deficiency caused by a diminished birth rate following the famine. In relation to the entire rural population of Ukraine, reported

An eyewitness reports that the village of Domaniwka had a population of 3,500 before collectivization. During the famine of 1933 only one child was born, a boy, to activist Dmytro Demianenko.

²¹ M. Grin, A. Kaufman, *Ekonomicheskaya geografiya SSSR po oblastyam i respublikam*. I ed. Moscow 1933, p. 287.

²² SSSR "Strana Sotsializma." Moscow, 1936, p. 169

to be 24,743,000 people as of ²⁰ January 1, 1933, the loss by famine amounts to 19.4 per cent. ²¹

The catastrophe of 1932-33, which was primarily directed against the Ukrainians, caused a sharp decline in their number in proportion to the population of the USSR, as shown in the following table: (in millions of people). ²²

	1926 Net figure	Weighted proportion to total po- pulation of USSR	1939 Net figure	Weighted proportion to total po- pulation of USSR	% of increase com- pared with pre- vious
Total USSR out of above	147.0	100.0	170.5	100.0	115.9
Russians	77.8	52.9	99.0	58.4	27.2
Ukrainians	31.2	21.2	28.1	16.6	-10.0
Kazakhs	4.0	2.7	3.1	1.0	-22.5

If the number of Ukrainians had been increasing at the same rate as that of the population of the USSR as a whole during the period from December 17, 1926 to January 1, 1939, i. e. at the rate of 15.9 per cent, then there should have been 36.2 million Ukrainians on January 17, 1939. But in point of fact there were only 28.1 million. During the 12 years from 1926 to 1939 the number of Ukrainians in the USSR declined by 3 million or 10 per cent.

A population deficiency of 8.1 million Ukrainians in the USSR caused by famine and lowered birth-rate is the basic price of the famine.

The number of Russians increased during the same period by 27.2 per cent, while the mean average increase for the entire USSR was 15.9 per cent. The increase for the entire USSR was 15.9 per cent. The increase in the Russian population took

²⁰) Ibid.

²¹) J. Stalin made a noteworthy statement in 1933: "We have absolutely achieved a betterment of material conditions of the workers and peasants from year to year. Only sworn enemies of the Soviet government can doubt this." J. Stalin, *Voprosy Leninizma*, 11th ed. Moscow, 1947, p. 386.

²²) Frank Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union. History and Prospects*, Geneva, 1946, p. 138. It is the best published work in English about the population of the Soviet Union.

place simultaneously with a proportionate decrease in the number of other nationalities."⁸⁸

From the viewpoint of Dr. Lorimer, "in most cases however, the decline is probably not demographic at all, but simply indicates the cultural identification of such persons with one of the major Soviet nationalities."⁸⁹ That is, the population gravitates towards assimilation with the larger nationalities. Russians are also a nationality of the USSR. Dr. Lorimer maintains, that "the decrease in the number of persons reported as Ukrainians was probably due, in the main, to increasing identification with the Russians; especially in the case of Ukrainians living in the RSFSR."⁹⁰

Dr. Lorimer does not deny the famine of 1932-1933, and its negative influence on the population growth of Ukraine. But when he tries to explain the decrease of Ukrainians in the USSR in the 1939 census compared to 1926, he does not accentuate the famine, only the process of assimilation of Ukrainians with the Russians.⁹¹

If we agree, for the sake of argument, that Dr. Lorimer is correct in his assumption that the decrease in the number of Ukrainians in the USSR between 1926 and 1939 was due to their assimilation by the Russians, then it is necessary to explain which ethnic groups were being assimilated by the Russians, whose number during that period increased by 37.7 per cent, or the Azerbeydzhanians, who increased by 33.3 per cent. Besides an increase in the number of Armenians, Azerbeydzhanians and Russians, the following groups of nationalities increased also: Tadzhiks (25.3 per cent), Tatars (23.7 per cent), Georgians (23.5 per cent), Uzbeks (23.5 per cent) and Chuvash (22.4 per cent).⁹²

Accepting Dr. Lorimer's concept, we would have to concede

⁸⁸) As stated above, the number of Ukrainians and Kazakhs declined in net figures: the former by 3.1 million, the latter by 0.9 million.

⁸⁹) F. Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects*, p. 137.

⁹⁰) *Ibid.*, p. 139.

⁹¹) In our opinion, material published in the USSR on the subject of the 1939 census is too scant to permit conclusions regarding processes of assimilation.

⁹²) Dr. F. Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects*, p. 138. During the 1939 census, of 14 nationalities of over 1 million besides those enumerated above, the Germans increased by 14.2 per cent, Jews 13 per cent, Byelo-Russians 11.2 per cent, Mordvins 8.3 per cent, Ukrainians declined 10 per cent and Kazakhs 21.9 per cent.

that besides the 28.1 million Ukrainians, who reported as such during the 1939 census, there was some part of them, assimilated to such a degree that they knowingly regarded themselves as Russians. What is the basis for this statement? The 1939 census, included, as is well known, the question of nationality, i. e. stress was laid on the ethnic origin of a person. A Ukrainian, who considered himself such in 1926, could not very well have himself included among the Russians in 1939, forgetting his ethnic origin and nationality, even if he did report Russian to be his native tongue.²¹

The 1926 census proves that this assumption is correct. The question of nationality (i. e. ethnic origin) was answered by 31.2 millions as "Ukrainian," although 4,024, or 12.9 per cent considered Russian to be their native tongue.²² If the census of January 1, 1933 had contained the question regarding the native tongue as well as the question of nationality, then it is almost certain that some of the 28.1 Ukrainians would have reported Russian as their native tongue, but despite that would remain Ukrainians.²³

On changes that took place in the Kazakh population, Dr. Lorimer reports: "...there was an absolute decrease of about 869,000 persons in the number reported as Kazakhs between 1926 and 1939, whereas at the average rate of increase of the whole Soviet population (15.9 per cent) we would have expected an absolute increase of 631,000 persons. The sum of these figures gives a deficit of exactly 1.5 million below the expected number in 1939. We must also take into consideration the fact that there was a terrific depletion of livestock in this region, more serious than in any other part of the Soviet Union, between 1928 and 1934 with a loss of 73 per cent of the cattle, 87 per cent of the sheep and goats, and 88 per cent of the horses. This occurred during the period of collectivization and the

²¹ The 1926 census reported 308,636 non-Ukrainians in Ukraine who considered Ukrainian their native tongue. See A. Khomenko, *Natsionalny sklad ludnosti Ukr. SSR (perepys 1926)*, p. 85.

²² F. Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects*, p. 55.

²³ There is sufficient basis for supposing that the net and relative number of Ukrainians who would have reported Russian as their native tongue in 1939 (had the question been presented) would have been smaller than in 1926: the years of Ukrainization could not have remained without influence in this direction.

settlement of nomads, which were vigorously opposed by tribal chiefs and many of their followers. It is impossible to escape the conclusion that there must have been heavy losses in this region due to the exceptionally high death rate."⁴ These remarks regarding the Kazakhs are even more applicable to Ukraine, therefore we have to look for the reason for the decrease in the number of Ukrainians between 1926 and 1929, not to the processes of assimilation of Ukrainians, but to the famine of 1932-33.

The post-famine years in Ukraine were characterized by a marked lowering of the standard of living, and a hard life in general, especially in the rural areas. Disease was on the increase, particularly psychic and gastric. A decline in the birth-rate stood in direct relation to the famine, together with an increased infant mortality rate, and the general infirmity of those who survived.

A simultaneous consequence of the famine was a sharp increase in the number of uncared-for children, with the inevitable result of beggary, thievery and robbery.

All the post-famine phenomena in the realm of the spiritual and material culture of the Ukrainian nation require special study and research, not within the scope of the present work.

Decades and centuries will pass, generation will follow generation, gradually people will forget the hungry years of 1932 and 1933, and only proverbs and sayings, born in Ukraine during the famine, will remain as a reminder of these times. A sample of these sayings will give an idea of what the folklore of these times offers: "When Lenin was dying, he ordered Stalin: Don't give people bread, and don't show them bacon." "No bread, no lard; Soviet rule has taken all." Another variation of the same: "No bread, no salt, no cow, no hog — a picture of Stalin on the wall." "Hammer and sickle over the collective farm — inside hunger and death." Another variation of the

⁴ F. Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects*, p. 140.

same saying: "Hammer and sickle bring death and hunger." "Those who reap rye on collective farms, have to go begging bread for themselves." "They work in the "kolhosp" and go hungry." "God punishes by cold, Stalin destroys by famine."

²² More details on Changes in Ukrainian folklore under Soviet rule, contained in an article under the same title, by this author were published in *Entsyklopediya Ukraynoznavstva*, Munich—New York, 1949. Vol. 1. pp. 316-320.

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
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I V A N D U B Y N E T S

**THE GREAT FAMINE
IN UKRAINE IN 1932-1933**



I V A N D U B Y N E T S

* March 30, 1903. — † January 30, 1954.

I V A N D U B Y N E T S

A M e m o r i a l

Ivan Dubynets was born on March 30, 1903 in the Ukrainian village of Medvyn, in the province of Kiev. His parents were poor peasants struggling to make ends meet while providing for their eleven children. How well they did this may be seen from the fact that all seven Ivan's brothers and sisters received a high-school education. At the age of seven Ivan Dubynets entered school in his native village remaining there until 1918. From 1918-21 he was a student of the gymnasium in Bohuslav. For the next five years he was a teacher in Medvyn. In 1926 Dubynets enrolled in Kiev University and in 1930 he graduated in geology. He soon made a name for himself as a brilliant geologist. His articles on the graphite deposits in Ukraine established him as an authority in this field, and in 1937 he read a paper at the International Geological Congress which was held in Moscow.

During the Second World War Dubynets remained in Kiev and later made his way to the west along with hundreds of thousands of his countrymen. After 1949 he lived in New York where he devoted all his spare time to the preparation of the present volume. The materials and documents collected by him form the basis of the White Book. Ivan Dubynets, however, did not live to see it in print. On January 30, 1954, he met a tragic end when, through an accident, he was overcome by gas fumes in his room.

CHAPTER I.

THE VILLAGE "ACTIVE" AND THE "THOUSANDERS"

In order to speed up collectivization and particularly the de-kurkulization of the more prosperous and better farmers, and to create a material and technical base for the ensuing collective farms, the Soviet government set up a so-called grain collecting plan. This represented severe economic pressure, as well as a moral and physical blow to the rural population.

To enforce these plans, which the Soviet government considered politically essential, was more than the local village governments could do, and so the Communists did not depend on them. Special "centres" were created in the villages which blindly, and without the least hesitation, carried out all the instructions of the Soviet government and the Communist Party.

For this purpose the so-called "committees for the assistance of rain collecting" were also formed. These comprised some local Communists and poor farmers but chiefly criminals and the morally unfit, who eagerly robbed what was not their own. The villagers called these committees actives, brigades of activists, and later "brigades of the Red broom," which swept the villages clean of all grain and farm produce.

Still, the government could not wholly depend on these actives. It decided to employ more trusted men and so it mobilized factory workers and other city Communists and sent them to the villages. At first there were ten thousand of these, but later the number grew to 25 thousand and subsequently to many more. The villagers called them thousands. They took charge of the work heretofore carried out by the village actives and eventually took over the local village governments and the newly-formed collective farms.

**ORIGIN OF THE GRAIN—COLLECTING "ACTIVES"
RESOLUTION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF JULY 29, 1929.**

1. The main undertaking of the new grain collecting campaign is, in contrast to those of former years, to complete the year's grain collecting by January 1 in all the new districts and by February 1 in all the others.

2. The *kurkul* population will raise as much opposition as in the past. In order to forestall this opposition it is necessary from the very beginning to take advantage of the experience of the poor and middle farmers' organizations acquired in past grain collecting campaigns. This experience will be useful in enabling the new campaign to run smoothly from the start.

3. To put the grain collecting plan up for discussion at general farmers' meetings.

5. The Central Committee considers it imperative to have the support of the public organizations. So that these organizations are constantly at the service of the grain collecting enterprise "committees for the assistance of grain collecting" will be created within the village governments. These committees will be appointed at the poor and middle farmers' meetings.

7. The Komsomols must expand their activities. Their organizations must draw the youth into the service of the "committees for the assistance of grain collecting" and utilize the "light cavalry."

8. The *kurkuls* try to organize their resistance to the Soviet government measures from the opposing elements of the population. The Party organizations on the other hand must endeavor to organize extensive activity among the women, expounding to their delegates the tasks of the "committee" and drawing into its body the more active groups.

12. Contests must be held for the fastest completion of the grain collecting plans among districts, villages, co-operatives and collective farms, thus encouraging more energetic action.

13. The 1929-30 campaign of the grain collecting plan is the most important undertaking in the realization of the socialist structure. This campaign must be carried out by all Party organizations and with all Communist energy.

(*Vistl*, August 5, 1929).

THEY ROB AND DRINK

In the village of Lukobarske, in the Proskuriw district, the committee for the assistance of grain collecting consists of a former Polish commander, some kurkuls, hooligans and drunkards. They all distort the class line and break the laws of the Revolution.

The committee is selling the property of those, including the poor farmers, who refuse to hand over their grain, for next to nothing to their friends and relatives. For instance a fanning mill was sold for 1.1 rubles and later resold for 60 rubles. The difference was spent on drink. Although this incident was made known to the District Party Committee no steps are taken to correct this practice and grain collecting is proceeding as usual.

(*Pravda*, October 22, 1929).

STEPAN KAVUN

SADISTS — GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES

During collectivization the Soviet government depended, first of all, on criminals, sadists and other degenerate elements to carry out the inhuman methods it set forth. One such sadist, in the village of Viytiwka, was Anton Oleksiyovich Orlenko.

He carried out all the orders of the government without question, even if it meant taking the life of a human being. He swept out the last kernels of grain from pots and cans, thus sentencing young children to certain death.

The word "Orlenko" was sufficient to frighten playful children into absolute silence and the grown-ups went out of their way to avoid him. He carried a pistol with him wherever he went, always looked filthy and cursed everyone within hearing.

Finally, even the government was forced to reprimand him. He spent a year in jail where he was made some sort of a guard. He was then released and sent to other villages as a specialist in grain collecting, where he continued to practice his inhuman acts.

Due to such "Orlenko's" and their superiors a great famine began in 1931-32 which, at its peak in 1933, caused an unheard of number of deaths and even cannibalism in Ukraine.

THEY CRITICIZE THE POOR FOR THEIR PASSIVENESS

Not all grain collecting committees are able to organize around them committees of poor farmers. In many districts of the Kherson region committees of poor farmers are totally inactive in the grain collecting committees. In the Lubni region the *kurkuls* will not part with their grain and the committees of poor farmers remain absolutely indifferent to the problem.

A thorough check-up is being conducted with regard to the surrender of all grain surpluses to the government by the committees of poor farmers and all unorganized poor farmers. A check-up reveals that in some instances members of the former hide their grain surpluses and agitate against grain collecting. In two districts of the Kryvy Rih region active members of the committee protested at an open meeting against the grain collecting plan. These are instances of an attitude of appeasement toward the *kurkuls*.

In villages of the Nikopol region, individual members of the committee of poor farmers protested against compelling *kurkuls* to sell their grain to the government.

(*Pravda*, October 30, 1929)

THEY BLAME THE COMMITTEE OF POOR FARMERS FOR INACTIVITY

Upon closer scrutiny of the work of the committees of poor farmers (*KNS*) it is found that they do

not always occupy first place in the undertaking of the social reconstruction of the rural areas.

The Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet heard the report on the circumstances of the Kupyansk District Committee of Poor Farmers and upon consideration of certain facts affirmed that no work is being done by the committee.

The rural organizations failed to interest the poor and middle farmers in the recent social-political campaigns. The Presidium has voiced a harsh reprimand to the directors of the District Committee of Poor Farmers and the Regional Committee of Poor Farmers of Kupyansk.

The campaigns of grain collecting and collectivization are in a sorry state. The president of the village KNS, Lisovetsky, hid kurkul grain in his house during the grain collecting campaign and also, upon his initiative, reductions in the farm taxes were made and in the insurance premiums of the kurkuls.

The work of the different District Committees of Poor Farmers is quite unsatisfactory. They are littered with opposing elements.

(Vistl. January 7, 1930).

THE GOVERNMENT MOBILIZES ROBBERS

The Dniepropetrovsk district leads all the grain collecting plans in Ukraine. One of the chief reasons for this success is that the factories have sent there immense cadres of proletarian activists.

Two units of 250 members each of tested Communists were mobilized. The town Soviet sent 50 men. The Regional Council of Trade Unions sent 100 active non-party-member laborers. Professional Associations sent 18 brigades and 18 authorized agents for work in the villages, and the District Party Committee sent 230 men during the period of grain collecting. The Komsomol also mobilized substantial units of young workers.

The Dniepropetrovsk proletariat comprehends the importance of grain collecting and thus threw into the

villages about 1,000 of its finest active. In addition the Party organizations reinforced the leadership by sending its finest, well-tested men.

The grain collecting plan reached every village Soviet and every populated point.

(*Pravda*, October 8, 1929).

HELP FROM MOSCOW . . . TO ROB

October 16, 1929. Kharkiw. In many villages throughout Ukraine hundreds of labor brigades are taking an active part in the organization of grain collecting. They are giving great service to the poor in the fall seeding, and overhauling farm machinery.

The All-Ukrainian Council of Trade Unions has sent 120 labor brigades to the rural areas. Besides this the District Trade Unions have voluntarily dispatched brigades of workers to the villages. For instance, the Kharkiw Trade Union has sent several hundreds of workers.

Besides this, workers from other parts of Ukraine have organized labor brigades from Moscow, Lenin-grad and other cities of the Soviet Union work for several months at a time.

These brigades play a major part in the grain collecting plan. In the Kupyansk and Shevchenko districts work on a large scale began only with the coming of these labor brigades. With their help the poor and middle elements are steadily making their attack on the *k u r k u l s* who are putting up a frantic resistance against grain collecting plans and the labor brigades.

(*Pravda*, October 8, 1929).

THE PARTY AND THE TOWN TAKE OVER THE VILLAGE

(From the records of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of November 17, 1929).

The main points are:

1. The 15th convention of the Communist Party

has decided to gradually bring haphazard peasant farming within the orbit of the great USSR production mill, and step up the expansion of the socialist reconstruction of the farming area and the building of a great agricultural industry.

2. The widespread collective farm movement is taking place amidst an intense class struggle with its changing forms and methods. The most important assignment of the Party organizations step is thoroughly to strengthen the participation and influence of the city proletariat, and the proletariat and semi-proletariat of the rural areas in the collective farm movement.

12. The Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union urges greater and greater activity on the part of the factory workers in the collectivization of the farms, by forming labor brigades, acting as organizers and instigators of the collective movement and also by the participation of these workers in the collective farm meetings and in the election of officers.

The Party leadership in collective farms must be strengthened in every detail.

Inadequate aid from the Komsomol organizations in collectivization must be noted.

Beginning an all-out attack on the capitalist elements and thoroughly strengthening the production clamp between socialist industry and the farming industry, the Party organizations must mobilize all their forces in time for the next seeding campaign.

By uniting the poor-middle masses of farmers around the Party, the labor class will thus be able to assure a strong agricultural base for the socialist industries of the state and at the same time insure the whole structure of socialism.

(*Visti*, November 22, 1929).

THE 25-THOUSANDERS

(From the Resolution of the November Plenum of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party).

The industrial workers are a great reservoir from

which leaders for the building of the socialist farm may be drawn.

The Central Committee considers it vital, aside from a systematic reinforcement of the collective farm movement by Party leadership, to send no less than twenty-five thousand laborers with adequate organizational-political experience to work during the coming months on collective farms, at machine-tractor stations and in divisional boards.

In picking these workers, the Professional Associations must take an active part and choose the most progressive men.

(*Pravda*, November 22, 1929).

PREPARING THE 25-THOUSANDERS

The collective farms welcome the decision of the Central Committee to send them workers. Many collective farms are asking for an increase in the number allotted to them. The collective farms in the Mykolayiw region have sent a petition for 500 more workers. The Mykolayiw factories have begun additional recruiting. The news is similar in other regions.

Meetings of collective farmers everywhere are demanding that workers be sent them immediately. They claim that help is needed right now to start the spring sowing. The workers have all been assigned their own jobs. In most cases they will take posts as directors and members of divisional boards in large collective farms and machine-tractor stations.

(*Pravda*, December 31, 1929).

According to plan, Ukraine has been asked to mobilize only 7,500 workers to be included in the grand total of 25,000. A number of volunteers has appeared — around 14,500 — of whom 7,800 will be selected. Who is to be sent on this assignment?

In first place are the industrial workers. The metal-workers union is giving 3,200 men — 40 per cent; the minerals' union 1,650 men — 20 per cent;

the railroad workers' union 1,100 — 15 per cent. The remaining twelve unions are to supply 2,000 men.

(Pravda, January 18, 1930).

Included in the 25,000 are recruits from the following towns and territories:

Moscow Region was asked for 6,000 issued a call for 18,000 volunteers									
Leningrad Region	"	"	"	4,000	"	"	"	10,000	"
Ivanov Region	"	"	"	3,300	"	"	"	5,000	"
Lower Novohorod	"	"	"	800	"	"	"	3,800	"
Ukraine	"	"	"	7,500	"	"	"	16,000	"
Urals	"	"	"	1,700	"	"	"	2,970	"
Number of volunteers called for:				60,000					

(Pravda, January 24, 1930).

CHAPTER II.

DE-KURKULIZATION AND DEPORTATION OF THE DE-KURKULIZED

De-kurkulization of the more prosperous farmers and the deportation of the finer, better educated village families is perhaps the most tragic page in Ukrainian history. Even the Communist government writes of that catastrophic event as follows:

"The government allowed the farmers to confiscate the kurkuls' livestock, machinery and other inventory in order to promote collectivization. They drove the kurkuls from their land, de-kurkulized them, took away their live stock and machinery and demanded their arrest and deportation. The kurkuls were expropriated, just as the capitalists were expropriated of their enterprises in 1918. This was a policy of the liquidation of the kurkul as a class, on the grounds of social collectivization.

(History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1945 edition, page 290-291)

And the Soviet government not only allowed but ordered the expropriation of the kurkuls, e. i. the more prosperous and better farmers. With such drastic action the Soviet government achieved its goal in the following ways.

1. The wealth seized from the kurkuls formed the material and technical groundwork for the collective farms.

2. The mass arrests and deportations of the Ukrainian kurkuls served to terrorize the poorer farmers and, bereft of the leadership of their braver friends, they meekly allowed themselves to be driven into collectivization.

3. The Soviet government acquired millions of slaves who were sent to Siberia and the Far North to work in forests and build strategic centres, there to be physically exterminated.

The 16th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party which was held in the summer of 1929 directed that de-kurkulization be allowed to the extent of 10 cent of all the farmers. This is what it meant in Ukraine.

In 1928 there were over 5 million farmers in Ukraine, only 4 per cent of whom were not land owners. Forty-eight per cent owned up to 7.4 acres of land, 41 per cent owned from 7.4 to 25 acres and only 7 per cent were owners of more than 25 acres. (W. Kubyovych, *Geographiya Ukrainy*, p. 194). All these were farmers who worked their own land and the government's permission to liquidate 10 per cent of them made it necessary to include large numbers of the so-called middle-class and poor farmers, especially when the ratio was increased to 15 and 20 per cent in some places.

At that time over 500,000 farm families were de-kurkulized involving about 2 million people. About half were deported to distant concentration camps where, but for a few exceptions, they died.

The most intensive de-kurkulization was begun in the winter of 1929-30 and continued until 1933. The biggest deportations of the de-kurkulized farmers and their families were carried out in the winter seasons of 1929 to 1931 inclusive.

The extent and methods of de-kurkulization are best told by the Soviet's own documents and through the testimony of living witnesses of those events.

The resolution of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet legalized



Executed by on explosive bullet



The execution of kurkuls

de-kurkulization in Ukraine. We have never seen similar resolutions published in PRAVDA for any other republic in the USSR.

THE KURKULS AND MIDDLE FARMERS

KURKULS. — The most bestial, coarse and savage exploiters, who many times in the history of other nations revived the rule of landlords, tsars, clergy and capitalists. There are more kurkuls than capitalists but the kurkuls are a minority in the nation. These blood-suckers have become rich from the people's poverty during war. They gained ohtusands and hundreds of thousands by raising prices on grain and other foodstuffs. These spiders luxuriated at the expense of the war-ruined farmers, and the hungry workers. These vampires drank the blood of the wirking people, growing more prosperous as the workers in the city factories grew hungrier. They grabbed the land of the landlords and grain and again enslaved the poor masses.

(Lenin, *Collected Works*, XXIII, pp. 206-207 [in Russian]).

The term "middle farmers," from an economic view-point, comprises those farmers who work small tracts of land either belonging to them or leased; who,

firstly, are able, under capitalist rule, not only to eke out a miserable existence for their families, but to obtain a small surplus which may, in the extreme case of a good year, be turned into capital and, secondly, are often able (for instance for a family of two or three) to hire outside help. The Revolutionary proletariat must not have as its aim—in the first place for the sake of a speedy beginning of the proletariat dictatorship — to draw this element to its side but rather to limit itself to simply neutralizing it, i. e. to render it neutral in the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.

(Lenin, *Ibid.*, XXV, pp. 271-272).

RESOLUTION OF THE UKRAINIAN SUPREME SOVIET AND THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARY OF JULY 3, 1929

(Resolution regarding the broadening of rights of the local Soviets for assisting state instructions).

In order to quell the *kurkul* speculators who are hampering the resolutions of the citizens' general meetings in the execution of state plans and assignments, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and the Council of People's Commissars have decided:

1. To permit the village Soviets, in the event that general meetings of citizens pass regulations to complete grain collecting plans voluntarily by the whole village, the task to be divided among individual farmers, to levy on those farmers who do not comply with such regulations and fail to hand in their grain, a fine, by administrative orders, up to five times the value of the grain withheld and if necessary to sell the guilty farmer's property in order to obtain the required fine.

2. In the event of a group of farmers conspiring and refusing to turn in their grain, resisting the executive of the grain collecting plan, such farmers must be tried according to article 57 of the Criminal Code of the USSR. If individual farmers maliciously refuse to hand in their grain even after a warning by the administration according to the said article and this resolution, then such persons are to be tried according

to article 58 of the Criminal Code of the USSR, which provides for severe measures of repression.

3. Of the monies obtained from such fines and sales of confiscated properties 25 per cent is to be deducted and given to the appropriate funds of co-operative, and poor farms' organizations.

(Visti, July 14, 1929).

SEVERE PUNISHMENT IS THREATENED

In the village of Vyshnevets, Synelkiw district, in Donbas (Donets Basin), one kurkul Zhydchenko, was fined 27.9 tons of grain for the grain collecting plan, and later another 32.8 tons, then an additional 24.5 tons as outstanding for the previous year. Such cases were common in many other districts.

The progress of the collecting plan is due mainly to the poor and middle farmers. The kurkul is now also forced to turn in his grain but he does so slowly and reluctantly, bringing in small portions at a time and only the less vital products like barley, millet and corn. He holds back rye and wheat.

November 1st was the deadline for the kurkuls to bring in their grain. Now the actives are conducting checks in the villages.

As regards the kurkuls, appropriate measures will naturally be taken according to the law. The approach will be most severe, most merciless. All public opinion will be directed against the kurkul — the hoarder of grain.

(Pravda, November 2, 1929).

PRESSURE ON THE KURKULS IS DEMANDED

In the Dniepropetrovsk region only 38 per cent of the grain collecting plan has been completed. The reason for this unsatisfactory state of affairs may be explained mainly by the weak pressure exerted on the kurkuls. The kurkuls used every ruse to avoid handing in their rye and wheat and our organizations were unable to force them to do so.

Sufficient evidence of this is that on November 15 only 23 indictments were issued against *k u r k u l s*. The village Soviets do not exercise the rights given them by the law in their struggle with the *k u r k u l s*. There are any number of cases of leniency. In Peshchepyn district only four *k u r k u l s* were tried in court. For that reason only 62 per cent of the grain collecting plan was completed there.

(*Pravda*, November 25, 1929).

WARNING IN THE JULY 3RD RESOLUTION OF THE UKRAINIAN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Until recently the grain collecting plans in Ukraine have been progressing mostly with the aid of the poor and middle-class farmers even though the village meetings resorted to measures and assigned the *k u r k u l s* definite duties pertaining to the plan. The Party organizations have taken no interest in determining whether these orders are complied with or not, while the poor and middle-class masses are unorganized.

The term allowed the *k u r k u l s* for bringing in their grain has long since expired — October 1st — but they evade this duty. The July 3rd resolution of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee provides for a whole string of compulsory measures against the *k u r k u l s* who maliciously refuse to turn in their grain surplus. This resolution is forgotten by many regions. In the Kiev, Uman, Zaporozhe and many other regions compulsory measures are not employed against the *k u r k u l* population.

But recently progress has been felt. Some regions have finally begun to use compulsory methods provided for in the Resolution of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee.

(*Pravda*, October 30, 1929).

THE KURKULS ARE BEING LIQUIDATED

The struggle for the liquidation of the *kurkuls* has spread to all regions. It is a fierce campaign into which are drawn wide circles of poor farmers and farm laborers. This struggle for liquidating the *kurkuls* is also very popular among the middle farmers who go hand-in-hand with the poor farmers and farm laborers. Hundreds of *kurkuls* have already been evicted from their homes while their property has been taken over by the collective farms.

In the Chervono-Povstansk District alone, one hundred *kurkuls* have been thrown out of their homes. The regulation for evicting *kurkuls* was passed unanimously at a mass meeting. From all corners of the Regions come news that middle and poor farmers and farm laborers have not the slightest qualms about liquidating them. The *kurkuls'* homes, barns and stables are appropriated by the collective farms. Their homes are used mostly as collective farm community centers, offices or nurseries.

In the village of Bilyaiwka the village Soviet had been located in a poor building and now has moved to a handsome house formerly owned by a *kurkul*. Nine day's notice is given the *kurkuls* to vacate their premises.

(*Pravda*, January 24, 1930).

In the Odessa region, in the last five-day period, 10 per cent of the farmers and 9 per cent of the land have been seized by collectivization. In all regions with social collectivization *kurkuls* are being liquidated according to the resolutions of the masses of poor farmers and farm laborers and their property is turned over to the collective farms. In the Bereziw district 350 *kurkuls* have been *de-kurkulized* and 1,650 hundredweights of hidden grain has been confiscated, 750 head of cattle, 625 calves, thousands of items of farm machinery and 3,500 hundredweights of forage. One hundred and three houses were given to farm laborers for their living quarters and the rest were turned over to collective farms to be used for

administrative, cultural and educational purposes. The machinery will be useful in the spring seeding. The horses will considerably ease the present shortage of draught animals in the collective farms.

In the village of Pavlynka one kurkul set fire to his house after it had been appropriated by the collective farm.

(Pravda, February 9, 1930).

In all districts of the Mykolayiw region where an all-out collectivization drive is in progress mass meetings of farm laborers and the poor and middle farmers have been held passing resolutions for liquidating the kurkuls, whose land and possessions are turned over to the collective farms and poor farmers.

In the Blahoyev district of social collectivization, of the Odessa region, the question of liquidating one hundred kurkuls was raised at a meeting of farm laborers and the poor and middle farmers. Then, on January 25, in the middle of the night a group of kurkuls loaded their wagons and made for the town. They were caught and punished.

In the Konstantyniw district the movement for the liquidation of the kurkuls is widespread among the poor masses. In many villages decisions have been passed at meetings to complete collectivization in the month of March. It was also decided to de-kurkulized 150 farmers and hand their property over to the collective farms.

(Pravda, January 30, 1930).

In all the collective farm around Odessa stiff measures are being taken. Livestock, farm machinery, buildings, orchards and vineyards are turned over to the collective farm fund. At the same time liquidation of the kurkul pseudo-collectives has begun. When they heard of this resolution they immediately began to sell their property and divide the proceeds among their middle-farmer relatives and let their livestock go unfed.

(Pravda, January 25, 1930).



Mass execution of peasants

THE GUILTY ARE SOUGHT AT THE BOTTOM

(Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union regarding the Harbuzyn Party organization, passed January 12, 1931).

The Central Committee states that:

1. The major farm campaigns conducted in the Harbuzyn district were entirely unsatisfactory. Not enough attention was mobilized around this undertaking, nor was there sufficient activity displayed by the poor and middle masses. And a candid manifestation of a rightist swing was evident in the practical work of the District Party organization.

Leaders of the District Party Committee and of the District Executive Committee have proven themselves incapable of making a strong attack on the kurkuls. The difficult assignment, only partially carried out, against the kurkuls in the grain collecting plan was very much behind the schedule and the kurkuls had not one farm tax imposed on them. Districts with fourteen villages revealed only fifteen kurkuls. The fall planting of wheat was

only 92 per cent completed and other grain only 82 per cent. The mobilization of expenses was unsatisfactorily carried out.

2. This is all due to the fact that leaders of the whole district Party organization have fallen into the habit of holding unprincipled gatherings-social functions. A lack of real self-criticism is felt in the organization. All this serves to undermine the efficiency of the Party organization in carrying out its political farm-program.

The Central Committee therefore decrees:

1. That the resolution of the united Plenum of the District Party Committee and the District Executive Committee of December 12 be approved.

2. Because of actions contrary to the Party the following are to be removed from their posts: Burynin — Secretary of the District Party Committee; Drakh — Representative of the Organization Department; Bondarenko — Head of the District Executive Committee. The case of their Party membership to be reviewed by the Central Communist Committee.

3. The Organization Department of the Central Committee be given two weeks in which to procure the required number of workers and send them to the districts.

(*Visti*, January 15, 1930).

ROBBERY AND EXPROPRIATION ACCORDING TO MOSCOW REGULATIONS

This happened in the Yampil district, Vynnytsya region, in 1929. In order to intimidate the majority of farmers and so lay a foundation for the ensuing collective farms the more prosperous farmers, who owned from seventeen to twenty-four acres of land, were extremely heavily taxed, for tens of thousands of rubles and ten to fifteen tons of grain. It was known beforehand, of course, that these farmers would never be able to meet these stiff obligations since they had never possessed such sums of money, nor raised nearly as much grain on the land they owned. However, these farmers were warned that for failing to pay the required taxes their property would be confiscated and

turned over to the collective farms. They, as malicious *ku-
kuls*, would be brought to trial.

The terrified farmers in such cases frantically tried to save themselves and their families. Usually they began by selling their cows, hogs, clothes, etc. and paid part of the levied taxes. They gave the state their whole crop but that was not nearly enough.

Finally the time limit for the payment of taxes would expire and the huge debts would be held against them. True to earlier promises the farmers were arrested, tried in the village courts in the presence of all their neighbors and sentenced to ten years in concentration camps. The remaining property was then confiscated.

Accordingly they were shipped to the far North, their farms turned over to the newly-organized collective farms and their wives and children driven from their homes notwithstanding the season or the weather.

Whenever a few farmers in a village were thus robbed and sentenced, the better farms were generally used to build the collective farm. The others were added to the basic economy of the collective farms or simply ruined, after all building materials had been moved to the collective farms.

Thus the economic basis for collective farms was laid in every village.

V. SHYNKOL

DEVASTATION OF THE VILLAGE OF NOVO-PAVLIWKA

The village of Novo-Pavliwka, in the Nikopol district, Dniepropetrovsk region, located about three miles from Nikopol, was fairly prosperous and numbered over 2,000 farmsteads.

At the very beginning of *de-kurkulization* thirteen farm families were *de-kurkulized*, with a total of fifty people. Four of the families managed to escape from the village and the remaining nine, numbering 32 persons, were arrested and deported to the far North. Prior to being sent away they were robbed of their possessions and virtually stripped of their clothing so that they and their small children wore only thin garments for their trip north in the bitter winter cold.

Later, another group of 28 farmers was *de-kurkulized*.

There were about 128 people in this group. Profiting from the experience of the previous de-kurkulized group most of the people fled from the village. The seven families, consisting of 22 people, who remained were then arrested and sent to the North. This was in 1930.

I myself happened to be included in the last group although I did not live in the village at the time. I worked in Zaporozhe and had come illegally to visit my mother. She advised me to leave the village immediately. After bidding her farewell I made my way to the railroad station and there was arrested and sent to prison in Nikopol.

On June 28, 1930, when I was on the train heading north with other de-kurkulized people a GPU agent appeared and made the following announcement: "Listen you, de-kurkulized! We are sending you away not for execution but to work! The Party and the government have decided to introduce collectivization and as you are useless we are sending you away so as not to have any interference from you in our undertaking."

Later I jumped off the train and fled.

YAVDOKYM BONDAR

THE DE-KURKULIZED WHO DIED IN EXILE

In the hamlet of Nova Volodymyrivka, Sakhnovshchan district, Kharkiw region, many farm families were de-kurkulized in the collectivization period of 1930-31. They were deported to the far North and Siberian concentration camps with their whole families, including the old folks and small children, where most of them perished. Although I remember the family names I cannot recall all the members of each family.

Bondar — Pavlo
Boyarsky — Pavlo, Pilip, Semen
Chornohor — Iwan, Harasym
Derkach — Taras
Dykhtyar — three brothers
Hetchenko — Denys
Kabluchka — Stepan
Kharchenko — two brothers
Khalyava — three brothers
Kiryachko — two brothers

The latter were single men and were taken to Arkhangelsk. A young girl, Oksana, daughter of Vasyi Petrusenko, managed to escape. She was the only survivor of that group. The rest all died from cold and hunger. She told many stories of the horror in that forest.

These names are only a few of the whole group, as I cannot recall them all. The village consisted of 840 homes. There were also many who were d e-k u r k u l i z e d and driven from their homes but were not deported. They were scattered throughout other villages and towns. From this group I recall the following names:

1. Sashko Karabut.
2. Andriy Karabut.
3. Hryhoriy Koloda.
4. Korniy Plotivets.
5. Serhiy Kravchenko.
6. Opanas Kravchenko.
7. Petro Kravchenko (veteran of Petlyura's Army).
8. Fedir Yurchenko.
9. Hryhoriy Sushchenko.
10. Sashko Sushchenko.
11. Semen Sushchenko.
12. Mykola Sushchenko.
13. Pavlo Sushchenko.
14. Ivan Sushchenko.
15. Sashko Sushchenko (other than mentioned earlier).
16. Ivan Sushchenko (second).
17. Terentiy Pilipovich.
18. Ivan Levchenko.
19. Mykola Levchenko.
20. Sashko Buryim.
21. Mykhailo Buryim.

All these men had wives and children who were driven out with them.

Following are three documental accounts by living witnesses, examples of d e-k u r k u l i z a t i o n in three villages



Hands tied behind the back before execution

in different districts of the Kiev region. In the village of Stavok, Rzhyschchiw district, fifty farmers were de-kurkulized whose list of names had been prepared by the head of the village Soviet. In the village of Shcherbasyntsi, Medvyn district, of a total of 350 farmers 64 were de-kurkulized, or 18 per cent. The village of Shamrayivka, Jelyko-Polovetsk district, had 300, or 10 per cent, of its farmers de-kurkulized. Among them were included school teachers and priests. The chief perpetrator of the task in the latter village was the representative of the Soviet government, Kovalyov, who was sent from Russia as a Party "thousander" and became secretary of the village Party organization.

F. PRAVOBEREZHNY

EACH VILLAGE TO "GIVE" FIFTY KURKULS

At about the beginning of the year 1931 a GPU agent came to our village, Stayky, Rzhyschchiw district, summoned the head of the village Soviet, Starovoyt, who was a Party candidate, and held with him the following confidential conversation.

"Comrade Starovoyt! Your village is asked to give fifty kurkuls."

"But where will I find them? They have all been taken away already."

"I am not concerned with that. This is my order."

"You know very well that only the poor farmers are now left in this village. How can we find kurkuls?"

"If you do not know whom to take I shall pick them out myself, but you will be sorry."

"All right, take them yourself. I do not know of any kurkuls."

"Well, I do. And the first one is you! The next is your father-in-law and the rest I will soon find. Give me the list of names of the village residents. Who of these was in Zeleny's gang, in 1919?"

"You already know that the whole village was with Zeleny."

"Very well. By morning I want you to have a list of fifty names ready. If you do you may cross out your own and your father-in-law's names. If not, you will both die in Kolyma."

The next morning the GPU agent was handed his list of fifty kurkuls."

After the deportation of the "k u r k u l s" a similar attack began on the "u n d e r-k u r k u l s," the poor farmers who were nationalistically awake, and the village intellectuals. Next came the "k u r k u l fellow travellers" and then "class enemies" and "enemies of the people."

P. HIRCHAKIVETS

18 PER CENT WERE DE-KURKULIZED

In the village of Shcherbasyntsi, Medvyn district, Korsun region, lived Petro Berestovy with his wife and six children. During the NEP (New Economic Period) he owned a steam-powered flour mill. In the spring of 1928, before the beginning of d e-k u r k u l i z a t i o n and collectivization, huge taxes were levied on him. Later he was tried and sentenced. His farm and property were sold to pay his debts. In 1930 he and his family were shipped to Arkhangelsk where all but the eldest son died. He returned to the village and led a life of crime, robbing and stealing for revenge, until finally caught and shot by the GPU militia.

In the winter of 1930 many farmers were d e-k u r k u l i z e d in this village which consisted of 350 farm homes. The following were the victims: Sydir Starenky and his family of three members. He had owned about seven acres of land and a windmill. Hryhoriy Mishchenko, psalmist in the church, had a wife and child and owned about three and half acres of land. There was another Mishchenko who had a wife, four children and very little land, but owned an oil mill (salad oil). Petro Shokalo had a family of seven, owned a windmill and very little land. Artem Shchybra was a good father, had a family of two, owned six acres of land and kept a female helper.

Artem Shchybra was an old and ailing man. One day the local activists lead by two 25-thousanders, Krivzhynsky and Kohan, came to his house, led him outside and placed him on a wagon, then drove him outside the village and there left him forbidding him ever to come back. There he dug himself a cave, planted a little garden and thus existed until his untimely death.

Later, in 1930-31 forty-eight more farmers were d e-k u r k u l i z e d. Altogether, out of 350 farmers sixty-four were d e-k u r k u l i z e d in Shcherbasyntsi, or 18 per cent. Most

of them were shipped to the North, some fled to other villages and a few remained in the village.

I had made a list of all the victims but one day when we were in the act of hiding some grain and fat, members of the village Soviet came to our house. They took the list of names, along with the other things and tried to arrest me because of it. I fled and never returned to the village again.

P. NESTOR

DE-KURKULIZATION IN THE VILLAGE OF SHAMRAYIWKA

Before collectivization the village of Shamrayiwka in the Velyko-Polovetsk district, Kiev region, had around 3,000 homes. All the villagers had been active in the Ukrainian liberation struggle of 1917-1921. From that time until 1928 a small partisan group operated in the vicinity of the village, a detachment of Shkarbanenko's forces. There were about twenty men and they were somewhat of a menace to the Communists in the whole Bila Tserkva region.

In 1929 the head of the village Soviet, P. Vynnychenko, who was also a member of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and personally corresponded with Petrovsky, was arrested by the GPU and replaced by an imported Russian. The secretary of the Party center at that time was a Russian, Fursov, who was later replaced by Kovalyov. Kovalyov was a degenerate and a sadist who always laughed when he abused his victims. He delighted in throwing naked children out into the snow. On his face he wore a perpetual grin which in a way belied his cruel nature. He was a natural executioner and butcher.

At the beginning of collectivization fifteen families were immediately de-kurkulized and deported to the far North. After that de-kurkulization and deportations continued at a regular pace until at the end of the year 300 families had thus been victimized.

All the village intellectuals were liquidated. The village priest, Naum Kharchenko, had been shot right in his own yard in 1920. During collectivization a priest of the re-established Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church, Fedir Severynenko, was sent to Siberia with his family. The public school principal and the teachers, Vyshnivsk and Nezabutovsky, were

shot during the trial of the SVU (Association for Liberation of Ukraine). Another teacher, Novokhatsy, was sentenced to ten years in Siberia. After serving his sentence he died from consumption in the Bila Tserkva station while on his way home.

MARIA NAZARETS

HOW THE COLLECTIVE FARM IN THE VILLAGE OF HUBSKE WAS ORGANIZED

The collective farm in the village of Hubske, in the Poltava region, was organized in 1929 by former members of the Committee of Poor Farmers and the amoral element of the village. Head of the new collective farm was Tymish Stetsenko, a well-known criminal since childhood. He had three wives at the same time of whom one, Mary, he murdered. His brother, Mykyta, was of the same type.

Five hundred acres of the best land, belonging to the villagers, was appropriated by the collective farm. The farmers protested, and took their case to higher officials but to no avail. In November the village was visited by two 25-t h o u s a n d e r s from Donbas (Donets Basin). The first job of these Party emissaries was to remove the bells from the church. For this they engaged the village a c t i v e who had already joined the collective farm. The farmers made a united protest, even beating up the representatives. Then a militia detachment came to the village and under their protection they were finally taken down.

After this the whole village was levied for high taxes — about 25,000 bushels of grain for 500 farms numbering around 2,500 people. The farmers met this plan with the greatest difficulty, buying grain from other villages and cleaning out their own stores. Then came another tax — 30,000 bushels of grain. But the farmers had not a kernel more and none was to be obtained anywhere. So d-e-k-u-r-k-u-l-i-z-a-t-i-o-n began.

To intimidate the villagers two show trials were held at which two farmers, Musiy Panchenko and Fanasiy Varovenko — the latter owned seventeen acres of land — were sentenced, as malicious k u r k u l s, to eight years each in the northern concentration camps. There they both died.

After this no more trials were held. The village a c t i v e simply decided at its night sessions who was to go next and



Woman, after execution, with ring-finger cut off.

proceeded with the victim's de-kurkulization. Fifty families were thus robbed and evicted from their homes. Those who remained were forced to join the collective farm. Having shattered the village the local active, headed by Hotsulov, the agriculturalist, visited every marked home in turn taking away all the grain and hauling the machinery and livestock to the collective. They were on these rounds from morning until night. In this manner, in the spring of 1930, complete collectivization had begun. The village farmers were helpless in the face of this robbery and could only protest.

When a similar process of collectivization was taking place in the neighboring village, Drabovo, the farmers became very indignant and staged an uprising. They secured firearms and killed the whole active. A GPU regiment then arrived and machine-gunned the village for a whole day. The uprising was quelled and the guilty were brutally punished. The village of Hubske was so stunned by this event in Drabovo that it meekly submitted to collectivization.

But in the spring of 1931 the local village Soviet in conjunction with the village active and upon the advice of the Lazirsk District Party Committee decided that a few dozen local families must be deported to the far places of the USSR —

Siberia, the Urals, and the far North. Included in that contingent were the following families. Dorosh Yurchenko, owner of 70 acres of land, was sent away with his family of seven. Iwan Kasyan, owned 49 acres of land, went with his family of five. Slynko had a family of five and 40 acres of land. Serhiy Nazarets had a family of six and 30 acres of land. Maryna Hawryk was a widow with five children and owned 40 acres of land. Maria Karpets was a widow with six children and owned 74 acres of land. Ivan Panchenko had a family of eight and 50 acres of land. Hryhoriy Panchenko had 50 acres of land and a family of seven.

Twenty other families marked for deportation fled from the village. The fate of those deported was not learned, but it is very likely that most of them died.

M. ZHORNOKLIVETS

260 PEOPLE FROM ZHORNOKLOVY SENT TO CONCENTRATION CAMPS

Eighty of the finest farmers in the village of Zhornoklovy, Helmvyaziw District, Poltava Region, were *de-kurkulized* during the collectivization in 1929-31. All these families were shipped to the North, to Arkhangelsk, Vologda and the Urals where they all died. Below is a list of names of those families.

1. Bublyk, Paraska — three members in family
2. Bublyk, Hryhoriy — 5 members
3. Bublyk, Ivan — 2 members
4. Bublyk, Petro — 5
5. Bublyk, Fedir — 5
6. Bublyk, Opanas — 2
7. Bublyk, Yakiv — 6
8. Bublyk, Nykyfor — 1
9. Butowsky, Mykola — 1
10. Chornenko, Panfil — 2
11. Dyachenko, Dmytro — 3
12. Dyachenko, Petro — 2
13. Kudelya, Harasym — 5
14. Kudelya, Semen — 4
15. Otets, Konstantyn — 5
16. Padalka, Danylo — 6
17. Padalka, Mykyta — (writer) 2

18. Padalka, Ivan — 4
19. Padalka, Stepan — 6
20. Padalka, Ulas — 2
21. Padalka, Mykhailo — 3
22. Padalka, Petro — 2
23. Padalka, Yakiv — 3
24. Perekhrest, Zenko — 2
25. Perekhrest, Danylo — 6
26. Perekhrest, Vasyl — 1
27. Perekhrest, Ivan — 2
28. Perekhrest, Paraska — 1
29. Perekhrest, Ivan Petrovych — 4
30. Pishchansky, Omelyan — 9
31. Pishchansky, Ivan — 3
32. Plytin, Yakhrem — 2
33. Plytin, Petro — 2
34. Plytin, Yakym — 1 shot by NKVD, 5 members
unknown
36. Plytin, Nykyfor — 5
37. Plytin, Zakhar — 4
38. Plytin, Karpo — 5
39. Sydorets, Andriy — 4
40. Sydorets, Mykola — 1
41. Sydorets, Horpyna — 1
42. Sydorets, Mykhail — 6
43. Wasynko, Nykyfor — 1
44. Wasynko, Mykhail — 6
45. Lukianenko, Omelyan — 7

The following list of names is of people who were also deported but whose subsequent fate is unknown:

1. Bublyk, Havrylo — 4
2. Bublyk, Petro N. — 1
3. Bublyk, Harta — 4
4. Bublyk, Osyp — 2
5. Bublyk, Danylo — 1
6. Butowsky, Petro — 3
7. Chornenko, Ivan — 3
8. Kononets, Havrylo — 3
9. Kudelya, Ivan — 2
10. Kukuanenko, Trokhym — 2

11. Padalka, Ivan — 3
12. Padalka, Pavlo — 3
13. Padalka, Hhyhoriy — 3
14. Padalka, Vasyl — 6
15. Padalka, Yakiv Ulasovych — 4
16. Padalka, Andriy — 6
17. Padalka, Opanas — 2
18. Padalka, Lukyna — 3
19. Perekhrest, Petro Pavlovych — 1
20. Perekhrest, Sanko — 2
21. Perekhrest, Dmytro Dmytrovych — 4
22. Perekhrest, Dmytro Pavlovych — 1
23. Padalka, Yakiv Fedorovych — 4
24. Plytin, Stepan — 4
25. Plytin, Ivan — 3
26. Plytin, Sashko — 3
27. Plytin, Tymofiy — 2
28. Plytin, Domakha — 5
29. Plytin, Zakharko — 8
30. Plytin, Ivan Nykyforovych — 2
31. Sasinovych, Serhiy — 4
32. Sasinovych, Vasyl — 2
33. Wasynko, Pavlo — 5
34. Wowtsyuh, Panteleymon — 3
35. Wowtsyuh, Zakharko — 2

The following five documented accounts by living witnesses describe the methods of de-kurkulization of families with small children, in mid-winter. One is from the Kiev region, another from Dnipropetrovsk and three others from Poltava.

In a country which proclaimed the building of socialism, and in its propaganda abroad cried out for the protection of children as the future of humanity, the government enacted the following.

"Children between the ages of two and thirteen were thrown out of their home by Shlekov, a Communist-thousander, who then locked the door of the house and warned all the villagers that if they dared give these children shelter they would meet a like fate on the next day." (The village of Budyshcha).

"We begged and pleaded to be allowed to spend one night in our home but to no avail. We were dragged outside and the door was locked against us." (Village of Verkhovytsia).



Executed Priests

"My younger brothers were thrown out the window into the deep snow. Swearing and cursing in filthy language the activists, propelling mother with the gun barrel and kicking the children along, pushed us out of our yard." (Shtankiw village).

"They placed us all on wagons with a few of our belongings, brought us near the hamlet of Lukashenki and dumped us near a ravine." (Village of Bakayske).

"Maria and her children were taken about one mile from the village and dumped in the snow like some unwanted garbage." (Village of Fediyiwka).

TARAS YAKYMENKO

THEY RUINED MODEL FARMS

Before the Revolution the village of Budyshcha, Lysianka district, Kiev region, consisted of 260 farmsteads with a population of 1,330 and 3,000 acres of land. At one time the village had a landlord, Pavlo Senko. But after the Revolution and the partition of land he was allotted twelve acres and became a regular farmer.

D-e-kurkulization and collectivization began in 1929-

1930 and caught the former landlord in its web. He was robbed of absolutely everything he had, de-kurkulized, and with his wife and two children sent to the far North in spite of the fact that the whole village defended him as a good and upright citizen.

Norenko was a model farmer. He was forty years of age and had a wife and five children. He was de-kurkulized in a most barbarous manner by a group of activists headed by a Russian, Shlukov. When they entered the house he ordered the others: "Take everything. Do not forget the freshly-baked bread." All Norenko's property was taken away including livestock and machinery. Shlukov threw the children, who were between the ages of two and thirteen, out of the house into the snow and locked the door. Then he announced to the whole village: "Whoever gives this family shelter will meet a similar fate tomorrow."

Then Hryhoriy Norenko and his wife took their children to the edge of a forest outside the village and in the bitter January cold dug themselves a cave in a gorge. In a few days, however, the GPU came to the new abode and arrested Norenko. His children soon died from exposure and hunger. The mother vanished and some time later her body was found on the frozen river.

Classifying the middle and poor farmers as under-kurkuls they de-kurkulized them in the same way as the kurkuls. Out of the 260 families of the village, 32 were de-kurkulized and most of them were sent to the far North.

The rest of the villagers were forced to join the collective farm which was named "Morning Star." Later, because the latter was considered a Petlyurist term it was renamed "Open Fields" and still later "Bolshevik."

The church was closed in 1927. The priest left the village and the deacon was sent to the North. The church was used first as a granary and later as a recreation center.

A. KOLODKO

DE-KURKULIZING THE VILLAGE OF VERKHOVYTSYA

The village of Verkhovytsya, in the Dniepropetrovsk region, was de-kurkulized on November 22, 1929. Acting



Executed Priests

upon instructions from the Regional headquarters, the head of the village Soviet, Harasymenko, sold twenty-seven farms on that day for ridiculously low prices. The farms sold, or rather stolen, belonged to the following families: Chuhuyiv, four Oryshko brothers, three Palanytsya families, two Karpenko's, two Bilan's three Voloshyn's two Brovarets's, two Bezuhly's, two Dubata's, two Karnaukh's, two Bereza's, two Owcharenko's, three Korolenko's, three Didukh's, three Borshatsky's, one Fedorenko, one Pereverza, one Rybalchenko, one Doroshenko, one Lyashenko, one Riznyk, one Kolodko and a number of others.

My father, Kolodko, was levied a tax for 1,200 rubles, then an additional tax, then a cultural tax, then an income tax and finally an obligation tax for 2,000 rubles. Naturally it was impossible for him to meet all these obligations so he was arrested and on the same day his grain and livestock were taken away. The rest of his property including household possessions was "bought" by the so-called poor. My mother, my twelve-year-old sister and I stayed on in the house for a short time.

Then on December 15, at 7 o'clock in the evening, three activists from the village Soviet appeared at our home, Bondarenko, Evtushenko and Heidik. They drove us out of the house just as we were. Neither tears nor pleas to allow us to

spend one night in the house helped. Bondarenko even tore the felt boots off mother's feet and a fur jacket off my back. After we were out of the house they locked it against us.

From December 15 until January 18 we roamed the village. The villagers were warned against giving us help and were afraid to offer us bread or take us in for the night. We roamed the village by day and slept in a shed at night.

On January 18, 1930, we were told to appear at the collective farm. From there they sent us to a small station, Verkhovets. The next day we were loaded into a train car in which was our father, whom we recognized only by his voice. In two days we were on our way to the Urals. Our long train consisting of ninety cars, packed fifty to a car, all Ukrainian farmers, travelled for a month and a halt. We were brought to the Nadezhdinsk region as special settlers to work in the logging industry.

A. ROMEN

THROWN OUT OF HOME ON CHRISTMAS EVE

On December 24, 1929, the day before Christmas, we were preparing for our Christmas Eve Supper. Our father had been arrested earlier as a *P e t l y u r i s t* (soldier in Petlyura's Ukrainian Liberation Army) and killed by the Communists. In the mid-afternoon we saw a vehicle approaching. We understood immediately what that meant — we would be thrown out of our home and *de-kurkulized* as the family of a *P e t l y u r i s t*. I snatched a coat and cap and jumped through the window but after running for more than a mile in the loose fresh snow I was caught, beaten with the gun barrel and brought back to the house.

They carried out all our household goods and loaded them on the sleds. They rounded up the cattle and chickens. Having finished, the head of the village Soviet shouted to his *a c t i v i s t s*: "Why are you standing there? Throw them out the window," pointing to the children. Then they threw my younger brothers through the window into the snow outside. They grabbed my mother, who had fainted, by the collar and shoved her through the door. The children cried and clung to mother. The *a c t i v i s t s* swore and cursed in filthy language and propelling mother with the gun barrel and kicking the

children with their boots along the way they pushed us out of the yard.

My mother and the five small children walked away down the street while I, being the oldest, was put on the sled and taken to the nearest station for deportation. That was the last time I saw my loved ones. When I returned from exile in 1941 I located their remains in the cemetery where they were buried after their terrible death in the famine of 1933. I arranged for Christian funeral rites for them and placed a cross on their communal grave. Ivan Klymko (from a pamphlet **ALONG THE PATHS TO GOLGOTHA** [in Ukrainian] by D. Solovey).

TO A HOLE IN A CLIFF AND THE URALS

In September, 1930, in the village of Bakayka, Reshetyliv district, Poltava region, many families were *d e- k u r k u l i z e d* and arrested. Among them were the three Tumak brothers with their families, Petro Blokha and family, Ivan Kisil and family, the Meleshko family and others. Arrested were young and old, women, children and infants. All were placed on wagons with a few belongings, such as some clothing, food and cooking utensils, taken near the small village of Lukashenky and dumped under a cliff.

The villagers were forbidden to take these people into their homes but the victims were allowed to dig themselves caves in the cliff. Around nine caves were dug and two or three families lived in each one. Later, in October and November, when the wet, cold weather set in and finally snow, it became impossible to continue living in the caves. After persistent pleas, the village Soviet permitted the cave dwellers to be taken into the village homes. Because only ten homes comprised the tiny village each one took in several families.

At the end of October about ten men were arrested, some of those brought in and some of our local villagers. We were all taken to a prison on Kobylya Street, in Poltava, where with many other prisoners we were charged with plotting to overthrow the Soviet government. Those arrested in our village were: Semen Zhadan, Sydor Zhornyk, Ivan Klymko, Mykhail Klymko, the Tumak brothers, Petro Blokha and a few others.

The remaining families were all arrested the following spring and with some of the local people were packed into a

freight train and transported to the Urals. A few people escaped and lived in Donbas — the Meleshka family for instance. Later they were arrested again and given ten years.

IVAN KLYMKO

THEY THREW THE CHILDREN INTO THE SNOW

Maria Zhadan lived in the village of Feleyevtsi, Reshetyliv district, Poltava region. Her husband, Tymofiy, contracted tuberculosis in a cold prison and died in 1924. Maria had four children and owned 22 acres of land. Besides her home and farm she also had for collectivization two oxen and a cow.

After the 1929 harvest Maria was asked to give 350 bushles of grain for taxes. She did not have that and as a kurkul was tried at a show trial in her own village. (Her husband had owned 98 acres of land and had also rented from the landlord before the Revolution).

In December, 1929, a group of activists came to Maria's home. They were Hnat Luchko, Maxym Luchko, Fedir Verkhola and Pavlo Luchko. They told her: "This is not your home any more. You do not belong here. Take your children and go."

A sled hitched to a nag waited outside, with Kyrylo Gedz from Chubiw as driver. The snow was knee-deep and the temperature was 22 degrees below zero F. Maria with the children, was placed on the sled in the garments they were wearing when the deputation arrived, for they were not even permitted to take warm clothing for the little ones.

They were taken about a mile from the village and dumped in the snow like some unwanted garbage.

For a few months Maria and her children lived with relatives in another village then, fearing arrest, she fled to Donbas.

Maria's home and farm provided the foundation upon which the collective farm in the village of Fediyiwtsi was built.

I. NADDNISTROVY

A FATHER SENT TO SIBERIA, THE CHILDREN FORCED TO BEG

In a hamlet of Uchastka, Orynynka district, Podillya region, lived Trokhym Zaverukha. He had a wife and five children, the

oldest of whom was ten. In 1928, during the land re-organization, he was evicted from his home and re-settled in the village. He was allotted some very poor land from which he found it difficult to support his family.

In December, 1929, the grain collecting commission was taking away all the grain and food produce he had. He wanted to hide a little for his family's needs and found a place in the cemetery where criminals and suicide victims were buried.

One night he loaded a cart with grain and other supplies and was digging a hiding place with his wife when the commission caught them. The next day he was sentenced to six years in concentration camps. His wife and children were left without any food while the next harvest was six months away.

The mother made sacks for the children and sent them through the village to beg but the people could spare nothing as they had little enough for themselves. As soon as the snow disappeared in some places the children searched for potatoes left in the fields from the fall harvest. Their mother grated the frozen potatoes and baked pancakes on which they managed to exist for a while. In spring they dug roots and sprouts out of the ground from which their mother made soup. They were refused food at the collective farm kitchen because they were children of an arrested man.

Undernourishment and hunger became prevalent throughout the Ukrainian villages in the spring of 1930, after the first grain collecting plan had swept away all food and complete collectivization really began. Hardest hit were the large families with small children.



The following documents tell of the methods of deporting de-kurkulized farmers to the far North. One briefly describes the trip of a group from Dniepropetrovsk and the second, by Ivan Klymko, the journey from Poltava to Arkhangel'sk. "Whoever veers one step off the path will be shot."

They walked for ten days through deep snow, sleeping with small children under the open sky, on a bed of tree branches with only the bonfire for comfort. Such were the methods of transportation to the assigned points.

P. Volohodsky tells of the deportation of such a group from Dniepropetrovsk to Vologda, and A. Romen of a group from

Poltava to the northern Urals. "The windows in the freight cars were boarded up tightly. Without fresh air and water people died in hordes, especially the children. Mothers and fathers collected their urine, cooled it and gave it to their sick children to drink." These were the conditions under which the latter group traveled.

P. MEZHOVY

ONE STEP OFF THE TRAIL AND YOU WILL BE SHOT

Not long ago the hamlet of Husarsky, Mezhiw district Dniepropetrovsk region, was inhabited. It had nineteen farmsteads before collectivization destroyed it.

Ten of the families were de-kurkulized and exiled in 1929-30. Five families were de-kurkulized somewhat later and evicted from their homes. And four families were removed to the village of Vesele and forced to join the collective farm, where half of them died from starvation in 1933.

The first ten de-kurkulized farmers were arrested in February, 1930, and five days after were taken to the railroad station in Demuruna and loaded into freight cars. The trapdoors were fastened with wire and padlocked. Later, their families were brought and loaded into the cars with them. I was among them.

We were so tightly jammed it was impossible to walk or even crawl through the car. We were issued three buckets to a car with the instructions that one was to be used for water, one for the latrine and one for soup.

The children cried, the women wept, the men were silent and thoughtful. When the train pulled out at ten o'clock that evening hysterical lamentation from the women and children broke out in the dark train, joined by muffled sobs from the men. The GPU guard standing outside beat on the walls of the car with his rifle butt and bellowed, "Stop that noise," followed by the filthiest Russian curses.

At the station, Prosyana, several more carloads of other de-kurkulized victims were added to our train and we continued on our journey. The train stopped on side tracks of large stations only. After a long and arduous trip we reached the Arkhangelsk region.

We came to a stop at the station of Mezhdudvorye and the

ЗВЕЗДА

№ 11	11	11	11
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№ 11
1930

№ 43 С

Кам'яні **БЮРО РОЗСЛІДУВАНЬ**
на Д

Б.с. № 571 | Відділ *до* *Відділу* *Лавинський* *ру*
Бюро розслідувань при редакції «ЗВЕЗДА» та «ЗІРКА»
при цьому надіслав вам нотатку під заголовком

Прохас негайно розслідувати та прожити заходи пові-
домити нас на протязі 7 днів.

Розголошеною прізвищ авторів нотаток користь за ст.
104, п. В арт. ст. 117 К. А., згідно з повт. Версукі, надруко-
вані в № 27 «Правди» від 3/II—1925 р.

С тов. вітання
Зав. бюро розслідувань

РЕДАКЦІЯ ГАЗЕТ
ЗОРЯ та ЗІРКА

БЮРО РОЗСЛІДУВАНЬ

НАГАДУВАННЯ

24 *24* *1930*
Відділу *Лавинський*
18/6
16 БЕР 1930
Просимо негайно повідомити
про наміри розслідування.
Лав. бюро розслідувань

Orders threatening punishment for betrayal of denouncers

door opened with the order, "Get out of the train!" The men were told to form in line. Then the NKVD chief, Zaytsev, a man of medium height, wearing a fur coat with a belt around the waist, and having a stiff right leg and a whip, limped up to the men and announced:

"I am a representative of the Soviet government and commander of this convoy. My assignment is to bring you to your destination where houses are ready for you and where you will live very nicely." Then he asked if anyone had any complaints. After a silent pause he continued:

"The distance from the railroad to your place of destination is ninety-three miles. Whoever takes one step off the trail will be shot."

After ten days of walking through deep snow, sleeping with children under the open sky, on a bed of three branches with only a bonfire for comfort, we came to the village of Kuzminka, Nyandomsk district, Arkhangelsk region. The local residents had been removed from the village and it was encircled with three strands of barbed wire. Heavily armed GPU guards stood at the two gates.

Five or six families were housed in each home, depending on the size of the house and the families. Two houses in the center of the village were assigned as offices for the superintendent. In order to reach the office the gate guards had to be passed and they searched everyone thoroughly, asking questions.

The next day we were given bread, 300 grams per adult and 150 grams per child. Besides the bread and a little salt fish we received no other food. After three days all the men, my father and I included, were sent on a job floating logs fifty miles away. Our families stayed at the village.

While at work we received 450 grams of bread and a herring for every two men daily. We had no other food although they promised that a shipment was on the way and we would soon get more. Needless to say the shipment never arrived. After some time, realizing that I was losing strength, I decided to flee.

People were dying steadily. Two men from my village died at work and seven in the camp. As I was leaving three more died.

THE DE-KURKULIZED IN ARKHANGELSK

In 1930 forty people were arrested in the village of Fediywka, Reshetyliw district, Poltava region. This happened at about the end of February or the beginning of March, when the roads were impassable.

Prior to the Revolution these people were owners of land ranging from fifty to one hundred acres and before collectivization they had workers' allotments of no more than twenty-two acres, depending on the size of the family.

Those arrested were Petro Yarovy, Nykyfor Yarovy, Petro Zhornyk, Marko Demyanka, and many others. They were all confined in the Fediywka Village Soviet.

The next day wagons were driven up to the homes of the arrested to carry away their families. They were allowed to take some clothes and food with them. Everything else was left behind. There were about a dozen families, with grown-up children, numbering about a hundred people in all.

The wagons drove up to the village Soviet, picked up the arrested men and took them all to the railroad station of Sahaydak. There they were packed into a freight train which, under close GPU guard and with heavily bolted doors, took them to Arkhangelsk. No one attempted to escape. The women and children were not able to, and the men would not abandon them.

It was never known how many of those people died or how many survived. All their property was appropriated by the village active, then headed by Radyon Demyanko, and later turned over to the collective farm.

P. VOLOHODSKY

ARMED GUARDS SURROUNDED THE VILLAGE

The hamlet of Hanno-Tomakivka in the Verkhne-Dnieprovsk district had twenty-four farmsteads which, in 1929, were appropriated by the collective farm. All the property on these farm was socialized.

In spite of this fact on February 24, 1930, two messengers came to the hamlet and announced that all men between the ages of 17 and 60, inclusive, were to report to the village Soviet. All the men went and only a few returned that evening. The rest

were arrested and taken to regional headquarters.

The following day, February 25, fifty activists, Communists and Komsomols, appeared in the hamlet, headed by Medvedev. Armed with rifles and pistols they surrounded the whole hamlet. Every home in which families were earmarked for deportation (relatives of the men held in the village Soviet), was guarded by three men.

Finally, from Regional headquarters a Communist, Makharin, arrived and ordered all the families to be loaded on wagons and driven to the Verkhne-Dnieprovsk station. There they were joined by their men, who had been arrested earlier.

Together they were all packed into a freight train and shipped to Vologda in the far North. Other carloads of dekurkuzized victims were added to the train in Dnepropetrovsk and Synelnyko. The train was closely guarded by a GPU unit.

I was only sixteen years of age at the time, so was not arrested.

A. ROMEN

UKRAINIANS SENT TO THE URALS FOR PHYSICAL EXTERMINATION

Our family, then living in the hamlet of Shtankiw, near the town of Romen, was dekurkulized on December 23, 1929. Later I was arrested, questioned, beaten and thrown into prison. I escaped and found work in Mariupol as a blast-furnace loader and the same time attended school.

On October 10 of the following year the GPU again arrested me. They took me to the station in Sartana and pushed me into a warehouse. It was already jammed full of people of all ages, whole families, women, children, infants and the aged. All were Ukrainian workers, farmers and intellectuals who had been sentenced without trial as a "foreign class and unreliable element." All were being sent out of Ukraine to distant Siberia.

That night we were driven like cattle into an unusually long train and packed sixty to a freight car. It was the second train pulling out of Sartana station where 9,000 people waited in horrible conditions to be shipped to the North. All the windows of the train cars were boarded tightly and we soon felt the lack

В. С. Р. Р. **Ф. С. К.**
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С. О. К. Р. В. И. С. А. О. М. У. - № 863/9.-

Повертаючи лист, який в справі поданий у виборчи
 презах гр. Діронієва, Скарпуратура невідомий, що коли
 встановлено, що гр. Діронієва користувався сезонною назмо
 ною працею під час польових робіт терміном 2 місяці, то
 він виборчих прав по інструкції не повинен мати, беручи
 на увагу, що гр. Діронієва засуджено до в'язни на 12 роки,
 на підставі п. 12 інструкції "Про вибори до рад" - він по-
 бовляється виборчих прав на час ув'язнення."

Т. в. о. СКАРПУРОВА / *Скарпурова* / Болшехович /
 СЕКРЕТАР А. М. В. С. Т. Р. / ДИРЕКТОР

Deprived of franchise

Д. Черв'яко.

До Голови сільради Крижанецького району.

Заготівля прядки та льнону /волокни/ в цілому по району перебуває під загрозом браку виконання наванта центром контрольних планових завдань.

Голова сільради та робітники місцевого установа в організації, абсолютно не знали цієї важливої умови в той час, коли заготівля цього виду забирає в собі величезного державного значення.

У відповідності з директивами Нацкоммергу, від сільради була вилучена вся прядка Голови сільради, Радянським Казначейством ПРИКАЗІМ ПРОТІВМ 24-а годин арештовано розгорнуті на місці заготівля прядки та льнону; в адміністративному порядку доставляється владина куляцько-земельним господарством та призначити остатні негайно ці завдання в а к о н' т н.

Про всі ці заходи негайно повідомте.

Про кількість прядки в льнону, що на нього було доставлено завдання куляцьким господарством по сільраді та кільком господарствам доставлено ці завдання-повідомте РНК на планіше листів 27/ХІІ-30 року о 4 год. д н я.

Голова Радянськомуну / П. К. Я. Е. Н. Я. /

Секретарь ГАРІЦЕНА

Catastrophic decline in production

of fresh air. The children, the sick and the old suffered unbearably.

Once every four days the guards opened the doors. They were the so-called "regimen days" when each carload of people received ten gallons of water and each person a kilogram of bread. Soon people began to die, particularly the old and the children. The dead bodies remained in the cars until the "regimen days" when the guards threw them out into the ditches along the tracks.

In desperation the parents collected their urine, cooled it, and gave it to their sick children to drink.

On the sixteenth day of our journey we came to the Nadezhdinsk station in the northern Urals. We were unloaded, the guards immediately surrounded us and drove us on foot for 45 miles to the east. There we built a camp and worked on the railroad which was being built to Nadezhdinsk.



The following four documented accounts by living witnesses, are concerned with the living and working conditions of the *d e - k u r k u l i z e d* in concentration camps.

"In Vologda — all the wall spaces of the church were filled with tiers of plank-beds. Over 10,000 people were housed in that church. All other churches and monasteries of the town were similarly packed. During the months of March, April and May 25,000 people died." By F. Pravoberezhny.

"From our contingent of 4,800 prisoners 2,300 remained alive six months after arrival. The others died from cold, hunger, disease and suicide." A. Romen on a concentration camp in northern Urals.

"The terrible conditions of overwork and hunger soon reduced our trainload of prisoners by 80 per cent," writes Andriy Kolodko of a concentration camp in Sverdlivsk region.

"Go and save your lives. We must die here." Those were the last words of P. Volohodsky's mother as he parted from her on his flight for freedom.

F. PRAVOBEREZHNY

CHURCHES IN VOLOGDA BECOME SHELTERS FOR THE DE-KURKULIZED

At the beginning of February, 1930, we were brought to Vologda. All the men between the ages of 14 and 55, inclusive, were separated from the rest of the group and told that they would go to adjoining villages to prepare homes for their families. The majority of them never saw their loved ones again.

As my father related to me later, they were taken beyond Totma, to a camp division, Volochka, situated in the dense taiga some 300 miles away. There they made camp out in the open.

The next day they were given some tools and told to build themselves dwellings. When the men managed to throw together a few pitiful structures they were driven into the forest to cut logs.

As the men were departing from our camp my mother hid me in the crowd and so I was left with her and my twelve-year-old sister in Vologda. After the men were gone we were taken to a large church in the town, the Church of the Holy Protector, which was said to have been built by Ivan the Terrible.

All the wall space of the church was lined with tiers of plank-beds. To reach the top beds tall ladders were used. Over 10,000 people were housed in that church.

All the other churches and monasteries were similarly packed. In the Good Friday Church 7,500 people were jammed; in the Holy Savior Church 4,000; in the Church of St. Peter and Paul, 5,000, and so on. All the town warehouses, auditoriums, and barracks were filled and even the huge prison which housed 16,000 to 17,000.

Our own church was like a beehive. Any semblance of sanitation was impossible. The children, nearly all barefoot, and the sick, gratified their needs right in the building. The dead bodies also stayed inside. They were collected once a day, usually in the morning. The church was unheated although the cold reached 40 degrees below zero.

People died by the dozen daily. During the months of March, April and May 25,000 perished in all the churches. In May my mother and sister also died.

A. ROMEN

PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION IN THE TAIGA

At the end of October, 1931, our freight train, carrying a full load of Ukrainian workers, farmers and intellectuals, stopped in the midst of the silent taiga, 43 miles from Nadezhdinsk. As we all trudged on through the deep snow our guards suddenly came to a halt and one of them sneered, pointing to the dense taiga.

"Your Ukraine is right here. Whoever tries to escape will be shot."

We tried to shape some kind of shelters from tree branches and dig caves in the ground. We kept a bonfire burning

constantly. Each day was harder to bear. Cold weather was setting in and people caught chills. In December they died like flies, not only the children, the aged and the sick, but everybody. Painful, heartrending cries were constantly heard from children suffering frostbite. Some people went insane. Mothers killed their children and then committed suicide. Every morning new frozen bodies were hanging from tree tops.

In January, 1932, we completed our primitive barracks with great difficulty. At least we could protect ourselves from the bitter cold but we now suffered with different diseases, scurvy, typhus, dysentery and others. The people were hungry and run-down and had no resistance against disease. They died in great numbers.

By April, six months after our arrival, 2,300 people remained alive out of the 4,800. The rest died from exposure, starvation, disease, and suicide. Those who tried to escape were caught and shot or sent to special concentration camps. Those who were not, perished in the impenetrable taiga from exposure and starvation.

In any case, escape was impossible. Siberian natives stalked the taiga with shot guns, more on the look-out for refugees than wild animals. For each one they caught they received 100 rubles, a bushel of flour and a quart of vodka from the Soviet government.

In such conditions we built the railroad to Nadezhdinsk. The railroad station built on our camp site was named Stalin.

After a year I fled from the camp.

ANDRIY KOLODKO

THE DE-KURKULIZED — SPECIAL SETTLERS

The de-kurkulized farmers from the village of Verkhovets, Dniepropetrovsk region, together with thousands of farmers from other Ukrainian regions, were brought to the forest in the Nadezhdinsk district, Sverdlovsk region. They were unloaded into the snow about six feet deep. The frost registered at 75 degrees below zero.

"Right here you will build your homes. Do not ask for food. You should have brought that with you." was what the chief guard informed us.

Without even an axe or a saw we began building huts from

tree branches. In two weeks all the children, the sick and the aged had frozen to death. The number of prisoners did not decrease, however, for two or three train-loads arrived daily with new victims, all *de-kurkulized* Ukrainian farmers.

Later we worked in the forest cutting logs for barracks. The daily quota assigned to us was 590 cu. ft. of logs for every two men. Those who completed their quotas received one pound of flour, ground from corn together with the cobs, per week. Those who could not received nothing at all.

Terrible hunger set in. In six months only 20 per cent of our train-load of prisoners survived. In that time my parents and twelve-year-old sister died.

If we talked with the local people we were warned against saying that we were *de-kurkulized* and brought here by force but were told to say that we were "special settlers."

Having buried my parents and sister I decided to escape to save my own life. With two fellows from my own village, Brovarets and Korol, I made plans and one stormy night we broke through the guard line and fled westward.

For a while I lived as a fugitive, but was later caught and sentenced to five years which I was serving when the Second World War broke out.

P. VOLOHODSKY

THE DE-KURKULIZED IN A CONCENTRATION CAMP BEYOND VOLOGDA

We were brought to Vologda on March 14, 1930. At the station we were all searched. The men were separated and taken away. Later we learned that they had gone to Totma region, 140 miles away, to cut logs.

Those of us who were unfit for such work were settled in the center of the town in St. Andrew's Church where four tiers of plank beds were already erected along the walls. It was very difficult for the people, in their weakened condition, to climb up to those beds. All the food which we had tried to bring with us had been taken away and we now lived on the *b a l a n d a* (soup made from refuse) given us and 200 grams of bread which we received daily per person. The children also received the same rations. By the end of two months half of the children had died. On May 20, 1930, those who had survived, and had not escaped,

were piled on to a barge and taken down the river to the town of Totma.

In the confusion of this transfer of prisoners I managed to get away and even reached Ukraine, but was then caught and thrown in the GPU prison in Dniepropetrovsk. At first I refused to admit that I was a refugee from exile but the investigator searched the card index and found the report about me. "We know everything," he stated in a self-satisfied manner and I was sent to join my folks in Totma. I was then 16 years of age.

When I arrived there I discovered that my father was dead. The people lived in mud huts in the deep forest. We worked long hours every day receiving 300 grams of bread and some cereal as our daily ration. The camp was divided and each division had a "commandant," three "d e s y a t n y k s" and two "militiamen" who formed the ruling body. They were all employed from the local population. The "commandant" opened all our mail and parcels, which were received once in a great while by prisoners who had relatives back home, seldom handing them to us. They had supreme power over us and there was no one to complain to if we were mistreated.

I realized that I could not survive in that camp. One day my mother blessed me and two other youths saying, "Go and save your lives, for we must die here. There is no one to help us. Remember us always."

L. LAVRENTIY

PERSECUTED BY THE BOLSHEVIKS, SHOT BY THE GERMANS

Hryhoriy Kravchenko lived in the village of Konovaliwka, Nekhvoroshchan district, Poltava region. His parents died during the Revolution and at 16 he took up farming. When 1930 came, because he was a good framer, he was taxed heavily by the Soviet government and being unable to meet the impossible demand was sentenced to seven years in concentration camps.

On November 20, 1930, after spending some time in the Kharkiw prison, he was put on a freight train with other prisoners and shipped to the far East. During the trip the prisoners received 300 grams of bread and one salty fish for every three persons. They were given no water so they

scraped the frost which collected on the walls of the cars. There were 45 people in a car and all slept on the floor. It took them a month to reach Khabarovsk and three people in Kravchenko's car died on the way.

From there he was transported by boat to Kamchatka where he worked on a secret Army project.

In 1937, having served his full sentence and given a written promise not to divulge the secret project, he returned home, and learned that his wife and three children had died in the famine of 1933. According to NKVD regulations he was not permitted to live in his native village so he went to Donbas and worked as a coal miner until the coming of the Germans.

In 1941 he returned to his village where he became head of the community and divided the collective farm among the villagers. For that he was shot by the Germans on December 29, 1941.

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The concentration camp in the near North — Arkhangelsk, Vologda and western Siberia — were filled very quickly with the dekulakized farmers and the Soviet government began shipping them to the far East — Kamchatka and Sakhalin. One of the following documented accounts is of work in a concentration camp in Kamchatka and another — a Soviet document — about settling them in Sakhalin, encouraging them by promises that they would go as free settlers.

SETTLING THE PRISONERS IN SAKHALIN

According to information from Moscow, January 8, People's Commissar Comrade Yantsov stated that plans to settle those sentenced for longer periods in Sakhalin, have been completed. Agreement has been reached with the government trust companies for developing the natural resources of Sakhalin.

From among all those sentenced for longer periods, certain cases will be picked with consideration as to the degree of their social menace and skill, such as lumbering, carpentry, etc. In Sakhalin they will live in freedom and will receive from the trust company 65 per cent of the pay of free workers.

After six months of good behavior their pay will

the Kherson district, has recently started to take on more workers. Of the 1,100 newly employed, 571 have connections with farming, among whom no less than 50 are kurkuls.

In the disguise of workers they are trying to hinder in every way the work of the factories. They are absent from work and spend their time drinking. For instance, Udovychenko is an imposter and drunkard, Bezserdechny obstructs discipline and at home hid his grain surpluses, Bayda is a former Petlyurist, Drozdov is a former Junker (landowner), and so forth.

At the plenum of the village Soviet in the village of Lelekiwka a foundry worker, Kryzhanovsky, agitated in the presence of 180 farmers against industrialization and the five-year plan.

In the mechanical division is a worker, Zhulchenko, son-in-law of a kurkul, who has been assigned to give the state four tons of grain. Next to him works Zaporozhan who maliciously kept out of the reach of the grain collecting plan. Kolessa was twice laid off for drunkenness.

The factory managements do not pay sufficient attention to the contamination in their factories.

(Pravda, February 11, 1930).

Y. BONDAR

THE FARMERS WERE CAUGHT. IMPRISONED AND DEPORTED

In 1929, when de-kurkulization began, my father fled to Donbas. I was left alone with my mother in the house which was stripped of everything by collectivization. We lived in the hamlet of Novo-Mykhailiwka, Sakhnovshchana district, Kharkiw region.

I decided to go to Donbas too. I boarded the train in Sakhnovshchyna and got as far as Lozovoy when I discovered that people were snared like rabbits in the station. All trains were checked and travellers without documents were arrested and put in the basement. I was one of many. We spent a whole month there. All were Ukrainian farmers.

When our relatives learned of our misfortune they came with food. The guards questioned them and threw them into the basement also. And so basements became packed.

In February we were all put into freight trains and transported to the North. Because I was young, 20 years, I was sent to Sakhnov and again confined in a basement. My new cell-mates were also Ukrainian farmers.

Perhaps due to my youth I was released and went home to my mother. She was living in a different house. At this time Stalin published the article, "Intoxication From Success." People took their livestock from the collective farms and the collectivization structure was tottering.

I tried again to go to Donbas and this time was more successful. I reached Chasovy Yar and found my father there. He had acquired an old horse and worked at the brick factory hauling clay. There were Ukrainian farmers there at that time. It seemed as if farmers from all over Ukraine were seeking refuge in Chasovy Yar. They each had the same job as my father and lived in mud huts and caves near the factory. There I spent the summer and fall of 1930 in comparative peace.

Then in February, 1931, many GPU agents appeared one night and raided the place. All those pitiful de-kurkulized farmers who had found themselves a spot where, by honest, hard labor they could earn their bread, were arrested and their horses and wagons were confiscated. Because at that time my father was away with his team I was taken instead. We were locked up in the theatre.

On the theatre stage sat five investigators at separate tables and called in turn those wizened old farmer-laborers for questioning. Eventually my turn came.

"Where is your father?" asked the investigator.

"He is not here. He went away to look for other work."

"Was your father de-kurkulized?"

"Yes."

"Go and wait in the vestibule."

I waited for about half an hour and was set free. The next morning all those arrested were loaded into a freight train and under heavy guard sent to Siberian concentration camps. A few escaped and returned to Chasovy Yar but GPU agents in plain clothes trailed and shot them.

Y. BONDAR

PERSECUTION OF THE DE-KURKULIZED IN INDUSTRIES

Having successfully avoided arrest and deportation in February, 1931, a fate suffered by all other de-kurkulized farmers living in Chasovy Yar, our family moved to another town to seek a livelihood. We were in dire circumstances. Our family consisted of eight members, of whom three were capable of earning. We could not find a place to live.

We begged for a place to dig a cave and were told to go to the cemetery. Finally, for 20 rubles a month, we were able to rent a mud hut built in a clay pit about six square yards in area. The back wall was the wall of the pit and the front wall had a window about one foot square.

I worked in the mine for nearly two years. For all this time of my Stakhanovite labor, never taking a single day off, I was able to save for a new pair of shoes. The rest of my earnings went to feed the family which was languishing in that mud hole. We were hungry and bloated from starvation. Two members of our family died in those horrible living conditions.

In 1932 I was summoned by the military commission to be drafted into the Red Army. I was asked to show the certificate of my social origin. I did not possess such a certificate and was sent to the village of Sakhnov for it. I came to the secretary of the village Soviet whom I discovered to be an old acquaintance of mine, Hryhoriy Hawrysh. He flatly stated that he would not give me the certificate and moreover did not wish to see me again.

I returned to the military commission and was sent to Voroshylovgrad where I was taken into the Army but only as a guard in the Air Force stationed in Crimea.

Y. BONDAR

ABUSE OF WORKERS IN DONBAS (DONETS BASIN)

In 1931 I worked in a mine in Donbas. The work was carried on in three shifts beginning at 6 A.M., 2 P.M. and 10 A.M.

Before each shift the workers were given a "work-out." They were criticized, agitated and driven. As is known, there

were great numbers of de-kurkulized farmers in Donbas at that time who were trying to save themselves and their families from concentration camps. They lived in caves and mud huts, had no food and were constantly hiding from GPU agents. Out of desperation some of them took to drinking. This resulted in absenteeism from work at the mines. Officially this was called "simulation" and hideous propaganda was directed at this offence.

For example, the activists staged vulgar parties. They would dig a pit in the open field, nail together a box and to the accompaniment of accordion music and loud threatening speechese against the "simulants" bury the box—symbol of the "simulants."

If anyone missed a day's work he would not get paid at the regular pay-office but would be asked to go to pay-office No. 2. This was a wooder construction made to resemble a huge bottle about nine or ten feet high. About six feet from the ground was a wicket against which a ladder was leaning. The cashier sat inside at a small table. To receive their pay, people climbed the ladder while musicians stood arond and played plaintive tunes.

Among the group which was forced to receive its pay in this humiliating manner were those who suffered with contusions of the feet or hands. Because the management would not allow them time to have these wounds attended to they were forced to stay away without permission.

Sometimes this was reason enough to have one's ration card taken away. When that happened it was not an easy matter to secure another one.

M. SOLOMON

DE-KURKULIZED YOUTH FLED TO THE TOWNS

To avoid arrest and deportation to Siberia great numbers of the rural young people fled to the cities and towns at the beginning of collectivization in 1929. There they tried to secure work, attend schools and acquire some trade or profession in order to better their own and their families' circumstances.

Most of them travelled on false passports usually made out with fictitious names and class origin. They were sons and daughters of well-to-do or middle farmers.

I, too, was one of the fugitive youths. After my father was

d e-k u r k u l i z e d I went to Poltava which had many good schools. Poltava was not an industrial center so was not on the state bread supply plan, but depended on the local supply. This meant it could only get what multure its local flour mills, which milled flour for the farmers in the district, could supply. And because the farmers ground what little grain they had on their home-made grind-stones the large flour mills had a very uncertain and unsteady source of multure. As a result the students in Poltava often went for days without bread, which was rationed according to physical exertion.

1. First category — those doing heavy labor — 400 grams daily.
2. Second category — other laborers — 300 grams daily.
3. Third category — office workers, workers' dependents and students.

Besides bread, we received dinners in cafeterias which consisted of boiled cabbage, and on rare occasions a potato.

It was impossible to study while constantly hungry and many students went to industrial cities in Russia where there was no famine. After the winter vacation, 1932-33, more than half the students did not return to their sturies, and by spring no more than one-third still persisted.

In addition, the government conducted periodical purges of the students, looking for the **k u r k u l** elements. In May, 1933, I became a victim of one of these purges.

W. MEDVID

SOURCE OF THE HOMLESS IN THE USSR

We lived in Taman, in Kuban. My father was arrested in 1928 in connection with the Kuban-Ukraine Assocation and after 18 months of investigation was sentenced to be shot. Later, this verdict was changed to ten years of hard labor in the far East.

In 1929 our farm was confiscated. In 1931 my mother, my 8 year sister and I, aged 6, were banished north beyond the Urals with hordes of other "class enemies."

When our train reached the Urals the guards relaxed their vigilance somewhat, especially over the children, who jumped off at stops to beg for bread or water from bystanders. At one such stop the train left before I had time to get on again. I lost my mother.

Then a group of us fled from the "home" making our way south to a warmer climate. We were caught in Odessa, sanitized and sent to a "children's home" in Cherkasy.

I lived there for some time and attended school. In 1939 I learned of my parents' whereabouts. I located my father who had served his term and then free. I met my mother in 1940. She and my sister were saved from concentration camps by friends who supplied false documents for them in 1933.

During the Second World War, despite two years' Army training, I refused to fight for the "socialist state." I now live in the U.S.A.

THE HOMELESS IN THE CAPITAL CITY

Too often we can still see homeless waifs on the city streets of the capital. They are especially found in the crowds around the market-places. Here may be heard filthy curses, and embarrassing situations may be encountered, to say nothing of the possibility of falling victim to pick-pockets while shopping.

In this case the homeless must not be blamed too much because if they beg in an honest way they get nothing. All beggars have become a nuisance. Anyway the waifs are but a minor problem.

On the streets there are often homeless people of a different sort. They may be encountered in restaurants, taverns and other public places. There are also many beggars from the villages — young and old.

There are beggars everywhere, hanging around theatres, restaurants or outside bakeries begging for a crust of bread, and even just sitting on the cold pavement on the main streets wailing sorrowful songs.

(Visti, February 5, 1930).

CHAPTER III.

ANNIHILATING THE CHURCH AND DESTROYING RELIGIOUS LIFE

The Marxian slogan, "religion—opiate of the people," was nothing more than propaganda for a long time. Churches of all denominations in the USSR continued to function even though with the advent of the Bolsheviks all church properties were expropriated, by a special decree, by the state.

Religious life was then financially supported by the people. Christian traditions and morals were preserved by the family and home. The people were allowed to use the churches as they wished, some of them rich architectural monuments of the different nations of the USSR. For this privilege they paid big taxes to the state, and also supported the clergy and other church servants.

Then the internal war began in the USSR. The Communists well know the moral strength that the church gave the people and so, with the beginning of collectivization, decided to destroy it. With the help of the village actives, who de-kurkulized the farmers, they started their attack by taking down church bells and closing the churches and continued by arresting and deporting the clergy along with de-kurkulized farmers.

It was a fierce hard struggle. The people resisted strongly, especially the women (see "Resistance of the Women", Chapter VI).

Unlike de-kurkulization, collectivization or even famine, the destruction of the church and religious worship by the Communists gained world-wide attention. This happened during the severe persecution following the callous anti-religious campaign throughout the Christmas season of 1929-30, when city parks were filled with mountains of bibles and other religious books and ikons. The Archbishop of Canterbury then made a statement and so did Pope Pius XI. An anti-Soviet

campaign started up in the outside world which even the Communists could not ignore.

Trying to save their prestige before the outside world, the Communists found a few clergymen of the Russian Orthodox Church, who had not yet been shot, formed a Synod and in its name gave an interview to the press contradicting the reports that religion in the USSR was persecuted and even passed a resolution by the Central Committee of the Communist Party that, in future, persecution and destruction of religion was prohibited. All that was done, of course, for the benefit of external propaganda, for persecution and destruction of religion continued unabated.

In 1934, in Kiev, capital of Ukraine, churches of inestimable value as historical monuments were totally ruined. In connection with collectivization the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, on which the Communists began an attack back in 1923, was completely annihilated. Scores of bishops and archbishops were exterminated as well as thousands of priests and tens of thousands of the faithful. Most of them died in concentration camps in the North. Churches were turned into community centers, storage houses for farm produce, or simply demolished.

Following are documents with scores of facts about the destruction of churches in different Ukrainian villages and towns. Some are excerpts from the Soviet press itself.

The reader may judge for himself all the horror and heart-break which went with the annihilation of religion.


ANTI-RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT ORGANIZED BY THE GOVERNMENT

According to RATU (Radio-Telegraph Agency) information a movement is spreading throughout Ukrainian villages for the appropriation of churches by cultural-educational institutions. Only recently did the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet gratify the demands of the workers in the village of Buryma, Konotop district, to use one frame church as a public school.

In the Zaporozhe region workers in a shoe factory, the factory "Internationale," and the firemen's union, "Dnieprelstan," have decided to ask the town

Soviet to start a petition for the use of the church bells by the school.

Other villages responded to the decision in the following manner. In the village of Krabovka, Pryluky region, a general meeting decided to hand the



church over for cultural purposes. The villagers of Vladova voted unanimously that the monastery church be used to house the new electric plant which will serve the Vladova workers and the collective farm.

(Visti, July 4, 1929)

* * * *

In the small town of Zhurafa, in Mohyliy region, a group of atheists instigated an anti-religious campaign among the Jewish population. On September 29, members of the synagogue "Sadihun" unanimously carried a motion at a general meeting to turn the synagogue into a community center.

The Jewish national village Soviet repaired the synagogue with the money raised by their own contributions and on October 14, a Jewish feast day, "Yona Cooper's Day", they officially and with proper ceremony handed the synagogue over for the center.

Clubs and Red centers in industries of Kiev are preparing for an anti-Christmas campaign.

In St. Volodymyr's Cathedral an all-Ukrainian anti-religious museum will open soon. An anti-religious exhibition will be held, a stage show, etc. The clubs are holding special anti-religious evenings.

(Visti, December 14, 1929)

THE CHURCHES ARE CLOSED, THE BELLS TAKEN DOWN

The Kharkiw Komsomol Organization has formed special brigades which travel to rural areas holding meetings and aiding the anti-religious movement.

On the evening of December 25 a mammoth carnival will be held by the young people of Kharkiw. The workers in most of the factories have announced their decision to work on Christmas Day. At the same time they are making demands on the government to consider the possibility of turning Christmas Day into a special day for the benefit of industrialization.

The Kharkiw workers' patronage organizations

are sending to the villages of the Kharkiw Region ten brigades with actors, films, movie projectors and entertainment groups.

In Hadyach only 22 Trade union clubs have been drawn into the atheist club. The anti-religious propaganda is weak. No wonder the campaign for the confiscation of the cathedral brought undesirable results. When the organizations demanded that it be confiscated, the unorganized masses displayed a backward religious fanaticism and refused to give it up.

In the village of Zimeniw, Tsebrykiw district, Odessa region, the local activists campaigned during the October anniversary to take the churches away from religious fanatic groups and hand them over to educational establishments. Nearly the whole population voted in favor of this idea.

But in the Petriwka village, the kurkuls opposed the great masses of the poor and middle-class villagers. There were a few like P. P. Poltovsky, Lisaveta Hura (a kurkul's daughter), I. F. Boltovsky, P. Lypsky. Two Komosomols disgracefully joined the company of the kurkuls, Lavchenko and Mykolayenko.

(Visti, December 14, 1929).

CHURCHES ARE CLOSED AND THE BELLS SHIPPED AWAY

The laborers and farmers of the Pervomaysk District sent two carloads of church bells, removed from the churches in the Odessa region, to the Profintern factory. Telegrams of congratulations have been sent to Comrade Yaroslavsky and the Central Council of Atheists.

(Pravda, November 27, 1929).

The drive to remove church bells for industrial needs is spreading. Sixty-seven villages have already volunteered their bells. In Markove a public meeting has proclaimed the village atheist, and has decided to close the church and banish the priest and his family.

In the Dobrovelyckiw district, the people have voted to take down all the church bells in the district

and give to the cultural-educational establishments five churches and two synagogues.

In their resolution to take down the church bells the people of the village of Lysa Hora have added the following words: "Instead of the bells we will enjoy the hum of the tractors."

The count of all the new atheist villages has not yet been taken but we have reason to believe that there are over one hundred.

Pravda, November 30, 1929)

Upon the instigation of the workers, atheist collective farms are being organized in the Kharkiw region. During the Christmas Holidays, Komsomol centers and atheist groups will organize collective farms to be named in honor of the fighting atheists, (Central Council of Atheists).

The Kharkiw patronage centers are assigning workers to the rural areas for extensive anti-religious propaganda. In December 25 some villages will hold gala openings of cultural-educational centers in the churches.

(*Pravda*, December 23, 1929)

CHURCH BELLS FOR INDUSTRIALIZATION OF UKRAINE

In the villages of Mykroshka, Zabolotnya and Osnyky, in Chernyakhiv district, Zhytomyr region, general meetings of poor and middle-class farmers have decided to close all churches and use them for schools and nurseries.

The villagers are bringing in church bells to the District Executive Committee. About 8,000 pounds of bells have been collected and turned over to the fund for the industrialization of Ukraine.

The villagers of Stavyshche, Brusyliv district, have decided to donate the church bells for the industrialization of Ukraine and the church for use as a community center.

In the village of Kyslomut, Rzhyschiw district, the GPU has uncovered a counter-revolutionary organization of churchgoers and *k u r k u l s*. Its activi-

ties were directed by representatives of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church. All the leaders have been arrested.

Throughout the whole of the Artemiw region the workers are voting to be allowed to work on December 25 for the sake of the industrialization of the nation, and on December 26 for the aid of the collectivization fund.

Workers in the Dniepropetrovsk factories, especially the metallurgical plants of Lenin and Petrovsky, congratulate the VURPS (All-Ukrainian Council of Trade Unions) for its decision to keep working on Christmas Days. At the same time the workers are asking for regulations to be passed to prohibit the sale of Christmas trees and to devote Christmas Days to anti-religious radio programs. Workers are also demanding that the churches be closed in the workers' districts.

In Kharkiw it has been decided to shut down St. Dymytriy Church and give it to the motorists' association for their headquarters.

In Zaporizhe, it was decided to close the synagogue on Moscow Street and give the Lutheran Church to the German workers club.

In the Vynnytsya region, it was decided to close the Nemyriw Convent and the adjoining churches.

In the Stalino region it was decided to close the Roman Catholic Church and give the Armenian-Gregorian Church in the town of Stalino to the workers of the East Club.

In Luhansk all St. Mykhail's Cathedral is closed, the St. Peter and Paul Church and the Church of the Savior. All are used for cultural-educational purposes.

Taking into consideration the great number of resolutions of the workers meetings, and professional and public organizations, the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee has given permission for the closing of fifty churches in Ukraine.

These will be given over to social-cultural institutions.

The Horlov metallists sent a telegram to the Kharkiw Regional Trade Union Council with the in-

formation that their convention has discussed the matter of closing all the churches and prayer-homes in the city and are now appealing to the workers of Kharkiw to follow this lead and close all the churches and prayer-homes and donate the bells for the needs of industrialization.

(*Visti*, December 22-26, 1929).

They renounce their cloth and service in church

1. Lipynsky—deacon of the Lubotyn Church in the Kharkiw region.
2. Petro Karpovych—priest of the Slobidka Church in the Kupyansky region.
3. Dedir Kololytnyk—psalmist in the village of Danylowka, in the Kharkiw region.

(*Visti*, December 26, 1929).

THE GOVERNMENT CLOSES CHURCHES

The administrative division of the City Soviet of Kharkiw has decided to close a few churches in the city. It has also decided to take down all the church bells and give them to industrial needs.

The presidium of the city Soviet has now approved that decision.

Nine churches will close in Kharkiw, among them St. Mykhail's Cathedral St. Dymytriv's Church on Sverdlova Street, the Church of the Ascension on Feuerbakh Square, St. Penteleymon's Church on Klyuchkiwka, the Church of the Old Rites on Yaroslav Street, the church in Lypovy Grove, and the unfinished church on Pavliwka.

At the same time the presidium wholly agrees with the administrative division about the removal of all the church bells in Kharkiw and giving them to industrial needs.

The decision must be approved by the Regional Executive Committee.

The presidium has decided to take proper steps to prevent prayer meetings in private homes now that the churches are closed.

(*Visti*, January 5, 1930)

ГОЛОВА

Кам'янського Районного Виконавчого Комітету
Рад Р.С. та Ч.Д.

19 р.

Службова записка №

Пов Зв'язі до Радничаті
С.О. Сіменці Сеній Семе
Ріжкіс та Козако Іванов
Про те що коли Воєні буд
Курдари Р.С.С.С.С.С.С.С.
Курдари Р.С.С.С.С.С.С.С.
Курдари Р.С.С.С.С.С.С.С.
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Kurkul farms sold at auctions

BELLS REMOVED FROM 148 CHURCHES IN PERVOMAYSK REGION

In the revolutionary attack on the old Christmas, the tempo must not be slackened, anti-religious work must not relax.

(Newspaper slogans).

In the last three months of the previous year the bells from 148 churches have been taken down in the Pervomaysk region and given for industrialization purposes. Most of the bells came from the villages of Pervomaysk district where 23 churches out of 29 have been taken care of—80 per cent. The bells have been shipped to the factories.

In the town of Pervomaysk itself the bells have been removed from all churches. Laborers, office workers, skilled workers, farmers are all impatient in their demands to close all the churches and synagogues in the region.

Around this affair, however, a cruel and stubborn class struggle is waged. Kurkuls and their fellow-travellers are using all means possible to hinder anti-religious propaganda and to halt the mass movement for closing the churches and taking down the bells.

In the village of Hrushky it was decided to declare the village atheist, and to banish the psalmist and the priest within 24 hours.

In the large village of Marchykhkna Buda, in the Hlukhowka district, the "popes" and the kurkuls had feathered themselves a cosy nest. Before the war they had started to build a large stone church. In 1927 the kurkuls strongly agitated for the completion of the church and began collecting money but now, through the villagers' initiative, the church has been turned into a school.

In the village of Pampil a religious congregation began building a new church in 1926. Now the church has been turned into a theatre and another one into a school.

The villagers of Vorhon were ignorant and backward. But now all-out collectivization is in progress.

"It is impossible to build a collective farm where there is a church," they declared and passed a resolution to have it closed.

The most backward villages like Antoniówka, Demyaniówka and Shatryshche have finished with the clergy and churches and have decided to turn the latter into cultural centers.

The "popes" and their defenders, the *kurkuls*, are using every means to halt the anti-religious current. Through agitation of the backward factions, especially the women, they are endeavoring to put up a struggle against the mass anti-religious movement.

For instance, in the village of Beryukha, when the Komsomols, the poor villagers and the local activists began taking the church bells down without first preparing the public for it the *kurkuls*, who had prepared beforehand, beat up the youngsters, then with whoops and yells moved up to the village Soviet and set the building on fire.

At present a show trial is taking place in Beryukha in connection with this event.

The villagers of Zolochiw, Kharkiw region, have broken with individual farming and joined the collective farm. The activists have decided to liquidate the religious spirit in the village. A public meeting was called where a unanimous vote was taken to close the church and use it as a theatre.

The villagers took the cross down and replaced it with a red chamois flag. In place of ikons, on the inside walls there now hang portraits of Stalin, Petrovsky and Chubar.

In the Pervomaysk district in the Pervomaysk region the villagers have donated seven tons of church bells.

Teachers in the Borymlyansk district, Sum region, passed a resolution at the pedagogical union meeting on December 31, 1929, to close the local Cathedral and the Holy Trinity Church and have taken on themselves the responsibility of conducting large-scale anti-religious propaganda among the local population.

(Visti, January 1, 1930)

CHURCHES FOR COMMUNITY CENTERS, BELLS FOR INDUSTRY

From many villages of the Shevchenko region comes news that villagers everywhere are passing decisions to remove the bells from the churches and give them to the aid of industrialization. The savings which they represent will be turned over for cultural-educational needs.

Last fall the villagers of Rebediwka district, sent a petition to their village Soviet for permission to use the Roman Catholic Church for cultural-educational purposes, and have decided to trade the church bells for a microphone. The petition was signed by 500 people.

In the footsteps of the Lebedivka villagers, have gone the villagers of Hryshchenka and Pekar, in Kaniw district, Berezan in Smilyan district and the large village of Medvediwka, where they have also decided that the bells should go to help industrialization.

In the village of Chepayiwtsi, Zolotonosha district, the villagers gave 5,000 pounds of bells for industrialization after they closed down the church.

Naturally the popes and *kurkuls* are putting up a frantic resistance against this anti-religious movement. They circulate lies and resort to intimidation.

More and more popes are renouncing their calling, realizing that their work is harmful to the workers. And so as not to die in the gutter they are using different tricks. For instance there is pope Debedivsky, who has offered his cross and two rings in aid of MOPR (international organization to aid workers in capitalist countries). In the village of Kyriywka, Petrivka district four popes have recently renounced their calling and have infiltrated the collective farm.

Following the example of the popes are many *kurkuls*.

(Visti, February 5, 1930)

CLOSING THE CHURCHES

From Cherkasy comes the news that upon the demands of the villagers, the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee has decreed that six monasteries should be closed so that they may be used for the collective farm.

From Kiev comes information that, following the resolutions of the District Executive Committee, the remaining 48 monks have been deported from the former Kiev-Pecherska Lavra.

(Pravda, January 12, 1930)

At the convention of rural women of Vradiev district, attended by a great number of women, one openly stated: The women of my village have sent me here especially to ask the convention not to take down the bells from our churches. I am certain that you will not do so . . ."

(Pravda, January 19, 1930)

The collective farm "Red Partisan", in the village of Zavidivka, Bereziw district, Odessa region, is run by kurkuls. Passionate arguments have been going on in the village about the church and three prayer buildings, with the more progressive group of citizens proposing to have them closed. At all three meetings, which were devoted to this matter, with discussion of all pros and cons, it was decided by the majority to close them and send a declaration to that effect to the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee. Then shouts were heard. "Fire. We're burning." The straw pile on the collective farm was on fire.

After this incident a purge was conducted, and 48 kurkuls were expelled from the collective farm. Of the nine kurkul homes confiscated, five were given to farm hands and two to be used for children's nurseries.

A COMPLETE RELIGIOUS PROGRAM

The Secretariat of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee has approved the demands to liquidate

churchgoers, and has approved the regulation of the Luhansk Regional Executive Committee to close the Roman Catholic Church and turn it into an Army club:

In the town of Chervonahrad, Poltava region, the Jewish community has discussed the matter of giving the local synagogue to cultural establishments, and the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet has consented to grant their wishes. But because in Chervonohrad there is a shortage of storage space for grain the synagogue will temporarily be used for that purpose.

Workers of the Rykov factory in the Armemiiv region closed the church in their village and in the village of Vynnytsya. Now the neighboring villages are doing likewise. In December the villagers of Illintsi passed a resolution to close their churches and use them for cultural purposes. In the village of Olkhovata the people have decided to close the two churches. One is used for a co-operative store and the other as a community center.

In the village of Varwariwka a general meeting, held December 24, decided to take down the church bells and to close the church.

The same was decided at meetings in the villages of Vowcha, Kruhlya and Lohtyarny Khutir. The people in the last village decided to banish the pope.

In the village of Kryva Kossa, Mariupol region, it was decided at a public meeting to close the church and turn it into a theatre. For his detrimental work in the village the people banished the pope.

The villagers of Dyvna, Kiev region, decided to close the church and make it a cultural institution.

In the village of Obytochna, Melitopol region, it was decided at a general meeting to use the church for a public school.

The people of the village of Boriwka, Mohyciw region, decided at a meeting December 22 to close their church and turn it into a community center.

The villagers of the village of Rodiwka, Mariupol region, took down the church bells in December of last year and gave them to help industrialization.

The people of the village of Zhernokliw, Chevchenko region, unanimously accepted the decision to close the church and begin an attack on the old life of ignorance and superstition. In a telegram to the chief of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee the collective farmers are begging for a visit from him to Zhernokliw to see for himself the great changes in that village.

The slogan, "churches for community centers and bells for industry" is popular throughout the Shevchenko region and the workers are quickly putting it into effect. News pours in from many villages that workers are deciding to take the bells down so that they may be used for industry.

The bells have rung for the last time. Now they are needed for industrialization. In the Novo-Ukrainian district a strong anti-religious movement flourishes. The old Orthodoxy is dying and with it poverty, eternal exploitation and national ignorance.

In the village of Pishchany Brod there were two churches. A declaration was signed by 3,000 atheists and sent to the District Executive Committee asking to have the churches closed and given to collective farms. The priests and *k u r k u l s* are jointly putting up a fight against the anti-religious movement which grows by leaps and bounds.

Church bells are still pealing in a few villages bring to mind the poverty and ignorance of the old

Church bells are still pealing in a few villages villages inhabited by drunkards.

(*Visti*, January 7 and 8, February 5 and March 14, 1930)

ANTI-RELIGIOUS CAMPAIGN DURING THE CHRISTMAS SEASON

In Kharkiw individual atheist workers gave talks different establishments explaining to the laborers the city Societ's resolution to close nine Kharkiw churches and to take down the bells.

The Kharkiw regional organization of the atheists is sending to the villages 1,000 Komsomols and cultural-educational brigades on January 5. They will

visit 186 villages and 18 collective farms. Besides anti-religious work these patronage brigades will conduct cultural-educational work.

In the Kharkiw region a whole string of villages are closing their churches on Christmas Day and are organizing community centers instead. In the village of Myroniwka the people are acting on the advice of the Kharkiw proletariat and are turning the church into a community center.

The village of Kryvychky, Ulyaniw district, Berdychiv region, shows signs of having broken with the old life. Instead of a cross, a red flag is at the top of the church.

On the other hand, upon closer inspection this village gives a different impression. Before our eyes almost every farmer was butchering a hog. This aroused our interest, so we asked one woman about it and she explained: "The hogs are suffering from some disease. They are dying so the people are slaughtering them first."

At the office of the village Soviet several villagers together with the head and secretary worried about how to handle the situation. Nearly all hogs and calves are butchered. Now how will they store the meat?

(Visti, January 4, 1930).


ANTI-RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT IN THE USSR

"The capital is demonstrating against religion and for socialism."

The above is the slogan under which all anti-religious work was conducted throughout the Kharkiw industrial concerns during the Christmas season of 1929.

In DEZ (State Electric Plant) special shock brigades were organized who intensively carried on anti-religious work in every section of industry. There are over a dozen of these brigades. They conducted the drive for the collection of all ikons, ikon lamps, crosses, bibles, etc. All these will be burned at a mass anti-religious gathering.

In the factory, "Hammer and Sickle," the workers also collected ikons, crosses, bibles, etc., and will burn everything after work in the factory.



Kurkul children deprived of education

A special brigade of workers is organized which makes the following plea: "We, the workers, are appealing to the Ukrainian people to take down the church bells not only in Kharkiw but in all of Ukraine."
(Visti, January 7, 1930)

Multitudes of workers took part in an anti-religious demonstration in the town of Tula, Russia. They burned over 2,000 ikons.

The town Soviet of Krasnohrad granted the wishes of the Jewish workers to close the synagogue and allow it to be used as a club for national minorities.

News from Mihach-Kala brings the information that, according to the regulation passed by the mountain villagers of Kusomensk district, ten mosques have been closed and are now used for first aid centers, schools and co-operative enterprises.

In all factories in the Artemiw region work continued as usual on Christmas Day. In the evening, amid great excitement, an anti-religious carnival was held.

In Slovyansk, Donbas, 10,000 workers held a demonstration demanding the closing of the cathedral. Four thousand ikons were burned.

A grand anti-religious demonstration took place in Zaporizhya in which 5,000 workers, office workers and Red Army soldiers took part. Over two thousand ikons were burned and as many bibles.

(Visti, January 8, 1930).

ZHORNOKLIVETS

CHURCHES ROBBED AND SMASHED

When, in the village of Zhornoklovy, Hlemyaziw district, in the Poltava region, a church service began at 10 o'clock on Christmas morning, 1929, in the church of St. Peter and Paul, a rowdy Komsomol gang broke inside.

They pushed through to the altar and attacked the priest, Konstantyn Skyba. They tore off his vestments and dragged him by the hair outside. The congregation rushed to defend their priest.

A fight started outdoors in which the worshippers beat up the Komsomols.

At 12 o'clock that day two cars of GPU agents came into the village, arrested Father Konstantyn and fifty villagers and threw them into the Hlemyziw prison.

A few were released later but most of them, with Father Konstantyn, were deported to Arkhangelsk where they all died eventually.

That same day all property in the church of St. Peter and Paul was looted and the altar, the altar screen, the cross and ikons were smashed.

F. PRAVOBEREZHNY

THE CHURCH AND RELIGIOUS BRUTALITY DESTROYED

In the villages of Rzyshchiw and the neighboring districts in the Kiev region, anti-religious propaganda was placed first in importance by the Communist Department of Education. In the community centers a systematic series of lectures was held on anti-religious topics. These lectures were not based on philosophical or educational arguments but were of the lowest type of ridicule and degradation of religious tradition and filthy abuse of the churchgoers. At Christmas, various anti-religious carnivals were staged in order to interfere with church services.

In freakish masks Komsomols, masquerading as God, angels, Holy Mary, with their faces smeared in soot and tails dragging behind, entered churches, dancing and singing, while services were in progress.

In my native village of Stavka, Rzyshchiw district, such a carnival attacked worshippers on Easter Sunday, 1931, singing shameful ditties about God and the Church.

The anti-religious campaign was also carried on in another manner. As mentioned earlier, all church buildings now belonged to the state and the worshippers had to rent them for their use. The fees were naturally high and extremely high taxes were levied on the churches as well. The priests were taxed for their "non-worker's income." The people were soon unable to meet all these dues and the churches were closed for non-payment and used for the storage of grain and other farm produce.

And so in our village, Stavka, the church was demolished one month after it was closed and a community center built from the material. On the site of the church a public bath-house was erected.

In addition a frantic campaign was directed against the clergy. They were charged with "counter-revolutionary activities," "anti-Soviet agitation," being "enemies of the people" and were sent to Siberian concentration camps or exterminated in other ways.

M. DIDENKO

MOCKERY OF GOD WITHOUT LIMIT

The Uspenya Church in the village of Nizheny was filled on Easter Sunday, 1930. The choir sang "Christ Has Risen" and the congregation, led by Father Hryhoriy Spasky, was filing out for a procession outdoors. As soon as the priest appeared in the doorway an anti-religious carnival rushed through the gates of the church grounds.

They carried placards, made to look like church banners, displaying atheist slogans. They were attired in costumes impersonating the clergy. The gangleader, Kravets, was dressed to resemble Jesus. Their noses were painted red and they carried whiskey bottles and glasses. To top it all they sang disgraceful anti-religious songs.

Father Hryhoriy, hoary and seventy years of age, hesitated for an instant then calmly went forward toward the gang. The Komsomols stopped short and became silent. The priest then turned back and continued with the procession.

But the people could not calmly overlook the incident. Someone shouted, "What mockery of God is this?" and a few rushed at the gang to drive them out of the church grounds. A fracas ensued, and some Komsomols were driven away in ambulances.



Y. BONDAR

On Easter Sunday, 1930, a church service was in progress in the village of Chushyne, Sakhnov district. While the congregation was making its way in procession around the church the village active drove slowly around the outside of the

church grounds on a wagon, carrying an old sow with them. They pinched and poked the sow all the while to make it squeal noisily and so interfere with and ridicule religious traditions.

I. BUZHANYN

THE HOLY MARTYR

In August, 1931, when I was working as a geologist in the Odessa region, I came to the village of Troyany, Hrushkiwka district. It was the eve of the feast day, Holy Savior Day, and I was greatly taken aback by the pealing of bells from the top of a large stone church calling the villagers for prayer. In all the other villages which I had visited heretofore the churches had been closed and the bells taken down.

That evening I heard an amazing story from the old couple, local school teachers, with whom I was spending the night.

The church warden in Troyany had been well-liked and respected by all. He was seventy years of age and had served in the church for several decades. That Spring the Communist government wanted to close the church and take down the bells but the people violently protested. The church was their one source of moral support in those trying times. The village Soviet asked for the keys of the church but the warden, after locking it, buried them in his yard.

They arrested the church warden and tortured him to force him to give up the keys but he bore his torture in silence. After three months in the district prison he was dying, and so as not to have him die in prison the Communists released him. When he reached home he just managed to tell the people where the keys were hidden before he passed away. This happened on the Saturday before Easter Sunday.

The next day, Easter Sunday, the villagers opened the church and brought in the coffin with the warden's body. This event became known and talked about not only in Troyany but in all the neighboring villages. Because he died a martyr's death to save the church for the people he was revered as a saint. Great throngs of people came to the church that Easter Sunday.

Four months had passed but the government had not made any more attempts to close the church and to take the bells down.

THE WOMEN DEFEND THE CHURCHES

The project of taking down the church bells and closing the churches is surrounded by a stubborn class struggle in which kurkuls and women are taking an active part.

At a mass meeting, November 3, the people of Syniushyn Brod passed a resolution to have the church bells taken down and given for industrialization as a gift of the twelfth anniversary of the Revolution. They had also undertaken to instigate the neighboring village of Stanislavchyk to do likewise.

Then on the morning of November 6, the day set for removing the bells, several hundred women gathered at the church and, agitated by the kurkuls and their henchmen, interfered with the planned work. Thirty of them locked themselves inside the belfry and rang the alarm for a day and two nights, terrifying the whole village.

The women would not allow anyone near the church, threatening to stone those who tried to get by them. When the head of the village Soviet arrived with a police officer and ordered the women to stop ringing the alarm and to go home they started to throw rocks at them. The mischief makers were later joined by a group of drunken (it must always be drunken — Ed.) men.

Later, it was discovered that the local psalmist with several kurkuls and their friends, had gone from house to house asking the people to come to the church and not permit the bells to be taken down. This agitation influenced some (actually several hundred — Ed.) of the simple-minded women.

(Visti, January 5, 1930).

FORCED TO RENOUNCE PRIESTHOOD

I, priest of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, Ivan Panteleymonovych Porohznyi, from this day forward leave the services of priesthood and as a citizen of the USSR wish to work in the social field for the welfare of the people.

(#)
ДО РЕВОЛЮЦІЙНОЇ ВІДСКОВОЇ ІАДИ
РЕОЦУЗІЯКИ.

2117 1106
в. М. Кривенька
На зов Держави по пробній мобілізації
робітників зорлів дещо змалом отамі.
Мв Кривеньська Сільська Іада на Дніпр-Петровці
ні віа імені бідноту та організації сада
дещо до змалому пененці дещо безкогатоно
620 пУА жето, 115 пУА пененці, 140 пУА Ячменю,
та 50 пУА овоа, а разом 1126 пУА.

в. М. Кривенька
в. М. Кривенька

ГОЛОВА КОМУНАЛЬНОЇ СІАДИ / ВАКЕРІНА

СЕКРЕТАР / ВАКЕРІНА

Requisitioning of further 1126 puds of grain

Priest of the village of Kowali, Kaniw district,
Kiev region. I. P. Porozhniy.

(*Visti*, August 14, 1929).

I, Savatyi Patolichev, former priest of the synodical church in the village of N. Kropyvna, in Podilya region, as of December 25, 1928, forever leave the service of the religious cult, renounce my calling and its ideology which is out of place in the building of socialism. The very existence of the church has become purposeless and only hinders the rebuilding of human life and the building of a new order. I wish to secure an honest livelihood and a rightful citizenship for my children. November 2, 1929. H. Savatyi Patolichev.

(*Visti*, August 14, 1929).

I reject my position as deacon and renounce all religious beliefs because I consider all religion absurd. I ask all servants of religious cults to follow my example. Stepan Ilnytsky, December 12, 1928.

Having spent 25 years as church attendant and psalmist in the Russian Holy Synod and almost seven years as priest in the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church I did not find true brotherly love, peace or goodwill.

The teachings of the clergy, black (monk) and white, religious fanatics, always was and is an absurd fraud, an opiate and an exploitation of the blind masses and the downtrodden. W. Stauchenko.

I, priest of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, in the village of Khmariwka, Tulychn district, Fedir Tymofiyovych Polyak, through my ignorance entered into priesthood in 1922, serving until August 1, of this year. Becoming a priest, I did not foresee that I should be included among the enemies of the proletariat by the historical development of the class struggle and that, consequently, I should become an enemy of the first proletariat state in the world. I cannot continue in the ranks of the propagators of religious fraud, national ignorance, and now renounce

priesthood. I hope to cleance this black mark by honest work for the welfare of Soviet society. June 10, 1929. F. T. Polyak.

(Visti, August 14, 1929).

I, priest of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, have served in this church for three years and am convinced that religion is the opiate of the working people and farmers. In the time of socialism the rebirth of the Autocephalous Church came about, organized by counter-revolutionaries and the cast-off, rotten intellectuals, and has been carrying on hostile agitation against the Soviet government during its whole course of existence. Petro Andriyovych Halashko.

The fate of God's servants at this time was very uncertain. They were all branded as "enemies of the people" by the Soviet government. They were arrested and deported to concentration camps like the *kurkuls*. To save their lives, or more often the lives of their children, many of them renounced their connection with God's work as soon as the liquidation of the Church and religion started and published announcements of their intentions in the press. Some of them wrote simple, laconic statements while other declarations were obviously dictated by the village active for they defiled their own work in the church. The Communist press eagerly printed such announcements.

RENOUNCING THE PRIESTHOOD, TO SAVE THEIR CHILDREN

I, citizen Ivan Nykyforovych Horlynsky, resign from service as priest of the Novo-Orlytsya Church in the Kremenchug region and from this day forward do not wish to be known as such.

I am breaking all ties with the Church. The creative urge of the great masses, which has now appeared, will not allow me to live any longer in the obviously anti-Soviet camp of the clergy and *kurkuls*, hostile to the worker-farmer government. Therefore I renounce the dishonorable profession of a servant in a religious cult. Volodymyr Mitkalo, village of Turkeniwka, Zaporozhya region.

I, of proletariat origin, was forced through poverty to serve as psalmist. I do not wish to remain a non-worker element any longer but want to work at something really useful and am resigning from my position as psalmist. M. Sharkovych, village of Kobylivka, Tulchyniv region.

I am convinced of what the Soviet government tells us — service in the religious cult is hostile to the people. Since I am a son of a poor farmer, though through my ignorance I have served as a priest since 1924, I do not wish to remain an enemy of the Soviet government and henceforth refuse to serve in the religious cult. Onysko Pavlyn, former priest of the Pokrova Church in the village of Sokilka, Kisheniwka district.

I, son of a poor farmer, have become gray in the service. During the Revolution, through my ignorance, I became a priest. It was never my wish to be an enemy of the Soviet government and so I do not wish to wear the label "enemy of the people." From this day forward I refuse to serve in the religious cult and renounce my cloth to take up work which will be of benefit to the Soviet government. Former priest of the Ivan Bohoslaw Church, village of Sokilka, Kremenchug region — Hryhoriy Vasylovych Los.

Twenty years ago, during the Tsarist reign, I served as a parish priest. At present I have no intention of returning to this service and hereby wish to announce my rejection of the cloth for all time. Todor Vasylovych Dobrochynsky.

(Visti, December 14, 1929).

At that time the whole civilized world reacted to the mass persecution and elimination of the Church. The newspapers of Europe and America were filled with accounts of these events. The Archbishop of Canterbury and Pope Pius XI made public protests. It was mentioned in the British Parliament, and plans were made for its discussion at the League of Nations.

The Communists could not ignore this feeling. They found a few clergymen of the Russian Orthodox Church still living, and proclaimed them members of a Synod. And for the benefit of the press abroad they printed in Pravda an interview with the

group and then one with Metropolitan Sergei alone, who was subsequently made a patriarch.

The interview was an insult to the Orthodox Church, for a month later, in a resolution passed by the plenum of the Central Committee of the Supreme Soviet, the Communists admitted the crime of government persecution of religion in the USSR.

For the purpose of whitewashing its crimes the Soviet government quickly organized throughout the Soviet Union special meetings of workers and farmers protesting against interference by "capitalist churchmen" in the internal affairs of the USSR.

The closing down of churches, and the destruction of religion continued as before by the administration. For instance in 1934 in Kiev many churches and valuable historical monuments were ruined. After collectivization and during the famine, 1932-33, 90 to 95 per cent of the churches throughout Ukraine were either demolished or turned into clubs or farm storage houses.

THE WORLD MOVEMENT TO SAVE RELIGION IN USSR

Pope Pius XI's protest against the persecution of religion in the USSR was the signal for a widespread campaign against the Soviet Union in the capitalist world. The Church fathers and bourgeoisie are calling for the salvation of the repressed Orthodoxy and are appealing for a "Christ's march" against the USSR.

In Paris, on March 19, prayers were held to halt religious persecution in the USSR. Prayers were held in all the Catholic churches and even in Notre Dame Cathedral. After prayers the Archbishop of Paris expressed his sympathy for the Russian people.

Anti-Soviet prayers on March 19 in the Catholic churches in England passed almost unnoticed by the general public.

During the prayers in Prague, on March 19, leaflets were distributed against the Pope's protest which asked the world to march against the USSR. At an anti-Soviet meeting in Prague Archbishop Kor-

dak called the Bolsheviks "murderers of Christ" and Lenin an "arch-murderer," at the same time asking for help in liberating Russia from Communism.

On March 19, anti-Soviet prayers were held in the Catholic churches in Berlin. During the evening prayers a group of workers entered the Church of St. Paul shouting "Rote Front."

In Bucharest, on March 19, meetings of protest against the alleged persecution of religion in the Soviet Union were held in the Catholic churches.

All Catholic churches in New York as well as a few Episcopal churches held anti-Soviet services.

In Warsaw, Lodz, Upper Silesia, etc., anti-Soviet prayers were held because the Pope set that day for Christ's march against the USSR.

(Visti, March 23, 1930).

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ON THE RELIGIOUS SITUATION IN THE USSR

From the Conservative bench L. Thompson asked if the Department of External Affairs intends to take steps, according to Article 11 of the League of Nations Charter, to bring before the League problems which have a bearing on the freedom of religion in the USSR.

Henderson answered that the release of information about the investigation into the state of religion in the USSR has brought a wide response from all parts of Great Britain and other countries. The government is giving serious thought to this information, but doubts whether the plan proposed by L. Thomson would bring the result which he has in mind.

In any case the government is ready, when it is possible and in the best interests of those to whom this question pertains, to use its influence to further an investigation into the question of the freedom of religion and the freedom to practise religious rites. Henderson stated that he is waiting for a report from the British representative in Moscow about the state of religion in the USSR.

(Pravda, February 15, 1930).

METROPOLITAN ALEXEI CONCEALS RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION

Representatives of the Soviet press presented a series of questions to Metropolitan Sergei, acting for the Patriarch who, in the presence of the members of the Synod, gave the following answers.

Question: Is there really persecution of religion in the USSR and if so what form does it take?

Answer: There never was nor is there at present any persecution of religion in the USSR. According to the decree separating the church from the state the people are allowed to practise any religion they desire and are not persecuted for doing so by any state organs.

Question: Is it true that atheists are closing the churches, and how do the believers react?

Answer: Yes, some churches are closed but that is done not by the government but by the people — the believers.

Question: Is it true that the clergy and the believers are subjected to repression for their religious beliefs and are being arrested, deported, etc.?

Answer: Repression and arrest of the priests and believers is done by the government not for their religious convictions but to preserve order, the same as among other people.

Question: Are free church services and sermons allowed in the USSR?

Answer: Church services and sermons during the services are not prohibited in the USSR. Religious lectures and religious education for adults are also allowed.

Sergei — Metropolitan of Nizhniy Novhorod.

Serafim — Metropolitan of Saratov.

Alexei — Archbishop of Khutyn.

Filip — Archbishop of Zvenyhorodka.

Piritim — Bishop of Orekhov-Zuyeysk.

(*Pravda*, February 16, 1930).

METROPOLITAN SERGEI MISLEADS THE FOREIGNERS

On February 19, 1930, foreign correspondents approached Metropolitan Sergei with questions about the circumstances of the Church in the USSR and he gave them the following answers.

Question: How can the Church continue to survive in view of the political, economic and social circumstances of the clergy and the latest acts passed by the government concerning them, such as: cancellation of their citizen's rights which forces them to move from their homes, makes it impossible for them to procure food ration cards and according to the last decree forbids them to reside in cities and towns?

Answer: In the franchise section there were no changes made recently. (Those rights had been cancelled still earlier — Ed.). Our worshippers are all working people who enjoy all citizen's rights. It is they who support us. We do not notice any shortages. Statements about deporting all clergymen from Moscow are not compatible with the truth.

Question: What is your opinion about the protests by Pope Pius XI and the Archbishop of Canterbury?

Answer: We consider the speeches of these spiritual leaders to be basically a contradiction of the spirit of our Christian teachings.

Question: What is your attitude toward the recent administrative measures against the Church, such as: (1) forbidding the ringing of bells in cities and towns; (2) establishing *subotnyks* and *nedilnyks* (Saturdays and Sundays people were asked to volunteer for work without pay to help build the social state) and (3) closing the churches in Odessa?

Answer: In the cities of many countries the ringing of church bells has been restricted for a long time and in some cities forbidden altogether. In the USSR ringing church bells is forbidden if the workers request it. *Subotyks* and *nedilnyks* have had no bearing on the church; we do not complain about

the absence of worshippers. And we know nothing about the measures of the Odessa administration to close its churches.

Sergei— Metropolitan of Nizhniy Novhorod.

SHIFTING THE BLAME

Excerpt from the Resolution of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee concerning the prohibition of administrative organizations from interfering in religious matters).

At the meeting of the Secretariat of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee held on March 11, of this year, Comrade Vasylenko gave the information that in the outlying districts of Ukraine there were cases of interference by government organs in religious and church matters. Occasionally subordinate organizations, without waiting for regulations from the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee or even permission from the District Executive Committee, close prayer houses first and then start a petition for their closing.

The Secretariat of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee assigns the Central Prosecutor of the Republic to uncover any cases of misrepresentation of government directives in this matter and to give an account at the next session of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee. It has been decided that those guilty of misrepresentation will be dealt with.

At the same time, the Secretariat of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee has proposed that the District Executive Committee forbid subordinate organizations from breaking valid laws regarding the closing of prayer houses.

(*Vist.*, March 12, 1930).

CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY CORRECTS FALSE STATEMENT OF THE METROPOLITAN

... The Central Committee also considers it important to note the wholly unacceptable perversion of

the Party line regarding the struggle with religious survivals. We have in mind the closing of churches by the administration without the assent of the majority of the population, which leads to a strengthening of religious propaganda.

The Central Committee pledges:

7. Resolutely to put an end to the practice of closing the churches by the administration. Henceforth the closing of churches may only take place upon the request of the majority of the people and after resolutions passed at the villagers' general meetings have been confirmed by the Regional Executive Committee. Strict measures will be taken against those guilty of abusing the villagers for their religious tendencies.

(*Pravda*, March 15, 1930).

STAGED DEMONSTRATIONS

News pours in from the villages and towns of Ukraine of mass protest staged by workers against the anti-Soviet statements by churchmen (protest from the outside world against religious persecution in Ukraine — Ed.). In answer to these hostile measures the workers from Dniepropetrovsk are donating their half-day's earnings to build an aeroplane "The Dniepropetrovsk Worker."

Many workers are adding their protestations to the general wave of proletarian indignation over the provocation of the enemies.

(*Pravda*, March 23, 1930).

CHAPTER IV.

OWNERS' DESTRUCTION OF THE STOCK

I. MEDVYNETS

WE WILL KILL THEM AND EAT THEM OURSELVES

Ukrainian farmers, although raising livestock and fowl, rarely ate meat. Their main diet was bread and vegetables and meat was something they had for holiday dinners only. They used milk liberally but the eggs were all sold. When a hog was full-grown it went to the market. Only for Christmas and Easter holidays would a Ukrainian farmer allow himself to butcher a hog, the fat from which was made to last the year round.

In 1929, when the Communists announced the beginning of collectivization and started to socialize and take away to the collective farms all the livestock, hogs and chickens, without any recompense whatsoever, the farmers protested against such robbery.

"We will kill them and eat them ourselves," they stoically asserted. And a mass butchering began.

In all the villages of Medvyniwka and Bohuslavka districts, in the Kiev region, every farmer slaughtered his cattle, hogs, and fowl and salted the meat to preserve it. Salt disappeared from the co-operatives and prices soared. A pood (36.1 lbs.) of meat could be bought for a pood of salt, or even for a pood of grain.

The farmers were now all on a heavy meat diet to which they were not accustomed, and sickness set in. At the same time, meat became plentiful in the markets of nearby towns and on the workers' tables.

This mass slaughtering of livestock and fowl was a spontaneous reaction by the Ukrainian farmers against the robbery by the Soviet government.

COLLECTIVIZATION IS DESTROYING LIVESTOCK

The kurkuls are making a violent attack on the collective farm and instigate the killing and selling of livestock.

Information from Tahanrih tells us that under kurkul influence a mass sale of livestock is carried on by the middle and poor farmers before their entrance to the collective farms. During the last three months over 26,000 head of beef cattle were sold, 12,000 head of milch cows and 16,000 head of sheep. Buyers travel to different stations buying livestock at high prices, snatching them away from government markets which are now at a standstill. Cattle, horses and sheep are criminally sold everywhere. This practice is most evident in regions where there is all-out collectivization.

Under the influence of kurkul agitation — that in collective farming their property will be taken away to make everybody equal — the farmers are not only slaughtering their beef cattle but even the milch cows and sheep and are selling their horses for half their value.

From Artemiw, Donbas, comes news that the meat packers have slaughtered 19,070 head of cattle as compared to 11,050 head in the past year. In some regions things are even worse. Calves and yearlings are slaughtered and even pedigree cattle. Horses are sold for only a fraction of their true worth.

Before entering collective farming the middle, and even the poor farmers try to get rid of their livestock, hoarding the money from the sale.

(Pravda, January 11, 1930).

In the Blahosloyew district the number of horses has been reduced by 14 per cent, sheep by 39 per cent, oxen 84 per cent, grazing cattle 70 per cent, milch cows 13 per cent. Conditions are just as bad in other districts. Slaughtering continues.

In the village of Zavadiwka, Odessa region, the blockheads announced socialization of livestock

without previously preparing the farmers and on the following day out of 400 sheep only 167 were left. The rest were killed. Out of 600 cows, 200 remained and it is not known what became of the missing.

(Pravda, January 24, 1930).

TO SAVE PEDIGREE CALVES

The meat packing concerns must carry on with their work in such a way as to ensure that pedigree calves and producing cattle are saved. Also the fattening-up of cattle must be resumed as soon as possible on the pastures of distilleries, breweries and sugar refineries.

The present buying methods must be replaced by contracting livestock from the collective farms and the middle and poor farmers, thus speeding up the socialization of livestock.

(Vestnik, November 23, 1929).

15,000 HORSES ARE DESTROYED

Recently in Byelorussia conditions have arisen which threaten collectivization of farming with grave consequences. Individual poor and middle farmers are, under the influence of the kurkuls, selling their horses. These are bought by a hide syndicate and the dairy-livestock co-operative solely for slaughtering. The horses are killed exclusively for their hide and the meat and bones are buried. Thirty per cent of the horses slaughtered were fit for work.

Upon the advice of the Collective Farm Association, the Byelorussian collective farms will throw 65,000 to 85,000 horses on the market this year. These calculations were reached after considering that with individual farming 18.5 horses were needed for the cultivation of 100 hectares (247 acres) of land while, with collective farming, only 11.5 horses per 100 hectares are required. Therefore the Collective Farm Association considers it unwise to keep 85,000 horses it does not require.

In addition the Association expects another 65,000

horses to come in after the liquidation of the *kul's*. And so 150,000 horses will be destroyed.

That this is a mistake is seen from the statement of the plenum of the Central Committee which says that many collective farms have only one or two horses and that measures be taken to supply those collective farms with an adequate number of draught animals.

(*Pravda*, January 6, 1930).

I. BUZHANYN

"EQUUS KOLHOSPUS"

In 1929-30 when, according to orders from higher authorities, the Communists drove the people into collective farms, and the farmers slaughtered their livestock and fowl, then after March 2, 1930, when Stalin, trying to save the situation, published his article "Dizzy With Success," and the farmers took the collective farms apart and claimed their socialized cattle, the horses were left in collective farms in enormous numbers. There was no feed for such herds. At that time an extensive propaganda campaign began in the Soviet press urging that horses were idle eaters and would soon be replaced by tractors.

And so the farmers' horses were unwanted in the collective farms. No one knew what to do with them. In the fall of 1930, they were driven in great droves, into the open fields to shift for themselves. As long as there was a blade of grass here and there and an odd weed they grazed and roamed the countryside.

When winter set in there was nothing for them to feed on. The horses came back to the villages and collective farms, but were driven away. They rambled along main roads and byways growing thin and dying from hunger. There was not a road anywhere where dead horses were not obstructing passage and around them the village dogs and flocks of cows were tearing at the horse-flesh. A horse could then be bought for 1.5 rubles.

In 1931, while working in the villages of the Hayvoron Hrushkiw, Savran, Pishchany, Bershady and other districts of the Odessa region I found innumerable horse skeletons in the ravines and gullies. Being a geologist and marking down all my paleontological discoveries in my notebook, I ironically named them "*equus kolhospus*." (Domestic horses are called "*equus domesticus*" in Latin).

COLLECTIVIZATION AMONG THE KAZAKHS

In 1930-32 I worked as a bookkeeper for the Alabatyn state grain farm in the Stepaniw distrikt, Omsk region, in Western Siberia. There I had the opportunity to observe collectivization among the Kazakhs.

The colonization of Siberia along the Omsk-Ural railway had forced the Kazakhs to the more open southern regions. In 1929-30 and all their livestock was socialized. They were not cattle. The Kazakhs were forced to join the collective farms capable of running collective farms and had no desire to do so. When Stalin made his desperate speech "Dizzy With Success," the Kazakhs took back their livestock from the collective farms. They rejoiced that Stalin was on their side.

After this, a new method of collectivization was adopted, persuasion and agitation. But the Kazakhs refused to join, and again they were compelled to. Because the government considered them unreliable small cattle collectives were specially organized for the Kazakhs. Most of their livestock was taken to the large state farm "Giant" which was planned for 100,000 head.

All summer long in 1931 building materials were hauled to this state farm. Fences were built, mowers were brought in and large quantities of hay harvested for the winter. But not all the fences could be erected before winter came, and so a substitute plan was devised.

The hay was in long stacks. Between the stacks rows of poles were driven in the ground and over them and the haystacks a covering was made. This was a warm shelter for the cattle with the feed at hand. Mangers were made and most of the cattle were tethered. For a while everything was fine, but soon complications arose. The cattle broke loose and ate hay from the stacks, soon eating holes large enough for them to walk through and out of the enclosure. And so at the beginning of February, 1932, a catastrophe occurred in that state farm.

This was the time of the snowstorms in those steppes. They continue without let-up for a month accompanied by severe frosts as low as 30 degrees below zero. The snow piles into high drifts through any openings it can find.

That year when the snowstorm began it soon broke down and buried the fences and haystacks. It also piled drifts over the cattle inside the fences. A state of emergency was declared and all hands summoned to the rescue, but to no avail. The cattle froze and died under the snow.

By the following spring 13,000 head of cattle remained alive out of 117,000.

S. K.

THE KAZAKHS SLAUGHTERED THEIR CATTLE

In 1931, when collectivization was once more started, the Kazakhs refused to join. They took their cattle from the fields and pastured them in deep ravines or thick forests to keep them out of reach of the collective farms.

When winter came, the ravines and forests were filled with snow and the Kazakhs slaughtered their cattle. They froze the meat and hid it in brush piles. When the Soviet personnel who worked on the state farm wanted meat they simply followed a trail to one of the brush piles and stole it.

When the spring thaw came the hidden meat began to spoil. Special brigades were sent to search the woods for the meat. They cleaned out the rotten parts and buried them in the ground.

In this way the Kazakhs were robbed of their livelihood. Without their cattle they had nothing to live on and by spring, 1932, they were in the midst of a horrible famine, just like the one then raging in Ukraine.

CHAPTER V.

THE RUIN OF CO-OPERATIVE TRADE AND THE PARALYSIS OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF CONSUMER GOODS

When the Communists came to power they abolished private enterprise, but soon co-operative enterprise began to flourish. All establishments for food products — meat, milk, eggs, fruits and vegetables — were in the hands of co-operatives through which a supply filtered to the workers in towns and cities. And through its trade net, the manufactured goods were distributed to the rural areas. Private stores, of which there were a few in the towns and villages, were heavily taxed by the government and barely existed.

With the beginning of collectivization and the destruction of the better farmers who had been the main source of food products for the cities, co-operative enterprise was liquidated, for though it was a benevolent institution it was, nonetheless, chiefly owned by private individuals. As a result normal distribution of consumer goods was paralyzed, and immediately a food shortage occurred. Long queues formed outside the stores and a fierce struggle ensued for the little there was. Speculation on the cities' free market boosted prices. The workers soon felt the aftermath of collectivization in their stomachs.

To relieve the critical situation cafeterias were opened in the cities in nearly all establishments, factories and mines. The rush to these cafeterias was so great that they were soon unable to cope with the demand. Again a shortage of food appeared. Because the cafeterias were not a private enterprise but were ordered from above they were inefficiently run and insanitary.

At the same time co-operatives in the villages were paralyzed in their trade. The farmers could not buy even the most ordinary everyday necessities. Private stores in the villages had all been liquidated. And so the villages also were now experiencing shortages and a struggle for manufactured

goods was soon in full force. Long queues were everywhere.

The following documents give concrete examples of that situation.

Here are four documents for the month of October 1929: The first two show that in Kiev and the larger towns of Donbas only from 5 to 40 per cent of the required amount of essential foodstuffs was supplied. The other two describe the gigantic queues of people outside the co-operative stores in Donbas, Dniepropetrovsk and Poltava regions.

IRREGULARITY OF DISTRIBUTION IN KIEV

Recently in Kiev irregularities in the supply of consumer goods to the workers has been felt. Bread lines are in evidence again. There are shortages of meat, potatoes and milk. The reason for this is obviously the failure of food establishments to provide certain regions. (Until then distribution of food products was in the hands of the co-operatives who bought produce from the farmers at free market prices, but with compulsory collectivization all co-operative enterprise was paralyzed. — Ed.).

The Meat Trust, instead of the required 74 tons of meat, supplied only 5 tons for the month of March.

The Central Workers' Co-operative instead of 1,300 pails of milk provides only 550 pails. Kiev's daily need is 7,000 pails.

The Food Supply Association took on the responsibility of supplying the Central Workers Co-operative with fresh cucumbers but no cucumbers have arrived. This order was changed to pickled cucumbers but they have not come either.

The situation with regard to tomatoes is equally bad. The Food Supply Association does not can them. Two months ago the Food Trust received an order from the Central Workers' Co-operative for 125,000 quarts of tomatoes, but they have not yet arrived.

A critical situation exists in the supply of wood. The Central Workers' Co-operative has an agreement for 13 million p o o d s of wood, but only 32 per cent

of that quantity has been delivered. No railroad transportation is available for wood.

The Fruit Supply Association has undertaken to deliver four carloads of potatoes daily but so far has only delivered four carloads in three months.

Inefficiency in packing and delivery made be explained only by stupidity and utter disregard for the plans.

(Visti, October 1, 1929).

DEFECTS IN DISTRIBUTION TO WORKERS IN DONBAS

In the Artemiw region, in Donbas, a shortage in the supply of vegetables exists and the meat supply is irregular. On March 22, they received no meat at all.

The situation as regards butter is bad. Individual co-operatives received only 5 to 27 per cent of the required amount.

The egg supply is no better. Only 13 to 53 per cent of the actual requirements are met.

The fish and herring supply is also bad. The Rykov Co-operative received only 13 tons instead of the 60 tons needed in August. In September, instead of 60 tons no fish at all was received.

The distribution of sugar is irregular. The workers frankly state: "The newspapers say that we have plenty of sugar and we have sugar shortages."

There are serious irregularities in the distribution of vegetables. Deliveries are not guaranteed. Only 15 to 20 per cent of the normal requirements are received.

In the Stalino region the delivery of foodstuffs is also irregular. Shortages in salad oil, vegetables and dairy products are keenly felt.

In the Luhansk region there is no irregularity in the bread supply, but its quality is very low. Workers are demanding an increase in the supply of bread because prices on flour have risen to 9 rubles per pood (36 lbs.).


Irregularities are also felt in the distribution of

butter, eggs and cereals. Dovzhan Co-operative received only 40 tons of butter instead of 100 tons. Deliveries of vegetables are often very late.

It is surprising that in Donbas irregularities in the coal supply are felt. In Luhansk, instead of 400 carloads 200 were delivered.

Co-operatives supply only 8 to 10 per cent of the milk requirements.

(Visti, October 2, 1929).



Requisitioning of seed

DISTRIBUTION PARALYZED EVERYWHERE

In Romno there are twenty different co-operative stores but on their shelves they have only such unessential items as face powder, cologne, perfume, chocolates, expensive wines, candies and so on. Such food necessities as oil, cereals, herrings, tomatoes etc. are not to be found.

The Central Workers Co-operative stores used to allot a worker 600 grams of bread daily and his dependents 200 grams each but now they have decided to economize, and on off days allow the workers only 300 grams each and their dependents 100 grams.

At a workers' meeting in the Makhorka factory the heads of the Central Workers' Co-operative were asked whether or not white bread will become available, and if the prices on cucumbers and butter will come down, because, they are higher in the co-operatives than on the private market.

Unfortunately the workers received no reply to their queries.

(Visti, October 2, 1929).

In the Kremenchug district special days are set for the Izyum Consumers' Trade Organization the only bread store sells other goods, for instance confections. While long lines of people are waiting to buy bread anyone can walk up and buy pastry out of turn.

"What about those who do not buy pastry but need bread?"

"That's nothing. They can wait," is the reply of the co-operative servants.

(Visti, October 5, 1929)

BREAD LINES AT THE STORES

Near the Sentyaniwka station, in Donbas, at four o'clock in the morning the large sign of the TST (Transportation Co-operative Society) store can be seen across the way. The store is closed because of the early hour.

But to the right, a little closer to the station, be-

side two small buildings women, teen-agers and children sit dozing. At first sight they might be taken for passengers awaiting a train but, on closer inspection, it becomes evident that it is a line for bread and meat.

Actually this is not news. Such lines are encountered all through the district. Workers leave for their jobs at 6 or 6:30 a.m. and bread must be obtained for their breakfasts. Some are lucky enough to find a loaf, others go to work without it.

Bread is sold every two days, and so is the meat. Sanitary conditions in both stores are deplorable. Sheds are built from slabs which leave open cracks in the walls. Often bread and meat are brought in in the evening and left in the sheds overnight. Dust and sand blow in through the cracks and that is why the bread and meat are so grimy.

Trading in this manner must be stopped if only because a typhoid fever epidemic is breaking out in Donbas.

(F. Haydamaka, *Visti*, October 9, 1929)

DISORDER IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF POTATOES

In Dienpropetrovsk all Central Workers' Co-operative warehouses, fuel yards, circus grounds and other possible storage spaces are overflowing with potatoes. Two or three hundred carloads arrive daily. Altogether 250,000 cwt. of potatoes are due to come in. Only recently long lines stood outside the co-operative stores waiting for potatoes which were not there. Now the Central Workers' Co-operative does not know what to do with the potatoes on hand.

There are not enough distribution points. There is a shortage of storage space and no packages. There is no transportation either for the potatoes or for the workers to unload them.

The Co-operative could distribute potatoes right from the train in thickly populated workers' districts like Kaydaka, Nizhne-Dnieprovsk and others, but the railroad officials categorically refuse to send the cars

that way, explaining that the invoices are made out to Dniepropetrovsk.

Cars are not available to the factories on railroad branch lines.

On the freight yards mountains of potatoes lie in the open but the railroad management absolutely refuses to supply canvas even though there is plenty of it.

As they unloaded with steel shovels they are badly cut up, which has caused them to rot.

(Dniepropetrovsky, *Visti*, October 14, 1929)

SUPPLY TO THE WORKERS IN A TERRIBLE STATE

Serving the consumers to be raised to the highest level.

Twisting Party directives, inefficient management, littering the apparatus of trade organizations with foreign elements, and inertia, are the chief drawbacks to the smooth running of the co-operatives. (The above slogans were published by the Soviet government on the pages of its newspapers when supply to the workers was completely paralyzed by collectivization. Ed.)

A special commission appointed by the Regional Party Committee, consisting of 246 people, conducted an investigation for two months into the work of the Kharkiw Central Workers Co-operative. Their findings were as follows:

In meat distribution, many mistakes and even criminal offences were found. Service is very poor. The meat store was filled with foreign and hostile elements. Many of the workers were arrested.

Decentralized supply of dairy products has not been organized.

Fruits are badly stored, a large percentage is spoiled and great shortages have been found.

There are many shortcomings in the clothing trade. The required sizes are not available, the assortment is poor and unseasonal and not nearly enough children's clothing is in stock.

There is an oversupply of haberdashery.

The service in the trading system is very poor. Street vending has diminished considerably. The limited stock of goods has resulted in a higher cost of labor connected with the trading industry.

The turnover of stock is very slow: groceries—41 days, haberdashery—83 days, dishes and cookware—84 days, musical instruments—144 days.

With the average turnover increasing by 19 per cent, food products turnover increased only 10 per cent. The bread stores even decreased their turnover by 37 per cent.

The drive to bind shareholders to certain stores is stupidly conducted, without considering the stores' possibilities. A store of approximately 600 square feet has 4,000 compulsory customers and a store area of approximately 500 square feet has 8,000 customers.

The inevitable results are: long queues, misunderstandings, dissatisfaction on the part of the consumers and poor service.

In every store prices showed utter disregard for the directives.

In the Central Workers' Committee's cafeterias meals are not prepared according to dietetic standards and even at the present moment 600 workers from the Kharkiw Locomotive Plant are suffering from stomach disorders.

The quality of the meals is low. Service is inadequate. Supply for food produce to the cafeterias is irregular. Sanitary conditions are unsatisfactory and cafeterias have losses.

The bread is poorly baked. Baking of bread has increased 3,611,000 pounds.

Prices on goods fluctuate a great deal: on herrings from 15 to 48 per cent, cereals—13 to 17 per cent, rice—20 to 91 per cent, other items—39 to 121 per cent.

The trading apparatus is littered with hostile and foreign elements such as former traders and white guardsmen.

The work of the public controllers, store commit-

tees and authorized workers is unsatisfactory.

The newspaper "The Worker's Need" is run unsatisfactorily.

In the opinion of the Commission of the Regional Party Committee the unsatisfactory operation of the Kharkiw Central Workers' Co-operative is the result of the bureaucratic structure of the organization. The Commission suggests that the supply to the workers be decentralized, and the work of the co-operatives be carried closer to the workers.

(Visti, December 17, 1929).

SUPPLY TO THE WORKERS IN A BAD STATE

(From the conference of the Ukrainian Worker's Co-operatives)

In Dniepropetrovsk workers are forced to spend several days a week buying their food supply, because certain food items are available only on certain days. The Workers' Co-operatives also receive their supply of goods at irregular times.

"Our potato situation in Odessa is dreadful," said a TST (Transportation Co-operative Society) representative.

A representative from the Kremenchug Central Workers' Co-operative complains that towns which did not get on the regular supply list now cannot supply the workers in their vicinity who in turn must look for their supplies on private markets.

The representative from the People's Commissariat of Workers' Farmers Inspection states that no revision of the registration list of shareholders has been made within the last few years so that many deceased are among those receiving food rations. All lists must be thoroughly checked and thus a lot of food saved.

The quality of footwear is extremely poor. Shoes wear out in a month or two. Absenteeism in Dniepropetrovsk is very frequent and is explained by the workers as being due to a lack of shoes to wear to work.

Often establishments send hogs to the farms to

be fattened but they are usually past the stage of being able to be fattened. Dairy farms are often sent cows which do not yield milk.

The government directive to raise the pay of the workers by 12 per cent must be carried out, but also prices on food products and the operating expenses of the co-operatives must be reduced. In many places, however, food prices continue to rise.

Co-operatives still function in an unsatisfactory manner. They have not eliminated their chief errors. A purge of the co-operative organization is sorely needed to rid it of foreign elements, who form the snag in the supply to the workers.

(Visti, January 1, 1930)

INSANITARY CONDITIONS IN CAFETERIAS

In all sugar refineries throughout Poltava cafeterias are run by local co-operative organizations, but not all are alike. For example, the cafeteria in the Chubariw refinery is clean and the meals are good.

On the other hand the co-operative cafeteria in the Leningrad refinery is filthy and untidy. The food is poor. Instead of bread some soft, soggy, sour mess is served. It has a chemical taste and often nails and twine are found in it.

Recently an outrageous incident occurred there. A worker ordered borsch (soup made from beets and other vegetables), dipped a spoon in it and lifted out a whole scalded rat. The reason for that was later determined. The kitchen is infested with rats. When meat is sliced they calmly come close and eat the left-overs. This irritated the cooks desperately and one of them in a fit of rage caught the rat and threw him in the borsch.

One worker ordered porridge. He stared at it and could not believe his eyes. The porridge was moving. Sensational news! Live porridge in the cafeteria! The answer: worms!

Too often workers complain about the quality of meals served in cafeteria No. 14, of the Kharkiw Central Workers Co-operative, in the factory "Miner's

Light." Most of the misunderstandings occur over borsch, which is always under-cooked. The manager has solved this problem in his own way. To those who complain he serves the liquid only. Those who come in later are served dishes unfinished by earlier diners, and the workers upbraid the cooks for the small servings given them.

In the Kiev factory, "The Red Flag", the cafeteria does not in the least resemble an establishment which caters to the public. It is small, damp, dark and dirty, located in an insanitary unhygienic basement through which sewer pipes run.

The cafeteria in the factory "Bolshevik", in Kiev, is located in an old tumble-down building with a very low ceiling. It has a catering capacity of 400 people, while there are 1,600 men working in the factory.

The insanitary conditions of the cafeterias are due to overcrowding which is also the cause of poor ventilation, crowding at tables and poor service. The calory content of the meals is also very low. An analysis showed that the dinners have a calory deficiency of 27 per cent. Instead of the 1,245 required calories only 932 calories are served in a portion.

Servings are uneven. Meals are without variety. The queues are long. Calculations reveal that 16.5 per cent of the workers wait up to 15 minutes, 35.6 per cent wait up to 30 minutes and 47.9 per cent wait over 30 minutes for their meals.

(Vistl, December 15, 1929)

RUINING TRADING IN THE VILLAGES

The Dobrovelychkiw Co-operative in Pervomaysk region serves thousands of shareholders. It has only three co-operative stores where previously 33 private stores operated.

After it was decided that the Co-operative would take over all trading it soon became evident that it had not enough distribution centers. And so the villagers, pushing and shoving each other, waste their working hours, sometimes whole days, in order to

buy some simple necessity. Often in such crowds petty thievery is committed.

It is all-important that our Co-operative open a few more stores in town and the neighboring villages. This will ease the load on the present store and will give uninterrupted service to the consumers.

(Visti, December 19, 1929)

DISTRIBUTION TO THE VILLAGES ALSO PARALYZED

The Consumers Association in the village of Korytne, Mohylyan region, receives the commodities in short supply punctually and according to plan. Unfortunately, though, they do not get to those consumers for whom they are intended.

Often some poor fellow will stand outside, freezing, but the store attendant will not let him in because he closes in half an hour. "Come in the afternoon," he tells him.

Fine! The poor man returns in the afternoon but the commodity has gone. Where? Hinko Levytsky took some for his wife, Mykyta Pohribaylo for a relative and the manager, Volodymyr Bratiychuk, for his friends.

On the whole, trading is done in a very haphazard manner.

For instance, a teacher comes to buy gas for the Organization for the Liquidation of Illiteracy and stands in line for four hours. Or somebody might ask for shoe soles and get the following reply: "Sell us a cow hide and we will sell you soles."

Can such an attitude toward the people be allowed? Should distribution of commodities be done in this unfair manner, almost never allowing anything to the poor? This problem should be given serious attention.

A district representative comes to the Odessa branch of VUKS (Ukrainian Co-operative Association) for a new stock of goods. He tries to choose the assortment and sizes, but the right sizes are not available. They promise to send them out later. The

representative returns and the goods arrive. But of what use are they? Expensive all-wool suits are of no use to the people. Women's coats would fit children.

Many organizations are stocked full of suits in small sizes. It is impossible for a man to buy a suit. Besides, no standard price is marked on the tags and this may lead to disregard for the law.

(Visti, January 18, 1930)

Naturally, with trading degenerating to such a hopeless state that the co-operatives have ceased to serve consumers normally, the consumers lost all interest in buying shares in them. The capital of the shares already in the co-operatives was inadequate for a large enough turnover to allow proper expansion needed to replace the liquidated private businesses.

In view of this the government issued an outcry, the so-called "maneuver with goods," e. i., promising all commodities to shareholders of good standing only. This was the beginning of a trade war against the consumers.

MOBILIZING EXPENDITURES THROUGH CO-OPERATIVE SHARES

The Ukrainian Co-operative Association has released a report on accumulated shares by the Consumers Co-operative, dated February 2. The quarterly plan called for 9 million rubles, but for October and November only 6½ million, 71.5 per cent, was collected. Many regions are very slow: Hlukhiw, Kono-top, Bila Tserkvo, Podilya, Izyum, Lubni, Poltava, Romen, Starobil, Kryvy Rich, Artemiw, Stalino.

In many regions a distortion of the class line is evident: Hlukhiw, Kamyanets, Lubni, Nizhen, Pryluky, Sumy, Artemiw, Stalino. In these regions the plans have been completed through the efforts of the poor farmers rather than through those better off.

The Regional Associations wield insufficient influence on the masses to insure a proper class line in the accumulation of shares.

The administration of the Ukrainian Co-operative Association suggests that regions should collect shares individually, together with the taxes. The plan

for the second quarter is for 16 million rubles.

Concrete plans have been drawn up: to agitate for a voluntary shortening of the instalment term for paying up shares, and to apply the "goods maneuver" to gain this end, i. e., supply only those shareholders with consumer goods who have paid up their shares before the appointed dates. All shareholders, with the exception of poor farmers and farm laborers, who miss payments are to be deprived of certain privileges in obtaining goods.

Sources of the shares:

In sixty Consumer Associations of the Odessa region from poor farmers and farm laborers, 9,000 rubles came in instead of 15,000, from the middle farmers 15,500 rubles came instead of 25,000 rubles, from *k u r k u l s* 25,000 rubles came in instead of 40,000. In Ivaniw Association 59 per cent of the shares came from the poor farmers, 44 per cent from the middle farmers and 37 per cent from the *k u r k u l s*.

In the farmers credit unions (Ukrainian Farmers Bank) loans are long overdue. Arrears amount to 31 million rubles.

The mobilization of shares is very sluggish. Instead of 7.2 million rubles only 800,000 rubles have been mobilized—11.8 per cent.

(*Visti* January 15, 1930)

PLANS FOR THE EXPORT OF BACON ARE HAMPERED

In two or three months a bacon plant will be open in Vynnytsya, but so far supply of the produce has not been ensured.

The production program of the plant is planned for 156,000 hogs. It is advisable to contract 24,000 hogs for feeding up to bacon grade. A check of the contracts of Vynnytsya, Berdychiw, Kamyanets Podilsky and Proskuriw regions shows that the plans cannot be carried out.

For example, a favorable situation exists in the Mohyliw region but the Dairy Association has contracted for only five hogs instead of 15,000 according

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застапувачка и застапувачка своје паролу ко-
ренима око одредената воево стојатиса органами и како правилна стран-
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и какошто органи работност.

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Order forbidding destruction of livestock

to plan. The main drawback in contracting is lack of credit and concentration of contracting. All this hampers contracting plans and, consequently, exporting plans.

(Visti, December 13, 1929)

EXPORT PLANS ARE HAMPERED

The College of People's Commissariat of Trade confirmed that exporting plans for October and November have not been completed satisfactorily. Exporting organizations work slowly and unwillingly. In certain regions commissions for assisting export plans function unsatisfactorily.

Thus, the College confirmed the necessity for employing a series of strict measures in order to achieve a certain vantage point in exporting trade at the earliest possible moment.

In view of the fact that some of the primary dairy and meat products have fallen out of the exporting trade, special attention must be given to secondary products. Export of such items as rags, bones, horse hair, medical grasses, all kinds of scrap, honey, fruits, fresh and dehydrated vegetables, and others must be expanded.

The secondary products for export must have the center of attention. At the same time it is imperative to expand the work of all branches of industry who supply goods for export. Especially is it advisable to direct more attention to such products as kaolin, granite, chemical products and coke-benzol products, and handicrafts.

The existing exporting plans of the People's Commissariat of Trade for the regions must be carried to the districts and individual organizations such as state farms, collective farms, co-operative associations.

The College has decided to set up strict supervision to prevent products earmarked for export from being unloaded for home marketing. Any infringement of this order will be severely penalized.

The College has declared a series of premiums for the best completion of exporting plans.

(Visti, January 1, 1930)

CHAPTER VI.

GRAIN COLLECTING

Preparing for an aggressive external policy against the capitalist world and equipping the Red Army through his first Five-Year Plan (actually war industry) Stalin adopted Trotsky's slogan—'Ride the farmer's nag until the Communist iron horse can be built'—the slogan for which Trotskyite opposition was smashed.

To build this military industry the Communists needed capital, which they did not possess. The capitalist world would not give them loans, so they decided to find this capital among their farmers by robbing them of all farm produce, especially grain, which they traded successfully abroad.

Therefore their internal war with the farmers for collectivization was carried on to gain government control of all agricultural products, and grain in particular. For that reason the Communists later, in 1931, adopted Lenin's slogan: "Struggle for grain—struggle for socialism."

In 1929 the Communists launched their all-out collectivization program with its fierce struggle for all farm produce, its grain collecting plans and finally, in Ukraine, the horrible famine of 1932-33. Half a bushel of grain was of more value then, according to Communist calculations, than a human life which could have been saved by that half bushel.

The whole attention of the Communist government was concentrated not on the circumstances of the farmers and on providing them with at least a bare minimum of food, but on the amount of grain collected (robbed) from them.

In those years completing grain plans became the chief slogan and a gage for the success of the local governments in carrying out directives and orders from the Communist Party.

Beginning in 1929, the Communist government rebuilt the whole system of management of the agricultural industry. It liquidated the local democratic organs which had governed with some degree of autonomy and instead created centralized all-Union bodies which had control of agriculture including, of

course, the grain collecting plan and other plans pertaining to this industry.

In the document below we see that until 1929 grain collecting plans in Ukraine were exclusively in the hands of Ukrainian co-operatives which were directly subordinate to the Ukrainian Central Government in Kharkiw. Still earlier grain was bought on the free markets at regular market prices. Just before the collectivization, however, the government forced the farmers, through contracting, to sell certain amounts of grain to the state at "state prices," i.e., at half price or for next to nothing. For this reason the grain collecting plan in Ukraine in 1928, which called for 65 million bushels of grain, brought only 80 per cent of that amount.

The second document mentions the liquidation of different local democratic purchasing establishments, among them co-operative organizations and the local democratic "ministries of lands" and the creation of an all-Soviet United People's Commissariat of the Grain Industry.

R. KIYANYN, former student

AGRICULTURE IS A HOARD

At the time of heated discussions and struggles in the Communist Party between the so-called "Stalin's general line" and "Trotsky's left wing trend," when Trotsky's advice to the Party was to put the whole weight of the building of socialism in the USSR on agriculture—in order to build our iron horse we must for the time being ride the farmers' nag—the following joke was in circulation.

Trotsky was asked to answer four questions.

1. What does the Party mean to the workers of the USSR?
2. What does agriculture mean to the state?
3. What is Trotskyist opposition likely to bring the Soviet nation?
4. What does the present rule according to Stalin's general line mean?

Trotsky replied that he must give a talk (*doklad*) in order to answer the questions. He was told that there was no time for that and that his answers must be as brief and possible. He thought for a while and said:

"To the first question you may obtain an answer by omit-

ting the first letter from my speech: doklad—oklad)burden),

To the second question by omitting the first two letters:
do k l a d—k l a d (hoard),

To the third question by omitting the first three letters:
d o k l a d—l a d (order),

To the fourth question by omitting the first four letters:
d o k l a d—a d (hell)."

And so in the Soviet language farming means hoarding.

THE GAP BETWEEN MARKET PRICES AND CONTRACTING

People's Commissar of Trade, Veitser, giving a report of the grain collecting plan for 1928-29, to the Presidium of the Ukrainian Central Committee, stated:

"Last year's grain collecting plan for 65 million bushels was completed 80 per cent on the whole, 77 per cent on wheat and rye and still less on corn and sunflower seed.

An obstinate resistance to the collecting plans is made by the k u r k u l who stubbornly refuses to sell his grain to the state.

Complying with the wishes of the farmers the grain collecting plan will be carried to every village.

The grain collecting plans have been handled by Ukrainian organizations: the Grain Association and the Consumers' and Farmers' Co-operatives.

Petrovsky suggests that children under government maintenance in children's homes should be given more and better food.

In its resolution, the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee confirms that last year's grain collecting campaign was conducted in difficult circumstances which arose because of the poor crop on the Ukrainian steppes, the wide gap between prices on the free markets and the contracts and the resistance of the k u r k u l.

The Presidium of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee further confirms that this year's campaign will also be difficult. Therefore it proposes that

all Regional Executive Committees, District Executive Committees and village Soviets draw into the grain collecting campaign and the execution of the plan all the village social organizations and all organizations of the poor and middle-class farmers in order to defeat *kurkul* resistance.

The Presidium proposes that 75 per cent of the plan be completed by January 1, 1930, and the whole plan for February or March.

The Presidium considers the main undertaking of all soviet and co-operative organizations to be the completion of grain collecting plans on time.

(*Visti*, January 5, 1929)

HOW PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIATS OF AGRICULTURE OF THE REPUBLICS WERE LIQUIDATED

(Resolutions of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party).

(a) The collective farm has become a widespread movement of the poor and middle masses and is causing speedy development of large collective farms and complete collectivization of entire districts and regions.

(b) Large grain establishments (collective and state farms) are outgrowing the boundaries of national state organizations, which had earlier been responsible for creating the Central Farmers Bank and the Association of Co-operative Organizations and, later, such social production organizations as the Grain Trust, Collective Farm Center, Tractor Center, Farm Supply, Cattle Ranch, Sheep Ranch and others, and now need one all-Union management.

(c) The matter of stepping up production, of strengthening industry and agriculture and strengthening a direct connection between industry and separate branches of agriculture presents, besides a union of all industry of the USSR, the need for a union of all branches of agriculture in the whole of the USSR.

(d) To create large socialist agricultural industry is possible only with a centralized organization and a strengthening of individual, backward, minority

regions with proletariat forces from the central regions of the Soviet Union.

(e) Development of scientific research in agriculture has gained momentum entirely due to all-Union management.

(f) In view of the above-mentioned facts it is a foregone conclusion that management of agriculture must be concentrated in one Soviet center.

Therefore the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party emphasizes the need for creating a united People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the USSR.

(*Vlast*, November 21, 1929)

Y. BONDAR

GIVE MORE AND MORE GRAIN

In the hamlet of Novo-Volodymyriwka, Sakhnov district, Kharkiw region, classification of farmers into *kurkuls* (the prosperous farmers), middle farmers, poor farmers and farm laborers began in 1928.

The *kurkuls* were taxed heavily with the so-called "export tax" because they were also referred to as "exporters."

After grain collecting, a representative would call on a farmer at night and order — "Give us the grain." After the farmer had taken in the 150 bushels levied on him earlier, he was always taxed with a similar additional amount. If he managed to meet the second demand another 100 bushels was imposed. If he pleaded that he had no more to give, he was told to buy some. In this case it would have to be bought at market prices and then sold to the government at the fixed price. I myself went to the market with my mother to buy grain for such a purpose but there was none for sale.

Sometimes one of the thugs would suddenly appear in the night, push a pistol under the farmer's nose and bellow: "You snake! So you have grain but will not give it to the state! Well, you will give me everything."

There was one who especially indulged in terrorizing the farmers. He was about 47 years of age, squat, with a black goatee and the appearance of a story-book villain. His name was Kholodov and his cruelty was notorious.

GRAIN COLLECTING PLAN NOT PROCTICABLE

After the 16th Party Congress in 1929, at which the problem of collectivization and grain collecting was frankly discussed, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine called a special meeting of the secretaries of Regional Committees, in July of that year, and gave them pointers on how to carry out Moscow's orders and collect all the grain from Ukraine.

After the grain collecting plan had been carried out in every village throughout Ukraine an individual farmer's plan was enforced.

The Regional Party Committee Bureau then wrote the following letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine to all affiliated bodies, and to the secretaries of the District Party Committees.

"The individual farmer's plan (imposing a certain portion of the grain collecting plan on individual, more prosperous farmers — Ed.) can be relied on for 25 to 30 per cent of the food produce plan. The remaining 70 to 75 per cent will have to be taken from the middle and poor farmers, in which case a seed shortage might occur for that group. The central grain collecting plan will not leave a single pound of grain for the people's own consumption.

"In some places protests are heard that the grain collecting plan is too big and cannot be completed. Ukrainian Party organizations are waging an intensive struggle with different forms of resistance to the plan.

"Actively assisting the government with its grain collecting plan in Ukraine are 6,500 Communists, hundreds of labor brigades and the middle-class farmers."

(*Pravda*, November 6, 1929. No. 231. Excerpt from an article by Vynnytsky, "Struggle for Grain.")

GRAIN IS SEIZED FROM FARMERS, AND ROTS

Twelve carloads of wheat are rotting in the basements of the flour mill "Red Star" in Zheleznyany

district in Donbas. Most of the granaries are unsuitable for grain storage. The roofs leak and the walls have large cracks through which the grain spills to the ground outside.

Seeing this slipshod inefficiency the farmers are rightfully indignant at the mill manager.

(Pravda, September 28, 1929).

At the Byelorussian branch of the Grain Association 2,500 tons of grain are piled out in the open. In Voronkovo 100 tons of grain has rotted in granaries. Grain loaded in cars is also starting to rot. In many parts of Odessa grain is lying in heaps on the ground not even covered. Because of the fast tempo of collecting grain from the farmers, tens of thousands of tons of grain are thus piled on the ground under the open sky.

Farmers wait in lines for ten to twelve hours, sometimes even two days before the grain they were told to bring is unloaded. Whole caravans of wagon loads of grain move one after another only to be unloaded on the ground because of lack of storage space.

Transportation of sugar beets to sugar refineries has started. This is also a shock action venture. Cars from the grain collecting will be used. In a week the corn collecting plan begins and the yield is three times that of grain yield.

If storage and transportation of grain is not handled with more efficiency thousands of tons will spoil.

(N. N. Kornilov, Pravda, October 12, 1929)

MIS-MANAGEMENT OF PRODUCE SEIZED FROM FARMERS

KIEV, October 18, 1929. A special commission conducted an investigation into the work of the Kiev Trade Unions in the grain collecting plan and it is found to be inadequate. It has been decided that shock brigades of professional union workers and worker's actives will be thrown into the districts. With this end in view many workers have been

mobilized, divided into groups and dispatched to the villages of the Kiev, Bila Tserkva, Uman, Berdychiw, Shepetiwka, and Pryluky regions.

Most of the workers have been supplied by the metallurgical, tanners, lumber jacks and printers unions. They will all remain at their assigned places until the grain collecting plan is completed.

The brigade which went to Krasyliv district, Shepetiwka region wrote back the following.

"The brigade came to the district under the auspices of the Grain Association. The work is difficult from every standpoint. This is our first experience with the potato-collecting plan and we find this unfavorable situation. Potatoes lie in the mud and are loaded into cars without being cleaned. 583 tons of potatoes lie out in the open and spoil as more continue to come. Lack of transportation interferes with the completion of the plan.

The same situation exists with the grain collecting plan. All storage houses, makeshift constructions, are filled to capacity. Grain is piled in wet places. In the Krasyliv district 2,500 tons of grain lie at one unloading point. Railway service is irregular and one car a day leaves the Krasyliv district... Because of this delivery of winter grains is held up by the farmers. This may result in an uncompleted grain-collecting plan.

The brigade requests that urgent measures be employed."

(*Pravda*, October 18, 1929).

SHORTAGE OF BAGS FOR GRAIN

Ukraine has taken an assignment upon herself — fully to complete the year's grain collecting plan by the twelfth of October anniversary. An increased number of bags will be needed for that purpose, but only 40 per cent of the original assignment has been received in Ukraine.

Besides the steps taken by the administrations and organizations, great work has been done by the people in general in the task of mobilizing bags. The

Co-operative Center has asked its branches immediately to organize an active for collecting bags. In many regions this work is proceeding in shock action order.

In two days PRAVDA reporters found more than 15,000 empty bags, lying idle in co-operative and trade organizations. The Kremenchug Komsomols uncovered 18,000 bags in three days and 22 suitable places for grain storage. In the Uman region bag-collecting is carried on with the slogan: "Every farmer must give one bag." In Vynnytsya region, in response to the appeal from the Regional Executive Committee, 40,000 bags were collected in two days.

Altogether in eleven regions 175,000 bags were collected in five days for the grain collecting plan.

(Pravda, November 1, 1929).

ADDITIONAL ROBBERY — A GIFT

In answer to the assassination by the kurkuls of the village reporter, Sawchuk, in the village of Zubatiw, Shepetiwka district, the workers of the Lantsut Sugar Refinery and the Shepetiwka Railway Junction have decided to send a gift to the workers of the "Krasny Putilovets" factory in Leningrad of a trainload of grain. For this purpose the government will collect 700 tons of grain over and above the grain-collecting quota for the year.

(Pravda, October 20, 1929).

GIVE THE MOLTURE TOO

Molture is taken in flour mills, hulling mills and oil mills and is considered part of the grain-collecting plan. In the Kiev region molture is coming in slow, and so far only 27 per cent of the planned quota has been collected. This can be explained by the weakness in the Grain Association organization, and the inexperience of the agency, since, during the period of grain collecting farmers do not bring in grain for milling. Expanding the work of the grain-collecting plans the organizations do not give enough attention to molture.

The Kiev region has given itself the assignment of completing the culture plan by November 7.

(Pravda, November 5, 1929).

ROBBED GRAIN — GIFT FOR MOSCOW

Farmers in some villages of the Zhmerynka district, Vynnytsya region, have decided at their meetings to make a gift of a trainload of grain to the October Anniversary. This grain is to be collected over and above the grain-collecting plan. Farmers in the villages of Stodulsi, Zhmerynka and Holowchynsi, where the village reporter, Korol, was assassinated, decided to make an October gift to the workers of Moscow by sending a trainload of grain.

At the Plenum of the Zhmerynka District Executive Committee, where 500 farmers from different villages attended, it was decided to send Moscow a trainload of potatoes and ten carloads of grain.

The collection of potatoes and grain is going on throughout the district.

(Pravda, November 1, 1929).

ALL SUNFLOWER SEED FOR THE STATE

In the Dniepropetrovsk region the collecting plan for sunflower seed is progressing with unimaginable slowness. According to plan 25,000 bushels should have been collected but only 6,500 bushels, 26 per cent, have so far come in.

The kurkuls and private speculators have raised the price on sunflower seed oil. Oil is shipped through the mail in package form and the kurkul is abetting the speculator's scheme.

The oil mills are overflowing with sunflower seed. The kurkuls are getting rid of it very quickly and shipping oil to the towns and cities.

Measures have been taken against the speculators. The number of oil mills is limited and the amount of sunflower seed milled restricted. Only four to five pints of oil per month is allowed for each farm family.

(Pravda, November 24, 1929).

A SELF-IMPOSED TAX FOR CULTURAL PURPOSES

KHARKIW. Since October 1, self-imposed taxation has been in operation in Ukraine for the benefit of cultural needs. In many districts this campaign is carried on intensively. Public opinion of the poor-middle masses of the villages is mobilized around the self-imposed taxation plan.

Notwithstanding the malicious resistance of the *kurkuls*, the villagers everywhere are carrying decisions for self-imposed taxation amounting to 50 per cent of the regular farm tax.

According to the scant information received by the People's Commissariat of Finance, by October 15 farmers' meeting had decided on self-imposed taxation to the amount of 25 million rubles. The whole plan for this year calls for a total of 40 million rubles — 2.5 times that for the past year.

The districts have begun a gigantic task and attained notable results. For example, the Poltava region had already collected half of the self-imposed tax by October 15. Bringing in the tail end are such regions as Kharkiw, Izyum, Kupyansk, Stalino and Melitopol.

The Moldavian SSR has collected nothing.

(*Pravda*, October 21, 1929).

A "CLASS" APPROACH TO TEACHERS AND STUDENTS

There are two categories of teachers. One does public work through force and the other consists of "social enthusiasts."

The teachers took an active interest in the fall seeding. They gave 877 lectures throughout the region, organized 1,800 *supryahs* [in order to carry on farm work, implements and draught power had to be collected from all over the district and the various pieces of machinery and draught animals teamed up for the task at hand. Such a joint operation was called *supryah* and involed a lot of time [and effort, Ed], 60 trial cases, many agricultural fairs and

gave instructions on grain treatment.

lecting plan to the extent that they should be. Dis-

The schools are still not drawn into the grain collection of the class line is evident. In the village of Samoyliwtsi, Blyznets district, the pupils of one school were asked to bring 35 pounds of grain each (to be included in the grain collecting plan). The teacher gave the order without using the class approach and assigned an equal amount to the children of kurkuls, the middle and poor farmers.

Small wonder that kurkuls hate teachers who are "social enthusiasts." In the Meshev district the kurkuls wrote the teacher an anonymous letter which read: "Better give up work that does not concern you. Stick to teaching or you will be sorry."

(Pravda, October 27, 1929).

CHAPTER VII

COMPLETE COLLECTIVIZATION AND ITS DOWNFALL

After de-kurkulizing the more prosperous and better farmers and deporting them to concentration camps and repressing others with accelerated grain collecting plans, the Communists terrorized the rest of them into joining collective farms.

Although all-out collectivization of agriculture was actually planned by the government and the Party for a longer period, 1929 to 1931, they nevertheless made every effort, through their subordinate organizations such as local actives and the thousands, to step up these plans and complete collectivization as quickly as possible. These servants "did their utmost" taking nothing into account.

As we may see from the following documents the whole Soviet press, and especially the Communist Party organ Pravda, raised those collectivizing zealots on a pedestal "On the way to complete collectivization," was the slogan which glittered in every issue of Pravda.

None of the local Party directors, except maybe an odd few, foresaw the inevitable end their work was leading to. The chief slogan was, "Collectivize as much as possible as quickly as possible," with which they hoped to earn themselves praise from above. The methods of collectivization were left up to the collectivizers themselves. Any failures and shortcomings in their work were quickly blamed on the kurkuls and counter-revolutionaries to whom numbers suddenly appeared among the faithfully carried out by the lower Party workers. Any caution farmers.

Such then were the local Party directives and they were shown by local Communist workers were explained by the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine as rightest opportunism and were continuously deplored in the Party newspapers.

And so in the first year of the collectivization fever "com-

plete collectivization" suffered a scandalous downfall and the Party was forced to take a step backwards. (See Part II, Chapter II, "Retreat in Collectivization").

Following are a number of documents of the first period of complete collectivization, beginning in the middle of 1929 and continuing until March, 1930.

The first document shows the government measures for extensive popularization of collectivization among the farmers, such as declaring a holiday—"Collectivization and Harvest Day."

In the next document the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of Ukraine, which at that time was not yet liquidated as an autonomous administration unit, is ordering local groups not to use compulsory methods for collectivization.

COLLECTIVIZATION DAY

(Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party).

The Central Committee of the Communist Party acknowledges the necessity for organizing throughout the USSR a "Collectivization and Harvest Day." This would be set for October 14 and would have the characteristic of a mass production campaign.

The main purpose of this holiday would be the mobilization of the poor-middle masses for the uplifting and social reconstruction of agriculture and a continued attack on the *kurkul*.

Therefore the Central Committee deems it necessary at meetings and gatherings to discuss a summary of work towards increasing the yield, increasing the grain fields, means of collectivization, state farms and establishing contracting.

Also to expound more fully the agricultural five-year plan and the industrialization plan by organizing socialist contests in the villages for conducting agricultural lectures, increasing the grain fields, collectivization and a check on agreements for socialist contests where they are already taking place, and to mobilize expenditures for collectivization of the ploughing of the "collectivization hectare."

To arrange a program for drawing more farm

hands and the poor and middle-class farmers into the co-operative and collective farm structures and for eliminating class line distortions from the districts of collectivization. To acquaint the farmers with concrete examples of collectivization, excursions and exhibitions must be held.

It is considered expedient for leaders and the whole organization in preparation for "Collectivization and Harvest Day" to create special commissions within the Supreme Soviets of the Republics of the Union, in the state, regional and district Executive Committees, with the participation of Komsomol organizations, collective farms, Farmers' Co-operatives and other public organizations.

(Visti, September 4, 1929)

NO COMPULSION CONNECTED WITH COLLECTIVIZATION

(Directive of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of Ukraine)

The People's Commissariat of Agriculture has received news from different places that in some regions farm communities are organizing under the charter of TSOZ (Organization of Social Cultivation of Land) and, according to the resolution of the general meeting of the farm community, they consider it the duty of those who disagree with the idea to join too.

The People's Commissariat of Agriculture considers such a practice to be entirely unwarranted. In its letter to the Regional Agricultural Departments the commissariat reminds them that farm collectives, the TSOZ included, must be created only with the voluntary consent of the farmers.

Every farm community may join the TSOZ, but only when individual farmers with all the adult members of their families give their consent. If individual farmers are not agreeable they must not be forced to join.

The People's Commissariat of Agriculture stresses

that individual farmers wishing to join collective farms while others do not, have the right to demand a division of the farm, notwithstanding its size.

(Visti, October 11, 1929)

135,000 FARMS ARE SUBJECT TO DESTRUCTION

Up to the present, ten regions in Ukraine--Volyn, Chernyhiw, Korosten, Proskuriw, Poltava and others—have preserved the individual farm-stead form of farming. In these regions there are 135,000 separate farmsteads (farmers and their families living on their own land instead of in villages as is the usual custom in Ukraine, Ed.) and about 975 communities made up exclusively of these rural farmers.

The Commissariat of Agriculture has decided to take firm measures to liquidate these relics and to bring the question up before the government to put such measures into force through legal channels.

(Pravda, October 20, 1929)

100 PER CENT COLLECTIVIZATION— OCTOBER CONTRIBUTION

The Tilohulo-Bereziw district is making a change-over to collective farming. The success achieved in the last few days has exceeded all expectations. Within several days 25 per cent of the farms, taking in 100 populated points, have been collectivized. Twenty villages have been collectivized 80 per cent.

The pull to collective farms is so great that technicalities cannot be put through quickly enough. One hundred per cent collectivization will be completed by the twelfth anniversary of the October Revolution. This will be the October contribution.

Hundreds of applications are pouring in from kurkuls who are anxious to join the collective farms. They are giving all their property, livestock and machinery to the collective farms.

But there is a firm resolution not to admit the kurkuls even with such generous offers. At the

same time, a decision has been reached to conduct a general purge of the old collective farms to drive out the *k u r k u l s*.

(*Pravda*, October 27, 1929)

35,000 PEOPLE HERDED TO THANK THE GOVERNMENT

In the Novo-Ushytsya district near Kamyanets-Podilsky, in the so-called border region, 75 per cent of the farmers have been collectivized. Three days ago in the Novo-Ushytsya district headquarters a rally of the poor farmers of the district was held in celebration of the mass movement to collectivization. This rally was attended by 35,000 farmers—poor and middle farmers and farm-hands—from all the villages of the district and the neighboring regions of Proskuriv and Mohyliv.

The rally was held under the open sky with translators and loudspeakers so that all heard the greetings from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, the Soviet of People's Commissars and others.

The meeting lasted until the evening and ended with everybody happily signing the "socialist pact for competition among all the villages in carrying out the collectivization program." A resolution was passed stressing the need for all districts to adopt collectivization. A delegation was elected to present a flag to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine.

(*Pravda*, November 27, 1929)

COLLECTIVIZATION IS NEEDED UP IN ODESSA

The decision of the Regional Party Committee to complete the collectivization of farming in the whole region of Odessa within the forthcoming year has been hailed with great enthusiasm by the workers' and farmers' organizations. The conference of the village, the Regional Party Committee and Party centers has approved the decision as timely. The basic

reason for this is the swift, unceasing tempo of collectivization which has already taken in 40 per cent of the farms.

At present, the process of complete collectivization is drawing to a close in the Berezov, Spartan, Blahoyev, Tilihulo-Berezan, Kominternov and other districts. Putting through collectivization in the whole region simplified the matter of setting up eleven machine-tractor stations (MTS), seven belonging to the state, two to the co-operatives and two to collective farms.

Many experienced Party workers are coming to the villages. Extensive preparatory work is beginning. Patronage organizations of different establishments are opening campaigns for popularizing complete collectivization.

(*Pravda*, November 28, 1929).

STEPPING UP COLLECTIVIZATION IN THE KIEV REGION

The strong aspirations of the farm hands, the poor and middle farmers towards complete collectivization and the appearance among them of able organizers and cultural workers are going to allow for stepping up collectivization for 1929-30. Instead of 5.9 per cent of the farms stated to be collectivized as of October 1, 35 per cent should be completed by the end of the year and 40 per cent by spring.

In the sugar-beet districts, Kaharlyk, Berezan, Rzhyschchiw, Boryspol, the agreeable conditions make it possible to take in 50 to 60 per cent of the farms by spring, 1930.

Three to four months remain until the spring seeding. The work at hand must be reconstructed and help given to the poor and middle farmers to become fully collectivized.

(*Pravda*, December 31, 1929)

COMPLETE COLLECTIVIZATION

The Dniepropetrovsk Regional Party Committee has passed a resolution regarding collectivization. Ac-

ording to plan, 53 per cent of the whole area of the region must be collectivized by spring and 70 per cent by the following fall. Complete collectivization must be completed by spring of 1931. Already this year the following districts have come in on the collectivization program, Mezhev, Karl Marx, Verkhne-Dnieprovska, Vasyliw and Kamenka. In order to carry through the intended measures the Regional Party Committee has proclaimed the mobilization of the whole Party organization. Steps have been taken to strengthen the Party hold on the collective farm management. Party and Comsomol groups are being organized in the collective farms.

The technical base has improved greatly. Besides eight machine-tractor stations, which will begin to function next spring, some districts are organizing horse-tractor stations. With all these measures Dniepropetrovsk, which has a population of 1.5 millions and as a strip of the Ukrainian steppe provides 10 per cent of the grain of USSR, must be completely collectivized.

(Pravda, January 12, 1930)

The collectivization movement is growing. While earlier only odd districts had complete collectivization, the movement has now expanded considerably and embraces masses of poor and middle farmers in all regions of Ukraine.

Most of the steppe regions have been collectivized 50 to 60 per cent. The districts on the right bank of the Dnieper are keeping up with them. They are especially important for their technical education. By the time spring seeding rolls around Ukraine hopes to take 700,000 poor farmers into collectivization and about 150,000 farm laborers.

Collectivization is the key problem of all local, central and soviet organizations. This is proven by the recent conference of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine which was wholly devoted to collectivization.

(Pravda, January 13, 1930)

CHESTS IN COLLECTIVE FARMS TOO

The head of the District Executive Committee, Korol, came to the village of Oreshka, Novohardvolyn district, to conduct the collectivization program. He set to work immediately.

Without first acquainting himself with conditions in the village, or giving the villagers preliminary preparation, he simply announced that all must join the collective farm and added: "Those who do not will be deported to the Solowky Islands with the *kurkuls*." The farmers became frightened.

They did not wish to be shipped away to the Solowky so they signed up for collectivization. Then they worried about what would become of them.

In the Lyubarske and Starokonstantyniwka districts in the Vynnytsya region, everything was subject to collectivization even to the women's hope chests. All clothing, household goods and women's chests were taken to the collective farm general collection and then divided equally among everybody.

This created a bad impression of the collectives and brought strong protests from the women.

(*Pravda*, March 12, 1930)

COLLECTIVIZATION FEVER

The Vynnytsya Region is leading among other regions in the collectivization program. On March 10th it had collectivized 110,688 poor and middle farmers—70 per cent—and socialized 850,000 acres of cultivated land—75.0 per cent.

Nevertheless all districts are not collectivizing evenly. For instance:

1. Kalyniwka District (at the forefront)—93.4 per cent.
2. Lypove—85.3 per cent.
3. Lipets—81.3 per cent.
4. Turbiw—80 per cent
5. Sytkiw—63.4 per cent.
6. Nemyriw—62.3 per cent.
7. Voroniw—47.3 per cent.

Throughout the region 70.5 per cent of livestock has been socialized, 92.2 per cent in the leading Kalyniwka district and 39 per cent in Tyvriw, which is in last place.

The number of horse-machine stations opened in the region is 182. On March 1st there were only 107 of them so that in the first few days of March a 40 per cent gain was reached.

The number of socialized horses is 34,248.

They have been used for setting up 11 sugar beet trusts which needed 900 horses.

The districts leading in the number of horse-machine stations are: Zhmerynka—31, Kalyniwka—23, Turbiw—20.

(Visti, March 18, 1930).

I. DUBYNETS

COLLECTIVES OR THE TSAR

In the fall and winter months of 1931 a campaign for complete collectivization was in full swing in the villages of Kobyshe, Nosiwka district, Chernyhiw region, just as it was in other villages and regions of Ukraine. Continual meetings of farmers were called where they were told in glowing terms of the virtues of collective farming. The farmers were skeptical of propaganda promising such a paradise and preferred to continue to farm their own tracts of land.

But the Soviet orders were that all farmers must voluntarily join collective farms. So one day a general meeting was called in the village school at which a representative of the Nosiw District Party Committee, Myrovy, was in charge. After a long speech on the advantages of the collective systems said bluntly to the tired farmers.

"Those for the collective farms raise your hands." No hands were raised. All were silent. Then he said:

"Those against the collective farms raise your hands." Silence again and no hands went up. The enraged agent opened two doors leading to adjoining class rooms and announced.

"Those for collective farms and the Soviet government and against the Tsar enter the room on the right. Those against the collective farms, against the Soviet government but for the

Tsar enter the room to the left." The farmers continued to sit silently.

The agent was bursting with anger. He grabbed the first man before him by the sleeve and started dragging him to the room on the right. The farmer struggled and resisted.

"So! You are against collective farms but for the Tsar," shouted the agent and pulled him into the left room. The farmer fought back. Holding fast to the door he screamed in a voice full of anguish and despair, "Help! Help!"

All the same, the farmers finally made their applications to join the collective farms voluntarily.

W. SLOBIDSKY

DRIVEN INTO COLLECTIVE FARMS BY GPU PROVOCATIONS

The large village of Vesela, just outside of Kharkiw, was one of the most progressive villages in the whole region| Before the Revolution it was hampered by a land shortage but during the Revolution it supported the Soviet government and thus was given the land formerly belonging to the landlord. It became prosperous.

When collectivization started, the village, taking advantage of its good standing with the government, declined to join the collective farm. No coaxing or threats influenced the farmers in their stand. Then the GPU came in.

A veterinary arrived in the village. He visited the farmers and talked to them of the pitfalls of the Soviet regime, asked them about their own life and advised them against joining the collective farm. The farmers warmed to his talk, and agreed with the ideas he expressed. And so the list of "enemies of the people" was compiled.

The "veterinary" then called a meeting of those who thought alike. Fifty-two farmers, of the three hundred in the village, attended. The "veterinary" began a speech on the unfairness of the government, lamenting the suffering of the farmers and calling on them to defend themselves. The farmers needed no agitation, for they themselves were ready to do that and proclaimed their feelings at the meeting.

While the meeting was in progress the building was sur-

10 МЕТУ СЕЛЬСЬКОЇ ХА ГОСП.

ДО.....

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Немаючи на нинішній час категоричне розв'язання, кення по лінії райкоємислілки з справи контракти та закупівлі молока та худоби, для чого з цього часу не змінило ніякого з'ясування справи в році-тільки нестачання стору на існуючому.

головною причиною термів цієї роботи є те, що селар,и та інші громадяни організації бача, вважають що ця робота повинна керуватися лише виробничим організаціями, до роботи селар, нестачуються.

злетом після цієї роботи ці, знову, акція гомів селар, та виробничих товариств утворити цю комісію селар,и в "сезоні виробничому" т-ву комісії не перебуває, контракти всіх змі, на обов'язок яких покладає керування цією роботою. Провести збори виробничих селар,и селар,и, як і виробничих т-вах, збори агас та з'ясування "з не-куді і з'ясування це питання, взагалі утворити навколо цього питання селар,и тільки тоді можна селар,и, івати з'являти у цій роботі. На нинішній час, у селар,и з'являється і селар,и, що куркульство з'являється в різних селах та утворити останній вказати ці з'являється, на процесі збори. Про виробничі компанії, селар,и з'являється до виробничому т-ву за формами, і планом на місці райкоємислілки.

Г О Л О В А Р У К И / Г А Р Н У М А /

Р О С Т О В А Р У К И / М І Т Т І /

З Г Л О В О І С Е К Р Е Т А Р .

The milk and livestock requisitioned

rounded by a GPU contingent. The farmers were all arrested and exiled to the Urals.

After several years had passed I met one of the unfortunate participants in that fatal meeting. He was crippled, his hands and feet had been frozen. He did not know what had become of his colleagues but he had once met the "veterinary" who was moving about in freedom.

After that fateful meeting the other farmers joined the collective farm "voluntarily."

W. SLOBIDSKY

FORCED TO JOIN COLLECTIVE FARM BY POISONING

In the large village of Lypkiwka, near Kharliw, the Party organization assigned to the Communist Hurenko, the responsibility for organizing the collective farm by any means he saw fit, because if he failed he would be deprived of his Party membership. A Party card was, to anyone like Hurenko, equivalent to the so-called "Bread Card" because it meant a chance of a good, paying job.

And try all means and methods he did; at first mild, persuasive ones. The *kurkuls* had all been taken care of by that time and only the poor farmers were left, with nothing much to lose in worldly possessions. But they refused Hurenko's advice and did not join.

So he invented another scheme. He called the farmers to a meeting in a house and lit a fire in the stove. Before it started to burn well he closed all the dampers and posted guards at the door so no one could get out.

The imprisoned farmers were nearly all asphyxiated by the thick smoke. In semi-consciousness he led them out one at a time, giving them a chance to join the collective farm "voluntarily", otherwise he promised to return them to the smoke-filled house.

As was expected, they all gave their signatures to join "voluntarily."

That is how in the village of Lypkiwka the collective farm "Hammer and Sickle" was organized and Hurenko received praise from the Party Committee.

С. С. Р. В.
Тех. секретарь Радгоспін
Радгоспінський Комітет
Сільсько-господарський відділ
Сільсько-господарський відділ
Сільсько-господарський відділ

До Голови сільради: Миколайської, Березинської, Вілицької, Сурьківської, Миколаївської, Козинської, Сидимівської, Чарношанської, Ільківської, Якимівської та Закарпатської, Любомирська та Чортківська.

.....

За постановою вищих директивних органів та Радгоспінського відділу сільських рад і для радгоспін: Любомирська та Чортківська має організувати Сільські ОБСЛУЖУВАННЯ.

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Необхідно прийняти до цієї роботи акції та громадські організації сільські.

Колома Рад / Неумченко /

Секретар / Микола Іванович

Compulsory "savings banks" for the peasants

THOSE AGAINST COLLECTIVIZATION ARE ENEMIES OF THE GOVERNMENT

At the beginning of August, 1929, a District Party representative, Comrade Syerov, came to the village of Vyazivok, Pavlohrad district, Dniepropetrovsk region. He was in charge of grain collecting, taking away all the farmers had, and called upon them to join the collective farm. But the farmers refused.

In November the village was divided into four divisions and pressure was exerted on each one separately. Later, a general meeting was called and the representative-propagandist declared: "According to the resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party it is the duty of every farmer to join the collective farm. Whoever refuses to join is an enemy of the government."

Notwithstanding the alternative threatened, and the pressure and terror preceding, in all four divisions only four staunch Communist farmers, ten poor farmers and fourteen laborers, out of the 2,000 present at the meeting, voted in favor of the collective farm.

"Who is in favor of joining the collective farm?" asked the chairman of the meeting and only twenty-eight voted.

"Who is opposed?" No one voted.

Then the directors of the meeting flatly stated that all those present were on the list as having attended the meeting and the list was now accepted for the collective farm. If anyone did not wish to join he would have to make a special application to have his name withdrawn.

I. LISOVSKY

FORCED INTO COLLECTIVE FARM BY EXECUTIONS

Znameniwka, in the Novo-Moscovsk district, Dniepropetrovsk region, was a fairly large village with about 2,000 farmers. My story is about one street in this village, the T. Shevchenko Street on which we lived.

There were 65 homes in this street. After the harvest of 1929 collectivization and de-kurkulization began, in charge of a Russian, Bolotov, and his group of activists. In

С П И С О К

ТВЕРДОСТАВНИ РАЙОН ТА ЙХ ВИКОНАННЯ ТВЕРДСЬК
ЗАВДАНЬ ПО ДЕКУРКУЛІЗАЦІЇ НА 1/1-1933 року.

Дрібніше та інше.	Земельна	Відповідна	Характерист.
	в прогн.	в дотверг.	
А Ф І М І			
ГОРБОНЕС Кувша.....	27	6,6	Розгородились.
ГОРБОНЕС Ваво.....	13,3	16,63	Спеціальне місце: ✓
МАКАРЕНКО Валентин.....	16,6	6,66	Розгородились.
ЗЕЛЕНКО Марія.....	10,0	---	Розгородились, сам працює в Державному парку на комах як гарний спеціаліст.
КОРСУН Степан.....	17,0	---	Розгородились, чоловік в Спеціальні
РОМАШКОВО:			
БІЛІЙ Ніла Федорівна.....	14,0	---	Розгородились в 31 р. насудили в 1932 р.
ІВАНУШЕНКО Дмитро Іванович.....	13,5	---	Розгородились в 1931 р.
СІДІВ Бод.Вас.....	30,0	3,0	Розгородились.
ШАВРИН Іван Федорович.....	9,5	3,0	Розгородились в 1931 р.
ІВАНУШЕНКО Гаврило Іванович.....	8,5	2,0	
ІВАНУШЕНКО:			
ІВАНУШЕНКО Микола.....	26,34	10,08	В селі немає.
ІВАНУШЕНКО Захар.....	28,17	16,15	
ІВАНУШЕНКО:			
ІВАНУШЕНКО Іван.....	7,8	-	В т і м.
ІВАНУШЕНКО Федорівна.....	3,8	-	З т і м.
ІВАНУШЕНКО Марія.....	3,76	-	З т і м.
ІВАНУШЕНКО:			
ІВАНУШЕНКО Семен.....	16,08	-	В т і м, кім в Пури.
ІВАНУШЕНКО Кувша.....	32,00	-	Арестованний за деяких роки.
ІВАНУШЕНКО Новий.....	13,90	-	Р о з г о р о д и л и с ь.
ІВАНУШЕНКО:			
ІВАНУШЕНКО Мик.Викторівна.....	20,63	-	
ІВАНУШЕНКО Гаврило.....	7,06	7,06	
ІВАНУШЕНКО:			
ІВАНУШЕНКО Іван Григор.....	44,55	14,8	Розгородились, в селі між
ІВАНУШЕНКО Гаврило Григор.....	72,00	13,71	Розгородились, в селі між
ІВАНУШЕНКО Гаврило.....	22,54	-	В т і м.
ІВАНУШЕНКО Гаврило.....	10,06	-	Розгородились в Р. в селі

A list of the dekurkulized

the first days of this campaign seven farmers on our street were d e - k u r k u l i z e d.

But in spite of all the means used to force the farmers into the collective farm they remained adamant. Then a new method was devised.

The GPU arrived in the village. Six farmers on our street were arrested and sentenced to different prison terms. Three were sentenced to be shot. They were the village veterinary, Anton Malyshka, the church-choir leader, Khoma Lopata, who was d e - k u r k u l i z e d earlier, and Trokhym Myrshavia, a poor farmer but a Ukrainian patriot.

After this terrorism the rest of the villagers all signed up.

P A R T II

CHAPTER I.

RETREAT AND COLLAPSE OF COLLECTIVIZATION

Having begun the collectivization battle against the farmers, in the second half of 1929, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, headed by Stalin, led its Communist forces to utter defeat. The whole Soviet press and propaganda machine had been mobilized for this war. *P r a v d a*, of course, was the most authoritative from which other newspapers took their cue, and so did the special brigades who travelled all over the country supervising and goading on those in charge and battering the farmers with abuse.

The first six months of this war in Ukraine were conducted at a violent pace, striving for 100 per cent collectivization.

The Communists soon outdid themselves. In six months they uprooted the whole farming industry. They *d e-k u r k u l- i z e d* the better farmers, deported them to concentration camps and drove the others into collective farms by savage, inhuman methods, evoking hatred and resentment for the regime. They destroyed livestock and broke machinery. They were made to care for the grain robbed from the farmers. In many places armed battles flared up. Uprisings, assassinations of government representatives and *a c t i v i s t s*, arson and sabotage in collective farms became prevalent. This period of unrest could easily have resulted in open revolt.

It was really a tragic state of affairs, much like a raid on enemy territory where the raiders rob and plunder all they can in as short a time as possible, not knowing what to do with the spoils.

Even among the local Communists, who had been forced into the position of organizers in the attack on the farmers, a passive resistance appeared, which later turned into active resistance, for they saw the stupidity of their own actions. All this served as a trump-card in the hands of the rightist opposition, the Bukharin-Rykov group, within the Party who had forecast the downfall of the agricultural industry and had many sympathizers in the Party.

In addition, the Soviet government also began at this time, in connection with collectivization, its persecution of religious worship. This brought an unfavorable response from the outside world and caused a closer watch to be kept on other events in the USSR from abroad. The Central Committee was then alarmed into a retreat which was, as in any war, a maneuver to reorganize its forces and renew the attack.

The actual Soviet documents illustrate these events more eloquently.

WHY RETREAT IN COLLECTIVIZATION WAS NECESSARY

It is now evident that the principle of building collectivization on a voluntary basis has been abandoned. In district after district, the voluntary principle has been replaced by coercion through threats of de-kurkulization, disfranchisement and other repressive methods.

In scores of districts, instead of preliminary preparation and patient interpretation of the Party line in the collectivization program, bureaucratic and functionary decrees of over-inflated figures in the data of the allegedly organized collective farms have been paramount.

The kurkuls and their shadows capitalized on this distortion and, seeking to provoke, proposed, instead of agricultural artels, the creation of collectives and the socialization of dwellings, sheep, goats, swine and fowl. At the same time they instigated the farmers to slaughter their livestock before joining the collective farms explaining that "in any case everything will be taken away." The class enemy counted on the distortions and errors of the local organizations to provoke the indignation and wrath of the farmers towards the Soviet government and thus lead to revolts.

Consequently, in view of the blunders of the Party organizations and obvious provocation by the class enemy, threatening signs of serious dissatisfaction on the part of the farmers appeared in many districts against the background of unquestionable success in collectivization. In some places the kurkuls and their agents even managed to talk the farmers into anti-Soviet action.

Following a decision of the Central Committee, Stalin's article "Dizzy With Success" was published, and has served to

appease the farm masses. On March 15 the Central Committee resolution concerning the struggle with the distortion of the Party line in the collective farm movement was published. (History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, (in Russian, 1945, yy. 294-295.)

DIZZY WITH SUCCESS IN COLLECTIVIZATION

(Excerpts from Stalin's article, published in PRAVDA, March 2, 1930).

It is a fact that by February 20 we had collectivized 50 per cent of the farms in the USSR. This means that by February 20, 1930, we had doubled our Five-Year Plan in collectivization. The fundamental change of the farm to socialism may be considered assured.

But success also has its dark side, especially when it is achieved comparatively "easily," in the form of a surprise, so to speak.

The success of our collective farm policy may be explained by the fact that it is based on the voluntary principle of the collective farm movement and on the attention paid to different conditions in different districts of the USSR. The collective farms must not be filled by force. The collective movement must be based on the active support of the majority of the farm masses.

But, instead, what is really taking place? Can we say that the voluntary principle and the deference paid to local peculiarities have not been violated in many districts? No, unfortunately we cannot. What use are they, these bureaucratic decrees regarding the collective farm movement, these unworthy threats to the farmers? They are of no use except to our enemies.

The artel appears to be the fundamental link in the collective farm movement because it is the most expedient method of solving the grain problem, which is the basis of the whole system of agriculture. Attempts are being made to come out of the artel confines and plunge right into the farm collective.

What good is this foolish hastiness, so detrimental to the cause? To antagonize the collective farmer with "socialization" of dwellings, cows, sheep, goats, swine and fowl when the grain problem has not yet been solved and the artel system is not yet consolidated is a "policy" useful to our mortal enemies only.

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY IS FORCED TO CONFESS

(From a resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, March 15, 1930).

To all Central Committees of the National Republics and the Regional, District and Party Committees.

There is positive evidence of distortion of the Party line. The principle of voluntariness is being violated and replaced by coercive measures, such as threats of de-kurkulization and disfranchisement.

As a result some middle and even poor farmers fall into the ranks of the de-kurkulized and in some districts, indeed their number reaches 15 per cent, and that of the disfranchised 15 and 20 per cent of the total population.

There are cases of an extremely uncouth and criminally offensive attitude on the part of subordinate Party workers towards the population. People are often victimized by counter-revolutionaries, who have wormed their way into the Party, through robbery, division of property and arrests of the middle, and even poor, farmers. Bureaucratic directives are applied to swell the percentage figures of collectivization.

Hand in hand with such distortions is the unreasonable, and quite useless, compulsory socialization of dwellings, sheep, goats, swine, fowl and sows in many districts and the stupid switch from the artel to the collective farm system.

As a result of these senseless distortions the

collectivization movement has been discredited in many districts and the farmers are hastily withdrawing from the quickly-formed, uncertain artels and collectives.

The Central Committee also considers it important to note the un-called for distortions of the Party line in the exchange of commodities between villages and towns. The prohibition of markets is resulting in a shortage of consumer goods in the towns.

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party resolves:

1. To stop compulsory methods of collectivization.
2. To consolidate the success so far achieved in collectivization.
3. To stop the compulsory socialization of dwellings, sheep, goats, swine, fowl and cows.
4. To conduct an inquiry into the methods of *d e k u r k u l i z a t i o n* and disfranchisement.
5. To abide by the rule of excluding from *k u r k u l* category those families which have government representatives among them, such as Red partisans, men in the Red Army and the Red Navy (privates and commanding officers), rural school teachers, on condition that such representatives vouch for them.
6. To re-open the market places and make it illegal to close them in the future.

(*Pravda*, March 15, 1930).

The following documents are excerpts from the Soviet press, which had earlier supported collectivization, revealing the monstrous methods and form of collectivization and its aftermath. At the same time they show how the failure of the collective farms came about.

THE AFFAIR IN HAYSYN

In different villages of the Haysyn district unwarranted interference by the administration had occurred in the struggle with religious superstitions. Church bells were taken down without the consent of the majority of the population and churches were closed without express permission from headquarters.

People were forced against their will to join collective farms under threat of over-taxation, confiscation of livestock, machinery and seed grain.

Seed grain was obtained by raiding the poor and middle farmers. The raids were usually carried out in the middle of the night, provoking the animosity of the people towards government measures.

Such incident undoubtedly cause a lack of understanding of the true meaning of collectivization, because collectivization built on coercion is a perversion of the truth.

All this merely aids our enemies, the *k u r k u l s*. They have begun to perk up their heads and spread counter-revolutionary tales, instigating the poor and middle farmers against the Soviet government measures.

In connection with this, twenty-one people have been indicted and will soon be brought to trial before the Regional visiting assizes in Haysyn. Included in the list are:

Head of the District Executive Committee — Dobrynsky.

Secretary of the District Party Committee — Palamarchuk.

Vice-President of the District Executive Committee — Kwyatowsky.

Komsomol Secretary — Shahyn.

Inspector of Public Schools — Mahita.

(*Visti*, March 30, 1930).

RIGHTING SOME WRONGS

Outrageous distortions in collectivization have come to light in the village of Syrovo, Vradyewka district. The Party and Komsomol centers, the Committee of Poor Farmers, the authorized collectivization representatives and the grain collecting agents had decided to complete, at all cost, the collectivization of the whole village. For this purpose they set up several offices in different parts of the village.

They began their task by calling those who had refused to join the collective farm into one of the

part of the round he was asked to go some distance outside the village and fetch the dirt for sodding the office grounds.

Three other people, when they refused to be talked into signing, were given a note to deliver to the adjoining village, Kumar, about ten miles away and told to return before morning.

The secretary of the District Party Committee, Kutsenko, forced the villagers to feed all the office staff.

This treatment gave the *k u r k u l s* the weapons they needed and consequently 600 people, out of a total of 900 collective farm members, withdrew in a single day (after publication of Stalin's article "Dizzy With Success," — Ed.) and the collective farm collapsed.

(*Pravda*, March 13, 1930).

ATTEMPTS TO REPAIR THE DAMAGE

In the village of Bobryky, Nizhenka district, a group of ignorant collective farmers, influenced by the *k u r k u l s*, gave notice of their intention to withdraw from the collective farm. The Chief of the District Land Department, Shlyakhovy, could find no other solution than to arrest the farmers, and he ordered the militia to do so. The assistant prosecutor, Makaglov, who was on an assignment in the village, arrested the group of poor and middle farmers and quickly put a resolution through the village Soviet to have them deported.

The Nizhenka Regional Party Committee Bureau has declared that in the Bobryky District the Party line is particularly distorted. According to the Bureau resolution, the secretary of the District Party Committee and several other people have been dismissed from their posts.

The Hlukhiwka Regional Party Committee Bureau has declared that a number of distortions exist in the Novo-Siveriwka district. In accordance with the Bureau resolution the chief of the District Party Committee, Barabash, has been dismissed and the

District Party Committee representative has been recalled from the district.

(Pravda, March 23, 1930).

The Luhansk Regional Party Committee Bureau declared, after a lecture on collectivization, that, notwithstanding the precise directives of the Regional Party Committee, in certain places and in the Krasnoluk District especially and to a degree in the Slavyansk and other districts, grave blunders were permitted as well as distortions of the class line, which are apparent in the raids, the confiscation of seed grain and the socialization of cattle.

(Pravda, March 15, 1930).

In the village of Petriwka the farmers were asked for immediate and complete socialization of all their property, including swine, sheep and chickens. This caused great resentment among the poor and middle farmers. The *kurkuls* have taken advantage of these blunders and now agitate against all our measures. All anti-Soviet forces have united against collectivization. The *kurkuls* have launched their campaign just before seeding time, inciting the poor farmers into withdrawing from collective farms taking out their seed grain, horses and machinery.

(Pravda, March 25, 1930).

Crass administration in the Petriwka district, Dniepropetrovsk region, has resulted in paper-made collective farms. They had to be dissolved. Consequently, the head of the District Executive Committee, Yakimets, was relieved of his post and so were the head of the District Land Department, the head of the Committee of the Committee of Poor Farmers, the head of the village Soviet and the secretary of the Party center. The Bureau of the Regional Committee of Komsomols is to be dissolved.

(Pravda, March 23, 1930).

In the village of Maksymo-Novo-Hrushiwka, Shakhtynka region, a unique event occurred on March 20. On this day, which was set for seeding operations to begin, 36 collective farmers handed in their notices

of withdrawal from the collective farm. The head of the village Soviet, instead of explaining the true reasons for this mass withdrawal, arrested these people.

(*Pravda*, March 26, 1930).

Instances of relentless administration were evident in the Haysyn district. The poor and middle farmers were forced to join the collective farm by over-taxation, confiscation of their livestock, machinery and seed. Collection of seed grain was conducted in the form of night raids on the poor and middle farmers. Figures for the organized collective farms were inflated.

The visiting assizes of the Tulchyn Regional Court has given the secretary of the District Party Committee, Palamarchuk, and the head of the District Executive Committee, Dobzhynsky, a public reprimand, and has suspended them both from public office for three years. Others suspended from their positions were: the vice-president of the District Executive Committee, Kvytkovsky, for one and a half years, the schoolteacher, Heres, for two years and the agriculturalist, Reznik, for five years.

(*Pravda*, April 11, 1930).

In the Kamenka district, Sheychenko region, collectivization was barely 40 to 50 per cent completed, in the Medvedivka region 10 per cent, in Cherkassy and Chyhyrny still less, and yet on paper the record shows 60 to 90 per cent. Where are the missing figures in the rate of collectivization?

The *kurkuls* have begun widespread agitation in those places where the foundation is not yet knocked from under them, and for the time being have triumphed.

In great numbers they terrorized the collectivization activists and carried away from the collective farms whatever livestock and machinery had thus far been collected, knocking the uncompleted structure down. In Medvedivka, a week and a half ago, the *kurkuls* set fire, to the horse barn and the hay-loft. Fourteen horses and all the hay burned.

Following this incident 150 men gave notice of withdrawal from the collective farm.

In a similar fire in Ivkiwka all the forage was burned. The same happened in Hrushkiwka, Verbowka and Yanech. In Komariwka the collective farm guards were beaten up and all the machinery was taken away. In the village of Chernyawka all the village activists were held helpless in a school-room while the farm machinery was taken away.

Again we are partitioning the land into individual farmsteads for those who do not wish to farm collectively, and then once more we will socialize and rebuild until the kurkul resistance has been broken once and for all.

(By: Hrebenyuk. *Pravda*, April 17, 1930).

In the village of Verowka, Enakiev district, in the Donets basin a collectivization superintendent, Kyrychenko, flatly stated that the farmers had two alternatives. One was to work in a mine and give all their property to the collective farm, and the other to join the collective farm bringing their farms and equipment with them. The third course led to Siberia and Kamchatka. This was for those who refused to turn their property over to the collective farm and who consequently would be so oppressed with heavy taxes that they would be driven off their land.

After these preliminary statements, they plunged into compulsory socialization. First, the horses were taken from the collective and individual farmers, then the farm implements such as plows, seed drills, harrows, and finally the grain was swept from the sheds, leaving not even a single bushel for the farmers' family needs.

They took the horses from those farmers who were away at work in the mines, ignoring the pleas and tears of the women. Not even a signed statement was given to that effect. One worker, Terentiy Lazarenko, who had worked in the mines for twenty-five years and was the sole breadwinner for his family of seven, was deprived of his one horse and the farm machinery he possessed. The horse was

appraised at 7 rubles, and later sold for 60 rubles. When Lazarenko asked for the return of his possessions he was threatened with Kamchatka.

(By a worker, Nelepa, *Pravda*, April 19, 1930).

The Regional Administration of Tulchyn was absorbed in bureaucratic management. By intimidation and coercion these super-collectivizers wrought the inevitable results. The collective farms grew on paper only. Distortions assumed mass proportions. The work of the poor and middle farmers was not all taken into account.

The local organizations abused the poor farmers and twisted the Party line with regard to the middle farmers. Ruthlessly and conveniently the class line was distorted in the co-operatives. Those who did not subscribe full shares were not sold any merchandise. The poor farmers went without salt, matches and kerosene for their lamps.

In many districts of the Tulchyn region the middle farmers were especially ill-treated. Where, during 1928-29 their taxes had been 5 rubles, in 1929-30 they were raised to 135 rubles. The farmers were placed in a position where they could neither buy nor sell. This caused a mass withdrawal of the farmers from the collective farm. The Tulchyn officials did not understand the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, taking it to be a digression from the general line.

The Tulchyn region is being re-staffed with new officials who are capable of carrying on the work in Communist style.

(W. Kuzmenko, *Pravda*, April 26, 1930).

DISTORTERS OF THE "PARTY LINE"

In the Zinoviev District Executive Committee, Bocharov, Owcharenko and Riryukov maliciously distorted the Party directives.

These men slyly wormed their way into the Party and, sent to the villages to conduct important campaigns such as the preparation for spring seeding

and collecting seed grain, they began their work in a very high-handed manner.

Bocharov opened five offices in the village and started to collect the seed. With the poor and middle farmers who had no seed grain Bocharov dealt energetically. He locked them in cold sheds without their outer garments for several hours at a time. He perfected this method as he proceeded. After keeping the farmers in one shed he sent them to the next office, to be placed in another cold shed for similar treatment, from there to the next and so on.

Naturally, such an extreme distortion of the Party and the Soviet government line only served to discredit the government, and evoked bitter resentment from the farmers.

The malicious and bull-headed distorters of the Party line and government directives wound up in the ranks of the convicted.

The Zinoviev Regional Court sentenced Bocharov to seven years imprisonment and Owcharenko and Bi-ryukov to five years each.

(*Visti*, April 29, 1930).

Below are several documents, the evidence of living witnesses, on the same subject.

As Yawz, the agriculturalist, points out women played a major role in the demolition of the collective farms. The men at that time had been extremely terrorized and cowed. They had been dragged by the activists and different government representatives so many times to offices of the village Soviet and collective farm headquarters and interrogated about collectivization, grain collecting and other farming campaigns. It was usually the men who were arrested and deported. Thus they had become more or less subdued and resigned to their fate, so the women took over the fight.

They became active participants in public affairs — mostly anti-Soviet participants. During the period of the removal of church bells it was the women in all the villages who rallied to the defence. During the compulsory enrollment of the farmers into collective farms, the women created an uproarious resistance and the men were forced to recognize their efforts.

So it was the women who were the fiercest enemies of collectivization.

When news of Stalin's article, stating that collective farms must be built on a voluntary basis and not on coercion, became known, the women all rushed to take them apart. The demolition of the collective farms must be considered the greatest political movement of the women in the USSR.

S. YAWZ (an agriculturalist)

"DIZZY WITH SUCCESS" AND THE DEMOLITION OF THE COLLECTIVE FARMS

When collectivization began in the fall of 1929, many local Communists and activists were so captivated by the new venture that they wholeheartedly threw themselves into the task. In frantic excitement they drove the people into collective farms with excessive cruelty. They took away all their livestock and fowl. The farmers began a mass slaughter of their domestic animals rather than give them away for nothing. Here the Soviet government committed serious blunders, with its brutality toward the farmers, which later boomeranged.

Then Stalin wrote the article "Dizzy With Success," shoving the whole blame on local Communists and pretending that the government knew nothing of what went on at the bottom. When he declared, in his article, that collectivization was wholly voluntary the farmers, particularly the women, were quick to capitalize on the statement. The men, fearing repression and arrest, were more careful in their actions but the women were keenly energetic.

Simultaneously, the women in all the villages organized and made a grand raid on the collective farms taking away their livestock, machinery and grain. Once the action got under way it spread like wildfire so that not a single village remained where the hastily-formed collective farm was left intact.

The local government organs, the militia and even the NKVD itself, were helpless in the face of this powerful onslaught. In places where attempts were made to defend the collective farms the women fought with weapons as well as with Stalin's words.

THE UPRISING OF THE COLLECTIVE FARM WOMEN

In the spring of 1930 the women's movement of rebellion had spread as if by contagion to all the villages of Ukraine.

From the Nemyriwka district it leaped to the Braglav district in the Podilya region. In their zeal to take the collective farms apart the women often resorted to violence, sometimes wounding aggressive Communist agents. When I was visiting a village in the Bratslav district I had occasion to witness one such incident. During a farmers' meeting the women surrounded the Communist emissary, threw him to the floor and beat him until he was taken to the hospital unconscious. Throughout the whole attack the men merely stood and stared, dumbfounded.

However, this spontaneous movement of the women was soon checked by the NKVD. Tens of thousands of the women were imprisoned or exiled. I saw them driven like cattle through the mud by the NKVD to the nearest prison. It is a spectacle that I shall never forget.

I have sometimes wondered if their corpses were not among those which I saw unearthed from the mass graves in Vynnytsia.

M. BOHUSLAVSKY

WHAT OCCURRED IN THE VILLAGE OF ZELENKA

In the village of Zelenka, Myroniw district, Kiev region, there were 1,189 farmers. During the period of de-kulization and collectiveization 365 farmers, or 30 per cent, were liquidated. Twenty-one farmers were arrested by the GPU, 181 with their families were shipped to the far North, and 140 were evicted from their homes. The rest were driven into collective farms by coercion and terror.

When Stalin's famous article appeared in the press, in which he tried to whitewash his own guilt by placing it on his subordinates, the farmers, all in one day, took their socialized possessions and left the collective farm. Only about 10 per cent still remained. The Soviet government reacted to this event by new repressive measures, forcing the people back to the collectives again.

Twenty men were then arrested in the village for allegedly

belonging to the Organization for the Liberation of Ukraine. Most of them were poor farmers and their subsequent fate was unknown. Others subject to arrest had fled from the village.

Herewith we present a document concerning the disfranchisement of farmers. The document does not always state the total population, so that it is impossible to know the exact percentage of those deprived of their franchise. The term "earlier" means prior to the 1928-29 period when 5 to 7 per cent of the farmers were already disfranchised. According to the evidence altogether 15 to 20 per cent of the farmers were disfranchised, including the poorest farmers.

DISTORTION OF THE FRANCHISE

In the Dniepropetrovsk region an extensive inquiry is being conducted into the list of those deprived of the right to vote. Even the preliminary steps in this direction have revealed many cases of violation of the class line.

In Krasnopol 38 people had been disfranchised earlier and now the number stands at 168; in Voskresenets 33 earlier, 77 at present; in Pidhorod 98 earlier, 312 at present; in Slavyansk 157 earlier, now 459.

In a great number of cases the lists included names of poor and middle farmers. In the Novo-Kaydak village Soviet a poor farmer was disfranchised for alleged speculation. In Pidhorod a poor widow with many children was disfranchised for selling sunflower seeds.

Many District Executive Committees knew of what was going on, but took no steps to correct it.

In many districts disfranchisement also included severe restrictions for the poor and middle farmers, such as expulsion of their children from schools, refusal of medical aid and refusal of all documents.

The Regional Party Committee is now taking steps to amend these errors, renewing the franchise of many poor and middle farmers in the process.

CHAPTER II.

REORGANIZING THE FORCES

After the Communist government had destroyed the economic base of agriculture, bringing about the downfall of complete collectivization while still in its initial stages and Stalin had announced his retreat tactics, giving rise to the demolition of the collective farms in all of Ukraine, the Communists then declared a re-grouping of their forces. This reorganization was meant to strengthen the foothold gained thus far, to bring up the rear and the reserves for a new, more successful attack upon the farmers, for complete collectivization was the only means by which the Communists could hold a complete monopoly over agricultural products.

The re-grouping of Communist forces began by placing all blame on subordinate workers of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, for the Central Committee itself had to remain infallible. The subordinate representatives of the government were forced to correct their distortions of the Party line, and on rare occasions were indicted and prosecuted. But these trials and prosecutions assumed a jocular, farcical aspect and were viewed with scorn by the people. Sometimes, for appearance' sake, the offenders were sentenced to two or three years in concentration camps.

There "distortions" had de-kurkulized and exiled to concentration camps in the North, tens of thousands of innocent farmers. Yet not the slightest attempt was made to return any of them to their homes, or return their confiscated property. All these efforts were credited to the success of collectivization, the foothold, which the Party was making such an effort to strengthen.

The re-grouping of forces simply meant changing the Central Committee representatives from one district to another. This and the few articles and promises from Stalin were supposed to appease the farmers. The promises were broken the very next day, the attack to smash the kurkuls was intensified a hundredfold.

What type of re-grouping of forces took place in the farmers' camp which had hitherto fought against collective slavery, for the anti-Communist forces were also re-grouped? The farmers were still classified, but not as they were during the first period of collectivization, when material riches signified the *kurkul* category. All the richer and more skillful farmers had long since been de-*kurkulized*, but the *kurkul* opposition to collectivization did not in the least diminish, and the class struggle became even more acute. Who, then, were the new *kurkuls*?

The *kurkul* label was now attached by the Communists to all those who refused to be persuaded to join the collective farms, and therefore constituted an opposition. If they were finally drawn in by unavoidable circumstances they became passively resistant.

Now the *kurkul* included the middle and poor farmers and at times even former activists Communists and Komsomols who defended the farmers. For that reason the popular terms now employed were "under-*kurkuls*," "*kurkul* fellow travellers," "*kurkul* saboteurs," and finally "enemies of the people."

The government cry against the *kurkuls* in the collective farms, rather than outside them, constantly deploring the "*kurkul* saboteurs" and making this group the scape-goat for all their blundering mismanagement and disorder.

RE-GROUPING AND ATTACK RATHER THAN RETREAT

(Excerpts from Stalin's reply to the comrade collective farmers.)

Is not this struggle with the distortion of the Party line a step backwards, a retreat? Of course not!

What we want is that those who permitted blunders and distortions should retreat from their mistakes. Only on these conditions shall we be able to continue with the real (underlined by the author) attack upon our class enemies.

How is a successful attack in war possible? When people do not limit themselves to a general push ahead, but also endeavor to secure the footholds already won, to re-group their forces to suit the

changing surroundings, pull up the rear and bring in the reserves.

The same may be said about the rules of attack on the class war front. A successful attack cannot be waged to liquidate the class enemies without firmly securing the positions already gained, re-grouping forces, assuring the front of reserves, bringing up the rear.

(Problems of Leninism, Moscow, 1952, pp. 345-346 [in Russian]).

RE-GROUPING OF FORCES BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY

Confronted with numerous signs of Party line distortions which have threatened collectivization with an untimely end, the Central Committee immediately began to remedy the situation. Besides Stalin's article, "Dizzy With Success," published March 2, 1930, the Central Committee published its resolution in regard to the "struggle with Party line distortions in the collective farm structure" in which it stated that "workers who cannot or will not lead a decisive fight against Party line distortions must be dismissed from their positions and replaced by others," (RESOLUTIONS OF THE CPSU, Part II, p. 663 [in Russian]). On April 3 Stalin's article, "Reply to Comrades Collective Farmers," was published. It stated that,

"On this basis the success of the collective movement was assured and the foundation laid for a new, gigantic growth of the collective farm system." The 16th Party Congress held on June 26, 1930, was recorded as the "congress of a mass socialist attack on the whole front of the liquidation war against the *k u r k u l s* and the establishment of complete collectivization." Soviet historians held that:

"Although, prior to the mass movement of the farmers to collective farms, the Soviet government depended mainly on socialized industry, it henceforth depends also on the swiftly growing socialized section of agriculture, the collective and state farms."

(History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Moscow, 1945, pp. 295-298 [in Russian]).

On May 1, 1930, collectivization of the farms in the chief grain-producing regions was already reaching 40 to 50 per cent.

The Five-Year Plan of the collective farm structure has been fulfilled more than one and a half times.

THE PARTY AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE DEVIATE IN COLLECTIVIZATION

(Excerpt from Kosior's speech at the Congress of the CP(b)U, on June 5, 1930).

We have often heard from our Party officials everywhere such statements as these about the present plight of the collective farms:

"Why are you hitting subordinate workers for allegedly distorting the Party line?"

"The Central Committee had not given sufficient leeway in collectivization. It did not heed the distortions when they took place, and it failed to give adequate directives."

"In this race and 'dizziness from success' the guilty are not only the workers on the lower levels but also those at the top, including the Central Committee."

"Frankly, the Central Committee is no less guilty than the others. The subordinate organizations were excited over their successes but the Central Committee was equally dizzy with success and failed to give proper directions in this matter."

"Until the present furore the Central Committee had never bestowed any favors on the collective farmers. After committing a series of serious blunders, the Central Committee hopes to redeem itself by suddenly granting favors."

The Party now resolutely launches its program of socialist reconstruction of the rural area.

SAVING PRESTIGE OF THE PARTY AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

(From the 7th Party Conference of the Ukrainian Military Region).

Attempts to discredit the Central Committee are coming from the right wing.

In his speech to the Marxist agrarians, Stalin

spoke of the liquidation of the *kurkuls* on the grounds of complete collectivization only, and of *de-kurkulization* only in those districts with complete collectivization. The Central Committee's resolution of January 6, 1930, bears this out. Stalin's reply to the driller's union again emphasizes the unlikelihood of *de-kurkulization* taking place outside the areas of complete collectivization, and yet in many places where the extent of collectivization is small the *kurkuls* have been liquidated.

The Central Committee is not at fault here.

In the resolution mentioned above the Central Committee clearly regards the farm *artel* as the basic form of collectivization, yet in many places this resolution has been violated and collectives have been created instead. The Central Committee is not to blame.

The Central Committee specified wholly voluntary collectivization, emphasizing the duty of every Communist to strengthen the union between workers and the poor and middle farmers, and urging that the work be carried on with the aid of poor farmers and farm laborers. In many places this resolution has been violated and the Central Committee is not at fault.

The task at hand is to secure and further develop the collective farm movement.

We often encounter situations where former leftist distorters are ready to abandon the battlefield to the *kurkuls* and to dissolve the mighty collectives. They throw up their hands and let the whole affair go under.

Since the 15th Party Congress, the role played by the proletariat has increased tremendously in the whole nation. In the socialist reconstruction of the rural areas its role has also grown considerably.

There are factions among the intelligentsia who are closely united with the Soviet government and the Party. Strong evidence points to the fact that a large number of the intelligentsia is drawn to the Party.

(*Visti*, May 15, 1930).

SABOTAGE IN AGRICULTURE IN UKRAINE

The GPU has uncovered a counter-revolutionary organization which, for years, has carried on sabotage in Ukrainian agriculture.

Usurping key posts in the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, the State Planning Department, the Ukrainian Farmers Bank and farm co-operatives this organization has willfully and systematically distorted the main political directives of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, made forcible attempts to direct agricultural development along capitalist lines, helped to strengthen the *kurkuls* economically and has counteracted the socialist measures of the Party in agriculture.

This organization comprised a group of men who had in the past been active in landlord slavery, who are former Constitutional Democrats, monarchists, mensheviks, and so forth. Among them were the following.

1. Syabro — Director of the agricultural division of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture — tried to create strong individual farms.

2. Mankovsky — Member of the State Planning Department.

3. Reznykov — Chief of the farming administration of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture — used his position to strengthen the position of the *kurkuls*.

4. Dibolt — Member of the administration of the seed division.

5. Podolsky — Director of the livestock division of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture.

6. Kononenko — Member of the administration of the Ukrainian Farmers Bank.

7. Tsentylovykh — Reviewer of the land plan of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture.

8. Obdulsky-Abdulevsky — Director of the statistical division of the Ukrainian Farmers Bank.

9. and 10. Onufriyev and Pidhorodny—Specialists in the State Planning Department.

11. Didusenko — Instructor in economics.

12. Matskevych — Head of the agricultural research center in Kiev.

13, 14, 15. Stepanenko, Dolenko, Emelyanov and others — Noted directors and specialists in the timbering industry.

16. Hursky, 17. Kolesnikov, 18. Shustov, 19. Kovalenko, 20. Padalka, 21. Marchenko — Planners of logging and lumbering.

(Visti, March 19, 1930).

The following documents are evidence of the confusion in the Communist Party and its Central Committee in connection with the distortion of the "Party line" and the reorganization of its forces in the farming area. This caused the demolition of the collective farm system and numerous misunderstandings among the Communists themselves. The farmers defended their own interests with Stalin's article.

Then a new article was published by Stalin, "Reply to our Collective Farm Comrades," in which he tried to explain the reason for the farmers' withdrawal from the collective farms, propounding Lenin's theory of voluntary collectivization. The Communists, as always, disregarded this theory completely and coercion and *d-e-k-u-r-k-u-l-i-z-a-t-i-o-n* continued unabated after the re-grouping was completed. No restitution to the poor and middle farmers was attempted, for no record to this effect was ever published in the Soviet press.

We have brief accounts from eye-witnesses telling of the feeble attempts to return the *d-e-k-u-r-k-u-l-i-z-e-d* children from concentration camps, where they were dying in enormous numbers. When that was done they all landed in the Soviet Children's Homes adding to the already huge numbers of homeless.

HOW STALIN EXPLAINED THE FAILURE OF THE COLLECTIVE FARMS

(Excerpt from Stalin's article, "Reply to Comrades Collective Farmers").

How can we explain the withdrawal of one section of the farmers from the collective farms? Some comrades fall into despair and become panicky. Others rejoice and forecast the complete collapse of the collective farm movement. Both are mistaken.

First of all, only dead souls leave the collective farms, which is nothing more than a display of nonsense.

Secondly, those leaving are foreign elements,

Воробей Павл Иванович
13
Колхозники не должны
не работают... не участвуют...
не платят...
Секрет
Давыдов

Order for widespread sale of liquor

actually hostile to our cause.

Finally, those leaving are the wavering element who are neither a hostile force nor dead souls. They are those farmers whom we were not able to convince of the rightness of our cause today, but whom we will no doubt convince tomorrow. The obvious conclusion is that the withdrawal of one section of the collective farmers is not a negative occurrence, but rather a beneficial process of the revival and strengthening of the collective farms.

A month ago it was considered that 60 per cent of the grain producing regions had been collectivized. If, after the withdrawal of one section of the farmers 40 per cent still remain, it will represent a great achievement.

Are those who are withdrawing the right thing? No, they are not.

A few days ago the Soviet government decided to exempt from taxation for a two-year period all socialized draught animals in the collective farm — horses, oxen, etc. — all cows, swine and fowl, either under the management of the collective farms or under the individual management of collective farmers.

Aside from this, the Soviet government has decided to extend the terms of debtors until the end of the year, and to cancel all fines imposed prior to April 1 on those farmers, who have now joined the collective farms.

These favors will be of great assistance to the collective farmers, and will not apply to those who have withdrawn.

(Problems of Leninism, Moscow, 1952, pp. 347-350 [in Russian]).

STALIN SPECULATES ON LENIN'S THEORY OF VOLUNTARY COLLECTIVES

(From Stalin's article "Reply to our Collective Farmer Comrades").

What are the chief errors in the collective farm movement? There are at least three of them. The first is the violation of Lenin's principle of volunta-

riness in the building of collective farms. Here is what Lenin said:

"Our immediate task: the conversion to socialized cultivation of land and to a great socialized agricultural industry. But no force whatever must be applied by the Soviet government; no law enforces this. The farm communes are created voluntarily, and the change to socialized cultivation must be only voluntary. The slightest attempt at coercion against the farmers must not be made. The law forbids it." (Volume XXIV. Page 43).

"Encouraging the different kinds of organizations, and also farm communes of middle farmers, the Soviet government representatives must not in any case resort to force. Too much haste in this matter is detrimental."

(Lenin's Collected Works, XXIV, p. 174; Stalin's italics).

(Problems of Leninism, Moscow, 1952, pp. 339-40, [in Russian]).

STALIN SPECULATES ON LENIN'S THEORY CONCERNING MIDDLE FARMERS

(From Stalin's article "Reply to our Collective Farmer Comrades").

Where is the root of the error in the farm problem? In the wrong approach to the middle farmer. As long as the attack was waged on a mutual front with the middle farmers against the *kurkuls* everything was fine, but when our comrades, excited by their success, gradually began to change their course from an attack on the *kurkul* to an attack on the middle farmer, and in their blind pursuit of a high rate in collectivization began to apply such coercive methods against the middle farmers as disfranchisement, *de-kurkulization* and expropriation, the attack was distorted and the mutual front disintegrated. They forgot that the coercion applied to our class enemies is fatal and indeed is forbidden against our ally, the middle farmer. Cavalry raids, so necessary in war, are dangerous if applied to the task

of building the collective farm structure.

Here are Lenin's own words regarding the middle farmer:

"...To apply coercion here means to lose everything. There is nothing more foolish than even the thought of using force against the middle farmer in our mutual relations with him in agriculture." (Volume XXV, p. 168).

And further:

"Coercion in connection with the middle farmer is most dangerous. This is a multi-million group. Even in Europe, not one of the revolutionary socialists ever advocated coercive measures against the middle farmer." (Volume XXIV, p. 167. Stalin's italics.)

(Problems of Leninism, Moscow, 1952, pp. 335-336).

F. PRAVOBEREZHNY

THE RETURN OF THE DE-KURKULIZED CHILDREN

The whole affair of de-kurkulization and collectivization had, by the beginning of 1930, become unendurable. News trickled in from Vologda, Arkhangelsk and Siberia of the mass deaths of the de-kurkulized children. The rural people had reached such a discouraged state that terrorism had lost its sting for them and they could no longer be intimidated. In Ukraine, and even Russia, the people were so overstrained that a spontaneous outbreak of revolt seemed imminent.

Here again the Kremlin quickly employed its old stand-by, the tactic of "one step backwards — two steps forward." Orders flew to the North and the Siberian wilderness that all de-kurkulized children must be returned to their native villages immediately. When spring came special "express trains" brought these children back, often forcibly away from their unfortunate parents. True, some were willing to surrender their children knowing that certain death awaited them in the camps, but even then the separations were tragic.

After returning them, their parents' property was not given back to them for their maintenance, but they were simply handed over to relatives and good-hearted neighbors. Many

of them soon scattered throughout Ukraine and Crimea adding to the hordes of homeless waifs and juvenile delinquents.

The re-grouping strategy was carried to the anti-Soviet and anti-collective elements. The old *kurkuls* disappeared from the villages but a new type now took their places. They were branded for their ideological and psychological characteristics, and were equally a menace to the regime. The class war and the collectivization war became even more acute.

In the following document, Stalin discusses the reasons for this. The misleading lie in this document is that the new "class enemies" were not farm people, but had somehow schemed their way into collective and state farms. Actually the reverse was true. Anti-Soviet citizens fled to the cities and towns where they could more easily escape attention in the large factories and establishments. Only those farmers remained in the villages who could not, even in these circumstances, bring themselves to desert their land.

However, torrents of accusations were hurled at these farmers, the new *kurkuls*.

In another document Stalin bluntly states that all "class enemies" were in the collective farms and it was useless to look for them elsewhere. Again the farmers became the scape-goat.

INTENSIFYING THE CLASS WAR

(From Stalin's speech at the Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party, January 7, 1933).

Finding themselves thrown off the track the die-hard survivors of the disappearing classes — private industrialists and their servants, private business men, landlords, priests, *kurkuls* and under-*kurkuls*, former officers and managers, former policemen, all kinds of bourgeois and intelligentsia, of the chauvinist type, and all other anti-Soviet elements — have dispersed throughout our factories, trade and other establishments, the railroad and water transportation systems, but mostly they have infiltrated our collective and state farms. They are hiding under the mask of "workers" and "farmers," sometimes even managing to penetrate into the Party.

Acting quietly, they are causing as much damage

as possible. They burn storehouses and break machinery. They organize sabotage in collective and state farms. Some of them go so far, professors among them, as to inject the collective farm livestock with plague germ, and horses with meningitis.

Theft and looting of factories, trains, warehouses, collective and state farms is their special form of "activity."

These people from the former exploiting class are utilizing their private-ownership habits in the collective farms to encourage looting of social property and thus crumble the foundation of the Soviet order — social ownership.

That is why the struggle for the preservation of social ownership, — a struggle in all the forms and means which our Soviet laws provide — is one of the most vital undertakings of the Party.

(Problems of Leninism, Moscow, 1952, pp. 426-428).

COLLECTIVE FARMS ARE A HUNTING GROUND FOR CLASS ENEMIES

(From Stalin's article "About Work on the Farm" at the Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party, January 11, 1933).

They are looking for the class enemy outside the collective farm. They are looking for human beings with the faces of beasts with large teeth, thick necks and cuts on their hands. They are searching for the *kurkul* of the posters. Such *kurkuls* have long since disappeared from the scene. Today's *kurkuls*, under-*kurkuls* and other anti-Soviet elements are people who are "quiet," "sweet-tempered" and almost "holy." They may be found right in the collective farms occupying such positions as storekeepers, collective farm managers, bookkeepers, secretaries, etc.

They are all "for" the collective farms, but carry on sabotage and all sorts of damaging work which will hurt the collective farms greatly.

When the collective farms are operated by *mensheviks*, *Petlyurists*, white guards, former *Deni-*

kists and Kolchakists they become the refuge of all kinds of counter-revolutionary activities.

There have been many cases of Communists being in the network of the collective farms operated by former white officers, Petlyurists and other enemies of the workers and farmers.

(Problems of Leninism, Moscow, 1952, pp. 438-442).

CHAPTER III.

SAVING DISTRIBUTION, TRADE AND AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRIES

In a previous chapter, "Liquidating co-operative trade and paralyzing distribution to the towns and villages," we presented documents concerning that catastrophic period when, as a result of collectivization, distribution of food to the workers in the cities and manufactured commodities to the farmers was hopelessly disorganized.

The prevalent propaganda urging that the first Five-Year Plan was under way and that at its culmination life would be better did not satisfy the workers and the farmers. They were hungry and the food shortage was growing worse. The lines were long and tedious often with no food at the end. Soon their work began to suffer. Rationing did not relieve the situation, more drastic measures were needed.

And so, hastily, in the spring of 1930 all larger establishments, such as factories and the city co-operatives were forced to arrange their own sources of food produce. They had to set up their own fruit farms, chicken and other fowl ranches, dairy and livestock farms so that agriculture became an important occupation of the cities. Bread and other flour by-products were the only items which were rationed more or less satisfactorily. Sugar and confections also presented no major problem.

The fruit problem was soon solved, for by late spring the workers had fruit from their own gardens. Eggs were available only in the winter season of 1930-31. Worst of all was the milk and meat supply. It took two years to solve this problem even partially.

The newly-formed collective farms received urgent orders from the government to raise fowl, dairy and beef cattle. Quotas for milk and eggs for the state were imposed on collective and individual farmers to be filled without consideration for the farmers' own needs.

The co-operative trade created on a social-community basis through the voluntary private initiative of the farmers and

workers was liquidated. Although all trade establishments in the towns and villages were called "co-operatives" they were really state businesses run according to state administration directives.

In all cities and towns the workers and office workers were rationed through the card system and there were purchase record books with occasional additional coupons for manufactured items such as clothing, footwear, kerosene, fuel, etc. Consumer goods were in extremely short supply all over and soon a black-market trade began to flourish, which the government could not stamp out.

Appearance of any food or manufactured goods in the state stores was considered a magnanimous government favor to the workers rather than legitimate transaction of business.

RUINING DISTRIBUTION THEY SEARCH FOR THE GUILTY

In the Dniepropetrovsk network of the Transportation Consumers Organization the top directors were the following:

President — Zadyranov.

Assistants—Tkach and Fomin.

Manager of the trade division — Samiylenko.

Head of the revision commission — Bilous.

They were all in contact with private speculators, and misappropriated merchandice, money and property. In the meat supply store former officers were in charge, and Tsarist stooges, Petlyurist commanders, Hetman followers and other squanderers.

Fifty men were arrested and indicted.

An investigation and purge are being conducted in the Kiev Transportation Consumers Organization. The class approach must be used in all fields of work.

To replace saboteurs, bureaucrats and stupidity, the better types of farm laborers and poor farmers should be brought in.

Unsparring criticism and self-criticism must be used to uncover the deficiencies and the unworthy elements in the co-operative apparatus.

Supply of food to the public is the most important phase of the co-operative reconstruction.

(Visti, April 27, 1930).

8,000 SWINE DIE OF HOG CHOLERA

(Resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party).

The Central Committee states that:

In the Haleshchena biological station, in the Bryhadiwka district, Poltava region, kurkul work has been in evidence over a long period of time. Thirteen per cent of all the hogs died, 20,000 bushels of forage were sold illegally, surpluses were kept back from the grain collecting plan and 8,000 hogs died of hog cholera.

Therefore the Central Committee resolves:

1. To expel from the Party and indict the station manager — Rozkoshenko. To expel from the Party for khvostism (according to a Soviet dictionary: submission to spontaneity in the labor movement) the head of the workers committee — Lavrentiev. To dismiss from work with a severe reprimand the Party center secretary — Myronenko.

2. To dismiss from work, expel from the Party and indict the director of the state farm "Udarnyk" (shock-worker) for laxness in execution of duty and for assistance in destroying the hogs.

3. For permitting the destruction of hogs and for failure to counteract the menace in the collective farms the Bryhadiwka District Party Committee Bureau must publish a severe reprimand against, and dismiss from work, the following:

- (1) Secretary of the District Party Committee — Lytvynenko.

- (2) Chief of the District Party Committee — Ryaboshapka.

- (3) Chief of the District Professional Council — Paposhkin.

- (4) Head of the Farm-workers Control Commission — Kozhanchikov.

(5) Manager of the District Land Administration — Hvozdetzky.

4. For total inactivity the representative of the Veterinary Trust, Utkin, must be dismissed from work and expelled from the Party. This resolution is to be handed to the Veterinary Central Committee, drawing special attention to the unsatisfactory management of the biological station.

5. To publish a reprimand against the director of the Veterinary Department of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture for failure to give proper direction in the struggle against cholera.

(*Visti*, February 3, 1932).

WHY THERE IS NO MEAT

(Excerpts from Kosior's speech at the Kharkiw Regional Party Conference).

I have often heard workers say, "Why do we have no meat?"

In 1928 our livestock industry grew to such an extent that we exceeded the pre-Revolutionary quantity of livestock. The number of workers has recently increased by 60 per cent. Our people are now eating twice as much meat. The year 1928 was our turning point.

This year our attack on the kurkul and his ultimate liquidation has played its part. The kurkuls venomously destroyed their cattle. The damage they did in the livestock industry was no less serious than in the grain collecting plans.

The mass destruction of livestock which has been taking place during the past year also had a bearing on the situation. The recent count of all livestock shows a reduction in the number of head of cattle of 16 per cent.

The rightist opportunists and Trotskyites ask: "Why have we no meat? It is the fault of collectivization. Why have we no milk? Collectivization is to blame, it took all the cows."

And what about consumer goods? We all know

that the situation is not good. Especially is this keenly felt in the rural areas. However, in the past four months the general supply has increased by 50 per cent.

(Pravda, June 2, 1930).

LIVESTOCK DESTROYED

In order to remedy the irregularities in the supply of meat and meat by-products of the best quality to the workers, and to increase the raw materials for the meat packing industry the Party has decided to reconstruct its livestock industry by rabbit breeding. In the existing meat supply situation the rabbit-raising industry must be developed to the greatest possible proportions and in shock action tempo.

Every effort must be thrown into the struggle against complacency in this momentous task. All work must be carried on strictly according to plan.

The collective farms, state farms and co-operatives must be in the forefront of the rabbit-raising venture.

Rabbit-raising is not child's play. It is serious business. It must be practical.

Urgent measures are needed. Contracting of rabbits must begin.

Local organizations, first of all the collective farms, state farms and co-operatives must enter into this field with the maximum of energy.

Slogans used in the development of rabbit-breeding as a basic source of the meat supply).

(Vistl, March 20, 1930).

PENALTIES FOR IRREGULAR MEAT SUPPLY

(Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars and the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee).

To ensure a dependable supply of meat by the farmers and to forestall any unlawful exemptions by the local governments of farmers or collective farms from supplying assigned quotas of meat to the state the Council of People's Commissars and the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee resolve:

1. For unlawful exemption of individual farmers

or collective farms from delivery of their assigned quotas of meat to the state, or for failure to deliver said quotas on schedule, the heads of the village Soviet are to be arraigned on criminal charges and prosecuted as follows:

(a) For unlawful exemption of meat delivery, imprisonment of not less than one year and in more serious cases (unlawful exemption of the *kurkuls* and other prosperous elements) a longer term of imprisonment is to be imposed. (Article 97 of the criminal code).

(b) For failure to deliver or for late delivery of the assigned meat quotas a three-month term of imprisonment is to be imposed or one year of forced labor.

(c) For a similar offence, if it should result in the non-completion of the meat collecting plan, imprisonment of ten years is to be given, and in no instance less than two years.

2. To recommend that the People's Commissariat of Justice of Ukraine review this matter immediately, and appoint a direct control to put these measures into effect in every region.

President of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee — H. Petrovsky.

Head of the Council of People's Commissars — W. Chubar.

Secretary of the Ukrainian Central Executive — Voytsekhovsky.

(*Visti*, February 12, 1933).

NO MEAT, MILK OR BUTTER FOR THE TOWNS

(Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine).

Notwithstanding the Council of People's Commissars resolution of April 2 of this year the supply of meat, milk and butter is very unsatisfactory. For the second quarter of this year, 1933, the plan has been only 47 per cent completed.

For 15 months prior to June 10 the meat supply to

the Chernyhiw region was only 49.8 per cent of the quota, and to the Kiev region 54.5 per cent.

The supply of milk and butter lags still further behind schedule. The Donets Basin has received only 30 per cent, the Chernyhiw region 28 per cent, the Kharkiw region 29.3 per cent and the Kiev region 29.4 per cent.

Lack of proper management from the collective farms and regional organizations is felt in the matter. In the People's Commissariat of Supply there is not even an elementary record of the rates of the meat assignment deliveries. Absence of supply assignments in the collective farms is resulting in a complete stoppage of deliveries of produce in many regions.

The meat supply plan for the second quarter was completed only 10.01 per cent in the Talne district in the Kiev region, in Lysyanka 8.3 per cent, in the Bohudukhiwka district, Kharkiw region 18.3 per cent and in the Velykopysariwka region 20 per cent.

At the same time the milk supply plan was completed in the Kalyniwka district, Vynnytsya region 3.4 per cent, Oryniwka district 5.7 per cent; in the Trostyanets district, Kharkiw region 11.3 per cent.

In addition many cases of distortions of the Party and government directives have been found in different organizations of the meat, milk and butter supply:

(a) Unlawful requests by the District Executive Committees to sent them for approval penalties imposed on defaulters by the village Soviets.

(b) Refusal to impose penalties.

(c) Selling livestock confiscated from defaulters.

(d) Appropriating milk, earmarked for state supply, for local consumption.

Chief of the Council of People's Commissars, V. Chubar.

(Visti, June 21, 1933).

Centralized distribution played a major role at that time in the food supply to the regional towns, central establishments and all industries. All such establishments and industries made

applications for their quota of workers to the People's Commissariat of Trade of Ukraine and through its channels obtained their share of food and manufactured goods.

All regional towns, their industries and establishments, all rural establishments, including the schools, depended on the local supply; that is, whatever the regional organs could hold back from the state collecting plans and whatever remained after completion of the plans.

As a result, the different industries and establishments had their own distribution centers, or stores, which catered only to their own workers and office workers. Eventually they even set up farms to raise produce for their own use.

Also the so-called closed stores, which served only a select group and were closed to the general public, started to operate.

I. D. (geologist)

CENTRALIZED DISTRIBUTION

In the years 1931 to 1934, every summer for five months, April to August inclusive, I directed geological expeditions throughout the Odessa region. These groups consisted of technically trained personnel from Kiev and other workers whom I engaged from among the local people. To feed these groups I received supplies from the centralized supply headquarters of the People's Commissariat of Trade of Ukraine in Kiev or Kharkiv. I could not secure any food locally.

Items included in the supply were bread or flour, cereal or macaroni, sugar, oil, sausage and *m a k h o r k a* (a poor grade of tobacco). It was handled in the following manner.

From Kiev, where the geological center was then located and from where I was dispatched for expeditions, an application went to the People's Commissariat of Trade for food for a certain number of workers. The application also stated the district supply center (District Consumers Association) at which I was to receive my supplies. The Commissariat then sent from its stores the food items mentioned earlier. No milk or eggs were provided for us. It was taken for granted that we would buy these products from the local farmers with our own money.

In 1931 it was more or less possible to buy a little milk, eggs, butter or even an occasional chicken from the farmers. In 1932 we could buy a few eggs or an occasional bottle of milk

from the co-operatives, but by 1933 it was absolutely impossible to buy anything at all. In that year our group, only four men this time, did not receive our expected food supplies. We lived in Pervomaysk and did not eat for forty days. We were all swollen from starvation. We managed to survive only because I unlawfully received somebody else's assignment of a bushel of semolina from which we made a thin gruel.

THE APPEARANCE OF CLOSED DISTRIBUTION CENTERS

(From the Resolution of the Secretariat of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee in regard to the management of town and districts co-operatives in their supply to the workers).

Inspection of the state of supply to the workers in the cities and towns of Kiev, Dniepropetrovsk, Luhansk, Mariupol, Konotop, and others reveals the following changes:

(a) The workers co-operatives have grown. In Dniepropetrovsk on October 1, 1929, 125, 294 workers were members of the co-operatives and on October 1, 1930, there were 178,037. In Kiev on the same dates the co-operative memberships were 210,000 and 336,252 respectively.

(b) Distribution itself has improved greatly as indicated by the consumers' purchase books filled out by the co-operatives. The extent covered is, Kiev 43 per cent, Dniepropetrovsk 69.5 per cent, Luhansk 86.1 per cent.

(c) Closed distribution centers have been created, 9 in Konstantyniwka-Donbas, 33 in Dniepropetrovsk.

(d) City and town farms have been set up. Dniepropetrovsk has a hog ranch of 2,732 hogs, Mariupol has a dairy farm of 1,681 cows and vegetable farms amounting of 1,320 acres. Kiev has a vegetable farm of 2,400 acres.

(e) Food supply to the general public has improved. The extent covered by the public plan is 8.4 per cent in Mariupol, 30.2 per cent in Luhansk, and so on.

(f) Work and management of the co-operatives is improved.

The chief shortcomings are:

(a) Insufficient mobilization of the working masses for the execution of the government and Party directives.

(b) The management of the co-operative organizations in towns and rural areas has not become the battle headquarters of the management and organization of the workers' supply.

(c) The un-organized public, especially the women, have not been drawn into co-operative work.

(d) Plans for reconstruction of workers' supply have not been carried out.

(e) Public consumption has not yet attained first importance.

Secretary of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee — Vasylenko.

(Visti, January 4, 1931).

O. KIYANYN

WHAT ARE THEY GIVING?

There was a dire shortage of food and other everyday necessities in Kiev during the hunger period of 1930 to 1934. Rationing was strict and ration books and coupons were used for the smallest purchases. People were obliged to buy their food at certain stores only, and coupons were provided for manufactured goods which could be used in any store carrying the needed items. The stores had no steady supplies but received them periodically and irregularly.

The hungry and poverty-stricken people trudged in long processions along the streets trying to find a store which had anything to sell. The appearance of goods in some stores was greeted as a pleasant surprise and treated like a gift and favor from the authorities. That is when the term "give" instead of "sell" became common. "What are they giving?" "In the N. store they are giving this or that." "Everything has been given out." "We will be giving it on such and such a day."

Every resident of Kiev carried with him wherever he went a little net sack which folded into a small knot and could be placed in a coat pocket. This was in case he came across food

in some store unexpectedly. I carried such a sack and so did my wife, and all my friends and acquaintances. Not only in Kiev was the little sack popular, but in all the cities and towns of Ukraine and throughout the whole USSR.

O. KIYANYN

GO AWAY! WE ARE NOT GIVING ANYTHING TODAY

The poor and famished people of Kiev often became victims of conscienceless pranksters as they roamed the streets seeking for some food to buy.

For instance, two or three students would be walking along the street and seeing a number of anxious-looking people would decide to play a joke on them. Coming to a closed shop they would form a line, and before long several dozen people would be standing behind them. Soon the shoppers would ask each other what was being "given" in the shop but, without finding out anything definite, they would continue to stand and the line would grow. By then the front group had had its laugh and departed.

The shop-keepers, seeing the line, would come out and try to tell the people that they had nothing to "give," but the crowd being desperate would not go away. "We know you are keeping it for your friends, but we will not let anyone in out of turn. Open the store!"

"Go away. We are not giving anything today. Somebody has fooled you."

The crowd would gradually disperse, cursing and deploring the shopkeepers and the instigators of the useless queue, feeling badly for having wasted so much time in which they just might have found some store which was actually "giving" something.

O. KIYANYN

SPECULATORS AND BLACK MARKETS

Speculators and black markets were an "unplanned" source of consumer goods for the town and city dwellers in those difficult collectivization years of 1930 to 1933.

Except for a few exceptions (the big Soviet and Party lords) the workers and office workers being on a planned consumer goods supply never had enough food, clothing, footwear

and other everyday necessities. But all this could be bought on the black markets at high prices.

There were several black markets in Kiev but because they were not allowed to operate within the city limits they were located some distance out. One was permitted on the vacant plot of land between Pecherska Lavra and Demiyewka.

It was a huge market-place carrying assorted merchandise where anything could be bought. There were different corners for different types of goods. Everything was sold discreetly, nothing was displayed anywhere. The ground was littered with used household articles, but everything else was carried under the coat-tail to enable it to be hidden quickly if a policeman showed up.

The market sold goods which came from the state stores. The managers worked hand in hand with the speculators, sharing the profits made by the enormous prices. Such items as oil, sugar, butter, herrings were substantial quantities there. Although the market was open every day, most of its business was done on Sundays, which was the day of rest for the workers.

At least 25 to 30 per cent of the workers' earnings was spent in these markets.

The supply of consumer goods to the villages was in a still worse state than that to the urban centers. If any supplies were occasionally brought in, it was on condition that the farmers give the government all the grain they had for the privilege of buying whatever they needed.

The farmers had great difficulty in procuring such necessities as salt, matches, kerosene, etc., let alone any clothing or footwear.

Especially hard hit were the schools, both teachers and pupils, as the Soviet documents tell. These circumstances prevailed in the schools throughout Ukraine.

GIFTS OF MERCHANDISE TO THOSE WHO GIVE ALL THEIR GRAIN

(Consumer goods are exchanged in the grain collecting plans).

The People's Commissariat of Supply and the All-Ukrainian Co-operative Association has assigned a reserve of manufactured goods for 149 districts

which have a decisive bearing on the grain-collecting plan for the month of January.

The goods are allotted to collective farms, the collective farmers and the poor and middle individual farmers who complete and over-complete their assignments of the grain collecting plan in January.

The People's Commissariat of Supply proposes that the District Executive Committee continue to give active aid to the District Consumers' Association in distributing the following goods to those who have delivered their grain: cotton material and footwear which in the first place must be sold to those who have given wheat, rye and oats.

According to the Supply Commissariat's directives the local organizations must encourage the collective farmers by selling them manufactured goods up to 50 per cent of the value of the grain they have given and to poor and middle farmers 40 per cent of the grain they bring in.

The supply departments and consumers' co-operatives in the 149 districts must make use of all available transportation for a quick delivery of the merchandise to all villages and collective farms.

The District Executive Committees must watch for the arrival of goods in their districts and immediately arrange for their delivery to the assigned points.

All District Executives are asked to use these manufactured goods solely for the promotion of the grain-collecting plans.

(*Vistl.* January 9, 1932)

NEGLECT OF THE SUPPLY TO THE SCHOOLS

In the village of Besediwka, Stavyshcha district, the schools have not yet been put on a regular supply. The supply to the teachers and pupils has not been given due attention.

In the Sukhiwka School, Bryhadyriwka district, only 20 textbooks were received and no clothing or footwear at all. Needless to say this has resulted in poor attendance.

The same situation exists with the food supply and the teachers' pay. To top it all, no fuel has been given the schools.

How can satisfactory work be expected in the schools when local organizations take no interest in assuring the required conditions?

(*Visti*, January 7, 1931)

SUPPLY OF TEACHERS WAS INTERRUPTED

(From a resolution of the Executive Committee of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet regarding supply of teachers).

After hearing representatives of the People's Commissariat of Education, the People's Commissariat of Supply, the Ukrainian Co-operative Association, the People's Commissariat of Workers' and Farmers' Inspection and the All-Ukrainian Council of Professional Associations the Executive Commission of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet declared that:

1. In many districts irregularities are permitted in supplying teachers, and their pay is often held in arrears for one to two months.

2. The aforementioned supply situation must be remedied and the teachers' salaries raised.

3. The local organizations in many districts have failed to realize that distortions in the teachers' supply, especially binding teachers to certain collective farms and allowing them only poor quality products, is a sign, to a certain extent, of hostile action, such as that of the *kurkuls* and their agents who have often tried to hamper cultural-educational work.

To ensure full execution of the Party and government directives in easing the teachers' circumstances the Executive Commission resolves:

1. That the People's Commissariat of Supply, the Ukrainian Co-operative Association and the Ukrainian Collective Farm Center must within ten days arrange for supplies to be sent to the teachers from the collective farms, and also supply teachers in those villages which have no collective farms.

2. The Ukrainian Collective Farm Center, the Regional Executive Committee, the District Executive Committee must immediately conduct an inquiry into the state of the teachers' supply of payment of the teachers' salaries by the evillage Soviets.

(Visti, March 17, 1932)

I. MEDVNNETS

TSARIST OVERCOATS FOR SOVIET FOOTWEAR

During collectivization, the most distressing problem of the Ukrainian rural population was the lack of footwear. To buy it in the stores was an absolute impossibility. The villages were allowed only a small quantity which went to the collective officials. People finally resorted to tanning the hides of their farm animals and became quite proficient at this, but the Soviet government prosecuted them for it. Then another method was devised.

For instance in Medvyn, Kiev region, the farmers had kept large flocks of sheep in pre-Revolutionary times. They made sheep-skin coats to wear and wove heavy woolen materials for overcoats and outer garments. Every farmer had several of these overcoats. After the Revolution they wore out and were used for bedding.

When collectivization came, and with it the disappearance of all shoes, these Tsarist relics were resurrected for making boots. These boots were worn by the young and old, men, women and children. From 60 to 80 per cent of the rural folk were shod in these new, makeshift contraptions. Soon, special shoemakers appeared in the villages who specialized in making such boots from old overcoats.

In the winter season or wet weather this footwear could be worn with rubber galoshes over the top. So the chief worry of the farmers was to procure these galoshes, and they paid any price for them. The Soviet government must have taken this into consideration, because an almost adequate supply of them came to the villages from time to time.

As to clothing the people were clad in rags and tatters of clothing they had bought in better days.

ALL SOVIET TRADE AND COLLECTIVE PLANS WERE ROBBERY

The Soviet trade system and collecting plans during the collectivization years represented complete robbery of the farmers. For example, I shall relate the story of the village of Huta, in the Bohodukhiwka district.

The farmer was forced to sell a cow-hide to the government for just a few rubles and then pay 1,500 rubles for a pair of shoes made from the cowhide.

Pigskin was bought from the farmer for several kopeks, or a pair of shoe soles and the farmer was charged high prices for products from that skin.

Earlier, when farmers butchered hogs they left the skins on the carcasses, cutting them up with the fat but when the Soviet government passed a regulation forcing the farmers to skin the hogs and sell the skins to the state.

Through the game-collecting plan a fox skin brought 25 rubles to the hunter and the finished skin cost ten times as much.

The situation was the same with all farm produce also. Eggs, milk, etc., were bought from the farmers for next to nothing, and sold back to them for high, speculative prices.

NOTHING FOR EXPORT

We declare that the local and district committees for the assistance of the export industry as a rule do not function.

The People's Commissariat of Trade and professional organizations do not pay sufficient attention to the task of insuring the completion of the export plans and raising this trade to the desired level.

To correct the faults, and improve the work of the local committees for the assistance of exports, it is proposed by the Central Control Commission of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Control Commission of the Workers-Farmers Inspection that:

1. Within five days the People's Commissariat of Trade give the needed instructions to the localities as to the organization of committees for the assistance

of export and the work they are to carry on.

2. Within a five-day period the Ukrainian Co-operative Association send proper instructions to their subordinates as to the work to be done by the committees for the assistance of exports.

3. All local and district branches of the Workers and Farmers Inspection Control Commission must, by January 25, check upon the work of the committees.

4. Taking into account the total inactivity of the committees for the assistance of exports, in Zolotonosha, Bila Tserkva, Vapnyar, Slovechan, Bryhadyriwka, Artemiw, Vakhmut and other districts, heads of the District Executive Committees of the said districts must take this into consideration.

5. This resolution is to be published in the press.

Acting for the Central Control Commission of the Workers-Farmers Inspection—Jrosvirin.

(Visti, January 3, 1931)

I. D.

HORSETAILS FOR EXPORT

When complete collectivization was in progress and the farming industry was ruined, all collecting-plan organizations, including the co-operatives, found it impossible to complete the different collecting plans for salvage, which the USSR needed for export in its agreements with other countries. Then the Trade Department raised a cry and *P r a v d a* wrote on June 2, 1930:

"The export plan for salvage is falling through. According to the Trade Department data only 56.2 per cent of the export plan is completed, and some regions are contributing very little towards the plan. For example Izyum contributed 4.6 per cent of its assigned quota, Chernyhiw 7.8 per cent, and Mariupol 8.2 per cent."

In the salvage-collecting drive proclamations were issued to collective and individual farmers to bring in such stuff as horsetails (all horses' tails were ordered to be shorn), bristles, chicken feathers, bones, hides and hair from domestic animals.

As a result of the destruction of domestic animals the leather industry was threatened. No hide-collecting plans could

be carried to completion because no hides were available. If a farmer had a hide once in a while he generally tried to tan it himself for his own use. The district organizations also did this.

In desperation, the government proclaimed a mass killing of dogs, a rabbit-skin collecting plan and a drive for rat skins. Also, establishments were opened in every district where dead animals were brought. The hides were taken off and sent to the tanneries and the carcasses were used for soap-making.

An acute soap shortage also prevailed everywhere. In the villages the people searched for substitutes. Every sort of clay was tried. In the stores, small pieces of fuller's earth were sold and in the towns and cities people could buy on their purchase books packages of washing soda. One package per month per family was allowed.

It is perhaps as well to mention here that distilleries were the only industry which operated at full speed. They had plenty of raw material (grain) for their purpose and whiskey could be bought freely in any quantity.

COLLECTING HIDES FOR TANNERIES

A drive has been launched for skins and hides. A strict proletarian control has been set up in the hide collecting plan. The *kurkuls* and speculators will be most severely attacked and a steady development of the leather industry will be assured. (Newspaper slogans).

The flow of raw materials for the leather industry has declined noticeably in the second half of last year.

In June, 1930, 100,000 cowhides were collected and 115,000 skins from sheep, goats and swine.

In October, 1930, 92,000 cowhides were collected (the plan called for 175,000); sheep-skins: 99,400 were collected (plan 264,000); pigskins: collected 25,000 (plan 40,900).

Steps have been taken to overcome all obstacles and the plan shortage was not very large. In November 141,000 cowhides were collected; 108,700 sheepskins (plan 230,000); 33,100 pigskins (plan 58,100).

Disagreements exist among different organizations of the hide-collecting plan. A special one-month drive is needed to stimulate the plan, and a resolute

struggle must be waged against using hides for home handicrafts.

In the Novo-Buzyok district permission was granted for the return of hides taken from the collective farm "Spring Pathway" in spite of the fact that an illegal use of hides for home use was uncovered.

In the Skvyr district permission was given to return to a farmer 26 sheep skins.

In the Vynnytsya district the hide-collecting organization was prohibited from catching and killing dogs.

The Sophia Regional Consumers' Organization is tanning hide in its own workshops.

(Visti, January 2, 1931).

SAVING THE RABBIT INDUSTRY WITH RABBITS AND RATS

Interruptions in the leather industry caused by insufficient supply of raw materials must be avoided. (Slogan).

Sabotage by the class enemy in the livestock industry has caused a marked decrease in the herds, and this in turn has resulted in hide shortages for the state leather industry and is hampering the completion of planned undertakings. This means a shortage of shoes for the workers.

To anticipate this situation firm steps must be taken to draw the masses into the action of completing the hide-collecting plan. Besides cowhides and sheep skins the leather industry needs second rate skins like those from pigs, dogs, rabbits and rats.

Pigskins are becoming increasingly important to the industry. During the past year, 1929-30, 100,000 pigskins were used. Collection of the skins is very slow. The factories do not receive their needed supply of raw material.

Collection of dog skins is also slow. The organizations were asked to collect 69,400 dog skins but they brought in only 23,500 skins, or 36 per cent of the assignment.

In order to aid the skin-collecting plans 505

tallow-melting stations are planned where dead animals will be skinned and the carcasses melted down. The disastrous state of the hide collecting plan may be seen from the following figures.

In October, 1929, 984,000 hides came in. In November 1,121,000

In October, 1930, 76,000 hides came in. in November 80,000

In other words last year's collection brought only 7.7 per cent of the skins collected the previous year. This collapse of the plan may be explained only by sabotage and by the opportunism of organizations affiliated with the hide collecting plan.

(Visti, January 6, 1931).

CHAPTER IV.

FARMERS TERRORIZED BY POLITICAL AND ECONOMICAL CAMPAIGNS

After re-grouping their forces the Communists continued the strong drive against the farmers to force them into collective farms. All individual, and even collective farmers lived in constant terror of the different political and economic campaigns.

Some of these campaigns were:

1. **The Grain-Collecting Plan.** Besides delivering to the state the assigned quotas of grain, the farmers were usually forced to sponsor additional plans in order to over-subscribe to the already excessive state plan, thus dooming themselves and their families to starvation.

2. **Farming Campaigns.** These were the fall and spring seeding campaigns which entailed the collection of seed grain, overhauling machinery and going through the actual seeding operation. There were also sugar-beet planting, and the harvest campaigns of grain, sugar-beets and vegetables.

3. **Economic Campaigns.** This involved collecting taxes in money, issuing state bonds, levying the cultural tax for local educational purposes, collecting expense money for the different campaigns, selling co-operative shares.

4. **"Export Campaign."** This was the drive for all kinds of salvage which the government needed for its external trade.

There were also a great number of minor campaigns, such as, compulsory delivery of certain quantities of meat, milk, eggs, fruits and vegetables to the state. The campaigns continued in a never-ending procession, every day of the year, without giving the poor farmers any respite even on Sunday or such holiday as Christmas and Easter.

All the campaigns were conducted by the so-called brigades of **a c t i v e s**, shock brigades, propaganda brigades as well as the so-called workers'-farmers' co-operatives. The popular method was to call small meetings in the fields after work or at night in the collective farms, not allowing the farmers to sleep.

This was counted on to bring people to a state of complete physical exhaustion and psychological frustration, a state when a human being loses his human instincts and become a soft, pliable tool in the hands of his master.

Sooner or later this had to lead to complete collectivization. The farmers had no other alternative.

INCREASE IN THE YIELD

(From a resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, January 7, 1931, regarding work of the Grain Trust).

1. The Central Committee states that the task of the Party in the field of the development of grain farming has been accomplished beyond the expected objective. The Grain Trust has sufficient seed for 12,500,000 acres. This means a yield of about 120,000,000 bushels instead of 80,000,000 bushels as in 1930.

2. The Bolshevik tempo of the Grain Trust in the work of creating large flour mills should this year be turned in the direction of raising the qualitative indices in the People's Commissariat of Agriculture.

3. Measures to raise such qualitative indices in 1931, as proposed by the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the USSR and the Grain Trust, will be given complete approval.

(a) To raise the yield in both new and old state farms by 20 per cent from that of last year by employing proper agricultural methods and decreasing losses during harvest.

(b) To increase tractor work hours from 2,300 to 2,500.

(c) To cut down costs by at least 20 per cent.

4. Consideration must be given to the transportation difficulties arising from the 150,000,000 bushel increase collected by the Grain Trust in 1931 (35,000,000 bushels from that is to be sowed for seeding in 1932) and arrangements made with the People's Commissariat of Transportation and the Transportation Association for a quick delivery of grain, from the fields to the railroad stations.

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Вестіа із протвояку Кримураітскаго
 Союзнаства рашіу візбувнїаго Зберенія,
 1931 року. Тут присутні: Кисор, Кришак
 Ворд, Крикв Кошикорев, Сурна, Мухомов
 і Ермелев

Сурнаи: § 3. про візвочу землі Куркуліскаго
 Воєнодарствана на затвердені сьмислї землекор-
 исуваню. 11/10

Ухвалою: Просити П.В.Ка о відгукї
 Землео Куркуліскаго воєнодарствана в візвочу
 42 воєнодарствана закладенїа до програми
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З офіціалнаго запису: *Ломова*
 і *Секретаря Виз*

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The de-kurkulized are given poorest land

5. Experience shows that state grain farms have a great influence on collectivization, for they convince the farmers of the advantage of large farms and helps to introduce new agricultural methods to collective farms located in grain-producing districts.

Agreements must be made with collective farms in the forthcoming year whereby they will be given all possible aid.

(Visti, January 10, 1931).

P. LYKHO

ESTIMATING THE YIELD AND MAKING THE GRAIN-COLLECTING PLANS

In the spring of 1934 I occupied the position of general accountant in the Chornous Machine Tractor Station, in the Kharkiw region. In my work I had the opportunity of seeing the records of the yield in collective farms in 1932 and 1933, kept by the District Commissions.

These Commissions were made up of: the Head of the District Executive Committee, the Manager of the District Land Committee, the superintendent of the grain collecting plan, the Director of the Machine Tractor Station, the senior agriculturalist of the District Land Committee and the head of the collective farm in question.

The commission studied the grain fields two or three weeks before harvest and marked down the possible yield per acre. These estimates were later revised after experimental threshing of grain with flails or sometimes combines, but nevertheless they were usually merely guesses. On the basis of these estimates the agriculturalist then calculated the over-all yield on the collective farm's fields.

During my subsequent long years of work in the Machine-Tractor Station I never once knew the estimates of the District Commission to coincide with the actual yield of any given collective farm, for they were always exaggerated. For this reason I was very much surprised that the Regional Commissions, whose duty it was to approve and correct the reports of the District Commissions, rarely made corrections in the direction of a decrease in the figures but, on the contrary, always increased them.

Actually the work of these Commissions was nothing more

than a pretence, and the shares allotted the Machine-Tractor Stations for their work were derived from some other figures and plans which were unknown even to the Commissions.

Taking into account the figures prepared by the Chornous District Commission for 1932 and the actual yield of the collective farms in the district I had to declare a wide gap, the over-balance being on the estimate figures. All district and regional directors knew of this.

Consequently, to meet the demand of the grain collecting plan and the Machine-Tractor Station share the collective farms turned in all their 1932 harvest and on January 1, 1933, were still 4,000 hundredweights in arrears.

This default, which was later termed a money value of 21,000 rubles, stayed on the balance sheet of the Machine-Tractor Station until 1934, when it was stricken off in place of the regular running expenses and was later covered by government funds.

Moreover, government reports for 1932 showed that all grain-collecting plans and crop shares for the Machine-Tractor Stations were fully completed throughout Ukraine. This was quite untrue, but was useful for external propaganda.

Taking full responsibility for my words I can safely state that the calculations for the grain-collecting plans and crop shares for Machine-Tractor Stations, which were demanded from Ukrainian collective farms, were made not according to the gross yield but maliciously, as a penalty for the Ukrainian farmers' resistance to collectivization.

H. SOVA

GRAIN COLLECTING DIRECTIVES WORKED OUT "SCIENTIFICALLY"

In every district, until 1927, the agriculturalists set the grain and forage balances. Cross production was calculated on the basis of statistical observations of the growth of grain and on the actual threshing. This method was scientifically worked out, and the answer represented the gross yield in a given district, region or republic.

With the beginning of collectivization, and the extortionate grain-collecting plans, the ultimate gross yield was arrived at through sheer guess work and passed on as scientifically worked out directives.

For example, in 1931 the gross yield of the eight most important crops, spring and fall wheat and rye, oats, barley, buckwheat, millet and corn, was 20,000 tons in a certain district, according to calculations by agriculturalists. However, from regional headquarters in Poltava a plan was formulated for 30,000 tons. I was asked by the head of the District Executive Committee to make a formal protest which he signed.

After some time we received an explanation, stating that we had omitted from our plan the surplus that the farmers should have from other years.

As a matter of fact, the farmers had no surplus because the grain-collecting plan for the previous year had called for all the grain they had, all the surplus they did not have and even cut into the allotment originally allowed for the farmers' family needs and the fodder for livestock. The regional plan had been deliberately exaggerated to legalize the robbery of the farmers.

THE GRAIN COLLECTING PLAN FOR 1931-32 NOT FEASIBLE

In the Zinkiwka region the kurkuls who penetrated into collective farms are using sabotage. In the village of Stupka the head and the secretary of the local Party center not only do not exert any pressure upon the kurkuls, but are themselves repeating the kurkul refrain that the grain-collecting plan is not feasible.

In the village of Valsiwka the plan has been completed only 50 per cent, although threshing was completed two weeks ago.

In the villages of Budyshcha, Piryk and Pavliwka it has been discovered that kurkuls are burying their grain.

The head of the Molotov village Soviet, Butakov, and the District Executive Committee representative, put no pressure on the kurkuls in spite of the fact that they gave only 50 per cent of their assigned quotas of grain.

Only by a stubborn struggle with the class enemy and by severe prosecution of the instigators of kurkul sabotage in the Zinkiwka region can the grain-

collecting plan be brought through to completion.

(*Visti*, October 10, 1931).

In the last five days the plan in Smilyank.. district was 1.8 per cent accomplished. The collective farms completed 2 per cent of the plan, the individual farmers have given nothing, and the kurkuls and other well-to-do brought in 3 per cent.

Instead of stepping up the grain-collecting plan even the past tempo has decreased. No excuse whatever can be offered for the failure of the individual farmers to bring in even a pound of grain.

(*Visti*, October 18, 1931).

IMPRACTICABLE GRAIN-COLLECTING PLANS COLLAPSE

In places where the grain-collecting plan is allowed to drift the grain flows into the kurkul pits.

In the Mykolayiwka district, Mariupol region, where complete collectivization is in effect, only 20 per cent has been received in the grain-collecting plan. Many collective farms tend to reserve too much grain for home consumption, complaining at the same time that the plan is impracticable, and that the district organizations are wholly indifferent to this fact.

Even such extreme cases as stealing from the threshing machine or hiding grain in the straw were ignored.

The kurkuls are putting up a dogged resistance to the grain-collecting plan. In the village of Khomutiwka 20 kurkul grain pits were discovered, containing about 250 hundredweights of grain, and throughout the whole district 69 such pits were found. The kurkuls are helped by henchmen from the collective farms and sometimes even by members of the Party.

In the Artemiw region 83.5 per cent of the plan was completed by November 10, only 40.9 per cent from individual farmers. The main reason for this drop is the opportunist, kurkul policy of the directors in the village Soviets and collective farms.

In the Mariupol region there is evidence that many collective farms sell their grain illegally. In the collective farm "Red Farmer" 83 hundredweights of grain were sold in this manner and in "Soviet Ukraine" 65 hundredweights. There are also cases of collective farms getting rid of all the grain, leaving none for seed.

These excesses definitely cannot be overlooked.
(*Visti*, November 15, 1931).

IMPOSSIBLE GRAIN-COLLECTING PLAN COLLAPSES

The grain-collecting plans are in a bad state. In nine districts 60 per cent of the plans remain to be fulfilled.

In many districts in Ukraine the plans fell short by 20 to 21 per cent despite the fact that the dead-line has been extended.

The most backward districts are:

Baryshpil — 52.3 per cent.

Pulyn — 50.7 per cent.

Tetiev — 57.9 per cent.

Kryzhopil — 59.7 per cent.

Obodiwka — 58.3 per cent.

Baranske — 58.9 per cent.

Orzhytsya — 56.9 per cent.

Tulchyn — 58.3 per cent.

Staro-Saltiwka — 59.6 per cent.

Several scores of villages have completed their plans up to 60 or 70 per cent.

Special brigades have been organized to be sent from one district to another to assist with the grain collecting plans.

The brigade from Tytriv, where it was exceptionally successful, was sent by Matusyevych, head of the District Party Committee, to the village of Pyatkiwka, Bershadsk district.

In the village of Voytiwka, in the same district, where 5,000 hundredweights of grain still remain to be collected grain-collecting is exclusively in the hands of the brigade.

In the village of Krasnosilka, Haysyn district, the secretary of the Party center met the brigade on arrival from the Vynnytsya district and assigned to it the whole task of grain collecting.

In the village of Novo-Pawlivka the brigade did magnificent work in the grain collecting plan.

(Butshenko, *Visti*, February 2, 1932)

HOW A RED PARTISAN WAS ROBBED BY THE GOVERNMENT

From the time I was a young boy I worked for other farmers. Later, I worked in the chemical plant in Konstantyniwka and joined the partisan forces in 1919. In 1920 I settled in the village of Bilyk, Kobylyaky region, where I was allotted twelve acres of land which I farmed myself.

I became a so-called middle farmer. I paid my taxes and was never exposed to repressive measures.

Last year, according to contract, I had to turn in 120 bushels of surplus grain but because, on the orders of the head of the village Soviet, Lebedenko, my whole crop was taken while still in sheaf, I did not have a single bushel left. According to information from the collective farm "Red Ukraine," which took my grain, the amount my grain produced was 270 bushels of rye and 75 bushels of spring wheat. I was allowed nothing for my own consumption or for seed.

I sent a complaint about the compulsory expropriation of the grain to the Kobylyaky regional prosecutor, but so far I have received no reply.

Please take steps to look into my complaint and return my land to me.

(*Visti*, August 8, 1932).

PARTY'S FAITH NOT JUSTIFIED

(Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine).

The Central Committee representatives who supervised the grain collecting plans and have not executed their duties nor justified the Party's faith in them, are being recalled from the districts.

5. Troyitske — Kornyatko.
6. Baransk — Buryakov.
7. Dobrovelyhkiwka — Lazoryshak.
8. Orativ — Shmatov.
9. Plyske — Hryz.
10. Petriwka — Holstein.
11. Teplyk — Onishchepa.
12. Zinovievsk — Katel.

Twenty-two experienced Party workers were sent to the backward villages. These villages are: Artilne — completed 74 per cent of the grain collecting plan, Krasno-Pavliwka — 80 per cent, Rizdvyane — 73 per cent.

Tkachenko, head of the Artilne village Soviet, is to be expelled from the Party for the collapse of the grain collecting plan.

The collective farms and village Soviets in the Kremenchug region have promised to complete the forthcoming plan as a tribute to the 3rd session of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet.

In Velyko-Tereshkiwka village Soviet shock brigades have been organized, who are doing great work in the village.

In the village of Dmytriwka ten such brigades have been organized.

We must assist the collective farms to complete their grain collecting plans by collecting the grain from the poor and middle individual farmers.

The Central Committee declares the month of January to be the shock action month of the grain-collecting plans in Ukraine.

(Vistl, January 1, 1932).

B. A.

THEY SEIZED ALL THE GRAIN THEN SEARCHED FOR MORE

The chief cause of the famine was the so-called grain-collecting plans, conducted with the slogan, "surplus grain for the state." In the villages of the Drabi district, in the Poltava region, these plans were carried out in the following manner.

The directives from the Party center were to divide the

villages into small divisions. Every division was visited daily by special shock brigades who speeded up the grain-collecting plans. These brigades consisted of the following persons: one member from the presidium of the village Soviet, or simply any member from the village Soviet; two or three Komsomols; one Communist, and the local schoolteacher. Sometimes the head or another member from the co-operative administration was included and, during summer vacations, several students.

Every brigade had a so-called "specialist" for searching out grain. He was equipped with a long iron crow-bar with which he probed for hidden grain.

The brigade went from house to house. At first they entered homes and asked, "How much grain have you got for the government?" "I haven't any. If you don't believe me search for yourselves," was the usual laconic answer.

And so the "search" began. They searched in the house, in the attic, shed, pantry and the cellar. Then they went outside and searched in the barn, pig pen, granary and the straw pile. They measured the oven and calculated if it was large enough to hold hidden grain behind the brickwork. They broke beams in the attic, pounded on the floor of the house, tramped the whole yard and garden. If they found a suspicious-looking spot, in went the crow-bar.

In 1931 there were still a few instances of hidden grain being discovered, usually about 100 pounds, sometimes 200. In 1932, however, there was none. The most that could be found, was about 10 to 20 pounds of scarehnings from grain which were kept for chicken feed. Even this "surplus" was taken away.

M. INHULETS

THE AFFAIR IN ZHOVTA

In the winter of 1932 PRAVDA published an article about the crimes of the grain-collecting commission perpetrated in the village of Zhovta, Pyatykhatsk district, Dniepropetrovsk region.

In the early spring of the same year the visiting assizes of the Dniepropetrovsk Regional Court came to the village. Those brought fro trial were: Lyabunov, representative of the Pyatykhatsk Party Committee, also head of the Pyatykhatsk District Committee of Professional Unions; Marko Shulika, secretary of the Zhovta Party Committee; and ten members of the grain-collecting brigade.

At the trial, of which I was a spectator, it was decided that the accused had been guilty of undue brutality during the grain-collecting. The farmers were exacted such huge quantities of grain that they could not fulfill even one-tenth of the amount. The members of the commission, headed by Lyabunov, broke into farmers' homes, took everything they could lay their hands on, smashed the brick ovens, drove the half-clad families out, including the children, then nailed the doors and windows amid the cries of the victimized people and coldly proceeded to the next house.

One witness related how, when he was returning home from the market, he met the members of the commission on the road and they stripped off his clothes and shoes before letting him go. When he arrived home he found his house destroyed and his family weeping and crying outside. There were dozens of families in the village who had suffered in the same manner.

The members of the commission were sentenced to prison terms ranging from two to seven years. The secretary got two years, and Lyabunov received one year of forced labor to be spent at his own profession. He served his "sentence" heading the miners' committee of the Professional Union in the Shwartz mine of the Kryvy Rih iron ore basin. And so the "sword of proletarian justice" punished the key figure in the destruction of farmers in the village of Zhovta.

When the grain-collecting plans were completed in all the regions of Ukraine, the government did not relax its drive for every kernel it could get. Different villages and collective farms were asked to meet additional, voluntary plans, which were to appear locally initiated. The whole Soviet press was engaged in these campaigns and served as the "eyes" of the government.

SUPPLEMENTARY GRAIN-COLLECTING PLANS

The Poltava district has offered a supplementary plan for 25,000 hundredweights of grain and will complete it by January 15.

Several collective farms in Novomytskiw, Kurovchanka and other villages have resolved to complete their supplementary grain-collecting plans before the deadline of January 15.

Collective farms in the Oleksiyiwka district are calling upon the neighboring villages for advance fulfillment of the supplementary plans.

The collective farm in the village of Karayiw, having fulfilled its supplementary plan of 400 hundredweights grain, has come forward with an additional plan for 162 hundredweights.

In the village of Horodok the collective farm has fulfilled its plans 110 per cent, and is now completing an additional plan.

The collective farm in the village of Varivets had undertaken to complete a supplementary plan for 280 hundredweights of grain and brought in 345 hundredweights instead. It has now promised an additional plan for 116 hundredweights.

The Cherepiwka collective farm in the Proskuriw district has also advanced a supplementary grain-collecting plan.

(*Visti*, January 6, 1932)

In Chervonohrad the expanded Plenum of the village active, the village Party organizations, heads of the village Soviets and heads of the collective farms has advanced a supplementary plan for 90,000 hundredweights of grain.

(*Visti*, January 6, 1932).

STEPPING UP GRAIN-COLLECTING PLANS

The Hrytsiw district newspaper, "Socialist Life," has organized a special shock-action village reporters' staff who will speed up the completion of the grain-collecting plan among the individual farmers and plan-evaders of the district.

The staff directs the operation by adding an extra page to the newspaper entitled "Storm," and this is circulated in four villages. The staff has found grain in Bilopil, kept back from the plan by the *kurkuls*.

Poshtaryk, head of the village Soviet in Kapustyn, works hand in hand with the *kurkuls*. He helps them to sell their grain and gives these plan-evaders a certificate for milling.

VILLAGE REPORTERS' DRIVES AID GRAIN COLLECTING PLANS

Zmiyiv. Editors of the district newspaper "Zmiyiv Pravda" have joined the reporters' drive to help complete the grain-collecting plans, and have sent 40 reporter shock-workers to the villages. In addition 6 shock brigades were dispatched to the slow villages.

Konotop. The district newspaper has joined the reporters' shock action drive. Six inter-village shock brigades and eleven reporters' brigades have been organized and dispatched to the villages.

Sumy. The district newspaper has organized inter-village reporters' shock brigades to help the backward villages.

Shepetivka. The editors of the newspaper "Shepetovka Pathway" organized ten shock brigades and sent them to the villages. The reporters' drive for the completion of the grain-collecting plan is under way.

Baryshpol. The district paper "Collectivization Flag" has joined the reports' shock-action drive. Six brigades were sent to backward villages.

Cervonohrad. Five reporters' brigades were organized and sent to the villages.

Nikopil. Reporters' brigades have been organized to go to the villages to supervise grain collecting.

(Visti, January 16, 1932).

The seeding campaigns were no less significant than the grain-collecting plans. The chief aim was to seed all possible fields by any means and methods imaginable.

Minor plans, such as what acreage was to be planted under what crops and other small details were made by the Ukrainian government centers for the regions, districts and villages. Plans for the whole of Ukraine were made in Moscow.

The fall seeding was conducted on the whole without great difficulty because it was over before the grain-collecting plans for the harvested crops had been completed. The spring seeding was always carried on under heavy strain. There was never enough seed, and about mid-winter the seed-collecting campaigns

began. They were conducted in much the same manner as the grain-collecting campaigns. The seed campaign of 1930 went through without too much trouble, the 1931 campaign met with greater difficulty and in 1932 it was worst of all.

The campaign usually began with a stream of orders and instructions from central headquarters. Special ten-day drives were declared, special investigation brigades mobilized, agriculturalists summoned and agricultural students called to help. Tractors were overhauled and "saboteurs" prosecuted. Horses were mobilized and farmers accused of destroying them were prosecuted for the shortage. Special competitions were announced for the fastest preparation for, and completion of, the spring seeding.

Despite all such measures and counter-measures of the Soviet government spring seeding was always a trying, laborious task. In the spring of 1932 it was almost left uncompleted. On May 20, when all seeding in Ukraine should have been finished, the campaign was only 50 to 60 per cent achieved.

PLANS FOR 1932 SPRING SEEDING

(From the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR).

Seed collecting must be completed in collective farms by March 10. (Slogan).

1. The seeded area of spring grain for 1932 is to be set at 47,000,000 acres. 5,500,000 acres are to be seed by the state farms and 41,500,000 acres by collective farms and individual farmers.

2. The following grains and produce are to be planted in the following proportions: (1) Grain — 25,000,000 acres. (2) Technical produce — 8,197,000 acres. Included in the latter figure are: — sugar-beets — 3,271,000 acres, cotton — 50,000 acres, hemp 500,000 acres, sunflower — 2,500,000 acres, soya beans — 260,000 acres, m a k h o r k a — 140,000 acres, tobacco — 26,000 acres. (3) Fodder grains — 6,870,000 acres. For grazing — 4,894,000 acres, seed — 1,300,000 silage — 676,000 acres.

The seeded area for the Machine-Tractor Stations is to be set at 18,497,000 acres.

It must be kept in mind that the collective section of the farming industry will cover 84 to 85 per cent of all seeding areas.

3. Included in the general spring seeding plan the vegetable plan must be set at 526,000 acres; orchards will be increased to 101,000 acres, strawberry and grape plantations to 49,000 acres. Included in these figures are the town orchards of 41,700 acres and strawberry and grape plantations of 15,000 acres.

4. In our struggle for crops we must strive for a higher absurd yield. The grain yield should come to 11 hundred weights per hectare (2.47 acres); sugar beets — 200 cwt. per hectare in state farms and 150 cwt. in collective farms; cotton — 4 cwt. per hectare and sunflower seed — 7.2 cwt. per hectare.

Responsibility for the work must be undertaken by the brigades, groups and individuals. All kurkul tendencies, such as, lack of personal responsibility, carelessness of work done and concealment of surplus, must be combatted.

Head of the Council of People's Commissars — Chubar.

Director of Affairs of the Council of People's Commissars — Lehky.

(*Visti*, February 19, 1932).

SEED SHORTAGE IN UKRAINE

The grain collecting plan in Ukraine was completed on November 7, 1929, and now the nation is threatened with a seed shortage for next spring. To forestall this situation a seed-collecting campaign is starting in February. It will be conducted in the same manner as the grain-collecting campaigns.

(*Pravda*, January 21, 1930).

At the present time only 21 per cent of the required seed grain in Ukraine has been collected. In the Bila Tserkva region so far only one-third of the required amount of seed has been collected. The grain is in poor condition, containing weeds and hull. In the Odessa region the following amounts of seed

grain have been collected in such districts as, Fridrikho-Engels — 30 per cent, Blahoyev — 7 per cent, Chervonopovstansk — 11 per cent, Hrosuliw — 15 per cent, Shevchenkiw — 14 per cent.

The February 10 issue of PRAVDA wrote: "The administration of the seed-collecting campaign has stated that in Ukraine only 47 per cent of seed reserve has been mobilized. For this poor showing the following were reprimanded: The People's Commissar of Agriculture of the AMSSR, and the Directors of Regional Departments of Agriculture in the Regions of: Hlukhiwka, Korostenka, Chernyhiw, Uman, Kupyaniwka, Artemiw, Lubni, Nizhyn, Poltava, Dniepropetrovsk, Luhansk, Mariupol, Nikopol, and Kher-son."

Not until the end of February was the whole required amount collected.

(Pravda, February 27, 1930).

ALL THE GRAIN SEIZED, NONE LEFT FOR SEED

Collection of seed grain must be stepped up considerably. The government objective to have all the required seed collected by March 10 has not been reached.

The progress of the mobilization of seed grain is entirely unsatisfactory. According to figures of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture on March 10 the collective farms in Ukraine had only 55.2 per cent of the needed seed grain.

The worst situation is in the Odessa region where only 45 per cent of the seed-collecting plan has been completed and the increase in the latest ten-day drive is only .1 per cent.

The districts in the Kharkiw region have completed 48.2 per cent of their objective, and the increase for the last five-day drive is 2.4 per cent.

The collective farms in the Kiev region have completed their plans by 57.6 per cent, with a subsequent increase of 5 per cent. In Donbas 60.8 per cent of the seed has been collected with an additional increase of

3.1 per cent; in Vynnytsya 70.5 per cent, with an increase of 1.7 per cent; in Dniepropetrovsk 44.3 per cent, an increase of .1 per cent; in Moldavia 78.1 per cent, an increase of 4.4 per cent.

The seed collecting plan in Ukraine is 38.5 per cent completed for wheat; 50.9 per cent for barley.

(Radio Telegraph Agency of Ukraine)

(Visti, March 19, 1932)

THE RACE IN PREPARATION FOR SPRING SEEDING

(From a resolution of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR).

The survivals of the socially hostile elements, the *k u r k u l s*, and their henchmen in the towns are trying to hamper the Communist preparations for the spring seeding.

In many districts and villages, in state farms, Machine Tractor Stations and collective farms this preparation is far from satisfactory.

1. Proper steps were not taken to collect the seed reserve, and not all state and collective farms have cleaned their seed and grain.

2. Tractors and farm machinery have not been overhauled and tractor fuel has not been provided.

3. Horses are not in fit shape for heavy spring work and insufficient feed is provided for them.

4. In many state and collective farms seeding brigades have not been fully organized. They have not been assigned their divisions of land, nor have they been equipped with machinery. Some brigades do not yet know their assigned tasks.

5. The individual farmers are lagging behind schedule in seeding preparations.

6. Planting preparations in the sugar-beet districts have been badly neglected.

The Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and the Council of People's Commissars resolve:

1. To conduct a special ten-day drive from April

3 to April 10 for speeding up spring seeding preparations.

2. To place the responsibility for the ten-day drive on the village Soviets who, with the aid of collective farm administration, must launch the drive immediately and intensively having organized special investigation brigades to help them.

3. The District Executives and the town Soviets are to have the complete management of the ten-day drives.

Head of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet—Petrovsky.

Head of the Council of People's Commissars—Chubar.

Secretary of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee—Voytsekhovskiy.

(*Visti*, March 27, 1932)

AGRICULTURALISTS ARE MOBILIZED

In its seeding campaign the Kiev region depends on agriculturalists to a great extent. About 300 agriculturalists have been mobilized throughout the region, together with several hundred agricultural students. Although all Kiev agriculturalists have been mobilized for the seeding campaign, some of them readily desert their positions.

Many establishments consider their agriculturalists indispensable and will not permit them to leave. Representatives of the mobilization trio, and instructors of farm work are visiting the districts and checking on the mobilization.

According to information from Kharkiw, the central mobilization commission from the Ukrainian People's Commissariat of Agriculture is getting specialists ready in quick order. In the Kharkiw establishments 199 specialists have been mobilized, which is 80 per cent of the general total. The shortage is explained by the fact that many organizations have a pressing need for specialists in their preparations for the spring seeding.

The mobilized specialists have been sent to dif-

ferent districts for work in the collective farms. Mobilization was completed on March 4th, and by the 6th all had departed for their destinations.

(Pravda, March 14, 1930)

S. K.

"SABOTEURS"

In February, 1933, the entire general administration of the Polyvyanka Machine Tractor Station was arrested, as in many other places of the Salsk steppes in the Rostov region. The director, agriculturalists, bookkeepers, mechanics, technicians and collective farm administration were arrested. They were tried by the visiting assizes of the Regional Court from Rostov.

Their indictment was "sabotage," which was revealed to be in the form of failure to have the tractors and farm machinery in shape for the spring seeding and because the oxen and horses were too thin and weak for heavy work.

Actually the reason for those shortcomings was that absolutely no spare parts were available for repairs. The forges were unable to secure any fuel, no iron or even wood, with which to make replacements in machinery. All efforts by the Machine Tractor Stations and collective farm administration to get any of the needed material were fruitless. There was nothing to be had.

Just the same the whole group was found guilty of malicious sabotage, and sentenced to one year's imprisonment. The chief mechanic received three years imprisonment. It was clearly evident at the trial that the whole party was innocent and, perhaps out of consideration for this, they were permitted to serve their sentences at their usual work, receiving only half the pay.

Such trials and indictments for "sabotage" were common in the whole northern part of the Caucasus and in the Rostov region.

HORSES PROTECTED BY SOVIET LAW

(Changes in the Criminal Code of Ukraine, 1927 (collection, No. 26, Article 13).

1. Article No. 75.2 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine is to be approved in the following wording:

Handwritten signature and notes at the top of the page.

ВСІН РАЙОННИМ НАСІТРАДАМ.

Дана Райксову округ району мустарку аманути дирофети
приходу регуляції сезону і переробки олійнісілля. Буудууугу
но перрегулявана переробка пшире аманути олією аманути
заготівлі олійних культуур апродуємо нагадо пера (рети аманути
наши директе апроду пера мустарок тако апроду аманути се-
амаком переробки довідком сілрад . аманути аманути контрол
бу Райксовых тако аманути аманути аманути аманути аманути
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РАЙКОВУ

18/1-30р. БИТ 70РР, Сектор Райксовых
гпр. 505 пр.

Ban on the private manufacture of sun-flower-seed oil

For unlawful slaughtering of livestock and horses, and for intentionally injuring livestock and horses, or for other premeditated actions which bring about the disability of draught animals and for instigating others to such crimes, the kurkuls and private buyers are to be imprisoned for terms ranging from one to two years, with or without banishment from their places of residence.

2. Article No. 75.2a of the Criminal Code of Ukraine is to be approved in the following wording:

For unlawful (i. e. without obtaining a special permit from the veterinary) killing of horses in socialized establishments (state and collective farms, Machine Tractor Stations and others) and for intentional injury of the horses a one-year prison term is to be imposed.

For criminal neglect of the animals a six-month term of forced labor is to be imposed.

If criminal neglect of animals is systematic, or causes serious loss of horses, a three-year prison term is to be imposed.

This resolution is passed on the basis of the resolution passed by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and the Council of People's Commissars on December 12, 1931.

Petrovsky—Head of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee.

Serbychenko—Deputy-Chief of the Council of People's Commissars.

Vasylenko—Secretary of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee.

CONTESTS AND COMMITTEES

(From a resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine regarding contests and competitions).

To declare the need for the small newspapers of the collective, state farm and Machine Tractor Stations for such farm contests as the preparation for seeding as well as for the seeding operation itself.

Reconstruction of the management of the contests

is to be assigned to the regional newspapers, and the actual operation is to be in the hands of the district newspapers. The central newspapers are to help in this work.

The creation and existence of the village reporters' brigades on the small newspapers must be assured.

(Visti, March 3, 1932)

COLLAPSE OF THE SPRING SEEDING PLAN OF 1932

According to the report of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture the amount of seeding completed on May 20 was only 20,037,000 acres, or 42.4 per cent of the plan. On May 15 only 35.5 per cent of the planned area had been seeded.

In the Dniepropetrovsk region 59.6 per cent of seeding plan completed; the early grains 79.2 per cent.

In the Kharkiw region—44.9 per cent; early grains—61.4 per cent.

In the Vynnytsya region—33.9 per cent; early grains—55.7 per cent.

In the Odessa region—49.5 per cent; early grains—87.4 per cent.

In the Kiev region—23.1 per cent; early grains—39.4 per cent.

In the Moldavian SSR—32.9 per cent; early grains 82.7 per cent.

In the Donets Basin—48.6 per cent; early grains 82.7 per cent.

The general plan in Ukraine has been completed at the following rate for the different grains and produce:

Wheat—61 per cent.

Barley — 78.1 per cent.

Oats — 59 per cent.

Sugar-beets — 30.2 per cent.

Ensilage — 45.1 per cent

Soya beans — 19.7 per cent.

Cotton — 74.2 per cent.

Hemp — 6.3 per cent.
Flax — 20.9 per cent.
Corn — 30 per cent.
Hay — 31.8 per cent.
Potatoes — 25.3 per cent.
Vegetables — 26 per cent.

Seeding must proceed with shock action. Leftist depreciation by individual farmers must be mercilessly crushed.

(*Visti*, May 20, 1932)

Production brigades, the most vital link in collective farm production, must be strengthened. A simple method of piece-work must be devised. Recording of the collective farmers' work must be improved. Work days depend on the amount and quality of the actual work done. These are the pressing problems faced by the collective farm brigades.

(*Visti*, May 30, 1932)

Third in importance among the political campaigns of the Soviet government was the financial campaign. This entailed the collection of farm taxes in cash, and the collection of debts. For execution of these financial plans the government recommended the creation of special commissions—brigades.

At that time the government had ceased to maintain the village schools and other village educational institutions, such as community centers and others, out of its budget. It supported only high schools, which were the so-called regional schools. Therefore, the village schools were financed through a special educational-cultural tax collected from the farmers which amounted to fifty per cent of the regular farm tax, and was levied differentially with the so-called class approach.

The financial campaign also took in the government loan drives. These were usually completed within a few days and the farmers, especially the *k u r k u l s*, had to subscribe to these loans in cash.

The campaign handled the mobilization of "free" cash of the farmers for deposits in the savings treasuries.

The farmers had no money at that time. They received only minimum pay in the collective farms, a wage which was never used for personal necessities, such as clothing, shoes or household needs, but which went to pay the government taxes.

However, even this was not enough. It was necessary to sell some of the produce, sorely needed for the family's consumption, such as milk, butter, eggs, fruit and vegetables, in order to raise the required tax money.

It was a little easier for those families having a member working in some industry or establishment, for ready cash was then available to meet the tax demands.

We present here an example of how the workers and office workers were paid, and the circumstances of the currency in the state banks.

UKRAINIAN CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDS THE CREATION OF ROBBING BRIGADES.

(Resolution of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee, passed February 2, regarding N. Zodalazivsky's report on the mobilization of funds).

For inexcusable inactivity in the organization of the funds-collecting plan in the first quarter of 1931 N. Zodalazivsky, of the District Executive Committee, is to be severely censured. The District Executive Committee, with the collective responsibility of the head and the whole presidium, must immediately begin an extensive drive for the mobilization of funds, and have the task completed within the shortest possible time. Therefore:

1. The quarterly plan must immediately be carried to the village Soviet.

2. Through the village Soviet the funds-collecting plan must be carried to each separate village and to every corner of every large village. For the practical realization of the plan special commissions must be organized from among the village *a c t i v e s*, Committees of Poor Farmers, Komsomols, farm laborers, delegates from the women's divisions, and so forth, under the leadership of the village Soviets and their financial divisions.

7. The *k u r k u l s* and other anti-Soviet elements must be foiled in their efforts to hamper the plan. The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet resolution of January 25 regarding the collection of debts from the *k u r k u l s*

and other defaulters, must be enforced as soon as possible after accounts against the *kurkuls* have been checked with the village Soviets.

In placing the whole responsibility for the completion of the funds-collecting plan within a specified period of time on the District Executive Committees, the Secretariat of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet intends to include in the undertaking such organizations as the professional unions, collective farms, People's Commissariat of Agriculture, Komsomol and public organizations.

(*Visti*, February 3, 1931)

TAX FOR CULTURAL NEEDS

The first term has expired but the plan is only 41 per cent complete. The culture-collecting plan must be fully completed by April 1. (Newspaper slogans).

The first term expired on March 1 when, according to the government resolution, the villages should have subscribed 50 per cent of the final objective of the educational-cultural tax drive. However, this half of the plan has not been accomplished by many collective farms and village organizations.

On March 1, only 41.9 per cent of the plan was complete. The most backward are the Odessa region which completed 17.5 per cent of the plan, the Kiev region with 20.2 per cent, Vynnytsya—22.5 per cent, Kharkiw—29.8 per cent, Dniepropetrovsk—32 per cent, Moldavia—28.8 per cent.

The district and village organizations do not comprehend the importance of completing this plan fully and punctually. Some districts do not take proper steps to insure full completion of the plan among the *kurkul* farmers. In many districts the campaign has not been conducted as widely and intensively as it should have been.

The regional organizations should exert more pressure on the district organizations which seem to expect the plan to be realized without mobilizing the masses, and without due pressure on the *kurkuls*.

At all costs the plan must be completed by April 1.

(*Visti*, March 9, 1932)

SURPLUS MONEY MUST BE PLACED IN SAVINGS TREASURIES

The village savings treasuries are the center of attention. A mass drive for the savings treasuries. (Newspaper slogans).

In Ukraine the villages are lagging behind schedule in the mobilization of surplus funds for the savings treasuries. The cities and towns are up to 67.1 per cent of the plan while the villages have barely reached 19.7 per cent. The over-all rate in Ukraine so far is only 44.2 per cent.

All regions have very low figures. The villages of the Kharkiw region have completed 24.3 per cent of the quarterly plan, Kiev region — 17 per cent. In two months the Odessa region has managed to get up to 7 per cent, Dniepropetrovsk 6 per cent and Wynnysya 4 per cent.

This situation may be explained only by the fact that the villages are making an insufficient effort in the drive. This must be remedied. The district and village organizations must constantly keep in mind the necessity for continual mobilization of surplus money.

Fourteen specially organized brigades are leaving for different points to launch a mass savings collecting campaign.

(*Vistl*, March 20, 1932)

The following documents relating to the grain collecting plans tell about the collecting of multure, the grain paid in return for milling in government flour mills.

Farming campaigns also included sugar-beet weeding and the fall harvesting of this produce. This campaign was always enmeshed in great difficulty and agitation.

Another campaign was the collecting of salvage which was essential to keep up Soviet trade abroad.

ANOTHER APPEAL FOR MULTURE

The multure-collecting campaign has suffered a shameful collapse. During the fourth five-day drive in March only .9 per cent of the year's multure col-

lecting plan was completed. Altogether on March 20 46.1 per cent of the planned quota was collected. The farthest behind is Moldavia with only 32.7 per cent of the plan completed, and Odessa with 38.4 per cent. The leading regions are Dniepropetrovsk with 48.8 per cent and Vynnytsya with 48.9 per cent. Not a single region so far has achieved 50 per cent of the plan.

Like other things, multure is sold and used up locally but the local organizations do nothing about it. Here is a typical example: the manager of the state farm in the Troyitske district, Odessa region, sold around 1,700 cwt. of multure, and the courts are stalling prosecution for three months.

The district organizations do not pay sufficient attention to the process of multure-collecting considering it to be a matter of secondary importance.

There are many cases of secret milling in closed mills. The collective farms very often grind grain for their members without collecting the usual multure.

The collected multure is not brought to the state stores.

The Regional Committees must, within ten days, begin an extensive inquiry into the amount of multure being collected by the village Soviets and arrange for its transportation to the grain collecting stations.

(Visti, April 2, 1932)

MULTURE A PART OF THE GRAIN COLLECTING PLAN

All multure must be turned in on the fixed date. Thefts of multure must be prosecuted. (Newspaper slogans).

The multure collecting plan in the Bila-Tserkva district has been completed only 26 per cent. In many mills surplus multure is not shipped.

Many collective farms, such as, "Chubar" in the village of Novo-Selysche, "Shock Worker" in the village of Poltavske, "Shevchenko" in the Hrekinka village, "Commune" in the village of Ozyryane, "Voroshylov" in Pershotravnevy district completed

only 30 per cent of its multure-collecting plan.

The plan in Lozova stands at 36 per cent.

Many collective farms have adopted *kurkul* methods of keeping multure in their granaries.

In the Khrestyniwka district only 23.4 per cent of the multure was collected on December 26. There are signs that multure is being sold in the district. The collective farm "Victory" in Zayachkiw village has sold 114 cwt. of multure and the collective farm "Teamwork" in Sebastyanivka village sold 32 cwt. of multure. The collective farm "Community" in Bykowska has sold five tons of multure.

In Cherkassy the multure-collecting plan calls for 16,000 cwt. of multure, but on January 1 only 3,900 was collected.

In Poltava, multure-collecting is carried on incompetently. For irresponsibility and a criminal attitude towards the multure-collecting plan the representative, Sopukha, was expelled from the Party and dismissed from his position.

(*Visti*, January 10, 1932).

THE BEET CROP IS IN DANGER OF NOT BEING GATHERED IN

The sugar refineries of Ukraine received only 40 per cent of the sugar beet requirements. A merciless struggle must be waged against the selling of beets. The selling of beets must be stopped. (Newspaper slogans).

The sugar-beet collecting plan in Ukraine is progressing unsatisfactorily. According to information of the Radio Telegraph Agency of Ukraine only 61,500 tons of sugar-beets were delivered to refineries on November 14—40 per cent of the plan. In the Kharkiw Trust the plan has been 45.3 per cent completed, in Vynnytsya 39.6 per cent and in Kiev 36.2 per cent.

The deplorable attitude of the combines as regards the daily report on the sugar-beet collecting progress must be noted. Out of 155 combines only 63 sent in information on January 14.

The artel "Molotov," in the Konotop region, is feeding sugar-beets to the horses and hid thousands of hundredweights of them in underground store-rooms.

In the Kobelyaky district hundreds of thousands of sugar-beets are being stolen or fed to livestock, and in some villages it is made into silage.

In the collective farms "Red Ukraine" and "Shevchenko" 8 to 12 per cent of the sugar beet crop is left in the fields.

Selling beets is becoming widespread in the collective farm. In the artel of the village of Teply Khutir beets are stolen by the wagon load. The management of the artel has given the collective farmers permission to take home sugar beets in payment for digging them up, a wagon-load for a certain quota.

In the Sakhnov region collective farms 10 per cent of the sugar beets were left in the fields after the crop was taken in. Second diggings bring good results. In the Stepaniw collective farm 14 wagon loads of beets were dug up in the second digging on 17 acres of land.

(Vistl. November 15, 1931)

CHAPTER V.

COMPLETE COLLECTIVIZATION

Against the background of all these campaigns, the government employed drastic measures to draw in all the farmers, "voluntarily and compulsively", into collective farms. Regrouping its forces, officially correcting its mistakes and announcing new methods of "voluntary" collectivization, the Party and the government continued with the old attacks on the farmers, such as over-taxation and terrorism. The class war, de-kurkulization arrests and deportations flourished unabated.

The farmers, unable to withstand the heavy pressure, submitted to the collectives. But there remained a certain group who, trying to be loyal to the Soviet government to a certain degree and suffering the onerous, repressive measures, still refused to be forced in. They preferred to farm individually even though they were allotted the poorest land. Some of them tried to get work in factories and other establishments. From a moral viewpoint they seemed to be better off than the collective farmers.

However, they were a thorn in the side of the government because the collective farmers viewed them with envy, and so it employed against them the well-tried method of economic repression—over-taxation. All financial campaigns were mostly directed to strike at this group. Soon they were completely ruined. They were branded with the terms kurkuls, under-kurkul, kurkul agents, kurkul relics and "enemies of the people."

Finally the individual farmers were forced to leave their farms and move to industrial towns. This suited the government because the villages then became completely collectivized.

In the document below we see how the Party judged the collapse of the first period of its complete collectivization, the withdrawal of the farmers from the collective farms and Stalin's promises to convince the rest of the farmers of the advantages of collective farming.

Another document tells of government measures to force the farmers' return to collectivization, such as the confiscation of land and machinery, banishment from the villages and prosecutions. Such measures were directed against the *kurkuls*, who at that time were all those not having joined the collective farms.

Subsequent documents are excerpts from the Soviet press about the return of the terrorized farmers to collective farms and the steps taken actually to force them to return. For this under-taking the schools, including teachers and pupils, were mobilized to help.

CITIZEN'S RIGHTS DENIED, PRODUCTS SEIZED

(Resolution of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine, passed March 15, 1933, regarding terms of agreements and contracting of farm produce).

To liquidate the *kurkul* resistance in the social reconstruction of farming the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars resolves that:

1. Farming communities must discuss the question of the terms of contracting farm produce at general meetings of those members of the community who have the right to vote.

2. Commissions to assist contracting, to put the farm community decisions into effect, will be appointed at the said general meetings. The commission will map out the order and distribution of obligations of the poor and middle farmers, according to contracts. Regulations of the commissions must be approved by the general meetings.

3. The commissions will assign definite agricultural and zoo-technical tasks to the *kurkuls* and impose farm produce quotas to be fulfilled by them.

4. Division of the obligations of the poor and middle farmers and the duties assigned the *kurkuls* in the farm produce contracts must be duly approved by the village Soviet.

5. In the event that the poor and middle farmers

fail to keep the terms of their arrangements, their farm produce, money or other goods provided for in the contracts will be seized by the village Soviets.

6. Those *kurkuls* who do not carry out their contract terms will have their machinery and land confiscated and will be banished from their villages by the District Executive Committees who are given special authority to carry out these duties independently of prosecution as provided for by article No. 58 of the criminal code.

This resolution is passed on the basis of the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, of February 7, 1930.

(*Visti*, March 15, 1930)

TERRORIZED FARMERS RETURN TO COLLECTIVE FARMS

There are signs in the Dniepropetrovsk region of farmers going back into collective farms. In the village of Lotsmaniwka 150 poor and middle farmers have returned to the collective farm, 67 of whom brought their horses.

After correcting the distortions and conducting a purge of the collective farm in the village of Kotiwka 500 farmers enrolled. Many middle farmers are coming in. In the village of Mahdaliwka 40 of them joined, in Shevchenkova 36, in Zhdanov 36, in Novo-Moskovsk 140.

(*Pravda*, April 7, 1930)

In all districts information is extensively circulated explaining the resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and Stalin's article, "Dizzy With Success." This is resulting in the return of many farmers to the collective farms. In the Syneynykiw district a great number of the farmers have already returned. In the Vasylykiv district 78 farmers have come back, in Dniepropetrovsk 54, Boryslavsk 37, Kamenka 65.

Throughout all the regions of Ukraine the Central Committee resolutions are being popularized. In the Kiev region these resolutions are distributed to all

the farmers. Many regions report the return of those farmers who had earlier given notice of withdrawal.

(Pravda, April 9, 1930)

In the village of Spaske, Novo-Moskovsk district, 70 poor farmers have declared their intention to carry out their previously accepted obligations. In the Synelnykiw district 120 men have cancelled their notice to withdraw. In nine districts in the Kiev region 200 men have returned to collective farms.

In the village of Alexandriwka, Konotop district, 100 men had withdrawn from the collective farm and now 70 of them have returned. In the Artemiw region, out of 900 farmers who had left the collective farm, 650 came back. In Zaporizhya 673 have returned to the collective farm in three days.

(Pravda, April 10, 1930)

PILLAGE AND ROBBERY OF THE FARMERS

I am a widow, a poor individual farmer, in the village of Sokhe, Tsybryke district. I wish to reconut the unlawful acts of the head of the village Soviet, in my village, Kremenchuk.

This year the village Soviet took my cow for non-payment of a loan which I made as a re-settler, for a ten-year term.

I sold the last of my household possessions in order to raise the money to repay my debt to the government. On March 31, of this year, I sent an announcement to the Tsybryke Control Commission of the Workers Farmers Inspection that I had the money to pay my debt and asked them to return my cow, which is now in the collective farm "Budenny."


They studied my case, and made the recommendation that my cow should be returned to me when I paid my debt, but the head of the Sokhe village Soviet, Kremenchuk, has completely ignored it. He will not accept my money nor give me back my cow.

Domka Boychuk

(Pravda, August 4, 1932)

I am a farmer in the village of Rudnytsya, Pishchanky district, Vynnytsya region. I work on the land

steadily and consider myself a middle farmer. I have always met the obligations imposed upon me. Because I have not joined the collective farm, the village Soviet has given me difficult assignments.



More liquor to be sold

They arrested me and evicted my family from our home, throwing out all our household possessions.

I took my case to the highest court and to the Vynnytsya prosecutor. He twice ordered the village Soviet to return my house and property to me but it will not comply with these orders.

M. A. Vodyansky

(Visti, August 8, 1932)

VICTIMS SEEK PROTECTION FROM THE GOVERNMENT

I am 62 years of age and a farmer in the village of Novaky. I was disabled in 1920. In 1924 I moved to the farmstead, Voloky, where I had 16 acres of cultivator land, 12 acres of hay and a one acre orchard. When collectivization began, in 1929, I refrained from joining the collective farm because I had a large family of ten, but the collective farm took my cultivated land and orchard.

I complained to the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee. They agreed to return my land, or give me another tract, but the collective farm would not agree. Then I took my case to the land arbitration board which ordered compensation for me amounting to 1000 rubles, but I did not receive the money. I was given three plots of land, meadow and bush, which I cleared and broke.

On February 27, of this year, I received a letter from the village Soviet demanding payment of an insurance premium of 28 rubles.

On March 8 a brigade came to my place to search for hidden grain.

On March 10 a deputation composed of the District Executive Committee representative, Kuryatnykov, and the head of the village Soviet, Senchyn, visited me and presented papers, imposing a debt against me of 168 rubles. When I begged for time to pay this debt they took my clothing and several pounds of pork fat. They sold all my possessions—two cows, two horses, one sheep, one hog, the house, shed and pig sty — and banished me from the village.

There is a great deal of distortion connected with collectivization in our village.

At present I am staying in Kharkiw and beg the editors of *Visti* to take up my case and make inquiries into affairs in my village. I have been trying for four months to obtain justice but to no avail.

Zosym Brohoshura

(*Visti*, September 23, 1932)

MOBILIZING SCHOOLS TO HELP COLLECTIVIZATION

The People's Commissariat of Education has decided to mobilize all the students to help in the agricultural production campaign when they are free from studies, beginning in June.

All Regional Education Committees will be asked to engage the schools as soon as possible to participate in the social reconstruction of the rural area and the realization of the program mapped out by the Party and the government.

The People's Commissariat emphasizes the fact that should the schools refrain from activity in this matter it would benefit the class enemy. The schools work out the following questions in all the groups: political and economic assignments in the farm production campaign, complete collectivization, the spring seeding campaign and the role of the school in these campaigns.

In the opinion of the People's Commissariat of Education the schools must give special attention to the practical work they can do in the collective farms in their vicinities and in the drive to expand the collectivized section of agriculture.

The People's Commissariat of Education will soon publish a special booklet describing the part the schools will take in the spring farm work.

All schools must keep a record of the work they have done in this field.

(*Visti*, January 15, 1930)

MOLOTOV SPEEDED UP COLLECTIVIZATION

In the fall of 1931 Molotov himself visited the village of Pishchanky, Novo-Moskovsk district, Dniepropetrovsk region. In 1930-31 collectivization was practically at a standstill. The people became obstinate and would not even hear of collective farms again. Thus Molotov's visit was made to invigorate this movement.

He ordered all Party workers in the village, and several district workers, to be arrested. He severely censured the village government for their inefficient and bad management and expressed a desire to talk to the farmers personally. For better effect he called a meeting in the home of one farmer, Bilous-Zavhorodny.

Molotov gave a thunderous speech in which he accused the district and village governments of "distorting the Party line." He concluded with an appeal to the farmers to take into consideration all the advantages of collective farming and to enroll voluntarily. The farmers, thus encouraged, stood up to say a few words themselves. They complained of the harsh methods and repression used against them by the local governments. After the meeting Molotov was hailed by the farmers as a great friend.


"Molotov himself stated that it would be voluntary." "You heard what Comrade Molotov said. Nobody will be forced to join the collective farms." "We all heard what the government says. There are still good people who understand us." Such were the arguments with which the people cheered themselves.

Three days later, after having visited a few other villages, Molotov departed. On the following day news spread through the village that the Party workers arrested by Molotov had all been released. The people wondered for a few days what it was all about, then settled down to everyday living again. In about a week a GPU district representative came to the village and took five men into custody. They were the ones who had spoken out in agreement with Molotov at the meeting. A week later ten more men were apprehended. After some time the news came that they had all been sent to the far North for ten years.

Petitions to Molotov, Kalinin and Petrovsky for the defense

of those unfortunate people were unanswered. The district government threw itself into collectivization which renewed zeal, as usual on a "voluntary" basis.

From the personal testimony of L. V.



Kurkuls' livestock confiscated for collective farms

COLLECTIVIZATION IS OBLIGATORY AND "VOLUNTARY"

In 1931 all the kurkuls and under-kurkuls had been liquidated. Their land was confiscated, their homes pillaged and closed to their families and they were all arrested. Only the poor class of farmers remained, but they were reluctant to go into collective farms despite the persistent promises of a "happy life" there.

At this time the government passed a regulation that collective farms would be organized solely on a voluntary and not on a compulsory basis, but compulsory for 50 per cent of the population. Taking advantage of the word "voluntary" the farmers voluntarily refused to join. This was a general condition throughout Ukraine, but my particular story is of the Vynnytsya region.

The Soviet government tried by every means to seduce the farmers into collectivization. It sent its network of agents into action and they visited the farmers daily in their homes, talking to them, persuading them to join the collective farms. If this proved unsuccessful they brought the farmers to the village Soviet and talked some more. Nearly every night small group meetings were held. The farmers were not given any peace or a chance to sleep in this mad drive to wear down their resistance. After repeated drumming of this propoganda into the farmers, individually and in small groups, a general meeting was called by the village Soviet.

At the meeting a table was carried onto the floor loaded with completed applications. After a few brief words on the same topic, the advantages of the collective farms and voluntary-compulsory enrollment, the chairman added, "Those for the collective farms stand to the right. Those against collective farms and the Soviet government stand to the left."

The people were panic-stricken. They did not wish to join, but were afraid to admit this and be accused of being "enemies of the people", as they well knew would happen from the experiences of the kurkuls. For some minutes they sat confused and bewildered and then slowly and hesitantly they walked over to the right side of the hall—for the collective farms.

ПРОТОКОЛ Ч. 29

ЗАСІДАННЯ ПРЕЗІДІИ КРИМЛЯ.

Дніпро-Петровської Округи

Відбуваються II Листопада 1932

Учасниками засідання Президії: Засурин, Мосієвич, Трун, Коробка, Мосієвич, Черненко, Мельник, Давидович, Р.З. Губ. Дніпропетровська.

У А Д Л М: Розкладає описі виключення на території сільськогосподарських підприємств зерно-лісних господарств в 40% відкриті. Ділячки: Голова Кошиці Засурин.

У А Д Л М: Громадянина Черненко Миколи Миколайовича, який в 1931 році був виключено з права володіння лісами в 40% відкриті, постановили повернути йому право володіння лісами в 40% відкриті, але тільки в межах лісової ділячки, яку він мав в 1931 році. При наявності протестів з боку сільськогосподарських підприємств ліси та територія лісів.

У А Д Л М: Черненко Микола Миколайович, який в 1931 році був виключено з права володіння лісами в 40% відкриті, постановили повернути йому право володіння лісами в 40% відкриті, але тільки в межах лісової ділячки, яку він мав в 1931 році. При наявності протестів з боку сільськогосподарських підприємств ліси та територія лісів.

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У А Д Л М: Черненко Микола Миколайович, який в 1931 році був виключено з права володіння лісами в 40% відкриті, постановили повернути йому право володіння лісами в 40% відкриті, але тільки в межах лісової ділячки, яку він мав в 1931 році. При наявності протестів з боку сільськогосподарських підприємств ліси та територія лісів.

С П У А Д Л М: Заява Засуринської Кошиці та Засуринської Кошиці про повернення їм лісів, виключених з права володіння лісами в 40% відкриті, постановили повернути їм ліси в 40% відкриті.

У А Д Л М: В межах лісової ділячки Засуринської Кошиці та Засуринської Кошиці постановили повернути їм ліси в 40% відкриті, але тільки в межах лісової ділячки, яку вони мали в 1931 році. При наявності протестів з боку сільськогосподарських підприємств ліси та територія лісів.

С П У А Д Л М: Заяву описі виключення лісів та земель про виключення лісів з права володіння лісами в 40% відкриті, постановили повернути їм ліси в 40% відкриті, але тільки в межах лісової ділячки, яку вони мали в 1931 році. При наявності протестів з боку сільськогосподарських підприємств ліси та територія лісів.

У А Д Л М: Справу того що при утворенні округи лісової Засуринської Кошиці ліси, виключені з права володіння лісами в 40% відкриті, постановили повернути їм ліси в 40% відкриті, але тільки в межах лісової ділячки, яку вони мали в 1931 році. При наявності протестів з боку сільськогосподарських підприємств ліси та територія лісів.

С П У А Д Л М: Заява Ковальчика Петра Григорійовича про виключення його лісів з права володіння лісами в 40% відкриті, постановили повернути йому ліси в 40% відкриті, але тільки в межах лісової ділячки, яку він мав в 1931 році. При наявності протестів з боку сільськогосподарських підприємств ліси та територія лісів.

У А Д Л М: Заява Ковальчика Петра Григорійовича, який в 1931 році був виключено з права володіння лісами в 40% відкриті, постановили повернути йому ліси в 40% відкриті, але тільки в межах лісової ділячки, яку він мав в 1931 році. При наявності протестів з боку сільськогосподарських підприємств ліси та територія лісів.

Peasants' goods confiscated

The next day the brigade came and took away all their tures, stating that they voluntarily and in good faith had joined the collective farm, that they were willingly turning over all their land and property and promised henceforth to work, with their whole families, honestly and conscientiously for the success of the said collective farm.

The next day the brigade came and took away all their cattle, horses and farm machinery. The homes were filled with heartbreak and despair and curses while the Soviet newspapers triumphantly reported the growing rate of collectivization.

I. YAWZ

DRIVEN INTO COLLECTIVE FARMS BY COMMUNIST PROVOCATION

There were villages in Ukraine where the people stoically refused to be swayed by propaganda and instigation and even defied arrest in their stand not to join the collective farms. Then the Communists used so-called provocation methods.

Included among the organized and determined villages were Klembiwka, Pysariwka, Kartsy and others in the Yampil district, Vynnytsya region. To break this resistance the Soviet agents set fire to the home of one of the activists. The village was engulfed in turmoil and agitation. The villagers were all summoned to the square at the village Soviet. When a large mob had collected, an NKVD cavalry detachment suddenly appeared and surrounded the crowd of people. The commander called about a hundred names from a list and ordered those people to stand aside.

When the men had done as they were bid the commander pronounced them malicious "enemies of the people," stubborn active, and to prove his accusations he cited the case of the burning house.

The group of men was immediately taken in charge by the cavalry and escorted to the railroad station. Where they went from there no one ever knew.

The rest of the crowd were given applications right on the spot for "voluntary" enrollment into the collective farm. Needless to say everyone signed.

In this manner Lenin's and Stalin's principle of voluntariness in the building of collectivization, which Stalin elaborated in his article "Dizzy With Success", was adhered to.

F. PRAVOBEREZHNY

IF YOU DON'T SIGN YOU AND YOUR FAMILY WILL GO TO SIBERIA

In the village of Hermaniwka, Obukhiw district, Kiev region, the head of the village Soviet, Nikiforov, personally visited the farmers and instigated them to join the collective farm. He was a Party member sent to the village from Russia as one of the "thousanders." He had a method all his own which he used on the farmers. Coming to a home he sent all the farmer's family out of the house and sitting down with him at the table he pounded it with his pistol for proper effect and asked:

"Well, Kindrat, are you going to join the collective farm?"

The farmer fidgeted and coughed and mumbled something. He did not refuse but did not want to sign.

"Well, you have to sign because I am in a hurry."

"You know how it is, Comrade Nikiforov, I am not against collective farms but it is not convenient for me to sign right now. I am not very well."

"I advise you to sign," continued Nikiforov, pushing the form under the farmer's nose, "because if you won't, then you and your family go to Siberia."

Standing up he added coldly:

"Start getting ready. The train leaves tomorrow afternoon. You won't need to take anything with you. You will get all you need when you arrive there."

Thus the "ingenious" Nikiforov signed up the majority of the people in this large village for the collective farm.

Provocation, cheating, terror and such methods of agitation as have been mentioned here finally broke the resistance of a great many farmers.

F. Pravoberezhny

MIGHT AS WELL SIGN, FEDIR, SUCH IS YOUR FATE

Ordinary agitation was of little help in getting the people into collective farms. The farmers often agreed with the argu-

ments set forth but would not go so far as to join. Then more effective methods were tried.

In our village — Stavka, Rzhyschchiw district — a general meeting was called one day in the village school-house. When the people had all entered, the door was locked and the agitation started. The district representative made a speech enumerating the advantages of collective farms and ending with an appeal to the farmers to sign the applications.

Then one of the activists approached the table, obviously pre-arranged, and began:

"Please, Comrades, sign me in, and according to socialist solidarity I call upon my neighbor, Comrade Fedir Perepichka, to come forward and sign too."

Perepichka hemmed and hawed. His wife was ill and his children still small, and there was this thing and another. One by one his excuses were dismissed. Perepichka still stalled and an hour passed. Then a tired voice was heard from a group of men, "You might as well sign, Fedir, such is your fate."

Fedir signed, and after long persuasion and goading by the district representative he called upon one of his neighbors to come up and sign. This one also offered many reasons why he could not but ended by signing, and so the show continued.

The meeting lasted all night and all the following day without a break or intermission. If one of the farmers had personal reasons why he had to leave the room he was led out by two militiamen who brought him back again. But in spite of the extreme pressure only 25 men signed. The others remained adamant.

FUNDAMENTALLY COLLECTIVIZATION IS COMPLETE

The year 1931 meant a new growth for the collectivization movement. In the grain-growing regions 80 per cent of the farms are now incorporated in the collective farms. Fundamentally, collectivization is now complete. In regions producing less grain or in those regions raising technical produce, the collective farms comprise more than 50 per cent of the farms.

Two-thirds of the cultivated land is now included in the 200,000 collective farms and 4,000 state farms.

This represents a great victory for socialism in the rural areas.

(History of the All-Union Communist Party, 1945.)

THE RATE OF FURTHER COLLECTIVIZATION

(Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, passed August 2, 1931)

2. Collectivization must be considered fundamentally complete:

(1) In Northern Caucasus (with the exception of a few nationalist regions) where 88 per cent of the poor and middle farmers have been incorporated into collectivization, taking in 94 per cent of the cultivated land.

(2) In the Lower Volga (except the Kalmyk region) 82 and 92 per cent.

(3) On the Central Volga (Left Bank) 69 and 80 per cent.

(4) In Ukraine (the steppe region) 85 and 94 per cent.

(5) In Ukraine (Livoberezhya) 69 and 90 per cent.

(6) In Crimea, 83 and 93 per cent.

(7) In the Ural region (the grain-producing districts) 75 and 82 per cent.

(8) In Moldavia (Ukraine) 68 and 92 per cent.

3. As regards other grain producing regions of the USSR, (grain-growing regions of the Kazakstan, Western Siberia, Bashkiria, Eastern Siberia and the Far East), the cotton-producing regions of Central Asia, Kazakstan, and regions beyond the Caucasus, and the beet-growing regions of Ukraine, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party advises that no relaxation must be permitted in the collectivization program so that by 1932 collectivization will be fundamentally complete.

CHAPTER VI

RESISTANCE OF THE FARMERS AND THE WOMEN

Anyone not familiar with all phases of the internal war in the USSR may think that Ukrainian farmers used only passive resistance against the Soviet government and its Party police rule. Actually during that time there were many cases of armed struggle against the collective slavery.

Not all records and material concerning these events have been compiled. It is sufficient perhaps to mention the event that took place in Kuban in 1932-33, as an illustration of the extent of this warfare, when 12,000 fully armed NKVD soldiers fought with all their might to quell an uprising.

Of course, there were also instances of uprisings being provoked by government agents in order to have grounds to arrest the anti-Soviet element. These facts prove to what extreme desperation the farmers had been driven, when any revolt could easily be set off.

The Communists called all active resistance, whether armed or not, "rebellions" and *kurkul* provocations, and tried to turn public opinion against them. This did not deter the farmers. Such outbursts came about spontaneously, without previous preparation or organization, revealing the great anguish and desire for vengeance of the defenceless population.

The women played perhaps the greatest role in the mass resistance. This has been mentioned in other documents concerned with the demolition of collective farms which followed the publication of Stalin's article "Dizzy With Success."

I. Z—LYA.

CAN YOU HEAR US, WORLD?

A lady friend of mine who was an agriculturalist in Kharkiw was sent to help in the spring seeding campaign of 1930 in the collective farms in the Proskuriw district, which borders on Poland. She told me the following story.

In the spring of 1930, when the farmers had already been

forced into collective farms and not only their land, farm machinery and livestock had been expropriated but even their milch cows and fowl, a mass protest sprang up in the villages, especially among the women. It often led to armed encounters with government representatives. In many villages the women broke into collective farms and took whatever had been their property before collectivization.

In one village on the Zbruch River the men and women, driven by collectivization, staged a demonstration. They paraded through the village streets to the Zbruch River and the very border of Poland and called in a loud chant: "Can you hear us, world? We have arisen, come and help us."

This desperate plea was sent out to the whole non-Communist world whose answer then, as now, was stony silence.

M. TOHOBICHNY

LENIN DID NOT HELP, ALL WERE DEPORTED

In the village of Nove Horobyia, Malynka district, Kiev region, the local school teacher was a Komsomol, whom the government accused of not doing enough for collectivization. Then he began to call meetings every evening.

At one meeting after a preliminary warming-up period the agitator turned to a farmer, Tymoshenko, and said, "Tell us why you do not want to join the collective farm?"

"Well, you see, I really don't mind but my wife does not wish to, and I cannot join without her."

"Who is the head in your home, you or your wife?"

"At home I am head, but in the collective farm the head is useless without the hands," Tymoshenko tried to wiggle out of his situation.

These meetings continued all winter and still the collective farm was not organized. And then, when the news got around that women were exempt from joining collective farms, they went into action. One woman from Baraniwka rode horse-back through the neighboring village instigating women to keep out of collective farms.

The farmers in the village of Nove Horobyia, believing in the government statements that collectivization was voluntary, decided that the fault lay with their school teacher. So one spring day when the gutters were full of water from the thaw the farmers marched up to the school-house in a mob, took the

Тамно:

До всіх голів в одірах та уштованих в айваконию.

За останній час з боку комуністичних айваконию та голів цілком спостерігається, безперерпна пам'ятна до надання після виступу до сільськогосподарської, що велика кількість безпривади на те місце, щоб де вважали справу в хазі користуватися та користуватися з тому маршом Катерини в процесі вимірювання та вимірювання в окремій одірі ввечері по айваконию к таким термінам по 16, 18, 19, 22, 25, 28 числа, по таким пунктам:

- 1. Айваконию командир.
- 2. Айваконию командир.
- 3. Айваконию командир.
- 4. Айваконию командир.
- 5. Айваконию командир.
- 6. Айваконию командир.
- 7. Айваконию командир.
- 8. Айваконию командир.
- 9. Айваконию командир.
- 10. Айваконию командир.
- 11. Айваконию командир.
- 12. Айваконию командир.
- 13. Айваконию командир.
- 14. Айваконию командир.
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- 23. Айваконию командир.
- 24. Айваконию командир.
- 25. Айваконию командир.
- 26. Айваконию командир.
- 27. Айваконию командир.
- 28. Айваконию командир.

Голова айваконию / Нісі / 1930

1930

Demand for a confidential report on peasant morale

teacher to the village and locked him in a basement to keep him from calling the incessant meetings of which the farmers were tired.

One of the two students who had been with the teacher when the capture occurred ran through back fences and full ditches to the district headquarters, and announced that an insurgent revolt was in progress. The other hid in the attic until the following day, then went to the district headquarters with the information that the farmers were holding the teacher captive in a basement and were themselves marching through the streets in demonstration carrying Lenin's portrait and singing Revolutionary songs, proclaiming that Lenin, their father, did not create collective farms. This affair lasted for two days.

Towards evening on the third day a GPU detachment came to the village from Korosten, surrounded the village, and held it incommunicado. After several days the GPU entered the village and prohibited the farmers from leaving their premises, and later from leaving their houses. The school teacher was released and he declared that he had not been molested but was well fed and looked after, but that the farmers had locked him up because they were tired of so many meetings.

Another week went by. Then one Sunday morning the GPU entered every home and drove all adult residents to a "meeting." Because there was no other building large enough to accommodate the crowd of people they were taken to the bath-house. After making another thorough search of the village in case someone had hidden, the GPU surrounded the bath-house.

They ordered the people to go outside. Then about 200 men had their hands tied behind their backs and were escorted to the railroad station. The next morning, after spending the night in a cramped barrack without food or drink, they were loaded on to a freight train and taken to an unknown destination.

Not a single Soviet newspaper mentioned this event except one small local journal which curtly stated that 87 per cent of the village of Nove Horobyia was composed of *kurkuls* who had opposed collectivization.

M. PETRIVSKY as told to him by **SEKLAR**

THE UPRISING IN ANDRIYEWKA

In 1929 after my graduation from the Izyum Pedagogical

Technicum I was sent to teach in the village of Andriyewka, Balaklayiwka district, Kharkiw region. However teaching was not my main assignment, which was to serve on the grain-collecting commission. Harvest time, in the late summer, was particularly hard for me.

The commission had orders from above to take the grain straight from the threshing machine. The farmers opposed this with all their might, but we paid no heed to them.

One day I came to the threshing machine which was in operation on one farmer's place and as soon as I mentioned the grain-collecting plan the farmer's son snatched a pitch fork and started after me. Only a minor accident saved me from that irate youth. He tripped, and drove his fork into the ground instead of my back. In the meantime I was able to get away and hide in the straw pile.

That day the whole village rebelled. The villagers had gathered and, armed with whatever weapons they could muster, pitch forks, scythes, axes, stakes and poles, they marched on the village active.

They chased the Central Committee representative to the village Soviet. There he locked himself in and shot at his attackers with a pistol until his ammunition ran out. Then the mob broke in, and beat and trampled him to death.

For several days the insurgents held sway over the village. Then an army unit drove in from Kharkiw and an artillery group opened fire on the village. The farmers surrendered.

A few of them fled, but the great majority were arrested and deported. Several were shot.

The youth who chased me with the pitch fork also fled. Some time later I met him accidentally in Kharkiw, but managed to dodge him as I had on the farm.

S. F.

WHAT DOES IT MATTER WHETHER WE DIE TODAY OR TOMMOROW?

In August, 1932, in the village of Mykhayliwka, Burymka district, Sumy region, the collective farm "Shevchenko" was given a grain-collecting plan which, had it been fulfilled, would have threatened the whole village with starvation. The plan was required to be approved by a meeting of the collective farmers.

For three days the village Soviet attempted to call the meeting but the farmers would not appear. Then on the fourth day, August 11, the meeting was called for noon, and was to be held in the field. Three field brigades, numbering about 400 men, were assembled at one spot. The plan was announced and the collective farm bookkeeper read the amount of the year's crop, the grain on hand and the set wages — 200 grams of grain per work day.

The chairman of the meeting, the head of the collective farm, then turned to the farmers with the question, "Are we going to complete this plan?" The men remained silent, and the women began to weep. The chairman continued, "We have to work here in the collective farm, and live and eat. Do not think that I will give away your grain without your consent."

That night the head of the collective farm, David Ivanovich Chuyenko, disappeared. On the following day, however, the GPU captured and arrested him. They also arrested the head of the village Soviet, Ivan Dzhema.

The next day the farmers called another meeting in the fields. This time the women took the initiative. During a discussion one, Maryna Sukhorebra, stood up and said, "You all know what our head of the collective farm told us yesterday and today he is not here. Now they will send us another in his place who will take all our grain away. You saw how the grain is pouring into the railroad station and we have not received a kernel for eight months of labor. Throw down your tools and let us go home. What does it matter whether we die today or tomorrow?" Everybody left work and went home.

On the way home they were met by the NKVD, who tried to force them back to work. An elderly lady of about sixty, Motrya Karpusenko, pushed her way into the village Soviet and smeared with mud the portraits of the Soviet lords, Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich and others. Leaving Lenin intact she commented, "This one gave us land and these thugs took it away."

The mob of farmers ignored the NKVD orders until one of the latter started to shoot into the air. Even this went unheeded. Three women walked up to the District Party Secretary and the District Prosecutor and declared, "Throw down your guns, then let us talk. We demand the release of the head of our collective farm and the head of the village

20



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Рез. Раб. Районів, Севастополь, Червоноград, Миколаїв
Дніпропетровськ, Понорівський

Про відновлення пасивності
на № 12-число.

До Кам'янського району на Дніпропетровщині
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Deprived of franchise

Soviet, a reduction in our money tax, our pay for our working days for eight months, and a higher grain-collecting plan."

Then another brave woman, Yavdokha Tretyakiw, leaped at the Party secretary and snatched the pistol out of his hands. As she threw it away an armed NKVD officer tried to grab her and the others who had spoken out. All the other women immediately rushed to the defence of the accosted group, fending off the armed officers who, in turn, threatened them with prison and concentration camps.

The angry crowd suddenly made a rush for the stables to take away their livestock and their grain from the granaries, but armed guards were already there.

The ensuing days were exciting and bitter. Following an investigation three court trials functioned, one in the village Soviet, one in the school-house and one at the district headquarters. Sixty-seven people were sentenced, some to be shot, some to terms in concentration camps, while still others committed suicide. Among those sentenced to be shot was the head of the collective farm, David Ivanovych Chubenko member of the Communist Party and a former Red partisan. All other members of the collective farm executive received different terms of imprisonment.

VOLOHODSKY

THE WOMEN REVOLT

In the spring of 1933 in the village of Pleshky, Poltava region, situated about 18 miles from the Dnieper River, a terrible famine raged, like everywhere else in Ukraine. In Karpenko's yard were two sheds filled with the collective farm grain and they were the cause of a great tragedy in that village.

A group of women and girls had gathered at these sheds with the intention of breaking in and getting some grain. The instigator of this venture was an eighteen-year old girl named Nastya Denysenko. The village active made up of the following persons, Mykyta Tsar, Mykyta Matviyenko, Semen Shapoval, Stepan Rudenko, Stepan Denysenko, Petro Torba, Serhiy Denysenko, Rudy and others, and headed by two Russians, Ivanov and Sukhomlinov, tried to ward off the desperate women. They appealed to Nastya to prevail upon her group to leave the scene, but this only infuriated them into further action.

Instantly the women all held weapons, seemingly secured out of nowhere. Brandishing pitch forks, poles and rocks they drove off the active, broke down the doors of the grain sheds and began filling their sacks. In the meantime an urgent message had been telephoned to the Helmyziw district for help in quelling the revolt.

In about fifteen minutes several dozen armed mounted militiamen appeared at the scene of the trouble. The chief dismounted and ordered the women to cease their rebellion and go home, but his command was met with mute silence. The women all waited for Nastya to make the first move. She appeared at the front of her group and quietly stated, "We are starving and will not leave. This is our grain you Russian robbers are keeping from us."

The chief ordered his men to open fire. Nastya was the first to fall. Many others were killed and many more wounded before the hungry demonstration was subdued. Many of the women who survived the shooting were later arrested for the unforgivable crime of taking a little of their own grain to feed their starving children. Not one of them remained in the village.

Hryhoriy Kostiuk in, "Stalin's Purge in Ukraine."

THE UPRISING IN PAVLOHRAD

This uprising took place in the spring of 1930, during the cruel grain-collecting scheme, compulsory collectivization and dekurkulization.

By a coincidence the uprising was headed by a lieutenant of the Red Army who was on furlough visiting his parents, who had just been entered on the list sentencing them to liquidation.

Like lightning, the uprising spread throughout the adjoining districts. Many government officials, brigade members, communication and information officials were unable to get away in time and died at the hands of the enraged mob. The united efforts of the different divisions of the army, including the tank corp and the air force, were required to bring the revolt under control.

On the fifth day the spontaneous uprising, armed with such weapons as axes, pitch-forks, poles and pistols, was quelled in a regular army battle. The lieutenant-commander of the army was killed in the fight, and also many soldiers and many

insurgents. All participants in the gigantic protest were sentenced to ten years in concentration camps. Their families were all shipped to the North.

One of them, Ivan Petrovych Prykhodko, who was eighteen years old at the time of the uprising, was in the Vorkuta concentration camp when I entered that place. We were inmates together for four years, 1936-40.

WOMEN ORGANIZE THE DEFENCE

In 1928, the grain commission in the village of Efremiwka, Kharkiw region, assigned quotas to the better farmers, who had obstinately evaded the grain-collecting plan. On May 30, 1929, the commission decided to seize all the grain from the threshers and list the *kurkul* property for sale.

A member of the village Soviet, Soldatenko, visited the *kurkul*, Ihor Poshiniw, to list all his property, while at the same time Fomichiw, a commission member, went to seize his grain.

Soldatenko was met by a mob of women who created a disturbance, threatened his life and stopped Poshiniw from making the list. The next time a militia officer was sent to complete the list, but a crowd of 200 people intercepted him, greeting him with abusive language and beating one of the commission members, Ponomarenko.

A mob of women attacked the head of the village Soviet, Mykhayliw, and forced him to return the grain he had seized earlier. The women tried to beat the District Executive Committee representative, Buda, but he managed to escape.

The women rioted all day, and on the next they met again and continued with the rampage.

The visiting assizes of the Kharkiw Regional Court convicted the women for their drastic action.

(*Visti*, August 7, 1929).

THE WOMEN DEFEND THEMSELVES AGAINST COLLECTIVIZATION

The class struggle in the villages has intensified during the spring seeding campaign. *Kurkul*

tactics appear in many shapes and forms. They are placing their hopes on the women.

A tractor brigade was sent from a state farm to one of the villages of the Uman region, which was converted to complete collectivization. The brigade was intercepted by a mob of women, who would not let them enter the village. They even attempted to drown the tractor drivers in the creek.

The most savage kurkuls are in the steppe regions. Strong agitation against the collectivization is carried on by the white guard.

(Pravda, January 13, 1930).

In the villages of the Pervomaysk region, such as Bandurka, Tsariwka and Demydiwka, all the poor farmers have joined the collective farms. After some time, though, the men stated in the village Soviet that they wished to withdraw because their women were against it. In one village 48 people had joined in a week, then 41 withdrew later.

In one of the villages of the Holovaniwka district the women complained, "In the collective farm we all have to eat out of one kettle. We had enough of that during the landlords' reign."

(Pravda, January 9, 1930).

THE VILLAGE SOVIET ROBBS THE FARMERS

In the village of Pidhorodnya, seven miles from Dniepropetrovsk, a village Soviet representative, Radchenko, came on February 8 with a group of activists to the home of Bulata. He was a factory worker in Dniepropetrovsk and owned a middle-sized farm in Pidhorodnya. Not finding Bulata at home Radchenko began taking away the seed grain. Bulata's wife screamed at him, but he ignored her. Then she called her neighbors and about 7 or 8 women came and implored Radchenko to stop.

The kurkuls exaggerated the story and gave it wide circulation. "They are robbing the poor," they told everyone. "Who is robbing them?" the farmers asked. "The village Soviet—chase them" they urged the people.

Soon a large crowd had assembled at Bulata's home, most of them women, since the men were at work in the factory, (70 per cent of the villagers work in factories) and forced Radchenko to stop taking grain.

Several hours later the head of the village Soviet sent a militia officer, who managed to collect the grain.

On February 11 another alarm went through the village. The women again congregated and the *kurkuls* openly led the attack. They incited the poor and middle farmers to destroy the storehouse where the socialized seed grain was kept. The attack was defeated.

Especially active in the agitation were the wife of W. I. Kuzmenko, a malicious *kurkul*, Evdokia Hetman and P. Kuzmenko. These three women, on January 12, called together 15 poor farmers at the home of Skupchenko and urged them to rebel

(*Visti*, February 20, 1930).

WOMEN'S OPPOSITION TO COLLECTIVIZATION

The *kurkuls* are trying their utmost to check the tremendous wave of the collectivization movement, often using the women to achieve this end. (Slogan).

On January 10 a women's meeting was called in the village of Koshel, Nizhenka region, to discuss the reconstruction of farming and collectivization.

Two *kurkul* women, Marusya Padalka and Victoria Harmashewska, plotted to break up the meeting. They enticed a poor woman, Hanna Nosovych, to join them. Hanna made the following statement: "Do not listen to the dupes."

The three, joined by other rich women, created a disturbance, pushed the district representative against the wall with a bench while another group held the chairman of the meeting helpless and cut off all his buttons.

Naturally, the meeting was broken up.

The next day, when the Regional Party Committee representative came to the village, the women

again tried to obstruct the meeting.

The Nizhen Regional Court sentenced Marusya Padalka and Victoria Harmashewska to two years imprisonment with solitary confinement. Hanna Nosovych was given six months' forced labor.

(*Visti*, February 27, 1930).

Following are some documents which are evidence of acts of sheer terrorism perpetrated by the farmers against government representatives in charge of collectivization. Usually they took the form of assassinations and arson.

In Kamenets-Podilsky 10 activists' homes were set on fire. In Sumy, the home of the head of the village Soviet was burned down and another fire occurred in Shepetiwka, where a few activists were wounded. In the village of Obukhiw, in the Kiev region, a farmer killed a "thousander" with an axe before the eyes of an activist brigade. In the village of Vysyaky an activist commander was shot to death through his kitchen window.

KURKULS SET FIRE TO ACTIVISTS' HOMES

In Kamyanets-Podilsky terrorist acts by kurkuls against activists are becoming more and more frequent. In the village of Stara Synyava, in the same region, they burned ten homes of activists, causing damage amounting to 10,000 rubles. The guilty have all been arrested.

In the village of Zaborozenka the kurkuls set fire to the homes of the head of the village Soviet and of the grain-collecting agent.

(*Pravda*, October 9, 1929).

THE KURKUL TERROR

The grain-collecting plans in the Vyrowka district, Sumy region, have not been successful. On October 1, 78 per cent of the plans had been completed, but not even half of the food produce had been collected.

The Organization of Land Cultivation completed its original plan and arranged for the collection of surplus grain from individual farmers.

The kurkuls hand in their grain very reluctantly and only under severe pressure. They not only hinder the grain-collecting plans but resort to acts of terror against the collecting agents. On the evening of September 30 they set fire to the home of the head of the village Soviet in Hanniwka and on the following night burned the home of a member of the grain-collecting commission, Vyrya.

The class enemy has infiltrated the grain-collecting apparatus and is aiding the kurkuls by delaying the grain-collecting.

The grain-collecting undertaking is the most vital part of the class struggle, waged on a united front by the workers and the poor and middle farmers. (Newspaper slogans).

(Visti, October 8, 1929).

A frenzied resistance is being made by the kurkuls against the grain-collecting plans. In spite of their drastic acts of terrorism against activists, such as the assassination of Savchuk a village reporter and member of the Selychiwka village Soviet, and setting fire to homes of active co-operative workers in Myrutyne village, the Shepetiwka region has completed its grain-collecting plan for the year.

(Visti, November 24, 1929).

TERROR AGAINST GRAIN-COLLECTING IS SPREADING

The violent resistance to the grain-collecting plan, staged by the kurkuls in the Berdychiw region is being carried to extreme lengths. They terrorize Soviet activists and members of the grain-collecting commissions.

In the village of Dombal:w:ka the kurkuls burned down the home of the village Soviet head, and another home in Mala Klitenka.

The priest in the village of Sadky joined the kurkuls in their counter-revolutionary work and together they shot at the grain-collecting commission.

In the village of Slobozhshcha the kurkuls shot and wounded the local activist, the head of

the farm artel, who was very active in the grain-collecting campaign.

The priests are largely responsible for the terrorist acts.

In the village of Markycha, where the priest still has a land allotment, he was asked to give 200 bushels of grain and within half an hour the kurkuls produced the required amount, so that without even threshing his grain the priest handed in his quota.

These examples of strong resistance prove that serious attention should be devoted to the grain-collecting campaigns by such organizations as the village community centers and reading halls. They carry on intensive political, educational work by bringing into the open the detrimental actions of the kurkuls.

(Visti, October 10, 1929).

F. PRAVOBEREZHNY

A "THOUSANDER" KILLED WITH A CLEAVER

In January, 1933, surplus grain and farm produce was being collected. Everything edible was taken. My cousin, who lived in the village of Stayka, Rzhyshchiw region, hid a pint jar of millet seed in the ground near the shed, and it was found and taken. My neighbor had 6 to 8 pounds of buckwheat buried and this was also found and taken.

One day the search brigade came to the home of a farmer in Obukhiw village. He had at one time been a butcher. Now he was widowed, and had five children.

The commander of the brigade, a "25-thousander," persisted that the man show him where he had hidden his pork fat. The farmer insisted that he had no pork fat, that he had sold it all to raise money for taxes. The commander called to the NKVD, who accompanied the brigade on its rounds, to come and arrest the farmer.

The farmer turned to the ikon in the corner of the room and made the sign of the cross. He whispered a prayer over the heads of his children, all huddled over the brick oven. Then he grabbed his old butcher's axe and in that instant split open the head of the "25-thousander."

A SHOT IN RETRIBUTION

During the grain-collecting campaign of 1929-30 in the village of Vysyaky, Bohuslawka district, Kiev region, the District Party representative, Andriy Boyko, was extremely abusive to the farmers. He was an ardent Communist with very little education, and as a Party candidate worked as a warden in the bush. He lived in a house on the very edge of the village of Vysyaky. When the grain-collecting campaign got under way he headed an activist group, who searched for hidden grain and swept clean all the farmers' food stores.

One spring evening when Boyko was at home eating supper a shot was fired through his kitchen window which hit him in the head. The light in the room went out and when his wife, (whom he had forced to marry him after shooting her father and brother), entered and lit the lamp she found him slumped over the table in a pool of blood.

Thus, someone unknown had taken his revenge on Boyko for his cruelty to the people.

We have given only a few examples of acts of terrorism committed against government representatives. Actually this state of rebellion prevailed everywhere in Ukraine and throughout the whole of the USSR, and had reached such proportions that the government was forced to provide a special regulation to help the victimized activists.

AIDING THE VICTIMS

(Regulation of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee and the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars, passed March 3, 1930, to provide help to sufferers from kurkul violence).

To extend all possible help, by government and public organizations, to persons or establishments suffering as a result of kurkul violence, the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine have resolved:

1. To create a special fund, established by the Council of People's Commissars, to aid all those persons or establishments who have suffered at the hands of the kurkuls.

2. The funds are to be raised from:

(1) Appropriating 25 per cent of the proceeds from fines and penalties paid by individual farmers for violating rulings passed at general meetings regarding the grain-collecting plan.

(2) Funds assigned for this purpose from government and local budgets.

(3) Contributions of money and goods by village benevolent organizations.

3. To use the assigned funds for compensating the poor and middle farmers and government workers who have suffered losses inflicted by the kurkuls, especially those whose property was not insured.

4. The extent of help to be given from the fund shall be determined by the Council of People's Commissars according to the extent of the losses.

5. The Presidium of the Regional Executive Committee is directly to supervise the work of the Council in carrying out this regulation.

6. This regulation is passed on the basis of the regulation of November 16, 1929, passed by the Supreme Soviet and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR providing aid to individuals and establishments suffering losses from the kurkul violence.

Chairman of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee — Petrovsky.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars — Chubar.

Secretary of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee — Horlinsky.

Opposition to collectivization also stemmed from yet another source, which had its dangerous aspects for the government. It arose from numerous Soviet government agents themselves. Their desertions were eventually punished by the government. Following are a few examples.

HUMAN CONSCIENCE WILL NOT BE APPEASED

A young, full-fledged agriculturalist, M. Symakov, came to the Hladun collective farm in Ukraine

from the Tymiryaziw Agricultural Institute. After seven days at his post he withdrew. He wrote the following notice of resignation: —

"I do not believe in the collective farm system. The pace in the reconstruction of agriculture is too rapid. This is a wrong course taken by the Party. Let my words be a warning."

Symakov's resignation was accepted. He is no longer either an agriculturalist or a Party member.

Only one thing is not clear. How could the Party organization of Tymiryaziw allow into the Party individuals who cannot withstand the test of real work?

(*Pravda*, February 28, 1930).

The Karl Marx district in the Dniepropetrovsk region conducted collectivization through meetings and administration.

During the vicious class struggle in the villages some Communists deserted. The head of the Committee of Poor Farmers in Lobiykove village went to the collective farm one night and removed his horse. In the village of Kotiwka the director of the District Land Department deserted. Other deserters are: the head of the Chernetchyn village Soviet, the organizer of the women's division in Spaske, Baturyn, and many others.

The Dniepropetrovsk Regional Party Committee has sent over 2,000 city Communists for extensive work in the villages.

(*Pravda*, March 28, 1930).

DESERTER FROM THE "25-THOUSANDERS"

In the Dobovyaziwka sugar refinery of the Kotonop region, when production workers were mobilized to help collectivization in the villages, one of the workers, a member of the sugar workers' union, Kolesny, brought his ticket to the factory committee, laid it on the table and declared:

"Here is your ticket." Then, leaving the factory, he met one of his friends and boasted, "Thank God I am free."

Kolesnyk's case has been reviewed at the general meeting of the sugar workers' union on January 14, and a decision was unanimously reached to condemn Kolesnyk's act and to exclude him from the proletarian union.

(Visti, January 30, 1930).

I. D.

PROTESTED BY HANGING HIMSELF

Oleksander Khyzhynsky was a good friend of mine. I taught school with him and his sisters, in the same district. I knew the whole family well. They were cultured people, firm Ukrainian patriots and fine farmers.

In 1929 Oleksander graduated in economics from Kiev University, and worked as an economist in Kiev. In the winter of 1929-30 he was sent to help in the collectivization of the farms. What he saw there was too much for him to bear. Sensitive and highly impressionable by nature, he protested with his whole being against the abuse of the farmers but his protestations were a cry in the wilderness.

In the spring of 1930, before another assignment to the villages, he hanged himself one night in the cemetery beside the tomb of Askold, overlooking the Dnieper river.

YAVDOKYM BONDAR

SUICIDES IN THE RED ARMY

In the fall of 1933 when I served in the air force division of the army training camp in Crimea, reinforcements were sent there from the Odessa region and from the city of Odessa itself. The new draftees told us of the horrible famine raging all over the country, and of the enormous number of deaths. They described how whole villages died out leaving the dead unburied, and how the sinister black banners waved everywhere. Special brigades went from place to place picking up the bodies and throwing them into cellars and wells, then heaping dirt over them. There was no time to dig graves.

The young people who still remained on their feet were scrawny with large, protruding bellies. At the command to stand at attention the new recruits could not pull in their stomachs. They suffered perpetually from hunger, and wrote

letters home pleading for food parcels and complaining to the company newspapers about the poor army food.

The complaints were ignored by the Political Commissar of Aviation. As to the parcels, if anyone did happen on rare occasions to receive one the authorities threw it in the garbage and summoned the recipient for a severe lecture. Among other things he was told by the so-called political instructors, frothing at the mouth with rage, of how a Soviet soldier knew why he was serving in the army and whom he was defending, while capitalist armies were paid and had no idea why they were fighting, but that capitalism had dug its own grave and if only the "comrade soldiers" would work harder everything would be all right.

No one dared contradict such views, but from time to time a fitting reply was expected. Those who listened in silence, were noted down and later thoroughly investigated as to who they were, the kind of families they came from, etc.

Suicides were frequent among the Red Army soldiers. An acquaintance of mine, Kovalenko, shot himself; another, whose name I have forgotten, a chauffeur, also killed himself and a friend of mine went insane. One fellow's attempt at suicide was foiled by the officers. A Moldavian, whose name was Korotyán, was overheard discussing the famine and he disappeared no one knew where.

BREAKING MACHINERY

There have been cases in the Pavlohrad district of *kurkuls* breaking heavy, expensive machinery. In Blyzneshchane and other districts the *kurkuls* broke all their machinery and sold it for scrap iron.

(*Pravda*, February 2, 1930).

I. MEDVYNETS

BURN MACHINERY RATHER THAN GIVE IT TO COLLECTIVE FARMS

In the village of Medvyn, in the Kiev region, when the collective farms were taking away all the farmers' machinery, including that of the poor farmers, one poor farmer protested. He owned a very good millet-grinding machine and a winnower, which were to be appropriated by the collective farm.

"I would rather see these machines burn in my own stove than give them away for nothing," he declared. Then he broke them up and actually used them for firewood. Many other farmers did likewise with the machines they had.

CHAPTER VII.

THE GROWING CONFLICT BETWEEN THE COLLECTIVE FARMERS AND THE GOVERNMENT, THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF UKRAINE AND THE ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY, AND BETWEEN UKRAINE AND MOSCOW.

In 1930 and 1931, when the government was waging a fierce "class" war against the *kurkuls*, collectivization was fundamentally complete. All farmers had, in one way or another, been driven into collective farms. Those who remained outside were, as the Soviet press termed it, just "*kurkul relics*" who did not count because they played no major role in rural political or economic life.

Still the "class" war, as Stalin himself agreed at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on January 7, 1933, not only did not diminish but, on the contrary, gained momentum. Against whom was the "class" war fought in the later years of 1932-33? As has been revealed, it was carried on for the most part inside the collective farms, either against individual collective farmers or against whole collectives. What, then, were the reasons for this?

It seems that 1931 was the crisis year, not only because all the farmers had by then been forced into collective farms and complete collectivization had been inaugurated but because the collective farmers themselves had undergone an unusual psychological change. They now realized the duplicity of the government and this aroused strong anti-collective feelings.

They saw that no matter how they had entered the collective farms, whether voluntarily or by coercion, or how much property they had brought in they were nothing more than just so much manpower, automatons who had no say regarding their work and no right to the fruits of their labor. All produce was appropriated by the state and they, and their families were continually in a state of semi-starvation. They did not have enough bread, their taxes remained the same as before, or even rose, and they had no shoes or clothes.

They lost all faith in collectivization, and took no interest in their work. Without conspiring or plotting they went on a so-called "Italian strike." They came to their jobs, but put in the days without any attempt to work. Fields were left uncultivated, unseeded, overgrown with weeds and the produce was not gathered in. Livestock was neglected and died. This "strike" was supported by all collective farmers, regardless of whether they had formerly been poor, middle or rich farmers. The government raved and placed all the blame on the "k u r k u l s" and their "agents," but that did not solve the situation.

The real danger to the Central Government in Moscow came when the "strike" in Ukraine was joined by the local governments, heads of the village Soviets and collective farms, Communist representatives from District Party organizations, and even from the Regional Committees and the very Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine itself.

This was a natural phenomenon. Prior to complete collectivization in Ukraine the affairs of agriculture had been in the hands of the Communist Party of Ukraine which now lost its former, and even provisional, autonomy. Now everything was centralized under the complete jurisdiction of Moscow, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party. The Communist Party of Ukraine became just a figure-head and the executor of Moscow's orders. All seeding plans, collecting plans for grain and other products were sent ready-made, and the Communist Party of Ukraine had no right to correct or alter these plans in any way to suit local specifications. All the plans had a most brutal, colonial aspect. Moscow was killing the goose which had been laying the golden eggs for her. These Moscow-laid plans were frustrated in Ukraine, and collapsed. Strong antagonism was growing within the Communist Party of Ukraine towards the Central Committee and the All-Union Communist Party in Moscow.

The Ukrainian Communist Party was constantly purged by Moscow. Many village, district and regional Party directors were dismissed from their posts, tried, convicted of rightist opportunism, Ukrainian nationalism, and were replaced by Russian commissars, but it was all of no avail.

A secret alliance sprang up between the Ukrainian collective farmers and Ukrainian Communists. The final stages of the war for Ukrainian wheat had arrived in the year 1932-33, when one

of the opponents — centralist Moscow or the Ukrainian farmers — had to win. And Moscow won. With the greatest, most horrible man-made famine in world history it wore down Ukrainian resistance.

THE FARMERS TAKE NO INTEREST IN THE WORK OF COLLECTIVE FARMS

Yesterday's individual farmers sat in the collective farms. They were experienced in farming small tracts of land, but had no knowledge of how to run a large collective establishment.

Grave errors and faults were found in the work of the collective farms during the initial stages of their existence. The work was badly organized and discipline was lax. In many collective farms the income was divided not according to the number of work-days, but according to the number of months a man had to feed. Often a lazy man received as much as a hard, conscientious workers. In view of this inefficiency in the collective farm managements the workers' interest waned. Absenteeism prevailed even in the busiest seasons, so that many fields were left fallow. Cultivation of land was haphazard.

The neglect of horses and farm machinery and the lack of a feeling of responsibility for the work done weakened the collective farms and reduced their incomes.

(History of the All-Union Communist Party, 1945, p. 302 [in Russian]).

I. D. (Geologist)

COLLECTIVE FARM WHEAT ROTTED IN THE FIELD

This occurred in the summer of 1930 in the village of Uspeniwka, Andriyiwka district, Mariupol region, situated east of Andriyiwka, on the way to the hamlet of Soroka.

As a geologist I worked with a group which was then conducting research work in Andriyiwka and Soroka. I travelled several times a week past the Uspeniwka village and its collective fields of wheat stretching between the village and the highway.

In May the fields looked beautiful and were a pleasure to

behold, with their neat rows of strong, healthy shoots carefully weeded.

Later in the summer the luxuriant stalks formed heads and these filled and ripened. When the wheat was ripe, the fields looked like the finest wheat field of a good farmer.

Then the wheat was reaped, tied into sheaves and stooked. So far everything was fine. The work was all done by the keen, experienced hands of the collective farmers in the newly formed collective.

And then? I have never been able to understand why the wheat was not threshed, whether it was lack of time, shortage of help, absence of good management or simply no interest in the matter on the part of the collective farmers. I think the latter was the real reason because all knew that immediately after threshing government agents would be around to collect the grain, and so they did not care whether it was threshed or not.

Soon frequent rains set in. The wheat sheaves became wet and sprouted. The stooks were covered with a thick green growth on top, while the straw underneath turned black.

The last time I passed the fields in August the wheat stooks were a sorry looking mess, resembling green-topped manure piles.

Here are documents showing how from the very outset of collectivization and de-kurkulization a tendency towards opposition was developing in certain Ukrainian Communist groups, and they attempted to protect individual farmers in their particular localities who were subject to de-kurkulization. There were many such instances. The Soviet press wrote about them, condemning them as "rightist opportunism".

WE HAVE NO KURKULS

In the Kaharlyk district, the largest in the Kiev region, rightist opportunist tendencies have been noted in the taxation and the grain-collecting policies. All the directors, down to the District Party Committee secretary, encouraged the kurkul line. "We have no kurkuls. We have only farmers," they flatly stated. Consequently, the District Land Department has sanctioned the sale of the kurkuls' land. The kurkuls are farming large sections of

land and do not pay taxes. The collective farms are being corrupted by *kurkuls* who cynically declare that they are collective farmers and therefore must be exempt from taxes. The grain-collecting objectives are not attained.

According to the regulation of the Regional Party Committee the District Party Committee secretary has been removed from his position. Many saboteurs have been indicted. A repeat purge of the district apparatus is in the offing.

(*Pravda*, October 9, 1929).

NO KURKULS IN THE VILLAGES

The situation on the collectivization front is less than satisfactory. The subordinate government and Party ruling bodies in the villages and districts have been thoroughly infiltrated by rightist opportunists who frustrate Party plans.

The Committee of Poor Farmers are often headed by saboteurs, and become hostile organizations.

The head of the Petriwka village Soviet, in Be-rezany district, Shevchenko, stated, "We have no *kurkuls* and do not know how to carry on a class war."

The head of the Oleksandiwka village Soviet, and the head of the Committee of Poor Farmers also declared, "We have no *kurkuls*."

The head of the Novo-Petrowska village Soviet in the Bilopol district offers advice to farmers who are threatened with "tough assignments."

The head of the Fontan village Soviet declared, "We have no *kurkuls* in Fontan and therefore no one on whom to impose the stiff plan of self-imposed taxes, while the shock brigades are boys' games and we have no time for such nonsense."

(Excerpts from the editorial entitled, "Against Opportunism in the Soviet Apparatus," published in *Radyanska Ukrayina*, an organ of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee, November 10, 1930).

Before collectivization began there were very few Communists on the Ukrainian farms. According to the general se-

cretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Kosior, there was only one Communist in a thousand in the Ukrainian village. And from the very outset of collectivization and of the grain-collecting plans, the Ukrainian Communist did not justify themselves before Moscow. One purge after another was held throughout the Party organization of Ukraine, especially in the village organizations where, according to early calculations, 14.7 per cent of the Communists were eliminated in the first purge, and as many as 28 per cent in some districts.

Communist workers from cities and towns were sent to replace them but this was of little avail. Coming among people long abused and terrorized these newcomers were often so moved by the plight of the farmers that they defended them and opposed Moscow's centralized plans.

After three years of collectivization whole groups, as well as individual Communists, joined with kurkulism and Petlyurism. Then a new order was issued from the center, a new purge of the village organizations had to be conducted and those purged must be deported as "politically dangerous."

UKRAINIAN VILLAGES ARE SHORT OF COMMUNISTS

Notwithstanding the fact that a great majority of the members of the Communist Party of Ukraine are proletarian, the Ukrainian farm organizations are weak. Of the total farm population of 25 million there are only 3,000 Communist centers and only 25,000 Communists active in agriculture. In 1,250 state farms there are only 222 Communist centers numbering 2,634 Communists. In the 4,037 collective farms there are 174 Communist centers with 1,800 Communists.

The proportion of farm laborers in the Communist Party is insignificant, amounting to only 10.1 per cent.

In spite of the great and positive work done recently by the Ukrainian farm organizations, such as collectivization and grain-collecting, there are many cases of corruption of the subordinate farm and Komsomol organizations who have lost their class

feeling and have united with the kurkul element. There are thousands of instances of rightist leanings.

(From a resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee following Kosior's speech, *Pravda*, November 29, 1929).

THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN UKRAINE IS PURGED

(From a resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, following a speech by Zatonsky).

1. The Plenum of the Central Control Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine declares that the results of previous purges and inquiries into the Communist Party of Ukraine fully support the expediency of the November resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party and the 16th Party convention held in connection with the general check and purge of the Party. To replace the purged foreign elements the Party must be replenished with proletariat cadres, mainly workers and laborers, vital for raising the Party's fighting capacity and its ability to solve the most complicated tasks of reconstruction.

3. The Plenum of the Central Control Committee notes that former results of the purge of the Communist Party of Ukraine (eliminated in soviet centers 8.1 per cent, in farm organizations 14.7 per cent, in the army 4.6 per cent, government official 1.3 per cent) reveal the corruption of the Party ranks by social foreigners who managed to conceal their past and usurped power; setting up a bureaucracy they acted to obstruct socialist reconstruction.

(*Visti*, October 30, 1929).

UKRAINIANS ARE MISTRUSTED, INVESTIGATED AND ELIMINATED

An investigation of the subordinate apparatus in Ukraine has revealed great corruption. It is sufficient to say that in the 119 districts investigated, numbering 39,000 Communists, 4,250 members have been expelled from the Party — 10.8 per cent. The figures for

separate regions are, Mariupol 16.8 per cent, Kherson 28 per cent.

Those expelled are: — 18.2 per cent for their connection with the kurkuls, 14.8 per cent for distorting the class line, 9.9 per cent for bureaucracy, 9.9 per cent for sabotage and 8.2 per cent of those who were former landowners, police officers and industrialists.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine is sending 4,000 workers from factories to replace all those eliminated, and the professional unions are sending 1,000. In addition, poor and demobilized Red Army men may be used as reinforcements.

(Pravda, November 18, 1929).

PURGING THE PARTY OF "PETLYURISTS"

Considering the fact that in many districts, especially during the collectivization period, whole groups and individual Party center officials from many Party organizations united Petlurism, with kurkulism, making such Communists and Party organizations actual agents of the class enemy, which is vivid proof of a total severance of these Communists and centers from the poor and middle masses, the Central Committee and the Central Control Committee of the Communists Party of Ukraine resolve to conduct an immediate purge of the farm organizations who openly sabotage the grain-collecting plans and undermine the workers' trust in the Party.

In order to strengthen the farm Party organizations, increase their fighting power, mobilize the Party organizations and the huge working masses for the task of doubling this year's grain collecting plans, greatly reduced from those of last year, to strengthen the collective farms organizationally and economically and commence preparations for the spring seeding, plans must be approved to purge farm organizations of the Snihuriw and Frunziw districts, in the Odessa region, and the Solonyanka, Vasyliwka and Lepetyнка districts in the Dniepropetrovsk region.

The purge will free the Party of elements hostile to Communism, who are perpetuating the work of the *kurkuls* and who have usurped positions they are incapable of handing in carrying out Party policies in agriculture.

The purged are to be deported as "politically dangerous."

(*Visti*, November 18, 1932).

The following documents show how, in different districts, heads of the Party leaders were flying because of so-called 'opportunism' or of attempts to point out to the central government the impracticability of its plans. This 'opportunism' was greatly in evidence at the beginning of 1932, when the horrible famine raged in Ukraine.

As a result of the findings of the inquiries held into the grain-collecting opposition, as one document shows, 34 persons out of a total of 80 were expelled from the Party.

Another document is evidence of the prosecution of the Central Committee agents, old Communists since 1919-21 and veterans of the people's war. They were punished for inactivity and support of the "kurkul sabotage."

SUBORDINATE PARTY MEMBERS HIT FOR RIGHTIST OPPORTUNISM

Officials of the Nova-Ukraina district, disregarding the Central Committee resolution have, with their loose talk about intangible grain-collecting plans and their opportunist tactics, brought disorder to the district Party organization and to the mobilization of the collective farm masses. The Central Committee resolves:

To discharge the secretary of the Nova-Ukraina Party organization — Sherapov.

To discharge the head of the District Executive Committee — Hrechka.

To discharge the head of the District Control Commission — Pototsky.

They are to be severely censured and given a warning. The Bureau of the District Committee is to be censured.

(Resolution of the Central Committee of the

Communist Party of Ukraine. January 14, 1932).

To approve the motion of the head of the workers' tractor center to remove two Machine-Tractor Stations, in Dobrovelychkiwka and Kryvozerske districts, which failed in their collecting plans, to other districts.

To discharge the secretary of the Tarashchane District Party secretary, Duda; the head of the District Party Committee, Holtniw; a member of the District Control Commission, Tyurkin; and also to expel them from the Party and indict them.

To discharge Prokhorenko, the head of the Babanka District Executive Committee, and bring his case for review before the Central Control Commission.

(Resolution of the Central Committee, January 15, 1932).

The Vradiewka Party organization has failed in important agricultural economic assignments. Its grain collecting plans were only 76 per cent completed, while the fund-collecting campaign was only 72 per cent completed. It has not given adequate leadership in the collective farm movement, has wholly neglected the meat collecting plan, made no preparation for the re-election of the soviets and completely neglected spring seeding preparations.

For lack of sufficient activity in the war against the hostile line of the rightist opportunist leadership and for permitting false reports of the grain collecting plans:

The secretary of the District Party Committee, Pidruchenko; the head of the District Executive Committee, Korol, and the District Party Committee organizer, Ivanushkin, are to be discharged from their posts and their cases brought before the Central Control Commission.

The District Party Committee Bureau and factions of the District Executive Committee are to be severely censured.

The head of the District Collective Farm Center, Lubin, and the head of the District Control Commission, Frolov, are to be discharged.

(Resolution of the Central Committee, January 17, 1932).

The head of the Sakhnovshcsyna District Executive Committee, Osadchy, is to be dismissed and suspended from official duties for a period of two years. The District Party Committee secretary, Voytsikhovsky, is to be dismissed. The District Party Committee organizer, Shurykin, is to be dismissed and expelled from the Party. The head of the District Control Commission, Tyrtovych, is to be dismissed and his case reviewed by the Central Control Commission.

(Resolution of the Central Committee, January 18, 1932).

(Visti, January 15 to 20, 1932).

SUBORDINATE COMMUNISTS ARE PUNISHED

The collective farm "Skovoroda," of the Zolochiw district has been placed on the black list for failing to complete the grain-collecting plan. In order to erase its black mark the general meeting of the collective farmers decided to bring the plan to full completion.

The collapse of the plan was caused by the manager of the collective farm, Ryabukha, a member of the Party.

The collapse of the grain-collecting plan in the collective farm "Three Communes" was caused by the acting director of the Machine-Tractor Station, Party member Kyrylenko, who conspired with the *kurkuls* to hold up the threshing.

For sabotage of the grain-collecting plans conspiring with the *kurkuls*, Ryabukha and Kyrylenko will be expelled from the Party.

(Visti, November 30, 1932).

In the Okhtyr district the following people were indicted for selling grain, joining with the *kurkuls* in sabotaging the grain-collecting plans, organizing anti-Soviet activities in the collective farm, abetting the *kurkuls* and other counter-revolutionary elements: the District Party Committee secretary, Holo-

vyn; the head of the District Executive Committee, Palamarenko; the head of the District Collective Farm Center, Oboyan, and Lupenko, the representative of the District Land Department.

УХВАЛА
 Радянської Соціалістичної Республіки
 Союзу Радянських Республік
 Народних Засідателів: Шашкіна та Голуба.
 При Сесії
 розглянувши на відкритому засіданні справу, пов'язану з об'єктами на судівському за-
 річціні справу не обминування ІСЗІСІС, вказав Семішевська вказується,
 що його лотка і не зараз під другим понавіщені правде в ССЗІ, з будівель
 мент на зараз засудження, опомлеться, не ніби то у кресте знахся
 латьок майно і кулсба, та і інші належні лотці, скільки можуть
 лотка в ССЗІ не повина понавітні, а як лотка то не повинні у с/с-
 ботька куркуля перексвавати себе майно сул

У Х В А Л А М В:

Семішевській с/бали та родинніми бригадами неохітно належить переви-
 роти, ті жодні лотці куркуля понавітні в ССЗІ, на предмет її виконання
 і перевірити кому саме належить куркуля і інші лотці, ті засудженні ІСЗІ-
 ІСЗІСІС, та лібно не лотці, та зробіть належні виплати.

Секретар Н. Сулу
 Кришталевського району

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A Daughter of de-kurkulized parents works in a collective farm under assumed name.

The grain-collecting plans among the individual farmers are in a deplorable state.

(*Visti*, December 21, 1932).

COMMUNISTS ARE EXPELLED, BUT GRAIN SHORTAGE CONTINUES

(Resolution of the Party Collegium of the Central Control Commission of the Communist Party of Ukraine).

Having heard the speech of the head of the Bila Tserkva District Control Commission regarding the part taken by the Control Commission in the struggle for grain, and the report given by the secretary of the Party College of the Dniepropetrovsk Regional Commission concerning the findings of the investigation revealing opposition to the grain-collecting plans from many village workers in the district, the Control Commission concludes that the struggle for grain by the Bila Tserkva District Control Commission was conducted unsatisfactorily.

Having over 80 Party workers in collective farms and Machine-Tractor Stations, the Workers-Farmers Control Commission did not include them in the fight in the grain-collecting plan against kurkul-organized sabotage, and against the hoarders and thieves of the collective farm grain.

Because of inactivity and obvious kurkul sabotage in the district caused by numerous Party members and candidates, the grain-collecting plan, which had every reason to be completed, has lagged far behind schedule. On December 25 only 48.4 per cent of the year's objective was reached.

Notwithstanding the fact that the District Control Commission has expelled 34 people from the Party for inactivity in the grain-collecting campaign it has not raised the matter to a suitable level of principle and policy and has not used it in mobilizing the whole Party organization to smash kurkulism and its influence in the Party and has not completed the grain-collecting plan.

The head of the District Control Commission,

Bilous, and a member of the Commission, Miroshnychenko, are to be discharged.

Secretary of the Party College of the Central Control Commission of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Kiselev.

(*Visti*, January 3, 1933).

EXPELLED FROM THE PARTY IN CONNECTION WITH GRAIN-COLLECTING PLANS

(From a resolution of the Party Collegium of the Control Commission of the Communist Party of Ukraine).

Having looked into the matter, and into the conclusions of the former representatives of the grain-collecting plans, the Party College of the Central Control Commission has decided that for inactivity and concealment of district organizations who would not take steps to break kurkul sabotage in the grain-collecting plans:

1. Y. Kasyan — Party member since 1920, former superintendent of the grain-collecting plans in Konstantyniwka district — is to be expelled from the Party.

2. A. Nahorny — Party member since 1921, vice-president of the Dniepropetrovsk Regional plan, former superintendent of the grain-collecting plan in the Vasylikiw district — is to be expelled from the Party and indicted.

3. W. Sklyar — Party member since 1920, head of the Ukrainian Co-operative trade organization, former superintendent of the grain-collecting plan in the Lopatynka District — is to be expelled from the Party.

4. Bezrodny — Party member since 1919, head of the VUS, former superintendent of the grain-collecting plan in the Kobelya district — is to be severely censured and given a warning.

5. Dukhonin — Party member since 1921, Lavretsky — Party member since 1920, Vozny — Party member since 1924, Popov — Party member since 1926 — are to be severely censured.

Secretary of the Party College (Court) of the Central Control Commission of the Communist Party of Ukraine — Kiselev.

(Visti, January 4, 1933).

SHORTAGE OF GRAIN DUE TO RIGHTIST OPPORTUNISM

The practice of rightist opportunism in the work of the Stanislavchyk district characterizes other backward districts. District leaders have turned repressive measures against the class enemy into play.

Krylyna, the director of the District Party Committee promised to put pressure on the kurkuls. The village Soviet arrested two kurkuls, Hologats and Reniy, for defaulting on their difficult assignments, but Krylyna has vouched for them and tried to force the village Soviet to exempt them from their assignments. The kurkuls fled from the village, owing the state 42 cwt. of grain.

In Ridnytsya village, none of the village Soviet members has carried out his contract assignments, and the village Soviet head, Burdenko, arbitrarily reduced the plans of individual farmers.

Under the protection of Burdenko who, in turn, is protected by the District Executive Committee, the kurkuls do not fulfill their difficult assignments. Now the District Executive Committee is transferring Burdenko to the village of Kozlov to fill the position of head of the village Soviet.

(Visti, January 1, 1933).

As may be seen from evidence presented here, the conflict between Ukraine and Moscow grew and became more acute. Moscow's colonial, pillaging plans brought an alarming famine to most districts of Ukraine, in the spring of 1932. Trying to save the situation the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, having collected documentary evidence of the tragic state of affairs throughout all of Ukraine declared, through Skrypnyk, Petrovsky and especially Chubar, their protest to Moscow at the Third All-Ukrainian Party Conference, held in July, 1932, in the presence of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, Moscow's emissaries and members

of the Politbureau of the All-Union Communist Party, Molotov and Kaganovich. The reports and minutes of the convention and the speeches of the persons mentioned are not given here, but we refer the reader to the works of Hryhoriy O. Kostiuk, "Stalin's Purge of Ukraine," where this occasion is described in detail.

At this convention, Moscow was given due warning that should she not change her policy towards Ukraine that nation was threatened with a famine many times greater than was already in evidence in the spring of 1932. Moscow had every chance of saving Ukraine from the impending catastrophe simply by reducing its grain-collecting plans, but this step was not taken. Moscow was afraid that capitulation was threatening her in the face of the opposition of the Ukrainian farmers. Rather than that she made certain of the capitulation of the Ukrainian farmers themselves, who considered their continued existence to be threatened by the most horrible famine the world had ever known.

Immediately after the convention, Moscow made all preparations to hasten this capitulation and, at the same time, the capitulation of the whole Ukrainian nation. By mid-summer of 1932 the dread famine had spread throughout all the territories of Ukraine.

We give evidence of the organization and preparation for the famine, of the different ways in which it made its appearance, and of its aftermath in the following part, Part III, of the book.

P A R T I I I

CHAPTER I

THE ORGANIZED PREPARATION OF THE FAMINE

The famine and the deaths from hunger in the villages of Ukraine were very well known to Moscow in the spring of 1932. Under normal circumstances the Soviet government and the Communist party would have been prepared to prevent the repetition of a similar catastrophe in the ensuing years of 1932-33. The government and the party could have done so, but this was not their plan; Moscow required grain, but not the Ukrainian peasantry; Moscow had foreseen an increased sharpening in the struggle with the peasantry for grain, and had therefore, prepared well in advance all their organizational efforts to promote an artificial famine in order to break the resistance to collectivization.

The following was done to accomplish the desired results:

1) Plans for grain-collections were prepared for Ukraine, in spite of the actual state of the harvest yield and of the food requirements of the population. Thus, a determined effort was made to strip the peasantry of all grain.

2) A special edict was issued to expropriate the entire village economy, including that of the smallest peasant. The peasants were forbidden, under pain of death, to utilize the products of their toil, regardless of whether they belonged to a collective farm or not.

3) A special law was enacted to establish a commercial blockade of the Ukrainian villages in most of the regions of Ukraine.

4) Special laws were enacted to bind all toilers, workers and peasants to specific places of employment. A passport system was established to prevent the peasants from seeking employment outside their village, thus depriving them of the right to procure food from other sources.

5) Ukraine as a whole, and especially the Ukrainian peasantry was placed under a special transportation blockade, thus depriving the population of opportunities to travel in quest of food.

6) The authorities made strenuous efforts to conceal the existence of the famine in Ukraine, not only from the outside world, but also from other national groups in the USSR.

EXCESSIVE GRAIN-COLLECTION PLANS

According to the official estimate, the plan for grain-collection in Ukraine was set at 356 million poods, or 78 million poods less than was set for 1931, but this was in no sense a concession to the peasants. The reduction represented the collection deficit for 1931.

What did such a plan mean to Ukraine?

During normal times in the past, including even the early days of collectivization, the maximum arable area for eight cereal cultures (winter and spring wheat, rye, barley, oats, buckwheat, millet and corn), consisted of approximately twenty million hectares. Of this area winter cereals took about 45 per cent. The average combined yield per hectare of all cereals consisted of approximately 48 poods, and the total possible maximum yield would be about one billion poods (16.8 million tons). Of this maximum yield 792 million poods (13.2 million tons) was required for local consumption, leaving the surplus of 216 millions poods (3.6 million tons) to be marketed.

With the completion of total collectivization in 1931, the grain yield was below normal. The seeding was done in a manner that was both careless and untimely, which resulted in a poor harvest. Nevertheless, 356 million poods of grain were collected by the government. Even this figure was far in excess of the maximum stripping of the villages of the bare amount of cereals necessary for survival till the next harvest. Thus, over 150 million poods of cereals were taken over and above the minimum needs, with the result that in the spring of 1932 many villages and regions found themselves in "economic difficulties." In other words, a real famine existed.

What was the state of affairs in 1932?

It must be noted that the seeding of about 8.5 million hectares of winter wheat and rye was of inferior quality, because the soil had not been properly prepared and cleaned of weeds. Therefore of the expected harvest of 400 million poods, only 300 million poods were actually gathered.

According to the plan 10.5 million hectares were set for the seeding of spring cereal crops in the spring of 1932. However,

by May 15th, this plan collapsed since it was only partially fulfilled: wheat — 61 per cent, barley — 78 per cent, oats — 59 per cent, corn — 30 per cent. Thus, the plan for the planting of early cereal crops was completed. The cereals which could have been planted later in the spring, such as corn, buckwheat, and millet, were put in only to the extent of 50 per cent. Thus, of the planned seeding of 10.5 million hectares, only 6.7 millions were seeded, bringing a maximum yield of 320 million poods.

The total yield of eight cereal crops in the year 1932 did not exceed 620 million poods of which main food staples, such as wheat and rye, accounted for about 370 million poods. The foregoing figures are, indeed, deemed excessive; it would be safe to say, that this particular harvest was just about 50 per cent of the normal, or about 500 million poods. The government-planned yield of 11 hundredweights per hectare, also collapsed.

Even if the harvest yield did result in 620 million poods, then, in order to supply the normal consumption needs of the population of Ukraine, it was still a 150 million poods short of the mark. Despite this fact, the authorities removed 285 million poods or 80 per cent of the planned 356 million poods.

Thus the population of Ukraine, instead of having 790 million poods for normal consumption needs, was left only with 215 million poods, or less.

Taking into account the fact that the food requirements of the urban population, which consisted of about 7 million, was supplied from the official storesouses, the remaining 24 million of the rural population was left with but a fraction of supplies of food, live stock feed, and seed-grain. It was, therefore, evident beyond any doubt, that a state of famine was thus created, and this swept the villages and hamlets of the once-rich Ukraine.

The grain-collection plans were issued from the Centre (Moscow) mechanically, merely by taking into account the maximum possible yield of a hectare of land, and the total number of hectares that could be utilized. No attention was paid to the actual state of crops locally, to the amount of land utilized, and, least of all, to the minimum consumption needs of the local population.

GRAIN-COLLECTIONS FROM THE 1932 HARVEST

(From a resolution of the Council of Peoples' Commissars and the CC of CPSU).

On the basis of a victory of the collective farm and state-farm system of rural economy over the system of individual economy, and the annihilation of the kurkul elements in the villages of the USSR, together with the development of cereal crop farm units, the widening of the seeding areas and the growth of mass production of cereal grains, instead of 600 million poods of grain collected by the state in 1928, and 1,350,000,000 poods in 1930, in 1931, 1,400,000,000 poods were collected despite the drought.

The plans for grain-collections from different republics and countries, were to be designated as follows:

Ukraine — 356 million poods (instead of 434 millions poods, as per the previous year); Northern Caucasus 136 m.p. (154); Crimea — 10 m.p. (11); Central Black Soil Region — 115 m.p. (128); Tartar Republic — 24 m.p. (34); Kazakia — 36 m.p. (57); Eastern Siberia — 29 m.p. (32); Central Asia — 22 m.p. (25); Moscow Region — 27 m.p. (31); Nyzny Novhorod — 29 m.p. (33); Western Region — 6 m.p. (9); Leningrad Region — 4 m.p. (5); Ivaniwska Re-



Frozen corpses at a Kharkiw cemetery

gion — 4 m.p. (5); Zacaucasia — 4 m.p. (5); Belorussian SSR — 6 m.p. (6); Far Eastern Country — 7 m.p. 8); Central Volga — 72 m.p. (106); Lower Volga — 77 m.p. (100); Bashkiria — 26 m.p. (39); Ural — 48 m.p. (71); Western Siberia — 62 m.p. (74).

Grain-collection to be completed by January 1st, and at the latest by January 15, 1933.

Molotov — Chairman of the Council of Peoples' Commissars,

Stalin — Secretary, CC of CPSU.

(Visti, May 8, 1932).

EXTRACTS FROM W. KUBIYOWICH'S ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY OF UKRAINE.

1. ARABLE LANDS ON THE UKRAINIAN SSR TERRAIN.

1928 — 24,639,000 hectares, 79 per cent under grain crops.

1932 — 26,438,000 hectares, 75 per cent under grain crops, or approximately 19,828,000 hectares (20,000,000 in round figures) p. 381.

2. PROPORTION OF WINTER AND SPRING WHEAT AREA

1925 — winter cultivation — 45 per cent

1935 — winter cultivation — 48 per cent.

(It must be considered that even in 1932, the winter wheat area consisted of approximately 45 per cent, or 9,500,000 hectares, and the spring wheat area of approximately 55 per 55 per cent, or 10,500,000 hectares), page 389.

3. APPROXIMATE YIELD PER HECTARE OF ALL CEREAL CROP CULTURES

1931 — 9 hundredweights (54 poods).

1932 — 8 hundredweights (48 poods).

4. PROPORTIONS OF LAND UNDER CEREAL CROP CULTIVATION IN 1930—1934.

Winter wheat — 25 per cent or 5,000,000 hectares.

Spring wheat — 12 per cent or 2,400,000 hectares.

Rye — 22 per cent or 4,400,000 hectares.

Barley — 14 per cent or 2,800,000 hectares.

Oats — 13 per cent or 2,600,000 hectares.

Corn (Maize) — 6 per cent or 1,200,000 hectares.

Buckwheat — 3 per cent or 600,000 hectares.

Millet — 5 per cent or 1,000,000 hectares.

(p. 390).

5. AVERAGE ANNUAL YIELD OF GRAIN FOR YEARS OF 1931—1935

Wheat (winter and spring) 6,200,000 tons or 372,000,000 poods.

Rye 3,600,000 tons or 216,000,000 poods.

Barley 2,500,000 tons or 150,000,000 poods.

Oats 1,600,000 tons or 96,000,000 poods.

Millet	1,000,000 tons or	60,000,000 poods.
Corn (Maize)	1,500,000 tons or	90,000,000 poods.
Buckwheat	400,000 tons or	24,000,000 poods.
A total of 16,800,000 tons or 1,008,000,000 poods; in round figures 1,000,000,000 poods.		
(p. 394).		

6. ANNUAL CONSUMPTION OF GRAIN CEREAL PER PERSON

230 kilograms or 15 poods (mainly wheat and rye)
(p. 394).

7. GRAIN SURPLUS FOR MARKETING OUTSIDE OF UKRAINE.

Marketing of grain outside of Ukraine declined from the average of 8,600,000 tons during 1909—1913, to 3,600,000 tons during the years of 1932—1934. Therefore the normal consumption of the population of Ukraine required an average of 790,000,000 poods.
(p. 396).

8. PROPORTION OF RURAL TO URBAN POPULATION IN UKRAINE.

1926 urban population— 5,374,000; rural population — 23,645,000.
1939 urban population—11,196,000; rural population — 19,764,000.
(We consider that during the year of 1932, the urban population consisted of about 7,000,000 and the rural population of about 23,000,000 I. D.).
(p. 309).

W. Kubyowich, *Geography of Ukraine and the Adjacent Lands*, Ukrainian Publishers, Kharkiw—Lwiw, 1943, [in Ukrainian].

M. HRYNKO

THE PARTY KNOWS WHAT IT IS DOING.

In the summer of 1932, I was transferred, as an engineer-economist, to the Kharkiw District Grain-Collection Committee. The Committee was managed by a Communist, Abraham Solomonowich Nus, a semi-literate, ambitious individual, but possessing a party card.

On the orders of Nus, I was to compile a balance sheet of the food products of the District, based upon the official reports of the regional committees, with a view to estimating the possible surpluses to be transferred to the State. The following day, after I delivered the completed balance-sheet, Nus called me to his office and stated: "Your balance sheet is out of order. The amounts of food products shown by you as designated for transfer to the State, are too small. We must take more out of the District." In order to bolster his assestrion he produced and

read to me a letter from the Regional Committee of the CP(B)U, in which it was stated, how much and what cereal grains must be delivered to the State by our district.

I began carefully to point out to Nus that perhaps there was some mistake, because of this demand of the Regional Committee were carried out, then in two or three months the population would be left without food and would die of starvation, whereupon we would, certainly, be punished.

"Are you going to teach me what to do and how to do it? Figures of the amount of food products to be transferred to the State have been given by the Regional Committee — it is an order of the Party and the Government; They know what they are doing. It is not up to us to teach them. These figures have to be met at all costs," said Nus, admonishing me. He calmed down and told me take the figures of the Regional Committee as a basis for compiling another balance sheet showing which grains and the amounts to be designated for each locality, as well as to prepare an order to the local committees for delivery to the villages...

I was convinced that this order of the Regional Committee, was consciously calculated to precipitate a state of starvation among the peasant population. I could not participate in this utterly inhuman design. I begged Nus to write to the Regional Committee, and ask them to review their order or to relieve me of my duties, and thus I extricated unexpectedly myself from the mess...

After, some time there came news from various localities to the effect that the villages were being literally stripped of all grain. The months of February and March showed that my prognosis was correct. The capital of Ukraine was filled with peasant-beggars pleading for bread. The militia could hardly keep up with the removal of corpses.

THE LAW EXPROPRIATING PEASANT HOLDINGS.

(Resolution of the Central Committee and the Council of Peoples' Commissars on guarding the wealth of state enterprises, kolhosp s, cooperatives, and

strengthening of socialist holdings, of August 7, 1932).

Of late there have been increasing complaints from workers and members of the collective farms, of pilfering from loadings on the railroad and water transportation, and pilfering of cooperative farm property by hooligans and generally anti-social elements. There are also increasing complaints of threats and violence by the kurkul elements against those members of the collective farms who do not want to resign, but conscientiously and unselfishly toil to strengthen them.

The Central Committee and the Council of Peoples' Commissars consider that community property, (state, collective farm, and cooperative), is the foundation of the soviet system; it is sanctified and untouchable, and people, who threaten the wealth of the community, are to be regarded as enemies of the people, and so a decisive struggle against the pilferers of community property, is the prime duty of the organs of the soviet government.

The Central Committee and the Council of Peoples Commissars therefore resolved to:

- I. 1. Arrange to have the rail and boat loadings classified according to their importance as state property and generally guard such loadings.
 2. Use judicial punishment for pilfering of loadings on the rail and water transports, including the higher form of social defence — execution by firing squads—with confiscation of all property, or, as an alternative, under extenuating circumstances, the deprivation of liberty for a term of not less than ten years, with confiscation of property.
 3. No amnesty is to be granted to culprits who have been sentenced for pilfering of property on the transportation system.
- II. 1. Arrange to classify according to its importance, the property of collective farms and cooperatives (crops in the fields, community storage, live stock, cooperative stores and warehouses, etc.) as state

property, and generally strengthen the guarding of such property.

2. Arrange, by forms of judicial repressions for pilfering of the collective farm and cooperative property, higher form of social defence—execution by firing squad — with confiscation of all property, under extenuating circumstances, depriving of liberty for the term of not less than ten years and confiscation of property.

- III. 1. Conduct a determined struggle against the anti-social, k u r k u l-capitalistic elements who use threats, violence, or advocate the use of threats and violence, against members of a collective farm with intent to ruin the collective farm. These criminals must be placed in the same category as traitors.
2. Judicial punishment must be applied in defending collective farms and members of collective farms from threats and violence by k u r k u l and other anti-social elements. The latter should be deprived of liberty for from five to ten years with confinement in concentration camps.
3. No amnesty is to be granted to culprits sentenced on these charges.

MEMBERS OF THE COLLECTIVE FARMS SENTENCED AND EXECUTED

In order to expedite local settlement in matters involving acts of crime, and in order to mobilize the attention of the wide masses of collective farmers, co-operative farmers, cooperatives, and all the active soviet element, regional courts should practice the system of holding mobile sessions. The Kharkiv regional court delegated five such sessions to different localities in order to try forty cases. The Odessa regional court delegated four such sessions.

Particularly worthy of notice are cases that have been tried in the Harbuzynsky, Dobrovelychkiwsky, Rerezinsky and Rayhorod districts, where kurkuls were exposed as culprits who systematically pilfered grain from the collective farm fields. These class

enemies of the people, who endeavored to oppose the construction of socialism, were sentenced to execution by firing squad.

Proletarian justice properly and rapidly executes the directives of the government in these matters; it does not brook any indecision.

There shall be no mercy for pilferers, swindlers, robbers, wastrels and speculators.

(Visti, August 27, 1932).

According to the reports of the prosecutor of the republic, in the village of Chyblyn-Skadiyewsky, in Odessa district, kurkul Malchenko was sentenced for stealing ten "kip" (stooks of wheat of 60 sheaves each) from the fields of the collective farms, "May 1st" and "Leader," to the higher form of social defense-execution by firing squad.

In the village of Mykhayliwka, in the same district, Michael Bily and Ivan Sytkevich were sentenced to execution by firing squad for stealing 35 "kip" of wheat.

In the village of Zburiwka, in Holo-Prystansky district, kurkul Panas Nimych was sentenced to execution by firing squad for stealing six wagonloads of grain from the collective farm "Red Star."


In the village of Orchyk, a mobile session of the Supreme Court investigated the matter of pilfering collective farm property. A band of semi-kurkuls stole the grain off the stooks. From two such stooks all the heads were cut off. The court sentenced the semi-kurkuls Nestor Bezinov and Sam Prokudylo, to terms at an institution of forced labor, Bezhinov to five years and Prokudylo to three.

(Visti, August 27, 1932).

EXECUTION OF MEMBERS OF KOLHOSPS (COLLECTIVE FARMS)

Orichovsky district, Dniepropetrovsk region.

In the village of Kopani, kurkuls and semi-kurkuls organized a special band of pilferers of Antin Bondar, his assistant was kurkul Bordiuk,



Corpse of famine victim

collective farm crops. The leader was kurkul, the rest of the brigade consisting of semi-kurkuls Mas, Kowalewsky, Boroday, Desenko, and others.

The arrogance of these pilferers was so great that one night, having armed themselves with two sawed-off guns, an auger, and sacks, they bore the hole in the floor of the granary and took a great deal of wheat. The mobile session of the regional court sentenced Bondar and Boroday to the higher form of social defense—execution by firing squad, while others of the brigade were given various terms of imprisonment. (Visti, November 30, 1932).

The mobile session of the Dniepropetrovsk Regional court investigated the matter of kurkul Kozlowsky, of the village of Yakymiwka. He had obtained a job as a teamster on the farm of "Lenin's Parth," and systematically pilfered the collective farm grain and conducted general wrecking activity. Kozlowsky was sentenced to the higher form of social defence — execution by firing squad.

The mobile session of the Odessa Regional court sentenced the kurkuls Vasyl and Elisaveta Kharchenko, who had wormed their way into the farm

"Stalin" belonging to the Hnatiw village soviet, in Rozdilniansky district, and had pilfered the collective farm crops. The culprits were sentenced to the higher form of social defence — execution by firing squad, with confiscation of property.

(Visti, September 14, 1932).

SENTENCED AND SHOT FOR GRAIN COLLECTIONS

Recently, the mobile session of Dniepropetrovsk Regional court tried the matter of counter-revolutionary sabotage of grain-collections in the village of Verebka, sabotage organized by kurkuls and wreckers.

In the dock, besides these traitors, were placed Zelensky; the chairman of the village soviet — Bazyi, and his deputy — Tkachenko; the chairman of the artel "Memory of Lenin" — Małowych; the chairman of the artel "Five-year Plan in Four" — Lytwyn, and the chairman of the cooperative—Kobets.

In the dock, beside these traitors, were placed nine misers who violently opposed grain-collections — Cherniawsky A., Bilych Y., Sachko A., Trotzenko P., Bilych U., Dudnyk, Kowal and Zorenko.

By decision of the court, Zelensky, Tkachenko and



Children left to die

Kowal were sentenced to eight years' loss of liberty in the far distant camps, and confiscation of property.

Malowych, Kobets, and Zorenko were given suspended sentences; Bazyi, Bilokon and Dudnyk were sentenced to six years' loss of liberty.

The kurkuls Bilych and Trotzenko were sentenced to exile in far distant prison camps, for terms of ten years each.

The kurkuls Burko and Bilych, erstwhile tenants of Artel "Starlet" were sentenced to five years imprisonment in distant concentration camps.

The kurkuls Cherniawsky, Sachko A., and Sachko S., organizers of grain pilfering and counter-revolutionary sabotage of grain-collections, were sentenced to the higher form of social defence — execution by firing squad, with confiscation of property.

(Visti, February 2, 1933).

GUARDING FIELDS AGAINST THE STARVING

The mobile session of Bershad peoples' court, in the district of Vynnytsya, sentenced the miser, Olena Ivasyn, to five years' loss of liberty and confiscation of property, for the crime of clipping off the unripened heads of the winter crops.

(Visti, June 11, 1933).

Kolhosp members of Henichewsky district grasped the exceptional importance of the struggle to guard crops this year and, consequently, organized a determined resistance against kurkuls and other hostile element who coveted the collective farm crops.

In "Stalin" commune, a vigilant detachment was organized, which carefully guarded its crop. Odarka Yarova, a member of this detachment, caught two thieves who were mowing wheat. A collective farm member, Shashkewych, caught the son of the liquidated kurkul, Shyshkyn, red-handed while this culprit was starting to mow the barley.

In the collective farm "New Life," of the Novo-Olena village soviet, guards composed of better

members of the kolhosp were detached to guard the crops.

They deployed their forces so as to prevent the kurkul remnants (hungry — I. D) from stealing a single kernel of grain.

Vigilantes detained a speculator, Michael Zela. This matter was transferred to Henichev Peoples' Court and the district militia; despite this, the chief of militia, Kostorkin, did not prosecute Zela.

(Engineer I. D. Visti, June 28, 1933).

WATCH TOWERS ON THE FIELDS.

In the spring of 1933, while travelling through the villages of Pervomaisk, Olshansk, Blahodatniw, Dobrowlychkiw, Harbuzyn, and other districts in the northern part of the Odessa region, I saw watch towers all over the fields. They stood at every point where crops or gardens were planted. These watch towers came into being as a result of the law, promulgated, July 2, 1932, regarding "Guarding of Socialist Property." They were constructed in much the same manner as the watch towers in concentration camps.

If the field was clear, the watch tower was made of four high poles stuck in the ground, with a wooden or straw cage at the top. There was a long ladder from the ground to the cage.

If there was a tall tree in the field, then two or three tall poles would be erected beside it and a cage set amongst the branches. If the field happened to be alongside a woodlot, a watchtower would be placed on the nearest tall tree, and if there was an oak tree with large branches, a cage would be set amongst the branches.

In the cages of these watchtowers there sat armed collective farm vigilantes, guarding the crops from people. During seeding and the planting of vegetables, these vigilantes watched the fields to discourage the hungry from recovering and consuming the planted seeds. In summer, when crops and vegetables ripened, the vigilantes guarded the fields to prevent the collective farm members from clipping the grain heads.

If some of the hungry were caught retrieving the planted vegetables or clipping the grain heads, they were shot at and frequently killed.

Thus, the Soviet State diligently guarded its wealth, the

collective farm fields, from hungry people and members of the collective farms, and taught them to respect Soviet laws. These watchtowers existed for several years, and the fields were under armed guard until 1934 and possibly until 1935.

P. ONUKRIENKO

YOUNG COMMUNIST KILLED A HUNGRY WOMAN.

In 1933, on a certain state farm, the workers left a seed drill in the field. Scattered beside the seed drill was a quantity of formaldehyde-treated seed.

The following day when the workers returned to the field, they found the swollen corpse of an apparently starving woman who had been shot during the night. It was not immediately known who the woman was nor who had shot her. We conjectured that this miserable woman had come to the seed drill at night to gather the scattered grain and eat it.

It only later became known that this woman was killed by a young Communist, Borozynets, secretary of the local Young Communist cell. Borozynets was making his rounds, guarding the seeded fields from the hungry, wandering people. This particular young Communist was never brought to justice for murder; this was a normal occurrence at that time.

V. MALY

GUARDING COLLECTIVE FARMS FROM OWN MEMBERS.

In the spring of 1933, watchtowers for guarding crops were being erected all over the grain fields of the village of Druha Korulka and in other villages in the Barvenkiw district of Khar-kiw region. This was something unheard of since people lived and tilled the soil here. When questioned as to why such towers were being erected, the peasants usually replied that the "class enemy" was not asleep and might set fire to the collective farm crops. However, it was still a long time before the harvest.

Later on the peasants understood only too well for what purpose and against whom these watchtowers were erected. Armed vigilantes of the collective farm, and even GPU men, were detached to maintain a round-the-clock watch over the fields and the crops in 1933. Against whom were the fields being guarded?

There were no class enemies — *kurkuls* — at that time; they had all been liquidated and exiled to distant places of the empire. Only those peasants who were members of the collective farms were left in the villages, and of course they were dying of starvation. Therefore, in order to save their lives, they would be tempted to clip the heads of unripened grain.


The peasants also understood that those destined to die of hunger, must eventually come to such an end. The clipping of grain heads for food was tantamount to death. Anyone attempting to clip grain inevitably received a bullet...

P. CHONUSKY

SHOT, FOR A HANDFUL OF RYE STALKS.

In the village of Bohdariwka, in Chornius district, Poltava region, there lived Hryhory Liashko (people called him Hrisha). His father was liquidated as a *kurkul* and exiled to a concentration camp. Hrisha was thrown out of the family home. After some time Hrisha became insane, totally harmless, and useless. People fed him and pitied him.

1933 was a year of terrible famine in Ukraine. Harvest time was approaching; the early rye was reaped and stacked. Members of the collective farms thought that they could go out and glean after the reapers, but that was strictly forbidden by the law of "Guarding Socialist Property." However, the hungry



Graves of the famine-stricken

Hrisha had no idea of any such law; he went out to glean, and did pick up a few pocketfuls of stalks.

The collective farm posse, guarding the still unreaped patches in the fields, caught Hrisha with the gleanings and brought him to the village soviet. The village soviet, under the chairmanship of Stepan Kisiliov, held a public trial and, in accordance with soviet law, sentenced him to execution by a firing squad.

Hrisha Liashko did not understand what it was all about. He clutched his rye stalks and would not let them be taken away. When the trial was over, Hrisha was immediately executed on the spot.

This happened before my own eyes....

NATALKA LYUTAREVICH

STARVING PEOPLE SENTENCED FOR GLEANING AFTER REAPERS.

It was harvest time in Chornoukhiv, in the Poltava district, in 1933. Much of the land was idle, under a thick growth of weeds, but the tilled land yielded an abundant crop of wheat and rye. The summer was good, with plenty of rain. It seemed as though there would be enough to feed the starving peasantry and thus put an end to the famine, but the authorities had other ideas.

The first of the threshed grain was taken straight to the elevators. Small advances of grain were given only to those who worked on the harvest fields. Those who were emaciated and unable to work, were left to starve. Their only remaining course of action was to try and glean the fields for any left-over grain stalks, but, this was forbidden by law.

One day, when the collective farm members were returning home from work in the fields, they noticed a strange sight: a group of children, women and men being herded by an armed man on horseback. It turned out that the chairman of the village soviet, Samiylo Zozulia, had arrested these people as criminals, caught stealing the "socialist property of the collective farm" and was herding them to the militia station. The "criminals" were all barefoot, ragged and swollen with hunger; they could hardly move their feet. Each one had a sack containing some handfuls of grain stems, a *prima facie* exhibit of the crime committed.

They were met at the station by the chief of the district militia, comrade Smushkov, who shouted to Zozulia, "Herd them all into the barn and tomorrow we will decide who goes where."

The next day several corpses of dead children were pulled out from the barn and handed to the burial brigade to be disposed of. The dead were already outside soviet law and therefore could not be tried....

H. F.

NEARLY SHOT FOR TAKING STEMS OF GRAIN FROM HER OWN FIELD.

I come from the village of Fediyiwka in the Reshetyliw district in the region of Poltava. I was left with five children because my husband was sentenced to a five year term in the concentration camp as a result of his participation in the movement called "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine." I did not belong to the collective farm; I was an individual farm-holder, possessing three hectares of land, a horse, and a couple of sheep. We slaughtered the horse before Christmas of 1932 in order to have something to eat. The two sheep and my grain were stolen from me by my neighbours.

However, I did manage to have a boxful of grain buried in the garden. In winter I dug out the grain and cooked it. I could not have this grain crushed because it would have been confiscated. The vegetables, such as beets and potatoes, that I had were confiscated by the "booster brigades" composed of local young Communists, activists and teachers, who pillaged the village daily with orders to pick up anything edible.

The grain that I managed to conceal and use sparingly with various admixtures, lasted us until April of 1933. When our supply of grain was gone, my children began to swell and die of hunger.

The first was my four year old Hryts. I wrapped his remains in a bed sheet and buried him beside our dwelling.

After that my six year old daughter, Dina, died, and later on, my eight year old Oleksa, already a school boy, passed away.

However the "booster brigades" even then did not leave me alone, despite the fact that three of my children had died of starvation. They came to search for food. When they noticed the

freshly disturbed earth beside my dwelling, they started to look for food and asked me what was buried in the ground. I told them that my children were buried there but they did not believe me, and at once started to excavate one of the graves. In doing so they mutilated the remains of my boy Oleksa. After convincing themselves that the grave really contained the remains of a child, they ceased to excavate. They did not even put the excavated earth back, so I had to bury the remains of my child again although I was very weak and emaciated.

I was left with two children who were already swollen from starvation. I wandered daily all over the fields in quest of food and picked up anything that could be eaten, rotten potatoes, weeds, roots, twigs and sometimes at night even fresh potatoes that were planted by the collective farm during the day. I brought these things home and boiled them into concoctions for eating. I obtained salt from the local cooperative by bartering all my pillows and clothes. They did not sell the salt, only bartered it for pillows and rags (raw material for export purposes).

In the spring of 1933 the state authorities advanced the seed grain to the collective farm and also to the individual farmholders. As one of the individual tillers of land I, too, received my share of rye seed grain. Emaciated by hunger and possessing no implements or draught animals, I was physically unable to plant my share of seed grain, and was therefore compelled to enter into an agreement with the collective farm whereby they would till my land and seed it for a stipulated percentage of the crop yield, to be deducted together with the amount advanced as during the harvest. I had two and a half hectares seeded in rye.

About the middle of June, I and my fourteen year old boy went to the field to see our patch of rye. I could not take the other boy because he was badly swollen. I wanted to clip some heads of grain to bring home and cook for but before I could do that, the chairman of the collective farm, Stepan Maznychka, in company with some district representative, began beating me and my boy, threatening to shoot me. However, they restrained themselves and told me that they would send us to the regional authorities. They arrested me and my boy and threw us into a village jail. At that time every village was required to have a jail but before the revolution nobody ever

heard of jails except in the district centers. My boy and I were thus incarcerated, and a man was detailed to guard us.

This guard detail was also weak and emaciated and soon fell asleep. I decided to escape; I put the boy out through the window and after that I walked out of the door past the sleeping guard. Then I went home, gathered some sheets, matches, pots and the other boy and went away to the Perchiw forest.

I found a place in the undergrowth so thick that nobody would see us. At night I would go out to the fields to steal some potatoes or sheaves of grain. We would then thresh the sheaves with sticks and cook the grain in the pots. Thus we lived in that forest for about a month and a half. My children began to improve a little in health.

When harvesting started, everybody was busy and somehow my trouble with the village chairman was forgotten. My brothers were also individual land-holders and, by some stroke of luck, they were permitted to harvest their own crops. I helped them with their work. This gave us an opportunity to thresh some grain during the noon hours and bring it home in our water jugs. We cooked this grain and thus fed ourselves.

The individual holders were permitted to harvest their crops, but they were not permitted to thresh them. The threshing was done in the collective farm. After the grain was threshed, and after making all deductions for seed advances, services rendered, and the quota for grain collection, it was found that there was not enough grain to meet all the requirements, therefore the individual farmers were taken before the court and sentenced to three years each for failure to meet their quotas.

I was compelled to join the collective farm where I worked and cursed all those who compelled me to join this chain gang, toil there, and keep my children undernourished.

COMMERCIAL BLOCKADE.

Quite original and interesting are documents dealing with the establishment of a commercial blockade in the majority of the villages and districts of Ukraine.

The first of these documents provides not only for stopping the supply of consumer goods but also for the withdrawal of local supplies of such goods from six villages in the Dniepro-

petrovsk, Kharkiw and Odessa regions, as a punitive measure for failure to meet the grain-collection quotas.

The second document provides material concerning the establishment by the authorities of a similar blockade in eighty-two districts of Ukraine, as well as in all those other districts and villages that failed to meet the grain-collection quotas. Since the majority of districts and villages failed in their quotas, the commercial blockade was well-nigh general, affecting the majority of the Ukrainian peasant population.

This meant that the peasant population, deprived of locally produced food supplies, had no chance whatever of obtaining such supplies as fish, sugar, salt, etc., that had reached the villages in limited quantities prior to the blockade.

THE TOTAL LIQUIDATION OF PRIVATE TRADING

"..... under no circumstances permit the opening of stores of private merchants and thoroughly root out brokers and speculators who are endeavouring to profit at the expense of the workers and peasants.

Due to the fact that, of late, speculation in consumer goods, (food products — I. D.), is on the increase, despite the fact that it has been prohibited, the Central Executive Committee and the Council of Peoples' Commissars, hereby direct the GPU (NKVD), the prosecuting organs, and the local authorities to enact measures for rooting out speculation by providing for the incarceration of culprits in concentration camps for terms of five to ten years, without privilege of amnesty.

(Resolution of the CEC and CPC USSR, August 22, 1932).

BLACK LIST — HUNGER BLOCKADE.

(Resolution of the Council of Peoples' Commissars and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, December 6, 1932).

"Considering the particularly abhorrent failure of grain-collections in diverse districts of Ukraine, the Council of Peoples' Commissars and the Central Executive Committee hereby impose upon the Regional

Executive Committees, Regional Party Committees, District Executive Committees and District Party Committees the task of smashing the sabotage of grain collections organized by the kurkuls and counter-revolutionary elements, of restoring the resistance of sections of rural Communists who literally became leaders of the sabotage and of liquidating the passive and conciliatory attitude towards saboteurs, incompatible with the task of the Party members, thus ensuring a rapid acceleration of tempo towards the full and unconditional execution of the plans for grain-collections."

The Council of Peoples' Commissars and the Central Committee hereby resolve that:

For evident wrecking of grain-collection plans and purposeful sabotage organized by kurkuls and counter-revolutionary elements, the following villages are to be blacklisted:

1. Verbka, Pavlohrad district, Dniepropetrovsk region,
2. Havryliwka, Mezhiw " " "
3. Liutenka, Hadyach district, Kharkiw region,
4. Kamiany Potok, Kremenets district, Kharkiw region,
5. Swiato-Troyitzke, Troitzky district, Odessa region,
6. Pisky, Bashtan district.

Halt the supply of goods immediately, halt the local cooperative and state trading, and remove all visible supplies from the cooperative and state stores.

Prohibit completely all collective farm trading, equally for collective farms, members of collective farms and individual holders.

Terminate the advancing of credits, arrange foreclosures of credits and other financial obligations.

Examination and cleansing of all foreign and hostile elements from cooperative and state apparatus to be carried out by the organs of the Workers and Peasants Inspection.

Examination and cleansing of collective farm of the above villages, of all counter-revolutionary ele-

ments, organizers of the wrecking of grain-collections, to be carried out.

The Council of Peoples' Commissars and the Central Executive Committee hereby call upon the sincere and devoted members of the collective farms and on those toiling peasants who are individual holders, to organize all their resources for a merciless struggle with kurkuls and their henchmen, for the defeat of the kurkul sabotage of grain-collections in their villages, for honourable, conscientious fulfilment of grain-collection obligations to the soviet state.

December 6, 1932, Chairman of the CPC, W. Chubar, Secretary of the CC Kossior.

(Visti, December 8, 1932).

ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMERCIAL BLOCKADE.

(Resolution of CPC and CC of CP(B)U of December 15, 1932).

1. Resume, as of December 15, 1932, the supply and sales of commercial goods to all villages, except those, in which the collections of grain still remains in an unsatisfactory condition. Supplies to those villages are to be withheld until such time as they achieve a decisive improvement in plans for grain-collection. (List of Districts appended).

2. Obligate the Regional Executive Committees, Regional Party Committees, District Executive Committees, to see to it that in those district, where normal commercial relations are being resumed, a supply blockade is to be maintained against those collective farms and members of collective farm who purposely deviate from the fulfilment of the grain-collection plans, and against individual holders who are not fulfilling their contract obligations.

Chairman of CPC Ukrainian SSR, Chubar, Secretary CC of CP(B)U, W. Kossior.

List of district lagging in grain-collection, to which supplies of commercial products have been halted until they achieve a decisive improvement grain-collection plans:

DNIEPROPETROVSK REGION

- | | |
|-----------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. Apostolsky | 15. Mezhiwsky |
| 2. Bozhedarivsky | 16. Mychailivsky |
| 3. Berdiansky | 17. Molochansky |
| 4. Upper Dniprovsky | 18. Melitopolsky |
| 5. Vasyliwsky | 19. Nikopolsky |
| 6. Vysokopilsky | 20. Lower Vasulivsky |
| 7. Vasylinvsky | 21. Lower Syrohizky |
| 8. Upper Bilozersky | 22. Pavlohradsky |
| 9. Upper Lepetynsky | 23. Pokrovsky |
| 10. Upper Tokmakiwsky | 24. Soloniansky |
| 11. Kamyansky | 25. Terentievsky |
| 12. Kolarivsky | 26. Tsarekonstantyniivsky |
| 13. Lychiivsky | 27. Yakymiivsky |
| 14. Mahdalynsky | |

DON REGION

- | | |
|----------------------|-------------------|
| 1. Artemiivsky | 6. Rovenetsky |
| 2. Voroshylovhradsky | 7. St. Karansky |
| 3. Kramatorsky | 8. St. Nikol'sky |
| 4. Krasnoluchsky | 9. Troitzky |
| 5. Lower Aidarsky | 10. Chystiakovsky |

CHERNYHIW REGION

- | | |
|---------------------|-----------------|
| 1. Bobruynytsky | 5. Prylutzky |
| 2. Upper Bubniivsky | 6. Putywelsky |
| 3. Nedryhailiivsky | 7. Pomensky |
| 4. Nosiivsky | 8. Warwariivsky |

ODESSA REGION

- | | |
|------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Bastansky | 9. Karl Liebknechtiivsky |
| 2. Upper Vyskivsky | 10. Liubashivsky |
| 3. Wradiyevsky | 11. Novo-Buzky |
| 4. Upper Alexandrivsky | 12. Novo-Odesky |
| 5. Dobrovelychkiivsky | 13. Snihurivsky |
| 6. Zhovtneviy | 14. Troyitzky |
| 7. Domanivsky | 15. Frunziivsky |
| 8. Kryvoozersky | |

KHARKIW REGION

- | | |
|---------------------|----------------------|
| 1. Balaklievsky | 4. Upper Bohachansky |
| 2. Bryhadyrsky | 5. Valkiivsky |
| 3. Upper Pysarivsky | 6. Hadiayzky |

- | | |
|-----------------------|----------------------|
| 7. Krasnopilsky | 15. Novo-Georgievsky |
| 8. Kobeliatzky | 16. Obolonsky |
| 9. Kyshenkivsky | 17. Oleksiyivsky |
| 10. Lochvytsky | 18. Onopriyivsky |
| 11. Lypovo-Danylivsky | 19. Petrivsky |
| 12. Novo-Wodolazivsky | 20. Reshetylivsky |
| 13. Novo-Sanzarivsky | 21. Sachnovshchansky |
| 14. Nechvoroshchansky | 22. Trostiansky |

"PASSPORTS — A BLOW AGAINST CLASS ENEMIES"

In order to prevent the starving peasantry from abandoning the villages, as well as to prevent the so-called *kurkuls*, who escaped exile by abandoning the villages; also to trap those who escaped from the concentration camps, and, last but not least, to prevent the hungry peasantry from settling in urban centres to seek employment, the soviet authorities established a system of so-called "passportization." This was more than a mere identity card, since it required permission for a change of dwelling, permission that was stamped and countersigned by the local authorities. Thus the Soviet authorities made a determined endeavour to stop the mass migration of the peasantry from famine-stricken Ukraine. The passport system also gave the authorities a chance to initiate a mass terror and persecution



Famine oedema

of that section of peasantry who, until this time, had cunningly evaded the long arm of Soviet jurisprudence by wandering from place to place. Examples of persecution of the peasantry by means of passports have been given in earlier documents and in the documents to follow.

Another Soviet law, of equal importance, enacted prior to the passport law, was the law securing all factory and office workers to their place of employment by issuing the so-called "shopping books," binding the holder to certain cooperative stores designated to serve the needs of the workers of one particular factory or another. The customer was required to produce such a book for every article he purchased. These shopping books served almost the same purpose as the passports; they were designed to obtain an additional measure of control over the workers, and, at the same time, extend control over the peasantry.

THE SINGLE PASSPORT SYSTEM THROUGHOUT USSR.

With the aim of improving the census of urban population, the workers' quarters, and to relieve the said places of persons unconnected with production and positions in offices or schools, or not performing any useful community service (with the exception of invalides and pensioners), and also with the aim of clearing the said populated places from concealed *kurkul*, criminal, and other anti-social elements, the Central Committee and the Council of Peoples' Commissars hereby resolve to:

"1. Establish throughout the USSR, a single passport system.

2. Introduce a single passport system with binding domicile throughout the entire USSR within 1933, introducing this system, in the first place, for the population of Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkiw, Kiev, Odessa, Minsk, Rostov-on-Don and Vladyvostok.

3. Commit the Council of Peoples Commissars of the Soviet Union to establish a period of time for the introduction of the passport system in the remaining urban centers of the USSR.

4. Instruct the governments of the union republics

to introduce their own legislation, conforming to this decision regarding passports."

Conditions Governing Passports

"1. All citizens of the USSR, sixteen years and over, permanently residing in the cities, workers' quarters, employed by transportation systems, state farms, and construction projects, must have passports.

2. In places where the passport system is introduced the passport is the sole document to be used in identifying the person of the bearer. All other documents and certificates of identity, proving the right to domicile, are hereby cancelled as obsolete.

Passports are to be produced on the following occasions:

- a) Registrations of passport bearer (Domicile establishment).
- b) Securing employment at an enterprise or office.
- c) On demand of militia or other administrative organs.

3. In places where passportization has already been established, a recording of domicile is mandatory.

Citizens, who change their place of residence within cities where a passport system is already in operation, or those who are returning to such cities, are required to submit their passports to the domicile management within 24 hours, in order to secure domiciliary approval from the militia.

4. Persons under 16 years of age, who are wards of the state (orphans, etc.,) are to be entered in registers conducted by the proper institutions.

5. For army officials who are in military service in the ranks of the Workers and Peasants Red Army, special documents in lieu of passports will be issued by the proper military command.

6. Passports are issued by the Workers and Peasants Militia. To citizens permanently residing in populated places where passportization has been introduced, passports are to be issued without the formality of application forms, but citizens who are intending to reside at such places must fill out an application for a passport.

7. Newly arriving persons are to be issued temporary certificates, in lieu of passports, valid for three months. After the expiration of this term they may be extended for an additional three months.

11. Persons who are required to possess passports but who lack either a passport or a temporary certificate, are liable to an administrative fine of up to 100 rubles.

Citizens arriving from other places, without passports or temporary certificates and failing to obtain same within the time allotted according to instructions, are liable to a fine of 100 rubles and banishment by the militia.

12. For illegal residence without approved passports or temporary certificates, and also for contravening regulations regarding approvals, the guilty persons are liable to an administrative fine of 100 rubles. For repetition of the said contraventions, the guilty persons are liable to criminal charges.

(Decision of the CEC and the CPC of USSR, December 27, 1932).

PASSPORTIZATION IN UKRAINE.

(Decision of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee and the Council of Peoples' Commissars of January 1, 1933).

On the basis of the decision of the CC and the CPC of USSR of December 27th, 1932, AUCC and the CC hereby resolve to:

1. Establish a single passport system.... on all terrains of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic during 1933, covering first of all the cities of Kharkiw, Kiev and Odessa.

2. Establish a single passport system in the City of Kharkiw and the adjoining boroughs; in the Zolochiw, Lypetzke, Staro-Saltivsky, Chuhuyevsky, Zmiyivsky, Novo-Wodolazky, Walkivsky, and Bohoduchivsky districts of the Kharkiw region, commencing the 1st day of January and ending not later than April 1st, 1933.

In the cities of Kiev and Odessa and their adjoining terrains, passportization is to commence on March 1st, 1933 and is to be completed during a period of three months.

3. Obligate the administrative chiefs of the Workers and Peasants Militia to issue passports in accordance with the instructions of the CC of USSR, to citizens 16 years and over, who are permanent residents of cities and of large settlements, of workers' settlements, and those employed by transportation systems, on state farms and newly-constructed projects where a single passport system is being established.

SEMEN MODUL

PASSPORTIZATION — A BLOW AGAINST, CLASS ENEMIES.

We had six hectares of land, a horse, and a cow. Our family consisted of seven persons, our mother, and six children. We lived in Bila Tserkva districts, in the village of X (I omit the name of the village for fear of reprisals upon relatives who may still be alive — S. M.). In 1930 we were liquidated as *kurkuls* and were to be exiled but we scattered, thus escaping. After wandering for three years I managed to get a job as a miner in Kryvy Rih. I had a military document, but it was stolen in the dormitory where I lived.

Then came passportization. A profusion of posters displayed a murderous slogan — "Passportization — a mortal blow against the class enemy." Two months passed from the beginning of passportization. The majority of workers had their passports already, but I did not have one because I had no document on the basis of which I could obtain a passport. I was afraid that I would be thrown out on the street and perish of hunger. It was dangerous to go back home for some documents, but I simply had to; there was no other way out. I took a week's leave from work, bought a loaf of bread for 40 rubles and started home.

Arriving at Bila Tserkva, I went straight to the local military command and told them what I wanted. The officer commanding looked at the file and asked: "Kurkul?" "Not me, my mother was," I ventured an alibi, "And why were you

not filed accordingly in 1930? A deserter?" Bring me a certificate from the village soviet regarding your social status," the chief ordered.

Late that evening I arrived at the village and went to my brother's house. I found the windows boarded up and the doors, too. I peeked in through the door and there was my brother, and his wife and 8 months old baby; they, too, had come from Donbas two days before to look for documents.

The following day my brother and I went to the village soviet, but they told us that they did not issue any certificates to kurkuls. We were turned away with nothing. Before we got halfway to the house, we saw my brotehr's wife running towards us crying. She told us to run away quickly because the village activists had destroyed the house and had removed everything that could be moved. At this moment we noticed that two armed activists were coming toward us. My brother and I ran away as we were to Bila Tserkva. My brother's wife went back to the village soviet and begged them at least to give her back her top coat, which they had taken away from the house, so that she could wrap up the baby, but they chased her out. She then, in desperation, brought the child to the local child shelter (established for children whose parents had died during the famine), left it in the yard with great difficulty and came to Bila Tserkva. Catching the first freight train, she followed her husband back to Donbas.

In Bila Tserkva I somehow regained my composure after a nightmare of fear and again went to the military command to beg for a duplicate of my military document. They arranged court proceedings for me attesting that I conciously avoided classification of my social status. I signed that infernal document.

After boarding the train I scrutinized by document and found the following remarks: "Kurkul," "After 1930 disappeared," "To be made accountable for avoiding duties by having himself classified socially." Where could I go with a document like that? I began erasing different pertinent words and readjusting the existing ones. The compromising middle pages had to be torn out completely. With the "doctored" document, I went to the military office in Kryvy Rih in order to be socially classified. With the aid of good people in the office I was fortunate enough obtain my classification. Later

on, in devious ways, I was successful in obtaining a three-year and finally a five-year passport.

Nevertheless I lived under constant fear. Every time I filled out some questionnaire, I had to devise a coherent background for my parents and grandparents, in order to avoid exposure and arrest.

A. KULISH

UKRAINIAN FORBIDDEN TO LIVE IN MUSCOVY.

I, A. Kulish, formerly a resident of Poltava district, after being liquidated as *k u r k u l*, moved to the village of Kastorne in the Voronizh region. I had a team of horses and eked out a precarious living by contracting all kinds of dray work. There were also many more such liquidated *k u r k u l*s living with their families in this particular village.

Early in 1933, an order came from the GPU to the effect that all liquidated Ukrainian *k u r k u l*s were to appear with families at the railway station of Krasnaya Dolina, within 24 hours. To make certain that this order would be obeyed, the GPU dispatched its militia men to this village.

This particular railway station was on the line where many freight trains, loaded with people from the Ukraine passed; all



Corpse of famine victim

these freights were of the "distant destination" type transporting people past the Ural mountains into Siberia. A contingent of Ukrainian families, including mine, from the village of Kastorne was rounded up by GPU and added to these freight trains at the station of Krasnaya Dolina after a long wait for space in the box cars.

The station was unheated. People with small children sat or lay down on the cement floor. No food whatsoever was given people. Children and women cried incessantly; women tore their hair in fits of hysteria.

Every freight train was checked for available space. If any was found the GPU would simply throw as many people into it as could be squeezed in, and then lock the doors from the outside.... I was never to know where these people were destined to go, nor what happened to them...

SLAVES ANCHORED TO WORK BY FOOD.

(Decision of CPC and CPSU regarding the widening of rights of factory management in the matter of supplying and improving the food rationing system).

To improve further the organs of supply for the workers, and to intensify the struggle against the distribution of food supplies and industrial goods to delinquent loafers who evade work at enterprises, and also to augment the power of enterprise directors, the CPC and the CC of the GPSU hereby resolve:

- (a) To transfer to the factory managements, the right to issue food ration books to workers employed at the enterprises as well as to members of their families. Ration books to be issued by name as well as number.
- (b) Those relieved of employment are also to be deprived of food ration cards, industrial goods, ration card, as well as the right to living quarters designated for the particular enterprise as per the decision of the CPC and the CC of CPSU, of November 18, 1932.
- (c) Taking into consideration the possibility of the abuse of annulled ration books, the enterprise managements are enjoined to remove them from the holders. Use of annulled books is to be

regarded as speculation in ration books.

- (d) Newly-hired workers are entitled to an issue of all ration books providing they produce proof to the effect that they have surrendered their ration books at the former place of employment.

December 4, 1932.

Chairman of CPC, Molotov,
Secretary of CC of CPSU, Stalin.

(Visti, December 5, 1932).

4. TRANSPORTATION BLOCKADE OF UKRAINE.

We have no documents concerning Soviet directives placing a special transportation blockade on the population of Ukraine. Such directives were secret but, from recollections of living witnesses, we are able to reconstruct the then existing reality.

In the first of these eye-witness documents, M. Didenko, an erst-while soviet railroad worker, who was well acquainted with all these directives on the railroad system, furnishes materials about such a blockade between Ukraine and Moscow.

The material in the second document deals with a similar matter. It was difficult to obtain railroad tickets at Ukrainian stations; they were sold only to persons having travel orders which were impossible to obtain, therefore the peasants were compelled to travel by devious means, frequently without tickets. One of the following documents contains a description of the punishment meted out to a railroad worker for assisting starving peasants to travel to Kharkiw.

In another document, containing an eye-witness account, there are descriptions of how, on orders of the chief of the Soviet government, Molotov, the railway stations were cleared of starving peasants and they were turned back to die in their famine-ridden villages.

M. DIDENKO

MOSCOW CORDONED FROM STARVING UKRAINE

In 1932, when Ukraine was in the throes of famine, thousands of Ukrainian peasants sought relief by migrating to the northern provinces of Russia, especially to Moscow and Leningrad where no trace of famine existed. Some peasants travelled to those places to procure bread; others forsook the

famine-ridden Ukraine in quest of a home, where they could save themselves from starvation. The main railway line from Kiev to Moscow was literally choked with starving migrants, usually travelling to Moscow. They filled the streets of this inglorious capital of a slave empire, where they could be observed by many members of foreign embassies and missions. Such a situation was not agreeable to Moscow.

In the spring of 1933, when this movement of starving Ukrainian peasants to Moscow assumed catastrophic proportions, the then Commissar of Transport, A. A. Andreyev, issued a secret order to the railway officials, "to permit no travelling by the starving Ukrainian peasantry to Moscow by refusing to sell railroad tickets, and to sell tickets only to those who hold a travel order from the local authorities." The starving peasants reacted to this order by securing travel licences. The local Ukrainian authorities were liberal with the issuance of such travel licences.

The Commissar of Transport then issued an addition to his secret order requiring "all travel licences to be examined by the central bodies and to be approved only for persons on service or business duty." In order to implement this directive, a reinforced detachment of NKVD was placed on the border between the starving Ukrainian SSR and the abundant RFSSR, between the railroad stations of Mychayliwka (Ukr. SSR) and Zernovo



Died in the field

(RFSSR) in order to examine all trains destined from Ukraine to Moscow. The NKVD removed the starving peasants from the trains and arrested them. But hunger did not recognize any obstacles, even the NKVD. The starving Ukrainian peasants found another way to by-pass Andreyev's secret order; they would travel by train as far as Konotop or Tereshchenkovo railway station in Ukraine. There they would disembark and take to the side-roads on foot, thus traversing a distance of 80 to a 100 kilometres. After reaching a point past the railway station of Zernovo, they would again board the Moscow-bound train.

After a few months the NKVD became aware of such wholesale bypassing and began to patrol the sideroads, trapping many unfortunate wanderers. However this effort of the NKVD also failed because the peasants only took to more devious routes. Finally, the secret order forbidding travel by the Ukrainian peasantry to Moscow was cancelled at the end of 1934 by the new Commissar of Transport, Lazar Kaganovich.

T. S-ko

TRAVELLING TO MOSCOW FOR FOOD FORBIDDEN.

In April of 1933 I was visiting my relatives in the Bohuslav district in Ukraine. I found them in a terrible plight and decided to go Moscow to buy some food. After having at least partly secured them from danger of death by starvation I would return to my place of work in the Caucasus. Early next morning I was on my way to the nearest railway station.

At Myroniwka railway station, I purchased a railway ticket to Kiev without any trouble. However, when I asked for a ticket from Kiev to Moscow, I was refused on the grounds that I did not possess a special travel licence. There were hundreds like myself trying to buy fares to Moscow. I was desperate in my attempts to get to Moscow to obtain some food and immediately I began to look for a way out of the impasse.

Before long I met a "character" at the station who, for a special fee, secured me a ticket that would take me as far as Mychayliwka railway station. I hoped that I might stumble upon a chance to get a ticket to Moscow while enroute to Mychayliwka. The train was filled with people like myself, all hoping to reach Moscow, practically all of us without special

travel licences. At every stop en route, more such people boarded the train. I was under the illusion that I would succeed in my mission to Moscow.

When our train reached Mychayliwka, the last station before the border of the RFSSR, it was surrounded by a military detachment of the NKVD. Each passenger bound for Moscow was closely scrutinized. Those without special travel licences were rounded up, locked in one of the station halls and kept under guard until the following morning. Next morning I and hundreds like myself were loaded upon a freight train bound for Kiev. Thus we were escorted under guard, without fares or travel licences, back to where we had all come from. On the way back I learned from other passengers that travelling for food to Moscow was forbidden so as to avoid comprising the soviet system in the eyes of the foreigners.

The Ukrainian peasants, after delivering all their food to Moscow, were now compelled to die of starvation.

I returned to my place of employment in the Caucasus. I started sending my relatives every scrap of food that I could spare and thus saved them from starvation.

S. KOROBENYK

FORBIDDEN TO AID THE STARVING.

In 1933 I was employed as a senior railway conductor at the station, of Osnova, near Kharkiw. On May 25, I received an order from station-master, Peter Shaposhnikov, to take a passenger train at Osnova station from Kharkiw-Levada to Balaklea. There I received an order from Master Conductor Emil Onopko to sell tickets only to workers who were employed and to peasants who had travel orders signed by managers of collective farms, state farms, or district executive committees directing them to travel to obtain spare parts for tractors or other farm implements. Travel other than that was strictly forbidden to the peasantry. Consequently, sales of railway fares to such peasants were forbidden at the stations as well as on the trains.

These orders came from the Commissariat of Transport in Moscow, and their implementation rested with the third section of the NKVD, the chief of which was Baiyov, at Osnova station. We were assembled before departure by E. Onopko, who read the order and then made us affirm that we

vere familiar with its contents and were going to act accordingly.

That evening we arrived at Balaklea station; it was filled with starving, swollen people. Some women held their swollen infants. Everyone tried to board the train to go to a large city (Kharkiw) in quest of food, but no one would sell them any tickets nor allow them to enter the coaches. About three o'clock the following morning the complete train crew was asleep in the coach next to the locomotive. I could not refuse these wretched people the privilege of entering the coaches. I let them come in but admonished them to sit still and not to tell anybody about it.....

When I returned to Osnova station, I found that this incident had already been reported to E. Onopko and to labor committee chief Swinaryov. I was tried by the so-called local "labor court" for "disorganization of railway transportation" (transporting 75 per cent of the passengers without fares), and for contravention of an order of the Commissariat of Transport. The witness for the prosecution was a member of the train crew, Maria Sira. I was promptly fired from my position.

T. S-ko

MOLOTOV ORDERS STARVATION

In 1933 I was employed by the fishing industry at Machach-Kala, the capital City of the Dagestan Republic. The city is situated on the western coast of the Caspian Sea. I went there to escape the famine that was ravaging my native village in Ukraine. I found the food quite satisfactory. The workers could buy bread, meat, fats, cereal and fish. One could always buy the necessary quantity of provisions, at reasonable prices, in the local market. Therefore, many hungry Ukrainians travelled to these parts in quest of food.

Back at home in the Medyn district of the Kiev region, my family was starving. I decided to provide some food for them. I took a two-week leave from work, bought two poods of flour and three poods of corn at the local market, and in April of 1933 I boarded the Kiev-Baku train on the journey home. I checked my supply of corn and other provisions as baggage and kept the flour as personal baggage. During this four-day journey home, I saw a great many unusual things.

I saw numerous freight trains, filled with people

and baggage travelling in the general direction of Ukraine. All transfer stations which were normally filled with hungry people travelling to Kuban and Caucasus, were now empty. At Dniepropetrovsk the freight trains filled with people were reformed, taking some of the people to Kiev and the rest to Kharkiw.

The train on which I traveled was detained at Dniepropetrovsk for some time. This gave me an opportunity to learn what was happening. I learned that a short time before, Molotov, had visited Ukraine, saw the famine at its height, and also the starving people travelling to the Caucasus to obtain food. He therefore ordered the local authorities to clear all railway stations of all starving people.

All available freight equipment was pressed into service to round up the mass of starving people along different railway routes and shipping them back to Ukraine. Those lucky enough to have obtained some provisions were also lucky in getting free transportation back home, but those who were just on the way to Caucasus were turned back empty-handed.

Loaded in these freight trains were men and women, young and old, who were being turned back to their starving villages to die of hunger. No chance was given to them to secure and bring back with them some meager provisions. The people were desperate but there was nothing they could do.

CHAPTER II

THE STRUGGLE OF UKRAINIAN PEASANTS FOR BREAD

Economically annihilated, and bled politically during the era of *kurkul* liquidation in 1929-1930, later morally and psychologically terrorized during the period of total collectivization and partial famine created by deprivation of food in 1931 and the beginning of 1932, the Ukrainian peasantry was rendered defenceless when Soviet authorities organized a total famine in 1932-1933. The peasantry was in a state of prostration; nevertheless it endeavored to defend itself as best it could. The Ukrainian peasantry now had a partner, composed of the remnants of the annihilated and politically broken Ukrainian Communists, who then represented the local authorities.

A spontaneous situation developed where the local Communists unconsciously took up the defence of the Ukrainian peasantry against the Muscovite central authority. Thus began the last, unequal struggle of the Ukrainian peasantry against the authorities for mere physical survival.

The following three forms of struggle could be noted:

1. An effort, by legal means, to curtail the plans for grain-collection and the withholding by the peasantry of food provisions.
2. Illegally organized sabotage in the fulfillment of grain-collection plans and illegally permitting the peasants to provide themselves with food from supplies of farm products confiscated by the state.
3. Individual withholding by the peasants of small amounts of food products and their concealing from the authorities.

LEGAL EFFORTS TO CURTAIL THE PLANS FOR GRAIN-COLLECTION

An interesting document in this matter is the speech of the then secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, comrade Kosior. Kosior pointed out various Ukrainian districts in which local Party organizations sounded alarms to the Central Committee about the unreality of the

grain-collection plans and demanded their curtailment. Many regional Party organizations were of the same opinion and they too posed the question to the CIC of CP(B)U. Unfortunately, the leading figures of the Ukrainian Party were merely puppets in the hands of Moscow, unable to do anything on their own initiative in such matters. Moscow maintained a determined "No!"

An interesting document also exists regarding the position of the leaders of the collective farm in the Odessa district: "We have no more bread... We are all peasants".....

KOSIOR ADMITS ERROR THEN EXCULPATES HIMSELF

(From a speech by Kosior — secretary of the CC of CP(B)U summing up the results of grain-collection plans and the struggle for improvement of the agricultural economy of Ukraine, delivered at the Plenum of the CC of CP (B) U).

During the grain-collection campaign in 1931, we issued a warning as far back as August about the mass pilfering of grain. And until the end of 1932 there was an attitude of complacency that contributed much to these shortcomings.

There are five main errors in the work of the Ukrainian Party organization:

1. Lack of proper understanding of the new situation, collective farm grain trading being conducive to difficulties with grain-collections.
2. Poor management of collective farms.
3. Lack of interest as to who managed the collective farms (kurkuls, class enemies, etc.).
4. Overlooked the manoeuvres of the class enemies.
5. Insufficient leadership and lack of sense of responsibility of the communists in the collective farms.

Last year the state of grain collections was as follows; in July of 1931, we collected more grain than we did in the same month of 1930, and in July of 1932 we collected much less than we did in 1930.

If we accept the figures of 1930 local grain collections as 100 per cent, we will have the following picture:

In August	1931 grain collected, 172 per cent.	August 1932, 41 per cent
In September	" " " 117 per cent.	Sept. " 63 per cent
In October	" " " 61 per cent.	Oct. " 31 per cent

Similar proportions were attained in November and December.

In September and October, many districts such as Alexandriw, Zinovievsky, Novo-Ukrainsky and Harbuzynsky of the Odessa region and an array of districts in the Dniepropetrovsk region, when I pressed for the grain collections, produced the following pleas and excuses:

"What do you want? We have no transport facilities. We work on seeding and stacking. All is not well with our food." And all the while the grain was being pilfered from the stacks. The mood of "wait and see" prevailed. The talk was that the grain collection plan was difficult and incorrect.

In the course of preparations for grain-collection there was incessant talk of the need for revision of the plan, consequently everybody lived in hopes of an easier plan and directed the collective farms along a similar path. Afterwards, when a plan exceeding that of last year was announced (tripled in the Odessa district), regional and district leaders were not capable of counteracting and finally breaking the demoralized mood prevailing throughout the entire period of the grain-collection campaign. Party leaders who promised a reduction of plans did not keep their word. When their hopes for an easier plan collapsed, they were unable to mobilize themselves....

Of what value are the talks that took place amongst the secretaries of Party organizations regarding the plans? Were the regional organizations not aware of these opportunist talks? They were aware, certainly, but failed to retaliate.

When, perchance, some secretary was cornered and sharply questioned about his demoralized mood, he would swear that he had never discussed the matter in the district, only at the regional level.

Such an attitude by a secretary is despicable.

When the secretary is not sure of fulfilling plans he cannot inspire others. In 99 per cent of cases the defeatist mood of the secretaries was known to others.

To say that the plan, even the former one, was unrealistic is incorrect. There might have been certain maladjustments of a local nature, but as far as the territory of Ukraine is concerned the plan was correct. No one can say otherwise.

Had our work been conducted in a determined, proper manner, the occurrences at Bashtany, Orikhov, Kobeliaky, Balaklayiw and other districts would not have taken place. In the Orikhov district of Dniepropetrovsk region, widespread sabotage of grain collections took place, but the regional representatives never noticed what was happening there.

A great source of shame to senior leaders of the Kharkiw region is the fact that right by their side in Kobeliaky there was an organized sabotage of grain-collections, tolerated by the highest levels of the regional Party organization.

Good-natured moods, became facts during the visit of comrade Molotov for a meeting with the Central Committee. When the regions were requested to furnish a correct accounting of grain-collections the figures tendered in the morning were at variance with those tendered in the afternoon.

I must frankly admit that we have wrecked the plan, despite the fact that we had all the potentialities for fulfilling it...

(*Visti*, February 13, 1933).

M. SACHENKO

PREPARING TO SABOTAGE THE GRAIN-COLLECTIONS PLANS.

In collusion with the kurkul-Petlyurist elements, the flunkeys — Medvediev, member of the Party and chairman of the collective farm, and members of the board of management of the collective farm — Hahulia, a candidate for membership of the Party and director of personnel, and Zolotochub — a candidate for membership of the Party and director

of livestock, introduced gross inefficiency in the collective farm, tolerated bad management and organized sabotage of grain-collections. They organized labor in a faulty manner, did not mobilize the collective farm to fulfill important agricultural undertakings, purposely steered the collective farm towards stagnation, by the unseasonal reaping of grain and hay, loss of crops, failure to complete seeding plans, and by the loss of draught-animals and live stock...

The blindness of the management was utilized by the remnants of the kurkuls and Petlyurists, who were preparing for their own kind of harvest, by stirring up the members of the collective farm saying: "The state will take all the grain anyway."

The results of the wrecking activities of the



A victim of famine.

covetous kurkul exceeded all proportions. With the aid of their agents in management, the lazy, the thieves and loafers, pilfered the collective farm grain standing on the field, in sheaves, from the thresher, from granaries and so on. Directors, brigadiers, weighers, guards and reapers also stole and peddled the grain.

The outstanding feature of this organized, mass advance of kurkul elements in quest of the collective farm grain (those who foresaw the mortal famine and tried to save their lives I. D.), is the fact that the chairman of the collective farm, Medvediev and his deputy, Hohulia, were fully aware of it... and did nothing to prevent it. On the contrary, they pretended blissful ignorance and helped themselves to grain.

They exerted every effort to mislead the district organization by convincing them of the unreality of the local grain-collection plan... Twice these two-faced characters succeeded in obtaining reductions of their plans, and even then they failed to fulfill it... The entire wrecking activity of the enemies of the collective farm... was exposed and the robbers were arrested. The investigation of their case was recently completed and in the next few days the mobile session of the Kiev court will hold a trial in this affair in the town of Medwyn...

(Bilshovyk Bohuslavshchyny, March 23-25, 1933).

B. KINHUROV

"WE HAVE NO MORE GRAIN."

In the village of Lizavetiwka, in the Snihuriw district of the Odessa region, the grain-collection plans were 43.5 per cent fulfilled as of January 10th. It is being sabotaged by the management of the artel "Red Partisan" headed by one Hrobovyk, who states:

"We have no more grain. The collective farm did not steal it. We have no kurkuls. We are all peasants."

The thresher-mechanic of the collective farm revealed a table with a false bottom in which was

concealed four poods of grain. A search of a straw pile revealed a barrellful of select grain. Hretsenko disappeared without a trace. An immense amount of grain was stolen. The indolent are keeping pace with the misers. It is ironic that the wife of the recently-arrested chief of the collective farm "Better Life," in endeavouring to accuse all members of the collective farm of grain pilfering, states: "Only the indolent did not steal."

But did the village organizations do anything to recover the grain? No. Nor did the district organizations take any further action.

(Vistl, January 22, 1933).

2. ILLEGALLY SECRETELY ORGANIZED SABOTAGE.

The documents refer to the illegally Secretely organized sabotage of grain-collection plans by local government officials, and to cases where village Communists and Yong Communists acted as organizers of such sabotage.

In other documents, there are cases where the collective farm management distributed the government-restricted grain to the members of the collective farm, concealed the supplies of grain from seizure by the state under the guise of various supply requirements of the collective farm, and all with the knowledge of the district organizations. This story is also related in another document. In this document, too, there is an interesting episode showing how the chairman of the collective farm steered the "grain search brigades" only to those members of the collective farm whom he knew did not possess any grain supplies. This was done to deceive the searchers.

Another document bears witness to cases occurring in some of the collective farms where, in order to prevent the mass pilfering of grain, it was distributed to members of the collective farm not on the basis of work-days but simply to those who could circumvent the red tape of the authorities with regard to the various taxation norms.

One of the ways of concealing grain from the authorities was to adjust the threshing machine in such a way as to have most of the grain pass into the straw and chaff. The peasants were hopeful that they would succeed in concealing some supply of grain from the authorities, therefore 20 to 50 per cent was allowed to pass into the straw and chaff. However, this trick

was soon discovered by the authorities, who promptly compelled the peasants to re-thresh the straw-chaff. The re-threshing of straw and chaff was conducted on a much wider scale in proportion to the efforts of concealment, as a form of grain-collection sabotage.

COMPULSORY RECOVERY OF FOOD GRAIN FROM COLLECTIVE FARM MEMBERS

The basic source of seed-grain supply is the recovery of the pilfered and illegally received grain, the re-threshing of straw and the fanning of the chaff.

The class enemy employs all means, including murder, to prevent the recovery of pilfered grain.

On January 11th kurkul Kolomchenko of Novo-Volodymyrivka village shot and killed leading activists of the artel "Free Life," Andrew Kovalenko and Marta Sashenko, and seriously wounded collective farm members Chubenko and Semenov all of whom had tried to seize the grain which he had pilfered from the collective farm.

According to the decision of the Regional Executive Committee, four collective farms of the May 1st district of Shesterynsk village soviet were blacklisted for open sabotage of grain collections.

For the month of December and the first 25-days of January only 0.3 per cent of the grain-collection plan was fulfilled, and only 42 per cent of the yearly plan. 90 hundredweights were distributed illegally and only 27.18 cwts were recovered. The local class enemies were acting openly without reprisal from the local and district organizations.

A member of the collective farm management personally organized the pilfering of grain, and in the summer of 1932 he clipped the heads of grain from an area of ten hectares. The collective farm concealed this under the guise of various reserves. 6 cwts of surplus grain were concealed as seed-grain reserve.

In another collective farm, "Third Decisive," which was also blacklisted, 270 cwts of grain were distributed illegally and only 7 cwts. of this were recovered.

The chairman of the collective farm, Ponomarenko, and two members of the board, Petrenko and Kolo-siuk, flatly refused to return the grain. These flunkeys of the misers opposed the return of excessive grain refunds by the representatives of the District Party Committee...

(*Vistl*, January 30, 1933).

COMMUNISTS AND YOUNG COMMUNISTS — ORGANIZERS OF SABOTAGE.

The remnants of the liquidated misers and white-guardist counter-revolutionary element are proving to be sufficiently formidable to infiltrate into the collective farm management, where they influence the backward peasantry as well as some of the village Communists, thus precipitating a sabotage movement.

There are a number of cases where Communists and Young Communists concealed grain from the state stole grain which is the property of the collective farms and acted as organizers of sabotage of the grain-collections. Such deeds are contrary to the ideals of the proletarian revolution and to the interests of the workers, and peasants, system...

(*Komsomolska Pravda*, November 23, 1932).

ODESSA GRAIN-COLLECTION PLANS PROVING TO BE UNREAL.

The Odessa region fulfilled 75.7 per cent of its yearly grain-collection plans. The individual economy sector fulfilled 65.5 per cent of its quota, the *k u r k u l* sector fulfilled 49 per cent of its quota. The recovery, within the last decade, consisted of 0,3 per cent in proportion to the yearly plan.

Thus the Domaniw, Kryvo-Ozero, Liubashiw, Kakhiwka, Znamensk, Troitzky, and Frunze districts have barely collected a few tons of grain each within the last five-days. The leaders of the above-mentioned districts depended upon spontaneous action by the peasants. Officials appointed to these districts by the regional Party Committee and the regional Executive

Committee, act as mere observers and thereby tolerate the sabotage efforts of the enemy.

In the Domanynsk district the kurkuls and their agents pilfered and appropriated a considerable amount of state grain. No efforts were made to seize that grain despite the fact that scores of officials of the district Party and the district Executive Committee are stationed in the villages.

In the Buzynsky village community (the most backward in fulfilment of grain-collection plans) the authorized representative of the District Party Committee, Wyshniwsky, together with the chairman of the village soviet, are complaining that the grain-collection cannot be fulfilled. At the same time the activists are daily recovering grain secreted in the ground of garden patches.

The leaders of the Bashtan district claim time and time again that they have nobody to work with.

The management of the collective farm "Comintern" together with the village soviet appointed a brigade, headed by the Young Communists Kostiuk and Soroka. The brigade armed itself with mops and pails of tar and decorated every dwelling in the village with a slogan — "Here dwells a thief of the collective farm grain," whether the peasant fulfilled his quota or not.

Chairman Velychko of the agricultural artel "Kosior," belonging to the Mykolaiwsk village soviet, undertook a wholesale search for grain supposedly concealed by members of the collective farm, but bypassing the real thieves, who, as it later turned out, he himself had organized.

No grain was discovered as a result of that search. Welychko therefore claimed: "There is no grain. Nobody pilfered it or received it illegally. Therefore, there is nothing with which to fulfill the plan..."

(Visti, January 28, 1933).

MEMBERS OF THE COLLECTIVE FARM RECEIVE NO PAY FOR WORK DAYS

Our collective farm, "Molotov," belonging to the Brankiw village soviet commenced the division of the

fruit of its toils. The management organized this matter in such a way that a loafer received more than a respectable member of the collective farm who had toiled conscientiously.

For example, Daniel Pavlovich Levchenko has 208 work-days to his credit. There are collective farm members who, with their families, have 400 work-days and more but they received nothing tither in money or in produce. The loafers who have very few work-days to their credit, are receiving a considerable amount of grain.

This happened because, according to a ruling of the management (the ruling was handed down to the management from higher authorities), collective farm members, even shock workers, who have crops planted in their gardens, have had these crops credited to them as payment for work-days.

I believe that the collective farm management is working incorrectly.

M. E. ZOLOTARIOV

(*Visti*, March 15, 1933).

RE-THRESHING STRAW AND CHAFF.

The unsatisfactory tempo of threshing is exceeded only by the extremely unsatisfactory quality of threshing. Utilizing the class blindness of the leaders of the collective farm and village soviets, the *kurkuls* are exerting a vicious opposition. An immense amount of grain is funneled out into the straw and chaff during the threshing. In many districts 10 to 15 per cent of the grain goes into the straw and chaff.

In order to recover such losses in grain perpetrated by *kurkul* sabotage efforts, it is imperative to have the straw and the chaff re-threshed by trustworthy people for outside.

In a number of the collective farms in the Zolotonosha district, brigades of newspaper correspondents in the villages revealed that 50 per cent of the select grain was found in the chaff. In the Lypovetzky artel they are separating one bucket of grain from every three buckets of chaff. The grain thus concealed is

frequently found in the collective farm of the Novo-Syrohizky district.

Completion of threshing and re-threshing is to be conducted with shock tempos.

The raid of the workers' and peasants' press correspondents examined the Novo-Ukrayinsku district, and in Hlyniansky artel, for example, they discovered 30 per cent of the grain amongst the straw and chaff. Re-threshing yielded 700 cwts. of grain.

In the collective farms of Perchuny, Osytniazhka, Maryaniwka, 15 per cent of the grain was found in the chaff. In artel "15 years of Siwash Division" the chaff yielded 20 per cent grain and the straw yielded 11 per cent.

The Perchuky village soviet had a kurkul named Tataryn as the cylinder man on the separator and another, Osadchy, as a machinist. The straw from this threshing machine contained 26 per cent grain. In other places, a day of re-threshing yielded 30 cwt. of grain.

(From a speech by Khatayevich. *Visti*, December 9, 1932).

Slogans: Hatred of the collective farm masses should be directed against the pilferers of collective farm grain, against the enemies of the collective farms.

(*Visti*, December 5, 1932).

Smash the kurkul wrecking. Place the best shock workers on the threshing machines. Bring an end to kurkul equalization in the distribution of profits.

(From a speech by Khatayevitch. *Visti*, December 9, 1932).

THE STRUGGLE FOR GRAIN BY INDIVIDUAL PEASANTS.

One of the ways in which the peasants struggle for grain in order to retain as much as possible and to give the state as little as possible, was to grind the grain on the domestic millstones.

As usual, the authorities expropriated and closed down all privately-owned, steam and water-wheel, wind-powered and horse-powered grist mills. Only a few state-owned grist mills in each district were permitted to mill the grain after first

deducting 20 to 25 per cent of the grain as a fee for milling, the deduction was chargeable to the grain-collection quota.

The peasants could not afford to part with their meagre supplies of grain in this manner, therefore they contrived a domestic type of millstone, a prototype of the grinding device used by their ancestors two or three thousand years earlier, in the so-called Trypillian era. This was a hard menial chore, but the peasants did not mind that, as long as they could save a few pounds of grain. Millstones of various sizes and shapes were produced throughout Ukraine.

The authorities reacted to this peasant inventiveness by forbidding grain to be ground by such contrivances.

The documents that follow reveal cases of confiscation of millstones wherever they were found.

In the accounts of eyewitnesses are descriptions of these millstones and of the conditions under which they were used.

The ever present danger of seizure of grain and other food products by the authorities compelled peasants to conceal them. No granaries or other buildings could serve as suitable places for storage of food products because they were readily accessible to brigades of government robbers. Therefore grain and other food products had to be concealed so as to mislead the inquisitors. Grain was buried in gardens, in groves, in fields, bricked up under stoves, in false ceilings, etc.

R. L. SUSLYK

PEASANT INVENTIVENESS IN CONCEALING GRAIN.

When searches for grain became a commonplace occurrence, the authorities went so far as to examine every kitchen pot in every household. Any grain found in the pots was confiscated, and added to the grain-collection plan. The peasants, in turn, began to devise hiding-places which were most difficult to discover. Here is an example from the hamlet of Severyniwka in the Hrunsky district:

Limited quantities of some of the grain could be concealed in water, in wells, in hollow logs, in ponds and brooks.

Millet, beans or other cereals were placed in large or small bottles, and sealed with tar. Small bottles were then placed in a bucket and deposited at the bottom of a well or any other place where the water was of sufficient depth.

The flour was secreted as follows: a sack holding 50 kl.

would be packed tightly with flour and on the outside it would be smeared with dough. It would then be tied to a rope and immersed in water where it could later be located. It could thus be stored for several months without serious deterioration.

DOMESTIC MILLSTONES ARE "KURKUL FLOUR MILLS."

Waging a merciless struggle against the clandestine grinding of grain by kurkul domestic millstones, against pilfering and absorption of grain, the plans of the flour-millers must be fulfilled.

The village soviets and the district executive committees loathe fighting this clandestine grinding of grain; they limit themselves to penalizing the offenders from 10 to 30 roubles. A search in the Smotrytzky district revealed 200 such domestic millstones used by kurkuls for grinding grain.

A search in the Volochynsky district, during the month of December only, revealed 755 such domestic millstones.

Negligence in implementing the directives of the party and the government, places the organs of prosecution and justice in the forefront of responsibility for seeing to it that the mills are not deprived of their share of grain.

(Visti, January 11, 1933).

At the same time hundreds and perhaps thousands of kurkul millstones are working without respite. Lately (in the Odessa district) the kurkuls are setting up their millstones on the fields and are grinding the grain there.....

(Visti, January 24, 1933).

In the Dniepropetrovsk region, over 700 such millstones, on which grain is being ground without government regulation, have been discovered.

(Visti, October 2, 1932).

The peasants are not bringing their grain to the state mills, but are grinding it themselves in order to avoid yielding the culture tax to the bolshevik party.... In the Lubni district of the Poltava region, 27 millstones were found, in the Tsarychansky district 75, in the Slaviansk district of the Kharkiw region 100 of

these k u r k u l mills were discovered...

.....The peasants are grinding their grain at home on primitive, domestic millstones... In the Odessa region alone, 25 of these domestic mills were discovered.

(*Bolshevyk Ukrayiny*, No. 11, 1932).

R. L. SUSLYK

CONSTRUCTION AND CONCEALMENT OF DOMESTIC MILLSTONES

The authorities prohibited the grinding of grain by domestic millstones. If millstone was discovered in a peasant dwelling, it was promptly broken and in some cases the owner was penalized by the confiscation of property or at least a fine.

Elaborate hiding places had to be devised. In 1932-1933, the residents of the village of Nirka and Severyniwka, in the Hrunsky district, hid their millstones in the swamp that lay between their two villages. The swamp was dotted with dry stops upon which the peasants could set them up.

Grinding took place during the night in order to avoid the sharp eye of the authorities.

The millstones were of diverse shapes and sizes, usually the prototype of the regular millstones at the flour mill.

Quite often the peasants devised various types of grinders, most commonly one made of a wagon wheel. A set of grooved cones would be inserted into the axle head of the wheel, one mobile and one stationary. Small quantities of grain would then be thrown in and crushed.

Machinists in the cities and towns aided the peasants by shaping the metal grinding plates and cones for them. Such utensils could easily be concealed by depositing them in a pot, filling it with water and shoving it into an oven. It was possible to crush 2 kgms. of grain an hour with such an implement.....

L. PYLYPENKO

MILLET SEED GROUND ON MILLSTONES.

In 1933 I was teaching at a school at the village of Rohoza, in Kiev district. The teachers in that particular school received a monthly ration of one pood of millet seed per person. Other food products such as fats, flour or vegetables were not allowed.

All wind-powered flour mills were closed down by the authorities. The only functioning flour mill was situated in the town of Borishpol, a district centre some distance away from our village. Since the peasants had no grain to grind, nobody went to the flour mill. Whatever little grain was available was ground or crushed in the home-made contraptions such as domestic millstones and crushers.

The authorities continually searched for these home-made contraptions and destroyed them forthwith in order to compel the peasants to take their grain to the state-owned flour mill and thus extract multure from them.

The peasants carefully concealed these home-made implements and secretly crushed whatever grain they could obtain...

We teachers were also compelled to grind our rations on these implements but it was necessary to give the peasants some grist for the use of the utensil. Therefore, we invented our own brand of grind stones, fashioned out of perforated sheet metal into shapes resembling cones.

This toil consumed much time and energy. The grist was not sifted at all. This mixture of grits and chaff was then made into dough by adding water and baking it into "baladony."

CHAPTER III

THE STRUGGLE OF THE AUTHORITIES FOR GRAIN AND THE "RED BROOM OF DEATH."

This time the authorities used the "most modern methods" in conducting grain-collections and took steps, well in advance, to ensure complete success. The still green crop on the fields was meticulously checked, whether it belonged to the collective farm or not, and trusted people were posted to guard it. All threshing machines were prepared and placed only on community threshing-yards. Teamsters, for transporting grain to elevators and warehouses by the railway stations, were warned. The elevators and warehouses were readied and placed under NKVD guards.

When harvesting commenced, all the grain, including seed and live-stock feed, was promptly taken to the elevators by a carefully-guarded convoy. Members of the collective farm were "advanced" only 15 per cent of the grain earned "from the State" by their hard toil.

Those who had small patches of grain seeded in their domestic gardens received no "advance" whatsoever. The crop of the individual peasants was also threshed by the community threshing-machine and the grain yield was forthwith.

Despite such sweeping arrangements, there was still not forwarded to the elevators, leaving nothing whatsoever, enough grain to fulfill the collection plan. Where was the grain so coveted by the authorities? "Pilfered," replied the authorities. Immediately a campaign began in all the collective farms for re-threshing the straw and fanning the chaff. But this also failed to yield the expected quantities of grain to fulfill the plans. Where was the remainder to be obtained?

The authorities then announced that members of the collective farms illegally received "advances of grain" above norms. Instead of 15 per cent, they should have received only 10 per cent. A campaign was begun to recover the "illegally received grain." "Search brigades" were set in motion. "Booster brigades" (composed of people from outside the villages,

because local ones were not trustworthy) were set to follow up. "Red Broom Brigades" or "Brigades of the Red Broom of Death" as they were popularly known, were set to follow up the latter.


These "brigades" cleaned the village of every bit of grain as well as of vegetables and other food products, thus precipitating a condition of famine in Ukraine. As an aid to the "brigades" the authorities also organized special brigades of "workers' and peasants' press correspondents" whose task was to prepare publicity material for the moulding of public opinion. This campaign was then climaxed by the imposition of a commercial blockade of the villages in Ukraine.

The authorities achieved their goal; the peasantry was robbed of all grain and other food products and left to face the coming winter, sealed off by a blockade, awaiting the approach of inevitable famine.

REPRESENTATIVES OF CENTRAL AUTHORITIES WITNESSED THE FAMINE

A number of documents that follow contain accounts of eye-witnesses describing how the government stripped the peasants of the Poltava district of all their grain.

Other documents contain accounts of the mission to Uk-



Body of a little girl on a Kharkiw Street

rairie of members of the Politburo of the CC of the CB(B)U. The head of the then Soviet government, V. Molotov, after witnessing the famine in Ukraine could have persuaded Moscow to provide some measure of relief. But this was not in the plans of Moscow; Moscow needed grain at all costs, and L. Kaganovich was detailed to see to it that she obtained it.

Three documents also testify that the representatives of the Ukrainian central authorities saw the terrible plight of the Ukrainian peasantry and all the horrors of the famine, but were unable to do anything about it, because their power was limited solely to the execution of directives from Moscow. The last documents especially illustrate the helplessness and weakness, in these matters, of the highest leaders of the Ukrainian government, President Hryhory Ivanovich Petrovsky and Ulas Yakovich Chubar.

IVAN KLYMKO

LAST KERNEL OF GRAIN TO THE STATE.

In the hamlet of Luchky, in the Reshetyliw district, in the Poltava region the crops of 1932 were said to be below average, but would have sufficed for local requirements had not the state collected it to the last kernel. The majority of the peasants were already members of the collective farms, and only a handful persisted in cultivating individually. But the grain was taken away without discrimination.

The grain threshed by the collective farm was delivered to the state, including the seed grain, of which it was said that it was being retained for safekeeping. They promised to return the seed grain in spring, probably anticipating a famine, and that the starving peasants might consume the seed grain as a result. The members of the collective farm received 200 grams of screenings as pay for each work-day.

The peasants who were not members of the collective farm regardless of whether they were once well-to-do or poor, were compelled to have all their grain threshed by the collective farm. Their grain was then delivered to the state elevators, leaving them nothing whatsoever. Worse still was the fact that some of these peasants were short in their quota for the grain-collection plans. These people were prosecuted and penalized. Thus, Athanasy Hryhorovich Luchko was sentenced to five-years of penal servitude in the far distant concentration camps....

At the height of this robbery of the peasantry by the state, when the peasants were being stripped of every last kernel of grain, they tried to steal and conceal the grain from their own fields in order to have something to stave off the anticipated famine. Those who succeeded in concealing some grain and who were successful in avoiding detection, had a little food for their families, at least until the end of 1932. But even these meagre reserves did not last long, and in the spring of 1933 a terrible famine swept the countryside...

(Printed in D. Solovey, *Paths to Golgota*, [in Ukrainian]).

M. BARABASH

MOLOTOV'S SOJOURN IN THE STARVING UKRAINE.

The village of Kozelshchyna lies between Poltava and Kremenchuk. The premises of this former convent, which was closed immediately after the bolshevik revolution, were occupied by the district central authorities, after being transferred from Bryhadyriwka. Its various departments were accommodated in numerous suites of the building. There is no railway station near this village, just a platform and a ticket-sale wicket to serve the beach trains stopping there.

In the fall of 1932 this district, according to soviet jargon, "displayed a receptive mood in fulfilling the prime task of the Party and the government — the grain-collection plan." Of course the collection of grain in this district was conducted in much the same way as everywhere else in Ukraine; all grain coming from the threshing machines was promptly delivered to the state elevators; searches were conducted in the villages for all concealed grain; repressions and arrest were rampant, but the grain-collection plan was still far from being fulfilled.

And so at the end of 1932 a meeting of the Party hierarchy of all the surrounding districts was convened in Kozelshchyna which was to be attended by the secretaries of District Party Committees, authorized representatives of the Central Committee and the so-called "leaders of a thousand"... The announcement created quite a stir.

One day immediately following this announcement, at ten o'clock in the morning, a work train arrived at Kozelshchyna. Within half an hour a stop signal was erected and a short spur track was laid with a switch from the main line. Having completed the job, the work train disappeared in the direction

of Kremenchuh. Half an hour later another train arrived which was made up of a locomotive, a flat car carrying passenger automobiles and three luxurious passenger coaches. The train was switched to the newly laid spur. All movements of trains on that line were halted.

On this train arrived the then "Chairman of the Soviet of Peoples Commissars of the USSR," and later "The Peoples Commissar for External Affairs," member of the Politburo of the Central Party Committee of the CPSU," close adviser of Stalin, Viyacheslav Michaylovych Molotov...

I could observe, through the office windows of the premises where I was employed, the "important" train and all the movements around it. The distance was approximately 300 metres.

The train was surrounded by a military guard of the NKVD. Two people at a time would be allowed to enter the coach at the rear, with two guards at the door. Most probably they were high officials of the district Party Committees. The audiences would last from ten to fifteen minutes. "The close adviser to Stalin" did not emerge from his coach even for a second. After having stopped there for an hour and a half, the train then departed in the direction of Poltava. The work train arrived on its heels, dismantled the spur track and the semaphor and departed.

Following this incident, talk went around to the effect that demoted leaders of the districts had endeavoured to convince Molotov that there was no more grain, that the population was starving. The only thing they proved by their efforts was their lack of "bolshevik maturity," whereupon they were promptly fired from their positions.

The apparatus set in motion by Molotov raged in the districts. Total searches were conducted and everything resembling food was confiscated, including small packages of garden seeds, baked bread and cooked meals.

Mobile sessions of the regional court (composed of thousands) prosecuted peasants, activists, chiefs of the collective farms and of village soviets. They were prosecuted for wilful negligence in fulfilling the grain-collection plans, for sabotage, wrecking, counter-revolution and "contravention of the law of August 7, 1932."

The grain-collection plan remained unfulfilled but the success of the planned famine was assured. In 1933, throughout

the villages of the Kozelshchyna district people died of starvation according to plan as they did else where throughout the entire territory of Ukraine.

PAVLO BOZHKO

KAGANOVICH SWEEPED OUT EVEN THE SEED-GRAIN.

The winter of 1932-33 found Sakhnovshchansk district in Poltava region as well as the whole of Ukraine in the throes of the most terrible famine. People everywhere died in droves, but the authorities still persisted in pushing the grain-collection plans although the chances of their fulfillment were nil. This particular district was visited at that time by the special emissary of Stalin and Moscow, Lazar Moiseivich Kaganovich, the authority on Ukraine and general secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party. A conference of secretaries of Party cells, heads of collective farm, and directors of state farms was convened for the distinguished visitor.

After short preliminaries, Kaganovich demanded the fulfillment of the grain-collection plans and delivery of grain to the state elevators. When it was pointed out to him that all grain had been delivered and only the seed-grain left, Kaganovich ordered the seed-grain to be delivered as well. This happened on the eve of spring seeding.

Some of the prominent local Communists, resting on their laurels during the revolution, attempted to protest the order. They soon found themselves deprived of their Party membership cards, proclaimed to be "enemies of the people" and spirited away from the district. A short time later the state "loaned" the seed-grain to the collective farm. It had to be transported back under great difficulties and under strict surveillance. The road from the railway station was littered with dead people and horses. There cannot be any doubt that Stalin and the Politburo were fully aware of the famine in Ukraine. They all knew about it in Moscow and facilitated its existence.

B. A.

THE CENTRAL AUTHORITIES WERE AWARE OF THE FAMINE.

At the time when a full scale famine was already raging throughout Ukraine, some of the peasants were still in doubt as

to whether the central bolshevik authorities knew about it. This doubt was dispelled at the beginning of 1933 when a representative of the CC of the CP of Ukraine arrived at the Drabiw district in the Poltava region with the express purpose of "broadening the tempos of grain-collection plans and thus fulfilling the directives of the Party and the government."

Having convened a meeting of the chairmen of village soviets and of the village activists, the representative of the CC loudly assailed the local leadership by accusing it of inability to overhaul its work on the basis of directives of the Party and the government. He insisted that hostile class elements were concealing the grain, that the kurkul henchmen were wrecking the grain-collection plans, and that enemies of the people were spreading provocative rumors and lies about some kind of famine. The truth of the matter was that only loafers who did not want to work were starving...

Later on the representative walked along streets littered with corpses, but he pretended not to see them.

NATALKA LYUTAREVICH

UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT PETROVSKY AMONGST THE STARVING PEOPLE.

At the beginning of harvest time in 1933, the president of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialists Republic, Hryhory Petrovsky, arrived at Chornoukh in his special "Lincoln" limousine. He was touring the famine-stricken regions of Ukraine. A large group of women gathered near the building of the district executive committee, where the president was in conference (men, fearing persecution, did not appear there). Some of the women brought written statements with them; others had baked buns of elm tree leaves and buckwheat chaff (then the staple food of the collective farmers). Some of the women had their swollen children with them. They wanted to talk to the president and to give him their statements.

The president conferred at length with the chief of the district executive committee, Polonsky; the secretary of the district Party committee, Marchenko, and the chief of the NKVD, Lehrman. It was not known what they were talking about, but before long Lehman appeared at the front door and said; "Give me all the statements." He went inside. It is not known whether the president saw them or not.


However, after a while the president appeared and rushed straight to the waiting automobile. Standing in the automobile he admonished those assembled: "Why have you gathered here? Why are you not working in the fields?"

Those assembled retorted: "We are dying of hunger. Our children are all swollen. We want something to eat."

"I will be in Moscow soon and I will speak about it," replied the president, signalling the driver to depart. As the sleek black limousine slowly headed away, the assembled hungry women shouted: "Comrade Petrovsky, the elevators at Pyriatyn are bursting with grain. Permit us to obtain some grain there on account." The automobile bearing the president was already driving away at top speed and he probably did not hear the curses hurled at him by the disappointed women.

2. COLLAPSE OF THE GRAIN COLLECTION PLANS.

This year the authorities began the grain-collection campaign through an official apparatus known as the "Grain-Collection Trust." To encourage the collections, the authorities went as far as to announce a contest with appropriate premiums for early fulfillment of the plans. But the contest soon proved to be a futile, malicious jest; nobody knew what became of it or what the results were. The peasants were in no mood for con-



Corpses of famine victims are removed

tests. The authorities did not fail to remember the multure as an added feature of the grain-collection campaign, which, of course, was roundly boycotted by the peasants; they could not afford to have a fee extracted from their already meagre grain allowances. Thus they ground their grain on their domestic millstones and other devices.

In some places multure was deducted when grain allowances were allotted. In such cases the local authorities passed these fees on not to the state but to the needy peasants. Government officials then complained that the grain was being pilfered by *kurkul* agents.

While the authorities were able to exercise full control over the collective farm and collective farmers, they could not as effectively control the individual peasant. Therefore the individual peasants were placed under a "hard quota" of grain deliveries, failure in which resulted in additional "liquidation of *kurkuls*," this time the most poverty-stricken of peasants.

CONTEST FOR FULFILLMENT OF GRAIN-COLLECTION PLANS.

In order to stimulate the fulfillment of grain-collection plans by the anniversary of the October Revolution (November 7), the "Grain-Collection Trust" announced a contest:

Aiming at the early and complete fulfillment of the grain-collection plans, it is imperative to follow the example of the leading districts in the Central Black Loam Region and the Urals (Russian territories where plans for grain-collections were light and easy to fulfill I. D.), the "Grain-Collections Trust" announces an All-Union contest to select leading districts, state farms, collective farm and Machine-Tractor Stations.

A premium of fifteen, ten and eight thousand roubles respectively will go to the leading districts.

A premium of six, four and three thousand roubles respectively will go to the leading Machine-Tractor Stations.

A premium of three, two and one thousand roubles respectively will go to the leading state farms.

A premium of five, three, two and one thousand

roubles respectively will go to the leading collective farms.

A premium of five, three, two and one thousand roubles respectively will go to the leading villages.

(Vistl, October 20, 1932).

COLLECTING MULTURE.

Multure is an inseparable part of the grain-collection plans. A check reveals that in many districts of Ukraine the struggle for complete fulfillment of the multure plan is not being conducted properly.

The condition of the multure plan, as of January 1, is intolerable. According to data of the "Grain Collection Trust," only 36.1 per cent of the plan was fulfilled in Ukraine. The most backward regions are the Don, Kharkiw and Dniepropetrovsk.

The tempo of multure collections is falling off from month to month. Multure is being blackmarketed in thousands of tons by kurkul agents at the state mills, and in its stead they forward screenings to the state. Mills which have been forbidden to operate, are operating secretly. There is no control.

The struggle for multure is the struggle for the grain-collection plan.

(Vistl, January 6, 1933).

PERSECUTION OF INDIVIDUAL FARMERS.

There are noticeably demoralising moods in the matter of grain-collections. The present state of affairs is as follows: in the individual farm sector of the Kharkiw region, 40.9 per cent of the plan has been fulfilled, of the special hard quota (continuation of economic squeeze and kurkul liquidation, I. D.) only 35.3 per cent.

Regional organizations were unable to get things moving even in those districts in which punishment was ordered by the Party and government (decision of the CPC and CEC of December 15, 1932).

Notwithstanding the fact that the leadership of the Iziium district received several warnings, the grain-collection plan on the individual sector has only reached

45.8 per cent of the goal. The Orzhytzk district is still worse—only 37.4 per cent. Unusually delinquent are the districts of Reshetyliw and Sakhnovshchany as well as a few others in which, during the last few days, the grain-collection campaign has come to a virtual standstill.

In several districts, villages and regions administrative steps are being taken against the individual peasants.

Thus, in the Vovchane village of the Kobeliaky district the chairman of the village soviet and the secretary of the Party cell have gone from house to house searching for grain.

In Iziium and other districts the grain is being collected in such a way that the activists themselves maliciously fail to carry out their obligations. In the Radkiw village soviet in the same district the members act indifferently and conceal the grain themselves. There are leading members of the collective farms who fulfilled their quotas by 40 per cent and the collective farms fulfilled their plans by 26 per cent. These are the facts about the collection in the region.

(Visti, January 1, 1933).

3. RE-THRESHING STRAW AND THE RECOVERY OF ILLEGALLY ADVANCED GRAIN.

The time limit of January 1st set by the authorities for the fulfillment of grain-collection plans in Ukraine has obviously collapsed. Only 70 per cent of the plan was fulfilled, despite the fact that every bit of grain was collected. The authorities then extended the collection period until February 1st and ordered the re-threshing of straw and the fanning of chaff as a possible source of additional grain supply. It was found that some collective farms permitted 30 to 50 per cent of the grain to fall into the straw and chaff, and this was pure and simple sabotage according to the authorities.

However this source soon proved to be useless. "Sabotage" was not generally prevalent and yet the grain-collection plans failed everywhere. Another source of grain supply had to be found: the illegally distributed grain advances which had to be returned to the state. What were these illegally distributed grain advances?

According to a decision of the Ukrainian Collective Farm Center, the management of the collective farms was permitted to distribute to the members 15 per cent of the threshed grain as part of their remuneration for the work-days at the collective farm. In its second decision, the Ukrainian Collective Farm Center as well as the Peoples Commissariat for Agriculture explained that the members of the collective farm could be granted as much as 75 to 85 per cent of their remuneration in grain, provided the particular collective farm had fulfilled its grain-collection quota, set aside the required seed-grain fund and had provided a sufficient quantity of feed for livestock. In the event that quotas were not met, the collective farm members were not entitled to more than 15 per cent of the actual thresh yield as part of their remuneration.

An order was then issued requiring the members of the collective farms to return to the state all grain over ten per cent of the threshed yield. Naturally there could be no voluntary returns because most of the grain received had already been consumed and whatever was left was being saved by the peasants for future use. The authorities then started organizing special "booster brigades" to search for grain. The collective farm managements and the leaders of some of the districts bluntly stated: "There is no more grain, there is no possibility of fulfilling the grain-collection plan."

TAKE THE LAST MORSEL OF FOOD FROM THE PEOPLE.

The monthly plan for grain-collections in Ukraine shows only 28.9 per cent fulfillment of December 20 and the annual plan allows for 70.4 per cent fulfillment. Only 6.3 per cent of the plan has been realized during the last five-days (December 15-20). Unduly lagging are the Dniepropetrovsk and Odessa regions. There is absolutely no improvement in the Kharkiw region, especially in the individual sector where only 39.1 per cent of the plan was fulfilled as of December 21. A demoralized mood is noticeable everywhere.

Setting in motion and raising the tempo of the grain-collections is a task of vital responsibility at present.

The so-called visible resources of grain collections

in straw piles do not ensure the fulfilment of the plan. The task is assiduously to organize the work of re-threshing. According to the data of the Peoples Commissariat for Agriculture in Ukraine, released on January 10, re-threshing in 108 districts during the last few days yielded 25, 216 cwts. of grain. However, the misers and their henchman are using the same methods in re-threshing as they did during threshing, in order to discredit it. It is, therefore, necessary to have tried and true members of the collective farms handle the re-threshing.

However re-threshing does not decide the matter of fulfilment of the grain-collection plans. The basic grain to be collected must come through recovery of illegally-distributed grain advances as well as of stolen grain. Hundreds of thousands of hundred-weights of grain have been scattered and illegally distributed as advances.

It is of the utmost necessity to manifest the greatest Bolshevik cohesion... in the realm of grain-collections.

(Visti, December 21, 1932).

THE MOST BACKWARD DISTRICT IN COLLECTION OF GRAIN.

The district of Kryvozero in the Odessa region occupies 49th place in grain-collection (Party secretary, Shepeliev and chairman of the District Executive Committee, Tampson) having fulfilled their plan by a mere 53.5 per cent. There is no struggle for grain in the district; every day brings in new facts about grain being wasted. For example, one collective farm has made a book entry of 92 cwts. of grain as expenses in connection with a meeting.

Most of the *k u r k u l s* and malicious delinquents have concealed their grain in neighbouring villages.

Insofar as re-threshing and the fanning of chaff is concerned, no attempt has been made to start it, despite the fact that in some villages (Plosky, Osychky, Kamianna) such re-threshing yields 16-8 Kilograms of select grain.

The village of Pisky in Bashtany district is not

moving at all, despite the fact that it wās placed on the black list over two decades ago. Threshing and re-threshing is being conducted so as to discredit both. For example, the "Marx" artel threshes only a hundredweight or less per day. No one wants to work the threshing machine. A similar situation exists in the "Voroshilov" artel (there was an unusually high death rate in those villages I. D.).

The chief of the Bashtany District Executive Committee, Shesko, does not want to know that some Party members have become agents of the *kurkuls* and are wrecking the grain-collection efforts...

(Visti, January 2, 1933).

RE-THRESHING STRAW AND CHAFF.

The indebtedness on the individual sector with respect to grain-collections in the Dniepropetrovsk region, as of January 1, amounts 350,000 tons of grain.

From what sources could the region relieve its indebtedness? The so-called visible resources of the region are few. About 15,100 hectares are still unthreshed.

The problem of the successful conclusion of the grain-collection effort can best be solved by re-threshing straw, fanning chaff and above all, by the recovery of the illegally-distributed grain advances, and the recovery of the pilfered grain.

According to the data of the regional Grain-Collection Authority only 31.9 per cent of the straw was re-threshed and only 33.7 per cent of the chaff was fanned. This yielded only 5,059 tons of grain. 16 districts did not even report on the amount of straw and chaff to be re-threshed. The region underestimates re-threshing as one of the prime sources of fulfilling the grain-collection plan.

Kurkul sabotage in this field of endeavour is not given a determined rebuff.

Frequent occurrences have been noted in many districts where *kurkul* agents are purposely re-threshing piles of straw containing no grain.

The director of the District Agricultural Section

of Tomakiw is apparently satisfied by false reports from the artel "New Life," to the effect that re-threshing of their straw piles yielded 25 cwt. of grain within five days...

The recovery of illegally-advanced and stolen grain has not been commenced simultaneously with the re-threshing of straw and fanning of chaff. According to the regional data, re-threshing was commenced in 17 districts, engaging a total of 1,060 threshing outfits. The recovery of pilfered grain consists of 3,158 cwts. No effort has been made towards fulfilling the plan in the other 27 districts of the region, from which deliveries of industrial commodities had been barred as a reprisal for sabotage and stubbornness by the misers in fulfillment of the grain-collection plan.

The Party emphatically demands action from the responsible organizations of the Dniepropetrovsk region, which is one of the basic grain regions.

(*Visti*, January 5, 1933).

A demoralized mood is prevalent throughout the collective farms of the Odessa region. The grain-collection plan, as of January 16, reached only 77.1 per cent of the quota.

The present basic task of the regional is the completion of grain-collections by recovery of the stolen and illegally-distributed grain, and the re-threshing of the straw piles. Apparently nobody seems to pay any attention to the matters mentioned above.

In the hamlet of Bereziwka, in the Ustym district, the activists of the collective farm discovered thirteen clandestine caches filled with grain. A great deal of stolen grain is being found secreted in the ground by *kurkuls* and their agents.

(*Visti*, January 24, 1933).

FIFTEEN PER CENT OF GRAIN TO BE ADVANCED TO COLLECTIVE FARMERS.

The Ukrainian Collective Farm Center, by a decision of September 20, 1932, hereby establishes the following regulations:

1. The management of the collective farms is obliged

to conform to the orders governing the issuance of additional grain and produce allowances to collective farm members on account of work-days for the period January 1 to October 1, thus bringing the proportions of allowances to 15 per cent of the actual thresh yield as of October 1.

2. In the distribution of grain allowances, based on 15 per cent of the actual thresh yield, it is imperative to establish the rate of wages per day, and also to take into account the total amount of grain advanced during the period prior to threshing, and the amounts advanced in produce and supplies used in in community feeding.
3. The management of the collective farms is obliged to terminate, by October 10, the distribution of additional allowances as per this resolution.
4. The Regional and District Collective Farm Centres are obliged to take immediate steps towards implementing this resolution.
5. This resolution does not concern those collective farms which, in accordance with the Ukrainian Collective Farm Centre of September 16, fulfilled their grain-collection plan, set aside the seed, livestock feed and insurance supply, then distributed the surplus, in kind or profits, proportionately amongst their members.

Chairman of the Board of the Ukrainian Collective
Farm Centre.
Maneyenko.

(Visti, September 23, 1932).

HOW COLLECTIVE FARM PROFITS WERE TO BE DISTRIBUTED.

(Decision of the Peoples Commissariat of Agriculture and the Collective Farm Centre of the Ukraine Soviet Socialist Republic).

1. The People Commissariat of Agriculture and the Collective Farm Centre hereby order the regional and district agricultural and collective farm organizations to commence immediately the accounting of the collective farm profits for 1932, bearing in mind that, on or before November 20, the collective farm


3. Grain allowances are to be distributed in the following order:
 - a) As remuneration for work-days, not less than 75 per cent in kind, the balance to be distributed after the final accounting.
 - b) Not less than 50 per cent is to be assigned in cash for workdays, the cash to be realized from sales of grain, beets, potatoes and other produce of the collective farms.
4. It is categorically prohibited to reduce any allowances to which the collective farmers are entitled.
5. Agricultural and collective farm organizations must ensure an increase in the valuation of workdays from 10 to 20 per cent on the basis of the quality of work rendered by collective farm members.

ALL GRAIN OVER 10 PER CENT ALLOWANCE RETURNED.

The collective farms "Laurenty" and "Frunze" in Oleksiyiv village soviet of the Bashtany district have completed their threshing and have halted deliveries of grain. The management of these collective farms state: "Everything has been threshed and there is no more grain."

The raiding brigade examined the quality of the threshing and discovered that a considerable quantity of grain had been left in the straw and chaff, and that over 18 per cent of the actual threshing yield had been distributed in kind to collective farm members. The raiding brigade convened a general meeting of the collective farm members at which 300 persons were present. The meeting unanimously decided to return voluntarily all grain received over and above 10 per cent of the actual thresh yield (according to a decision of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, they were authorized to receive 15 per cent of the actual threshing yield I. D.), as well as to organize the re-threshing of straw.

It was also decided to set up two special brigades of twenty men each, headed by leading shock workers,



Executed

members should be fully acquainted with the state of the profits of the collective farm economy as a whole and the proportion of profits to be allotted to the members. Equalization, that is the system of distributing profits according to the number of consumers in each family, should be drastically reduced. Agricultural and collective farm organizations are hereby ordered to:

- a) Distribute profits solely on the basis of individual labor rendered in fully accountable work-days.
 - b) Raise considerably the valuation of work-days in proportion to last year's valuation.
 - c) Cultivate the tendency that an early discharge of obligations to the state is conducive to a rapid distribution of profits.
2. As a rule after setting aside supplies of seed- and feed-grain, the surplus is to be divided amongst the collective farmers. Not less than 50 per cent of the surplus is to be paid in cash. In connection with this, a reserve supply of not less than ten per cent should be set aside as reserve for seed-grain, live-stock feed and funds for repayment of state loans. This is to be decided upon at meetings of the collective farm members.

to recover the illegally-received grain. The result of the diligent work of these brigades (a thorough search for grain in peasant dwellings) in their endeavour to recover the grain may contribute to the fulfillment of the grain-collection plan.

MYKHAILOVSKY

(*Visti*, January 5, 1933).

Instead of the recovery of illegally distributed and pilfered grain, as well as the re-threshing of straw in order to fulfill the plan, the district leaders of the Kiev region are wreaking these endeavours.

In the Hemyaziw district a raid was organized to examine the quality of the threshing. In their reports the district leaders state that: "There is no possibility of fulfilling the grain-collection plan."

(*Visti*, January 6 and 9, 1933).

4. RED BROOM BRIGADES.

The sub-commissions conducting various business campaigns in the villages were at that time of a permanent nature, and they have been especially active this year during the grain-collection campaign.

These commissions conducted thorough searches for grain in every village dwelling and were popularly known as "red broom brigades" or "mortal broom brigades." Acting on a slogan issued by the authorities — "Recover for the state, all illegally distributed grain allowances," these brigades simply stripped each peasant of grain and other produce, leaving him no alternative but to die of starvation.

Here are accounts by living witnesses of the work of these brigades. In the village of Hudna in the Kharkiw region, a peasant was thus robbed and then sentenced to penal servitude in a concentration camp. Other accounts provide material dealing with the work of the brigades in the Poltava, Kiev and Kirovohrad regions.

SUB-COMMISSIONS OF ROBBERS.

45 per cent of the grain-collection plan for the Cherkassy district of the Kiev region is to be met by individual farmers. So far this sector has delivered only 3 per cent of the plan, therefore the grain-co-

llection plan in the individual sector must be the centre of attention for soviet organizations.

Sub-commissions have been set up in some villages, but they have confined themselves purely to administration, thereby brutally contravening the Party line with respect to individual farmers.

The heads of the sub-commission in the village of Kumeiky are placing a burden on indigent collective farmers who possess small individual plots. At the same time kurkul holdings are not similarly burdened.

The acts of these kurkul agents, who have received no rebuff from village soviets or Party organizations, are clearly shown in the grain-collection plans. Only 1 per cent has been collected to date.

This formalism of the sub-commission prevails in conducting grain-collections amongst the individual farmers in the district.

(Visti, September 16, 1932).

P. PYATNYCHENKO

GAVE GRAIN BUT TOOK IT BACK LATER

In the village of Domontiw in the Zolotonos district of the Poltava region, members of the collective farm received 40 kopecks and 500 grams of grain (half in wheat and rye and the other half in millet, barley and buckwheat) for each workday during 1932.

Scarcely two weeks had passed when an order came from the central authorities to return all the grain received. Only a few abided by the order; the vast majority did not return anything. Thereupon a district official, authorized to recover the grain, mobilized 30 activists in village, divided them into brigades, and started thorough searches of every peasant dwellig. Every kernel of grain thus recovered was brought back to the collective granary.

Those who buried grain in the garden were unable to conceal it. The brigades used metal rods for probing every inch of the peasants' garden and yard until they found the grain. They even gathered up and took away the bean seeds planted in the gardens. The remaining 27 individual farmrs in the village

did not escape the searches; every kernel of grain they possessed was also confiscated.

Thus the whole village was swept clean of all grain and rendered a potential victim of famine.

YAVTUKH BEDZVIN

SEIZED GRAIN AND THREATENED EXILE.

It was autumn in the village of Huta in the Bohodukhiw district. The grain-collection was proceeding at a slow pace, because the peasants had virtually no grain. The authorized official in charge of grain-collection was said to be one by the name of Hordeyev.

In order to intimidate the peasants this Hordeyev selected the most prominent villager, Mychaylo Shlensky, and levied a tremendous assessment on his property for the purpose of taxation. Naturally, Shlensky was not able to pay the tax levied, and he was thus prosecuted and sentenced to ten years penal servitude in the concentration camp as a saboteur of the grain-collecton.

Being thus intimidated by, Hordeyev, the peasants readily delivered the last meager supplies of grain in order to escape the fate of Shlensky. The result was that in a few weeks time they began to die of starvation. Virtually the entire village of Huta perished. The few who survived became cannibals.

A similar fate befell other villages in that district, such as Hubariwka, Pawlivka, Yasynova, Roskopy, Oleshnia, and others.

I was then employed by an organization engaged in collecting all kinds of raw material. I had the opportunity to travel to Kharkiw, where I witnessed some gruesome scenes. I saw thousands of corpses piled under the brigade on Rybna Square, brought there from all over the city. The corpses were then carted outside the city, dumped into a ravine and covered with garbage. The dead were peasants from the surrounding village who had attempted to escape starvation by coming to the city in the hope of finding some food. The residents of the city saw this gruesome picture but they were powerless to do anything about it. The authorities were elated and probably congratulated themselves on their success in smashing the opposition of their foes, the Ukrainian peasantry, by an artificial famine.



Executed

M. NAZARETS

NO END TO GRAIN-COLLECTIONS.

Following the 1932 harvest in the village of Hubske, in the Poltava region, all grain coming out of the collective farm threshing machine was immediately delivered to the state. The few villagers who were not members of the collective farm and who worked their own small plots of land., were also compelled to deliver their entire grain yield to the state. The collective farm members had small gardens, parts of which were seeded with grain for their own use. But these, too, did not escape the all-embracing grain-collection that covered not only but vegetables and meat as well.

The activists of the village achieved a high degree of success in their methods of ferreting out grain. Armed with steel rods and kindred implements, these activists would turn the farmyards upside down seizing everything edible, and woe betide the one whose yard revealed some concealed food. His kitchen utensils would be broken and his house practically demolished. The activists would naturally by-pass their own dwelling where they kept a few things concealed for themselves. The authorities therefore adopted a different method.

The entire group of Hubske activists was dispatched to the village of Enkiwtsi and the activists of Enkiwtsi were dispatched to Hubske. This method assured a more thorough search. One of the victims of this novel method was Volodymyr Yarmolenko,

an erstwhile soviet partisan during the revolution. He was robbed of every particle of food. His family perished of starvation.

The grain-collections terminated in the spring of 1933 when a mass famine set in, since there was no-one to look either for grain or for those who had died of starvation...

When the grain-collection executions took place, many people thought that the higher authorities were unaware of what was happening in the localities. They sent complaints to the regions, to Moscow and even to Stalin himself. Some received replies directing them to discuss the matter with the local authorities. Thus M. P. a local village teacher wrote a letter to Stalin. In reply he received the following: "Stalin has received a great number of these complaints, therefore we are returning your statement. Take the matter up with your local authorities...."

Obviously the local authorities were the authorities of Stalin.

R. L. SUSLYK

SEARCH FOR GRAIN IN POTS AND JUGS.

The collective farm "Voroshilov" of Severynowka hamlet in the Hrunsky district had 260 hectares of land under crops in 1932. The levy for the grain-collection was 360 tons of the yield. When the peasants, who believed that there was some mistake, protested, the district authorities replied that the plan was lawful as the state was concerned.

The threshed grain, after deduction of the winter seed-grain supply, was all delivered to the elevator at Hadyach. 100 grams of screenings for each workday was allotted to the members of the collective farm. The grain-collection plan was far from being fulfilled; it was short by scores of tons. The district stubbornly demanded deliveries of more grain.

The district authorities sent a commission to the village to inspect the empty bins in the peasant granaries. The Commission came to the conclusion that the grain was improperly threshed. Re-threshing of straw was begun and it yielded 20-30-kilograms of screenings per day. The plan could not be fulfilled.

Later on, a few dozen people arrived from the village of Pirky. This was a special search commission armed with

various implements to use in the search for hidden grain. The commission promptly started work.

The fields were thoroughly examined for freshly disturbed ground marking a possible cache of grain. Others of the commission examined the barns, the gardens, the ovens and the walls. Anything that seemed a little suspicious was promptly demolished; trunks, barrels, pots and pans were minutely examined. The progress of the commission's work was marked by slowly mounting wagonloads of pots, jugs, packages and pouches containing grain, millet, beans, peas, corn and flour, and domestic millstones seized in order to prevent the peasants from crushing their own grain.

The search did not bring the desired results; it yielded but a few kilograms of divers cereals. The search was abandoned and the village left to face starvation.

A. HIRCHAKIVETS

HEARTH SEARCHED FOR GRAIN DURING THE GRAIN-COLLECTION CAMPAIGN.

Grain-collections paved the way for a mass famine in the village of Shcherbashynka in the Medvyn district in Kiev region. The entire crop of the collective farm was gathered and threshed and all grain was promptly delivered to the state elevators. No seed-grain supply was left. The members of the collective farm each received 500 grams of screenings as remuneration each workday. The number of workdays was small, therefore the allowances of screenings could last only until the winter. Those with large families were hardest hit.

The individual farmers who separated their grain by flails were also compelled to deliver their entire yield to the state. Their straw was later taken to the community threshing yard for re-threshing.

Despite the fact that all the grain was removed as it came out of the separator, the grain-collection went on unabated because the plan was far from being fulfilled. Search brigades were active; they were located at the dwelling of Levko Berestowy, Artem Shchyrba, Pavlo Stetsenko, Katherine Kovalenko, Foma Avramenko, etc.

The activities of the brigades were directed by an imported chairman of the village soviet, Tereshchenko, and his two aides, Kryzhanivsky and Cohen. The brigades conducted daily

searches of the dwellings, minutely examined everything and confiscated anything of an edible nature. They examined the ovens and checked what food was consumed.

One day in winter these brigades stopped an old man, Petro Dibrova, on the street and took off his boots and overcoat. Petro's old sister was taken to the office of the village soviet were suspended of secreting some grain. The sons of these two old people had earlier escaped to Donbas....

PETRO KULISH

SEIZED EVERYTHING EVEN DURING THE FAMINE.

By March of 1933 a small number of individual farmers still remained in the village of Zhabotyn in the Kamyansky district in Kirovohrad region. Amongst them were those who had some members of their family in the collective farm, but the remainder who were not members, were nicknamed "indusses."

Professional Communist party henchmen, detailed from Moscow in 1930 to herd the Ukrainian peasants into collective farms, were as active as ever in their abhorrent work; they searched for grain long non-existent, and intimidated the peasants with the crudest kind of blackmail to the effect that those who did not want to join the collective farms were hostile to collectivization.

Brigades of Young Communists and village activists systematically raided the village, seizing every remnant of grain, leaving the peasants without a morsel of food. If grain was found concealed in dwelling, then both the grain and the dwelling were confiscated on the grounds that those who dwell there were kurkuls. They were immediately arrested and sentenced to exile and forced labor in the Siberian concentration camps.

By April the entire population was starving. They used tree leaves with potato scraps as food. Those who had some old clothing or footwear, were able to barter them for food with village activists. Those unable to obtain some admixture for tree-leaves were compelled to go to a distillery in the neighbouring village of Melnyky, there to retrieve the pigswill from the dumps, swill which was discarded as unfit for livestock feed.

My neighbour, Pylyp Mykolenko, also went to get this 'food,' but he went only once and brought home about 20 kilo-

grams of the wet swill. The results of this trip proved fatal. Being in emaciated condition, he caught a cold and died. His wife still continued to work at the collective farm although she was swollen with hunger. Once in a while she would receive 200 grams of grain. She would mix it with tree leaves, and bake it into buns (she survived). Pylyp's brother, Timothy Mykolenko, 40 years of age and swollen with hunger, tried to save his life by deciding to move to the mining centers of Kryvy Rih or Donbas, where the workers received some bread rations. Gathering his remaining energy, he went back to the Zhabotyn village soviet to ask for a permit to leave the village. He received none, but was told to go back and work on the collective farm. Timothy was too weak to return home even though the distance was only half a kilometre.

He sat down to rest in the weeds behind the village soviet building and there he died. Next day the burial brigade picked up his remains and dumped them into an excavation especially prepared to receive the remains of a multitude of peasants.

TOTAL COLLAPSE AND END OF GRAIN-COLLECTIONS.

The monts of January 1933 did not bring any radical changes in the fulfillment of grain-collections. They remained stationary at an average of 70 per cent. The authorities then designated a third term for the fulfillment of plans, to terminate about the third of March. The search brigades in the villages were set into motion, but there was no more grain... The fulfillment of the plans therefore remained at the original figure of around 70 per cent in most districts and regions. To designate further terms was sheer stupidity even for the bolsheviks. The Ukrainians peasants, stricken by a mortal famine, had no interest in the matter.

Therefore the authorities ceased to mention grain collections about the first of March, and commenced a raucous publicity campaign in preparation for the spring-seeding effort, which was now in danger of collapse, especially in the individual farm sector. The leaders in Moscow proclaimed their decision to ensure a supply of seed-grain and thorough preparation for the seeding campaign. However, the Ukrainian village were then in the throes of mortal agony caused by a terrible artificial famine.

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PARTY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SOIL OF INDIVIDUAL FARMERS.

The Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union recognize the extremely unsatisfactory state of preparation of individual farmers for spring seeding. By March 20 only 728,000 cwts. or 42 per cent of the seed-grain plan was planed in the individual farm sector. The delinquency of the individual sector is especially noted in districts with a high percentage of collectivization.

The CPC and the CC believe that such a state of affairs in the individual sector places the fulfillment of plans, for the spring seeding campaign in an extremely dangerous position. It is therefore proposed that all regional, district and local executive committees:

1. Complete the execution of the seeding-plan within three days by furnishing each individual farmer with details of the plan as well as with the required supply of seed-grain.
2. Check the preparation of soil of individual farmers in every village soviet.
3. Have the collective farms assist individual farmers in overhauling their implements.
4. Furnish horses to individual farmers where necessary.
5. Set up special commission composed of chiefs of village soviets, district representatives, and representatives of the individual farmers, to organize and conduct spring seeding in the individual sector.

Chairman of the CPC of USSR, Molotov.

Secretary of CC of CPSU, Stalin.

CHAPTER IV

MORTAL FAMINE IN THE UKRAINIAN VILLAGE

The famine started immediately following the harvest and threshing in the fall of 1932, when all grain coming out of the threshing machines was promptly delivered to the state elevators and warehouses. The meagre supplies of grain that peasants received as their allowances or stole from collective farms, were totally insufficient for normal needs. The peasants consumed these supplies with the utmost care to make them last as long as possible. In addition to being very limited in quantity, the grain supply was decidedly inferior in quality, being either screenings or barley, millet, corn, etc.

The peasants existed on such vegetables as potatoes, beets, pumpkin, and cabbage of which they had limited quantities in their own gardens. But due to lack of a minimum amount of bread their bodies became swollen from emaciation and death followed as a result.

With the approach of the winter months, the death rate increased considerably. By spring the death rate became very



Children — victims of famine

high because all the supplies were gone. Death swept away whole families, in every village so that it became impossible to bury the hundreds of corpses. The highest death rate occurred in the months of April, May and June when the surviving hunger-ridden people ravenously consumed any green vegetation, and immediately an epidemic of dysentery occurred. The death rate abated somewhat at the end of June and during the succeeding months of July and August when the peasants and collective farmers were permitted to receive some food products from the new harvest. Matters improved gradually during the harvest with the organization of community kitchens which were supplied with food from the previous year's harvest. The authorities took this step in order to save the current harvest.

PEOPLE AND HORSES DIED DURING FAMINE.

The soviet press did not carry any direct news of the famine in Ukraine nor of the terrible death rate which resulted. The party and the local censorship took severe steps to suppress any publicity about the famine. Locally, the term famine was not used, but the term "financial difficulties," was substituted during discussions at the meetings. However, an entire array of other documents relate to the famine.

In some measure documents telling of the state of livestock, particularly of draught horses, on the eve of the spring seeding campaign in 1933 are significant. When the peasant collective farmers had no food, they did not care whether the horses in the collective farms were fed or not. When people died of starvation, it was not surprising that the horses died in droves.

Many horses perished even during the spring of 1932, when the famine began in Ukrainian villages and death devastated them. The horses were either being killed or were let loose to wander wherever they might because there was no feed for them. The authorities were therefore compelled to take notice of the situation. The spring seeding campaign of 1932, as well as the harvest, showed a decided lack of draught horses. But in the spring of 1933 the situation became much worse. The starving people stole and consumed the feed designated for the horses, while the horses died. The government then ordered mobilization of milch cows as draught animals during seeding.

In some villages more than half of the draught horses perished. For example in the Medvyn collective farm "Stalin," 75 per cent of the horses perished.

DESPERATE ATTEMPT TO SAVE HORSES.

(From a decision of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee and the Council of Peoples Commissars, regarding prohibition against slaughtering horses, January 1, 1932).

The All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee and the Council of Peoples Commissars hereby resolve to:

1. Prohibit the slaughter of horses suitable for draught purposes as well as breeding, or colts, except in cases of total incapacity. In addition, the predatory exploitation and inefficient care of horses is prohibited.

2. For illegal slaughter (without a permit from a veterinary surgeon) of horses by individual farmers as well as malicious crippling of them, the District Executive Committees and the City Councils are to impose administrative fines to the extent of the full value of the said animals. In cases where the kurkul's or individual farmer's livestock perpetrate such crimes or cause others to perpetrate them, the DEC's and the CC's are empowered to confiscate not only the animal concerned but the entire herd or a part of it. In addition to this, the kurkuls and the individual farmers are to be prosecuted as criminals.

3. Any infraction of the order set down in Article 1 of this resolution, relating to the socialized sector (collective farm, state farm, machine and horse stations, establishments, enterprises) is to be regarded as criminal responsibility. For careless handling of horses, in the socialized sector, resulting in the death of the animal, a penalty to the extent of the value of the animal is to be imposed and deducted from the workdays of the guilty party.

4. Condemning of horses can be done only by permission of the Veterinary-Sanitary authority on the basis of a special instruction from the Peoples' Commissariat of Agriculture.

5. Use of mares in foal and colts for draught work may be allowed only by permission of the veterinary technician.

6. An organization of the socialized sector possess-

ing horses must furnish a list of the said animals on proper official forms to the People's Commissariat of Agriculture.

7. The sale of horses and colts by the socialized sector to private persons forbidden.

8. The District Committees, city soviets and village soviets must round up stray horses and colts and transfer those capable of it to the district collective farms for draught work...

(Visti, January 2, 1932).

COLLECTIVE FARM HORSES PERISH FROM LACK OF CARE.

The collective farm "Voroshilov" (Zaporizhya district) had 75 horses, but now they have only 50 because 25 have died from lack of care. The horses are kept in three stables. The stables are cold. Nobody is held responsible for them. The construction of a new stable was started in April but it has not been completed; local building material is not being utilized...

In the collective farm "Red Vasytkiv," nobody cares for the horses. There was a time when nobody went to the barn for a whole day. The horses are not at all prepared for the spring...

In the collective farm "Commintern" in the Ochakiw district, the horses are totally neglected. Feeding is very poor, and has resulted in the death of ten horses. The sick horses are not segregated from the healthy ones. The sickness has spread to seven other horses.

In many of the collective farms of the villages in the Haysyn district the horses are emaciated...

There are frequent incidents when feed, issued for the horses, is removed by the stable help to feed their private live-stock.

It is imperative, according to the resolution of the Peoples' Commissariat of Agriculture, to bring to account all those guilty of pilfering the feed, of negligence in caring for horses as well as of maiming them.

(Visti, January, 1932).

STARVING COLLECTIVE FARM HORSES.

The loss of draught horses in the Pryluky district during last winter and spring amounts to 30 per cent of the herd. These collective farms are repeating the same mistakes this fall; negligence in the care and use of horses is rife.

More than half of the horses in the Perevolochane collective farm have been maimed and rendered useless. These horses are now being let loose to roam and forage at will. Feed was left scattered all over the fields and is rotting.

The collective farm "Artem," of the Pereyizdnyansk village soviet, has left 30 of the better horses without any care. There is no steady stable help. The horses are sick and dying.

The horses at the collective farm "Illyich" are lean and weak. They are never cleaned or washed; their mouths are covered with sores.

The state farm "Kuybishev" lost 50 per cent of its draught horses.

(Visti. October 24, 1932).

DETERMINED TO SAVE HORSES.

Ten per cent of the draught horses died during the last nine months of this year in districts in the Chernyhiw region. In districts such as Varvariw, the loss amounted to 13 per cent, Pryluky — 14 per cent, Nedryhayliw — 20 per cent, and Horodnyany as much as 26 per cent.

The masses of collective and individual farmers of the middle and poor class are not yet mobilized for predatory attitude to the horse and the ox. In many a struggle against negligence and a malicious and of the collective farms there is still that *kurkul* incompetence in the care and use of draught livestock...

Numerous examples can be pointed out of complete disregard of the most elementary rules of care for horses; cleaning, watering and feeding are irregular; horses stand up to their knees in manure...

In many collective farms the feed is being pilfered, but the regional, district and executive village com-

mittees are not employing efficient measures to halt this. There are numerous accounts of foaling mares and colts being used for heavy draught work. In the Zlatopil district 90 per cent of the mares have foaled prematurely.

It is necessary immediately to eject kurkuls and their agents, put a determined stop to the pilfering of feed, and pay special attention to the organization of proper care and better management of the collective farm stables.

(Visti, March 3, 1933).

A number of the leading collective farms of the Onopriyiv district in the Kharkiw region, began the practice of steaming coarse feeds in order to raise the general well-being of the horses. The straw and the chaff is being steamed by brigades of the "Comintern," "Komsomolsk," "Zalyvche," and "Shevchenko" collective farms. In the "Marx" collective farm the Young Communists, together with the collective farm activists, became a spear head in this endeavour.

These efforts have already yielded positive results; the number of emaciated horses has been reduced.

(Visti, March 3, 1933).

MILCH COWS REPLACE HORSES.

The district Agricultural Branch of the Henichewsk district in Dnepropetrovsk region is preparing cows for the spring seeding campaign.

Spring seeding begins early in this district. 76,951 hectares must be placed under crops, half of which will be sown to early spring crops.

In order to achieve the early fulfilment of the plan, skilful maneuvering of the draught stock is imperative, including the use of milch cows in auxilliary work.

The general draught-animal situation in the district is anything but satisfactory. There is no accurate balance-sheet of horses suitable for work and those to be restored to fitness.

The use of milch cows for light work had actually ceased. The District Agricultural Branch designated 1,777 cows for use at seeding time and made technical

allotments for each village soviet. Locally, the matter was treated carelessly. The lack of preparation is noticeable even in the better collective farms.

For instance, Krukovsky's brigade at the collective farm "Farmer's Toil" which has to seed 270 hectares, has only 26 horses at its disposal. The brigade has not even considered using cows.

(Visti, March 17, 1933).

76.2 PER CENT OF THE HORSES DIED DURING THE YEAR.

Particularly devastating damage at the hands of the wreckers (not local but Muscovite, I. D.) has been wrecked upon the livestock of the collective farm "Stalin" in the village of Medwyn in the Kiev region. Unmindful of the fact that it was possible to secure the required feed last summer, Medvediev, Hohulia and the director of livestock, Zolotochub, adopted a kurkul attitude towards it. Neither the first two "heroes," practicing kurkuls, nor the latter evinced any interest in the development of livestock, took no steps to improve their care, or to create a sound feed base. 50 hectares of clover and 50 hectares of hay remained unmowed on the field. The herd died in great numbers due to lack of feed.

As a result of such predatory work, the collective farm lost 107 horses in a year. Of the remaining 117.64 were rendered totally unfit for draught work. In addition to horses 2 cows, 18 sows, and 103 other pigs have died.

(Bilshovyk Bohuslavshchyny, March 22-24, 1933).

2. STARVING PEOPLE UNABLE TO WORK NORMALLY ON THE FIELDS.

There are also other documents concerned with the state of starvation existing in the Ukrainian villages and the resultant mortality. There are some of them;

Thefts became commonplace during the famine; they began in the fall of 1932 and assumed a mass character during the winter and spring. The authorities made no attempt whatsoever to combat it.

In winter the thefts most frequently took place around collective piggeries and barns.

When the spring seeding campaign began, the members of the collective farms seized every opportunity to steal some seed grain. Sometimes the leaders of collective farms used seed grain loaned by the state for distribution as food for their members.

One document tells of hungry peasants toiling on the fields, spending more time in rest than work. It also relates how seeds of peas and oats were distributed as food for the workers.

Other documents tell of how the management of a collective farm slaughtered 70 head of sheep in order to save their members from mortal starvation. It also relates that, in one of the death ravaged villages, "no section of the village soviet is functioning; the village activists have disappeared."

In still another document an instance is related of the total lack of interest in the village in the work of the collective farm. Everyone waited for nightfall. There was a lack of manpower, seed drills being operated by underage children. When collective farmers stole grain from seed-drills it was again attributed to the "class enemy." Many thousand of hectares of land lay fallow, because there was no-one to till it and nothing to till it with. Cows and calves, never before harnessed, were mobilized for draught work. The hungry village had no interest in tilling the soil no matter how much the authorities tried to encourage and spur them to work.

In the summer of 1932 large tracts of untilled land yielded a bountiful crop of weeds. These weedy tracts became ideal breeding-places for rodents. The rodent population became so large in the spring of 1933 that all the beet plantations were in danger of total destruction. It became impossible to combat the infestation, due to lack of manpower.

THEFTS, A COMMONPLACE PHENOMENON.

Thefts in our village of Yaroslavetz in the Bobrovinsk district became a commonplace phenomenon. Thefts occurred both day and night. Stealing began with livestock and ended with chicken and geese.

The attitude of the village soviet to the epidemic of thefts was mysterious. The chairman of the village

soviet, Vavchenko, and the secretary, Buriak, were devoted to drunkenness rather than the welfare of the village.

The peasants were openly saying that the chairman and the secretary went on drinking sprees with bandits and thieves. The militia simply filed the thefts and released the thieves.

The peasants are afraid to complain because when the militia release the thieves, they are liable to wreak vengeance upon them.

(Visti, September 8, 1933).

PROTECTION OF SEED AND FEED FROM THE STARVING.

The Tsiuruopin districts has been fully provided with seed, grain, and feed but the matter of protecting them has not been settled.

When the seed grain was being cleaned at the collective farm "Pravda" one of its members, Kavun, was caught with 12 kilograms of grain. In the collective farm "Frunze" an old collective farm member, Dushnyk, stole 4 cwts. of barley and hid it in his sister's dwelling.

The Holoprystan district received fifty per cent of the required seed-grain from the state grain loan fund and should have trebled the guard.

The collective farm "Comintern" of the Koley village soviet together with the authorized representative of the District Executive Committee, Sidelkin, and the chairmen of the collective farms, Kuryakov and Pytanets, having received the seed grain allotment, have begun distributing the seed as food to members of the collective farms.

This results in the pilfering of seed-grain and actions by hostile elements.

(Visti, March 22, 1933).

V. S. DOBROVOLSKA

THEFTS OF HOG FEED.

At the collective farm "Red Starlet," in the village of Medvyn in Kiev region, the farm director, Zamriy

Huriy, the manager of the piggery, Biliawsky, and Shabednyk and Okhrimenko pilfered chops detailed for hog feed as well as chaff piled on the field.

All these thieves are close personal friends and act with impunity, but the chairman of the collective farm, Nechytaylo, does not realize it. This same Nechytaylo has applied to the director of number three school for the position of janitor.

It is imperative to have a thorough check of the work of thieves as well as that of the chairman of the collective farm; all their workdays of a doubtful nature should be deducted, and they should be prosecuted for pilfering collective farm property.

(From the newspaper *Bilshovyk Bohuslavshchyny*, organ of the Political Branch of the Medvyn Machine-Tractor Station, December 8—10, 1932).

THEFT OF SEED GRAIN BY THE STARVING.

Despite the clear directives of the central regional organizations regarding provisions for the strict guarding of seed-grain during the seeding campaign, many districts of the Dniepropetrovsk region failed to comply.

In the Blahodatniw district thefts of seed-grain by *kurkul* agents began on the very first day of seeding. In the artel "Shostipillia," in the Poloh district, Moskalenko's brigade systematically holds back 8—10 kilograms of seed per hectare. In the "Petrovsky" artel of the Novo-Vasylkiwsky district seed-grain is being stolen from the seed drill. In the "Stalin" artel the teamsters are systematically pilfering seed-grain.

In some collective farm in the Kamensky district the seed-grain is being pilfered by reducing the planting norm. In the artel "Towards Better Life" seed-grain is being pilfered during cleaning and formaline treating. Teamster Kuzenko steals chops for feeding horses (the hungry want even livestock-feed I. D.).

Seed-grain is being pilfered in the artels "Dzerzhynsky," "Co-operator" and "Second Bolshevik Spring."

Instances of pilfering are known to chairmen of

village soviets and artels in district organizations, but the pilferers of socialist property have not been prosecuted to date (all those officials of the local authorities thus did their best to save people from death by starvation I. D.).

(Visti, April 2, 1933).

STARVING PEOPLE UNABLE TO WORK.

The collective farm "Kosior" in the Mykolayiw district has 9,000 hectares suitable for cultivation. This area should have been seeded within 6—7 weeks, but they only seeded 3,5 thousand hectares.

People report for work at 6 o'clock in the morning; they show up on the field at 8 o'clock and work until 10 o'clock. From 10 to 11 they have their breakfast. They work again from 11 to 12.30 when they stop for lunch which lasts until 3.30. At 7.30 p.m. they start for the village, arriving there at 9 p.m. Instead of 16 hours of actual work, they put in only 7½ hours.

(Visti, April 23, 1933).

In the village of Rossotky, in the Lypovetsky district, oats are being seeded directly on the stubble. It is then being covered up with lumps of soil so large that not only the plant but the whole District Agricultural Branch would be unable to creep from under them. Often they seed not oats but some kind of screenings. Sowing is done by hand instead of seed-drill.

There is no control over losses from the seed-grain loan from the state. In the village of Skytka when a seed loan of this nature was received it was distributed as food allowances.

(Visti, May 15, 1933).

STARVING PEOPLE AND HORSES.

In the artel "Voroshilov" of the Henichew district, a class enemy who last fall conducted a stubborn resistance to grain collection, during the winter neglected the horses to such an extent that they were rendered useless for spring seeding work (no feed for

horses because the authorities grabbed everything I. D.) he is the culprit who dwells in the jungle of inactivity, wrecks discipline, wrecks the seeding-campaign and wrecks its quality... The collective farm has fifty horses but they are not working (unfit for work because they were underfed I. D.).

The actual workday on the fields, put in by members of the collective farm, consists of 0.3 to 0.4 of the 16 hour day that should normally be put in.

(Visti, May 2, 1933).

In the village of Novo-Kamianka in the Alexandriwsk district in the Odessa region, the grain-collection plan is not being fulfilled, many horses have died, much of last year's crop lies on the fields unharvested (the collective farmers saw that the state takes away all the grain and leaves them to starve, therefore they did not want to work for nothing I. D.).

42 horses have died within the last two and a half months, due to lack of care. 70 sheep have been slaughtered within the last month and a half, and all the mutton has been consumed; the shock-workers in the collectives received none. 35 head of sheep were recently sold in Odssa.

100 cwts. of cotton were left to rot on the fields. The cotton that was picked was used for fuel during last winter. No section of the village soviet is working. There are no activists in the village.

(Visti, May 15, 1933).

HUNGRY PEOPLE WORK ON THE FIELDS.

The brigades of the collective farm "Green Grove" do not know what to do next. People come out to the fields each morning without the slightest idea of what their task will be for the day. Tasks are being altered several times each day. The horses are not assigned to particular people but pass from hand to hand. Everyone on the field awaits nightfall (starving people are not interested in work I. D.). The collective farm is not interested in the quality nor the quantity of work done.

Seeding time showed that seed drills were not

overhauled. Seeding is being done haphazardly and consequently is not at all uniform. Instead of seeding 11 cwts. per hectare, they seed only 10 cwts.

In the artel "Lenin" of the Sakhnowsky district, only 75 per cent of the workers appear regularly for work. In the artel "Red Path," shock-workers start work at 5 a.m. while the idlers start at 9 a.m.

The class enemy endeavors to foment most of the trouble around the seed drills (hungry people had a chance to consume a few kernels of grain there I. D.). It is therefore advisable to have seed drills placed in charge of the most trustworthy collective farm members.

The artel "Red Sower" of Henichew has contravened certain agronomy regulations; 50 hectares of land had been seeded badly and the whole of that area had to be re-seeded. In the artel "Path of Illich," 12 and 13 year old children are manning the seed drills. In the artel "Spartak" of the Tsiurupyn district, only 25 per cent of the horses are working.

(Visti, April 4, 1933).

Thousands of hectares of untilled and unseeded land remain idle around the Lokhvitsya Machine-Tractor Station.

The draught resources of the Melitopol district are small — 90 tractors and 1,500 draught horses. These resources are being utilized but they are insufficient. They have mobilized 800 cows and bullocks. The horses are being fed with a mixture of steamed chaff and freshly-cut grass in order to prevent gastric troubles. The horses are improving generally.

(Visti, May 24, 1933).

THRESHED GRAIN IS DISTRIBUTED TO STARVING PEOPLE.

In the artel Holowcsyntsi in the Zhmerynka district, they reaped 11 hectares of wheat and 9 hectares of rye and distributed all of it to the collective farm members...

In the collective farm "The Star" in the Derezhniansky district, they distributed 60 per cent of the actual thresh yield. In the artel "Sower" they succeeded in

distributing all the grain that was threshed. In the artel "Memory of Lenin," more grain was distributed than was actually threshed; they threshed 207 cwts. and issued allowance orders to the amount of 518 cwts. (Visti, September 1, 1933).

NO ONE TO TEND THE BEET FIELDS.

In many districts the weeding and thinning of beets has come to a halt. In the Khristiniw district only 36.1 per cent of the beet field has been thinned. In Bralawsk, 54.8 per cent and in Makhnivsk, 58 per cent.

In the collective farm "Chubar" in Ivanovo, on the Novo-Ukrainsky district, of 200 hectares under beets, 90 were lost because the collective farm management neglected to organize cultivation. The remainder of the beet plantation is smothering under weeds, indicating small hope for any yield. No one works on the beet fields...

(Visti, September 9, 1933).

The established yield plan of 100 cwts. of beets from a hectare of land proved unrealistic. The reality proved that the maximum obtainable yield per hectare averages 20—25 cwts.

(Visti, October 14, 1932).

According to a directive of the Ukrainian Government, the beets should have been completely harvested and delivered to the sugar refineries; however, only 55 per cent of the plan was fulfilled as of today...

(Visti, October 24, 1933).

NO-ONE TO WEED THE BEET FIELDS.

In the artel "Kosior," women who hoe the gardens have displayed little quality in their work. They hoe five hectares of beets without touching the weeds. They are not fulfilling their norms; they are always late for work.

(Visti, May 24, 1933).

Large tracts of sugar beets in the Smila district have died and have to be replanted. The beet fields have been beaten down by rains and the plants have been attacked by parasites. No effort has been made to correct this.

The beetfields of Kamyanets Podilsky are heavily infested with beet parasites which threaten to destroy the entire crop.

(Visti, June 1, 1933).

The parasite has invaded the beet fields and is destroying the crop. All the able-bodied must be mobilized (very few were able-bodied at that time I. D.) to struggle against the beet parasite in order to save the seeded area.

One third of the plantations of sugar beet in the Wynnitzia region are infested with parasites. Thousands of hectares have been destroyed. A determined struggle against the parasites is not being organized in the majority of districts. They refuse to pick them by hand.

Around the Makiwka Machine-Tractor Station 34 kilograms of parasited have been picked off by hand from four thousand hectares. In the neighbouring area 143 kilograms of parasites have been gathered by hand from 4 thousand hectares.

In the Nemyriw district the struggle against the parasite has been impeded by a lack troughs for molasses. Instead of the required 8,600, only 500 were prepared.

(Visti, June 3, 1933).

3. GRAIN-RICH POLTAVA REGION PERISHING BECAUSE OF STARVATION.

Documents are being presented by living witnesses about the mass mortality due to starvation in the Poltava region alone.

People crazed by starvation frequently slaughtered their children or whenever they obtained some bread caused their own deaths by consuming it ravenously. Nobody bothered to bury the dead; they were left to be preyed upon by ravens. The bodies of those who died in their dwellings were devoured by rats. The members of the collective farms were fed with a mixture of buckwheat chaff. It is interesting to note that most of those who died were men and young boys.

Here are classic examples of collective farm slavery. A hungry woman with a hoe in her hand fell dead in front of the collective farm office. A woman dug out some refuse from a

soap factory and brought it home to eat. She and her family died immediately after eating it. An erstwhile merchant, finding himself in dire straits, took his last precious, personal possessions to the market, but died before having an opportunity to barter them for food. It is also interesting to note that cases of suicide were rare, despite the fact that many of those starving were half-crazed; they lacked the willpower to commit suicide. But there were people who had the courage to commit suicide. An erstwhile Red partizan hanged himself in front of the District Executive Committee office. Another man went to the cemetery and died on his father's grave. Diametrical opposites to these were cases of crazed human beings who starved their children in order to save their own lives.

There is a case of a man being hunted by the authorities who travelled back to his native village, bringing few scraps of food for his family. The facts of famine were concealed from Red Army servicemen. A document illustrates a case in which a Red Army serviceman returns home only to find all his family dead of starvation.

IVAN KLYMKO

HANGED HIS CHILDREN.

Vasyl Luchko, who lived in a hamlet called Lukashenky, in the Reshetyliw district of the Poltava region, was a member of a collective farm in 1933 and had a family of three children, two boys and a girl. His wife was a village activist. The famine set in. His wife journeyed to Myrhorod or Poltava to buy food. While she was away, Vasyl, maddened with hunger, hanged his two boys.

My niece notified me that Vasyl's boy, Mykola, had died. I went to his dwelling and saw the older boy hanging from a rope in the kitchen. When I saw Vasyl, I asked him: "Vasyl, what are you doing?" He nonchalantly replied: "I hanged the boy." "Where is the other one?" I asked. "In the granary; I hanged him yesterday." "Why did you do this?" I asked. "There was nothing to eat. When my wife brings some food, she gives it to the children and I get nothing. Now when she brings the food, they, will not be here and I will get everything. But don't mention this to anybody. Anybody. Do you hear?"

The neighbours and I then dug a hole in the orchard and buried the remains of the children. We did not tell his wife

what had happened and she remained under the impression that they had died of starvation.

A couple of weeks passed and his wife went away again to procure some food. Vasyl and his daughter stayed at home. One day, Hrytsko Luchko and I were passing by Vasyl's house and decided to visit him to find out how he was because we had not seen him for some time. The door was locked. We looked through the windows but could see no one. We broke the window-panes and entered the house. We found the corpses of Vasyl and his daughter lying on the hearth. The stench indicated that they had been dead for some days.

Vasyl's wife was now the sole survivor of this once happy famine. She stripped the metal roof off her dwelling and bartered it for some bread. After consuming it heartily, she died. Thus ended the family of the collective farmer, Vasyl Luchko.

(From a pamphlet by D. Solovey "Parths to Golgota" [in Ukrainian].)

H. F.

FAMINE IN THE VILLAGE OF FEDIYIWKA.

The village of Fediyiwka, in the Reshetyliw district of the Poltava region; was composed of 100 dwellings, with a population of 550 at the beginning of 1932.

The crops in 1932 were good. The management of the collective farm issued 200 grams of grain on account of work-days, which was sufficient during harvest time. Later on no grain was issued because everything went into grain collections. The individual farmers were also stripped of all grain.

The famine began. People, including the collective farmers, began to die before Advent (November 27th). The first family to die was the Rafalyks — father, mother and a child. Later on the Fediy family of five also perished of starvation. Then followed the families of Prokhar Lytvyn (4 persons), Fedir Hontowy (3 persons), Samson Fediy (3 persons). The second child of the latter family was beaten to death on somebody's onion patch. Mykola and Larion Fediy died, followed by Andrew Fediy and his wife; Stefan Fediy; Anton Fediy, his wife and four children (his two other little girls survived); Borys Fediy, his wife and three children; Olanviy Fediy and his wife; Taras Fediy and his wife; Theodore Fesenko; Constantine Fesenko; Melania Fediy; Lawrenty Fediy; Peter Fediy; Eulysis

Fedy and his brother Fred; Isidore Fedy; his wife and two children; Ivan Hontowy, his wife and two children; Vasyl Perch, his wife and child; Makar Fedy; Prokip Fesenko; Abraham Fedy; Ivan Skaska, his wife and eight children.

Some of these people were buried in a cemetery plot; others were left lying wherever they died. For instance, Elizabeth Lukashenko died on the meadow; her remains were eaten by ravens. Others were simply dumped into any handy excavation. The remains of Lavrenty Fedy lay on the hearth of his dwelling until devoured by rats.

I was frequently "mobilized" to dig graves at the cemetery and I saw two or three corpses being dumped into the same grave.

The members of the collective farm received small rations of buckwheat chaff for food. Individual farmers received a ration of wheat-chaff.

P. RESHETYLIVSKY

"TO HELL WITH YOU. YOU CAN ALL DIE."

The most devastating effects of the famine occurred in the months of March, April, May and June of 1933. These four months spared no-one; people died in dwellings, yards, alleys and city streets.

The hamlet of Hariachy in the Reshetyliw district of the Poltava region was composed of twenty dwellings. 27 people in this hamlet died of starvation. Five families survived but they left their houses and departed to places unknown. The vacant structures were demolished by the village soviet for use as fuel.

Vasyl Lisowy and his infant children were found dead in one bed. Some weeks previously he had scoured the collective farm fields for frozen beets. However, this was insufficient to save him and his children from death by starvation.

One day in May I travelled for two kilometres through the hamlets of Reshetyliw district, on the way to Doctor Podolsky. I counted eleven corpses of all ages and sexes lying by the wayside. I also saw the remains of Kolisnyk's children. Kolisnyk was at one time a well-to-do farmer, but he and his wife had died of starvation a week before.

A few days earlier the Kolisniks girl had gone to the chairman of the village soviet, Mykola Zinenko, to beg for food because her parents had died, but the chairman told the child: "To hell with you, you can all die."

TETYANA BUDKO

HOW THE DVIRKO FAMILY WAS DESTROYED BY FAMINE.

In the village of Lisniaky, in the Yahotyn district of the Poltava region, there lived a family named Dvirko, the parents and four children, two grown up and two adolescents.

This family was de-kurkulized and evicted from their house which was demolished.

During the famine of 1932-33, this whole family, with the exception of the mother, died of starvation.

One day the chairman of the collective farm, Samokysh, came to this old woman and "mobilized" her for work on the collective farm fields. The frail old woman took her hoe and, gathering the last reserves of her failing energy, went to the collective farm centre, but did not quite get there. Her energy failed, and she dropped dead at the very door of the collective farm centre.

I was attending school then and saw the macabre scenes of the famine. This old woman who died with a hoe in her hands was symbolic of contemporary Ukraine. I will never forget the scene...

STARVING MAN ATE MEAT AND DIED.

In the village of Lozovnia, in the Yahotyn district of the Poltava region, there lived a childless couple, Vasyl and Aleksandra Mostovy. The couple were well-respected, diligent workers. When grain collections swept the village clean of food, Vasyl and Aleksandra starved. They were very swollen, but somehow they survived until late in the spring when they could eat green vegetation, and especially green rye from the patch in their garden.

But misfortune befell Vasyl. His neighbor, Mostovy, died of starvation. Mostovy's widow asked Vasyl to dig a grave. The widow had slaughtered a cow in order to feed her starving

children. She prepared a generous meal for the starving Vasyi. He died on the spot as a result of his meal.

His wife then left for Melitopol in order to save her life. Their property was immediately transferred to the collective farm.

In Yahotyn there lived the family of Platon and Maria Vyshnevetsky. They had three children. Platon had once worked in the Manilov flour mill. His wife and I were bosom friends.

In 1932 Platon died of starvation. His wife, being in desperate straits, went to the soap factory dump to search for any kind of dead animal refuse to bring home and boil for food in an endeavour to save herself and her children from death. But no matter how much one boiled the refuse, it still remained poisonous. The result was that all the children died.

Maria, once a good looking, prim lady, was left alone, swollen with hunger. Wrapped in a sackcloth, she was now an eerie sight. Her dwelling was absolutely bare because she had bartered all her household effects for food. Finally she too passed away...

NATALKA LIUTAREVICH

FORMER MERCHANT DEAD IN THE MARKET.

It was the spring of 1933. The market-place in Chornoukh, in the Poltava region, was alive with the vendors of remnants of food and other articles, each vendor clutching tightly to his wares for fear that some hungry creature might grab them.

Sitting on a rock at the market place was an old resident of Chornoukh, Andriy Bannikov, formerly a prosperous merchant, who was compelled to become a farmer and eventually a member of the collective farm. He was then starving like everybody else. He brought to the market the remnants of his personal family possessions, and his wife's clothing, hoping to barter them for food. His skin was cracked, with pus flowing from the cracks. He was barefoot, and his feet were covered with blood. He was unable to barter his wares because the starving buyers were not interested in finery.

There he sat until evening, without making a single deal. Then he simply slumped down off the rock and died. Next day the burial brigade picked up his remains and dumped them into an excavation prepared for the dead.

STARVING MAN COMMITS SUICIDE.

Roman Pidlisny, his wife Priska, his son Tykhon and daughter Agatha, lived at the Hrushkivsky corner of Chornoukh. Their property consisted of a dwelling, a shed and about 10 acres of land. They had no live stock; the neighbours tilled their land on a share-crop basis, and they worked as hired hands for various peasants.

In 1930 they were pressed into joining the collective farm, but they categorically refused to be coerced. Their son, Tykhon, journeyed to Lubni where he obtained employment. Their daughter obtained a job as maid.

During the famine of 1932-33, Priska died and Roman was evicted from his dwelling by the local authorities under the pretext that he was inciting people against collective farming and spreading religious propaganda.

Roman Pidlisny then took to working for the dews of the town; he cut their firewood and carried their water, but this in no way provided a sufficient livelihood. The food at the market was very high, and his earnings were a fraction of a cent for a pail of water which he had to bring a distance of two kilometres. He had to sleep outside. He must have felt his days were numbered, because one day he decided to go to the St. Nicholas cemetery where his father was buried, and die there. Swollen and emaciated, he proceeded with much difficulty, frequently falling down, but he kept on.

A collective farm activist (his erstwhile neighbour, Maria Chornobay) met him while he was thus trying to reach his father's grave. She offered to assist him to his feet but he protested by saying: "Depart from me, you devil's creature, collective farm, you servant of Satan. Let me die in peace." The insulted woman departed, and Roman kept inching closer to his destination. Finally he reached his father's grave. There he remained for a couple of days until he died...

PAVLO ZOLOTAREVICH

RED PARTISAN HANGS HIMSELF.

Stepan Hryhorovich Prokydko of Chornoukh was once a Red partisan. He belonged to the category of people who were helping to establish a soviet system in Ukraine and he had

struggled on its behalf. After demobilization from the Red Army, he served in the militia for a long time, was a member of the Committee of Indigent Peasants, and generally a soviet activist.

In 1930 he joined the collective farm, where both he and his wife were very active. They had five children. The famine of 1933 however, brought untold hardships. After exhausting all his food resources, including the cats and dogs, they were compelled to steal vegetables from neighbouring gardens. One day his neighbour, Pavlo Tur, caught Pokydko's six-year-old daughter in his garden and clubbed her to death.

Appreciating the hopelessness of his situation, and sensing the imminence of death from starvation, Stepan gathered his four swollen children and went to the chairman of the District Executive Committee, Polonsky, to ask for relief. Polonsky could not promise him anything tangible. Insulted and unnerved by such an attitude towards himself, the former Red partisan, Pokydko left his children with Polonsky, telling him that he would rather see him eat them alive than watch them suffer a slow tortuous death from starvation. He admonished the children, under pain of death, not to come back home. Polonsky had the children placed in a "children's home" where two of them later died of starvation.

A few days later Stepan Pokydko was found hanging from an elm tree directly facing Polonsky's office window. Pokydko's widow caught a number of frogs, and after cooking them, devoured them all. This resulted in her death.

Of seven members of Pokydko's family, only two children survived...

NATALKA ZOLOTAREVICH

MAD PARENTS STARVE THEIR CHILDREN.

The family of Omelko Fedorchenko were my neighbours in Chornouch. They had two children, Mykola — 6-years-old and Olha — 2-years-old. Mykola was my godson.

In the spring of 1933 I saw the desperate plight of the children and decided to give them four glasses of goat's milk every day. I gave this milk to Omelko's wife, Mina, but I soon found out that the children were not getting it. I asked Mina what was the matter. She replied that her husband forbade her to feed the children saying: "All the other children have died,

why should we feed our own? "Let us save our own lives."

I told her that they would not get any more milk unless the children drank it in my presence. She agreed.

Omelko was angry and in order to avenge this he reported to the District Executive Committee that I was supposed to have a cache of grain secreted in the ground of my garden. The "booster brigade" came and literally turned my garden upside down but found no grain.

Omelko Fedorchenko died of starvation. Just before he died he cursed the chairman of the District Executive Committee, Polonsky, for swindling him by reneging on his promise to give him a pood of flour for every grain cache that Omelko revealed...

Omelko's children survived...

HNAT SOKOLOVSKY

I WAS A HUNTED MAN

After escaping from an exile convoy in 1931 I kept wandering from place to place for almost three years. I used false documents in order to avoid persecution. Finally, I established myself in one of the mines of the Don basis as powder-man's helper, but I could not stop worrying about the fate of my family.

One day, I met Semen Myrhorodsky who hailed from my village but was then a guard at the railway station of Filnonia. Semen had connections with our home village because his wife still lived there and used to come to see him. She told me about my family.

It was the famine year of 1933. I decided to undertake a secret journey to my village in order to see what I could do to save my family from mortal starvation. I had already seen hundreds of starving peasants arriving at the mining settlement to look for work and food. They died in droves, and the special burial brigade gathered the corpses and carted them away for disposal.

I secured as much food as I could carry with me, mainly sugar and dried bread, and went away. I arrived at the village at night and did not recognize it. The roads that once were alive with people, were covered with weeds. I found the place where my family lived. It looked more like a pig-sty than a dwelling. In it I found my mother and my two sisters, all half-dead and terribly swollen. They did not recognize me. Finally

mother somehow recognized my voice. She told me of their horrible plight.

I had to get away the same night and so I could not listen to everything they had to tell me. I began feeding them very carefully by giving them some tea with sugar, a small piece of bread and a small herring. Mother showed me a concoction of weeds which they cooked for food and which smelt like some acid. My sisters assured me that they were not afraid of hunger now because they had been lucky enough to clip some grain-heads at the collective farm. They were aware of the fact that the penalty for clipping grain-heads was exile to the Siberian concentration camps, but hunger knows no bounds.

I learned about the tragic fate of my brother who had died of starvation some time before. His remains, along with the remains of five others, were dumped into an old root-cellar and covered up. Mother pleaded with me to stay a little longer, so I decided to remain another day. Early in the morning I hid myself in a root-cellar in order not to be seen around in the daytime. I asked to have my wife brought to my hiding place. She came. I could not recognize her; she looked more like a corpse than a human being. She told me that our four year old son had died of starvation, and of other things that had happened while I was away.



A dying child

Victor and Serhiy Harmash, Petro Sanzhara who were once Red partisans and later soviet activists, also died of starvation. Former model farmers like Maksym, Timothy, Ivan, Lavro, and Mykola Sadovy, Pavlenko, Bazhan and others, had all perished with their families.

My wife also told me that all the dead were brought to the cemetery and piled up there because there was no one to dig the graves. There were cases of cannibalism. When the sister of one of the dead peasants went to the cemetery to see if her brother had been buried she noticed that someone had sliced some of the flesh from his body.

The following night I left my native village. My wife and my sister escorted me for five kilometres until we reached the Samara river. We noticed a wagon approaching from the opposite direction. I took cover. The wagon was driven by the chairman of the village soviet, Sapryk. He stopped to ask the women where they were going. They told him some story and he went away. I bade them goodbye and made my escape.

After some time my wife joined me at the mining camp. My sister died of starvation.

I remained at this camp until 1935, when I was betrayed by someone from my village. I was then arrested again.

NATALKA LYUTAREVICH

SON SERVES IN RED ARMY WHILE PARENTS PERISH OF STARVATION.

Arkady Kolota lived in the village of Chornoukhy with his family his wife Maria, their three sons — Mykhaylo, Mykola, and Ivan, and their two daughters — Lida and Zina. Arkady was a poor man who supported his family by working as a carpenter. His sole possession was his humble cottage. He was coerced into joining the collective farm.

In the spring of 1933 his youngest son, Ivan was in the Red Army, and his two daughters were working somewhere for board and lodging. The rest of the family was starving. The first to die was Arkady. His son Mykola followed him, then Michael, and finally his wife, Maria.

The remains of Maria were in the cottage for several days, decomposed and covered with maggots. The body was discovered by the two young daughters who had come to see their mother.

In the fall of 1933, young Ivan returned to the village and found most of his family dead. He came home in his uniform. After couple of weeks he was ordered surrendered his uniform. He did so, but had nothing with which to cover his naked body. He finally managed to obtain a few rags.

Later, during the second world war, he was in uniform again, but one can imagine how loyally he served old father Stalin.

O. OSADCHENKO

"PERISH — THAT IS YOUR WAY OUT."

I come from the village of Barashi, of the same district in the Zhytomyr region. Since my uncle was a district official during the czarist regime, we were not permitted to join the collective farm and had to live "as God wills." Enormous taxes were levied upon us which we were quite unable to meet.

In the fall of 1932 I was unable to pay my taxes, therefore the village activists, augmented by officials of the district authorities, seized all my belongings, even stripping my wife of the clothes she wore.

In the spring of 1933, my daughters, Vira and Maria, died of starvation, followed by my father and my wife entire family. The death rate in our own village was enormous.

One day in spring I went to the fields to look for some food. I was very swollen. As I proceeded slowly, I noticed the ravens flying around and alighting at a certain spot. I came closer and saw a woman lying down. She was still alive and begged me to help her to get up. But neither she nor I possessed sufficient strength. The woman slumped down again and I went away.

I met the chairman of the village soviet, Suprunenko, and the secretary, Puman, on the way and told them about the dying woman; whereupon Suprunenko retorted: "You too will soon perish. Perish, you *kurkuls*, that is the way out for you if you do not want to make a living by decent work."

I. STOYAN

VILLAGE OF HOROSHKY DYING OUT.

The village of Horoshky, in the Polonsky district of the Vynnytsya region was quite large, made up of areas that bore specific manes. The village had three Churches — Marian,

Bortny, and Spas. I will tell about the area in which I lived and knew well; it was the Lower Staromisto.

The area of Lower Staromisto was composed of 36 houses only some of which belonged to farmers. The remainder belonged to tradesmen or local officials. Some of these householders had a patch of land adjoining their gardens; some even had a cow.

All those who were not employed by the collective farm had to pay taxes based on a percentage of their earnings.

The famine years of 1932-1933 brought untold hardships upon the residents of this area. The drastic effects of the famine were already felt in the fall of 1932, but by spring the situation had assumed catastrophic proportions; everyone was swollen and dying of starvation. The starving people ate everything whether it was nutritious or not.

In the area of Lower Staromisto many people died. I cannot remember all the names, but I do remember Mykola Halat, Vasyl Hapotiuk, Anton Kit, Ivan Marchuk, Josephina Salatska, Anton Boronsky, Isidore Horbach, Yakiw and Stephen Halatiuk, Natalia Honcharenko. Their children also died.

The bodies of the dead lay around inside and outside the houses for several days because there was no one to bury them. Those who were still alive were not admitted to the local hospital because it was filled with people suffering from other diseases....

L. M.

DEATH OF MOTHER — NOT SUFFICIENT REASON FOR DAY OFF AT COLLECTIVE FARM.

In the village of Huray, in the Kopayhorod district, there lived a widow who had a son. Both were employed by the collective farm. In the spring of 1933, the widow became ill and stayed at home. The collective farm supplied only one meal a day.

One day the son returned from work and found his mother dead. He wanted to take the following day off in order to bury the remains of his mother, but he was told that if he missed a day, he would be severely penalized. The death of a mother was not sufficient reason to take a day off from work at the collective farm.

He begged the village soviet to arrange for the burial of his mother's remains but when he got home that night the

remains were still there and the cottage was filled with the stench of the decaying corpse.

Next morning he placed the remains in a bedsheet and put it outside, near the gate. He cried as he went to work again. When he returned that night he found the bedsheet but the remains had been removed.

The inhabitants of the village were dying in great numbers, so much so that the management of the collective farm was compelled to assign two men to dig graves, and two teamsters with a wagon to cart away the corpses.

The teamsters rode through the village and shouted: "How are you today? Are all well or have you any dead?" When no one in the cottage answered, they would stop to investigate. When they saw a corpse they would pick it up and throw it on the wagon. A load of corpses would then be taken to the cemetery and dumped into one large grave, just as they were.

About a month before the harvest another wagon had to be added for the job of carting corpses. No one was interested as to where and how the remains were buried...

PETRO KULISH

NO TRAVEL PERMIT — REMAIN HERE TO DIE.

Tymofiy Mykolenko was a peasant who lived in the village of Zhabotyn in the district of Kirovohrad. He had been a member of the collective farm since 1931. When the spring of 1933 arrived he was starving and very swollen. There was no food at home nor in the collective farm. But he did not want to die.

He made his way to the village soviet to beg for a permit to travel to some mining camp, either in the Donbas or Kryvy Rih in order to find a job. The village soviet refused to give him the required travel permit, but told him to go and work at the collective farm. Tymofiy had no more energy to return to his cottage, although it was only half a kilometre away. He went behind the building of the village soviet, into a thick growth of weeds in order to rest a while. The next day the burial brigade picked up Tymofiy's remains and carted them away to the cemetery.

This happened on May 15, 1933. Tymofiy was my neighbour.

MORTAL FAMINE IN THE VILLAGE OF KORULKY.

In the village of Druha Korulka in the Kharkiw region, the grain-collection campaign stripped the peasants of every bit of grain. Gleaning in the fields was forbidden under pain of exile to Siberia. Those who were still healthy could go away to the Donbas to the coal mines, where they could work and buy some food for themselves, part of which they could send back to the village. Those who were not healthy, the very old, and the young children, were left to face certain death.

During the fall and winter of 1932-33 the peasants exhausted the last resources of food including domestic fowl, livestock, cats and dogs. 36 persons died during the winter months.

When spring arrived there was absolutely no food in the village. The peasants took to utilising all kinds of green vegetation. They boiled or dried it, crushed it into powder and baked it. Dysentery followed a diet such as this, but it was still bearable.

The most terrible effects were caused by willow bark. The peasants stripped the bark of the willow trees, dried it out and crushed it into flour from which they baked "buns." These buns were completely indigestible and had no nutritional value. Many people died after consuming them. Dried corn cobs were also worthless nutritionally. 82 more people died as a result of this "food."

No more than 40 of the 64 houses were left inhabited. 118 persons died of starvation. To this must be added the number of those who had previously been liquidated as *kurkuls* and exiled to Siberia at least one third of the village. 1934 found the village with only one third of its former inhabitants left. The village was later populated by Russians brought especially from Muscovy.

S. KOROBENYK

STARVING PEOPLE SLAUGHTER THE STARVING.

In the spring of 1933 the starving Denis Ishchuk of the village of Bilka in the Trostianets district of the Kharkiw region went to visit his sister, who was married and had a two-year old child. He entered the house, killed the entire family and took away 20 pounds of flour.

Later on this same day Denis Ischuk murdered Petro Korobeynyk who was returning from Kharkiw with five loaves of bread for his starving family. Denis Ishchuk was finally arrested by the militia and confessed.

The village of Bilka had approximately 600 inhabitants before collectivization. 200 of this number died of starvation. For instance, Stepan Korobeynyk had a wife and five children. While I was visiting the village I went to the house of Stepan Korobeynyk. Everyone there was swollen and miserable-looking. The oldest girl, Halya, 16 years of age, was crying and begging her parents: "Give me something to eat, I am very hungry, I want something to eat." The younger boy, Mischa, would join her: "I want to eat more than you do." The father, with tears, streaming down his cheeks, answered them: "I cannot help you my dear children, I have not a thing." Then turning to me he said: "Please help my children and save them from death."

It was too late to help however, because the village was 120 kilometres away from Kharkiw. The entire family was dead within a week. Stepan's brother, Omelko, had a wife and two boys, Hrytsko and Ivan. They all died of starvation. The family of Omelko Susidka, consisting of five persons, also perished of starvation.

Many people died because they were not permitted to leave the villages in order to find some food elsewhere. Railway travel was forbidden, except by appointment.

NORTHERN CAUCASUS, KUBAN AND DON REGION DYING OF STARVATION.

The Kuban, which is populated mainly by Ukrainians, was subjected to an artificial famine during 1932-33, as was the Don Region, one of the foremost grain-producing areas of the former Russian Empire, but an area known for stubborn resistance to the soviet system.

From accounts of living witnesses, there are instances that show how, after the well known insurrection of 1932-33 in Kuban, most of the population of that area was exiled to distant concentration camps, leaving the area to the poor peasants who were dying of starvation. The expansive steppes, cossack stations and vacant cottages were covered with a bountiful crop of weeds. The surviving people lived like wild beasts, in woods,

in vacant cottages, fearful of each other and occasionally devouring each other.

There are also accounts of the decay of the Don region. People from the wheatfields of Salsk left their work and their villages to seek salvation elsewhere; they travelled by train and on foot. One could see endless crowds of swollen, emaciated children who had lost their parents and were now wandering around aimlessly.

The streets of Millerovo were strewn with the corpses of those who had died of starvation. This happened while Moscow was cynically broadcasting its battle hymn. "I do not know any other country where men can breathe freely..."

The wheatfields of Ukraine, the Don region and Kuban which once grew enough wheat and other grain to feed the whole of Europe, were now laid waste. The once prosperous farmers who had tilled these steppes and reaped an abundant harvest of golden wheat, now became the world's most indigent beggars.

P. PETRENKO

THEY RUINED AND STARVED KUBAN

The secretary of the state Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Shelboldayev, and the chairman of the state executive committee, Pyvovarov, together with the representative of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Lazar Kaganovich, who visited the territory in 1932, have utterly ruined all the Kuban. The economy of the Kuban Cossacks was plundered and ruined; most of the people, young and old, were exiled to Siberia. Only the old and the ailing remained. There was no one to till land and nothing to till it with. In 1933 all the cossack fields and stations were covered with weeds and those inhabitants left to forage for themselves were starving.

Krasnodar, the capital city of the Kuban region, was strewn with corpses which no-one bothered to pick up. My good friend, Ivan Redkiwski, who was formerly liquidated as a *k u r k u l*, his wife and four children, died of starvation.

The once prosperous farmer of the station — Hlynska — Serhiy Bukalov and his family of six, died of starvation. His older son, Havrylo, was arrested and exiled into some concentration camp.

At Uman Station I saw hungry, swollen people who, like

wolves, wandered around looking for something to eat. Many people starved to death at this once prosperous station. The family of Ivankiwsky, a Cossack who had been arrested and exile some time before, consisted of the mother and three children. Two of them died. The half-crazed mother ate the third and later died herself.

Countless incidents can be cited of the desperate plight of the Kuban Cossacks, the once proud and prosperous descendants of the famous Zaporozhian Cossacks of the Ukraine.

S. K.

THE END OF THE PRYOKOPNA STATION IN KUBAN

The station of Pryokopna is situated 15 kilometres from Armavir, near the river Kuban. It was a large village, nearly town, consisting of about 10,000 inhabitants. The central section had many two-storey structures, a tuberculosis sanatorium and a large school. However, by 1933 it was an absolutely deserted village, with few inhabitants, because the entire village was exiled to the northern concentration camps as a result of their participation in the Kuban insurrection during that year.

In June of 1933 the authorities started to organize a Machine-Tractor Station in the very centre of the village. Strange people were brought to the area to administer the station. I, too, was appointed to go there as a bookkeeper for the enterprise. I arrived there alone, hoping to bring my family later. The assistant manager of the Machine-Tractor Station advised me to pick any one of the vacant houses for my residence. One day I went around to pick a cottage and this is what I saw:

All the streets and alleys were overgrown with weeds. The houses were all boarded up. Inside all kinds of furniture and effects, such as dishes and other utensils were to be seen. There was no food or clothing. Beside the houses were fruit trees bearing almost ripe fruit. In some of the cottages there was broken furniture and the pots contained half-cooked fruit. Evidently some one must have lived there.

While crossing a little orchard on the way to another street, I noticed a decayed corpse which smelled terribly. Going a little further I encountered a living person — a ragged, wasted woman. The creature and I were both startled. After a while

she asked me: "Why do you wander around here? You can be grabbed, slaughtered, and eaten. You are a fresh human being."

"What are you doing here?" I asked her. "I merely exist until I am eaten."

Apparently at the time of the mass evacuation of the settlement, some of the exiles escaped and took cover in the forest, living in vacant cottages, devouring each other like beasts, with only the fittest and most cunning surviving.

I went back to the office of the Machine-Tractor Station and during the next few days I made efforts to obtain a leave of absence in order to bring my family to this God-forsaken place. As soon as I obtained my leave, I departed hastily with no intention of coming back.

S. K.

FAMINE IN THE SALSK STEPPES.

The Salsk Steppes, situated in the southern part of the Don region, are renowned for their fertile wheat fields. The harvest of 1932 was excellent.

However, in 1932 the state took away all the grain from the collective farms. The Polyviansk Machine-Tractor Station where I was employed as a bookkeeper, serviced 18 collective farms. The collective farms had hogs, sheep, some milch cows and very few horses.

During the harvest of 1932 the state took away all the grain from the collective farms. People were put on limited rations of screenings. The employes of the Machine-Tractor Station received as rations 400 grams of bread a day and 200 grams a day dependents, 1½ kilograms of cereal and a quart of oil a month. There was no meat whatsoever. The community kitchen of the collective farm provided it's members with soup made of some kind of cereal, boiled beets radishes and potatoes. People extracted some raw syrup from the sugar cane grown in their gardens. One could occasionally buy a piece of bread in the fall.

By the spring of 1933 all food products were exhausted and famine came to the famous wheat-producing steppes. Bread could not be obtained at any price. People swelle with hunger and died. Hardly anybody thought of working at the collective farm, because the predominant worry was to save one's life. People left their villages, stations and hamlets and journeyed to

the Salsk regional centre seeking some relief. Others took trains to various destinations in the hope of finding something to eat. There were droves of swollen, emaciated children who had lost their parents, but no one paid any attention to them.

By summer most of the villages of the Polyviansk Machine-Tractor Station had lost half their inhabitants as a result of the famine.

P. M.

"WIDE IS MY DOMAIN."

Millerovo station in the Northern Caucasus was always rich in grain, meat, fowl, and dairy products, and produced an abundance of other food at reasonable prices. But the famine of 1932-1933 also touched this station.

In the winter and spring of 1933 one could not walk along the streets without stepping over dozens of corpses or dying people. The dead were being picked up daily by special carts detailed for the purpose and taken to a specially-prepared excavation in the yard of the local jail.

The jail itself was filled to overflowing with hungry, dying people. This jail became very much alive after the visit to Millerovo of Lazar Kaganovich, together with the chairman of the State Executive Committee, Larin, the Party secretary, Shaboldayev, and the District Party secretary, Alfer. Kaganovich apparently instructed the state leaders on how to combat "counter-revolution" and other forms of unrest in the Northern Caucasus.

When there was no more room in the jail a vacant barrack was requisitioned for the purpose. There were thousands of people in these two institutions but hardly any came out alive. Corpses were taken away from there every day and dumped into an excavation. The hole was covered up when it contained 200 corpses.

The police, Party and government officials had a special food store where they had plenty of food but the inhabitants could not get any.

From the public square of this settlement the loudspeaker blared a radio program from Moscow "Wide is my domain... I do not know of any other where men could breathe so freely." This was the lowest form of cynicism ever conceived...

LEFT CHILDREN AT SHELTER AND LOST THEM

In the village of Nova Volodymyriwka in the Sakhnovshchansk district of the Kharkiw region, there lived a peasant, Luka Khalyava, with his family, during the collectivization in 1930. He and his oldest son were exiled to Siberia. His wife, Maria, was left with four small children, the oldest of whom was ten.

When famine came Maria realized that she would not be able to save her children and so she placed two of them in a public shelter.

Years passed. Luka returned from exile. He tried hard to find his children who had been left in the shelter, but no avail.

IVAN PANASYUK

FAT COMMANDERS AND HUNGRY CHILDREN.

The village of Yarevsky in the Poltava region is noted for its charming countryside. In June of 1933 a regiment of the Red Army was quartered in the vicinity, where it was going through routine tactical maneuvers. The Army camp, composed of hundreds of white tents, was out of bounds to the starving local population, even to the small children who might have found a small scrap of food or been given some by the Ukrainians there. The Ukrainians would gladly have shared the last ounce of bread with them because it would have been as if they were helping their own starving people.

The commanders of the regiment and especially their wives, droves of them, had access to the village. They arranged a kitchen inside the local church where they prepared and ate their meals.

It happened that a cinema company, by which I was employed, was shooting some scenes in that locale. Our director, Frankel, obtained number of meal tickets for this particular army brass kitchen by some mysterious means. I was one of the lucky ones in the company to get a meal ticket for two whole days.

I was able to obtain a first class meal for a nominal sum. I should have felt happy but this was not so, because after eating a hearty meal I came out and saw about twenty starving, emaciated children with swollen limbs, eagerly and vainly

waiting for some scrap of food. Their eyes were listless, their limbs had no dexterity. They symbolized the fate of Ukrainian children at that period. They stretched their swollen hands whenever a wife of some officer was passing by, but the women paid no attention to the urchins.

Since the holders of the meal tickets were entitled to purchase a limited amount of pastry from the kitchen, I utilized the opportunity to pass these on to the starving urchins. They took them without any visible sign of expression; they just took the pastry and quietly consumed it, by a reflex motion without any feeling.

The corpses of two boys and girls lay in the weeds a few steps away. They could not have been more than seven years old. The dead had no desire for soviet pastry. Their tiny faces were covered with large green flies. I can still see the picture in my mind's eye of the dead Ukrainian children, their faces covered with green flies, although twenty years have gone by since.

M. OSADCHY

"STALIN" CHILD SHELTER DYING OF STARVATION.

With the approach of the summer vacation in 1933 the children of the mining camp "Chuvyrin" in the Don Basin were accorded the privilege of going out to the summer camp. The camp was established in the village of Ulyaniwka, in the Hryshyn district, on the estate of some once-prosperous peasant, liquidated as a kurkul . . .

I represented the district branch of the Commissariat of Peoples Education at the cemetery held to open the camp. At twelve o'clock noon, Fesenko, the camp director, invited us to a buffet luncheon at tables placed under the luscious cherry trees. They were covered with all kinds of good food and non-alcoholic beverages. The luncheon was interspersed with oratorical efforts by all concerned eulogizing "the great father Stalin" for his extraordinary love for children and his deep concern about their welfare... The ceremonies terminated at two o'clock; the children took their rest period and the district dignitaries departed. I was to return also, but the Party Secretary of the mine-shaft, comrade P. was delayed for some reason. I sat under an apple tree to wait for him.

Comrade P. appeared after some time and offered a sugges-

tion something like this: "You have already seen one camp but now I would like to show you another one. There is a "Children's Shelter" here, in Ulyniwka."

I had heard about this shelter and often wondered why it was not conducted under the auspices of the Commissariat of Education. This particular place was situated about 400 metres from the village. It was a barn built of stone. My friend pushed the door open with his foot and *baĉe mē* enter while he remained outside.

I saw a horrible sight. The floor of the "shelter" was covered with straw, and on it lay the skeletons of about 200 children ranging in age from three to twelve years. The interior of the shelter was in semi-darkness, with light coming in through a few small windows close to the ceiling. The skeletons, dressed only in dirty shirts, lay in rows on the dirty straw. When I entered the skeletons moved and raised their heads. Stretching out their feeble hands they wailed, "Give us some bread, uncle." Apparently they were unable to get up. Then another chorus of "B-R-R-E-A-A-D" resounded from the skeletons. It sounded as if it were coming from the grave rather than from living human beings. I was stunned for a moment, but in the next second I bolted out of the door, the eerie sound of "bread" ringing sharply on my ears.

"Did you see it?" asked my friend. "Yes!" I replied.

"This is the famous 'Stalin Child Shelter'," said comrade P. the secretary of the Chuvyrin Party organization.

"Where is the staff? Who is looking after these children?"

"Don't you know? The Party and the government are looking after them. The staff... All that the "staff" does is cart out the corpses each morning." replied comrade P.

This incident illustrates the condition of artificial famine created purposely to decimate the Ukrainian peasantry, irrespective of age.

N. POLTAVKA

THE AUTHORITIES CARE FOR CHILDREN: BURY THEM IN THE GROUND.

The center of the City of Poltava is the so-called "October Square," with the City Hall at one side of it and the "Karl Marx Club" at the other.

In the spring of 1933, this Club was turned into a child

shelter. It was popularly known as the "children's patronate." The premises were surrounded by a tall fence.

Next to the "patronate" was the city communal house in which I was employed. One could observe, from the second storey of the communal house, everything that was going on in the patronate. It was full of half-dead, swollen children. They were being looked after either by the NKVD or by the Department of Education. Scores of children died each day; the corpses were carted away at night.

The workers in the communal house quietly commented that while the authorities loudly proclaimed that "children are the flower of the nation" the flower of the Ukrainian nation was being buried in the ground in much the same manner as the parent who bore the flower.

YURKO STEPovy

THE TRAGEDY OF KUBAN

In the fall of 1929 the Communists changed their general course and at the same time dark clouds began to gather on the horizon in the Kuban. A sinister announcement appeared in a regional newspaper, *Krasnoe Znamya*, proclaiming: "Complete collectivization and liquidation of *kurkuls*."

The so-called workers' brigades were organized in the towns, under the leadership of the "5-thousanders" from Moscow, who were sent in hordes to the villages to put the abominable slogan into effect.

The Kuban Kozaks soon started a mass opposition movement against the impending collectivization. They slaughtered their cattle and let the horses roam. At every turn they put up a fearless resistance. Not a village remained in Kuban where one or two government representatives were not slain for being too aggressive in appropriating the Kozaks' property and possessions which, though meagre, had taken generations to accumulate; ragged and hungry they were driven into collective farms. At that time Makayev, a member of the Bureau of the Kuban Regional Communist Party and editor of *Krasnoe Znamya*, was assassinated in one of the villages of the Slavyansk district.

However, no matter how strongly Kozaks resisted the

government, the vast forces of the army, the GPU and the militia broke down this resistance and the collective farms were built upon a foundation of the dead bodies of tens of thousands of Kozaks, shot in the GPU dungeons.

Finally, the tension between the people and the government reached a new high in the spring of 1930. Revolts and uprisings, sometimes referred to as "women's rebellions," flared up in many villages. The defenceless population fought with pots and pans, pitch-forks, spades and anything they could lay their hands on against the GPU who were armed to the teeth and in some villages against a regular army. These eruptions always had bloody endings, for the Communists retaliated in their usual savage manner.

For example the artillery corps, No. 220, fully armed with machine guns, rifles and heavy armor was summoned to the Slavyansk and Poltava villeges to quell the so-called "women's rebellion."

When the uprisings finally subsided and the KPU dungeons were jammed to capacity with the vanquished Kozaks, when every night hundreds or even thousands of them were shot on the Dubynets cliffs and their bodies hurled into the murky waters of the Kuban River, Dzuhashvili-Stalin, greatest terrorist who ever lived, published his famous article, "Dizzy With Success." In this article he called for the prosecution of all local government officials allegedly for forcing collectivization, making it seem as if the widelycirculated slogan, "complete collectivization and liquidation of the kurkuls," was a local invention instead of the deliberate plan of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

In the village of Tykhoretska, in the fall of 1932, a group of passengers were changing from the Moscow-Sochi train to the Stalingrad-Krasnodar train. The men were dressed in black leather jackets from beneath which showed wooden holsters containing mauza pistols. They were all silent, with somber, serious faces, for they were embarking on a grave mission for Moscow. They were going to counteract the collapse of the grain-collecting plan in Kuban or, plainly speaking, to annihilate Kuban.


Immediately upon arrival in Krasnodar they went to the address, 22 Komsomol, where the Kuban District Committee was located. Inside this gloomy, gray building bustling activity prevailed. It was brightly lit night and day, typewriters clicked

incessantly, the harassed staff rushed back and forth, from one room to another, while in the main hall a stormy session of the Kuban District Committee and the newly-arrived "25-thousanders" was in progress. The fate of Kuban was being decided. A special Central Committee representative, Lazar Kaganovich, appointed by Salin himself and invested with full authority to "bring order" to Kuban, was in charge of the session.

Before the crack of dawn on the following day the newsboys shouted the horrible headlines: "The Petlurist kurkul saboteurs of Kuban must be finished off," and Petlurist-Kozak counterrevolutionary work in Kuban must be uprooted."

In a few days the "workers" brigades, headed by the "25-thousanders," got busy in all villages "bringing order," as Stalin explained to Kaganovich. And soon the whole of Kuban was drenched in blood and tears as the Muscovite gangs mercilessly swept away the last kernels of grain from the Kozaks' granaries, arrested the survivors of previous arrests and packed the Krasnodar GPU dungeons, while the Kuban grain flowed into Moscow.

In the late fall of 1932 Kuban was finally completely annihilated. The once-prosperous villages were now ravaged and desolate. All Ukrainian national life in Kuban was liquidated. Ukrainian schools were compelled to teach Russian only. The



Famine victims in the street.

pedagogical technicum in the village Poltavska Stanycia was closed and teachers and older students re-arrested. The whole population of the village, about 25,000, was shipped across the Urals and the village was resettled with Russians and re-named Krasnoarmeyskaya. The same was done with the village of Uman which was renamed Leningradskaya, and with many other villages, such as Slavyansk, Pavliwka, etc.

The whole operation of the annihilation of Kuban was directed by Lazar Kaganovich, who is still living today, a key figure in the Soviet government while, thanks to him, Kuban is no more. Kaganovich's assistant in this undertaking was the erstwhile GPU chief, Kabayev, who ruthlessly helped to perpetuate the greatest crime in the history of Kuban and the whole civilized world.

NATALKA ZOLOTAREVICH

WE ARE GOING TO BURY A GIRL ALIVE.

The family of Vasyl Ocheredko consisted of nine persons, the parents and their seven children. Having been forced to join the collective farm, he surrendered all his possessions to it, including his mare. In the spring of 1933, when he and his family were on the verge of dying of starvation, he stole and slaughtered the colt that his mare bore in order to provide something to eat.

The NKVD immediately arrested him and spirited him away. The family was left in desperate plight. One day his wife took some old clothes and went to the neighbouring village, hoping to barter them for some food, but she never returned. Four of the children died of starvation. Two of the older boys left the village. The youngest girl, Varka, was taken to the Chornoukh "children's patronate" (shelter).

The patronate was managed by a Jewess named Vera Keilin who was collecting the children of the dead Ukrainian peasants not to save them from death but merely to take them out of sight to a place where they would die, unknown and unseen.

Varka Ocheredko was in the last stages of starvation when she was taken to the "patronate." She was all swollen; the skin on her legs was cracked and filled with pus. Apparently, the physical condition of the girl was regarded as helpless because she was loaded on a wagon together with other corpses to

be taken to the burial-place despite her please that she was still alive.

Since the grave was not yet excavated the corpses, including the still living girl, Varka, were piled up to be buried as soon as the hole was ready. Luckily for Varka no-one was guarding the corpses and she crawled out of the pile and on to the road where she was picked up by Olga Volkova, the wife of the local Jewish doctor. Volkova took care of the child and consequently saved her life. Later on Varka was living with me and told me all about it.

VASYL MYRUTENKO

"YOUNG COMMUNISTS."

The children whose parents died in the famine were left homeless. Perhaps the most fortunate were those who were taken to the collective farm "patronates" (shelters).

Our collective farm, "For Bolshevik Tempos," of the Chopovych district in the Zhytomir region, also established such a "patronate." In 1933 there were four children in it; two boys and two girls.



Starving children bereft of father.

I knew all of these children because they were all of my age (I was ten years old then). We were friends and school-mates. They led the miserable life of paupers without parents, but they remembered and very often spoke of their parents. Many a time we all went to the places where their cottages had once stood and asked the neighbors to show them the places where their parents were buried.

Both of those boys later joined the Young Communist League. One of them was even a secretary of the Young Communist cell in our collective farm.

We can only surmise what was in the hearts of these "Young Communists" and how faithful they were to the cause of the "proletarian revolution" after having undergone such an experience. It is safe to assume that half of the Ukrainian Young Communists organization was made up of youths with a similar background.

MYKOLA KOZKA

I BECAME HOMELESS AFTER MY PARENTS DIED OF STARVATION

I, Mykola Kozka, came from a peasant family. My parents, three sisters and two brothers all died of starvation during the famine in Ukraine in 1932-33.

Having lost my family, I became homeless and wandered all over the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics like a stray dog. I traveled all over Ukraine, Russia, Caucasus, and everywhere I saw my fellow countrymen hungry, swollen and dead.

In Kharkiw, which was then the capital city of Ukraine. I saw many horrible sights, a few of which I wish to relate.

On Kinna Square a woman lay on the ground. She was still alive but terribly swollen, her skin cracked and filled with pus and worms. Some of the passersby would attempt to place a few crumbs of bread into her mouth, but she was unable to eat. She cried continuously. Medical attention would perhaps have saved her life but no one ventured to give her such aid. I do not know what happened to her; she probably died much the same way as millions of other Ukrainians died during the Moscow-sponsored, artificial famine in Ukraine.

The streets of Kharkiw were filled with such swollen, dying and dead peasants.

I was detained by some militiaman who took me to the 8th

precinct of the militia (city police). There I was placed in a cell in which I spent the night. This cell was filled with tired, hungry people. The inmates were supposed to get some "food" in the morning but none came. I succeeded in escaping from this jail.

I left Kharkiw in the general direction of Moscow. I traveled through Bilhorod, Bily Kolodyaz, Wowchansk and other cities and towns of Ukraine. In all of them I saw sights similar to that in Kharkiw.

After much wandering I returned to Kharkiw. This time I was successful in getting a job looking after livestock in a military establishment on Iskynska street. A Jew by the name of Snider helped me to get that job after I told him of my life as a stray wanderer. This fellow saved my life.

B. A.

THE WAREHOUSES OF THE "GRAIN-COLLECTION TRUST" FILLED WITH GRAIN.

In the villages of the Drabiv district in the Poltava region terrible things happened. Corpses were strewn everywhere, in cottages, on roads, by the fences. Crowds of swollen, emaciated people moved slowly towards the railway station of Kononiwka in the hopes of boarding the train to destinations outside Ukraine, but it was almost impossible to buy a ticket. Most of the emaciated people died before they reached the railway station. Countless corpses were strewn all around the station, some of them half naked.

At that time I was personally present at the warehouses in Kononiwka belonging to the "Grain-Collection Trust." The warehouses were almost bursting with the immense amount of grain with which they were stuffed. Not an ounce of grain was given out of these state warehouses despite the fact that 40 per cent of the population of this particular district died of starvation.

As a rule, the death rate from starvation is always higher among adults than children. Adults died leaving their starving children, some of whom were taken to the so-called "patronates" (shelters). Some of the best and most industrious peasants in the village of Kononiwka perished during the famine. Such peasants as Sezon Shanko, the brothers Ivan and Fedor

Hrytsay, and Hryhory Chornohor died a terrible death.

One of the most heartless activists of the village, Constantine Boyko, who mercilessly stripped the peasants of food during the grain-collection campaigns, but who was later dismissed from his position as the chairman of the local food cooperative for stealing, ate his wife and later died, swollen beyond recognition.

M. T.

PEOPLE DYING NEAR THE GRAIN ELEVATORS.

Salsk station is an important railway junction in the region. There are railroad branches to Rostov, Stalingrad, Tykhotretsk and Kuban. It is surrounded by expansive fertile steppes with soil ideal for growing wheat and other grain. In 1932 these steppes yielded an abundant harvest.

However, in the spring of 1933 this station was filled with swollen, hungry people who had left their families at home and were trying to travel somewhere in order to procure some food. They planned to go to the mines of the Don Basin or to Muscovy, but they could not buy railroad tickets. They hung around the station for weeks, many of them falling dead.

The remains of those who died were collected and piled up in a small garden behind the railroad station, where they were picked up every day by a special transport and carted away for burial. At the time I visited the station, saw three corpses in this particular garden, a man, a woman and a child.

The warehouses near the station were filled with grain. Whatever grain could not be squeezed into the warehouses was simply dumped on the ground and covered with canvas. A lot of grain thus piled up was rotting. The warehouses were enclosed by a board fence and were guarded by armed NKVD men.

None of this grain was allowed to be given to those starving people who had produced it. It was loaded under guard into box-cars for shipment to ports of the Black and Azov Seas for export abroad.

S. P. KHARKOVENKO

IN THE PORT AND THE MARKETS OF KHERSON

In 1933, while I was a civil servant in Kharkiw, I was detailed for service to the city of Kherson. There, in my spare

time, I would go to the market place near one of the churches.

There sat women who sold grain in small tumblers, half-rotten beets carrots, etc. Shadows of emaciated, hungry and ragged peasants kept wandering amongst the vendors, stretching their hands and pleading: "Please do not let me die." Then came the despairing voice of a woman: "God, why have you punished us so?" The woman, clad in rags, then fell dead. . .

At that very moment the grain transports were anchored at the port, loaded with the golden Ukrainian wheat for export abroad. One of the vessels was of Greek registry; it was painted black as if symbolizing the black death that it was bringing to the Ukrainian peasants, to my brethren who produced the wheat. . .

HOW WORKERS AND CIVIL SERVANTS BORE THE FAMINE.

The workers and civil servants of the urban centers, workers' settlements and industrial districts, as well as the Red Army, were supplied with food products through ration cards. The majority of them, with the exception of the privileged category (Communists, NKVD, top professionals), who received their food from special supply centers, were underfed and con-



A corpse on Kharkiv Street.

sequently starved. Sometimes their children would steal some grain and thus alleviate their plight.

There were categories of people even in the rural districts, in the midst of the starving and dying population, who starved very little or not at all. In such rural districts there existed two categories of supply facilities. In the industrial areas there were two categories of factory kitchens. In some of the military branches there were even three categories of kitchens (airfields).

A document that follows shows an index of the wages earned by the civil servants of one rural Machine-Tractor-Station and an index of market prices of food products. According to this they could survive, living a life of semi-starvation. Another instance shows a family (NKVD) with an abundance of food products while other families died of starvation. This was the state of affairs throughout the entire Ukraine.

PAVLO LYUTAREVICH

WAGES AND PRICES OF FOOD DURING THE FAMINE.

Market prices of food in the Chornoukh district of the Poltava region:

1. Loaf of Buckwheat or barley bread,		
	1½ to 2 Klgm.	40 roubles
2. Ten potatoes		8 to 15 roubles
3. Glass of sour milk		3 to 4 roubles
4. Bottle of beet sauce		3 to 4 roubles
6. A tumbler of sunflower seeds		3 to 4 roubles
7. Fried fish, about half a kilogram		15 to 20 roubles
8. One carrot		1 to 2 roubles
9. One to one and a half kilograms of meat		
	(of doubtful origin)	6 to 10 roubles

Monthly wages earned by personnel of the Machine-Tractor-Station:

1. Director	400 to 500 roubles
2. Senior Agronomist	500 roubles
3. Senior Mechanic	450 roubles
4. Chief bookkeeper	400 roubles
5. Ordinary bookkeeper	150 roubles
7. Chambermaid	80 roubles

MARIA FESENKO

FAMINE AMONGST THE WORKERS OF POLTAVA IN 1932

We lived in the village of Shportiwka, one kilometre away from Poltava. The village was a suburb of Poltava containing about 100 cottages inhabited by families of the workers. We had no land, only a house and a small garden. In the past we had a cow, sometimes a pig and some chickens. There were six of us in the family. I was eight years of age and the oldest of four children.

During the collectivization in 1931, the cow and the garden were taken away from us. My father worked as a construction laborer in Poltava and supported the family with his earnings.

In the spring of 1932 our family was starving like all the other families. We received some food on our ration card which allowed 200 grams for father only. The rest of the family received some mixture of corn shorts for a while but not for long. We began to swell with hunger.

Father, realizing that under such conditions we would all be dead before long, therefore decided to migrate to some other place where we could get more food. He advertised our home for sale; it was a beautiful home but there were not many who were eager to buy a house.

At last some Russian came along and paid my father 600 roubles for it. With this money we travelled to Voronizh where we lived for two years. After that we moved to the Caucasus.

MARIA FESENKO

CHILDREN HELP PARENTS TO SURVIVE THE FAMINE.

In 1932-33, when the famine was at its heights, our family moved from Poltava to Voronizh. My father obtained employment at the freight shed of the local railway station. I was the oldest of four children. Many people came to Voronizh from Ukraine in order to escape the famine. The ration cards issued at Voronizh allowed very little food and consequently we were again starving. Father could not bring anything from the rail-

way freight shed, except a little bit of grain once in a while which he managed to slip into his boots.

The other children and I used to go to the railway yards to pick up scattered grain and occasionally some salt. It was almost impossible to buy any salt at the stores. The freight handlers purposely spilled grain and salt so that we could pick it up. The stores of grain and other products at the station were heavily guarded by the NKVD. There were huge piles of grain covered by canvas.

One day the other children and I discovered a hole in the enclosure around the grain piles and crept inside to take away some peas. However, the NKVD guard closed the hole and we had to spend the whole night at the pea pile. Next morning a new guard came who was not as tough as the last one, and he let us out. However I did not want to go home without bringing some grain with me, and so I stayed until the evening when I succeeded in creeping into a section piled with sacks of wheat. On the top of these sacks were small sample bags, containing about ten pounds of wheat each. I wanted to take away some sample bags but the guard was too sharp. I waited until morning, when he dozed off, to take the wheat and rush home.

I had almost reached home when I unexpectedly stumbled into a hole full of melted snow, almost up to my neck. Luckily for me my mother had just gone out to fetch a pail of water from the nearby well. She rescued me. Mother was already worried about my two-day absence and was crying, thinking that I was lost.

With my little bags in which I brought home the grain from the station almost everyday, I helped to save my family from starving to death.

There were many children scavenging grain at this station. Sometimes we would go to the market to sell a few tumblerfuls of grain or salt in order to obtain money to buy some other things to eat. There were children who lived around the station day and night. I remember once the children gathered and started asking each other who they were. One could hear them identifying themselves as: "I am a Ukrainian," "I am a Russian," "I am a Jew." It thus turned out that there was a sprinkling of other nationalities amongst the refugees from Ukraine.

HOW DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF PEOPLE SURVIVED THE FAMINE

From observation of the Chornoukh district in the Poltava region, not all the people were hungry or died of starvation, namely:

1. Not at all affected by the famine were Communists and their families, the personnel of the NKVD and militia, workers in the Political Sections of the Machine-Tractor-Stations, Soviet and Party officials in the districts and villages.
2. Partially affected by the famine were non-Party civil servants, engaged in commercial work, some members of the "booster brigades" (village activists, robbers), a very small percentage of the collective farmers and other categories of people who by, hook or crook, succeeded in evading the raids of various robber Brigades engaged in grain-collection for the state.
3. Totally affected were peasants, members of the collective farms, village tradesmen, families of "liquidated kurkuls" (former self supporting peasants), and peasants who did not join the collective farms...

I. D. (Engineer)

OPEN AND CLOSED COMMERCIAL OUTLETS FOR RURAL DISTRICTS

In 1932-33, two types of commercial outlets for the distribution of food products and commercial goods existed in the cities, towns and larger villages of Ukraine; one was a closed type of outlet, catering to the needs of the limited number of consumers, such as Party and district leaders, village soviet officials, collective farm officials, NKVD personnel, Machine-Tractor-Station workers and special appointees. Admission to such outlets was granted only by special passes and ration books. These outlets supplied the consumers with food products and other goods according to the standards of normal times. Their supplies were maintained by central distributing establishments.

The other was an open outlet in the form of district consumer co-operatives, catering to the needs of local workers and

while-collar workers. These outlets supplied such staples as bread, sugar, cereals, fats (vegetable oils), confectionery, etc. Goods were sold only by ration cards, in semi-starvation proportions. They depended on local resources for their supplies (coming from the mills and vegetable oil refineries).

D. DMYTRENKO (Engineer)

TWO CATEGORIES OF EATING ESTABLISHMENTS.

From November of 1932 until June of 1933, I was employed as an engineer on a project for the construction of a chemical-coke combine in Makeyewka in the Don Basin. I had at my disposal five technicians and twenty four workers.

We had two types of eating establishments; one for the engineering and technical personnel, the so-called "ETP," and the other for the workers. Some of the workers were attached to one, and some to the the other. In each case they could obtain their meals only by producing meal tickets.

"ETP" the food was a little better. Everyone received one

The workers cafeteria supplied three meals a day. The food was very low in quality and lacked the minimum calory requirements. Lack of decent meals reflected itself in their inability to perform a good day's work. In the cafeteria of the "ETP" the food wa sa little better. Everyone received one kilogram of white rye bread per day.

The coke-chemical combine was most irregular in paying wages. Sometimes they held back the pay for two or three months. Consequently, the workers were unable to work normally.

I took a daring step in securing an extra ration book for each man on my gang, which was a "crime" in the eyes of soviet law. But then each of my men was able to buy a double meal and receive a double ration of bread in the workers' cafeteria.

The men in my gang were able to sell the extra bread and thus earn enough money to pay for double meals.

Only then could I expect them to work more or less normally.

TESTIMONY ON THE FAMINE.

The spring of 1933 was the most horrible and tragic moment in the history of the Ukrainian people. In the fall of 1932 and the early winter of 1933 the Russian Communist government had taken away the entire grain crops and all food produce from the Ukrainian farmers in order to bring them into submission and obedient servitude in the collective farms.

In the collective farm of my native district, which numbered 672 people, 164 died that fatal spring of 1933. Actually this collective farm suffered little compared with all the surrounding places for to induce the farmers to remain there they were given 300 grams of bread per person baked from all kinds of chaff and some liquid concoction cooked from refuse. But there were villages and hamlets where not a single person remained alive—for instance, in the large village of Chernychyna, in the Neforoshchanske district, which stretched for two and a half miles, though I do not recall its population, and the hamlet Rybky, of the Sukho-Mayachka village administration, where the population of 60 died.

Here is one of the many incidents of the famine. In my native village there was a stallion kept for breeding mares. He was well fed, receiving 13 pounds of oats daily, but for some unknown reason he suddenly died. This happened at the end of May, 1933. The district administration forbade the stallion to be buried until a special commission arrived and held an inquest.

The dead stallion lay in the open for three days and began to decay. A guard was appointed to shield it from the starving people who would have eaten the meat. On the fourth day the commission arrived and having completed the investigation ordered the stallion to be buried.

No sooner was that done and the commission gone than like an avalanche, the people descended on the dead, decaying stallion and in an instant nothing was left of him. Violent arguments ensued because some had grabbed more than their share.

A spectacle I shall never forget was when a 16-year old boy, who, besides his stepmother, was the only survivor in the family, swollen from starvation, crawled up to the place where the dead stallion had been and finding a hoof snatched it in both hands and gnawed furiously. The boy was never seen

again and nunofficial rumors circulated that he had been eaten by his stepmother.

It was forbidden for people to leave their villages. GPU guards blocked all roads and railways. Any food that the farmers happened to be carrying was taken away from them. For picking a stray head of wheat or a frozen potato or beet left in the field a person was sentenced to ten years in prison or concentration camp, according to the ruling passed by the government August 7, 1932.

Thousands of corpses littered the streets, byways and buildings. Deaths occurred at such a rate that the government could not keep up with burying the corpses.

During all this time there was not the slightest sign of any famine in the neighboring Russian territory. The Soviet press never mentioned the famine in Ukraine but on the contrary even printed misleading propaganda about "flowering Ukraine" and her great achievements in industry and collectivization.

To cover up its bloody crime the Soviet government warned all doctors not to state the true cause of death on death certificates. Instead, they stated that a prevalent digestive ailment was the cause.

Millions of innocent, defenceless Ukrainians died in the monstrous famine, the like of which was never heard of in the whole history of the world. We believe that the free, civilized world will not let this satanic crime pass unheeded. The criminal Communist regime must be morally condemned and members of the Communist government prosecuted for their inhuman deed.

Yet in spite of the criminal methods used by the Kremlin to break the Ukrainian people, they continue to stand firm in their resolution to break away from Muscovite tyranny and regain their freedom.

YAVDOKYM BODNAR

FAMINE AROUND THE CRIMEAN AIRFIELD

I passed my medical in December of 1932 and was detailed to the fatigue company of the Airforce, stationed at the military airfield of Kacha in the Crimea. The airfield was surrounded by a barged-wire fence and carefully guarded against trespassing by civilians.

The trainees for pilots were all Communists, mainly from Moscow and Leningrad. About two percent of them were Caucasians, Mongols, and Chinese. There were no Ukrainians. The chief of the school was Ivanoff, an old officer, with the rank of lieutenant-general. The chief of staff was another lieutenant-general, Yevsukov. Romanov was the political commissar.

There were three types of kitchens: one for the officers; one for trainees and one for us of the fatigue-riflemen company. The first category received what was known as "Voroshilov rations" which meant an unlimited amount of the best kind of food. Our company, which spent half of its time on various fatigue duties and the other half at work on the vegetable gardens near the airfield, received 600 grams of bread a day for each man, some kind of soup known as "balanda" and two tablespoons of cooked cereal without fats.

The Commissar of Defence, Voroshilov, issued an order to have the bread sliced in very thin slices and not to scatter it. One of the men in the fatigue company, a Moldavian by the name of Korotnian, joked about this order. He was immediately taken away and never came back.

Outside the airfield, the civil population was starving. The people frequently slipped through the barbed wire fences to scavenge in the garbage dumps. There were civilians who worked in the mechanical shops of the airfield. After leaving work for the day, they would go around the kitchens to root in the garbage pails and strain the cans of dishwater for all possible scraps of food.

V. SKORENKO

SOME HAD TOO MUCH FOOD. OTHERS DIED OF STARVATION.

In the spring of 1933, I was employed as a technician in the communal branch of the Poltava City Administration. We were conducting an inventory of all the buildings, which made it necessary to make detailed measurements of every square foot. I had the task of detailing all the buildings on October Street (formerly Kurakin Street) and the avenue beside it where there was a building which housed the NKVD and its personnel. Some of the buildings on this avenue were out of bounds for us technicians, consequently we were not allowed to enter them; the others, which we were allowed to enter, were all lux-

uriously appointed, with expensive rugs and fine furniture. The food pantries were filled with all kinds of good things to eat, that made our mouths water because we worked on semi-starvation rations.

At another building further down the street I encountered a dead man lying in bed. I was scared and ran out of the place. After two weeks I ventured again into the same building. This time I saw the naked body of a dead old woman. I fled again.

After a few weeks I went once more to the building. This time I met a living woman. Questioning her about the mystery of the dead people, she replied that of her family of six only she, and her small daughter, remained alive. All the rest had died of starvation.

N. LYUBOTYNSKY

THE WORKERS IN UBAN CENTERS ALSO STARVED

In order to survive during the famine of 1933 I took a job at the railway depot of Liubotyn, in the Kharkiw region. I saw the following incidents taking place:

A conductor of the freight train crew, Vasyl Etakalo, came to work one morning and after a while fainted. A doctor who arrived to treat him tried to give him some medicine, but Vasyl refused to take it. A number of depot workers gathered around him, then came the depot administration, including the NKVD man, Laznevoy.

The doctor started complaining to the chief of the depot that Vasyl had refused to take medicines. Vasyl, listening to all this, interjected: "I don't need medicine. Give me some bread and I will be well." Those who stood around him understood well enough what that meant. They merely glanced at each other and slowly dispersed.

Laznevoy, the NKVD man, then fiercely admonished Vasyl with these words: "Where will I get the bread for you? I receive no more of it on my ration card than you do. Get up and go to work and don't engage in any propaganda, or you will regret it. . . Look at you. Get up and go to work."

Vasyl got up slowly and went to work...

FORAGING FOR FOOD LOCALLY IN THE VILLAGES

It was a different situation for the starving villagers, abandoned by the government in their villages to die by famine. The people struggled to keep alive in any way they could, using every means possible to them. They began a foraging locally for all kinds of food-stuffs. There were several sources of such food-stuffs, namely:

1. Thefts of milling grain from state stock-piles at the time of the grain collection campaign in the autumn of 1932; later, thefts from the collective farms' stores of livestock feed; as well as from the spring seeding- grain supplies and the crops in the fields in 1933. In some places all this went on with the open or tacit consent of the representatives of the local authorities. We referred to this source previously in the list of documents.

2. Searching out such sources of food as were never utilized in normal times, but which none the less kept people from starving to death. These were the inedible beasts and birds, both domesticated and wild, such as dogs, cats, rats, gophers, jackdaws, sparrows and water snails, as well as the meat of horses purposely maimed or caused to die.

3. Searching out such sources of food as were not suited to the human digestion or poisonous to it. Such food only prolonged the agony of starvation and its users died anyway in the end. This consisted of chaff from buckwheat or millet, the bark and leaves of trees, toadstools, all sorts of green grasses which caused dysentery, as well as carrion which poisoned the human organism and inevitable caused death.

4. Local market-places, of which the criminal and amoral elements took unscrupulous advantage, but which at the same time saved individuals of the more resourceful kind and even whole families from dying of hunger.

5. State department stores, "Torgsins," with whose help the government cheated the famished population out of what remained of their valuable articles of gold.

WHERE, WHERE TO GET SOME FOOD

The attention of the hungry people completely and continuously revolved about the question—where, where to get some food. Nothing else interested them. In some places, the sympathies of the local government leaders went out to them and on their own initiative they strove to help them in all sorts of ways. Thus in the district of Chornoukhy in the Poltava region there were different representatives of the government who gave such help. In the district of Sakhnowschanke, too, at the hog state farm, they withdrew certain amounts of the fodder for fattening the pigs to give to the starving people. Here and there in the schools breakfasts of sorts were organized for the pupils and teachers. Some physicians infringed the government's decree and admitted starving people into their clinics where they were nourished back to health.

Cows, where they remained to anyone at that time, were a great help to the owners and their neighbors. Everybody tried especially to acquire a goat so as to keep himself on its milk. Even whiskey, which then sold in the villages in unlimited quantities, to some extent saved the people from dying of hunger.

The famished people began to eat the food which previously they had disregarded. They fished water snails out of the rivers, shot sparrows, rooks and such.

One of the ways of getting food was stealing from state supplies. People stole corn oil-cake out of freight cars. Especially large thefts of grain took place at the time of the spring seeding campaign, for which the people were severely punished.

Attempts were made in different places to rob government stores which held a variety of grain. Thus at the Reshetyliwka station corn was stolen from such a stock. At the Mali Hyrla station in the province of Mykolaiwyske, the starving braved machine gun fire which guarded the "Zahotzerno" point. They robbed such a supply at the Hoholevo station in the Poltava region.

PAVLO ZOLOTAREVICH

HOW THEY SAVED THE PEOPLE FROM STARVING

In the autumn of 1932 the local authorities of the Chornoukhy district knew that famine was inevitable. There was talk on the quiet about it at the party meetings; it was being

whispered by the Communists amongst themselves, while their wives, by telling their friends on the quiet, were noising the secret about.

It must be admitted that there were some Communist individuals who were conscious of the seriousness of that spring of 1933 and took measures locally to save the people from starvation. Here are given only two such examples:

1. Kondrat Ocheredko, director of the Chornoukhy district land department, gave orders to the collective farms to sort over all the seed potatoes and give that part that had lost its quality to the kolhosp workers for food. Some of the kolhosp heads gave all the potatoes for food. Because of these orders Ocheredko was removed from his post.

2. Artemenko, director of the Chornoukhy Machine-Tractor Station, and Marchenko, chief of the political department of the MTS, in the spring of 1933 strove to institute communal meals for the collective farm workers during the spring labor in the fields. They asked the provincial organizations for rations of grain from the "Zahotzerno" system for this purpose. For this, they were rebuked by the Kharkiw District Committee for anti-state tendencies while Artemenko was expelled from the party.

Others, the majority of the district and local Communists in fact, saw and knew the reason for the famine but were afraid for their party cards and parroted the words imposed on them by the authorities at the top, that the famine was as it were the result of unconscientuous work and sabotage on the part of the unenlightened kolhosp workers, besides which, they made much of the fact that in the autumn of 1932 a great deal of bread was stolen in the kolhosps.

PAVLO BOZHKO

NO FAMINE FOR SOVIET HOGS

Once, in the Sakhnowshansk district of the Poltava region there were rich farms inhabited by well-to-do Ukrainian farmers. When collectivization started these farms were all dekurkulized and obliterated; on their sites several hog "radhosps" (Soviet State Farms) were set up. I worked in one of these, called the "Paris Commune," during 1932-33.

At that time famine was raging everywhere. The Soviet State Farm workers lived wretchedly. They did not receive

any wages for their work although, to be sure, their need for bread was greater than their need for money, since the starvation rations they received were indeed miserable. Still, none of us workers died nor were we unduly famished at the time.

No famine was intended for the hogs of the Soviet State Farm: these received regularly, according to plan, a variety of concentrated feed such as rye, corn, millet and barley of a fairly good quality. Bread was baked for us from the hog feed, each worker receiving 800 grams daily and each non-worker receiving 400 grams per day.

There was an extra ration of soup and meat from the kitchen besides, that was not bad at all. Every day it was necessary to slaughter one or another of the several thousand hogs because it had been injured or had some noncontagious disease. All this was used by our kitchen.

Paying no heed to the strict control of the Political department, we all stole pocketfuls of hog feed to bolster up the surrounding population, but it was not enough. In the villages all around us, such as Mazharka, Tarasiwa, Kopanky, Kotiwka a most fearful famine was raging; there was no one to dig graves and bury the dead.

The starving from all the villages around dragged themselves to these Soviet State Farms and begged for work, but the farms could not take them all. Whoever was taken on, however, was saved by the hog feed from death by starvation.

VASYL MIRUTENKO

HOT BREAKFAST AT SCHOOL

From the winter of 1932-33 on, they began to serve the pupils at our school so-called "hot breakfasts." This took place on our collective farm, called "For Bolshevik tempo," in the Chopoviche district of the Zhytomir region.

What sort of breakfasts were they? They consisted of a dish called "zatirka," which was prepared like this: A little flour was thoroughly stirred into some water, salted and boiled. As soon as this "zatirka" was taken off the stove, 200 to 300 grams of it was ladled into each pupil's dish.

When spring came, a little sorrel was added to this "zatirka," and later some new potatoes, and then it became "borshch."

A JEWISH DOCTOR HELPS THE STARVING

In 1933 the superintendent of the district clinical hospital in Chornoukhy was a Jew named Moisei Davidovich Fishman. He and his wife, Olga Volkova, who was likewise a physician, never lost the milk of human kindness during those difficult years, and, instead of carrying out the orders of the authorities, they courageously ignored them and helped the starving populace.

At that time the authorities had forbidden doctors and hospitals to admit the starving for treatment if the diagnosed illness were "debility from hunger." One could get into a hospital only if one had some other illness. Nevertheless, the hospitals did feed the patients and would not let them die of hunger.

And so Dr. Fishman admitted people distended from hunger to his hospital at every possible opportunity, diagnosed their illness as due to some other cause and slowly restored them to a normal state. For his deeds Fishman more than once had unpleasant interviews with the authorities, but being the good, authoritative physician he was, he did what his humane conscious prompted him to do, and defended himself against their attacks.

The memory of these two noble individuals, Fishman and Volkova, will long be cherished in the hearts of those people of the district of Chornoukhy whom they rescued from the famine.

TETYANA BURKO

OUR COW SAVED OUR FAMILY FROM STARVING TO DEATH

We lived in a settlement called Bozhky near Lisnyaky in the Yahotyn district of the region of Poltava. Ours was a large family, nine in all, consisting of our parents and seven children ranging from two to fifteen years of age. We belonged to a collective farm. We surrendered everything we had to the collective farm except for a cow, which, as it turned out, saved us all with her milk. A demijohn of milk then cost seventy roubles, and a small loaf of bread, a hundred roubles. We tried all sorts of ways and means at that time to get beet-pulp from the sugar refinery for the cow.

Everyone in our family who was able to work went to work on the collective farm. Father often went to Voronezh in Russia to trade our household things for food. My mother at one time had homespun linen, embroidered ornamental towels and embroidered shorts, but in that year of 1933 they were all exchanged for food.

I remember Easter day in 1933. Father was away from home, having gone to trade something for food for the holy day. On his way back he was arrested as a speculator because he had with him ten pounds of corn and four pounds of screenings which he had obtained in exchange for the very last shirts we had.

Mother made soup for us from two glassfuls of dried, crushed potato peelings and eight not very large potatoes. This was Easter fare for the whole family. We all sat on our low plank-beds weeping and praying, when in came the brigadier from the collective farm and, in quite a coarse manner, said, "Everyone except the youngest must go to the collective farm and get to work."

That was how they always made us go to work, without taking into consideration whether we had any food or whether we were hungry. Mother and my older sister were swollen from hunger, and I was very skinny at the time.

They released father after two weeks, but they took away all the food he had bought for us.

V. SAVUR

GOATS SAVED PEOPLE FROM STARVING

In the villages it was rare for anyone during the years of continuous collectivization to retain a cow. The Ukrainian farmers who were accustomed to farming on a substantial scale did not care for goats, which they regarded as incident creatures which it did not become a serious farmer to keep. They termed them "Jewish town cows."

But a few of the wiser villagers had assessed the worth of a milch goat in those times, and had begun to introduce goats into their farming. These were not taken by collective farms and made socialist property. A goat was then worth 300 to 400 roubles.

That was why my father who lived in the village of Medvin, kept goats at the time, as did some of his neighbours, which

gave them a few quarts of milk a day. It was always possible to get feed for a goat.

It was solely the goat that saved the lives of my parents in those years of famine. Those of their neighbors who kept goats were likewise saved from starving to death.

People always kept their goats in their houses at night in those days, so that they would not be stolen.

V. SAVUR

SAVED BY WHISKEY

In 1932-33, there were no foodstuffs of any kind for sale in the village co-operative stores except for whiskey, which was available in unlimited quantities, for whiskey is a government monopoly in the USSR which brings in exceptional revenues. That is why, even in those years of famine when masses of people were dying of hunger, the distilleries were working at full capacity turning grain into liquor.

A litre of whiskey at that time cost about six roubles at the store, while a two-pound loaf of bread cost ten roubles at the market. Some people, therefore, kept themselves from dying of hunger by drinking whiskey.

That is why in Medvina, in the Kiev region, the Reverend Platon Slutsky went from house to house advising the people to buy and drink whiskey. And truly, those who took his advice survived, or at least not as many did die as might have otherwise.

I. D. (geological engineer)

FOOD OF THE TRIPILIAN ERA

In 1933-34 I noticed while working along the Northern Buh and the Sinyukha rivers and their tributaries, in the districts of Pervomay, Olshansk, Holovaniw, Swaransk and so forth, that there were always large heaps of snail shells everywhere along the river-banks and on the village garbage-heaps.

These snails lived in the rivers and, since the Ukrainian people, especially the villagers, had never eaten them, nobody had paid any attention to them before. But in 1933, when famine reigned and the villagers were dying of starvation by the thousands, they sought food of any kind at all that could

be found in nature, and even turned their attention to these snails.

As is generally known, the people fell to eating all sorts of vegetation, such as linden, acacia, sorrel, lamb's quarters, nettles and so on, but this vegetation does not contain any of the albumen substances so necessary to the organisms of the famished. Most of the people who sustained themselves solely with such a diet ultimately died. These snails do contain the needed albumen. The people boiled them until they had boiled out all the albumen juices and nourished themselves on that. The thoroughly boiled meat, which resembled hard gristle, was chopped fine, mixed with green leaves, and then eaten, or rather, bolted. It was mainly in this way that the people were able to avoid the swelling which accompanies the famished state and to survive the famine. But only those who lived near the rivers and could gather the snails in their waters survived.

To come to the point, the Ukrainian soil was inhabited three or four thousand years ago by a people of the Tripillian Culture, who had not yet discovered iron and had used implements made of flint. These Tripillians likewise used to eat these snails, for archaeologists frequently find their shells deposited about their camping-places near the rivers. Therefore, the achievement of Stalin's twentieth century socialism amounts to this: that he compelled the Ukrainian villagers to sustain themselves on food eaten by their primitive forbears, three or four thousand years ago...

L. PYLYPENKO

THE STARVING SCHOOLTEACHERS' "BORSHCH"

To make this so-called borshch, one picked the leaves off the nettles growing beside the wattle fences along the streets, beet-tops and lamb's quarters from the garden, and sorrel from the meadow. A little water and salt was added, when salt could be obtained, and this mixture was cooked and dignified by the name of "borshch." Salt was hard to get, since trade was deliberately suspended in the villages to create scarcity. There was neither animal fat nor oil in this borshch, since they were not obtainable anywhere at any price.

Such borshch, served up with "baladoni" (millet dumplings), was all the Soviet schoolteachers had to nourish them, and on that alone it was a hard struggle to nourish them,

of living in the "socialist motherland." But the surrounding population lacked even those millet "baladoni."

As a result of such fare, my right eye soon lost 75 percent of its vision. The doctor whom I consulted about my eyes advised me to eat bread, milk and eggs! My wife, too was exceptionally weak from hunger.

In order to save ourselves from certain death by starvation, I began to shoot rooks. My fellow-teacher Petrushewsky shot sparrows. But I did not have the opportunity to gourmandize for long. Hudim, the secretary of the local Party Centre reported my to the District Militia, my hunting rifle was confiscated and I was forbidden to keep fire-arms of any kind any more. (I came of a dekurullized family.)

I did not taste meat again after that, but at the hot breakfasts at school I began to receive a supplement to by borshch in the form of one spoonful of beans cooked in water. The pupils, too, with the exception of the children of kurkuls, each received a spoonful of the same beans.

V. H-ENKO

OIL-CAKE

During 1932-33 I was a student in the Hdantsovles in the town of Kryvy Rih. We knew only too well what it was to be hungry. On our ration cards we were issued some thin soy-bean soup each day, and our lecturers explained to us that our short rations were due to the fact that the kurkuls had buried their grain in the earth.

We hungry students cast about us in all directions to find some food. We vied with one another in going voluntarily to the fruit terminal to unload the railway cars, where we tried to get something "by hook or by crook."

Our instructor, Onisimow, was dismissed from the very next day after he was heard to say that he had formerly fed his pigs better bread than they now gave the workers.

Everywhere at the time slogans hung, screaming: "Struggle for bread—means struggle for socialism." And truly, it was a struggle to the death for bread.

Somehow we students discovered that they were hauling corn oil-cake to the Kryvy Rih station in tarpaulin-covered horse-drawn wagons. Very little oil can be extracted from corn. We were told that the oil was shipped across the border where

it was used to paint submarines, because corn oil is the most stable in water. But where they were shipping the corn oil-cake we did not know. Oil-cake was then very dear at the market — a tiny piece the size of a penny box of matches cost one rouble.

We students would jump the wagons and steal the oil-cake out of them. Later, they began to haul the oil-cake by trucks in which sat a guard armed with a club. When the truck slowed down for the railway crossing we would jump it in a bunch. The guard would beat us over the head and hands with his club, but it was not very effective. We did not feel the pain and felt fortunate when we could steal a few oil-cakes out of the truck; we devoured them on the spot as if they were some great delicacy.

Meanwhile, the Krivy Rih newspaper, "The Red Miner" was writing: "The prosperous collective farmers are making their report to Stalin and writing him: 'Deat Father Stalin, do come up and see us to sample our "vareniki,"'" (dumplings stuffed usually with potato and cheese).

S. K.

"THIEVES"

In the spring of 1933, at the height of the famine, spring wheat was being sown in the fields of the Poliwyan and Salsk Motor Tractor Stations in the Salsk district of the region of Rostow. It was being sown by starving collective farm workers, and as might be expected, they could not resist eating the grain or pocketing a handful for their hungry families.

Finally, these sowers were searched one day, and grain turned out of their pockets. They were all arrested under the law of February 8, 1932, concerning the "Protection of Socialist Property," and locked up as criminals in the district militia jail at Salsk. The numbers of such criminals in the district mounted into the hundreds. They were given nothing to eat or drink in the first two weeks, except water. A father and two sons, twenty and twenty-two years of age, were in my cell while I was serving time as a "saboteur." The father died right in that very cell.

In that cell, intended for only a few persons, there were 36 prisoners—so-called "saboteurs" and "thieves." We had to sleep sitting up on the floor. For food they gave us each

500 grams of bread daily with some "balanda" (a thin, watery soup), and a dipper of water mornings and evenings.

After a time the "thieves" were given a special trial so as to serve as an example to others, and were all sentenced to five years in concentration camps in the far north. These convicted "thieves" also included women.

This was being done at a time when the majority of the peasants on the collective farms were dying of starvation and there was no one to work the land.

N. RESHETYLIVSKY

THE STARVING SENT BEFORE A FIRING-SQUAD

In the famine-stricken year of 1933 there were large heaps of corn piled up in the open at the Reshetiliwka station in the Poltava region that were going to rot, but were nevertheless being vigilantly guarded against the starving by the organs of the NKVD.

At another station in Poltava, Sahaydaky by name, there was a great deal of grain in the warehouses being guarded by the NKVD.

Sometime during the first few days of May, 1933, the hungry workers and villagers at the head of the local Komsomol organization marched to this station under a black banner, broke into the stores and commenced to take the grain home. But no one profited by it.

Some were distended to such an extent that, after filling their bundles, they were unable to carry them as far as their homes and died on the way. Others who did reach home did not have time to make use of it. For, the following night, the NKVD went shooting through the length and breadth of the village of Sahaydaky, carrying off in their "Black Crow" all those who had taken any grain from the station.

Their trial was conducted very swiftly. The provincial courts of Kharkiw, then on circuit, took one week to try these starving people as thieves, under the law of July 7, 1932, and sentenced a great many to death and others to concentration camps for from five to ten years. Those who were sentenced to concentration camps were removed to the Poltava jail first and it was there that I met them and was told of these occurrences.

THE STARVING DIED UNDER MACHINE-GUN FIRE AT THE GRAIN STOCK-PILES

Toward the end of April, 1933, the starving of the village of Novo-Voznesenka in the district of Vorontsiw, of the region of Mikolaiyw, made an attack on the grain stock-pile at Mali Hiria, where there was corn rotting in the open. The distance to the stock-pile was 18 kilometres. Twenty-three persons fell dead along the way, but the rest managed to reach their destination.

Two NKVD men, Kuznetsov and Sablukov, met these hungry people with machine-gun fire. Yakiw Husinsky, a sailor from Simferopol, happened to come upon this scene. He stole up from the side, killed Kuznetsow and Sablukov with his pistol, pulled the machine guns down from the corn-ricks, and trained one of them on the door to the office... Later he compelled them to take a count of the dead... There were 697. There were only a few wounded, because in this weakened condition many died even though only slightly wounded.

L. PYLYPENKO

A CORN-WAREHOUSE IS INVADED BY THE STARVING

A few hundred villagers from Mikhayliwske and the surrounding villages in the Velyko-Bohachewske district of the Poltava region, activated by deep despair as a result of the famine, went one night in the spring of 1933 to the grain warehouses at the Hoholevo station. There they drove away the guards, broke through the walls of the warehouses and began to fill their sacks with corn on the cob, which was all that was being stored there at the time. Having filled their sacks, the hungry mass of villagers crept back under cover of darkness to their homes, if they were able to carry their loads so far.

The day after the event the district representatives of the government arrived in Mikhayliwske with a detachment of NKVD militia.

They called a meeting. The secretary of the party organization reproached all those who had been swayed by the agitation of the class-enemy and had gone to rob the property of their State; he exhorted them to return their plunder because

the guilty parties would be found and suitably punished anyway. Others gave forth with similar speeches.

A few of the villagers did return their corn, but most of it disappeared—the hungry people just ate it up. They arrested five persons as "disturbers of the public order" to strike fear into the hearts of the rest.

Two days later, an automatic machine-gun appeared in the store-house of the Soviet State farm; the secretary of the party centre was put in charge of it but its presence was carefully concealed from the people. This measure was taken in case of a repetition of what had happened to the corn.

SOME DIED THROUGH EATING POISONOUS SUBSTANCE

The people did not stop, in their search for foodstuffs, to consider what the consequences of eating these food-stuffs would be. They just wanted something, anything, to fill their stomachs, and it did not enter their heads that they might die of it, though die they did very soon after. Here is a whole list of instances.

The starving grubbed up the poisoned seed that had been sown in the fields, ate there and then, died on the spot. During the spring they scoured the fields for roots of all kinds, stripped the trees of their bark, caught mice and gophers by pouring water down their holes to make them come out, ate carrion. An exceptionally large number fed on the carrion of horses at the rendering plants. At such a time they even devoured the carrion of horses infected by glanders and then the authorities themselves had them shot.

They fed on the mash left over from the previous year, which was considered no longer suitable for feeding to livestock. They boiled dried animal hides. They prepared pancakes and fritters variously termed "oladki," "baladoni," "motorzheniki," and so forth, from leaves and other inedible substances. They even ate toadstools and the doctors were not always able in that case to save their lives.

P. ONUKHRIENKO

POISONED SEED BRING DEATH

This happened in the spring of 1933. I was working then on a Soviet State farm. We were sowing a mixture of vetch

and oats. The seed had been poisoned before being sown by being treated with some sort of chemical substance.

After the sowing, some people who were distended with hunger appeared from districts and villages unknown to us; they lay prone upon the ground, and grubbing the seed out of the earth, began to eat it. What happened to them? All of them, and there were about twenty persons, just remained where they were. They all died from ating the poisoned seed, right there in the fields.

The Soviet State farm administration did not know where the people hailed from nor what to do with them. They reported the occurrence to the district authorities. From them came the order to "plough them under" (bury them all) in one pit.

IRYNA MEDVID

LECTURE ON THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE

On the orders of the People's Commissar of Education, Mykola Skrypnyk, the third course in Kharkiw University, in the academic year of 1931-32, was divided into two parts. On the surface this seemed a logical move for students who were graduating from the pedagogical institute had to practice teaching in the schools. In reality an ulterior motive was behind it.

Arrests and escapes of many school teachers in Ukraine had resulted in a serious teacher shortage and the order was issued to relieve the situation. I was assigned with a group of students to the Vovchansk district, in the Kharkiw region. The District Department of Education then sent me to "practice" in a school at the children's village, Tsyurupa, which was located on the old estate of General Brusilov.

Even though the children's village was maintained by the government the children were always hungry. The daily ration consisted of two thin slices of soggy bread, a colored liquid in the morning which represented tea, a thin liquid (soup) and a thicker liquid (cereal) for lunch and again a thin liquid for supper. The children were listless, apathetic, drowsy. They paid no attention and displayed little reaction to anything. The small children suffered most of all because anything they had was stolen from them by the older ones. It was impossible to accomplish anything in such difficult conditions and finally

all our youthful fervor waned amid the starvation and hopelessness.

One day, during the Russian language period, I had gone through the whole program: checked the pupils' homework, explained the new assignment in the difficult foreign language, and asked some questions. The monosyllabic answers took very little time. The classroom was shrouded in an oppressive stillness. The children sat motionless waiting for the bell, never laughing, talking or asking questions. I racked my brains wondering how to dispel the overhanging gloom and awaken some spark of interest in the children.

Then my eyes fell on a new April issue of the "Teacher's Magazine." I leafed nervously through the pages until an article caught my attention and I began to read. The children sat quietly for some time then they began to perk up their heads and opening their eyes in amazement they came up and surrounded my desk. I continued to read: "The children finished their lesson and the bell rang. Laughing and playing they skipped downstairs to the dining room where lunch awaited them, among other things, cocoa, white bread and butter. The servant had extra work sweeping up bread crumbs which the boisterous children carelessly scattered."

The children around me, famished and just barely existing, suddenly spoke out. "Where, where was there such food?" Choking back the tears I answered, "In Moscow."

I. HANNYCH

THE LIVING GRAVE

This event occurred during the peak of the famine in 1933, in the village of Mykailiwka, Neforoshchanske district, Poltava region. A farmer named Marko Klymenko lived in this village. He was not very poor but neither was he rich. He had a horse, a cow, a few simple farm implements and a nice orchard and vegetable garden beside the house. But his most valuable possession was a beautiful tract of land, twelve acres of highly fertile black loam.

With the beginning of collectivization the whole countryside was infested with Russian Communist workers and "25-thousanders," armed with pistols and unlimited power to crucify Ukrainian farmers. No sooner was the threshing completed than the Komsomol shock brigade under the leadership of

a "25-thousander," appeared in the village under the grain-collecting plan, diligently searching out and seizing every kernel of grain. The grain poured in a steady stream into the railroad stations and thence on to Moscow.

Those who had refrained from joining the collective farms were branded as kurkuls. And this is what happened to Marko Klymenko. Several times he had been summoned by Urbanov, who beat him with his pistol and demanded his signature on the application form, but Marko withstood the brutality and refused to sign. Then Urbanov ordered the grain-collecting commission to seize all the grain Marko had and even the buckwheat, millet and potatoes. Again they pressed him to join the collective farm, threatening him with deportation if he refused, and again he remained resolute.

Then he was declared a kurkul and dispossessed of all his property. The livestock and machinery were appropriated by the collective farm and everything else by the government. He was arrested and sentenced to Siberia with about ten others. As he was taken away he resisted strongly, and the GPU beat him so badly that he could not stand on his feet. Every inch of his body was bruised and covered with blood. In this condition he was taken to the district prison while his wife and three children were left without even a crust of bread in the cold, empty house.

The deliberate appropriation of grain by the Soviet government soon brought the inevitable results. In the first months of 1933 people ate mice, oil-cake, bark and almost everything imaginable. By spring hundreds were swollen from starvation. Dead bodies littered the streets and market places, ignored by everyone. Soon, though, an order was issued that all the dead must be promptly buried because the decay was causing disease which threatened the GPU, "25thousanders" and other Communist officials. Because none of the farmers were fit to dig graves Urbanov called a GPU detachment from the district headquarters for this task. They dug a huge pit where once every three days dead bodies were dumped, after being collected by the village active and Komsomol group, and covered with a thin layer of earth.

Urbanov himself took an active part in the burial. He distinguished himself by throwing into the pit people who, though they were motionless, were still living, and burying them. This happened when one day he came to the home of

Marko Klymenko and found his wife and three children lying on the floor, swollen and unable to move from starvation. Urbanov ordered them to be taken to the pit and buried. When some of his commission members protested that it did not seem right to bury people who were still alive Urbanov answered that it made no difference, that today or tomorrow they would die and have to be buried anyway.

When the woman and the children were brought to the edge of the pit she seemed to realize what was about to happen. Summoning all her remaining strength and raising her head she spoke in a pleading voice: "Please do not bury us. We are still alive and, God willing, we may yet get well again."

In answer Urbanov kicked her on the chin with his heavy boot and with the words, " You did not want to join the collective farm so now you die," he threw her and the children into the almost full grave and buried them.

That is why this grave was called the "living grave" by the people.

STEPAN DUBOVYK

THE BAN ON TRAVEL BY HUNGRY PEOPLE

On May 13, 1930, my father and I, after being de-kurkulized, were confined in Kharkiw prison. All our possessions, our home, grain, horses, barns, orchards were given to the poor.

I escaped from prison and for a time hid with a Bulgarian in Kharkiw, at No. 36 Ivanitska Street. After some time I secured work on the railroad in Balaklaya where I had a chance to see how, every night, hundreds of people were brought to the station, loaded into freight cars and shipped to the North. A little later I became a reserve train conductor, stationed at Osnova.

At the peak of the famine, 1933, I, as head of a train, had occasion to help people, which I did as much as possible. For instance on May 15, 1933, I received an order from the personnel director, Petro Shapozhnik, to take passenger train No. 315-316 from Osnova to Balaklaya, on the Kharkiw-Levada route. These was an order at that time that tickets should be sold only to holders of official documents, which meant only those who were employed. This ruling barred farmers from travel.

Our train reached Balaklaya in the evening and remained there until 4 A. M. the following morning. Many people, their hands and feet swollen from starvation, were milling about the station trying to get on the train to seek bread in the cities and towns. They begged and pleaded but were refused tickets for the journey. It was a pitiful distressing scene. Finally I ordered the guards to take them on and they did.

From Balaklaya the train went to Kharkiw, and then returned to Osnova. The head guard, Onopko, and the head of the workers' committee, Svinaryov, started proceedings against me. I was accused of organizing the illegal transportation of passengers and was dismissed from work. My pay was withheld.

This ban on free travel by starving farmers was an added cause of the deaths of hundreds of people in the surrounding districts. For example, 400 people died of starvation in the village of Borshchiwka, 350 in the village of Blahodyriwka, 300 in Virbiwka, an unaccounted number in Savyntsi, 1,000 in Balaklaya, 600 in Andriyiwka, 700 in Heniwka, 1,200 in the collective farm of "Red Star," 1,800 in the small town of Boromlya, and so on in all the villages, hamlets and towns throughout Ukraine. All these figures are approximate.

Graves could not be dug fast enough to bury all the dead, so they were simply dumped in wells or any holes or pits that could be found, and covered with dirt when they were full.

MYKHAYLO SHKVARKO

DEATH FROM STARVATION OF UKRAINIAN FARMERS

At the beginning of de-kurkullization and compulsory collectivization I was in the Kharkiw Kholodnohorska prison. In 1930 I was released and, with my family, found shelter in the village of Zhuravliwka, on the outskirts of Kharkiw. The village comprised mostly ex-prisoners or those fleeing from government repression in the Ukrainian villages.

My first encounter with the famine was when I was returning home from work at the Planning Institute one evening at ten o'clock, and met two boys in the shadows of the long flight of stairs. As I came nearer I saw that they were about nine or ten years of age. In cracked voices they pleaded, "Give us some bread, give us something to eat, for we have had noth-

ing for a week. Our mothers are dying of hunger."

In my briefcase I had three slices of bread, which I had saved from dinner in the dining room, and a one-pound herring from the shop at the plant and gave them to the boys. They took my offering and silently hurried to the space under the stairs where they were hiding from the militia.

Again, I saw in Zhuravliwka how a truck loaded with militia-men drove up to a line of people trying to buy some grain which was sold to the workers and officials, a kilogram (two pounds) per person, without ration cards. They took several swollen farmers from the line, threw them into the truck and told them, "If you want bread why don't you work in the collective farms? Instead, you loafers come to the city because it pleases you better."

The truck roared away taking them to a deep ravine where the Kharkiw militia took all those who died from starvation. They picked up the swollen and weak Ukrainian farmers around Kharkiw and put them into one communal grave.

Another case occurred when a young boy, about seven, came to our apartment to beg for bread. This was in March, 1933, when my wife and I were at work and our own son, age six, was at home alone. The strange boy had walked in and begged, "Boy, give me bread. I am hungry; do not kill me." Our son gave him a piece of bread which we had left for him to eat and the other boy ate it all at once.

When my wife returned home from work she found the boy asleep in the hall. When he heard her come in he awoke and started pleading with her not to tell the militia that he was there, for they would take him to the pit. He had seen them take his mother there the previous day. The next morning the boy was not in the hall. He had wandered on to look for bread.

One day in March, 1933, when my wife and I returned from work we found her younger sister and my younger sister, who had come in from the village where they lived, in our apartment. Both were swollen and their bodies gleamed like glass. After staying with us for about two weeks they began to look normal again, and in the meantime they told us what was happening in the village. There was no food. The government had collected every last kernel of grain and other produce, so they ate chaff and often died from eating it. More than half the houses were vacant. People tried to flee to Russia

or Donbas, but without documents they were not allowed on the trains. If they managed to get away somehow they could not secure work or buy food, so they came back home and died from starvation.

The schools were closed for lack of pupils, and the teachers joined the activist group and went around the village organizing brigades for collecting wood, iron, leather, wool and other things left in the vacant houses and other brigades for picking up the dead and hauling them to the Mosienki ravine.

They told us the heartending story of how my father-in-law, Pavlo Husar, swollen with hunger, had started out to Russia to seek bread and died in a thicket in the village of Lyman, three and a half miles from home. The people in Lyman helped to bury him. They also told us how my wife's other sister had eaten chaff and roots and died the following day; how my oldest brother's widow had been intercepted at least five times while on her way to Russia to get bread, and how she had exchanged all her clothes for food and tried to take care of her three children and my old mother, but finally died of hunger herself. Then two of her children died, Yakiv, 6, and Petro, 8. They were buried by their sister in the orchard under the cherry tree.

We were told how my mother was still living and was taken care of by her grandson Ivan, 12. My wife and I then decided that I should go and bring her to live with us in Kharkiw.

On my way to the village, as the train was passing through the station of Hrakovo, I saw how swollen and weak the villagers were as they tried to get on a train to go to Russia for bread; but the train crew, the conductor and guards threw them from the steps to the ground. At the railroad station of Valatselivka I saw the same picture.

In a third class waiting room at the station of Kupyansk-Vuzlova I saw more than 200 starving people, over half of whom lay like dogs on the cement floor and no longer even begged. The others thronged over them as they waited for the train. A great many of them died right there and the rest, the "more fortunate" ones may have succeeded in getting to another station, but did not escape deats.

From the station of Dvorichka I went on foot to my native

village. Although it was not long since I had last been there I could hardly recognize it.

The Moscow government had taken all the food away long before. Now the village was even bereft of cats and dogs. The officials hunted them and put them in a pound, but the hungry people caught and ate them. People avoided one another in the calm, unreal atmosphere for fear of being eaten, for people went insane and often ate their children, mothers, husbands, wives.

My mother and a few of her neighbors told me how H. Zhuk ate his mother; how a woman they knew ate her children, and how H. Skrynnyk ate his mother.

In July, 1933, I learned the fate of my younger brother, Pylyp. Two farmers from the village, V. Vasko and F. Khroshynyn, were then working in the Kharkiw Tractor Plant. They told me how my brother had gone to the field to pick a few heads of grain for his swollen, starving children. He had not picked a handful when, from behind the corner of a barn, the enraged collective farm brigadier, Ivan Suma, leaped out with a club in his hand. He seized Pylyp by the throat and began to strangle him. Pylyp was swollen and weak and pleaded with Suma to spare him for the sake of his children who were waiting for him at home. The savage brigadier threw Pylyp to the dry road and, without giving him time to fall, struck him over the head with the club. Pylyp dropped dead. His wife, Sofia, went out of her mind and wandered away, leaving the three small children in the house where they died within a few days.

After my arrest my mother again returned to the village. I learned of her fate from my uncle Semen to whom I returned after my release from the Pkhta-Pechora concentration camp in 1941. Having returned to her native village from Kharkiw my mother also brought some food with her. When the village activists learned of this they went to her house and took everything away from her. Then they killed her by smothering her with a pillow.

F. PRAVOBEREZHNY

INCIDENTS OF THE FAMINE

During a breathing-space of nearly two years, from the moment of the publication of Stalin's famous "Dizzy" article

in 1930, until 1932, there was being hatched in the innermost secret corners of the Kremlin a terrible, diabolical, inhuman plan that was intended to smash the Ukrainian farmers once and for all. In agreement with the well-known Communist principle that "the end justifies the means," the Kremlin decided upon using a means of compulsion unheard of in human history, namely depriving more than 40 million of the Ukrainian farm population of all foodstuffs and, with the help of the ensuing famine, to force them into submission.

The organization of the famine was worked out very carefully. That could be seen from the fact that even the seed-grain, which was always kept in special granaries in the collective farms, was in the early autumn of 1932, carried away for storage in large cities, mostly outside the boundaries of Ukraine. This was done to prevent the farmers, when the fierce famine really struck, from plundering the grain for their own consumption. The following spring, in 1933, the grain was brought back under heavy guard by special GPU detachments.

After the first quotas of the 1932 crop were collected from the farmers, additional and third quotas were demanded. Farmers started to hide a few scanty provisions, but soon local brigades and Komisomols were making a general search. Armed with crow bars, and accompanied by the militia and the GPU, they went from one farmer to another taking everything that was edible, even old oil cakes that were kept for the cows. Very few people succeed in hiding anything.

Hunger was the unavoidable sequel. There was no bread left at all in the villages. The miserable remains of potatoes and other vegetables were consumed before Christmas, and then people began to eat anything they could get hold of to still the pangs of hunger. They cut straw into chaff and, together with husks and bark, ground it in a mill. They mixed this with potatoes or potato peelings and baked "bread" from the mixture. Cats, mice and dogs became common foot items. In spring frogs, snails, squirrels, tortoises, nettle and sorrel were added to this list. Diseases of the digestive organs in their severest forms, very often fatal, became the order of the day.

Farmers flocked to large cities. All roads leading to Kiev were overflowing with wandering people with inflamed eyes, parched lips and completely exhausted bodies. Along the roadsides corpses of the "pilgrims" were lying. Men and women died while on their way to seek a crust of bread for their famish-

ed children, or while returning home empty-handed.

In Kiev every morning the streets were littered with the fresh corpses of farmers who had died during the night. Vans were kept busy collecting them and carrying them away. One morning, on my way to work, I saw the corpse of a young woman lying on the corner of Lviw Street, near Sinny Market. She was lying with her eyes wide open and her baby was crawling over her dead body trying to find its mother's breast. The driver of the truck, who was collecting the corpses was standing by awkwardly and helplessly. What should he do? If he threw the mother into the van—what, then, to do with the child? Throw it in too?

Mothers driven to the brink of despair were bringing their babies and sometimes their older children to the city in order to leave them unnoticed at the door of a shelter, a hos- thus save them from certain death. Leaving her baby on a pital or even at the private door of some "good people" and doorstep, the mother herself would retreat hastily and hide behind the next corner and, fearing for the fate of her child, would watch anxiously until it was "found." Once in a while the mother was caught while committing her "crime" and made to take it back home with her. Later, during the years 1934-38, I came across many mothers frantically passing from office to office in Kiev trying to find out what happened to the children abandoned by them in 1933. Many hot tears were shed by those who did not succeed in finding any trace of their lost children.

That the Stalin Famine had been planned and organized in advance is proved also by the fact that factories in Ukraine refused to employ local farmers as they did others from adjoining regions. This was evidently done to prevent the local farmers from getting bread at their place of work, which would help them to avoid the necessity of joining the collectives. A special inspection was ordered in the villages near large cities and industrial centers. The inspectors' duty was to see that the local population did not obtain jobs in their neighborhood. Similar orders were given to the administrators of factories and works. The control was strengthened by an order that no one without a pass should be given a job, not even a temporary one. In my village there were at that time large half-mechanized brick and tile works which used to employ over 500 workers during the summer season. In 1933 this establishment gave

work to regular workers only—that is, to those who had worked there in the previous season. The rest, about half of the whole force, was made up of workers from Byelorussia who had been contracted by special recruiting agents, although right on the spot the farmers would have considered it a boon to be given the jobs.

I shall quote here excerpts from the evidence given under oath before a notary public in Munich in 1938. The evidence, furnished by Anna Kasha, a displaced person (now a practicing physician in the U.S.A.) is an example of the famine in Dniepropetrovsk, far from my region of Kiev.

I, Anna Kasha, was born on December 23, 1910, in the village of Hladosy, Kherson district. My father was de-kurkulized in 1929, and exiled to the far North. I have never heard from him since. My brothers wandered about for many years all over Central Asia and the Urals. I myself succeeded in getting forged documents and established myself as a teacher at the primary school in Obushkiwtsi village near Dniepropetrovsk. Many of those who forged documents had to "change" their nationality because it was safer to do so. Ukrainians were treated badly everywhere; the authorities did not trust them and arrested them at the first opportunity.

"In 1932 I entered the Dniepropetrovsk Medical Institute. In 1933 I decided to visit my acquaintances in Obushkiwtsi. Disembarking from my ship I noticed at once that there were no children at the Dnieper harbor. Formerly many children used to come here to play and watch. In the village I did not see any people in the streets other than those who were going to work.


"I did not see anyone in H's courtyard, no child was looking out through the window as they used to. On entering the room I heard groaning, and advancing in that direction, I saw two children lying on the bed. One of them tried to speak to me. I recognized her as the elder girl, one of my former pupils. 'I am afraid of rats,' she said, 'they run all over me. Tania died a few days ago; the rats have eaten her eyes out, now they run over me. Mother and the children are on the oven; they stopped talking the day before yesterday. Father and Peter were taken by some strange people. Thy died a long, long time ago.'

"In the next courtyard I looked in on the Shch. family. Emptiness greeted me everywhere. The courtyard was covered with

ergot. A woman passing by said that nearly everyone on the street had died during winter. Then I went to see the school. I found no children there. The teachers had all gon their different ways. Only the principal remained, and he took care of a few children whose fathers worked at the factories. The majority of the population had died. Only those survived who worked regularly at the factories and received workers' food rations.

"Returning to Dniepropetrovsk I met a colleague, a teacher from the village of Vodyane near the city of Nikopol. She told me that she did not teach any more, for there were no children left to teach. Nor were there many older people left. Out of a population of 5,000 there remained alive four to five hundred people. Two to three hundred persons had been arrested and exiled to Siberia a few hundred dispersed all over the country fleeing from hunger, and the rest died from starvation."

I must add that it was strictly forbidden to use the term "famine" to denote what was happening in Ukraine. In the newspapers not a word about the famine was printed at that time, and in ordinary conversation and propaganda speeches the terms "difficulties" or "difficulties of growth" were used. For using the term "famine" one was deported to the North.



Orphans.

THEY SEARCHED FOR FOOD UNDER THE SNOW

When, in the spring of 1933, the snow had begun to melt in the village of Velyka Semeniwka, in the Kharkiw region, the famine-stricken people went out into the fields to look for something to eat. Some of them gleaned last year's ears of grain among the unploughed stubble, others looked for roots of all sorts or stripped the trees of their new bark. Still others caught field mice and gophers by pouring water down their holes to make them come out. In the case of dead livestock, the people did not stop to consider whether or not they were infected with a contagious disease; they would fall upon the carrion, cut it up in pieces and devour it. And then they would die.

NATALKA LYUTAREVYCH

DEAD HORSES AND RENDERING PLANTS

It was not only famished people who perished during the winter and spring of 1932-33, for, on the collective farms, the horses also died en masse. The hungry people saw their salvation in these dead horses, sharing the meat with one another. The authorities, however, prohibited this and ordered the collective farms to hand over all the dead horses to rendering plants, granting each collective farm an insurance policy in return. Should a collective farm fail to do this it could not collect the insurance policy. There was one of these rendering plants in Chornoukhy in the Poltava region, located just beyond the Jewish cemetery, on the way to Bilousiwa and Hiltsi.

Vasyl Bubir was in charge of this plant, and Ilko Hrebelcky was his assistant. These two men saved many of the villagers in such places as Kozlikwa, Kharsik, Bondariw, Kovaliw, and others, from the famine, by allowing the people to cut up the dead horses which were sent to the plant. The people would select the choicer cuts of meat, rinse them in the river down in the hollow and carry them in little bags home to their families. But on account of this, the rendering plant was not fulfilling its "plan." The authorities got wind of the reason why, and posted an armed guard around it.

YOUNG AND OLD—ALL WERE SHOT TO DEATH

In the village of Mala Lepetikha, not far from Zaporizha, a horse, subsequently discovered to have been infected with glanders, died on a collective farm sometime in March of 1933.

The hungry collective workers exhumed the horse and everyone in the place helped devour it. After some time, several cases of glanders cropped up among them. The authorities from Zaporizha investigated the matter and discovered that those people had become ill through eating that particular horse. They decided to exterminate all the inhabitants of the place who had eaten the glanderous horse.

In what words the resolution was committed to paper, in what minutes it was recorded, is not known. What is well known is the bare fact that a detachment of NKVD surrounded the place one evening, went from house to house and shot everyone—old and young.

The butchering of these people was committed to several "experts," especially selected for that job, among whom Oleksander Rezanov, an inspector of the Workers' and Peasants' Militia, distinguished himself by his singular savagery.

During that dreadful spring, when thousands of people were perishing each day, when corpses were lying untended in the streets and dwellings, no one even noticed this "minor" incident...

PETRO KULISH

A DIET OF MOULDY MASH

In the spring of 1933, when the whole populace was starving, the hungry people of the village of Zhabotinya in the Kamyanske district of the region of Kirovohrad were using the dried leaves of the linden, mixed with a little potato or screenings, for food. When there was not enough of these to add to the leaves, which themselves formed the main staple of their diet, they obtained mash from a dirty pit at the distillery in the neighbouring village of Melnyky; this was the previous year's mash which had gone mouldy and was no longer even fit to feed livestock.

My neighbour, Pylyp Mykolenko, who was 37 years old,

was one of those who went to fetch some of this mash home on his back. This was his first and only time.

It was April, 1933, and there were still light spring frosts in the mornings. Pylyp carried around 15 to 20 kilograms of the mash on his shoulders, for a distance of five kilometres. He was very emaciated and as soon as he brought the mash home he took to his bed where, on the fifth of May, he gave his soul into God's keeping.

Pylyp's wife, Olyana, continued to work on the collective farm in her hunger-swollen state. She was too weak to go there every day, but for each day she did work she received 200 grams of bread. She steeped this bread in water, added some linden leaves to it and made "fritters," called "oladki" which she took for her lunch when she worked in the fields. On this diet she survived the famine.

L. PYLYPENKO

A DISH OF DRIED CALVES' HIDES

The population of Rohozow in the region of Kiev, in an effort to save their lives, used the most unlikely substances as foodstuffs. Some went into the fields where dead horses were



Corpse of a woman in the field.

buried and cut chunks of meat from the carcasses. (The horses were dying to the same extent as the people at the time.) They cooked the meat and ate it without bread or potatoes.

Others had 'dried calves' hides from former days; these were scalded with hot water, scraped free of hair, chopped in little pieces and boiled in water.

Still others went on hunger-swollen legs to the threshing-grounds in the fields where the collective farm's threshing machine had worked the previous year; there they winnowed the chaff in sieves, hunting for stray kernels of grain and weed seed. They pulverized these in a mortar and baked "baladoni" of the flour.

When the spring sun became stronger and the drift ice began to break up in the pond, the waves began to throw up dead fish along the shores; the people gathered this fish, cooked and ate it.

Later, when it became really warm and the white acacia trees began to bloom, the people picked these blossoms, dried them in ovens, crushed them in mortars and devised all sorts of culinary delicacies for a meal. The children swarmed like bees over the acacia trees, feasting on the sweet white blossom.

N. LUYTAREVICH

"MOTORZHENIKI"—THE BREAD OF THE FAMISHED

The villagers of Bilousiwka, Chornoukny and other villages of the Chornoukhy district in the Poltava region were robbed of their foodstuffs by the food stock pile project in the fall and winter of 1932-33 and simply left to perish of hunger. Very seldom did anyone succeed in hiding away any grain.

The people made attempts on their own to save themselves from death by starvation. Members of large families who had not yet become completely incapacitated and could move to some other place fled the village for a job in the towns or to some province in Northern Russia, where there was no famine, such as Murmansk, Leningrad, Moscow, or the Urals. There they would establish themselves in jobs and assist their needy families with food parcels.

Those who were left in the villages sought some sort of foodstuffs in their own locality. They exhausted the rivers of all fish, frogs and snails. They ate up every dog and cat in

the villages, and caught and ate wild birds, such as crows, jackdaws and sparrows. But all that was insufficient. They ate the leaves of the linden, elm, and acacia; as a result, the lindens and acacias were everywhere completely stripped of their leaves since their foliage was regarded the most digestible. Buckwheat chaff was deemed a "delicacy."

They started to bake the so-called "motorzheniki" (literally, something that drives a motor at top speed), in place of bread. These were blackish-green cakes which, with their admixture of foliage and weeds resembled cow-dung.

Whoever was fortunate enough to save a cow, goat or sheep, and had some milk occasionally, was a source of envy to all. These beasts had to be very carefully watched over even in broad day-light, while at night they were taken into the owners' houses in order to prevent their being stolen and eaten by famished neighbours.

1. NADDNISTROY

TOADSTOOLS A POOR MEANS OF SATING HUNGER

Trokhim Zaveryukha's family from the Uchastak settlement in the Orininske district of the Podillya region was very hard hit by the famine in the spring of 1933. Trokhim's wife and five small children had been left completely helpless after he was sentenced to Siberia during the State purchases and grain stock-piling in 1929.

In the spring, when all sorts of mushrooms and toadstools appeared in the woods after the rain, the people fell upon the mushrooms and picked them off, leaving only the toadstools. Trokhim's children did not know how to recognize mushrooms; they picked toadstools, brought them home, and their mother cooked them. The toadstools poisoned the children that same day and they died in the next few days at the medical dispensary, where it was found impossible to save them.

Five-year-old Ivas and seven-year-old Olya died first. A few days later the three-year-old boy also died.

The mother left her one-year-old baby at home and went to the woods to look for more "mushrooms." She did not return. Six weeks later she was found in the bushes devoured by ants.

The nine-year-old boy fled from the village. He herded cattle somewhere for some official of the district and escaped

the famine. The one-year-old baby was taken to a children's shelter, where they gathered all the children whose parents had died of starvation. All trace was lost of Trokhim Zaver'yukha as well.

In this fashion all of Trokhim Zaver'yuka's family was destroyed by the famine.

HUNGER VICTIMS' MARKETS—SOURCES OF FOOD AND CRIME

The government did not at that time exert any control whatsoever, sanitary or otherwise, over the markets for the hungry. These markets were for the most part established by the amoral elements for the purpose of profiteering. A few resourceful individuals occupied themselves with pilfering from these markets and in this way avoided death by starvation.

Courts of lynch-law were established to try those who stole at the markets to satisfy their hungry stomachs; the government paid no attention to them. Courts of lynch-law were also set up in the villages.

But all these markets were actually the source of tremendous profit to the criminal and racketeering elements. There even existed special workshops for preparing foodstuffs of unwholesome quality to sell there, one instance which was the one in Yahòtyn.

P. L. SUSLYK

COAT-TAIL COMMERCE

In the spring of 1933 there was very little food for sale in any city and town markets in any district. Take, for example, the one in Zinkiw. There were small quantities of millet and corn, meal and grain, potatoes, sugar, etc., but all these products were very expensive and were sold by glassfuls or spoonfuls. Potatoes were sold singly, while pork fat of which, surprisingly, there was some, was sold in 10 gram pieces. There were also cutlets of human or dead horse meat for sale there.

But it was very difficult either to sell or to buy anything. The hungry, particularly the small boys, would snatch everything out of the vendor's hands. One such twelve-year-old boy, Mykhaylo Rak from the Nedilkiwshchina settlement, daily foraged through the market place, and, even, though he some-

times returned home mercilessly beaten, still he succeeded in saving himself from starvation.

Cautious people conducted their transactions in the following manner: It was necessary to find a partner, so that each could help the other. One of them would take all the wares, hide them under his coat and stand far off to one side. The other would take just a few cutlets or "flatcakes" (pancakes) and go in search of customer, noting who was holding money in his hand. He would approach such a person and whisper that he had this or that for sale, and they would strike a bargain.

When the hungry noticed the transaction they would immediately surround the two, but the vendor would gesticulate and say that he had already sold everything.

Thus, first one, then the other partner would dispose of his wares.

N. ZOLOTAREVYCH

A "GRABBER" AT THE MARKET

Anton Zakharovich Petrenko (commonly nicknamed "Tit") was a representative of hereditary paupers from Chornoukhy, but he would not join the collective farm, even though the village activists spared no pains in inviting him to do so.

In the spring of 1933 hunger constrained him to seek some means of salvation and he found it. He became a professional "grabber" at the market, and it was there that he spent all his time. He would saunter through the market and observe the women to see which one was not keeping a sharp watch over her wares. And then he would grab—a morsel of bread or an entire loaf, a bottle of milk, a piece of pork fat, or whatever he could.

When he had snatched something from the market he quickly fled to the "heaps" beyond the market place, and immediately devoured it there. That was how he lived through the famine and preserved his life. His forays always went unpunished.

N. LYUTAREVICH

A HUNGRY BOY IS TRIED BY LYNCH LAW AT THE MARKET

In 1933 the market days in Chornoukhy were Mondays and Fridays, as had always been the custom. But this year the markets were exceedingly wretched. The sort of commodities

the people brought to sell were often of questionable quality.

Some woman from the village of Postawniki once brought a large earthenware pot of baked fish. She sat watching her wares diligently lest some hungry person snatch a fish away from her, but her attention wandered and she did not have time to prevent one of her fish being seized by a hungry boy who began to run away with it. A wild clamour arose in the market place:—"Catch him!" "Hold him!" "Beat him!"

I came up to the crowd surrounding the captured thief, whom I recognized to be the son of Ivan Mikhaylovich Aleksandrov, formerly a fairly well-to-do peasant from the town of Chornoukhy. It was little Volodya, 7 or 8 years old, tattered and dirty, with hunger-swollen arms and legs. He stood in the midst of this brute mob of market women, sobbing and trembling. He had time to bolt down the snatched fish, bones and all, on the run, but now he understood all too well that the time of reckoning was at hand. Now the wronged market-woman approached Volodya, shrieking, "Blast your liver, what did you do with the fish?"

"Why, he ate it," someone spoke up from the crowd in despairing tones.

"Who is he?" again could be heard from someone in the crowd.

"As if you didn't know! It's that kulak Hnatenko's boy." (Aleksandrov was nicknamed "Hnatenko".)

"Beat him!" shouted one of the market-women. Flailing arms filled the air. Volodya could be heard screaming and wailing. When, later, the mob of market-women dispersed at the approach of a guardian of "revolutionary law and order," the militiamen Kononow, I could see Volodya, with one eye knocked out, lying unconscious upon the ground.

Similar incidents of lynch-law by market-women occurred frequently at that time.

N. ZOLOTAREVYCH

FAMINE, THIEVING AND LYNCH LAW

There was a rash of thieving in 1932-33 which assumed such proportions that it was difficult to combat it. The Soviet Government had never taken a sufficiently firm stand against the stealing of private property, at the time of the famine, but to make up for it, punished everyone mercilessly for any sort of anti-government offence. In this famine-stricken spring

the articles liable to be stolen were such as surely never before nor since were likely to be stolen anywhere else in the world.

Such things as beans planted in the garden or borshch cooking on the stove were subject to forays. If people noticed smoke coming from a chimney the house became an object of surveillance to the starving. Because, where there is fire there is likely to be food cooking. Frequently if the household-er had to leave his house for a time it was overhauled by thieves during his absence and the borshch on the stove was gone when he returned.

The militia did nothing to combat the thieving; the people, therefore, were forced to resort to self-help and courts of lynch-law, as a means of self defence. Here are a few instances from the village of Chornoukhy in Poltava region:

In the village of Kharsik, the birth-place of the famous Ukrainian philosepher, Skovoroda, Marfa Prykhodko dug up some potatoes which had been planted in the garden of Lohinow, an official of the Chornouchi County Military Commissariat. This woman was with child at the time. Lohinow caught her in the act and gave her such a merciless beating with a shoulder-yoke that she died on the spot. Lohinow was not punished for the deed.

Tolya, the daughter of Odarka Pokidko of Chornouchi, was looking for something to eat and crawled into the garden of the collective farm book-keeper, Hawrilo Turko, where she pulled up a few heads of garlic. Turko beat her so brutally that as soon as she had dragged herself home she died. Turko was not punished either.

Ivan Orel, who worked as a watchman at the collective farm store-house, wanted to pick something from Afanasy Brekalo's garden. Brekalo beat up Orel so badly that the latter died the next day. Brekalo went unpunished.

There were many cases of cows, hogs and goats being stolen in Chornouchi, the thieves being known to be Sizon Timoshchik and Khvedir Verteletsky. One day the villagers, enraged by the systematic robbery, held a court of lynch-law for Timoshchik and Verteletsky which was conducted by the Communist Kyrylo Kostevich Herasymenko, who later was appointed judge in that district. They killed both men right in their own homes in the presence of their wives and children. There was no investigation into the affair.

PROFITEERING DURING THE FAMINE

Examples of profiteering in Chornouhy the Poltava region were as follows:

1. Mokiy Khfedorovich Turko, father of the bookkeeper at the Petrowsky collective farm, who had some nine sheep on his farm for a long time sold fried dog meat at the market in the guise of mutton. He caught the dogs at the rendering plants, where they gathered to feed on the carion delivered there for rendering.
2. Iow Cherewko, warehouseman at the collective farm named "Toward a Prosperous Life," stole various food-stuffs from the collectiv efarm's storehouse, such as meal, and had one Fedos Cherwyak sell the bread baked from from it at the market, at forty roubles per loaf.
3. Fisyura, a communist and head of the Soviet Union of Co-operative Societies for the district of Chornoukhy, had his wife, Maria barter morsels of bread for innumerable valuable items such as tapestries, ornamental towels, embroidery, and so on.
4. Opanasenko, Deputy-head of the Chorno'uchi District Branch of the OGPU, discovered that Andriy Chervyak, from the settlement of Sukha Lokhytys which belonged to village Soviet of Bilousiw, had parted with gold coin at the State department store, (Torgsin), later forced Andriy Chervyak to surrendre the rest of his coins, which he himself appropriated. Chervlak and the rest of the family perished of hunger.

There was an infinite number of such incidents.

PANAS SKIRDA

"SHCHERBET"—POISON TO THE FAMISHED

There was no supervision on the part of the government of the market-places or of commodities sold there at the time of the famine, consequently the people sold whatever they wished. Under such circumstances, therefore, there was no shortage of criminal and profiteering elements who took advantage of the people's unfortunate situation and made an unconscionable profit out of it, selling all sorts of inedible and even poisonous substances in the guise of food.

"Shcherbet" was one of those poisonous substances, which was prepared at Yahotyn in the Poltava region not for personal consumption but exclusively for sale and strictly for profit. The "shcherbet" was prepared mainly by various small-town merchant-speculators, among whom was a goodly number of Jews. It was a small cake made of millet chaff mixed with molasses, occasionally enhanced by the addition of a small quantity of cattle-cake made from beet-pulp.

That type of "shcherbet" sold at the Yahotyn markets at prices well within the reach of the hungry people. Being sweetened with molasses, it gave the starving people a momentary sensation of satiety, but the gratifying effects did not last long, for the ingredients of the "shcherbet" caused a most agonizing pain when taken on an empty stomach, and the partaker of this food soon died of the most horrible cramps.

A huge number of people hastened their death by eating this "shcherbet." 150 people died on Pidvarka Street in Yahotyn, most of them after having indulged in "shcherbet."

Katerina Matyushka of the Royiwka settlement in the Yahotyn district made pasties with the flesh of dead children and sold them at the market.

"TORGSINS" — A SOURCE OF CRIMINAL PROFITEERING EXPLOITED BY THE GOVERNMENT

The greatest crime of profiteering at the expense of the starving, however, was committed by the Government itself, when it organized state department stores, called Torgsins, in almost every district town and city in the Ukraine expressly for this purpose, at a time when there were none in the districts of other provinces of the USSR.

"Torgsins," an abbreviation of "Torgowlasinostrantsami" stores for trading with foreigners, had formerly conducted their business only in leading cities such as Moscow and Leningrad. The stores were now opened in the midst of the starving populace of Ukraine in the famine-stricken year of 1932-33, with the aim of stripping the famished villagers of the last remnants of their family heirlooms such as gold and silver crucifixes, ear-rings, wedding-bands, other rings watch-cases, and even gold coins. They were a source of replenishment of the Soviet "Gold Funds."

Furthermore, Soviet goods at that time began to be boy-

cotted abroad as a protest against the Soviet government's robbery of its own people. Therefore, the goods which had been produced for export were now released on to the domestic market among the starving people.

Here is one example of the transactions of the "Torgsin" in the vicinity of Kiev, and Kiev itself: A hungry working-class family from the town of Nizhen exchanged their grandfather's wedding-band, a family heirloom, for food. These "Torgsins" took their levy of gold articles not only from among the starving populace in the country, but from among the semi-starved population in the cities throughout the Ukraine as well.

D. DMYTRENKO

THE "TORGSINS" IN AND AROUND KIEV

In 1932-33 my work as hydrographer took me to the district along the Dnieper River from Kiev to Cherkasy. That is how I found out that in addition to the "Torgsin" in Kiev there were also others in Bila Tserkva, Bohuslaw, Kaniw, Cherkasy, and Zolotonosho.

The "Torgsin" in Kiev was located on Khreshchatyk Street, on the corner of what had formerly been Duma Square. It was a large shop with several entrances from the street. All sorts of foodstuffs were on display in the shop windows—meat, fish, dairy products, confectionery, fruits, several kinds of flour, and so forth.

In the vicinity of this shop or just outside it a throng of people of all sorts could always be found, who could roughly be divided into three categories: the first was the starving villagers of the Ukraine, men, women and children, who did not have any gold. They came and stood outside the walls and doors of the "Torgsin" in the hope that some shopper at the "Torgsin" would share some of his modest purchases with them. The second was the workers, civil servants, and especially the students from Kiev itself who also did not have any "gold," but were half-starved and had come to the "Torgsin" to window-shop. The goods displayed for the most part bore labels in foreign tongues, the one occurring most frequently being "Made in USSR" in English. The people knew that all these commodities had been produced for the export trade, but were now being sold here, for some reason. However, they

could only be bought for gold or foreign currency.

The third category of people who came to the "Torgsin" had gold. It was possible for these people to buy some of the desired goods in the shop. These goods were on sale for gold, silver or foreign currency. The starved or half-starved people, fearing death by starvation, brought their family valuables there such as crucifixes, wedding bands, ear-rings, etc. For the most part, these were villagers, but many workers did the same. Some of the Jewish population who had relatives in the United States of America and received assistance from them in the form of dollars could also buy goods there.

We had a few silver spoons that had been in my wife's family. We took these spoons to the shop. There they were assayed and weighed in a room set apart for the purpose, and our names entered in a separate book. (I later learned that the establishment was under the vigilant control of the NKVD), and we were issued a cheque for which we bought some fish and meal for our starving relations in Kiev.

M. DIDENKO

BACON FOR A WEDDING-BAND

In 1932-33, a large "Torgsin" was located on the corner of Moskowska and Hoholiwska Streets in the main section of the town of Nizhen. Nothing was displayed in the windows of the large department store, but all the inhabitants of Nizhen knew that if you just had the gold you could get anything your heart desired in the store.

Our working-class family, like all the other working-class families in town, was famished. In our family there was a treasured heirloom, grandfather's golden wedding-band. We finally decided to trade this ring for some food at the Torgsin. So one day my wife and I went to the Torgsin with the ring.

We went up to the second floor above the shop. They accepted the "gold" there. A former "jeweller" of Nizhen acted as an "expert in gold." He assayed and weighed the ring in our presence. (It weighed some 15 grams.) We then went to a separate payment office, the ring was taken from us and we were issued a cheque for 45 rubles in payment for it.

With this cheque we could now, at last, gain admittance to the Torgsin department store, which was located on the first floor. A militiaman and an employee of the Torgsin

stood at the entrance of the shop, letting in only people who had cheques like ours.

We bought some pork fat, costing around 20 kopeks per kilogram, some butter, some sort of groats and some meal for our cheque. I cut up one pound of the fat into tiny morsels. On leaving the shop I distributed those bits among the starving women and children who stood at the doors waiting for just such a "hand-out." There were scores of these starving people around the shop. They could not themselves buy any food in that shop because they had no "gold." They would sit or lie around beside the shop begging for alms, and subsisted on that.

NATALKA LYUTAREVICH

THE TORGSINS PLUNDERED THE DEAD

The Communists took advantage of the famine to rehabilitate their gold funds. To this end they opened state department stores, or Torgsins, in all the larger cities and towns in the Ukraine. One was established in Chornoukhy also which carried absolutely everything in the way of foodstuffs; about the only thing the Torgsin did not sell, the people say, was bird's milk.

But the hungry could only buy there for gold or silver. And the hungry did carry the last of their family heirlooms—crucifixes, ear-rings and wedding-bands—to those shops. The Torgsin was under the particular supervision of the NKVD, and if any of the people brought any gold coins of the Tsarist regime, the NKVD would visit them and demand that surrender the rest of their coins to the state, without any compensation, and if they refused, threatened they with imprisonment in some distant concentration camp.

Seeing that one could save himself from the famine only with gold or silver, some people took to digging up old graves in which prosperous persons had been buried some decades before. The graves of the wife of a former merchant Reukow, (nicknamed "Stumbler"), of Fenyá Denisenko, of Colonel Kalnitsky, of Colonel Ivanov, of Squire Martow, and many others in the Pokrowsky Cemetery in Chornoukhy were dug up and pillaged in this manner.

Often the graveyard robbers could not agree on how the gold they had unearthed from the graves should be divided

and the matter ended in murder. In Chornoukhy, Ivan Stadnychenko stabbed his accomplice, Yawdokmy Timoschek, to death when they could not agree on the division of the gold they had pillaged from a grave.

CHAPTER VI

FLIGHT FROM FAMISHED VILLAGES TO INDUSTRIAL TOWNS

None of the stronger and more active villagers, who envisioned an inevitable death by starvation, accepted their fate meekly. They tried to save themselves from that death by seeking salvation beyond the borders of their own villages. Some of them left their hungry families at home and struck out for the industrial centres of Ukraine, or went beyond the boundaries of famine-ridden Ukraine, where their modest savings obtained for them some kind of foodstuffs to bring home to their starving families. Others, individuals and entire families, tried to leave their villages entirely, by fleeing to the industrial towns of Ukraine or even far away from Ukraine, in order to find work and so save themselves from a hungry death.

The authorities paid little heed to this migration, even as late as the autumn of 1932, but by the winter of 1932-33 these migrations had taken on the character of a mass exodus and the authorities put into effect a blockade on transportation between the villages and towns.

The starving peasantry was foiled. It was not allowed to leave the villages. It was impossible to obtain the necessary documents in order to purchase railway tickets, or the railway tickets themselves. To top it all, with the introduction of the passport system, even those who had managed to flee from their villages were hunted out in all the distant places, and, almost forcibly, returned to Ukraine during the spring sowing campaign of 1933, there to die of starvation.

FLIGHT FROM FAMINE-STRIKEN UKRAINE VILLAGES

It was particularly difficult for the villagers from the region of Odessa, the one farthest removed from all the industrial towns, to travel to the chief centres of Russia for food. There are several accounts of such a journey from the Rudnitsya sta-

tion on the Odessa-Kiev railway line. A similar journey was made by peasants from the Moldavian Republic.

A village woman from the region of Kiev travelled to Leningrad in search of food. A veterinarian's assistant from a collective farm in the Zhitomir region travelled to Russia to trade various articles of clothing for bread for his hungry family. People from the villages fled to the Donbas, an industrial centre of the Ukraine. "I'm from Vinnich'china — I heard there's bread here in the Donbas," explained one such arrival, who soon after perished from hunger. The working people of Donbas, in the throes of Stalin's Five-Year-Plan, were also experiencing the pinch of famine and were unable to come to the aid of the starving peasantry.

Famished people fled from the Ukraine as far away as the Kuban, which had not been subjected to the same extent to famine tactics the previous year, losing their parents along the way and being compelled to throw them out of the railway carriages.

The starving population even sought refuge from the famine in the metropolitan centres of Kharkiw and Kiev, but this brought them no relief. Everywhere they were met with cold indifference and hostility on the part of government organs. "There is no famine. Anyone who says there is a famine is an enemy of the people and the Soviet government," was the hypocritical propaganda used by the government in order to cow the workers and civil servants.

I. VOLODYMYR

KNIFED IN THE BACK

Rudnitsya is a station in the province of Odessa situated on the Odessa-Kiev line that goes through to Moscow and Leningrad. There is a junction there with a narrow gauge branch line starting at Pervomay (Pidhorodnya), and running through the little stations of Sinyukha, Yuzefpil, Tauzhna, Holovaniwsk, Hrushky, Mohylne, Khashchova, Hayvoron, Ustya, Bershad and Yalanets. All these stations were gathering-points for the people from the villages of Odessa's northern districts who had been pillaged by the government to the point of utter and immediate starvation in the year of 1932-33.

The stronger and more resourceful individuals who, in addition, knew their way about when it came to travelling to

the cities, would come to Rudnitsya and try to board any kind of train going straight through to Moscow and Leningrad. During these years, however, the Odessa trains were always overcrowded and very rarely took on passengers at Rudnitsya. Then, too, although it was still possible to travel over the narrow-gauge line to Rudnitsya without a special certificate of permission, at Rudnitsya they would sell tickets only to those who had these certificates.

People who were determined to make the long journey to Moscow or Leningrad in order to obtain food for their hungry families would spend days and days at Rudnitsya. They did not even attempt to get tickets anymore, since they did not have certificates of permission. However, they stormed each train as it arrived as if it were a fortress. Even the railway KPU could not do much to defend it against the onslaught of these people. When a train was due to arrive at the station, all the doors of the railway carriages were locked. The GPU would put the individuals with tickets on the train while the people without tickets would cling to the steps, sit on the buffers and climb on to the roofs of the carriages. They were put off the train farther on, but that did not deter them.

Once in the month of December a conductor refused to let any of the people board his train so one of the starving passengers, without a certificate of permission, stabbed him in the back with a knife. The conductor crumbled to the ground and the waiting villagers rushed into the carriage. However, the train was delayed until the KPU cleared out all the ticketless passengers.

V. SAVUR

DESTINATION: LENINGRAD—OBJECT: BREAD

Y. M., a kinswoman of mine from the village of Medvin in the region of Kiev travelled to Leningrad three times in the fall of 1932 in order to obtain some food. She went there by way of Kiev and White Russia (Vitebsk). These trips were extraordinarily exhausting and the travelling alone took the greater part of a week.

In Kiev they had already begun to sell the so-called "commercial bread"; one kilogram could be obtained at a time without a ration card. It was impossible to get several loaves at a time. There were such enormous lines of hungry villagers

waiting to buy the bread that it took a whole day to obtain just one loaf, after much exertion, in just one of the lines.

But in Leningrad there were no lines at all at the shops in which bread was sold without ration-cards. Therefore, in one day at Leningrad it was possible to wait one's turn at several shops and buy several loaves. That is what my kinswoman did.

A tremendous number of starving people from Ukraine, who had come in search of bread showed up in Leningrad. The local government organs and the Leningrad militia paid little heed to these people and did not persecute them; on the contrary, they frequently showed them kindness and consideration.

These people encountered their greatest difficulties while travelling in the trains. The first time my kinswoman made her journey, she brought back with her about ten loaves of bread, with little effort. The next time she brought back only five loaves, while the last time she was relieved of all her bread on the grounds of "speculation."

VASYL MIVUTENKO

FATHER TRAVELLED TO RUSSIA FOR BREAD

We lived in the Ukrainian part of Polisia in one of the villages of the district of Chopovich in the Zhitomir region.

My maternal grandfather, Hrytsko Ivanenko, and his two sons, Ivan and VasyI, were arrested in 1930, and his property was dekurkulized and sold. The older son, Ivan Ivanenko, could not bear the harsh treatment meted out to him by his interrogator at the Zhitomir prison, disarmed him and released the prisoners from two cells, but was then shot on the spot. We received our first and last letter from my grandfather, Hrytsko Ivanenko, in which he begged for some warm clothing, posted from the town of Vyatka, and another from his son VasyI, bearing a post-mark from Arkhanhelsk. Then we lost all trace of them.

My father was an assistant to the veterinarian. He joined the collective farm named "In Bolshevik Tempo," and relinquished everything he possessed except one cow that was left at home to supply the needs of a family of five; but father was always regarded as "unreliable" because his relatives were kurkuls.

In 1933 when the famine was at its height, father travelled several times to Russia for bread. He took with him his sheep-skin-lined coat, mother's shorts, even her wedding-shirt, and all the other clothing we still possessed. That saved us from death by starvation. But our cow helped most of all. We also lived on the meat of dead horses. Father, as the veterinarian's assistant, kept records of dead stock, and had the opportunity to get occasional cuts of meat from the carcasses.

DONBAS: MECCA AND NADIR OF THE STARVING

In February of 1933, the station of Khartsizk in the region of Stalin on the Dnieproporetrovsk-Rostow line, started to fill up with men, women and children who were trying to escape death by starvation by leaving the various provinces of Ukraine such as Kiev, Vynnytsya, Poltava for the Donbas.

I walked to work past this station every day, and saw those ragged, dirty, hunger-distended people with all their worldly goods stuffed in sacks. They would come up to me and beg for bread or something to eat. The militia-men chased them away from the station time and again, but they would always return. Some of those starving people hanged themselves on the trees or in the sheds belonging to the railway workers who lived in the town.

With the coming of spring the flood of the starving increased. By March these people, black as shades, roamed not only the station, but the whole of Khartsizk as well. The station house and platform could not accomodate them all. They filled up all the floor space and the overflow lay, slept, and died on the streets beneath the hedges of the public gardens. Every morning at seven o'clock I noticed piles of untidy, quite dead bodies, while next to them members of their families already clearly exhibited complete indifference to the surrounding sights. The militia would disperse the local working people so as not to have them looking at the corpses or talking to any of the starving, and would gather up the cadavers and somewhere dispose of them. Each day they would also carry many people who had died of hunger out of the railway carriages.

By April the starving had overrun the entire town of Khartsizk. They lay in every street, at every intersection, their arms were outstretched and they begged for alms with remarks like, "You can see for yourself why we are begging." The famished people died right in the streets, still clutching

the stray coins they had succeeded in obtaining by begging.

There was a Soviet state farm, the "Hornyak" No. 5, outside the town of Khartsizk. As I was going there one day, I happened to hear a groan coming from the shrubbery at the side of the road. I approached and saw a large, handsome grey-haired man about 65 years of age lying on the bare earth, covered with a peasant jacket, with his mouth agape and his eyes shut. His whole face was covered with flies.

I brushed away the flies, looked around to see that no one was watching, and asked, "Where are you from, grandfather?" "I'm from Vinnichchina . . . I heard there's bread here in the Donbas . . . I've come here to save myself from starvation . . . Now, please, let me have a little thin soup, not bread, because I'll die if I eat bread now . . ." whispered the old man in reply.

I then went to the Soviet state farm and recounted all this to the administration. They promised to send some soup to old man, but I know that no one saw to it that it was done, because everyone was afraid to take the responsibility, since it was forbidden to help the starving in an official capacity. The next morning a militiaman from Khartsizk discovered the old man's body among the nettles.

A few of the starving had the good fortune to land jobs, but their hunger was not sated thereby. These hungry people, who were already working, used to go along the streets and through the garbage heaps looking for something edible.

I was going to the town of Makiyivka one day when I glimpsed some people peering out of a trench near the pipe works. Taking a closer look, I saw that there was a dead horse in the trench. Then I realized that these people were watching over the horse in order to cut themselves a portion of meat unobserved.

On my way home after sunset I saw the people chopping the horse to pieces and carrying the meat away with them in little bags, leaving only the excrement in the pit, because they took away the hide and intestines, too.

At their various meetings the Communists never once made the least mention of all these scenes of famine and death being witnessed by the workers; they had to keep repeating the directive from Moscow that "the Ukraine under Moscow is a blossoming and happy land and there is no famine within it."

ESCAPE BY RAIL TO THE KUBAN

There were several of us dekurkulized families at Ilovaysk in the Donbas who knew each other. We were living there illegally and had to hide in order to avoid investigation. It was no longer safe to stay there permanently. At the beginning of March, 1932, Hrytsko Babych, Ivan Babych, two strange families, and our own—five families in all—decided to flee together to the Kuban.

Famine was already raging in Ukraine by the beginning of 1932. People looking for salvation travelled en masse to the Kuban in the hope of obtaining some bread to bring home to their families. There was no famine in the Kuban that year; it did not arrive until 1933. It was still possible to buy a bushel of meal in the Kuban for five to ten rubles, while in Poltava the same meal cost 120 rubles; a loaf of bread cost one rouble in the Kuban while in Poltava it cost 10 rubles, while a litre of oil cost 7 or 8 rubles there and was far more expensive at home.

Some people were going to the Kuban by rail to get bread, while others were already returning with their purchases. There were frequent changes of trains. The stations at such points were full of people wanting to board trains. The people attacked each train that arrived at the station as if they were storming a fortress. They crawled into both freight and passenger cars, through doors and windows, up on to roofs of carriages; they slung to buffers and steps, and were frequently injured or killed when the train was moving.

This journey with our families and small children lasted eight days. It was a nightmare of torture for us all, both physically and morally. At Tahanrih, Rostow, Kishchiw, Timoshowka, and so on, we sometimes had to wait several days for a train.

Once we reached the Kuban we landed jobs in the fish industry at Akhtara, situated on a bay in the Black Sea. It was very difficult to find living quarters, especially with children, and until we found a house we had to sleep on the floor of an inn, and pay one rouble each per night. All the same, since prices were reasonable and we were employed, we could have lived for some time in peace there with our families, but

our good fortune did not last long. Next winter we had to flee from there with our families.

(From D. Solowey's, *Along the Path to Golgotha* [in Ukrainian]).

YAVDOKYM BONDAR

HE HAD TO ABANDON HIS FATHER'S DEAD BODY AT A STATION

Luka Khalyava from the Nova-Volodimiriwka settlement in the Sakhnowshchansk district had four sons, one of whom was arrested and sent to Siberia, while the other three were working somewhere in a manufacturing plant, having run away from the village on account of the collectivization.

In 1932-1933, the year of the famine, Luka and his wife began to starve. Luka's wife died of hunger, so he buried her and decided to go to live with one of his sons in Kharkiw in order to escape a similar fate. He had barely arrived in Kharkiw when all the fugitives from the villages were required to leave the city, as that was when the passport system was introduced.

Luka's son had a family of six. He had to wait a long, long time at the station before he got tickets for the journey to the Donbas. He took Luka, his father, with him. Luka died in the railway carriage on the way there. There was no way for the son to bury his father because at that time no stop-over was allowed at way-stations and he could not forfeit the tickets either, because then death by starvation threatened his family in the course of their journey.

That is why Luka carried his dead father out of the railway carriage, propped him against the station wall and rode on with his family. When the train had started up someone did call out, "Who left the dead man behind?" but it was too late . . .

V. SAVUR

DEATH CLAIMS THE STARVING AT THE MARKETS KIEV

In 1932-33 the markets of Kiev—Zhitny at Podolya, Lukiwsky, Sinny, Zhydiwsky, Halitsky, Basarabka, Troitsky, Volodimirsky, Solomyansky, and Demiyewsky carried on busi-

ness day after day, as usual. At these markets the following scenes could be observed every day:

The market women sat in the stalls or in rows on the ground selling all sorts of grain by the glassful: wheat, rye, barley, millet corn, groats or some sort of meal, fish cakes, pancakes and little pies with some sort of filling. These were all priced at so many roubles each. Sales of loaves or, more frequently, slices of bread, were carried on "from under the coat." Meat, too, was sold "from under the coat"—it was mostly horse meat of questionable quality.

Vegetables, such as potatoes, onions, beets, and carrots, bottled milk, and other dairy products, which were brought to the markets by the farmers from the villages surrounding Kiev, were very sparse in quantity and extremely expensive.

Besides these foodstuffs, the markets were always overflowing with treasured articles from the villages, the most valuable heirlooms and artistic handicrafts the village families possessed, such as coral bead necklaces, passed on from mother to daughter for generations, embroidered, ornamental towels, shirts, table-cloths, hand-woven rugs and tapestries. The villagers from the entire countryside brought these, their most treasured articles, to Kiev, and sold them at ridiculously low prices or exchanged them for a few glassfuls of grain, in order to keep body and soul together.

One could observe three categories of buyers at the markets. The first category, which aroused widespread indignations, consisted mostly of wives of high Soviet officials, Communists and those in superior positions (the "workers with responsibility"), who were at the time receiving plentiful food-rations at shops, called *Raspreds*, which were closed to the general public. These women brought their left-overs to the market and traded them at extortionate rates for the villagers' most treasured possessions—ornamental towels, tablecloths, rugs, and tapestries.

The second category consisted of the wives of workers and minor civil servants who wanted to buy their undernourished families more food at the market, such as vegetables, milk for the children, or some sort of grits for the soup. They brought with them to the market only their modest, hard-earned Soviet roubles. The villagers' towels and tapestries did not interest these women. Their interests lay mainly in food.

The third category consisted of the ragged, distended vil-

lagers who were engrossed chiefly with the idea of buying some food. All the articles they had for sale were disposed of in return for two or three glassfuls of grain; a richly-embroidered table-cloth or shirt went in excscange for a four pound loaf of bread, a wall-hanging large enough to cover a whole wall for only two or three such loaves.

But the majority of these distended villagers, adults and children, consisted of those who had nothing at all to sell and no money besides. They had come to Kiev with the idea of never returning to their native villages again. They wandered through the market-place, their arms outstretched, pleading, "Please give me something . . . Please don't let me die." They rummaged through the garbage heaps and sucked at all the cores and peelings. But no one had the means to save them. The famished and hunger-distended people had for the most part nowhere to spend the night and spent it at the market-place. Some of them even died there.

At night trucks under the supervision of the GPU would arrive and collect not only the corpses but also the distended



Mothers and children doomed to die.

wretches who were in their death agony. They took them outside the city limits and buried them somewhere in mass graves.

It was not necessary to go to the Ukrainian villages in order to view the catastrophe of the famine. A little time spent at just one market-place was enough for anyone to realize in all its enormity the horror of the famine which had Ukraine and all its villages in its grip. The Soviet authorities saw and were well acquainted with it. The workers and minor civil servants in the towns likewise saw and understood the situation, but they could do nothing to help.

"Those are all 'enemies of the people' and kurkuls who won't work," the Communist propagandists would explain to the workers and civil servants at their various meetings, when questions about the phenomena occurring in the villages unintentionally cropped up. "Those are merely economic difficulties," these propagandists would elucidate. "There is no famine. Anyone who says there is a famine is an enemy of the people and the Soviet Government," they would affirm.

But the workers and civil servants understood it all after their own fashion.

NO FAMINE ANYWHERE ELSE IN RUSSIA

A happier lot was that of the individuals or entire families who broke through the blockade on transportation, overcame all the difficulties of travelling, and succeeded in emigrating beyond the boundaries of the famine-stricken Ukraine to Russia or other republics of the USSR, where there was no famine at that time. The following documents by witnesses who are still alive attest to this fact:

The first document describes a scene in which it was the Ukrainian workers alone who saved up their slices of bread and set them out to dry, to send to their relatives in Ukraine, while there was no need for the workers from other provinces and countries of the USSR to do this.

Another document brings us an instance of whole families of Ukrainian villagers fleeing in their wagons from the northern provinces bordering on Russia to the vicinity of Moscow in order to save themselves from the famine.

Here is a comparative illustration, made in the year of the famine in Ukraine, of the conditions at railway stations in the famine-stricken Ukraine and in the province of Tula in famine-free Russia. Not only was there no famine in Russia at

the time, but the Russian villagers could not bring themselves to believe that the *khokhly** could be dying of hunger." This pointed comparison is made in another document as well. Ukrainian grain on the free market in Russia cost a tenth of a tenth of what it did in Ukraine.

There were also some Ukrainian villagers who attempted to save themselves from the famine by fleeing to such republics of the USSR as Turkomansk in Central or Azerbaidjian.

**Khokhly* (singular: *Khokhol*): — Derogatory Russian nickname for Ukrainians.

M. DIDENKO

UKRAINIANS IN MOSCOW SEND DRIED BREAD HOME

In the spring of 1933, when I was a student at the Moscow Institute of Transport, I lived in the north-west sector of the city at Vsesvyatsk. There was a tremendous amount of construction on factories, plants, institutes and housing of all sorts going on in that district of Moscow. Thousands of workers from different districts of the USSR were employed on those construction projects. Among them were many Ukrainians who were employed there chiefly navvies. These workers had their families with them. Temporary single-story wooden barracks had been erected all around the construction site to house them. These contained accommodation of two sorts: that occupied by a single family to a room,, and that in which several families shared one room. Frequently workers from a particular part of the USSR would all live together in the same section of the barracks.

We students were sent to conduct cultural and educational classes for the workers. I cannot forget one scene which I saw at the barracks, on my frequent visits there.

The roofs of some of the barracks were all marked out into separate plots by chalk lines or strings. And each plot was always completely covered by sliced bread drying in the sun. Sometimes the plots did not provide enough room and plywood extentions were attached at the sides in order to accommodate more bread.

The workers' children who were too young to work used to spend each day going about the barracks chasing birds away with little switches so that they would not eat the bread.

Later I learned that it was always the Ukrainian workers who were drying the bread and that they were sending it to their relatives in Ukraine. The construction-workers were then receiving 1,200 grams of bread a day each, 600 grams of black and 600 grams of white. They always had bread left over and the Ukrainians could easily buy the leftovers from the non-Ukrainians to add to their own. It was the Ukrainian language which resounded through the barracks the roofs of which were overflowing with drying bread.

In the other barracks, where the Russian tongue predominated, and the workers came from other districts of Russia, there was no drying bread to be seen.

IVAN VOVENKO

I write for the "White Book" so that people will remember and so that the people will be afraid. My parents were well off and so they had 12 children. After the death of my father (1918) the older brothers looked after the household with my mother, and the older brothers took wives and left the household, and then I got married and took the household under me. I did not have the chance to look after the household for long. In winter of 1929 all the misfortunes came upon me and upon my family. Three brothers were arrested, they took away all our property and they put me in jail. So I was a jailbird for two months when my wife came to see me; she alone was free at that time, they let her out, but all the rest were kept in jail. They transferred me then to the cell No. 1 and there was Hanula Vasyl, who told me he had been in jail for the last 7 months; his two brothers were shot and he is about to be, too, he thought.

But they did not shoot me; they transferred me to Bila Tserkva; I met my 70 year old mother, there beaten to a pulp and half-dead of hunger. And they gave me almost nothing to eat and they beat me without mercy. Two cells, 1A and 4A were special ones; they put there only people to be shot. And they shot us fellows, kurkuls making of us political prisoners. The fellows looked to save themselves from this beating and the shooting and broke the floor and dug a tunnel and started to run away but they saw it and shot many and caught many, still very many got away, too. But as to me they took me and brought me to Kiev and they saw me as one of the most dangerous political prisoners but I understood as little in politics as

a wolf in stars. Here, in Kiev, the investigators came to me and told me again and again to talk. "Confess that you are for Petlyura!" They broke my seven teeth and put my fingers out of joint. And all the time they asked me about my brothers, who went to whom and what they did. And I said: "I do not know." But they would write down and say: "Sign," but I did not. And they beat me for so long that I had worms in my wounds. But they could not beat out anything from me, read the record of what I said but not what they wanted, I signed and having taken off my shirt showed the wounds with worms. And then, sometime later, they started to cure my wounds, and again later, they transferred me to the ninth corridor and there I carried the slops for the prisoners and they admitted that I was not a political one and that I was very young.

And then I had it somewhat easier and got to know many things.

In the first celler there were 9 cells—all of them filled with those to be shot. They shot them only in the night-time. They brought out the corpses in covered trucks. They shot some 70-120 per night. And then in time I got to know that my brothers sat in the death cells. I even talked to one of them through the hole in the door. He did not know he was to be shot and I did not tell him for it was impossible to break out of the Kiev prison. And so they shot my brothers all there. But they took me and many others to the station. And the peasants asked the head of the guards: "Where will they take us?"

"To Siberia, you damned kurkuls, to Siberia, you Petlyurist bandits."

And the peasants started to shout and to wail: there was much shooting and the prisoners fled, but not many succeeded. The greater part was shot and the rest of the beaten ones was put into the cattle cars and taken away. And as to food, there was almost none, and they beat, you said a word, they went at it again. For those who died there was a separate car. At the stops the convoy gave them away and received money, too; they wanted to flee, they said and so were shot.

Finally they brought us there. There were not so many of us left. And they brought whole frights of such poor people as we. And then there was a rumour that some American commission would come. People were happy; perhaps they would

take us to America, we thought. Oh, no; no America for us. They took away almost all; only a couple of thousand of us were left behind to bring the camps in order from which they took the people. In one of the camps, Krasnoyarska Dolina, 163rd Battalion, we found, as we started to burn the barracks, very many bodies in one of them and some people alive, too. We told the chief Sorokin of that. Then Sorokin gave the order to dig a great big hole in the sand and to carry there all the dead and quick to pour gasoline over them and to set the whole thing on fire. When we told him that one may not burn those alive he told us: "You were told what to do, so do it; otherwise you'll get into the hole yourself." We burned some 1600-1700 people.

And after some time they brought us to a camp that even did not look like one. There were clean barracks, all paths were covered with sand, soccer. They fed us well, they did not send us to work. In the kitchen and everywhere else there were NKVD-men dressed like prisoners. And then the commission really arrived. Our chief Shkriabin showed the commission this camp and the NKVD-men in prisoners' clothes were in the first row wherever commission passed, in case anyone would have asked anything. But nobody asked a thing. And so they took that commission in. They laughed even. "We are not afraid of those fools; we're afraid of our own bosses, but we will dupe America seven times in a row." And they did take them in. Everything became as before. And then I decided to flee with some others. From Krasnoyarsk to Ukraine: 8,000 miles. It was difficult but still I fled.

And I came to my aunt. But she did not seem to be too happy to see me. Then came the uncle and asked me warily all kinds of questions. So I told him that I ran away from Siberia. He became very thoughtful, still I was his relative, so he said he'd help me but asked me not to say a thing anywhere so that he himself will not be put to jail. So we sat down to eat but there was almost no food. I asked him who those swollen people were I saw down on the stations in Ukraine. And he told me that there was a terrible famine: that cannibalism was all around and that many people had died already of hunger. It was that 1933. But I did not take my uncle's advice and started to ask everywhere where my wife was, for she had been freed. And then they told me that she was in Kiev at heavy work. As soon as my wife knew I was at my

uncle's, she came to him but I was not there. They had arrested me. So she did not see me.

They put me with others in a train in Kiev and took me to the far North, to the camps around Murmansk instead of the Siberian ones. There they put us to cut wood and send it down, and again sorrow and again beating. Many died there. Many cut their hands and feet on purpose. They were bare-foot, hungry. It was terrible.

And people started to die like flies. And when Sunday would come along they called us to clean the camp and we got together all the dead, carried them to a pit and burned them. The highest percentage of people died in our battalion, No. 213, at the station of Tinokondi, Murmansk. We put away those dead and those about to die. One time we threw in the pit one of such about to die, but we did not burn him. He started to gnaw on the others who were still alive, and in three days he came back to the barrack. And as he came back, the cleaner sent the word to those above that such and such one is not dead, but alive. Then the chief, Borodin, got all the prisoners together and called that man a cannibal and shot him in front of our eyes. And we started to shout that we all will become cannibals if they would not let us have something to eat.

Then, they took three hundred of us and put us in an "isolator (solitary cell). The world has not seen such like as I saw in that "isolator" during the 9 days. Nobody held it out there for longer than three weeks. And then again some commission came, not an American one this time, but a Soviet one. Nobody said a word for everybody knew that in case anyone would say anything, they would shoot not only the one who spoke, but every tenth one, as soon as the commission left.

Some time later they took us to a new camp. Up until that time I had seen frightful things, but I had not seen anything as terrible as that. And so I decided to put an end to my life. I was all ready to do it but a friend of mine stopped me. I almost got there anyway sometime later while working in the barrack they called the Hospital. Here they started to cure me.

I made the acquaintance of a doctor here, a Ukrainian, and he made me well and got me a job in the store. Here, it was better. In this store there were many new clothes sent to the prisoners. But the heads of the store took all the new

clothes and stuff and sent it to Leningrad to be sold there on the black market. As we packed the clothes, we workers, too, got some money. But we had a special ticket system in the camp and one could not get anything for the Soviet money. They sold whole wagons of the cloth. The stuff would come down from Moscow to the camp and from the camp to the black market in Leningrad. All this was done under the direction of the NKVD-man, Oleksy Makarov.

Often they would take me along for this business of transporting things to the black market and one time, as we went to Leningrad, I made up my mind to flee. And I fled.

I went through much sorrow then, as I lived on forged documents. And so I lived until the coming of Germans. Then I went back to my village, then to Germany, and finally to this blessed land of the U.S.A. Now I live as well as anyone else. And anybody who does not like America should go to Russia. But very few people come alive from out there.

M. RUSSETSKY (engineer)

FLIGHT INTO MOSCOW

In 1932, when the famine was raging in Ukraine, I was serving my period of army duty as an engineer in a special army construction project in Khymki in the suburbs of Moscow. There was absolutely no famine in Moscow and no one would believe me when I told them of the famine in Ukraine. The only one who knew of the famine and who did believe me was Borisenko, the Commissar of the First Red Ensign Division (who later was liquidated). He helped me a great deal by giving me all sorts of food to send in my food-parcels to my relatives in Ukraine.

At that time, many of the villagers from the northern provinces of Ukraine who owned horses gathered up the whole family and emigrated to look for work in the vicinity of Moscow in order to escape the famine. With Borisenko's assistance, and that of other people with whom I was connected, I organized these villagers into a complete small town of navvies at and around the construction project. The majority of them also worked on the excavation of the Khimkinsk reservoir.

When I had completed my period of service and was leaving, in the fall of 1932, the whole population of that "barracks and clay-and-wattle huts" village came to bid me fare-

well and thank me for everything I had done for them. My post was filled by my assistant, an engineer named Korolyow, from Vyatky in Russia. At my earnest request he made himself the same kind of protector of these villagers that I had been previously, and kept me informed by letter of the aid he was giving them.

S. ZAPOLENKO

NO FAMINE IN RUSSIA

I was a worker in the Donbas chemical industry during 1933 and in April of that year I was given a 30 day vacation and a fortnight's pass to the rest home in Pushcha Vodytsya in the vicinity of Kiev. I had to travel to Kiev and Poltava. No sooner had I left the Donbas, than, at the very first stations along the way, I began to see bodies of famine victims. They were simply left lying about the stations. At the same time I could see a tremendously long line at the ticket window trying to get tickets. From time to time someone in the line would collapse and not get up again—he had finally died of hunger. Then a special brigade would drive up, collect the corpses into a truck, frequently including persons still alive but lacking the strenght to resist, and take them to a pit which had been prepared for them some distance from the station.

I stayed only seven days in Pushcha Vodytsya—I couldn't stomach any more of it. Almost every day I would wander through the streets of Kiev, noting what was going on.

The city was teeming with villagers who had come from their foodless villages, making their way to Kiev by every means in their power in order to try to get bread for themselves and their hungry families. But even the citizens and workers of Kiev found it almost impossible to obtain food. Lines of 2,000 or 2,500 people would be lined up at every shop, sometimes waiting for several days, because the shops would run out of merchandise. They even spent the night in the lines, although this was strictly forbidden.

More than once I saw mounted militia dispersing the "unlawful" lines, riding into the groups of people and belabouring them with knouts. After each "dispersal" several dead would be left behind. But no sooner had the militia disappeared than, very cautiously, the lines would begin to form again. The many

corpses which followed each such "dispersal" were left to lie in untidy heaps until nine o'clock the following morning, when they were gathered up by special trucks and taken outside the city.

One day I went to the Lukyaniwska prison to find out if my father was still being held there. I couldn't find out a thing. But while I was standing at the entrance gates I saw several empty trucks go in and after a while come out again, loaded to the brim with something that was covered over with tarpaulins. Under my breath I asked a chap standing near-by if they were carrying out the sick, but he replied, likewise under his breath, that those were the corpses of prisoners who had died of starvation. Right after that my informant promptly vanished.

After I left Pushcha Vodytsya I went to my native village, where I spent four days and witnessed the same thing: famine and corpses of the famished everywhere. With that I returned to Donbas. You could not get food at any price at any of the stations along the way, but at every station there were corpses, and more corpses.

I still had a fortnight's vacation left when I returned to the Donbas. I met some Russian fellow-workers who were acquaintances of mine. They were having their vacations at the same time and suggested that I go with them to visit their native village. I came out with the remark, that, like as not, there was a famine there, too, but they assured me there was none, and showed me their letters from home. I agreed to go with them. Once again, I was passing through Ukrainian territory and observing the familiar scenes of famine. But no sooner had we crossed over to Russian territory than everything changed. Life was proceeding in a normal fashion. There was not the faintest trace of any famine on the way to my friend's village, which was about 25 kilometres from Tula. I could have bought all kinds of food at the stations. At the collective farm in their village, likewise, there was not a single sign of famine. The young people enjoyed themselves after their day's work was done. They held parties in the evenings.

One evening I went outdoors, strolled up to the neighbouring house and had a smoke with the owner, a middle-aged man. We fell to talking. I described the terrible famine reigning in Ukraine at the moment, especially in the provinces of Kiev and Zhitomir, where I had personally seen it with my

own eyes. The good man gave me an astonished look, then an expression of plain disbelief crossed his face. He thought I was pulling his leg. Suddenly he began to laugh hard. "Ha!Ha! Ha!" he exclaimed through his laughter, "The khokhly are dying of hunger?"

PANAS SKIRDA

THERE WAS AN ABUNDANCE OF UKRAINIAN BREAD IN RUSSIA

In May I was sent to Russia for grain by one of the artels from Yahotyn in the Poltava region.

I could not buy anything to eat, even when I offered to pay well, at any of the railway stations we passed through in Ukraine, all the way from Kiev to the settlement of Mikhayliwsk on the border of Ukraine and Russia. But once we crossed the border into Russian territory more and more food became available. In Moscow there was an abundance of everything and it was cheap.

There was plenty of food in the town of Kashino, about 270 kilometres from Moscow, where I went to get the grain for my artel. A "pud" (16 kilograms) of rye cost 3.50 roubles at a time when in Yahotyn, right in the heart of the grain-growing area of Poltava it cost 350 roubles. So Ukrainian grain was ten times cheaper in Russia than it was in Ukraine.

The people of Kashino sowed and raised flax and hemp only; their milling grain was imported from Ukraine.

There was an abundance of Ukrainian grain in Russia at the time, although Ukraine itself was undergoing a raging famine. So that if anyone tells me there was a famine in Russia, too, in 1932-33, it is as if he were twisting a dagger in my heart, because it is a terrible lie.

Stalin's regime has never decimated the Russian population by famine even a fraction of the extent to which it decimated the Ukrainian population.

CHAPTER VII

INTERRING THE VICTIMS OF FAMINE

The burials of the corpses of the people who had died of hunger were in themselves harrowing scenes. In the fall of 1932, when these deaths from starvation were still single occurrences in isolated families, the relatives or the neighbours of the deceased endeavoured to inter them in the graveyards, according to Christian custom, at least to the extent of burying them separately in line with the other graves, and heaping little mounds of earth over the graves to mark them. But later, in the winter and particularly in the spring of 1933, when none of the family survived, or when the relatives, if still living, were too feeble to bury their dead, the corpses remained lying where they fell, inside the houses and out in the yards, and sometimes, in the streets, and roads. They lay there for long periods of time, sometimes for days and weeks on end; they poisoned the air around them in their state of decomposition. At last they were buried in root cellars which in happier days had held potatoes and beets, or in cellars adjacent to houses, and there were even instances where they were thrown into wells. At times they were laid in the ditches bordering the streets and roads, and merely covered over with earth.

The villages then wore the aspect of battlegrounds following an attack. But it was not an army corps who buried the dead, it was ordinary collective farm brigades, the "burial brigades," was ordinary collective farm brigades, the "burial brigades," who did it in much the same manner in which one would bury a domestic animal.

Such burial brigades, which were provided by the collective farms in the country and by the councils in the cities, were sufficiently devoid of human attributes frequently to obury people still living along with the dead. There were many instances of such "living corpses" who had already been thrown into graves coming to "life" again and later working on the collective farms or in other Soviet establishments.

SOCIALISM IN PRACTICE

A small group of us were seized at the market-place and pressed into the job of digging pits for the dead under the surveillance of the village activists. These pits were deep, being intended to hold 20 or 30 persons. When we arrived in the morning at the graveyard where we had been sent by the Chornoukhy district militia, there were already large heaps of corpses awaiting internment.

There were men and women among them, but the greatest number by far were children. Some of the corpses were wrapped in winding-sheets, but the majority wore the clothing in which death had overtaken them. A putrid stench issued from the pile of corpses because the people had died some time before and their bodies were beginning to decompose.

They were bringing the dead into the graveyard in wagons, then carrying them on ladders improvised as stretchers. If a pit were ready, they would throw them in at once; if the pit were not yet dug, they heaped them up in piles.

After we had finished digging out the pit we were ordered to throw the corpses into it. I noticed as I was carrying out this harrowing task that some of the corpses had their eyes pecked out. This was the work of flocks of carrion crows (vultures) which at the time hovered in the air over the villages having a fine feast. The representative of the village soviet was present and wrote down the names of all deceased persons if he happened to know who they were.

When all the corpses had been placed in the pit, Samiylo Zozulya, the head of the village soviet of Chornoukhy rode up to us on horseback. Without bothering to dismount, he glanced into the pit and ordered that it be left uncovered as it was not quite full. The pit was to be filled with fresh corpses. Then this Samiylo Zozulya, this communist, turned to us and pointing to the pit with his riding-whip said, "They wouldn't work on the collective farms. But they've had a little taste of socialism in practice." I wonder—did this party henchman realize just what he in his evil sarcasm had uttered? For he spoke a profound truth about Stalin's socialism as it was and is being practiced...

FORCED TO DIG

The collective farms assigned their strongest people, those who had a modicum of capacity for work left, to the burial brigades in that year of 1933. But their number always decreased as time wore on. The authorities began to resort to other measures. They started to raid the market-places, and if they seized a person who was still capable to do so, they would force him to dig pits at the graveyard for several days, even if he were a stranger in the village. They kept such people under close guard.

Oleksander Denisenko was seized in the market place in that fashion. He was a worker from Murmansk who had come to Chornoukhy to visit his mother, Maria Nikiforiwna Denisenko. A thorough search of his mother's house was made at the same time, and the 20 pickled herrings which he had brought her from Murmansk and a little bag of beans were confiscated.

Oleksander Denisenko had to dig pits for several days before he managed to escape. He hid in my house for a little while, and later went back to Murmansk.

DRAGGING THEIR FATHER TO THE PIT

The burial brigade very often did not show up right away to take the dead to the graveyard. It happened sometimes that the deceased had to lie several days in the house, and his body began to decompose and stink. When that happened, the relatives tried to get him buried on their own.

Once in the spring of 1933, I saw Pavlo Bondar's two daughters dragging their father, who had died of starvation, in a little wagon from the Andreysky corner of Chornoukhy to the graveyard. Pawlo had been a tall man, while the wagon in which he was being pulled was a very small one. Pavlo's torso lay in the wagon, but his long legs dragged on the ground so that a small cloud of dust was raised by his heels all the way.

P. S.

HARVESTING CORPSES INSTEAD OF CROPS

In July of 1933, I, along with many others, was conscripted into the "auxiliary forces" of the Red Army, and taken to

Berdyansk. In Berdyansk they assigned us to Machine Tractor Stations, to harvest the crops, four men to each machine, but many of us were also sent to bring in the grain harvest in the villages, since there was no one left there to do it, everyone having died of starvation.

When we arrived there, it was not the crops but the corpses that we gathered up throughout the villages. These corpses had been thrown into cellars that had been only slightly filled with earth and they really stank. With four men to lift each one up on pitchforks, we managed to pull all the corpses out of the cellars. We threw them all on to the back of a truck and buried them in the fields a good distance away from the village.

I recall that we found an elderly half-dead man in the store-room of one of these houses. We brought this man to the Machine-Tractor Station and there slowly nursed him back to health. His given name was Mykola, but I have forgotten his surname.

Before my mobilization I passed through the station of Sumy. Both at the station itself and all around it, there were a great many people lying about. Some swollen with hunger, and others already dead. No one came to the rescue of these people. Those who lived wandered aimlessly about, stepping over the corpses, and in the end the same fate overtook them. But in the fields just outside of Sumy here were two large heaps of grain, one of rye and one of millet, lying under the open sky. There was a strong guard around the piles which would not let anyone approach them.

M. DIDENKO

MYSTERIOUS TRAINS LOADED WITH CORPSES

During one special period in the spring of 1933, almost every day at daybreak there were two mysterious trains of empty freight cars leaving Kawkazska in the Northern Caucasus for Mineralni Vody and Rostov. Each train consisted of from five to ten cars. They would return two to four hours later, be retained for some time at a remote, unfrequented siding and later be shunted up an unimportant branch line to an abandoned gravel pit. When they arrived at the station at Kawkazska and while they were standing at the siding, the cars which were loaded with some kind of freight, were hermetically sealed and had a guard of NKVD around them.

At first hardly anyone paid any attention to these mysterious rains. I was a student taking my practical work there at the time and I paid no attention to them either.

But once a conductor of that train, a communist, who trusted me, quietly called me aside, led me up to the train and said, "I want to show you what is in these cars." He slid the door open a crack in one of them. I very nearly fainted when I peered inside. The car was filled with corpses obviously dead from starvation. Later, the conductor related the following:

The stationmaster had received a secret order that two trains of empty freight cars should stand in readiness every day before daybreak at the disposal of the local railway NVKD. The NKVD would provide the crew, the engineer and conductors. These trains were departing to pick up the corpses of famine victims that had been brought to the railway stations from the surrounding villages and settlements by truck. The trucks, under the supervision of the NKVD, would collect all corpses at those villages and settlements during the night. Frequently people who were still alive could be found among the dead; they finally expired in the freight cars. The corpses were buried in mass graves beyond the gravel pit along the unfrequented railway line. The vicinity of the gravel pit was likewise guarded by the NKVD. Local residents were not allowed in there.

Later, near the station of Tikhoretska I saw one of those settlements which had been completely depopulated by the famine. Where there had been close to 300 dwellings formerly there was not a soul now; all the houses had collapsed and the streets were choked with weeds.

F. PRAVOBEREZHNY

QUANDARY!

Every day in the spring of 1933 trucks and horse-drawn vans could be observed on the streets of Kiev collecting the corpses of the villagers who had died overnight. One morning, as I was hurrying to work, I chanced upon the corpse of a young peasant woman lying on the corner of Lviwska Street where it adjoined the Simy market-place.

She was lying face-up wide-staring eyes and her baby was crawling over her clutching at her breast with its little hands. The driver of the van who collected the bodies stood helplessly over the woman wondering what he should do. The dead moth-

er could be thrown into the wagon, but what was he to do with the living baby? Throw it into the wagon, too?

In the extremity of their despair mothers would bring their infant babes and even their somewhat older children to the towns and abandon them on the doorsteps of shelters, hospitals or simply of kind-hearted persons who would take them in and save them from the famine.

After she had put her child in some doorway, a mother would often spend hours lingering somewhere around the corner, afraid lest something evil befall it, waiting until it was discovered. Sometimes these mothers were caught at the scene of their "crime" and their children were returned to them.

I knew many mothers who went from one institution to another, in the years of 1934 to 1938, inquiring what had been done with the children who had been abandoned there in 1933. There was many a tear shed by mothers who failed to come across any trace of her children.

L. PYLYPENKO

PEOPLE DUMPED LIKE GARBAGE DOWN A PRECIPICE

There was a soviet state farm in the village of Stare, in the Borishpilsk district of the region of Kiev. About 20 persons who were swollen and unable to walk anymore, let alone work, were, in the spring of 1933, collected together at the farm community living quarters by order of the farm party organization. All these people were transported by truck through the village of Rohoziv, and dumped down a precipice named Hlyboka Dolyzna, located about five kilometres beyond Rohoziv. There they perished under the open sky, since all were incapable of walking.

V. NESHCHADYMENKO

BURIED ALIVE ON ACCOUNT OF TWO KILOGRAMS OF MEAL

This happened in the spring of 1933, and concerning Musiy Tsyura, nicknamed "Rabbit," from the village of Domantiw in the region of Poltava. He with his 11-year-old son went fishing in a boat on the river to catch something for his starving family, which consisted of his wife, three children and an 80-year-old

father. Musiy rowed to a spot 2 kilometres away from the village where the fish bit better.

But the big fish did not bite at all that day. He and his son had already eaten the few small fish that they had caught at the start. He had expected to catch more by evening, but they had no luck at all. In the evening Musiy and the boy, hungry and cold, started for home. They used up all their strength when they were only half-way home, and Musiy lay down in the boat, sending the boy on to fetch his mother so that she could take him and the boat home.

Half an hour later, Musiy's wife arrived and began to call to him, but Musiy was delirious with fatigue and hunger and only kept mumbling incoherently. His wife decided that in any event he would die after she brought him home, and all things being equal, it would be more expedient to bring him closer to the collective farm at one grave 2 kilograms of meal to the family of every man who died. At the collective farm it was confirmed that Musiy had been seen lying stretched out in the boat, and had since died; so they issued his wife the 2 kilograms of meal and she ran home forthwith to bake "mandriki" from it for her hungry family.

The burial brigade from the collective farm immediately set out to fetch Musiy and started to put him in the death-van to take him to the graveyard where they had a pit large enough to accomodate 15 persons. However, Musiy was still breathing.

"Where shall we take him? To the pit, or home?" the members of the brigade asked each other. "What do you mean, where? To the pit, of course. If we take him home he'll die there anyway and tomorrow we'll have to take him to the pit all over again." So they took Musiy who was still alive, to the cemetery and tossed him into the pit.

Musiy regained consciousness in the sheltered warmth of the pit and crawled to one corner, apparently trying to climb out. But he did not have the strength and had to stay there.

Next morning some people were passing by on their way to the mill to grind some grain substitutes such as acorns, corn cobs, etc., which they used to bake "mandriki." One of these Suprun Zakharko, visited the cemetery out of curiosity to see who had recently died. He looked into the pit and saw only Musiy, the "Rabbit," sitting up in it. So when Zakharko reached the mill he said, "I went to the cemetery to see who was

newly-dead, and guess what—there, in a corner of the pit, was only a "Rabbit" sitting up, with his head drooping."

Some of the people at the mill thought that there really was a rabbit there, and grabbing a cudgel hurried to the cemetery to kill it, so that they could make soup of it, but of course they had been hoaxed. They came back to the mill swearing at Zakharko for not explaining to them what species of "rabbit" had been sitting in the pit.

An hour later the burial brigade brought nine corpses and tossed them in on top of Musiy, who was still alive.

Musiy's son lay for two whole days beside the collective farm granary imploring them to give him something to eat, and within a week or so Musiy's entire family had succumbed to the famine.

YAKIW MASLIVETS

THEY THREW THE LIVING IN WITH THE DEAD

In Kharkiw, one May morning in 1933, a truck was collecting the corpses of famine victims which were lying about in the street. There were already six bodies on the truck as it drove up to the Kholodno-Horsky market-place. They proceeded to load on another man, a villager about 45 years of age, who was still alive. This man began to beseech them in a voice full of anguish not to take him.

"Why, I'm completely well . . . I'll just rest up a bit and go away myself," pleaded the man. The two workmen exchanged glances, tossed him into the truck, and began to pile corpses on top of him.

About 4 or 5 days following this incident there was a meeting at the plant where I worked, at which the Party Organizer, Stefan Polozov, exhorted the workers not to pay any attention to the people dying in the city, because they were kurkuls who were coming from the villages to Kharkiw and dying there in the streets in order to incite the workers against the Soviet Government . . .

PAWLO KORYTSKY

OUR KIN PERISHED AT THE HANDS OF THE GENOCIDISTS

Ten families were all related. There were six families on my father's side and four on my mother's. Each family had four

to eight children and there were also two to four grandchildren to each family. At the time of the communist genocide in the Ukraine, our kin was almost totally destroyed; some families were sent to district of forced settlement in the forest; others were thrown out of their homes during the introduction of collectivization and left without any means and rights for existence; still others died out of hunger in the years of 1932-33. Only a few individuals of the younger generation saved themselves by fleeing from home and hiding their so-called "alien" family background.

The family was liquidated in 1931 at the time of total collectivization in our district; my father, my step-mother my sister, aged 13, my brother, aged 14, were transferred to settle in the lumber districts in Viatka Region in Russia, the other side of the Urals. I saved myself by going earlier to the industrial centre of our district where I concealed my social origin. My own mother died of typhus in the epidemic of 1921.

Most of the family of father's sister, Varka, died in the spring of 1933 of hunger. Father's sister Varka, her husband Philip, the older son Stepan, his wife, two of the younger adult sons died. Two little children who were lucky to get refuge at the kolhosp, in the so-called "children's orphanage remained alive.

The family of my father's sister Mary all died from hunger in the spring of 1933. Died of famine: Mary herself, her husband Pawlo, her son Vasil, his wife and their two small children. The older son committed suicide. He hanged himself. Only the youngest son saved himself, fleeing to the Far East, somewhere around Vladivostok.

This family of the father's sister Kilina was broken at the time of introduction of collectivization, it was de-kurkulized. The two older sons looked after the household. Father's sister Kilina and her husband Lavrenti died during the typhus epidemic in 1921.

The family of father's sister Hanna was liquidated in the collectivization. Hanna's husband Sergi was de-kurkulized and sent somewhere to Transbaikalian region to a concentration camp for forced labor. The family itself was de-kurkulized, too, and thrown out of their home. Two minor children remained with their mother, illegally, living among the people.

The family of father's brother was broken up in the days

of the civil war. The brother emigrated in 1920 and is in the U.S.A. at the present time.

The family of mother's sister, Olena, was broken up by collectivization. She was de-kurkulized and told to leave her house. Her husband, Mikita, died in the typhus epidemic of 1921. She remained with the children in her district illegally, hiding, almost until the start of the war of 1941.

The family of mother's brother, Yakiv, was broken up during collectivization and thrown out of their house. His wife remained with the children illegally and he ran away to the Donbas region to save himself from the forced labor in the concentration camp.

The family of mother's brother, Ivan, was destroyed during the civil war. Ivan, his wife and his six-month-old daughter were shot by a bolshevik detachment. Two little daughters remained orphans and grew up among people unrelated to them.

The family of mother's sister, Oksana, suffered the least, for her husband, Mykola, was a "poor" peasant. He received permission to join kolhosp after the first de-kurkulization when they took his horse and his outfit from him.

This is the short history of decline of our kin through hands of the criminal communist genocidists in the Ukraine. I do not indicate either the place or the family name as I do not wish to bring ruin on those of our kin who remain alive.. I have signed this note with an assumed name.

More definite details were submitted by me under my real name to the attention of the U.S.A. Congressional Commission under Kersten. There will be a time when we will be able to name all those murdered by the communists. Now I submit the names only so far as the situation allows so that the names of my loved ones will not be lost.

VIRA P-KO

IT HAPPENED IN 1933

This never-to-be forgotten spring brought with it famine and death to the Ukrainian people: a famine and death for which the spring itself was not to blame. I was then completing my course in zootechnics at the technical school on the Tallynasok State Farm, located in the rich black earth district of Babanka.

There was nothing glamorous about my outward appearance, not that of my fellow-students. We all looked prematurely aged, due to the combination of studies, inordinate labor in the fields and a starvation diet. Our worn clothing, sad, haggard faces and ever-seeking eyes gave us the look of people in search of death, rather than life.

Our studies consisted merely of compulsory attendance at lectures, for the heavy labor in the fields, together with our constant hunger, undermined us both physically and mentally, while the thought of bread dominated all others and dogged us day and night.

Our work quotas were extraordinarily heavy, neither illness nor feebleness being recognized by our director as valid excuses for failure to fulfill them; the constant threat of Siberia for "saboteurs" and "traitors" who did not fulfill the quota, like a huge extracting machine, squeezed out the very dregs of our strength. Sometimes in the evenings music would wail, for of course the Soviet student must needs have some cultural recreation, but who of those famished, exhausted students wished to dance? However, even the famished had to shuffle their feet at times in order to prove that life had become "better" and "happier," and to insure themselves from the Party's evil eye, so that they could safely complete the zootechnics course.

At length the long-awaited day of graduation arrived. To our surprise, the faculty council of the technical school arranged some commencement exercises for us. Each one of us arrayed himself in his better rags; each looked forward to some new position in the zootechnics field; each hoped that he would escape from the clutches of the accursed famine. Our spirits rose, even a touch of humor appeared among those awaiting the distribution of diplomas, when suddenly Director Tuz appeared on the stage and announced, "In accordance with the resolution of the Central Committee of the Party all the students are being sent out for two months to bridge the gap in the harvesting campaign . . . The granting of diplomas will take place after the completion of the above-mentioned task."

Then began the most difficult time of our students days. It is with great sorrow that I recall this harrowing period of famine in the Ukraine.

On the farm to which we were sent there had been quite a number of workers, but only a third of them were still alive. The following was a daily occurrence: In the morning, bullock

carts full of yet-living people were transported to work. Some were so dried up, only the eyes glittered as a sign of life; their arms were skinny and long, their legs likewise, their noses protruded, their clothing was tattered, they were unkempt, unwashed, the men unshaven, their eyes avid with hunger. Others were distended, their arms and legs like logs, their bellies huge; their legs were particularly horrible. When they moved them the skin cracked, a fluid seeped out, the sunlight caused festering sores to form, on which flies alighted and soon larvae developed.

So they proceeded, transporting both the lean and the swollen to work, and in the evening the bullock-carts would collect two-thirds of them from the fields and take them to the previously-prepared "fraternal" graves; sometimes even those still living were picked up and buried. It was rare for members of the family to come to claim their dead; they, too, were deep in the clutches of starvation.

Like hungry wolves lying in wait for their prey, the workers of the State Farm lay in wait for the assorted kitchen refuse which was thrown or poured out beside the students' mess, and indeed, there was not much to be thrown out, except potatoes or beet peelings or some smelly bone. They precipitated themselves in a heap at these leavings, retrieving them from the pit, in which everything was in a state of decay and larvae flourished. The poor hungry people, having lost all feelings of disgust, ate all that they could lay their hands on and died of stomach ailments in the bushes close by.

Once I happened to be a witness of such a ghastly, unheard-of occurrence. Not far from the students' quarters lay the latrine. After lectures, during our dinner-hour, my friends and I often used to see someone who always, in the greatest heat of the summer day, used to wander in that filth, seeking something and putting it in his mouth. What could he possibly find there, we often wondered? A feeling of dread and horror assailed us. How could we prevent this abomination? Even though we ourselves had nothing to spare, receiving, on the completion of our quotas, 200-300 grams of incompletely-baked bread, we resolved to save this individual.

We approached in a group and observed the following: Out of the human offal the man was picking cherry stones, apple and pear seeds, and other such things which became visible after the sun dried out the vile stuff in which they were em-

bedded. We were seized by an unheard-of horror. How should we approach this person, who was perhaps, mentally deranged? He might attack us. A burning pain enveloped us, our hands and feet trembled, ants crawled up and down our spines. Then one of the boldest, Larissa M—h approached to a certain distance and shouted, "Come to us. We have bread! The figure straightened out and began to flee but our group blocked the way. The man halted. It is difficult to describe that frenzied expression in his eyes which gazed with complete sanity out of the skeleton-features.

Without questioning him at all, we put down the pieces of dry bread which we had earlier prepared for him, and shouted to him to come again to this place at the same time the next day. We did not expect to see him the following day, for we doubted whether he had understood us, but he did come, we again gave him some bread and some clothing, having made a collection among the students. On leaving him we told him to wash and put on the clean clothing. We were curious to know whether the man had understood us and whether he would obey. On the third day we were all there again. A shocking scene ensued. This time we approached closer with the bread. Before us stood a clean young person, who, even in that old clothing, looked almost normal. Gently swaying with exhaustion, he approached us, stretching out his hand toward the bread when suddenly he swayed backwards, his large protruding eyes assumed a frightfully death-like appearance, he fell backwards and died in a convulsive fit.

Later we discovered that this was Vasil Kuchma from the village of Babanka, whose starving wife had killed and eaten their five-year-old daughter. He had been working at the State Farm, saving every last crumb and bringing it home to save his beloved daughter from a hungry death. Heavy labor and hunger compelled him to seek additional means of subsistence. He went out into the harvested fields to glean ears of grain and was arrested the next day, but, strangely enough, was not sentenced. They kept him in prison for a week, beat him, then set him free. It was obvious that his end was near.

After returning from prison he noticed that his little Marika was not at home. He asked his wife where she was. The wife replied that she had taken her to her mother's at Talne, in the hope that she might escape starvation there. He believed her and was glad that his daughter would be safe. He sustained

himself by cooking chaff, burdocks, and other weeds. However, uncertain thoughts tormented him. Was Marika really at his wife's mother's? Or was she elsewhere? Sometimes, on returning home with some sort of food for himself and wife he smelled the odor of meat. He searched, but found nothing. However, once when he came home he discovered a horrifying sight. In the middle of the floor lay his deranged wife, dead, tightly clasping the severed head of her child. He crossed the threshold and collapsed. He was found, still alive by some people. In a confused state he left his home, whereupon the fate already known to the reader overtook him.

It might also be in order to mention here certain facts concerning the students. Twenty-five of them died at this time, unable to bear the hunger and excessively hard labor.

IVAN KLYMKO

PLEASE DON'T BURY ME—I'M STILL ALIVE

In the vicinity of Resheteliwka station during the spring of 1933 there were always many corpses of people who had tried to go somewhere else and escape the famine, but who failed to reach the station and expired along the way. Special workers under the supervision of the GPU would travel along the railway tracks in hand-cars, removing these corpses to the pits which were dug near the signal-arm (in the direction of Poltava). The pits were dug in the form of trenches 10 to 12 metres long and 2 metres deep. As soon as one trench was filled with bodies and covered with earth, a fresh one was dug. No one knows how many trenches there were, nor how many people were buried in them.

One day some railway station employees, Ivan Luchko, Sanko Luchko, Hrytsko Chapra and others happened to pick up Ivan Hayduk, a once-prosperous villager from the Bay-dakiw settlement. He was still alive when they reached the pit.

"Don't throw me the pit — I'm still alive!" Ivan entreated.

"On throw him in and let him finish there. It's not likely he'll live, anyway," said Ivan Luchko, one of the brigade.

But the others took pity on Hayduk; instead of tossing him in they left him to breathe his last beside the trench.

Two hours later I passed the trench on my way home, and there was no one there, neither the workers nor Ivan Hayduk.

(From D. Solowey's *Along the Paths to Golgotha* [in Ukrainian]).

MARYNA ZAVHORODNYA

I'M STILL ALIVE — I'M HUNGRY!

The collective farm named in honor of Molotov in the village of Parkhomiwtsi, in the Krasnokutsky district of the region of Kharkiw assigned a wagon and two men, in the spring of 1933, to the job of driving from dwelling to dwelling to pick up the dead and transport them to a mass grave in the cemetery.

When they came to Pylyp Koval's house they found Pylyp lying in the inglenook, slowly wasting away with hunger. They took him for dead and had begun to lift him from the inglenook when he turned to them and begged them to help him, saying, "I'm still alive . . . I'm hungry."

"You'll die all the same, and we don't want to come for you a second time," replied one of the burial crew. And so they lifted Phyllyp from his inglenook, placed him on the wagon and in an hour's time had him in the grave.

Phyllyp Koval dragged himself out of the grave and managed to crawl home. In the morning the neighbours brought him some baked beet to eat. He recovered his strength later, and lived. He worked on that same collective farm, the "Molotov," right up to the Second World War.

ANDRIY MELEZHYK

STRATON'S RESURRECTION

Straton Klimkovich Senik was 48 years of age and had a wife and three children aged nine, six, and one. Prior to collectivization he owned 9 hectares of land and was regarded as a middle peasant. His wife Yelysoveta and the children died in the famine in April, 1933. I happened to witness the harrowing death scene.

I realized that I had not seen my neighbors up and about for several days, and decided to call on them. There I saw the following scene: Yalysoveta lay dead on the raised wooded platform along the stove-bed with all three children, also dead, be-

side her, the youngest at its mother's breast.

When I walked in, Straton asked in a low voice, "Who's come in?" He was lying in the inglenook all swollen; he could neither see nor recognize me, but he could hear my footsteps.

"It's your good friend Andriy," I replied.

"Are my wife and children still living?" Straton asked.

"No, they are dead," I returned.

Next, he entreated me to take some of the finer articles from his chest to the co-operative store and exchange them for whiskey. (In the village co-operative store at that time there was nothing for sale except whiskey and tooth-powder.)

In the interval in which I exchanged his wife's rep skirt for a litre of whiskey the special brigade from the collective farm had come and gone, removing all the dead from the house. When I returned from the co-operative I gave Straton just half the whiskey and two "motorzheniki" (round cakes baked from a mixture of dried leaves and buckwheat chaff). At his request I also brought him a leafy little branch from a young pear tree in his orchard. I saved the rest of the whiskey, afraid that Straton might die if he took the whole litre at a time.

The next day my wife Varka brought Straton the other half-litre of whiskey and a few "motorzheniki." I went to visit him after dinner, but did not find him in the house—the brigade had taken him for dead and removed him to the graveyard.

But the third day it was learned that Straton was still alive. He crawled to the collective farm brigade's quarters all by himself. There he recounted how he had preserved his life. When the brigade had removed him from the house he was actually debilitated through hunger and drunk on whiskey. At the graveyard, when the brigade unloaded the corpses into the grave he happened to land on top. They did not cover the grave with earth because it was not yet quite full. They dug the graves not deeper than one meter and tossed the corpses into them uncoffined, wearing whatever they had on when they died.

Straton's skin cracked with cold in the night, and the subcutaneous fluid which caused his swelling drained away. Straton regained consciousness and realized that he had already been buried. Summoning all his energy he crawled out of the grave and dragged himself into the fields, where he remained for three days, nourishing himself on various grasses and roots. Then he crawled to the brigade's quarters.

He caused the village soviet of Bilousiwka a great deal of

inconvenience by his resurrection because they had entered him in the register of vital statistics as having died of "catastrophic calamity."

Straton survived. It was spring and he could find an abundance of vegetation and roots to eat. Some time later he left the village of Bilousiwka and went to Moscow where he got a job as a janitor at one of the student residences.

CHAPTER VIII

CANNIBALISM

Cannibalism and the practice of eating corpses, the phenomena of a psychologically abnormal condition, cropped up among the starving villagers as a result of the famine, since an extraordinarily acute scarcity of food causes the human being completely to lose the psychological attributes of the normal state and transforms him into a sub-human being with an atavistically-emphasized biological or animal instinct for devouring its own kind in the struggle for existence.

The facts prove that such phenomena as these occurred in the majority of the villages throughout almost the whole of the famine-stricken Ukraine; there were virtually hundreds of these cases. The facts likewise prove that this "biological atavism," or the eating of one's own kind in times of dearth, appeared to be in full conformity with the "natural law," in that it was the females who, in the majority of cases, ate their mates and offsprings.

In the abnormal state of affairs that then existed by reason of the government's complete detachment towards its starving people, the phenomena of the most heinous of all crimes, that of murder, in order to traffic in human flesh for the sake of gain, had every opportunity of flourishing.

In the majority of cases, the "cannibals" were persons who were no longer normal psychologically, and who eventually likewise succumbed to the famine, or else were punished locally by being put or shot to death. (We are not acquainted with the Soviet legislation covering these cases.) Only in those instances in which the government singled out such "cannibals" and sent them to concentration camps, where they received more or less normal nourishment, did these hapless people in time return to a completely normal state, but there the government took unconscionable advantage of them, working them at the hardest labor until they were completely destroyed physically. Instances of former "cannibals" returning to their native village from concentration camps were practically unheard-of.

HE COOKED HIS DEAD METHER'S HAND

Maria Palamarchuck, a 42 year old widow, and her 12 year old son Serhi lived in the village of Parnysy in the Popelyansk district of the Kiev region. In the spring of 1933, and particularly in the month of June, many people died daily of starvation. No one paid any attention to the plight of his neighbours at that time, because death was a constant visitor in each home.

Both Maria and her son were distended with hunger. They had no food at all, and there was nowhere they could obtain it; even if it had been available they would not have had the strength to fetch it. Maria died on the 18th of June.

Only three days later, on the 21st, did the neighbours notice that there were no signs of life around Maria's home. They entered her house and saw the following gruesome sight: Maria lay dead, with only a stump where her hand had been. The hand itself was boiling away in a small pot on the stove. Her son Serhiy had done this.

"What are you doing Serhiy?" asked the neighbors.

"I am hungry," replied the boy, who had reached a psychologically abnormal state.

Two days later Serhiy, too, died of starvation.

H. KVIKCO

"WE ATE FATHER"

The Priymak family, consisting of father, mother, two older sons of 18 and 20 and a third son who was still quite young, lived in the village of Sulymiwka near Yahotyn.

The mother died of hunger. Some time afterwards the older sons killed their father and ate him. The little boy revealed this deed to the neighbours when he boasted to them, "We're not scared of straving. We have plenty of meat. We killed father, now we have meat."

P. ONUKHRIENKO

HE ATE HIS WIFE

In our village of Velyka Semeniwka which is in the Petrowski district of the region of Kharkiw a villager named Hrebenyuk went mad from hunger in the spring of 1933, hacked his wife to death, salted her flesh, and cooked it. The neighbours somehow found out about it and notified the "Red Farmer" collective farm and the village soviet. When the village soviet executive arrived they found some of the wife's salted

flesh in the cellar and some in a little earthenware pot in the oven. Hrebenyuk confessed to the executive that he had hacked his daughter to death at the same time as wife and had already eaten her.

They arrested Hrebenyuk, who was quite mad, and locked him up in a cellar at the village soviet offices, which was used as a local jail. The next day, when they came to interrogate him further before sending him off to the district administration, they found him dead.

THE CHILDREN ARE THERE—IN THE POT

Nikifor Filimonovich Sviridenko, from the village of Khar-kiwtsi in the Pereyaslaw district was the son of poor people who did not own any land before the revolution. After the revolution Nikifor was given a piece of land, married his Natalka, and set up housekeeping. He had two small children.

During the winter of 1932-33 the government, conducting its grain-garnering operations, relieved them of their last kernel of grain. Nikifor's relatives, like a great many other families, starved for some time and finally perished.

In February, 1933, the neighbours noticed that for two or three days there had been no sign of life in Nikifor's dwelling. Accordingly, three neighbour-women entered the house through the unlocked door. On the mud floor they perceived Nikifor's corpse, while the dishevelled, hunger-distended Natalka lay in inglenook. No children were to be seen.

The neighbours asked Natalka how she was feeling, and she answered, "I'm hungry. There's an iron pot in the porch. Bring it in. It has food in it."

One of the women went out to the porch and saw the little fingers of a child protruding from a small pot standing on the floor. She screamed in fright. The other woman came out, and removed the whole tiny hand from the whitish liquid in the pot.

They began to question the woman, "Where are your children, Natalka?"

"They're in the porch," replied Natalka, whose reason had been unbalanced by hunger.

Nikifor and Natalka had murdered their children and eaten the first one, but had not yet begun on the second. Nikifor was dead, and Natalka was taken to jail after this, but she also died there three days later.

FIRST THEY ATE THEIR OWN FAMILY . . .

Hnat Zhadan who lived in the hamlet of Lukashenki in the Reshetiliwsky district of the region of Poltava was a collective farm worker. There were five persons in his family: he, his wife Motrya and their three sons, all small boys. In the winter of 1932-33 we neighbours noticed that Hnat's little boys had vanished, but they did not appear to have died and been buried. The neighbours, especially Nastya Klymko, began to watch the Zhadan family suspiciously; Nastya always remarked "I'm afraid they may some day snatch my child and eat it."

One day Nastya noticed that Motrya had invited a strange woman to spend the night at her house. Another time Nastya and my wife remarked that Motrya had a moment before led some small boy into her house. The woman continued to watch the family.

As soon as it became dark and the lights flashed on in the Zhadan house the women stole to the window and began to watch what was going on inside. The little boy was sitting on a low bench eating some kind of food that had been set before him.

Suddenly a rope tied in a noose was slipped over his head from behind. The noose tightened and he was struck over the head with the back of an axe . . . The women realized that they were preparing to kill the boy and rushed to the collective farm.

Some kind of meeting was going on there. They reported what they'd seen to the manager of the collective farm, Radion Demyanenko, the schoolteacher, and an unidentified representative from the district party centre and he left the meeting unobserved and hastened to Hnat's house. I joined them.

As they were approaching the house they met Hnat, who had gone out to fetch a pail of water. They compelled him to turn back and accompany them to his house and this is what they saw:

There was a fire in the stove and on it, cup-up arms and legs of the little boy were cooking in iron pots. The boy's torso was in a tub under the bed while his head lay in a pile of dirt on the hearth.

Both Hnat and Motrya Zhadan were arrested and locked up at the village soviet. The next day the investigating committee disclosed that they had found a whole pile of human

bones and various articles of clothing in their cellar. In three or four days, Zhadans along with 10 or 12 other cannibals were loaded into a railway car at the Reshetiliwka station and taken to Kharkiw.

(From D. Solovey's *Along the Path to Golgotha* [in Ukrainian])

PAVLO KOSHOVY

SHE KILLED HER NINE-YEAR-OLD DAUGHTER

In the year 1933, there lived in the village of Velyko-Polovetske in the region of Kiev a poor widow by the name of Hapka Druzenko with her son Arsen and her two daughters Olya and Halya. Halya was only nine years old. Hapka's husband had previously died of starvation. The family, like all others, continued to starve.

Arsen, more adroit than the others, departed for other points of the USSR to seek his fortune. The elder daughter Olya went to live with her grandfather in the village of Maze-pyntsi, some 5 kilometres from Velyko-Polovetske. Hapka was left alone with her daughter Halya.

The neighbors noticed that Hapka's house remained shut



A peasant woman — victim of famine.

up for more than a day, and no one was seen around it. They became suspicious and decided to force an entry.

When they came in they noticed drops of blood on the earthen floor. There was no one in the house. They began to search the premises and on opening the oven discovered a child's hand, with the fingers intact, protruding from the pot. They took the pot out of the oven and saw the flesh of the nether parts of a child in it.

About 50 people from the neighborhood gathered in and about the house. A militiaman arrived. They continued the search and discovered under the bench near the stove a sack containing the rest of the body and the head, by which they were able to recognize Halya's remains.

News of this horrible deed spread rapidly through the village. Still more people arrived from every part of the village.

Hapka Druzenko, who had been absent all the while, now returned to her house. Every part of her body was distended and she could hardly drag one foot after the other. Although she saw throngs of people about her house she continued walking toward them at the same pace. The militiaman approached her and began to question her . . . But Hapka did not answer a word. She collapsed to the ground, dead . . .

This frightful scene, which I witnessed personally, I shall never forget as long as I live.

V. STOYAN

SHE BOTCHED THE JOB

Yarina Halat, nicknamed "Munka" ("Sourpuss"), who lived in the Nyzke Staromisto section of the village of Horoshki in the district of Polonsky in the region of Vynnytsya, lost her husband in the famine that spring of 1933. Yarina was left with a two or three year old child. She was swollen with hunger and went mad with fear at the prospect of starving to death.

Very early one morning, Yarina took a knife and started to cut the throat of her child, who was still sleeping. She botched the job and the child began to breathe with a loud, rasping gurgle. The Reverend Likhmitsky was then living in the next room of the house. He heard the noise and began to knock on the wall and ask Yarina what had happened.

Yarina began to weep heart-rendingly. The neighbors as-

sembled when they heard her wails, although they were also so swollen they could hardly move. A great hub-bub began around the house. Soon the militia arrived on the scene.

Yarina and her child, who had finally died, were taken away by the militia.

Shortly afterwards they also took away Father Likhnitsky, who never returned.

ANDRIY MELEZHYK

HER CHILD'S FLESH DID NOT SAVE HER

Luka Vasylyovich Bondar lived in Bilousiwka in the district of Chornoukhe in the region of Poltava. He was 38 years old. He had a wife named Kulina and a 5 year old daughter named Vaska. Before collectivization he owned 5 hectares of land, and therefore belonged to the class of poor peasant.

In March of 1933 Luka, although distended with hunger, went away to some distant villages in search of something to eat, and did not return. At that time people frequently failed to return from such trips. About a week later his wife Kulina died of starvation and the collective farm brigade removed her body to the cemetery.

After she was interred the neighbors started wondering what had happened to her daughter Vaska, who was not known to have died. They entered Kulina's house and began to search for the child. In the oven they found a pot containing a boiled liver, heart and lungs. In the warming-oven they found a large earthenware bowl filled with fresh salted meat, and in the cellar under a barrel they discovered a small hole in which a child's head, feet and hands were buried. It was the head of Kulina's little daughter, Vaska.

Hulemba was the head of the village soviet at that time. The neighbours who discovered the remains of Vaska were Maria Stepaniwna Ostrowska and Valentina Onopriewna Bondar.

K. S.

A MOTHER EATS HER CHILD

Marina Strizhachenko married Volodimir Ribka who lived in the village of Velika Kokhniwka. Then came 1933. Volodymyr perished of hunger in April of that year. About a week later Marina killed and ate her child.

Marina Ribka was tried for cannibalism in the village by the people's court, which sentenced her to several years in a far northern concentration camp. The judge was the head of the village soviet, Andriy Sokirko.

The Ribka family were our next-door neighbours.

N. VOLOHODSKY

WHERE'S MARKO

A starving widow, Odarka Karpenko, from the village of Kawray in the region of Poltava killed her 18 year old son Marko while he was asleep. This happened in the spring of 1933. Her married daughter, Priska, who lived in the neighbouring village, came to visit her mother and asked, "Where's Marko?"

"He went somewhere yesterday and hasn't come back yet," was Odarka's reply. Priska went home, feeling uneasy in her mind, and the next day she came to see her mother again, and asked "Well, is Marko home?"

"No, he is not," replied Odarka in a low, somewhat insane-sounding voice.

Priska could smell the odor of boiled meat which seemed to be coming from her mother's stove, and thought to herself that there was something queer about it, because where in that time of famine could one get any meat? She waited until her mother left the house, then slid open the door to the oven and took out an earthenware pot. Priska uttered a shriek which could be heard at the other end of the village. A few starving and swollen persons entered the house and began to revive Priska, who had fainted. Soon the militia appeared in the house, having been informed of the matter.

They made a thorough search and found Marko's head and the remains of his body in the cellar. What fate overtook Odarka Karpenko no one knows because she never returned to the village and no one ever saw her again.


V. POLTAVKA

IN A MAD FIT SHE ATE HER CHILDREN

In the town of Yahotyn there lived a couple named Krikhno, who had two children. Krikhno's wife, Sofia, whose maiden

name was Rozum, was very beautiful, a good housekeeper, a good mother and a loving helpmate.

Her husband was arrested and punished for not meeting his quota in the grain-and-meat-collection campaigns. Sofia was



Red Army helps with the harvest after villagers perished in the famine.

left alone with her small children, suffered great hardship and was finally driven to insanity, so that she killed and ate her children.

The NKVD took her away and no one knows what they did with her.

NATALKA ZOLOTAREVICH

SHE KILLED HER TWO CHILDREN

One spring morning in 1933 I brought a food parcel to my relative, Maria Nikiforiwna Denysenko, who was imprisoned at the Chornouchy District Militia's jail. While waiting my turn to have it accepted, I noticed a wagon driving up to the Militia's building. In it three persons were sitting: the driver, a militiaman and a woman whom I did not know. The wagon had come from the village of Hiltsi and the woman was a native of that village. The militiaman got down from the wagon and took the woman into the Militia's quarters.

The driver shouted to us woman to come closer and have a look at some jellied human flesh. All the people standing in line ran to the wagon. I also approached the wagon and this is what I saw:

There was a "lokhanka," a fairly small tub, in the wagon, holding some human flesh and a head, while an earthenware bowl contained some real jellied meat. One could plainly see a boiled human hand with all its fingers in the jellied meat. I remember what the driver told us.

This woman had a husband and two children. Her husband had died of starvation some time before. One day the neighbours noticed that one of the woman's daughters was missing. To the neighbour's query, "Where is your daughter?" she replied that her sister from the Caucasus came to visit her and had taken the girl home with her. But after some time, the woman's other daughter was missing too. Then the neighbours began to suspect that she had killed the children. They notified the militia and this meat was the fish of the second girl.

STEPAN KAVUN

CANNIBALISM IN THE REGION OF VYNNYTSYA

In the village of Viytiwtsi there lived a widow, Yawdokha Kotol, who had two young sons, 12 and 14 years of age. The

entire family was distended with hunger in the spring of 1933.

One day Yawdokha enticed a neighbour's son into her house and killed him. She cooked his flesh, while the head and the inner organs she took and buried in the clay pit. Her neighbour, Nikon Ivanchenko happened to see her, told the authorities and took Yawdokha away. Her children died of hunger.

In another village, Popiwtsi., lived Maria Lipovenko. She too was a cannibal. They took her away also and she never returned.

Before the collectivization our village of Viytiwtsi had a population of around 4,000. During the famine of 1932-33 more than half of them perished. My brother and his entire family were among those who died of starvation at that time.

CANNIBALISM WITH CRIMINAL INTENT

This form of cannibalism is likewise founded on a psychologically abnormal basis, but in this case it constitutes an act of full criminal intent. The following cases are a few examples of the occurrence of such phenomena in the villages.

CASES OF CANNIBALISM IN THE DISTRICT OF RESHETYLIW

At the settlement of Tokari in the Reshetyliw district a woman killed her husband with an axe and began to cook him. The husband was a brigade-leader at the collective farm. When his absence was noticed they started to look for him and in due course came to his own house. There they smelled the odor of cooking meat. They became suspicious—where at that time could a person get any meat? They dashed to the oven and pulled out a small earthenware pot, from which the fingers of a human hand protruded. The rest of the victim, hacked to pieces lay under the bed . . .

In the village of Fediyiwka Motrya Cherewko used to entice in any children she found beside her fence under the pretext of hiring them to tend her cow while it pastured. She used that ruse to kill Pawlo Ivanovich Babich's daughter, making her flesh into sausage which she sold at the Fediyiwka market. Demid Hnatovich Fediy, the head of the co-operative seized her with these sausages. She was arrested and sent to the district town, but she died before she arrived there.

Likewise in Fediyiwka Pawlo Atamanets used to seize chil-

dren at the station, kill and eat them until Demid Hnatovich Fediy rescued a little girl from under his knife. In 1942 the girl now a grown woman, visited Demid Hnatovich Fediy to thank him for saving her life. Atamanets, together with the rest of his family of five, later died of starvation.

Whenever a dead horse was taken to the animal burying-ground, the entire village followed. Even though the veterinarian doused the animal with carbolic acid before throwing it into the pit, all the people fell upon it, hacking it wherever they happened to light on it. On one of these occasions Vasil Lukich Fediy chopped off Nadezhda Borisiwna Fediy's fingers in the scramble, took them home, and ate them along with the horse-meat.

There was also the following occurrence. Panko Fedorovich Litwin received a small food-parcel from his son in the city, who was a member of the NKVD. His neighbour, Oksana Honta, heard about it and wanted to kill him. She stuck a knife into his throat while he was sleeping but was not strong enough to cut it entirely. The neighbours took Panko to the hospital, but he was supposed to have run away from them. Later it was rumoured that he had been thrown down a precipice.

S. YEWSEWSKY

SHE TURNED HER FATHER INTO JELLIED MEAT

Mondays were market days in the village of Zhidiwtsi in the Popelyansky district of the Province of Kiev. In June, 1933, these markets were crowded with famished villagers from all the neighbouring villages, trying to buy food of some sort for their starving families.

On one such market day the buyers noticed Olena Rudenko, a 32-year-old native of Zhidiwtsi, who was renowned in the village for her beauty. She was selling jellied meat at the market at one rouble per plate. In twenty-five minutes she had sold all her wares.

As she was preparing to leave the market she was approached by the local militiaman and a sanitary inspector. They detained her and took her to the office of the militia.

The next day an investigation revealed that Olena Rudenko had killed her father and for two consecutive days had sold his jellied flesh at the market. Her psychological condition was abnormal.

All trace of Olena Rudenko vanished after her arrest...

SHE SLEW SIX CHILDREN

In the course of the spring of 1933 there were many instances of children of various families in the town of Nizhen, in the Chernihiv district, disappearing without a trace. An intensive search failed to reveal any clues. The children just seemed to vanish into thin air.

The eleven-year-old daughter of a woman living on Maherska Street disappeared in this fashion before the month of May. The mother began to search everywhere for her, inquiring of everyone if they had seen her somewhere. A distant neighbour sent the frantic mother a message that she had indeed seen her daughter the day before, sitting in the park of what had formerly been the Nizhen Lyceum. A market-woman was giving her some candy. The mother had a maternal uncle who worked in the office of the Criminal Investigation Division of the Soviet Militia. He undertook to look for his vanished grand-niece.

He asked a woman who lived beside the park on Hrafska Street, if she had seen the girl. The woman replied that she had not. The uncle again obtained a detailed account from the woman who had happened to see the girl and was not involved in any other way, and this woman categorically affirmed that she had seen the girl in the park, together with the woman. Again the militiaman visited the woman, this time making the most importunate demands that she give an explanation of her meeting with the little girl. This time, too, the woman categorically denied that she had seen the little girl. The militiaman, being a trained detective, had on his first visit noticed a towel with red stains on it; on his second visit the towel was gone. As he had entered he had glimpsed the woman's husband through the window of the room next to the one they were in; now, therefore, he asked the woman, "Where is your husband?" The woman replied that he was not home. Besides that, she seemed flustered and was not quite able to hide it from the detective's penetrating glance.

Thereupon the militiaman suddenly burst through the closed doors into the next room, where the woman's husband, supposing the militiaman to know all, cried out in a terrified voice, "It was not me—I had nothing to do with it!"

They made a search of the house and found the dismember-

ed body of the vanished child. The woman was tried in the open court at Nizhen. The trial lasted three days and disclosed that the woman used to catch children from all over town by luring them to her house with candy. There she would kill them and make pasties from their flesh to sell at the market. She had already killed six children for this purpose. She was sentenced to death before a firing squad.

PASTIES OF HUMAN FLESH

This is a case that took place on Hoholewska Street in the town of Zhitomir during the winter of 1932-33. A starving woman in search of food entered the courtyard of a building near the city bank in the vicinity of Mikhayliwska Street, and there found fragments of human fingers on the garbage-heap. She reported this to the city militia. The militia made a search of the building. In the cellar vault they discovered hanging from the walls several human bodies which had been dressed in the manner of the carcasses of hogs, as well as an assortment of clothing which had belonged to the unfortunate victims who had entered the building. The trial, conducted by the OGPU and closed to the public, (although rumors circulated among the populace), established the following information about the criminals:

A certain family, consisting of a couple and the wife's brother, lived in the building. The brother was a cabman who drove people from the railway station into town. As there was a scarcity of rooms in the hotels, the cabman would inform his fares on the way to town how hard it was to get a room there and would suggest that they stay at the home of acquaintances of his who would be pleased to put them up for the night. The fares would consent to the arrangement and the cabman would drive them to his sister's place.

They would treat a guest courteously, give him supper and a room to sleep in, but in the night, when the tired traveller was fast asleep, they would clout him over the head with the blunt end of an axe and lower the body into the seller through a trap-door in the floor, hidden under a rug. They would undress him and dismember his body.

The wife made pasties from the flesh, which her husband sold at the market, and frequently also at the bank in the neigh-

bourhood, where the employes would buy them because they were quite tasty . . . The clothing of the victims was also disposed of at the Zhytny Market, which was close to Hoholewska Street.

The trial established that the family had murdered about seven or eight persons in this way. These cannibals were sentenced to be shot.

During these famine-stricken years the phenomenon of cannibalism was not confined solely to the starving; in addition it provided a source of profit to criminal elements who, in this grisly manner, took advantage of the difficult times.

V. POLTAWKA

A WHOLE GANG OF CANNIBALS IN POLTAVA

A friend of mine who worked with me as a technician at the factory had Proletarska Street as her district for taking the particulars during the spring of 1933. She was forever complaining of an evil stench at Numbers 32, 34, and 36, coming either from the buildings themselves or else from the weeds growing around them.

Soon afterwards my friend related to me that entire wagon-loads of men's, women's and children's clothing were being removed from the attic of one of the buildings, and that in the building itself they had uncovered a whole gang of cannibal manhunters. This gang's practice had been to entice the newly-arrived seekers of food away from the railway station to their house, where they would slay them and manufacture from their flesh meat products which they sold at the market.

My friend saw with her own eyes a scattered pile of human hair of every conceivable color.

Every citizen of Poltava will testify to this.

A large, modern secondary school was soon afterwards erected on the site of this building.

WOMEN CANNIBALS AT THE SOLOWKI ISLANDS

Semen Pidhainy, a Soviet political prisoner, in his memoirs of the Solovki Islands, entitled "Nedostriyani" (Firing-Squad Survivors), mentions, in Volume I, pp- 104-108, the presence of 375 female cannibals from Ukraine, among them grandmothers, young married women and young girls fifteen of whom were minors ranging from 10 to 15 years of age. Some of the

latter were there with their mothers, aunts, sisters or grandmothers.

These young women and girls, numbering more than 150 persons in all, were objects of amusement to the psychologically-twisted sadists who headed the camps. At each of the visits of these heads to Golgotha, as the place where the women were kept was called, silent, anguished weeping ensued. No one dared raise her voice in protest, unmerciful tortures being the immediate result of such action. The women had no one to whom they could disclose their grievances. But when one of the young girls committed suicide, another, Nastya Plekan, who could no longer bear it docilely, shattered this bewitched circle of silence.

Nastya was a brigade-leader among the women. One day 38 of the 41 women who were ferrying a raft across a channel in rough weather were drowned, and only Nastya and two others managed to save themselves.

Nastya spoke out, "Why am I being punished so? Why did they shoot my father and my brothers, why did they starve my mother to death nad turn me into a cannibal? We are all equal here; are we really, truly cannibals, then? No, it is not we who are cannibals—it is they who drove us to insanity and this accursed lot. We are the pure of heart, we are the kindest of the kind. If there is a heaven and a hell, we are the ones who must go to heaven after death and stand at God's own side, along with the most saintly martyrs . . ."

CHAPTER IX

DEMOGRAPHIC REPERCUSSIONS OF THE FAMINE

The famine resulted in terrible consequences for the Ukrainian agricultural population and the Ukrainian nation as a whole. They are documented in both the Soviet and the world press. They can also be noted in our own documents.

The most important of these consequences, the ones which Moscow had carved, were political. The famine broke the back of the nation's political resistance to bolshevik collectivization. Having rid themselves of the millions of superfluous mouths to feed in Ukraine, Moscow could also derive, with little if any additional effort, millions of bushels more of grain from Ukraine.

The qualitative index of the Ukrainian population which had died in the famine could be said to be as follows:

1. Those villages and districts in the various provinces which were economically the most backward, predominantly purely agricultural in character, and farthest removed from railways and industrial centers, were the ones fatally affected by the Soviet blockade on transportation and consequently depopulated to the greatest degree by the famine.
2. Those categories of people in the villages and districts of the different provinces who were the most passive by nature, the most conservative in their agricultural methods, the most backward in cultural respects, and also the poorest succumbed in greatest numbers to the famine. Each village had entire streets and neighbourhoods of these poverty-stricken people who completely died out, and it made no difference whether or not they were members of the collective farms. At the same time, it must be admitted that the most deeply-rooted traditions of humane and Christian morals and ethics were generally conserved to the greatest extent among these categories of people. They were least adapted to the terrible conditions of life and least able to cope with the new situations which the collectivization by the soviet government imposed on

them. Particularly vulnerable were those families left without their men-folk.

3. The following categories of people survived the famine in the greatest numbers:

(a) The more enlightened families, even when these had been previously "de-kurkulized," who had fled betimes to the cities and industrial establishments.

(b) Those families, members of which were workers or civil servants, were studying in the cities or were employed somewhere as skilled tradesmen. These broke through the blockade on transportation to the Ukrainian village by fair means or foul.

(c) Those families which were more adroit and active, including the amoral or criminal types, who associated with the village party members and usurped the rations of others, sometimes obtaining these by robbery and pilfering.

(d) Soviet party members, who frequently had the privilege of acquiring food from co-operative stores closed to the general public.

FAMINE STATISTICS BY VILLAGE AND DISTRICT

We are submitting a list of documents, the majority of them pertaining to the province of Poltava, but some of them dealing with other provinces in Ukraine, which enumerate the number of famine victims in the various villages and districts.

From the village of Zhornokliw comes a list of 430 persons, which comprises only those families in which more than two persons succumbed. In our files there are also lists of the families in which only one or two persons died of starvation.

In the village of Pleshkan only 982 persons out of a population of 2,000, or 49 per cent, survived. The village of Komariwka was completely wiped out. Likewise, the village of Rokitna was completely depopulated and turned into open fields. The settlement of Reykiwka lost 50 per cent of its population, the village of Heyzeriw lost 60 per cent, the village of Velika Orzhitsya also 60 per cent, and the village of Krasne, 80 per cent. The majority of the victims belonged to the poorer classes. The village of Hubske, which had been inhabited by 3,500 persons, lost about 25 per cent of its population. The village of Domaniw, which was equal in population to Hubske, lost 800 persons, or 23 per cent while only one child was born in the interval. The village of Yareski in the Mirhorod district, which had formerly served as

location for the Soviet film industry because of its beautiful scenery along the river Psol, originally had a population of approximately 1,500, which was reduced by 700 or 47 per cent.

In the province of Kiev, 1,700 of the 5,000 inhabitants or 30 per cent of the village of Rohova starved to death. Strizhawka lost 500 of its 2,000 people, or about 25 per cent. In the March, of 1933 along, 80 people perished there. The village of Medvini, which before the First World War could boast of a population of nearly 12,000, had barely half that number following the Second World War. During the famine year 1932-33 25 per cent of the poorest citizens on Dubiniwka Street in Medvina were wiped out. This was one of the most prosperous streets in the village.

In the province of Odessa, a village in the Dobrovelichkiwsky district, which formerly comprised about 250 inhabitants, was affected to such an extent that only one man, seven women and fifteen children survived.

On the basis of precise data, 19.4 per cent of the population in a single district in the province of Dniepropetrowsk died out in 1932-33.

The destiny of death by famine did not bypass even some of the districts of the Donbas. In the village soviet of Novo-Ekonomichne, 740 out of the total population of 3,000 died in the single month of March alone.

We have already referred to the appearance of completely depopulated villages in our earlier documents. Below we submit just one more instance. Similar phenomena could be observed throughout the entire Ukraine in those times.

430 FAMINE DEATHS IN ZHORNOKLOVY

430 persons, members of 155 families in the village of Zhornoklovy in the Helmvyaziwka district of the province of Poltava died of the famine during 1932-33. The following is a list of those families in which more than two persons perished.

11 of Mykola Chornenky's family died, namely he himself, his wife, his father and 8 children.

7 persons died in each of the following families: Hrytsko Avramenko's, Hrytsko Monakh's, Serhiy Bublik's, Ivan (Paska) Pashchenko's, and Ivan Fedonchuk's.

6 persons died in each of the families of Mykyta Lukyane-

nko, Mytrofan Owcharenko, Mykola Litvinenko, Omelko Mikolayevich Padalka, Petro (Votkal) Demyanenko, Ivan Mitrofanovich Padalka, Yowtukh, and Ivan (Ozhohzko) Pishchansky.

5 persons died in each of the families of Stepan Kudelya, Marko Padalka, Fedota Chornenko, Hrytsko (Konoval) Padalka, Kondrat (Vaskun) Padalka, Kuzma Vasylyovich Perekhrist, Yawdokha Mikolayenko and Antin Piwtroisty.

4 persons died in each of the families of Ivan Pishchansky. Korniy Perekhrist, Serhiy Chornenko, Omelko Chornenko, Fedir Sachava, Ivan Sachava, Danylo Sachava, Mykhaylo Protasenko, Ivan Kudelya, Ilko Kudelya, Ihnat Bublik, Trokhym Pavlovich Padalka, Petro Pishchansky, Ivan Bakum, Ivan Piwtoristy, Lukyan Mikolayenko, Kondrat Mikolayenko, Stepan Perekhrist, Ivan Pashchenko, Prokop Kuzmich Padalka, Ivan Hrihorovich Chornenko, Ivan Yakymovich Chornenko, Ivan (Halushka) Padalka, Petro Kononets and Yawdokha Vasinko.

3 persons died in each of the families of Stepan Ivanovich Kudelya, Marko Ovcharenko, Petro Pashchenko, Livon Pashchenko, Stepan Kudelya (the secretary), Andriy (Zoyka) Padalka, Pavlo Petrovich (Slipenko) Padalka, Fedoska Perekhrist, Ivan (Puzir) Paschenko, Pilip Kudelya, Yosip Chornenko, Pilip Dyachekno, Mykhaylo Semenovich Perekhrist, Fedir (Bezkorowayny) Padalka, Ivan (Chukhry) Chornenko, Hrytsko (Schuchka) Padalka, Kuzma Padalka, Matviy Pisnya, Yakiw Hawrilovich Chornenko, Mykola Kharko, Konderi, Maria Kasyanova.

36 families lost 2 persons each in the famine. (We have their namse but do not include them here.)

47 families lost one person each to the famine. (We have their names also but likewise do not list them here.)

Konstyantin Sachava and Mykola Chornenok took their own lives by hanging themselves, while Lukyan Mykolayenko died in prison.

A. VOLOHODSKY

THE FAMINE DEVASTATES THE VILLAGE OF PLESHKANY

The village of Plenshkany in the Hlemyziwsk district of Poltava, in its setting of woods and orchards, used to lead a prosperous existence. It had a population of more than 2,000 persons, inhabiting 420 dwellings. Within its limits ithad 2,2000

hectares of land under cultivation and about 400 hectares of hayfields. In the famine years of 1932-33 this village suffered extraordinary devastation.

At the time of collectivization and the grain collection campaign, the brigade of activists under the leadership of Communist emissaries from Moscow robbed the people of every last crumb of their food stores, sweeping out every stray kernel from the nooks and crannies, sacks and even out the cooking-pots.

Then came the famine. The greater proportion of the people died, leaving only 982 survivors. All the dogs and cats in the village fell prey to the starving people and disappeared. The linden trees were stripped of their bark and the acacias of their blossoms, all sorts of roots were gathered, to no avail.

There was a four-grade school in the village before 1932-33, with all four rooms filled with children. After the famine the school was closed for a whole year because there were no children to attend it. In the following year classes were resumed but were held in only two of the class-rooms, with two grades in each class-room and only a few pupils in each grade.

In this same district the village of Komariwka, which had had 415 inhabitants was completely wiped out by the famine and struck off the list of villages in the district.

PANAS SKIRDA

FAMINE IN THE VILLAGES OF THE YAHOTYN DISTRICT

The hamlet of Roykiwka was once settled mostly by well-to-do people. A large number of these were sent to northern concentration camps or to prisons, while 50 per cent of those who were allowed to remain in the hamlet starved to death in the famine of 1932-33.

The village of Heyzeriwka, later renamed Zhouzneva, had a "commune" ten years prior to the collectivization. During the famine those who belonged to the commune all survived, but 60 per cent of those outside the commune starved to death.

The large village of Stara Orzhitsya also lost 60 per cent of its population in the famine.

The village of Krasne, bordering on the district of Zhurwsk was formerly a prosperous one devoted to sheep-raising. Most of its dwellings were covered with tin instead of the cus-

tomary thatch. Precise data show that 80 per cent of its population starved to death during the famine. I had to pass through this village during that period and this is the impression I received. Everything was overgrown with weeds—entire streets were without the slightest sign of life. All the roads and pathways were choked by weeds.

Even the town of Yahotyn wore a similar aspect.

The majority of the people, mostly the poorer ones, who had joined the collective farms, died of famine. Those who did not belong to the collective farms sought salvation by working on soviet state farms (radhosps), on the railway, or in food establishments in Yahotyn itself, as well as by taking themselves off to other cities in search of work.

Such streets in Yahotyn as Kalindiwka, Zavod, Yami, etc. were completely depopulated by the famine in that year; only the activists remained alive. Yowdokha Karpiyka, one of these activists, was notorious for her sadism. (She was nicknamed "The Black One.") Other activists were Pylypenko, Kosidina, Domashewsky, and Vasyl Babich. These activists smoothed the path to death for other folk. Later some of them were punished for "perverting the party line."

Completely wiped out by the famine were such families as the Koshelniks, Chortohirs, Yaremenko-Moroz's, Rodaks, Sovis, Svestilniks, Komlichenkos, Pozums, and many others whose names I cannot at the moment recall.

M. MAZARETS

HURSKÉ LOSES 44 PER CENT OF ITS POPULATION

Before the collectivization of the village of Hurske had a population of about 2,500. The village was land-rich and prosperous.

Then came 1933. The head of the village soviet at that time was Klyaznikov, a Russian district Party commissar especially sent from Moscow. The villagers were deprived of all their food by unceasing robberies. They could not fight the famine with their own resources. The authorities forbade them to leave their village; tickets were not sold to them at the railway station unless they could produce a permit from the village soviet. Whoever somehow contrived to go to Russia for bread had it taken away from him by the railway GPU on the way back. A "Torgsin" (state department store) was opened in Lyubni,

in which one could exchange gold and silver (ear-rings or rings) for food, but the villagers had no gold or silver.

The people at the collective farms lived on a diet of millet-husk soup. Pawlo Kaydash died in a furrow in the fields from partaking of this soup. The people started to eat all sorts of pot-herbs, weeds and the foliage of trees. They devoured every dog and cat in the village. A especially large number of people died at the beginning of the harvest season, after eating the new grain in their famished condition.

In one of the neighbourhood of the village of Hurske the following families died out completely: Pavlo Mazarets and his family of 6, Serhiy Yarmolenko and his family of 3, Samson Hrytsayenko and his family of 5, Kuzma Mazarets and his family of 3, Mykola Pawlenko and his family of 2, Timokhvan Pavlenko and his wife, Dmytro Nazarets and his family of 3. Ivan Yarmolenko and his family of 4, Ivan Prichodko and his family of 4.

Andriy Mazarets had a wife and three children. The children died first, then Andriy. His wife Natalka ate her husband's dead body in order to save herself, but died, too, before finishing his head.

The dead were collected from the streets and houses by four vehicles assigned to the job by the village soviet, and were buried in the graveyard in large pits designed to hold 10 to 15 persons each. The physicians were ordered beforehand by the authorities to ascribe the deaths to "albumin deficiency."

Neither the national nor the local press breathed a single word about the famine.

M. PETRENKO

DEATH-RATE: 800—BIRTH-RATE: 1

In 1928, prior to the collectivization, there were 3,500 inhabitants in the village of Domantiw of the Zolotonosha district of Poltava. In 1929-30, when the collectivization began, 28 families were thrown out of their homes. Five of these families were sent to Siberia in their entirety, while the men only of four other families were sent there. The rest of the dekurkulized were forced to leave the village.

Luka Sheremet's family of 8 was totally destroyed. He had owned 4 hectares of land and operated a water-mill in partnership with two other men. Luka was sent to Siberia, his

wife and two small children died of starvation in 1933, two small children, 3 and 5 years of age, found themselves in the children's shelter at the collective farm, while two older children went out to work in the world, likely joining one of the bands of homeless waifs.

Musiy Tsyura's whole family died of hunger, as did the Reverend Stepan Subovich's and the Reverend Nichipir Kalyatin's and many others.

The starving ate up all the dogs and cats in the village. They caught fish and muskrats in the rivers and collected snails. They ate dead horses. But all this was to no avail.

Of the 3,500 persons in the village around 800 or 23 per cent died in 1933 alone, while there was only one birth—a son to the village activist Dmytro Demyanenko.

IVAN PANASYUK

THE FATE OF THE VILLAGE OF YARESKI

The village of Yaresky in the province of Poltava lies a few kilometers away from the Kiev-Poltava railway line in a sea of fruit-trees and greenery. For many years the Soviet film industry exploited the lovely scenery of the place, such as the Vorskla River, the willows, the birch woods, the black poplars, the picturesque slopes and boundless steepes of Poltava, for its film productions.

This village formerly boasted over 1,500 inhabitants. In the famine-stricken years it, too, was neglected, although it was in a better position economically than other villages because the annual visit of the film expedition always brought in a few spare kopeks.

When I arrived in Yaresky at the beginning of June, 1933 at the call of the film expedition I found not more than half of the people—some 700 persons—still surviving. The rest had swelled and died in that year of famine of 1932-33.

I had a talk with a man who was in the Yaresky village soviet, who was also earmarked for a speedy death by starvation, whose duty it was to keep track of the population's movements. (He registered the births and deaths.) He explained to me that all sorts of inconceivable human ailments, with regard to the time, were entered in the column of "Cause of death," such as diarrhea, ague, cramps, etc.—anything as long as it was not famine.

The people who still had a spark of life when I arrived did not walk but merely dragged themselves over the ground. Distended, silent, they wandered at a very slow pace in their yards or down the street, forcing themselves to put one swollen leg ahead of another, the legs being distended to the circumference of pails above the knee. They all had unnaturally fat, swollen countenances and half-dead, lacklustre eyes.

There was no crowing of cocks, no cackle of hens, no barking of dogs in the village of Yaresky. Half of the houses stood derelict, in some the windows apertures were carelessly blocked up with broken pieces of old boards, in others they gaped wide open . . .

L. PYLYPENKO

ONE-THIRD OF THE VILLAGE PERISHED

Up to the time of collectivization the village of Rohozova in the province of Kiev contained about 1,000 dwellings and had a population of about 5,000. According to the testimony of the inhabitants of this village 1,700 persons, or about a third of the population died in 1932-33; this estimate well deserves belief as the real truth. According to sources known to me, a third of the pupils at the Rohozova school, where I was teaching, died. Those who were still alive resembled walking corpses. They slept during classes and could not retain anything in their minds.

It is a known fact that it was principally the men and boys who died and the women and girls who survived. An instance of this was my neighbour Sereda's family. He and his son Oleksiy died, while his wife Tetyana and his daughter Olha survived. The children were of school age.

Neither coffins nor crosses were prepared for the deceased. The collective farms each day assigned vehicles for the burial of the dead which would make the rounds of all the streets, calling from house to house to collect any dead persons to be found within and piling them like cordwood on the wagons to take them to the graveyard. Large, elongated, graves were dug in the graveyard, into which the dead were tossed. They did not cover them over until they had been filled with corpses. Dogs would visit the open graves and gnaw the bodies. In any case, the pits were covered with a light layer of earth so that the dogs

could unearth the dead at will and would gnaw their arms and legs.

By order of the authorities, the collective farms issued to those persons who dug graves and collected corpses 150 grams of grain per corpse. Therefore it frequently happened that the demoralized, brutalized burial crews would remove persons who were still living off the streets, throw them on their wagons and toss them into the graves, in their eagerness to receive that extra allotment of 150 grams of grain. If any of these "deceased" still had the strength to talk they would beg and implore the crew not to throw them into the grave but to wait a little while longer. But the implacable grave-diggers would say, "This way you won't suffer as much," and would toss them in without any show of mercy whatsoever.

I. KABAN

THE DEVASTATION BY FAMINE OF THE VILLAGE OF STRIZHIWKA

The village of Strizhiwka in the Rzhyschchiw district of the province of Kiev boasted a population of 2,000. 500 of these died at the time of the famine in 1932-33. March of 1933 was a record month for the death rate, which amounted to 80 cases.

I do not list the names of all the deceased here, but only those whom I knew intimately, and these were:

1. Roman Kuban, my paternal grandfather.
2. Kyrylo Chkhalo, my maternal grandfather.
3. The families of Stepan Basenko, Ivan Bilous, and Dokiya Borozenko, who were all three school friends of mine.
4. Prokip Shumilo, who died at the railway station in Kiev.

There were two cases of cannibalism reported in our village.

A man nicknamed "Lebedka" (Little Swan), ate the corpses of his father and mother, but later he, too, died.

I don't recall the name of the person involved in the other case of cannibalism.

B. BUZHANYN

ONLY EIGHT HOUSEHOLDS LEFT

A village in the Dobrovelichiysky district of the province of Odessa had 64 farmsteads prior to collectivization. All of these

were well kept. The people lived prosperously. They had a great number of cattle.

Just before the harvest season in 1933 I was conducting a geological survey of the northern region of Odessa. I visited this village and there observed the following scene.

The village consisted of one long street which was completely overgrown with weeds. Through these weeds meandered a narrow footpath. No vehicles at all passed that way. The uninhabited houses stood forlornly in their yards, their windows broken, their doorways yawning. Not a trace of human footsteps were to be seen from the street to dwellings, and the yards, too, were choked with weeds. There was not one living soul in all those dwellings.

Here and there a narrow little path would wanted from the street to one of the houses. In that case the windows would have unbroken panes and the doors would be shut, while a bucket lying about or earthenware pots hung on pegs would betoken the presence of a living being.

When I had passed midway through the village I had seen only three or four houses with signs of human habitation about them. In one of these houses, which had a well beside it, the presence of which interested me, I discovered three women and two children still alive. They were mistress of the house, whose husband and child had succumbed to hunger, with two of her other children and two neighbour-women.

The women informed me of the fate of the village and its inhabitants. Out of the 64 households in the village only 8 were still inhabited by living beings — 7 women and some 15 children in all. The rest had all died. There was not a living beast in the village, including cats and dogs, nor a single fowl.

The women and children appeared terribly emaciated but not distended. They survived by gathering snails in a nearby river, which they would boil for several hours until they had boiled all the juices out of them, when they would eat the liquid as a soup. They minced the cooked snails added some linden and acacia leaves to them and baked little cakes. They treated me to some of these dark-gren caks. They could not be chewed; only bites could be taken out of them and bolted down. The women obtained albumen from the snails, and this saved them from death.

DEATH BY STARVATION FOR 20 PER CENT OF THE DISTRICT

In a district of the province of Katerynoslaw, cited as a sample of just one administrative territorial area, the population at the beginning of 1932 was 60,000 while the land area consisted of over 100,000 hectares.

The birth rate was very low during 1932 and 1933, only several dozen births being recorded, which could not affect to any great extent the increase of the total population.

According to precise data in the register of deaths 11,680 persons died of starvation in this district exclusively during 1932-33. This makes 19.4 per cent, or about 20 per cent in round numbers.

The situation was no better in other districts of the province. There were cases of whole villages dying out and entire administrative village soviets having to be closed down, as for instance in the village of Chernetchina on the Orel River in the Nekhvoroshchansky district, which was completely depopulated by the famine. Formerly it had more than 200 households. Similar instances throughout the province mounted up into the hundreds. Dnipropetrowsk belongs on the list of those provinces which suffered the most cruelly on account of the famine and in which the highest percentage of the population died of starvation.

N. PLICHKOVSKY

SPECIAL REGISTER OF THE FAMINE DEATH-RATE

At the beginning of April, 1933, I was substituting for the director of the Hrishinsky district branch of the Board of Instruction in the Donbas. I was sitting in his office one day when there was a knock at the door and in came a villager in a peasant's coat.

"Here is a packet for you. Please take it." The villager handed me an envelope.

I took the envelope. In the upper left-hand corner, in place of the return address, there was only inscribed the word "Confidential," and lower down, the address "Director of the Hrishinsky District Branch of the Board of Instruction."

"Thank you," I replied after reading the address. I opened

the packet and took out a small slip of paper which appeared to be a printed form, (hence the inference that this was a widely-circulated standard form).

The paper's contents, as nearly as I can remember them, were these:

"Summary of the death rate for the month of March at the Novo-Ekonomichne village soviet. Total Population . . . Men . . . Women. (I do not remember the figures.) Deceased: . . . Men . . . Women. (I do not recall these figures either.) Total 740 persons.

The Novo-Ekonomichne village soviet had a population of somewhere around 3,000, and in the month of March 740 of them had died. (This figure I remembered very well indeed at the time.) I was seized with terror. It did not state in the summary what the causes of the deaths were but everyone was aware that people were dying of famine.

I became frightened of that paper — the summary of the death rate — and could not understand why it had come into my hands. Later the reason was disclosed. The paper was intended for the District Inspectorate of the National Agricultural Register, (INHO), which was under the supervision of the GPU, but the secretary of the village soviet had written INO (Inspectorate of the Board of Instruction) instead of INHO, omitting the letter "H." I do not know if and how they punished the messenger and the secretary of the village soviet for this mistake.

TETYANA BUDKO

THE APPEARANCE OF A DEPOPULATED VILLAGE

There was no one to work on the collective farms, particularly on the beet-raising ones, during the spring of 1933. The beets became choked with weeds. The authorities sent people from the nearby cities, factories, and Soviet offices to weed them, mobilizing them for the job.

I was forced into one of these mobilized groups. There were 300 of us and we were transported in 10 wagons. We passed through the village of Sotnykiwka in the Yahotyn District of the province of Poltava which was then almost completely depopulated. We did not stop anywhere in the village, but even yet my hair stands on end and shivers crawl up my spine when I think about it. It had a terrifying appearance.

The streets and houses were overgrown with weeds. There were no signs of any living thing, human or animal, on the streets, not even a cat or a dog. In some of the houses the doors and windows were open, while in others they had been removed to fire the stoves and there were only black spaces showing. In the weeds around the houses and evidently in the houses themselves decomposing human corpses were lying about, because an incredibly putrid odor, intensified by the warm weather, permeated the village.

There was a rumor that here and there in this village a few mad people were still about, who would pounce on unwary passers-by.

We worked in the fields beyond this village for several weeks. They fed us rye "zatirka," which was a kind of thin gruel made of a little rye meal stirred into boiling water, something like the stuff farmers used once upon a time to feed their hogs. We all slept together side by side on beds of straw, holding onto each other in fear of falling prey to cannibals.

THE SUM TOTAL OF FAMINE VICTIMS

We do not have any precise numerical data concerning the number of people who died of starvation in the individual districts and provinces nor in Ukraine as a whole. Such data are possibly buried in the secret vaults of the Soviet archives, but even so they are not exact, for to obtain these it would have been necessary to conduct a special survey of the results of the famine throughout Ukraine, collecting at first hand the statistics in the villages themselves and interviewing the villagers who had survived. As we very well know, the Soviet Government did not make such a survey.

The documentary materials containing the reminiscences of living witnesses, which we have already submitted, indicate that in the individual villages and districts of the grain-growing provinces in particular, such as Poltava, Dniepropetrowsk, Kirovograd, and Odessa—that is, in those parts of Ukraine that lies on the left bank of the Dnieper River and in its steppe-lands the depopulation ranged from 20 per cent to 50 per cent and even higher. Even if we accept the figures of the victims given by the witnesses as overdrawn, still, if you average them, they come to about 25 per cent to 30 per cent. In the border provinces of Ukraine, Komenets Podilsky, Vynnytsya, Zhitomir as well as in the beet-raising districts already mentioned, in the

Donets basin (Donbas), in the districts nearer to Kharkiw, province of Kiev, in the more industrial districts such as the Dniepropetrowsk and Zaporizhe, the depopulation was not as extensive—about 15 per cent to 20 per cent.

Even these roughest of calculations of the extent of the depopulation by famine in the villages throughout the whole territory of the Ukraine, which are based merely on the submitted documents, indicate the figure to be 25 per cent.

A few Ukrainian economists such as Sosnovy and D. Solovey undertook a more detailed survey of the extent to which the Ukrainian population died out in 1932-33. In their conclusions they arrived at a similar percentage, and in absolute figures the number is indicated as above six millions. (The figure is somewhere between six and seven millions.)

CHAPTER X

THE SUPPRESSION OF THE EFFECTS OF FAMINE AND THE STRENGTHENING OF THE COLLECTIVE SLAVE SYSTEM

In the wake of the famine and its demographic changes came great political and economic repercussions, which resounded not only within the Ukraine, but throughout the entire USSR.

The highest Communist authorities in the Kremlin themselves personally appraised the political significance and demographic consequences of the situation, which it was impossible to conceal from their own satellite states or from the world abroad.

In summing up achievements in agriculture and collectivization at the end of the first Five-Year Plan, the Communist press did not gloss over, but openly admitted a host of incredibly harsh and cruel forms of struggle between Communist authority and peasant population. It admitted forced collectivization; the slaughter of livestock by the peasants; the destruction of agricultural stock and machinery; direct, occasionally armed, anti-Soviet insurrections; the killing of activists and burning of their settlements; mass sabotage; even the collaboration of Communists with anti-Soviet elements; but now where does it mention the famine or its demographic results. Even the Communist press recognized the heinousness and illogicality of this crime before history, in which the protagonists of the struggle were the laboring peasant and a proletarian government. Therefore they ignored the famine and continue to ignore it.

As we are all well aware, after the famine subsided not the slightest interest was shown on the part of any government department in instituting an investigating body, whether state or educational, to study its effects. Instead, all the documents concerning it were permanently filed away in the archives of the Communist Party and the NKVD.

In order to justify themselves before the Ukrainian working masses who had personally witnessed the tragic events of the

famine, the Communists officially and unofficially circulated their own version of the matter, explaining that actually there was no famine but that only the *kurkuls* who refused to work on the collective farms were starving as a result of their lack of co-operation. They used the same sort of propaganda in other parts of the USSR wherever rumors of the famine in Ukraine penetrated. And in order to whitewash themselves in the eyes of the Soviet satellite states, they instituted a legal court of law, transferring all the blame for their crime to a group of highly-qualified agronomists, whom they accused of causing the "economic problem."

Their explanation to the world beyond their own borders took a different slant. They attributed the news concerning the famine to the inventive imaginations of various capitalist and bourgeois journalists, meanwhile laying great stress in their propaganda on the success of the Five-Year Plan, which was to benefit all those who would trade with them. This was done against a background of the world-wide economic depression. Under such circumstances news about a famine in Ukraine was only one of a series of journalistic sensations, soon forgotten by the world.

The negative effects of the famine in the economic sphere were as follows:

(a) There was a shortage of manpower and working stock in the villages, collective farms, and Soviet State Farms.

(b) There was a shortage of food for the survivors of the famine, and of fodder for the livestock. Delivery of foodstuffs from the villages to the industrial centres was suspended.

(c) There was a shortage of seed for the sowing, which in turn threatened to decrease the acreage sowed and to undermine the success of the state's agricultural plans for 1933.

The Communists solved these economic problems in the manner in which the occupier of a foreign country would proceed in building up its war-disrupted economy, namely, by:

(a) Issuing seed, fodder and food loans.

(b) Mobilizing a labor-force composed of civil servants, industrial laborers and Red Army men for the sowing and harvesting campaign of 1933.

(c) Sending out to Ukraine tens of thousands of their tested Communists, who were to act as Political Commissars in the newly-instituted Political Divisions on the Collective Farms, Soviet State Farms and Machine Tractor Stations,

whose chief functions were to be the administration of party government decrees and the carrying-out of the State's grain and meat garnering plans.

Their most aggressive political leaders decimated by the purge, the Ukrainian workers and peasants, already weakened by famine, capitulated and adopted collectivization with its implied slavery.

EXCERPTS FROM STATEMENTS OF COMMUNIST PARTY POLICY CONCERNING THE FAMINE

Those workers who witnessed the famine at first hand and attempted to investigate its causes in the villages were branded as politically illiterate and ignorant, or "psychologically under the influence of the *kurkuls*." This is a typical example of the government's explanation concerning the existence of famine, and who was to blame for it:

"Not the government, but 75 agronomists and economists are to blame for the deterioration of the economic status of the agricultural class and for bringing about a state of famine in the land," was the explanation given to all the Soviet satellite states by the Communist government, on the subject of its criminal policy in Ukraine during the famine.

Stalin's cynical statement that "millions of poverty-stricken wretches . . . have now attained security . . . and the Party can now stock-pile, instead of the former 500 to 600 million bushels, 1,200 to 1400 million bushels of grain annually" was the excuse for their crimes given by the Communists to the Soviet satellite states and the rest of the world.

Even at the Party Congress in 1933 no necessity was felt on the part of the delegates to inquire into or protest against the famine in Ukraine. Therefore the Party did not have to justify itself.

Stalin's cynical remark at that same Party that, in the USSR, "exploitation, unemployment in the cities, poverty in the villages . . . were permanently banished" was likewise for the benefit of the world abroad.

To cap the climax, the French Premier, whom the Communists were able to hoodwink completely during his visit to Ukraine in 1933, unconditionally reinforced Stalin's statement regarding famine in Ukraine.

THE HARVEST CAMPAIGN OF 1933

I was employed as a structural engineer by the largest All-Soviet planning organizations, called the "Prombudproyekt" (Industrial Construction Project), which had branches in all the larger cities of the USSR. At that time, as a result of an agreement between the Soviet government and the Albert Kahn Co., an American firm with headquarters in Detroit, thirty American engineers and architects were working with us in the capacity of consultants.

Such important industrial construction projects as the Zaporizha, Kamensk, Stalino and others were then nearing completion, but in our branch of this organization at Kiev more than forty engineers and architects were removed from their professional jobs and sent out to the Pohrebishch district in the Kiev region to take part in the harvesting campaign. Ninety-five per cent of these individuals had never done any farm work and knew nothing whatever about it.

We travelled by train to Pohrebishch and continued from there by truck. When we passed through the village of Cheremoshne, which had been completely depopulated by famine, not a living thing was to be seen, not even a cat or a dog. At the outskirts of another village, similarly deserted, black banners hung. A feeling of extreme depression descended on our entire party, from which not even Varshawsky, our party manager, was immune.

We arrived at our destination, the name of which I cannot recall, at three in the afternoon. We were then each issued a loaf of delicious, well-baked bread, some sausage, and hod broth with meat in it. As city dwellers long deprived of the beauties of nature, we spread out our lunch on a grassy hill-top under the trees, above a ravine. We no sooner began to eat than out of the ravine came crawling famished old people and children, who no longer had the strength to walk, and began to beg us for food. Their foul clothing reeked revoltingly, since they were so enfeebled that they could no longer cope normally with the eliminative processes. We were so horrified by the sight that we gave them our entire lunch, even

though we ourselves were hungry. We unwittingly did these poor people more harm than good, for the majority of them, having neither seen nor tasted bread for a long time had lost the ability to digest it, and died within two days as a result of over-eating.

After lunch we were summoned to a meeting at the collective farm, at which the secretary of the local Party Center took the floor and proceeded to explain the phenomenon observed by us. "The enemies of collective system," explained, "have caused a situation where there is no one to harvest the crops, assuming that the Soviet government will then submit to them, but they are badly mistaken. The city has sent us its workers and the crops will be harvested. You representatives of an enlightened city will give us your support," etc.

We listened with revulsion to his speech. Throwing discretion to the winds, another engineer, Lisowsky by name, and I, with the tacit support of the others, began to question him. I addressed the Party Business Manager Kopilenko as follows: "You have just given us not only bread, but a very substantial meal besides, and promise to feed us well during the harvest. Why don't you give this food to those reapers and farm workers who are skilled in this type of work, or even to the people who came crawling to us half an hour ago to beg for bread?" and other questions of a similar nature.

Since the entire party of engineers gave us their tacit support, the Party Business Manager had to hear us out. Then he answered in the following vein. "The two comrades who have just spoken have exhibited their complete ignorance and political illiteracy, even though they are highly educated people. We Communists have a different conception of the decrees of Party and Government. We should help those "reapers," as you have entitled them, to die, and not raise them up again. They are enemies of the Soviet Government, madly opposed to collectivization. They want to force the Party and the Government to their knees, but they'll never succeed in this."

After the meeting we were invited into another room, where we were informed that we were to be sent back to Kiev with a very adverse report. Our Party Organizer, Varshawsky, vouched for us, however, explaining that both Lisowsky and himself were excellent shock-workers, and that we had been momentarily carried away by new impressions, which we did not at the time fully comprehend, and furthermore, that the rest of the group did not share our views. Lisowsky and I confirmed his statement, and we were allowed to stay.

We worked over a month in that village. We all did our best to aid the famished—gave them our rations, brought home grain from the fields, and so on. As a result there were fewer deaths. But what we had seen in this village—hunger-distended, famine-ridden people, corpses in the streets and houses, mass burials of the victims in a common grave, and so forth, had its counterpart in every village in the land.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT SEEKS A SCAPEGOAT

Recently the OGPU discovered and investigated a counter-revolutionary sabotage organization which had infiltrated some of the departments of the Commissioner for Agriculture and the Commissioner for State Farms and was operating mainly in the agricultural districts of Ukraine, Northern Caucasus and White Russia.

This counter-revolutionary organization was composed mainly of civil servants of high ranking bourgeois or landed extraction.

The majority of those arrested admitted that they were guilty of organizing counter-revolutionary movements in the agricultural sphere, which manifested themselves in:

(1) Deliberate damage to and destruction of tractors and other agricultural machinery.

(2) Burning of Machine-Tractor-Stations and linen mills.

(4) Pilfering of food-stock by members of the Collective Farms.

(5) Disorganization of seeding and harvesting operations.

(6) Slaughtering of working and productive livestock.

The evidence resulting from the investigations and from the confessions of the arrested saboteurs proves that the prisoners' intention had been to disorganize agriculture and produce famine in the land. (*italics ours.*)

More than 70 people were arrested, including:
... (a list of 30 persons follows)
(*Visti*, March 4, 1933)

THE SO-CALLED "GUILTY" FACE THE FIRING-SQUAD FOR THEIR "CRIMES"

On the basis of the resolution passed by the Central Executive Committee of the USSR on February 10th, 1933, the staff of the OGPU at its March 2, 1933 meeting reviewed the case of the arrested civil servants of bourgeois and land-owning extraction, formerly employed in the Commissioner of Agriculture establishments and the Commissioner of State Farms, who had been convicted of counter-revolutionary sabotage of state agriculture in Ukraine, Northern Caucasus and White Russia, and decreed the following:

"For the criminal act of organizing counter-revolutionary sabotage, calculated to cause loss to farmers and the state, at various Machine-Tractor Stations and Soviet State Farms throughout the districts of Ukraine, Northern Caucasus and White Russia, which manifested themselves in the following ways: damage to and destruction of tractors and agricultural machinery; deliberate weed-infestation of fields, setting fire to Machine-Tractor Garages, Machine-Tractor work shops and linen works; disruption of sowing, harvesting and threshing

operations with the object of lowering the standard of living among the agricultural population and creating a state of famine in the land; the following leading participators of the counter-revolutionary sabotage organization are deemed, as a state-defence measure, to be guilty of high treason and consequently incur the supreme penalty: death before the firing squad:

1. Konar, Palascuk Fedir Mykhaylovich.
2. Kuznetsov, Ivan Vasylyovich.
3. Kremenetsky, Mykhaylo Mikolayevich.
4. Rudnyew Mykhaylovich.
5. Tyelyehin, Mykola Khomich.
6. Wolf, Moysey Mykhaylovich.
7. Skorunsky, Edward Sihismundovich.
8. Kovarsky, Mykhaylo Pukhimovich.
9. Koroy, Ivan Oleksandrovich.
10. Pokrovsky, Serhy Stepanovich.
11. Motiliw, Boris Fedorovich.
12. Pirohow, Hnat Petrovich.
13. Kramarenko, Ivan Trokhimovich.
14. Mikhaylowsky, Heorhy Mykytovich.
15. Fabrikant, Yakiw Osipovich.
16. Fomenko, Stakhy Kalinovich.
17. Honcharenko, Andriy Yakovovich.
18. Ponomarenko, Oleksander Stepanovich.
19. Rozevich, Ivan Vikentiyevich.
20. Babak, Ivan Asonovich.
21. Zinchenko, Ivan Mykhaylovich.
22. Shabanov, Ivan Andriyovich.
23. Pasichnik, Ivan Hrihorovich.
24. Kiyashko, Fedir Vasylyovich.
25. Byelyayew, Tikhon Konstantinovich.
26. Tarasov, Mykhaylo Andriyovich.
27. Sapeha, Semen Fomich.
28. Duday, Pavlo Petrovich.
29. Ulitin, Timofy Makarovich.
30. Feshchenko, Oleksander Mykhaylovich.
31. Zelenkov, Oleksander Ivanovich.

32. Ivanov, Oleksander Mykhaylovich.
 33. Hadeonov, Serhy Oleksandrovich.
 34. Holovin, Andry Hawrylovich.
 35. Mankiwsky, Oleksy Vasylyovich.
- The following are to be imprisoned for a term

of 10 years:

1. Shterin, Hrytsko Lazarovich.
2. Chornomorsky, Viktor Semenovich.
3. Yewnevich, Oleksander Afanasiyevich.
4. Porokhownikow, Oleksander Pakomovich.
5. Lewshin, Moysey Moyseyevich.
6. Kirnarsky, Ivan Oleksandrovich.
7. Orshansky, Samuel Isakovich.
8. Volko, Mykhaylo Mikhaylovich.
9. Zimnikh, Oleksy Pavlovich.
10. Vikhlyayew, Oleksander Panteleymonovich.
11. Zhdan, Leontiy Serhiyovich.
12. Dubrovich, Diomont Afanasiyevich.
13. Ozarew, Oleksander Semenovich.
14. Hrihorovich, Dmytro Artemovich.
15. Sapozhnikovv, Volodymyr Ivanovich.
16. Sherekhowtsew, Stepan Fedorovich.
17. Kushnirenko, Pavlo Silvestrovich.
18. Arsenenko, Denis Anisimovich.
19. Byelow, Mykhaylo Mikitovich.
20. Lashkevich, Adam Frantsovich.
21. Khlimanov, Volodymyr Potapovich.
22. Draprovich, Volodymyr Ivanovich.

The following accused are sentenced to 8 years

imprisonment:

1. Koshlakov, Volodymyr Oleksandrovich.
2. Borovikov, Mykola Serhiyevich.
3. Dolt, Abram Myhaylovich.
4. Boyko, Ivan Ivanovich.
5. Pupko, Samuil Demyanovich.
6. Silm, Mykhaylo Hrihorovich.
7. Minutsa, Ivan Heorhiyevich.
8. Krotov, Ivan Makarovich.
9. Kukhar, Mykola Oleksandrovich.
10. Yemelyanov, Oleksander Abramovich.
11. Savich, Mykhaylo Fedorovich.

12. Mashkanov, Arsen Ivanovich.
13. Kossobutsky, Yosyp Ivanovich.
14. Zakrewsky, Ivan Ilarionovich.
15. Melnichenko, Maksym Fedorovich.
16. Botsko, Makar Prohorovich.
17. Stebulsky, Yosyp Vikentiyevich.
18. Titov, Anton Anisimovich.

Sentence executed.

V. Menzhinsky, head of the OGPU.

(Visti, March 12, 1933)

STALIN'S "ABASHED" SILENCE ON THE QUESTION OF FAMINE

"Such was the Party's success, that in approximately three years it was able to organize more than two hundred thousand grain and stock-raising Collective Farms and around five thousand similarly-engaged Soviet State Farms, and simultaneously to increase the acreage sown to twenty-one million hectares in the space of four years . . .

The Party's success is also evident in the fact that, in place of the five to six hundred million bushels of commercial grain available annually during the period when individual methods of agriculture predominated, it can now garner one thousand two hundred to one thousand four hundred million bushels of commercial grain each year.

Progress is evident in the eagerness with which nearly all the agricultural poor have embraced the establishment of collective farms and the consequent levelling of classes and abolishment of the evils of improverishment and pauperization among the peasant population in the villages.

It (the Five-Year Plan) raised the standard of living of the indigent and middle peasant to a level of security on the collective farms, simultaneously abolishing the process by which they were formerly economically ruined and improvised. Now the peasant is a secure agriculturalist.

(From Stalin's speech at the Plenary Session of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the CPSU, "Summing-up the first Five-Year-Plan."

(The Problems of Leninism, 1952, pp. 416-421 [in Russian]).

"What was the chief impediment confronting our agricultural efforts during the past year (1932)? The chief impediment was the greater difficulties experienced by the grain-garnering

institutions, far outweighing those of the previous year."

(Except from "Concerning Agriculture," Ibid., p. 433)

"We have achieved the uplifting of millions of paupers to a middle standard of living, as a result of their taking advantage of the better agricultural implements and more fertile soil on the collective farms. Our achievement is such that millions of poverty-stricken wretches who formerly lived from hand to mouth have now, on the collective farms, attained the status of middle peasants and become economically secure."

(Excerpt from a speech at the First All-Soviet Congress of Collective Farm Shock Workers, Feb. 19, 1933; Ibid., p. 451.)

**THE 17th CONGRESS OF THE ALL-
UNION COMMUNIST PARTY VOICES ITS
OPINION ON THE SUBJECT OF THE
1932-1933 FAMINE IN UKRAINE**

"... Comrades! The discussions at this Congress have revealed complete unanimity on the part of our Party leaders on, one may say, all questions of Party policy. No dissension whatever, as you know, has been raised the main speech. We have witnessed an extraordinary accord on matters of ideology and Party policy in the ranks of our Party. (Applause.) The question was raised, whether, after such a session, a concluding speech is necessary. I maintain that it is not. Allow me, therefore, to excuse myself from making such a speech." (Stormy applause.)

(Stalin's concluding speech. Ibid., p. 524.)

**STALIN ASSUMES HIS ROLE OF POLITICAL
FAKIR**


In the economic sphere, these were years of a world-embracing crisis. The depression seized not only industry but also agriculture in its grip. The industrial depression interwove with the agrarian, affecting without exception all agrarian and semi-agrarian countries, which in turn only aggravated the deepening industrial depression.

Four years of agricultural depression totally impoverished the indigent agricultural classes in even the

solid capitalistic countries, and had even more serious effects in the dependencies and colonies. The sum total of unemployed approached three million in England, five million in Germany and ten million in the U.S.A. And to this the occasionally unemployed whose numbers exceed tens of thousands, add the millions of destitute peasants, and you will have an approximate picture of the desolation and despair of the laboring classes.

From the mass of facts which threatened to block the success of the USSR's peace politics, it is necessary to single out and emphasize two which unquestionably had serious implications. They are:

- 1) The commencement of friendlier relationships between the USSR and France, and the USSR and Poland.
- 2) The inauguration of a normal relationship between the USSR and the USA, which rein-



A hungry child seeks food.

forced their commercial connections and provided a basis for mutual co-operation.

. . . The ensuing period reveals a picture of constantly increasing amelioration in the spheres of state economy and culture . . .

"Unemployment, the scourge of the working class, vanished; vanished, too, has pauperism from the villages. The dear peasant, whether collective farm-worker or independent farmer, can now live comfortably . . . Exploitation, unemployment in cities and poverty in vilages have been uprooted. This epoch-making achievement in living-standards cannot even be dreamt of by the workers and peasants of even the largest democratic countries."

(Except from Stalin's Report at the Seventeenth Congress of the CPSU. The Problems of Leninism, (in Russian), 1952, pp. 494-459.)

NESTOR KOROL

SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY

I lived in Moscow since 1929. Of course, there was no famine there. The inhabitants of Moscow, as well as the entire population of the RSFSR were provided with ration cards, and more important, could obtain all the necessities of life. As in previous years, I received daily 250 grams of rye bread and 250 grams of white bread. This was plenty for me. The only limitation in Moscow at that time was that there was a smaller choice of different kind of bread. Moscow's population was aware of the famine in Ukraine and reacted in various ways. However, the opinion that "Finally now they would break the 'khakhols' (Russian disdainful name for Ukrainians) spine," was widespread. The hungry people from Ukraine began to appear in Moscow, buying or begging bread from those who did not use their entire ration. In Moscow I myself I saw several death scenes of people who had arrived from Ukraine swollen from hunger. I witnessed such scenes in the Trubnyi market-place and at the Bryanski railroad station. The people swollen from hunger ate ravenously the bread they received, and after a short while died in terrible pain. The physicians at the Skli-

fasovsky emergency hospital in Moscow, mostly communists, always registered "over-eating" as the cause of death in such cases.

Immediately after the crops were harvested before the famine began in Ukraine, orders were dispatched to all Ukrainian railroad stations not to sell tickets for points outside the Ukrainian SSR. Exception was made only for those who traveled on business matters for the governmental departments and institutions. However, this applied only to those institutions subordinate to the central (all-union) government in Moscow, and not to the local government (e.g. in Kharkiv). The Ukrainians tried to avoid these restrictions in the following ways: they went to the last station on Ukrainian territory, then moved on foot to the station on Russian territory situated as more far as possible from Ukrainian boundary and bought tickets to Moscow "to go for bread." After a short while at the Bryanski and Kharkiv railroad stations in Moscow (they led to Ukraine) they set up the so-called "border-commandos" of the GPU who took away the bread bought by the hungry peasants, and forced them back to Ukraine under GPU guard. To avoid these "border-commandos" the victims began to take a devious route through Byelorussia. However, these guards also appeared on the Byelorussian and Baltic railroad stations in Moscow.

Due to the nature of my work I had to go to Ukraine several times in the winter of 1933 and summer of 1932. There I saw with my own eyes the scenes of mass starvation and even cannibalism. I submit here the cases of people who I am sure are no longer alive:

1. In the village of Sytkivtsi, Sytkovetsky district, Vinnytsia province, the peasant Chapayda killed his neighbour Makar Kczyodra.

2. In the village of Onytkivtsi, Tyvrivsky district, Vinnytsia province, peasant woman Olena Hordiychuk and her husband (they lived close to the school, on the left side of the road toward the town of Tyriv) ate human flesh.

After these peasants were arrested, several human skeletons were found in their homes.

3. In the hamlet of Khorosha, near the village of Medvyn, Kiev province, the widow H. who had two sons, killed one of them and fed her younger son with his flesh. Before the harvest in 1933 I personally spoke with her in relation to this case.

She told me that in this manner she had saved one son from from certain death.

4. In the village of Medvyn I saw a little boy, of about 6 years, with a scar on his neck. His mother, maddened with hunger, tried to kill him in order not to see him starve. The boy escaped his mother and had found shelter with the village teacher.

5. In the village of Tahancha, near Bohuslav, Kiev province, I heard young girl talking (knew some of them personally) who were saying that human flesh is similar to that of duck. I asked them if they had eaten it, and one answered that she had tasted it. Later they asked me not to say anything to anyone about their conversation because the GPU shot all cannibals. It is frightful to have to record that such a highly civilized and cultured people as the Ukrainians were so maddened by hunger that they were reduced to cannibalism.

6. In the village of Sukholisy, near Bila Tserkva, Kiev province, only 45 women remained alive out of a population of 1,800. In the neighbourin village of Nastashka, originally having over 2,500 inhabitants, one person remained alive. I saw the rotting human corpses in the empty houses.

7. In the small town of Syniava, near Bila Tserkva, in the spring of 1933 I saw piles of bodies, amounting to about 3,000 in the cemetery. They were not buried because the people in the town who had remained alive were not strong enough to did the graves in the yet frozen earth.

8. In the village of Kozatske, near Zvenyhordka, Kiev province, I saw piles of human bodies (over 7,000) which were to be buried after the ground softened. I witnessed similar scenes in the Villiges of Rotmystrivka, Oleksandrivka, Ivanhorod, and many others in the Kievan and Vynnytsya provinces.

The following Spring when I visited these areas again, the Moscow government had transported entire colonies of Russians into these villages, where they occupied the vacant homes of the starved Ukrainian peasants.

From the biological view, it is interesting to note the succession of mortality from starvation: little boys died first, then men and after that old women died, after that the middle aged men, then the middle aged women and then little young girls. Mature girls died last of all.

HERRIOT'S "FILM STUDIO"

In the spring of 1933, Herriot, the French Premier, came to visit the USSR, traveling from Odessa to Moscow via Kiev and Kharkiw. On the way he wished to drop in on a few Ukrainian villages and collective farms to ascertain whether there actually was a famine, because, although the press of the entire world was extremely vocal about it at the time, the Soviet press did not even mention its existence.

A collective farm near Kiev, "October Revolution" by name, located in the village about 7 kilometres from Brovary, was especially embellished for Herriot's visit. For the purpose of discussing ways and means of converting the collective farm into a "Potemkin Village" a special meeting of the Party District Committee, attended by members of, it seems, the Khatajevich Group of the Central Committee of the CP(B)U, was held in Kiev. An elderly Communist inspector in the State Commissariat of Land Workers, an agronomist by profession, was appointed as temporary head of the collective farm for those few days; other agronomists were appointed as brigadiers. The Collective Farm underwent a thorough clean-up campaign, for which task all Communists, Komsomols and activists were mustered.

The County Theatre at Brovary was stripped of all its furniture, (chairs, etc.), which were moved to the "club" on the collective farm. Plush side-curtains for the windows and tablecloths for the tables were donated by Kiev. One cattle shed was hurriedly converted into a dining-room, with table-cloths and flowers gracing the tables. The telephone exchange, along with its operator, was moved in from the county town of Brovary. Several swine and bull-caves were butchered to supply the dining-room. Even beer was brought in.

All corpses and starvelings were removed from the roads and environs of the collective farm, and all the peasants were ordered to stay indoors. But before this was done, a general meeting of the collective farm workers was held, and they informed that a film studio from Odessa was coming to visit the collective farm for a few days in order to take some photographs. For this, all work was going to be replanned, and only those chosen by a special committee were to participate. The rest were to stay in their houses, and not appear on the collective farm.

Those selected by the committee (Party members, activists, Komsomols, etc.), were especially costumed in clothing brought in from Kiev, such as shoes, suits, hats, socks, and handkerchiefs. Dresses and other items of feminine apparel were supplied to the women. Barbers arrived from Kiev to clip the shaggy collective farm workers. The whole masquerade was led by Sharapov, authorized by the District Committee, and Denisenko, his assistant. The people were informed that these two were the producer and his assistant from a film studio and truly, they were "producers," but only for the purpose of welcoming Herriot. These "producers" decided that the most effective way to welcome Herriot would be in the dining-room, with all the collective farm workers seated behind tables groaning under a variety of foods. The following day, upon which Herriot was scheduled to arrive, this was done. The collective farm workers gorged themselves on the substantial dinner and the tremendous chunks of meat, washing all this down with beer and carbonated beverages. Some of them immediately fell ill as a result of over-eating. The collective farm workers bolted the unaccustomed food with lightning speed, and the "producer" excitedly rushed about and pleaded with them to eat slowly, so that the "guest" would still find them at table when he arrived.

At that moment a telephone message arrived from the Kiev branch of the District Committee, informing him "Itinerary altered. Proceed with liquidation."

Accordingly, another meeting of the collective farm workers took place. The authorized "producer," Sharapov, thanked the participators for everything, including their excellent behavior, then Denisenko took the floor and directed them to return all the clothing and footwear, with the exception of the socks and handkerchiefs. The collective farm workers begged to be allowed to keep the clothing, promising to pay for it in money or labor, but their pleas fell on deaf ears. Everything had to be surrendered and returned to those shops in Kiev from whence it had come.

The next day all the goods that were brought for the occasion to the collective farm were taken back. It was only later that the workers learned that these had been supplied in anticipation of Herriot's visit. Herriot was not fated to observe the substantial, well-to-do life of the collective farm workers near Kiev; however, he did see similarly embellished sample on a

similar collective farm near Kharkiw. On the way to Kiev and in Kiev itself, where he attended the Opera, visited the museums, rode about in the streets, and so forth, he did not see anywhere a single hunger-distended peasant or corpse, because the GPU took good care to cover-up and conceal anything not acceptable to foreign eyes. And the trusting French Premier later announced in France that nowhere in the entire USSR nor in Ukraine did he observe a single indication of famine.

I was a personal witness of this film-studio farce on the "October Revolution" collective farm.

THE LIQUIDATION OF THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FAMINE

All the seed and forage reserves of the collective farms and Soviet state farms had been taken away by the grain collectors. In the spring there was no seed. The government tendered the following to explain this: "inclement climatic conditions in the summer of 1932 . . . caused the destruction of a portion of the crop." It was forced to dip into its reserves and issue a loan to Ukraine and Northern Caucasus (the Kuban and Don regions). The Odessa district received a donation of oats from the Moscow region which were unsuitable for seed. Means of transportation for the fodder issued as a loan to the collective farms was not available when needed. A loan of seed-grain was likewise granted to the entire system of Soviet state farms throughout Ukraine.

Due to the manpower shortage, town laborers and civil servants were mobilized for work on the farms, but they received better rations than hungry peasants.

Peasants from the central provinces in Russia were settled in various villages which had been completely depopulated by famine. There are examples of such settlements in the Kharkiw and Zaporozha provinces. Other provinces were similarly depopulated. D. Solovey even mentions the existence of a special "Resettlement Bureau" in Moscow, under the aegis of the NKVD.

But it must be realized that this problem of man-power shortage was the one which troubled the Communists least, since the organized Machine-Tractor-Stations could easily cultivate larger tracts of land and cost far less to maintain than the superfluous and now useless peasants. And this in turn fur-

thered production of greater quantities of grain on the depopulated areas of Ukraine, which had indeed been the major aim of the Communist government.

UKRAINE OBTAINS A LOAN OF SEED-GRAIN

"In connection with the fact that the severe climatic conditions in the summer of 1932 adversely affected the yield, and consequently many of the collective farm and Soviet state farms on the Ukrainian steppes and in some of the districts of the Northern Caucasus do not have enough seed for the spring sowing, the Council of the People's Commissions and the Central Committee of the CPSU resolve:

1) To issue a loan for seed grain from the State Granaries to the collective farms and Soviet state farms in Ukraine and Northern Caucasus, in the following quantities:

20,300 bushels to Ukraine.

15,300 bushels to the Northern Caucasus.

(Resolution of the Council of the People's Commissions and the CC CPSU, Pravda, Feb. 26, 1933.)

MOSCOW ISSUES A LOAN OF SEED-GRAIN TO UKRAINE

On the sixth of March, 1,000 centners of oats arrived in Berczowka from Moscow province. At the same time, the Odessa District grain stock pile dispatched a notification to the effect that this was seed oats. However, immediately afterwards the District grain stock pile informed the manager of the Berczowka elevator that the seed was of a variety suited only to colder climates, and that it should not be sown in the Odessa region. The grain in the wagons was intended for the Andriyivsky and Ivaniwsky districts.

Voloshyn, the manager of the elevator thereupon wrote a remark on this notification to express his agreement therewith, but continued to issue "the seed to the collective farms. Krasnyansky, the agronomist,

whose duty it was to test the oats, added to Voloshyn's resolution: "Noted 14 of March, three days after notification received," (9.3).

As a result of such a negligent attitude toward this business on the part of Voloshyn and Krasnyansky, the managers of the District grain stock pile, the collective farms received oats not suited to the climate and it will now be necessary to return it to the elevators.

Shcherbakov

(Vistl, March 17, 1933.)

HUNGRY STOCK IN UKRAINE IS ISSUED A LOAN OF FODDER

"According to a report from the Radio and Telegraph Agency of Ukraine the Khariw collective farms received a loan of 122,840 centers of fodder from the State. The full quota of fodder was to be delivered to the point nearest the collective farms. However, the extreme unwieldiness of the regional and district organizations constitutes a serious threat to the timely execution of this loan.

Up to the 17 of March only 5,780 centners, or 4.6 per cent of the loan have been issued to the collective farms by the various centres of the Grain-Collecting Organization.


The Provincial offices of the Union Trade Stores, managed by Horelow, the Union Meal Manufactures, managed by Obodowsky, and the Union of Flour Mills, managed by Lavrukhin, received the consignments as early as the 13 of March, but have not yet begun to expedite them to the various districts.

The attitude toward the distribution of the fodder loan to the collective farms and district organizations is quite inadmissible. For instance, 1,500 centners of fodder were dispatched to the Chornoukhy district. The District Executive Committee, headed by Tredunow, and the District Lands Division headed by Rohachenko, retained the entire consignment in their repositories, not letting a single centner slip

through their fingers to the rightful consignees.

The collective farms in the Pyryatyn, Orshansk and Pavlowsk districts have likewise not received one centner of their allotted fodder loan.

(Visti, March 18, 1933.)



Hungry children

M. DIDENKO

THE GOVERNMENT ISSUES A LOAN OF SEED GRAIN TO UKRAINE

On the 17 of March, 112,615 centners, of 66.2 per cent of the authorized State seed-loan were distributed throughout the system of the People's Commis-

sariat of Soviet State Farms of Ukraine.

The Grain-Collecting Organization received the following percentage of its quota: 76.9 per cent in the Dnipropetrovsk, 55.7 per cent in the Donets region and 76 per cent in the Odessa region.

Stock-Raising Soviet State Farms received the following: 48.1 per cent of their quota in the Dniepropetrovsk, 39 per cent of their quota in the Donets region, and 65.8 per cent of their quota in the Kharkiw region.

The Hog-Raising system received the following quantities: 88 per cent of their quota in the Dniepropetrovsk region, 50 per cent in the Donets region, 71.8 per cent in the Odessa region, 72 per cent in the Kharkiw region, 69.2 in the Chernihiv region 71.1 per cent in the Kiev region and 31 per cent in the Vynnytsya region.

(Visti, March 18, 1933.)

M. SOLOMON

OUR BEET-WEEDING CAMPAIGN

In July, 1933, the majority of the industrial workers in Kharkiw were mobilized for spring farm work. I was then employed in a cement factory in the vicinity of Kharkiw, named "Nova Bavaria." Several groups of such mobilized workers were sent out from Kharkiw at the time. Our group from the "Nova Bavaria" station was sent in the direction of the Sakhnowsky district, where half of us, around 300 men, were redirected to the village of Terno, to weed beets there.

This village had once been large and prosperous, but now it presented a shocking appearance. Part of the population had been wiped out during the *k u r k u l* purges and another part, collective farm workers this time, perished of hunger during 1932-33.

The fields had been sown to beets but since there had been no one to weed them they were now, in July, barely visible for weeds.

All of us workers from Kharkiw were billeted on the straw strewn floor of the collective farm sheds. We were each issued 600 grams of bread daily, especially brought in from Kharkiw, but the collective farm

workers' daily ration consisted of thin, watery soup served three times a day. We worked in the fields at least twelve hours a day. Not all the workers knew how to weed and thin beets. But even those who did not were not able to do much good, because the weeds had already gotten the upper hand.

We worked for a month at Terni, where, according to the inhabitants' account, a considerable proportion of the population had already starved to death in the spring of 1932.

L. PYLYPENKO

BREAD FOR THE WORKERS FROM TOWN, RAW CABBAGE FOR COLLECTIVE FARM WORKERS

In the village of Rohozova in the Kiev region there were four collective farms but no one to cultivate them, as all the collective farm workers were dying of starvation. The government was well aware of this, and proceeded to send out workers, predominantly women, from Kiev, to perform the spring field work, such as hoeing beets, haying, and so forth. Country teachers, including myself, were also mobilized for such work.

The workers from Kiev were fed black bread, fish, cheese, sugar and such foods, delivered by truck to the fields where they were working, while the teachers and the hunger-swollen collective farm workers received one head of raw cabbage per person daily, delivered from the collective farm by wagon.

The carbohydrates in the cabbage, mixed with saliva, tasted sweet and delicious to us, but our hunger was not diminished. And observing what the city workers ate we keenly felt discrimination practised against us peasants by the government.

V. MALY

RUSSIANS REPLACE UKRAINIAN HUNGER VICTIMS

In the summer of 1933 the village of Druha Korulka in the Kharkiw district presented a shockingly desolate appearance. No songs were heard in the village now, which formerly had been so gay. The farm yards were overgrown with weeds, since there was no stock to graze on them and trample them down.

The cottages were shabby and discolored, as the housewives no longer possessed the energy or interest to repair and whitewash them. The existing remnant of villages also resembled their homes and yards: ragged, cadaverous, sallow, hunger-distended and worried, more like walking corpses than people.

The places formerly belonging to *k u r k u l s*, who had been transported away, and those whose owners had died of starvation, were even more neglected.

As early as the winter of 1934 twenty-five Russian families and later seven more, were brought in to replace the *k u r k u l s* and the dead.

These Russian families did not need to build homes for themselves. They proceeded to occupy the premises left vacant by the *k u r k u l s* and the dead. After a time, these newly-arrived Russians assumed all the leading positions on the collective farm, such as those of head, storemen, brigadiers, field-overseers, time-keepers, etc. Then they proceeded to form the executive body of the Korulka Village Soviet.

LEONID VEREMIYENKO

PEASANTS FROM THE BRYANSK PROVINCE TAKE OVER

Before the Revolution the village of Konotoptsi in the Veseliwsky district of the region of Zaporozha consisted of 120 estates. Its inhabitants originally came from Konotop in the region of Chernihw.

When collectivization commenced in February, 1930, the estates of 18 farmers in this village were destroyed and in March their families were transported to concentration camps in the north, where most of them perished. As collectivization proceeded and the native inhabitants continued to be sent beyond the borders of Ukraine, only 36 farmsteads were left intact, and only five native families remained unmolested.

The deserted farmsteads were resettled by specially-selected peasants from the Bryansk region.

The famine began in the fall of 1932 and reached its peak in the summer of 1933. Of the people who still remained in the village, 80 died during this year. There were even instances of cannibalism.

A similar incident took place when the village tailor,

Plitnichenko by name, went away for a few in order to obtain food for his starving family. When he returned three of his children were missing. They had been stolen and eaten by his neighbors. The incident affected Plitnichenko's reason and soon he himself perished of hunger.

After experiencing the forced collectivization and the famine of 1932-33, the village of Konotoptsi lost its former outward appearance and 95 per cent of its population besides.

UKRAINE IS REOCCUPIED AND HER COLLECTIVE SLAVE SYSTEM REINFORCED

The annihilating operations did not cease when the political and economic destruction of the Ukraine agricultural classes had been achieved by means of collectivization and famine; they extended to embrace the Ukraine Soviet Government itself and the Central Committee of the CP(B)U. Passive and active resistance toward Moscow continued to be widespread. In Ukraine the Communists ascribed this to "bourgeois-nationalists" intellectuals of "Petlyurists" leanings.

The Political Divisions of the Machine-Tractor Stations and Soviet State Farms were alone entrusted to conduct agricultural operations in Ukraine. Please note that the resolution decreeing this does not so much as mention the necessity of making provisions for the social and material well-being of agricultural workers, but stresses instead the consolidation of the local departments of government and the carrying-out by the collective farms and their workers of their responsibilities toward the State.

The resolution passed on January 24, 1933, by the All-Union Communist Party's Central Committee reveals its utter distrust of the party organization in Ukraine. This party organization was even compelled publicly to proclaim its complete bankruptcy. A complete reorganization followed; P. Postyshev was sent out to represent Moscow in the capacity of State Commissar and the collective farms and Soviet State Farms were organized into 846 Political Divisions administered directly by Political Commissars newly-arrived from Moscow.

THE POLITICAL DIVISIONS OF THE MACHINE-TRACTOR STATIONS OR: VILLAGE POLITICAL COMMISSARS

The following is an excerpt from the Resolution passed by the Plenary Session of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party on January 11, 1933, regarding the organization of the Machine-Tractor Stations and Soviet State Farm Political Divisions:

"The anti-Soviet elements among the peasant population are fiercely opposed to the successful solution of this two-fold problem: the continued progress of agriculture and the fulfillment of social reconstruction. The *kurkul*, although agriculturally uprooted, still possesses a modicum of influence; former White army officers, former priests and their sons, former estate-managers and owners of sugar refineries, former bureaucrats and other anti-Soviet elements of bourgeois-nationalistic, Eser and Petlyurist convictions, who have settled in the villages, are using every possible means to disorganize the collective-farms, attempting to undermine good-will toward the Party Government in connection with agriculture: by taking advantage of the fact that some of the Collective farm workers are ignorant, they are inculcating in them an attitude opposed to mutual co-operative farming methods and collective farm development . . . the anti-Soviet elements are attempting to organize sabotage movements, spoiling machines, appropriating collective farm goods, undermining work discipline, organizing the stealing of seed, sabotaging the Grain-Collecting Organizations and occasionally they even succeed in their attempts to destroy the collective farms.

Besides this, the village Party and Komsomol organizations, even the cells in the Machine Tractor Stations and Soviet Farms are often lacking in proper revolutionary class-feeling and do nothing to counteract the anti-Soviet manifestations of these hostile elements, nor do they wage the prescribed daily struggle to further Communists influence among the masses . . . sometimes they themselves fall under the

influence of these destructive elements and hob-nob with the enemies of the collective farms, Soviet State Farms, and the Soviet Government . . .

II. DUTIES OF THE POLITICAL DIVISIONS

The foremost duty of the Political Divisions of the Machine Tractor Stations is to oversee the prompt and unquestioning carrying-out of their responsibilities by the collective farms and their workers, and to wage unremitting and determined war on such anti-State manifestations as pilfering of collective farm goods and sabotage in the grain-and-meat departments of the collective farms . . .

The first duty of the Political Divisions is to organize Party and Komsomol cells within the Machine Tractor Stations, paying the strictest attention to their quality and to their loyalty to the Party . . .

The second duty of the Political Divisions is to establish an auxiliary of non-Party members around the Party and Komsomol cells. We do not require unity within diversity, we demand unanimity within the collective farms which will assure the leadership and executive powers to the Communist cells, and reinforce them with the support of the non-Party activists."

A RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE REOCCUPATION OF UKRAINE

(From the Resolution passed on Jan. 24, 1933, by the Central Committee of All-Union Communist Party.)

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party regards as established the fact that the Party Organization in Ukraine failed to carry out successfully its assigned duties of organizing grain stock piles and fulfilling its grain quota, which, although initially reduced, it was necessary to reduce thrice more.

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party considers the regions of Odessa, Dnie-

propetrovsk and Kharkiw as the basic and decisive ones from the agricultural standpoint, and deems it highly necessary to strengthen them at the earliest possible moment.

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party resolves:

1) To appoint Comrade Postyshev, present secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, as assistant secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(B)U, and as first secretary of the Kharkiw District Committee.

2) To appoint Comrade Khatayevich as first secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk District Committee, while retaining him as one of the secretaries of the Central Committee of the CP(B) U.

3) To appoint Comrade Veher as first secretary of the Odessa District Committee.

4) To relieve Comrade Mayor, Strohanov and Terekhov from their present posts, and note the changes on the rolls of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

5) Comrades Postyshev, Khatayevich and Veher assume their new appointments not later than January 30, 1933 . . .

(From Kosior's speech 'Summing up the Achievements of the Grain Stock Piles, *Pravda*, Feb. 15, 1933).

MOSCOW'S DECISION CONCERNING THE INSOLVENCY OF THE CP(B)U

(Resolution of the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CP(B)U, passed on February 7, 1933, concerning grain-collecting operations within Ukraine, and the Resolution passed on Jan. 24, 1933, by the Central Committee of the CPSU.)

The Party Organization in Ukraine failed to carry out its designated tasks of organizing grain stock piles and fulfilling its grain quota, in spite of the fact that the initially reduced Plan was reduced three more times. (Italics ours.)

The Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CP(B)U, together with the secretariats of the

City Party Committees and the County Party Committees considers that the Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Stalin's speech give a stern but absolutely just evaluation of the state of the grain-collecting operations in Ukraine and a truly Communist criticism of the unsatisfactory work of the Ukrainian Party Organization and of the unsatisfactory management of grain stock piles and collective farms by the Central Committee of the CP(B)U.

The Plenary Session further considers it necessary to stress the fact that, from the very inauguration of of the Grain Collecting Organization, the Central, Regional and District leaders of the Party Organization were insufficiently zealous in carrying out their duties, failing to discover in time the manoeuvres of class-enemy such as *k u r k u l s*, Petlyurists and Makhnovists, who succeeded in infiltrating the collective farms and assumed leading positions there . . .

Furthermore, the Plenary Session regards as indisputably correct the decree passed on January 24, by the Central Committee of the CPSU, and welcomes the appointment of Comrade Postyshev as assistant secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(B)U, and the strengthening of leadership in the chief regions of Ukraine.

The Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CP(B)U, together with the secretaries of the Local and District Party Organizations accepts Comrade Stalin's criticism and observations regarding the recalcitrant leaders.

The Party Organization in Ukraine and its leaders will exert all their efforts immediately to correct their errors and definitely to redraft their program in order to achieve the consolidation of political leadership on the collective farms.

(*Visti*, Feb. 8, 1933.)

UKRAINE IS REOCCUPIED ANEW — THIS TIME BY POLITICAL COMMISSARS

1,340 comrades were sent out to Ukraine to assume executive posts in the districts. 237 secretaries of District Party Committees, 279 heads of District

Executive Committees and 158 heads of District Controlling Committees were replaced by more efficient workers during this period.

643 Machine Tractor Station Political Divisions and 203 Soviet State Farm Political Divisions were organized under the direct supervision of the Central Committee of the CPSU. These were staffed by approximately 3,000 leaders, who played a salient part in inaugurating new genres and methods of leadership.

No fewer than 107,000 persons were initially sent to the collective farms, 3,000 of whom were intended for permanent positions of leadership such as collective farm heads, Party Centre secretaries, etc.

Entire divisions of strong, experienced Communists were sent out to the villages, in order to organize the collective farm system.

(From P. Postyshev's speech at the November Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CP(B)U, as reported in *Pravda*, Nov. 24, 1933.)

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