re: Invent

NOV. 28 - DEC. 2, 2022 | LAS VEGAS, NV

S E C 4 0 4

A day in the life of a billion requests

Eric Brandwine (he/him)

Vice President and Distinguished Engineer Amazon Security

Authentication

and Authorization

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Cryptographic Protocol

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
THE APP WILL LET YOU SEND MESSAGES TO YOUR FRIEND ROBERT, OR MY BROTHER. CAN THEY REPLY? NÔ. MY NEW SECURE TEXTING APP ONLY ALLOWS PEOPLE NAMED ALICE TO SEND MESSAGES TO PEOPLE NAMED BOB.

https://xkcd.com/2691/



aws

Cloud




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TLS was expensive and not widespread

No iPhone or Android

Rickrolling hadn't been invented




Dinosaurs roamed the Earth


Netflix delivered via the postman

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
sign(, "One Cloud, please!")→ 🙀




sign(, "One Cloud, please!")→ 🙀



sign(, "One Cloud, please!") → 🙀





TLS was expensive and not widespread



So, where are we?

Every request is signed Requests can't be tampered Requests can't be replayed Protocol is stateless

X Crypto is expensive

Meet the hash!

Cryptographic Hash Algorithm:

- Also known as a "digest"
- Maps arbitrary length input to fixed length output
- Has the avalanche effect
- Is "hard" to reverse

Fast!

Bonus! We're already hashing!



sign(\odot , H("Really long message that keeps going...")) \rightarrow

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Hash-based Message Authentication Code

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hmac-sha256(


hmac-sha256(, "Shhhh! Don't tell!") =
 e5248d8d5dfd0897c02f3e6088de46d0f4858973cf2cab67e6c08080a107db40
hmac-sha256(, "Shhhh! Don't tell!") =
 717d8051682eeb25566812a59f54448c192f26ca8fa3d60f9887b3ef7bce86f0
hmac-sha256(, "Rhhhh! Don't tell!") =
 fdce6af8037a6b3465fd95204d772e09e020767ef5c2001531e1bc17c7679450

362d571721e65959e4202253a2ff068c8dbeb974ba3c3776f8881a4d95fbfcf5

, "Shhh! Don't tell!") =


Meet the HMAC! HMAC(key, message) = H(key || H(key || message))


hmac(, "One Cloud, please!;1970-01-01T...") → 🙀





So, NOW where are we?

 Every request is signed Requests can't be tampered Requests can't be replayed Protocol is stateless Crypto is cheap Largely unaffected by quantum X Keys are symmetric












Access Key ID: AKIAQNZGKIQYW7B57D6W


Secret Access Key:


qMBZnReWlQxgL/CARH5Uko9OMIJbbm/0416xfZ5M





Auth Runtime Service





AWS Signing History


AWS SigV0	Largely internal
AWS SigV1	Canonicalization issue 2008
AWS SigV2	No known issues

hmac(, "One Cloud, please!;1970-01-01T…") → 🙀

Canonicalization

AWS Signing History

AWS SigV0	Largely internal
AWS SigV1	Canonicalization issue 2008
AWS SigV2	No known issues



So, now what?

- Literally millions of HMAC keys
- Asymmetric Cryptography is still slow
- HMAC is symmetric
- HMAC is still fast


AWS Signature Version 4


Hey! What happened to AWS SigV3?


What happened to IPv5?

If one is good...

Long-term customer secret








AWS Signing History

AWS SigV0	Largely internal
AWS SigV1	Canonicalization issue 2008
AWS SigV2	No known issues
AWS SigV3	Why are you still asking?
AWS SigV4	June 2012

Other Milestones

- October 2014: AWS Germany (Frankfurt) Region launch
 - 100% SigV4 for all services
- April 2019: AWS Asia Pacific (Hong Kong) Region launch
 - 1st opt-in Region







```
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
        "Sid": "EnableDisableHongKong",
        "Effect": "Allow",
        "Action": [
            "account:EnableRegion",
            "account:DisableRegion"
        ],
        "Resource": "*",
        "Condition": {
            "StringEquals": { "account: TargetRegion": "ap-east-1" }
        }
    },
        "Sid": "ViewConsole",
        "Effect": "Allow",
        "Action": [
            "aws-portal:ViewAccount",
            "account:ListRegions"
        ],
        "Resource": "*"
]
```

}

Short-Term Keys

Long-Term Keys: Valid until explicitly revoked

Short-Term Keys: Automatically expire

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Why?

- Identity Federation
- Role Assumption
- Roles for *

TOKEN=`curl -X PUT "http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token"\


-H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 30"` \

&& curl -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: \$TOKEN"

http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/TestRole


```
"Code" : "Success",
"LastUpdated" : "2022-11-03T23:03:04Z",
"Type" : "AWS-HMAC",
"AccessKeyId" : "ASIAQNZGKIQY56JQ7WML",
"SecretAccessKey" : "x+0Bra63Fr+cER48CUtkHpCxLk8gFV8MawMS0RRF",
"Token" : "IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjE0f///////wEaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJI <snip>",
"Expiration" : "2022-11-04T05:28:38Z"
```

Challenges with Long-Term Keys



Secure Token Service

Secure Token Service




TOKEN=`curl -X PUT "http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token"\

-H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600"` \

&& curl -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: \$TOKEN"

http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/TestRole

```
"Code" : "Success",
"LastUpdated" : "2022-11-03T23:03:04Z",
"Type" : "AWS-HMAC",
"AccessKeyId" : "ASIAQNZGKIQY56JQ7WML",
"SecretAccessKey" : "x+0Bra63Fr+cER48CUtkHpCxLk8gFV8MawMS0RRF",
"Token" : "IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjE0f//////wEaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJI <snip>",
"Expiration" : "2022-11-04T05:28:38Z"
```



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Daily Region Service

nac(), "AssumeRole

Session token version: one
Role Name: "S3Admin"
account_id: "029608264753"
issuer: "AIDADEKZJMX2ZKUJ2YNT4"
encryptionKeyId: -47
CreateDate: 2022-11-03T23:03:04Z
Seconds: 21600
AccessKeyId: "ASIAQNZGKIQY56JQ7WML"
SecretAccessKey: "x+0Bra63Fr+cER48CUtkHpCxLk8gFV8MawMS0RRF"

Signed: sts.us-east-1

aily Region Service

Session token version: one Role Name: "S3Admin" account_id: "029608264753" issuer: "AIDADEKZJMX2ZKUJ2YNT4" encryptionKeyId: -47 CreateDate: 2022-11-03T23:03:04Z Seconds: 21600 AccessKeyId: "ASIAQNZGKIQY56JQ7WML" SecretAccessKey: "x+0Bra63Fr+cER48CUtkHpCxLk8gFV8MawMS0RRF"

Signed: sts.us-east-1

TLS was expensive and not widespread



Here Come The \oplus Ninjas

Thai Duong

Juliano Rizzo

May 13, 2011

Abstract

This paper introduces a fast blockwise chosen-plaintext attack against SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0. We also describe one application of the attack that allows an attacker to efficiently decrypt and obtain authentication tokens embedded in HTTPS requests¹ The resulting exploits work for major web browsers at the time of writing.

What just happened?

- Scale and customer requirements lead us to an interesting design
- Scale and growth broke our design
 - Innovation and careful cryptography gave us even greater scale
- Short-lived keys and SigV4 allow us to support new use cases
- Scale cost us simplicity, but not elegance

Thank you!

Eric Brandwine

@ebrandwine

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