Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg Publications

We develop a framework for quantifying barriers to labor force participation (LFP) and entrepreneurship faced by women in India. We find substantial barriers to LFP, and higher costs of expanding businesses through hiring workers for women entrepreneurs. However, there is one area where female entrepreneurs have an advantage: the hiring of female workers. We show that this is not driven by the sectoral composition of female employment. Consistent with this pattern, policies promoting female entrepreneurship can significantly increase female LFP even without explicitly targeting female LFP. Counterfactual simulations indicate that removing all excess barriers faced by women entrepreneurs would substantially increase the fraction of female‐owned firms, female LFP, earnings, and generate substantial gains for the economy. These gains are due to higher LFP, higher real wages and profits, and reallocation: low productivity male‐owned firms previously sheltered from female competition are replaced by higher productivity female‐owned firms previously excluded from the economy.

The extent to which women participate in the labor market and have access to formal employment differs greatly across Indian states. In this paper we build on the methodology developed by Hsieh, Hurst, Jones, and Klenow (2019) to estimate the productivity consequences of such differences. Using rich microdata on occupational sorting and earnings, our theory allows to separately identify labor demand distortions (e.g., discrimination in hiring for formal jobs) from labor supply distortions (e.g., frictions that discourage women’s labor force participation). We find that both demand distortions and supply distortions are negatively related to state-level economic development. Equalizing distortions across Indian states could raise state-level productivity by up to 15%.

The US-China trade war created net export opportunities rather than simply shifting trade across destinations. Many "bystander" countries grew their exports of taxed products into the rest of the world (excluding the United States and China). Country-specific components of tariff elasticities, rather than specialization patterns, drove large cross-country variation in export growth of tariff-exposed products. The elasticities of exports to US-Chinese tariffs identify whether a country's exports complement or substitute the United States or China and its supply curve's slope. Countries that operate along downward-sloping supplies whose exports substitute (complement) the United States and China are among the larger (smaller) beneficiaries of the trade war.

Does economic growth close labor market-linked gender gaps that disadvantage women? Conversely, do gender inequalities in the labor market impede growth? To inform these questions, we conduct two analyses. First, we estimate regressions using data on gender gaps in a range of labor market outcomes from 153 countries spanning two decades (1998-2018). Second, we conduct a systematic review of the recent economics literature on gender gaps in labor markets, examining 16 journals over 21 years. Our empirical analysis demonstrates that growth is not a panacea. While economic gender gaps have narrowed and growth is associated with gender gap closures specifically in incidence of paid work, the relationship between growth and labor market gaps is otherwise mixed, and results vary by specification. This result reflects, in part, the gendered nature of structural transformation, in which growth leads men to transition from agriculture to industry and services while many women exit the labor force. Disparities in hours worked and wages persist despite growth, and heterogeneity in trends and levels between regions highlight the importance of local institutions. To better understand whether gender inequalities impeded growth, we explore a nascent literature that shows that reducing gender gaps in labor markets increases aggregate productivity. Our broader review highlights how traditional explanations for gender differences do not adequately explain existing gaps and how policy responses need to be sensitive to the changing nature of economic growth. We conclude by posing open questions for future research.

We examine the effects of international trade in the presence of a set of domestic distortions giving rise to informality, a prevalent phenomenon in developing countries. In our quantitative model, the informal sector arises from burdensome taxes and regulations that are imperfectly enforced by the government. Consequently, smaller, less productive firms face fewer distortions than larger, more productive ones, potentially leading to substantial misallocation. We show that in settings with a large informal sector, the gains from trade are significantly amplified, as reductions in trade barriers imply a reallocation of resources from initially less distorted to more distorted firms. We confirm findings from earlier reduced-form studies that the informal sector mitigates the impact of negative labor demand shocks on unemployment. Nonetheless, the informal sector can exacerbate the adverse welfare effects of economic downturns, amplifying misallocation. Last, our research sheds light on the relationship between trade openness and cross-firm wage inequality.

What is the pathway to development in a world marked by rising economic nationalism and less international integration? This paper answers this question within a framework that emphasizes the role of demand-side constraints on national development, which is identified with sustained poverty reduction. In this framework, development is linked to the adoption of an increasing returns to scale technology by imperfectly competitive firms that need to pay the fixed setup cost of switching to that technology. Sustained poverty reduction is measured as a continuous decline in the share of the population living below $1.90/day purchasing power parity in 2011 U.S. dollars over a five-year period. This outcome is affected in a statistically significant and economically meaningful way by domestic market size, which is measured as a function of the income distribution, and international market size, which is measured as a function of legally-binding provisions to international trade agreements, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the World Trade Organization, and 279 preferential trade agreements. Counterfactual estimates suggest that, in the absence of international integration, the average resident of a low- or lower-middle-income country does not live in a market large enough to experience sustained poverty reduction. Domestic redistribution targeted towards generating a larger middle class can partially compensate for the lack of an international market.

We examine the employment effects of 3G mobile internet expansion in developing countries. We find that 3G significantly increases the labor force participation rate of women and the employment rates of both men and women. Our results suggest that 3G affects the type of jobs and there is a distinct gender dimension to these effects. Men transition away from unpaid agricultural work into operating small agricultural enterprises, while women take more unpaid jobs, especially in agriculture, and operate more small businesses in all sectors. Both men and women are more likely to work in wage jobs in the service sector.

We develop a framework for quantifying barriers to labor force participation (LFP) and entrepreneurship faced by women in developing countries, and apply it to the Indian economy. We find that women face substantial barriers to LFP. The costs for expanding businesses through the hiring of workers are also substantially higher for women entrepreneurs. However, there is one area in which female entrepreneurs have an advantage: the hiring of female workers. We show that this is not driven by the sectoral composition of female employment. Consistent with this pattern, we find even without promoting female LFP, policies that boost female entrepreneurship can significantly increase female LFP. Counterfactual simulations indicate that removing all excess barriers faced by women entrepreneurs would substantially increase the fraction of female-owned firms, female LFP, earnings, and generate substantial gains in aggregate productivity and welfare. These gains are due to higher LFP, higher real wages and profits, and reallocation: low productivity male-owned firms previously sheltered from female competition are replaced by higher productivity female-owned firms previously excluded from the economy.

Occasional widely publicized controversies have led to the perception that growth statistics from developing countries are not to be trusted. Based on the comparison of several data sources and analysis of novel IMF audit data, we find no support for the view that growth is on average measured less accurately or manipulated more in developing than in developed countries. While developing countries face many challenges in measuring growth, so do higher-income countries, especially those with complex and sometimes rapidly changing economic structures. However, we find consistently higher dispersion of growth estimates from developing countries, lending support to the view that classical measurement error is more problematic in poorer countries and that a few outliers may have had a disproportionate effect on (mis)measurement perceptions. We identify several measurement challenges that are specific to poorer countries, namely limited statistical capacity, the use of outdated data and methods, the large share of the agricultural sector, the informal economy, and limited price data. We show that growth measurement based on the System of National Accounts (SNA) can be improved if supplemented with information from other data sources (for example, satellite-based data on vegetation yields) that address some of the limitations of SNA.

Human capital—that is, resources associated with the knowledge and skills of individuals—is a critical component of economic development. Learning metrics that are comparable for countries globally are necessary to understand and track the formation of human capital. The increasing use of international achievement tests is an important step in this direction. However, such tests are administered primarily in developed countries, limiting our ability to analyse learning patterns in developing countries that may have the most to gain from the formation of human capital. Here we bridge this gap by constructing a globally comparable database of 164 countries from 2000 to 2017. The data represent 98% of the global population and developing economies comprise two-thirds of the included countries. Using this dataset, we show that global progress in learning—a priority Sustainable Development Goal—has been limited, despite increasing enrolment in primary and secondary education.