Ferguson v. Martineau

Decision Date20 November 1914
Docket Number(No. 244.)
Citation171 S.W. 472
PartiesFERGUSON et al. v. MARTINEAU et al.
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

One Arthur Hodges was convicted of murder in the first degree in the Clark circuit court. He appealed to this court and the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed. After the judgment of the Clark circuit court, Hodges made application to that court for a writ of coram nobis to inquire into the issue of his sanity at the time of the alleged offense for which he was convicted. The writ was issued, and upon a trial of that issue before a jury it was determined that Hodges was sane. Hodges was then conveyed to the state penitentiary and delivered to the superintendent thereof to await his execution under the provisions of the act approved February 15, 1913, Act 55 of the Acts of 1913. On the 6th day of November, 1914, upon the petition of W. M. Rankin, with accompanying affidavits, setting forth that Arthur Hodges is now insane, and asking that inquiry be made into the question of his sanity at the present time, the county and probate judge of Pulaski county, upon consideration of the petition, granted the same and ordered a warrant to issue for the arrest of Arthur Hodges, and directed the sheriff to have him before the probate court on the 23d day of November, 1914, to have the question of his sanity determined. On the 7th of November, 1914, application was made to the chancery court of Pulaski county for an injunction against the commissioners of the Arkansas penitentiary, restraining them from executing Hodges on the day set for his execution. The chancery court granted the petition and issued an order enjoining the commissioners from executing Hodges on the 14th day of November, 1914, or on any other date until the further orders of the chancery court. The petitioners apply to this court for writs of prohibition, directed to the judge of the chancery court of Pulaski county and to the judge of the county and probate court of said county, prohibiting them from interfering with the execution of Arthur Hodges on the day set for his execution under the sentence and judgment of the Clark circuit court. The judge of the probate court of Pulaski county set up, in response to the petition, that the writ of prohibition should not issue for the reason that this court has no jurisdiction to issue a writ prohibiting the probate court of Pulaski county from exercising its jurisdiction to inquire into the question of the sanity of Hodges, and further set up that he had such jurisdiction and that he had exercised it for good cause shown. The chancellor of the Pulaski chancery court responded that he issued the injunction restraining the commissioners from executing Hodges until his sanity could be determined by the probate court on the 23d day of November, 1914, the day set by that court for the inquisition; that he had issued all the orders that he could issue or would issue; and that the petitioners, if aggrieved by his action, had their remedy by way of appeal, and not by writ of prohibition. For convenience of hearing the cases are consolidated here and disposed of in one opinion.

Jones & Owens and Bradshaw, Rhoton & Helm, all of Little Rock, for petitioners. Wm. L. Moose, Atty. Gen., and Jno. P. Streepey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants.

WOOD, J. (after stating the facts as above).

In Featherstone v. Folbre, 75 Ark. 510-512, 88 S. W. 554, 555, we said:

"This court has no original jurisdiction to control or supervise any proceedings of the probate court. That all belongs to the circuit courts, as matters of original jurisdiction, and to this court by appellate and supervisory jurisdiction over the circuit courts. This court supervises and controls all courts inferior to the circuit courts only through the latter courts. In no other way can the harmony of our judicial system, as at present constituted, be preserved."

In the same case we held that the supervisory jurisdiction of this court over the probate court "comes, not originally, but by way of appeal and supervision through the circuit courts."

It follows that this court has no jurisdiction to issue the writ of prohibition in this case, directed to the probate court. If the application for a writ of prohibition directed to the probate court had been first made in the circuit court and refused, then this court would have jurisdiction by reason of its superintending control over the circuit court, but this was not done. The petition for the writ of prohibition directed to the probate court must be denied.

II. Courts of equity have to do with civil and property rights, and they have no jurisdiction to interfere by injunction with criminal proceedings. They cannot stay processes of courts having the exclusive jurisdiction of criminal matters, where no civil or property rights are involved. Portis v. Fall et al., 34 Ark. 375; Medical Institute v. Hot Springs, 34 Ark. 559; Taylor v. Pine Bluff, 34 Ark. 603; Waters-Peirce Oil Co. v. City of Little Rock, 39 Ark. 412; High on Injunctions, § 68; Kerr on Injunctions in Equity, p. 2, star; 1 Wharton, Cr. Law, 403.

This court, in State v. Vaughan, 81 Ark. 125, 98 S. W. 689 (7 L. R. A. [N. S.] 899, 118 Am. St. Rep. 29, 11 Ann. Cas. 277), quoting from the Illinois Supreme Court, said:

"It is elementary law that the subject-matter of the jurisdiction of the court of chancery is civil property. * * * The court has no jurisdiction in matters merely criminal or merely immoral, which do not affect any right to property. * * * It is no part of the mission of equity to administer the criminal law of the state. * * * A court of equity has no jurisdiction overs matters merely criminal or merely immoral."

The Supreme Court of the United States, in Re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, 209, 210, 8 Sup. Ct. 482, 487 (31 L. Ed. 402), says:

"The office and jurisdiction of a court of equity, unless enlarged by express statute, are limited to the protection of rights of property. It has no jurisdiction over the prosecution, punishment, or the pardon of crimes or misdemeanors, or over the appointment and removal of public officers. To assume such a jurisdiction, or to sustain a bill in equity to restrain or relieve against proceedings for the punishment of offenses, or for the removal of public officers, is to invade the domain of the courts of common law, or of the executive and administrative departments of the government."

See, also, Fitz v. McGee, 172 U. S. 516, 19 Sup. Ct. 269, 43 L. Ed. 535; Pom. Eq. Jur. § 644, and authorities cited. Such suit is in effect a suit against the state.

It follows that the chancery court was wholly without jurisdiction to stay the execution of the judgment of the Clark circuit court.

"The writ of prohibition is that process by which a superior court prevents an inferior court or tribunal from usurping or exercising jurisdiction with which it has not been vested by law." 2 Spelling on Injunctions & Other Extraordinary Remedies, § 1716.

See, also, Short on Informations, Mandamus & Prohibition, p. 436.

Here the want of jurisdiction on the part of the chancery court appears on the face of the...

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