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Crash: PNG DH8A near Madang on Oct 13th 2011, both propellers oversped
By Simon Hradecky, created Thursday, Oct 13th 2011 13:30Z, last updated Tuesday, Nov 15th 2011 17:52Z

An Airlines of PNG (Papua New Guinea) de Havilland Dash 8-100, registration P2-MCJ performing flight CG-1600 from Lae to Madang (Papue New Guinea) with 28 passengers and 4 crew, was lost from radar about 20km south of Madang around 17:00L (07:00Z). The aircraft was later located on land about 20km south of Madang, the aircraft was on fire. 28 occupants perished, both pilots as well as a flight attendant and a passenger survived.

Early Oct 14th Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs said no Australian was killed in the crash identifying one of the pilots survived. The Department continued that according to local authorities 4 people survived the crash, amongst them also the other pilot.

Late Oct 14th Australian consular staff at Madang confirmed 4 survivors. The Australian Captain received serious injuries to his legs but is in stable condition, the New Zealand First Officer received minor if at all injuries, a third survivor is a Chinese male in his fifties with serious injuries due to burns to his back and arms, who had escaped the burning wreckage through a crack in the fuselage, and the fourth survivor is believed to be a flight attendant. The captain has been flown to Port Moresby (Papua New Guinea).

Papua New Guinea's Accident Investigation Commission (AIC) said, the airplane went down 20km south of Madang near the mouth of the Gogol River and caught fire, there are reports of survivors and fatalities. Rescue forces have reached the crash site, police has cordoned the site off, ambulances have reached the site, local hospitals are on stand by. A first investigator has reached Madang. The Australian Transportation Safety Board has been asked for assistance.

On Oct 17th the AIC reported that the crew reported smoke coming from both engines, they lost power on both engines and were attempting a forced landing.

Papua's Authorities reported the black boxes have been recovered.

On Oct 17th the ATSB confirmed both flight data and cockpit voice recorders have been taken to Canberra (Australia) and have been successfully read out.

The airline stated there were 28 passengers and 4 crew on board. There appear to be a number of survivors while the remaining people are unaccounted for. Authorities have quarantained the aviation fuel at Lae Airport. PNG Airlines have grounded all their 12 Dash 8 aircraft until further notice.

No weather information is available for Madang (neither Metar nor local weather office data), however local residents reported a violent storm was in the vicinity at the time of the crash.

TAF Madang [AYMD]:
AYMD 130602Z 1308/1320 12008KT 9999 SHRA SCT016 SCT030 BKN140 Q1009 1011 1010 1008
AYMD 122301Z 1302/1314 12010KT 9999 SHRA SCT016 SCT030 BKN140 Q1010 1008 1009 1011

The remains of P2-MCJ (Photo: AP/Scott Waide):
The remains of P2-MCJ (Photo: AP/Scott Waide)

Map (Graphics: AVH/Google Earth):
Map (Graphics: AVH/Google Earth)


By Simon Hradecky, created Monday, Jun 16th 2014 13:42Z, last updated Monday, Jun 16th 2014 13:42Z

PNGAIC have released their final report concluding the probable causes of the crash were:

Contributing safety factors

- The Pilot-in-Command moved the power levers rearwards below the flight idle gate shortly after the VMO overspeed warning sounded. This means that the release triggers were lifted during the throttle movement.

- The power levers were moved further behind the flight idle gate leading to ground beta operation in flight, loss of propeller speed control, double propeller overspeed, and loss of usable forward thrust, necessitating an off-field landing.

- A significant number of DHC-8-100, -200, and -300 series aircraft worldwide did not have a means of preventing movement of the power levers below the flight idle gate in flight, or a means to prevent such movement resulting in a loss of propeller speed control.

Other safety factors

- Prior to the VMO overspeed warning, the Pilot-in-Command allowed the rate of descent to increase to 4,200 ft per minute and the airspeed to increase to VMO.

- The beta warning horn malfunctioned and did not sound immediately when one or both of the flight idle gate release triggers were lifted. When the beta warning horn did sound, it did so intermittently and only after the double propeller overspeed had commenced. The sound of the beta warning horn was masked by the noise of the propeller overspeeds.

- There was an uncommanded feathering of the right propeller after the overspeed commenced due to a malfunction within the propeller control beta backup system during the initial stages of the propeller overspeed.

- The right propeller control unit (PCU) fitted to MCJ was last overhauled at an approved overhaul facility which had a quality escape issue involving incorrect application of beta switch reassembly procedures, after a service bulletin modification. The quality escape led to an uncommanded feather incident in an aircraft in the United States due to a beta switch which stuck closed.

- Due to the quality escape, numerous PCU‟s were recalled by the overhaul facility for rectification. The right PCU fitted to MCJ was identified as one of the units that may have been affected by the quality escape and would have been subject to recall had it still been in service.

- The FDR data indicated that the right PCU fitted to MCJ had an uncommanded feather, most likely due to a beta switch stuck in the closed position, induced by the propeller overspeed. It was not possible to confirm if the overhaul facility quality escape issue contributed to the beta switch sticking closed, because the PCU was destroyed by the post-impact fire.

- The landing gear and flaps remained retracted during the off-field landing. This led to a higher landing speed than could have been achieved if the gear and flaps had been extended, and increased the impact forces on the airframe and its occupants.

- No DHC-8 emergency procedures or checklists were used by the flight crew after the emergency began.

- The left propeller was not feathered by the flight crew after the engine failed.

- The investigation identified several occurrences where a DHC-8 pilot inadvertently moved one or both power levers behind the flight idle gate in flight, leading to a loss of propeller speed control. Collectively, those events indicated a systemic design issue with the integration of the propeller control system and the aircraft.

Other key findings

- The flaps and landing gear were available for use after the propeller overspeeds and the engine damage had occurred.

- There was no regulatory requirement to fit the beta lockout system to any DHC-8 aircraft outside the USA at the time of the accident.

- The autopilot could not be used during the accident flight.

- The operator‟s checking and training system did not require the flight crew to have demonstrated the propeller overspeed emergency procedure in the simulator.

- After the accident, the aircraft manufacturer identified a problem in the beta warning horn system that may have led to failures not being identified during regular and periodic tests of the system.

Safety issues

- A significant number of DHC-8-100, -200, and -300 series aircraft did not have a means of preventing movement – whether intentional or unintentional – of the power levers below the flight idle gate in flight, nor a means to prevent such movement resulting in a loss of propeller speed control.

- The aircraft manufacturer identified a problem in the beta warning horn system that left the system susceptible to failures that may not have been identified during regular and periodic tests of the system.

- After the accident, the facility that overhauled the propeller control unit (PCU) installed on MCJ (as the aircraft‟s right hand PCU at the time of the accident) identified a quality escape relating to the use of incorrect reassembly procedures for the installation of the beta switch within the propeller control unit. The quality escape may have led to uncommanded fearing of the right propeller.

The PNGAIC analyzed that the aircraft was handflown on a steep descent with the propellers governed at 900 rpm, the rate of descent reaching 4,200 feet per minute. The airspeed increased until it hit the maximum operating speed (Vmo) causing the overspeed warning to sound. The first officer recollected that the captain pulled the power levers back quite quickly. Shortly afterwards both propeller underwent signficant simultaneous overspeeds causing damage to the engines, complete loss of forward thrust and smoke intruding cockpit and cabin through the bleed air system although no fire was evident before ground contact. An off field forced landed became necessary because of the loss of forward thrust making the following accident inevitable.

There had been no preexisting malfunction of the aircraft with the exception of the beta warning horn, which had failed.

The crew did not refer to checklists or execute standard emergency procedures. As result the left hand propellers remained unfeathered until 72 seconds before impact causing significant engine damage and drag as well as shortening the time between the overspeed event and forced impact with ground. The PNGAIC stated that had the airspeed and rate of descent been within the usual ranges the time between onset of the emergency to ground contact could have been 9 minutes instead of the actual 4:12 minutes.

Flaps and Landing Gear would have been available but were not used although they could have contributed to soften the impact with terrain.

The PNGAIC stated: "Several similar propeller overspeed events have occurred in other DHC-8 aircraft that did not have a beta lockout mechanism fitted. These all had factors in common such as the aircraft being on descent, high airspeed, and power levers moved below the flight idle gate. At the time of the accident, DHC-8 aircraft outside the USA were not required to have a beta lockout mechanism."

The PNGAIC analyzed, that two actions were required to force the propellers into beta range in flight: the power levers must have been pulled rearwards and the flight idle gate triggers must have been raised to permit the power levers below the flight idle position. The PNGAIC analyzed that a click was heard on the cockpit voice recorder just after the overspeed warning activated exactly at the time when the flight idle gates were expected to be operated in order to permit the power reduction move the propellers into beta range.

Further support for the theory that the flight idle gates had been lifted comes from the fact, that the beta warning horn, although malfunctioning, did sound - however only after the propellers had already entered beta range. This is further evidence that the triggers had been lifted.

The PNGAIC concluded: "In the absence of any identifiable mechanical component failures, movement of the power levers behind the flight idle gate by the Pilot-in-Command is considered to be the only plausible explanation for the simultaneous double propeller overspeed in MCJ."

The PNGAIC analyzed: "As a consequence of the inhibition of the propeller speed control and overspeed protection systems in MCJ, all propeller speed control was lost. This meant the propellers were driven by the airflow like the vanes of a windmill, resulting in the propeller RPM limits being significantly exceeded, a condition exacerbated by the aircraft‟s high speed. With the propellers back-driving the engines, the power turbines oversped and the left engine failed. The right propeller underwent an uncommanded feather because of a malfunction in the PCU beta switch system. However, expert knowledge of the propeller control system – beyond that which any pilot could be expected to possess – would have been needed to unfeather the right propeller and the right engine could not therefore be used for forward thrust. The left engine had shut down due to internal damage, so a forced landing without power was inevitable. Although it could not be used for forward thrust, the left engine was still powering the left hydraulic system and the left AC generator was producing AC electrical power. The propeller blade tips exceeded the speed of sound. The CVR recording showed that the flight crew had great difficulty communicating above the very loud noise. The propeller noise also masked the intermittent sound of the beta warning horn."

With respect to the beta warning the PNGAIC analyzed: "In 1999 the manufacturer recommended and Transport Canada mandated the installation of a beta warning horn on the DHC-8 to alert pilots whenever the flight idle gate release triggers were lifted in flight. This reduced the risk of inadvertent movement of the power levers below the flight idle gate during flight. Audible warnings can be very effective, although research has shown they are not always heard or comprehended in sufficient time for an effective response to be made, particularly in times of high workload or distraction. Due to the malfunction of the beta warning horn in MCJ, the audible tone of the horn – which was a defence against in-flight raising of the power lever triggers – was absent. If the beta warning horn had functioned normally, the pilots may have recognised what was happening and taken appropriate action quickly enough to prevent the propeller overspeeds from damaging the engines."

The PNGAIC further stated that the aircraft manufacturer identified a problem with the beta warning horn functional tests on one of their corporate aircraft and issued a service bulletin with a revised test procedure. 5 of 91 aircraft covered by the service bulletin showed defective beta warning horns. The PNGAIC stated: "The manufacturer identified worn micro-switch retaining brackets as the factor underlying this malfunction, and a further service bulletin was issued to rectify the problem."

The PNGAIC analyzed that according to flight data recorder the right hand power lever had been moved to about 13 degrees below flight idle, outside the governing range of the propeller control. The right beta switch closed. It is likely that the power lever was subsequently advanced into the governing range again, however, the FDR indicates the right beta switch remained closed until the end of recording. Consequently the beta backup logic feathered the propeller, the stuck switch would have prevented the crew to unfeather the propeller had they tried to unfeather the propeller - but they did not.

With respect to that PCU malfunction the PNGAIC reported: "Shortly before this report was finalised, the NTSB indicated to the AIC that, had the PCU still been in operation on an aircraft, it would have been subject to recall for issues directly related to beta switches sticking due to incorrect application of installation procedures at overhaul. It is possible that the quality control issue associated with that recall was implicated in some way in the feathering of MCJ‟s right propeller, but extensive thermal damage to the right PCU precluded any examination and testing to determine the cause of the beta switch malfunction. The AIC was therefore unable to determine if the quality control issue contributed to the uncommanded feather of the right propeller or not."

The PNGAIC analyzed: "Although the right engine remained undamaged after the propeller overspeed commenced, the uncommanded feather of the right propeller meant it could not be used for forward thrust. If the PCU had not malfunctioned and the propeller had returned to the governing range, the flight crew may have been able to use the right engine for forward thrust and a forced landing may not have been necessary. However, if the right propeller had not feathered and the engine power turbine had continued to be driven by an overspeeding propeller, it is possible the right engine would have failed in the same way as the left engine because of the forces exerted on the power turbine by the overspeeding propeller."

With respect to not reading the checklists the PNGAIC analyzed: "If the flight crew had used the DHC-8 emergency procedures for propeller overspeed, engine failure, and forced landing, it may have altered the final outcome of the occurrence. In common with the manufacturer‟s other abnormal and emergency procedures, these procedures were designed for flight crew to deal with the emergencies without recourse to ad hoc actions. Why the flight crew did not respond with standard emergency procedures is not clear. They said afterwards there had been insufficient time. It is possible they were overwhelmed and this somehow prevented them from putting into effect the procedures and methods they had been trained to use in such circumstances. On the basis that the flight crew responded in an ad hoc manner to the emergency, it appeared that the operator‟s training system had been ineffective in inculcating into those pilots the company‟s prescribed responses to emergencies. There was no evidence that either pilot had completed the propeller overspeed drill during their simulator training or simulator checks. It is therefore possible that they had never demonstrated this procedure to a check captain."

The PNGAIC analysed that had the airspeed been reduced to 120 KIAS as recommended by the checklists after the propeller overspeed onset at descending through 7500 feet MSL, the aircraft could have remained airborne for a further 9 rather than the actual 3:20 minutes from 7500 feet MSL (total 4:12 minutes from actual altitude of onset) and travelled a distance of 18.9nm from 7500 feet MSL down.

The PNGAIC analyzed that observing the checklists the aircraft was WITHIN gliding range to Madang aerodrome - at the time of descending through 7500 feet, after descending more than 2500 feet after the onset of the propeller overspeeds, the aircraft was 17nm from the aerodrome - , however cautioned: "This section is not intended to imply that the flight crew should have attempted to glide towards Madang. Instead, it examines what may have been possible given the height at which the propeller overspeeds occurred, and how long the aircraft could have remained airborne if the flight crew had managed the situation differently." The PNGAIC further stated: "Prompt execution of the applicable emergency procedures would therefore have probably allowed the flight crew to glide to, or close to, Madang aerodrome, had they been able to see it. However, the flight crew could not see Madang and were also aware of a storm in the vicinity of the aerodrome."

The PNGAIC summarized the analysis: "In summary, the aircraft‟s degraded controllability and the high rate of descent/short time to impact were at least partly attributable to the fact that the flight crew did not use the standard emergency procedures early on. While it is not possible to determine exactly what would have happened if the flight crew had had more time to deal with the situation, it is reasonable to suppose it may have positively affected their ability to assess and manage the situation in a systematic manner."

Flight track of the aircraft after the propeller overspeed (Graphics: PNGAIC):
Flight track of the aircraft after the propeller overspeed (Graphics: PNGAIC)

By Simon Hradecky, created Tuesday, Nov 15th 2011 14:09Z, last updated Tuesday, Nov 15th 2011 17:53Z

Papua New Guinea's Accident Investigation Commission (PNGAIC) have released their preliminary report via Australia's ATSB reporting, that the crew reported they were about 24nm before Madang descending through 13,000 feet MSL. About 3 minutes later the overspeed warning horn sounded shortly followed by both propellers overspeeding simultaneously and exceeding their maximum rpm limit by by about 60%. Witnesses on the ground reported hearing a loud bang at that time. The crew declared MAYDAY and reported both engines had stopped prompting Madang tower to immediately declare a distress SAR phase believing the aircraft would ditch in the ocean.

The aircraft however impacted terrain 33km south of Madang Airport, on sparsely timbered terrain on the north side of Buang River. The aircraft disintegrated due to impact with trees and ground, a intense fuel fed fire erupted. Villagers who had heard the initial bang and witnessed the aircraft descend proceeded to the crash site and help the four survivors out of the wreckage, that was engulfed in flames.

The four survivors were the captain (64, ATPL, 18,200 hours total, 500 hours on type) with serious injuries to his right leg, the first officer (40, ATPL, 2,750 hours total, 410 hours on type) with minor injuries, the flight attendant with minor injuries and a passenger with severe burns.

The wreckage trail was about 300 meters long, the traces indicating the aircraft contacted ground in a controlled state at a low rate of descent.

The aircraft had accumulated 38,421 hours in 48,093 flight cycles since its introduction to service in 1988.

The wreckage trail (Photo: PNGAIC):
The wreckage trail (Photo: PNGAIC)

The remains of right hand engine and propeller (Photo: PNGAIC):
The remains of right hand engine and propeller (Photo: PNGAIC)

Planned approach track and crash site (Graphics: PNGAIC):
Planned approach track and crash site (Graphics: PNGAIC)

Reader Comments: (the comments posted below do not reflect the view of The Aviation Herald but represent the view of the various posters)
Idle gate / quality of the report
By Paolo on Tuesday, Jun 17th 2014 06:40Z

On the ATR42, to prevent such mishaps, the idle gate is actuated by a solenoid, which automatically trips it between FLIGHT IDLE and GROUND IDLE according to the position of the squat (weight-on-wheels) switch. Nonetheless, the idle gate position is visualized by the position of a small lever located behind and below the power levers, on the pedestal: you can actually see it popping in and out as the aircraft lands or lifts off the ground. You might even use that lever as a manual override, but you would need both hands (or a hand from the copilot) because, due to its position, it is impossible to reach both the idle gate and the power levers with one hand. Good measure, IMHO. Kudos to the folks of PNG AIC for the quality of their report: I have seen works from the equivalent agencies of much, much richer countries, which were much, much less accurate, and whose English was chilling.

@rahaul
By fokker50 on Monday, Jun 16th 2014 21:15Z

Yep, there is. After the LUX air crash with a Fokker 50 a very advanced system called automatic flight idle stop protection was introduced. Works very well on the Fokker 50.

I have no idea what the current dash aircraft have to protect you from beta range in flight.


By Rahul on Monday, Jun 16th 2014 14:16Z

Isn't there a better way to prevent the in-flight operation of the POWER levers aft of the FLT IDLE gate?

Possible Cause Of Crash
By Gerald on Sunday, Nov 27th 2011 17:18Z

There is a chance that when the Dash 8 overspeed warning went off the crew pulled the aircraft engines into disking in flight, this would cause the engines to overspeed then fail. This has happened before that is why there are S/B and AD's to prevent this from happening.

FDR?
By -8drvr on Tuesday, Nov 22nd 2011 07:55Z

The chronology of events described in the opening paragraph, strongly suggests the movement of the power levers aft of the flight idle gate.

The AFM warns against this, stating:
"In-flight operation of the POWER levers aft of the FLT IDLE gate is prohibited. Failure to observe this limitation will cause propeller overspeed, possible engine failure and may result in loss of aircraft control."

Additionally, the aircraft Operating Data Manual contains a Safety of Flight Supplement which states:
"The selection of either or both Power Levers below Flight Idle in-flight is strictly prohibited. When the requirement exists to adjust engine power in-flight, flight crew must avoid contact with the Power Lever "Flight Idle Gate Release Triggers".

eywTdYCUUgBeY
By Nyanna on Wednesday, Nov 16th 2011 17:44Z

Super ifnormatvie writing; keep it up.

@anon Correct numbers.
By ER on Wednesday, Nov 16th 2011 13:42Z

Actually, form the 117 pax and 17 crew, 10 crew survived and 1 passenger.

@anon
By ER on Wednesday, Nov 16th 2011 13:39Z

Yep. In the Varig flight 820, a Boeing 707 that crashed in Paris in 1973, from the 117 passangers and 17 crew members, 7 crew survived and only one passenger. The reason was that, due to smoke in the cabin - caused by fire in a back toilet, - that forced the landing, all the crew who could, got into the cockpit, were the situation was bearable. This survivor passanger was in the last rows, but went next to the front door.


By anon on Wednesday, Nov 16th 2011 12:49Z

1. Out of 32 souls on board 4 survived and 3 of them were crew. Is this chance or training or some other fact that makes crew more likely to survive? Has this been seen on other accidents?

2. Why does an engine failure cause props to over-speed? Seems counter-intuitive to a layman like me.

PNG Crash / CVR and FDR
By Herb on Tuesday, Nov 15th 2011 22:25Z

Let's not speculate too much I think; as the CVR and FDR have been recovered and read out.
This most valuable data should eventually clear up everything, and it's also noteworthy to follow up on that interesting thing re: authorities have quarantined the aviation fuel at Lae airport.
This sounds as if the aircraft was eventually fuelled up with AVGAS not Kerosene by mistake, or they had a contamination problem.

Engine op and other things
By JayCanada on Tuesday, Nov 15th 2011 20:00Z

I agree with JTK's analysis of the prop photo. Regardless of it being LH or RH, the blades are bent significantly in a pattern conforming to rotation on impact. Further, the spinner (fallen off and sitting to the left of the prop in photo) shows damage consistant with impact while rotating (diagonal impact mark, consistant with rotation.)
Regardless of feathering, the plane seems flyable, no reason for an accellerated descent. More to come!


By (anonymous) on Tuesday, Nov 15th 2011 19:48Z

60% over maximum? That's some serious propelerage. How the hell do you get 60% overspeed?

re: Landing alternative
By Steve on Tuesday, Nov 15th 2011 18:15Z

I'm sure you would be asking why he didn't land on terra firma had he performed a ditching and suffered fatalities. Just in case you didn't know, a water landing isn't a picnic either. Guess how I know that.

Hold your judgement until the crew get to tell their side of the story and the investigation gets a little further along.

Scott
By JKT on Tuesday, Nov 15th 2011 15:45Z

"Its quite obvious the left hand engine in the picture was shut down before impact with the prop in feather and mostly intact suggests it was not spinning at time of impact."

I disagree. All four blades on the prop are bent, 90 degrees, in the same direction--the direction of rotation. This could only happen if the engine were not only spinning but at high speed at time of impact.


Landing alternative
By James on Wednesday, Oct 26th 2011 16:16Z

Why can't that experience pilot with 35 years of flying in PNG land the aircraft on the sea inoredr to have more survivors.


RH Engine
By Poncho on Thursday, Oct 20th 2011 15:32Z

PNG have the regist on the upper rt wing, you can also see the over wing fuel filler. It's the rt engine and the exhaust nozzle is in it's correct position.

Re - #2 Engine
By Scott on Wednesday, Oct 19th 2011 23:15Z

If you also look closely the aircraft is upside down so it would be the #1 engine if upside down facing foward

#2 Engine
By Poncho on Wednesday, Oct 19th 2011 18:23Z

Scott, It's actually the right engine (#2) that is is feathered not the left





By ANON on Tuesday, Oct 18th 2011 08:38Z

Missed this one?
Engine failure
By Scott on Monday, Oct 17th 2011 21:28Z

Its quite obvious the left hand engine in the picture was shut down before impact with the prop in feather and mostly intact suggests it was not spinning at time of impact.

Fuel??
By Dom on Monday, Oct 17th 2011 01:47Z

I've just heard from colleagues in PNG that the fuel situation seems to be an early factor here (though this is rumour), i.e. most likely dirty fuel - enough to have engine failure but can still burn after impact.

I'm not sure of anything else.


By (anonymous) on Sunday, Oct 16th 2011 01:55Z

It doesn't say anything about a fire in the cabin before the crash. The fire appears to be post-crash. That does tend to happen when a fully fueled plane crashes.


By sia pilot on b772 on Saturday, Oct 15th 2011 14:30Z

i am a singaporean pilot with sia n i agree with him. E instructor who is e pilot in this plane is not an actual pilot with sia.

Experience
By Singaporean on Saturday, Oct 15th 2011 01:39Z

While I respect the years of flying in PNG, please don't insinuate that the pilot was a Singapore Airlines instructor. If he was an SQ instructor, he would be working for Singapore Airlines, not flying a Dash in Papua. Do some research and you will find that a "Singapore Airlines instructor" is a light aircraft (single or twin engine propeller) instructor for basic cadets joining Singapore Airlines. This should in no way be mistaken with an actual Singapore Airlines line instructor.
RIP to the pax who perished.

Pilot
By Steve on Friday, Oct 14th 2011 23:06Z

Interviews with the pilot's family appearing in the Fairfax press today make it clear that he was experienced. According to the reports, he was 64 years old, 30 years flying in PNG, former Singapore Airlines instructor. Google for "PNG Aussie pilot" to find the reports.

Condolences
By Smy752 on Friday, Oct 14th 2011 20:41Z

So sorry to read of this tragic loss of life. Condolences to survivors and families of those who perished. The nearest and only radar is in the capital city POM (AYPY). Mountain ranges about 14,000 MSL between. Probably were never high enough for radar contact that far away. Weather forecasts are generated from same from POM at about 2 am LCL and sometimes updated between 10 am and noon LCL. Tower can only report what is seen out the window or reported by pilots. What the pilots can see is the best indication of wx. Forecasts help give trend, wind and moisture patterns and otherwise not much help. Almost always t-storms in the afternoon on that route. So what is unusual is the report of fire in the cabin. The captain's 35 years in PNG flying is remarkable. Praying for the survivors, investigation and recovery teams.

Dash 8 crash
By Norman Kirk on Friday, Oct 14th 2011 20:12Z

I have a friend (Richard Stewart) who is a Dash 8 pilot in PNG, any news?? condolences to all the vivtims and families

Survivors
By Jake (NZHN) on Thursday, Oct 13th 2011 20:13Z

There are reports in New Zealand that both pilots (an Australian and a New Zealand nationals) both survived the crash

RIP to all those killed.

Maneuvering in a violent storm?
By Dave f/e retireed on Thursday, Oct 13th 2011 18:20Z

Yes tragic! Condolences to family & friends of any victims. Does not sound good particularly if maneuvering around or through a violent storm at lower levels. (Or if fire broke out during flight??) However De Havillands are known for their rugged structure. Lack of any official weather information is strange!! Meanwhile hope & pray more survivors located.

Survivors
By Adam on Thursday, Oct 13th 2011 13:52Z

Hopefully there are some survivors. Terrible News.

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