

**UNIT COHESION AND MORALE
IN COMBAT:
Survival in a Culturally and Racially
Heterogeneous Environment**

A Monograph
By
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Field Artillery



19960617 045

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First Term AY 95-96

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED MONOGRAPH
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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <i>UNIT COHESION AND MORALE IN COMBAT: SURVIVAL IN A CULTURALLY AND RACIALLY HETEROGENEOUS ENVIRONMENT</i>	5. FUNDING NUMBERS
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6. AUTHOR(S) <i>MAJ ALEXANDER A. COX</i>

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) School of Advanced Military Studies Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
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9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027	10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
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11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <i>UNLIMITED</i> APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE: DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.	12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
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13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) SEE ATTACHED

14. SUBJECT TERMS <i>MORALE, 442d RCT, U.S. MARINE CORPS, WAFFEN SS, COHESION, UNIT COHESION, RACISM, CULTURAL BIAS.</i>	15. NUMBER OF PAGES <i>65</i>
	16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UNLIMITED
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by MAJ Alexander A. Cox, USA, 64 pages.

This monograph explores the role of cohesion and morale on unit effectiveness in a culturally and racially heterogeneous environment, whether these elements can be nurtured and maintained within this environment, and what the means are for doing this. The method used for this research is a comparative, historical analysis of three cases of military units that maintained high levels of morale and strong unit cohesion. The units selected for the study were the 442d Regimental Combat Team (Japanese American unit during World War II), the U.S. Marine Corps (in Vietnam), and the Waffen SS (WW II).

The monograph first defines morale and cohesion using the writings of military theorists (Sun Tzu, Jomini, and Clausewitz), research conducted by the Army Research Institute, reports compiled by clinical psychologists from the Army Medical Department (AMEDD), Department of Defense studies, work done by researchers from the Navy and Army War Colleges, and lastly writings of common soldiers. Once morale and cohesion were defined, they and their traits or characteristics were applied to the three case studies.

The outcome of the comparative analysis lead to the conclusion that all three cases had certain traits in common. These were the warrior spirit (and esprit de corps), unit loyalty and pride, a common shared purpose and goal, trust in each other and their leaders, self-less service, and self-sacrifice. The intangible entity that bonds men together and motivates them to push themselves to the last ounce of their strength or ability was evident throughout the cases.

The monograph concludes with lessons learned. In all three cases, the same forces are happening. Unit cohesion and morale, via esprit de corps, is manifested with each. The Marines are held up as a prime example for the major lesson to take away, that esprit de corps is the one major entity that can transcend the problems of race and prejudice.


SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

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
Title of Monograph: Unit Cohesion and Morale in Combat:
Survival in a Culturally and Racially
Heterogeneous Environment

Approved by:




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Accepted this 14th day of December 1995

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Unit Cohesion and Morale in Combat: **Survival in a Culturally and Racially Heterogeneous Environment**

Individuals from the time of Frederick the Great to our modern era, have tried to take the uncertainty and the unknown quantity out of warfare through drilling and strict discipline. There still remains that question of how will an individual react under fire. There is only so much that one can program a person to do. An individual's reaction to combat goes beyond what training or discipline can completely control. This study may add a piece to that puzzle on how to effect the way an individual reacts under fire and how to bind a group of individuals together not just physically but more importantly, psychologically.

The upkeep of morale and cohesion in combat are recognized as vital elements in the production of combat power in tactical units. Morale and unit cohesion are a reality of warfare. They are as much a factor of war as wounds and death. The commander that fails to recognize the importance of these factors is the commander who will fail in combat.¹

These two components of war are segments of the undeniably human influence in warfare. This human influence is the element of warfare that is unpredictable and as Michael Howard states, contributes to the 'fog of war'.² That being the case, questions arise as to whether morale and unit cohesion are entities that can be quantified, manipulated, or controlled. To further complicate the problem, the United States of the 20th Century is quite culturally and racially diverse.

Our military today is comprised of soldiers who are highly heterogeneous. This inherent diversity has a potential to lead to barriers to unit cohesion and the subsequent development and maintenance of high morale. The object is to find countermeasures to these naturally occurring barriers that demographic differences and personal traits as well as attitudes and habits may introduce into the units' environment. The degree of bonding or cohesion of any two soldiers is directly related to the similarity in demography, personal habits, attitudes, etc. However, military units are still formed based on rank and major occupational specialty (MOS). Given these barriers, only when units and individuals expect to work together for a long period of time will they see one another at a deeper level than that afforded by demography and other superficial similarities.³ Consequently, military units, being reflections of our society, experience cultural and racial diversity, drastically complicating the construct of the development of high morale and unit cohesion. How then do we address this problem?

In order to answer this question, the objective of this monograph is to explore the role of cohesion and morale on unit effectiveness in this culturally and racially heterogeneous environment, discern whether these elements can be nurtured and maintained within this environment, and what the means are for doing this.

This monograph will define cohesion and morale using the writings of military theorists such as Sun Tzu, Jomini, and Clausewitz, the findings of the Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences, the Institute for Defense Analyses, clinical psychologists, health care professionals, studies compiled by the Army War College and the Department of Defense, and what the common combat soldier feels that morale and

cohesion mean to him. The nature of cohesion and morale will be explored and quantifiable traits will be identified.

Once cohesion and morale are defined, these definitions and traits will be applied to three historical case studies; the 442D RCT (Europe, WW II), the Waffen SS (Eastern Front, WW II), and the U.S. Marine Corps (WW II and Vietnam). A comparative analysis of these historical models of units with high unit cohesion and morale will be conducted to define the characteristics of their cohesion and morale. The defined properties will be used to evaluate whether they can be applied to units today. The case studies will be analyzed based on these quantifiable features, if in fact there are quantifiable features. If these characteristics can be controlled or manipulated, we can better predict future unit performance in combat.

Many studies have been written on the subject of unit cohesion and morale. The intent of this monograph is to take a slightly different approach by analyzing the characteristics of historical models. Further, this monograph will discern whether these characteristics are applicable across the time continuum and whether they come through the rigorous test of survival in a culturally and racially heterogeneous society.

To define the limits of the problem, the characteristics and the very nature or basic qualities of the elements must first be described in order to distinctly specify their parameters. What are these entities exactly? According to the American Heritage Dictionary, cohesion is the 'close physical union of two objects or the bond or adhesion of these objects'.⁴ Morale, on the other hand, is the 'state of the spirits' of a person or

group as exhibited by confidence, cheerfulness, discipline, and willingness to perform assigned tasks.

Though cohesion is the physical union or joining of one or more entities, it goes further than just the binding together of a group of individuals. It is also the absence of isolation for those individuals. A soldier's spirit (morale) is difficult to maintain if he feels a sense of isolation from his comrades.⁵ The two elements are tightly interwoven.

Wilfred Trotter in Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War,⁶ speaks of man being fearful of solitude whether it is psychological or physical. From the soldiers standpoint, this herding instinct develops into unit cohesion.

Military theorists throughout history have maintained that these elements are key to success in warfare. As early as twenty-one hundred years ago, Sun Tzu,⁷ a Chinese military theorist, was keenly aware of the importance of morale and cohesion. Cohesion to Sun Tzu was the unity of will of a unit.⁸ Through this unifying will within the high and low ranks, you can achieve victory. Morale was the spirit of the warrior through which an army could 'trounce' its enemy.⁹ Sun Tzu wrote that the advantage is with the attacker when he strikes an enemy with low morale.

Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini,¹⁰ stated that it is the morale of an army, as well as the morale of a nation that makes a victory and its results decisive.¹¹ Jomini, unlike Sun Tzu, combined morale and cohesion under the label of morale, treating the two in terms of military spirit.¹² In his writings, he speaks of the impetuous attack upon an enemy by twenty-thousand men whose feelings were fully vested in their cause having a greater

impact than forty-thousand men who are demoralized or apathetic who attack the same enemy.¹³

Jomini's contemporary, Karl von Clausewitz,¹⁴ understood the capacity for the morale or 'spirit' of an army to become the decisive factor in an engagement. In terms of cohesion, Clausewitz makes the inference that the unit cohesion is more a factor of the morale of the unit as a whole rather than an equally decisive factor. He does not, however, underrate the value of cohesion. He wrote that the loss of order and cohesion in a unit often makes even the resistance of individual units fatal for them.¹⁵

Of the three theorists mentioned, Clausewitz was the only one who wrote specifically of a measure for morale and cohesion. His two indicators of the loss of morale were, first, the loss of the ground on which one is fought, and the second is the preponderance of enemy reserves.¹⁶ In other words the relationship of the size of your reserves to that of the enemy's. Though Clausewitz's works were extremely important in the formulation of modern military theory, he wrote before the industrial age. Technology may cloud the issue on morale and cohesion in terms of modern warfare.

The Army Research Institute (ARI) for the Behavioral and Social Sciences compiled much research on the importance of unit cohesion and morale. ARI contends that morale or rather 'human spirit' as they refer to it, does in fact act as combat multiplier, though the preponderance of their research was done on what they found to be more quantifiable and measurable and that is cohesion.

As was mentioned earlier, morale and cohesion contribute to the 'fog of war'. This fog stems from the fact that they are often times the indiscernible elements of human

emotion and intellectual and mental effort. Is ARI capable of dealing adequately with the intellectual and emotional processes of the mind? To get a complete picture of morale and cohesion, the deep mental processes need to be considered from a psychological standpoint.

The classical psychological definition of morale and unit cohesion emphasizes mutual attraction or 'liking', which is not necessarily adequate for a military context. The military definition usually stresses commitment as one of the motivating forces propelling soldier bonding. Current researchers propose a tripartite structure of cohesion consisting of:

- (1) horizontal, vertical, and organizational bonding components,
- (2) peer cohesion, hierarchical cohesion, and personal integration to describe relations between co-equals, and
- (3) several types of (cohesive) bonds existing: between members, between a member and a leader, and between a member and his "conception of the group as a whole." In other words, cohesion expresses the bonding soldiers have with each other, with their leaders, and with their unit.

In addition to point (3) above, a social psychologist in 1988 (Stewart), spoke of a multi-dimensional concept that included the cohesion of soldiers to the principles of the nation as well.

From a psychologist's viewpoint, cohesion is important to us because it increases one's resistance to battlefield stress, increases retention rates, and it enhances performance. An example would be the North Vietnamese soldier with excellent combat

resiliency versus the U.S. soldier in units that generally lacked cohesion. This is a general statement directed at those units that did experience cohesion problems. The U.S. soldier in these particular units in Vietnam experienced much personnel 'turbulence'¹⁷ that had very negative effects and ultimately lead to erosion of unit cohesion. Units that possessed higher levels of cohesion were characterized by enhanced performance in combat, reduced individual stress, and higher levels of motivation. How does one measure the cohesion of one unit compared to another?

Social psychologists declared that highly cohesive units experienced good vertical communications plus horizontal bonds of strictly peer cohesion in order to foster commitment to group goals. They measured this with the 'combat stress to wounded-in-action ratio'. In World War II, they compared two units, one with poor unit cohesion which had a ratio of 27.7% to 34%, and one with strong unit cohesion, which possessed a ratio of 2% to 5.7%.¹⁸

During the Korean War, air crews were measured for cohesiveness. One characteristic of high unit cohesion was more accurate bombing.¹⁹ The more cohesive air crews also made more 'within crew' choices for future missions, taking their future into their own hands rather than the less cohesive crews that responded primarily to external control from higher headquarters and did not offer input for future missions.²⁰ All of these measures could probably be disputed but at least offer a search for quantifiable measures.

As quantifiable features were pursued, these evolved to some of our current measures that may include: Skill Qualification Tests (SQT), the Annual Physical Readiness Test

(APRT), scores on operational readiness tests, percentage of soldiers receiving punishment under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), and higher levels of motivation. All of which can be quantified unequivocally except the higher level of motivation which is at best a rather ambiguous term reflecting the spirit of the soldiers.²¹ Do these measures still pertain today to peace-time units as well as units involved in conflict?

Social psychologists still had to discern methods to evaluate peace-time units. Clinical psychologists of the Army Medical Department (AMEDD) understand that man is still the 'first weapon' of warfare and that the morale of the soldier is still the single most important factor in war.²² The results of this study point to a fluctuating morale during combat, higher during the attack, during a positive action, and lower as units sit in the defense.²³ To measure morale, the researchers used questionnaires to conduct a 'common-sense' appraisal of the unit. Individuals were questioned on stress levels and were assigned personal stress ratings.

Other psychologists from the Department of the Defense (DoD) found that the initial bonding that soldiers went through among themselves was based on fairly superficial lines defined by a common demography. The deeper levels of bonding, which leads to cohesiveness may be dependent on more qualitative factors, e.g., similar attitudes, though they feel that a great deal of morale and cohesion is dependent on demography.²⁴ Demography takes into consideration race, culture, and anything that groups can identify with pertaining to a specific geographical region. The DoD researchers defined cohesion as the bonding of soldiers so as to sustain their will and commitment to one another and

the mission accomplishment despite environmental barriers, e.g. intra-group factions, turbulence, demands of combat, mission stress, etc. They, too, feel that cohesion is one of the most important aspects of group dynamics that facilitates team performance and protects the team members (unit) against psychiatric breakdown in combat.²⁵

Like the clinical psychologists from AMEDD, psychologists from DoD used the questionnaire method to get their data. Using a five point Likert scale with thirty-two questions on cohesion, they asked questions about perceived job performance, social affiliation, racial attitudes, etc. The scores from the questionnaires were then applied to the Kruskal-Wallis (KW) test to see if there were any differences discernible between groups of subjects who possessed the same or different characteristics, i.e., same age or different age, etc. The variables used in the KW test were age, race, racial attitudes, residence, location, rank, marital status, and drug or alcohol use.

Authors and researchers from the Army War College and the Naval War College, additionally, speak of a common shared purpose that binds individuals together and motivates them. The Army War College calls it cohesion and defines it as being characterized by pride, loyalty, and a shared understanding of a common purpose and most importantly a collective confidence in this common purpose.²⁶

The Naval War College Review,²⁷ on the other hand, calls its construct, *morale*, and characterizes it as an entity based on an enthusiasm for a cause and is further based on an enthusiasm for the men followed. Their definition is founded in leadership which is 'bound together' with morale, e.g., a leaders confidence in his troops. This confidence and faith is also that which subordinates have in their leadership.²⁸

As early as the 1940's, Edward E. Johnston, a writer for the Naval War College, understood that a state of high and stable morale which was based on firm discipline, would invariably add to the fighting strength of a unit. Maintaining this morale at a high level was a primary concern of a commander. Of significant importance is that planners of that time understood that racial and national characteristics could have substantial effect on morale and unit training.²⁹ How does one tell if your unit has high morale or high cohesion? Though they speak of it, they never really discuss how to measure it.

The Army War College writings, on the other hand, address rather ambiguously the idea of measuring cohesion by 'seeing and hearing'. What is meant is that the appearance of soldiers and the unit area will be the gauge. Part of this measurement by 'seeing and hearing' is the observation of the families of the soldiers, superior commanders and peers. Today, there is much in print, in terms of clinical and psychological studies of morale and unit cohesion. These seem to be coldly analytical and have a tendency to be objective and devoid of emotion. This is somewhat contradictory to the idea of morale and cohesion of units that is held by the common soldier.

To the common soldier, it is an important aspect of their life in combat to be respected and to experience a bonding as a part of a group. S.L.A. Marshall talked of the cohesion and morale of soldiers, stating that units won't adhere in combat whether trained or not if they are lacking the tactical unity which is in relation (ratio) to their personal knowledge and sympathetic understanding of each other.³⁰ The major aspect which enables an infantry soldier to keep going in his combat is the near presence or the presumed or perceived

presence of a comrade. His is sustained by his fellow soldiers primarily and secondarily, by his weapons. In fact, the common soldier would rather be unarmed and with friends than possessing the most advanced and quick-firing weapon and be alone.³¹

In a recent article, a commander of an armored battalion that fought in Desert Storm, wrote of the three general sources for cohesion within his unit. These were rigorous training to high standards, credible leadership, and soldiers who believed in one another. During the training period prior to warfare, patriotism and belief in the cause were important in the developing of the unit cohesion, though these had little effect on unit during the actual period of combat.³²

Morale, to the soldier in the field, is a state of mind. It is usually linked with the will to fight, in clinical terms, the psychological state of soldiers after battle defines whether those soldiers had high morale or were demoralized.³³ Morale is more though. It is that intangible force that motivates men to give their last ounce of energy, ability, and lifeblood to achieve some goal, regardless of cost to themselves.

Field Marshal Viscount Slim, based on his experiences which were corroborated during the Burma Campaign in World War II, wrote that morale was based on a foundation consisting of three parts. These three parts were spiritual, intellectual, and material.

Slim felt that *spiritual* was first of the three since only spiritual foundations could stand the strain of combat. He stated that there must exist a great and noble object whose achievement was vital. The method the pursuer of this object uses to get to the

object should be active and aggressive and he must feel that what he is doing is integral to the ultimate achievement of the object.

The second was the foundation of the *intellectual*, since man can be swayed by reason as well as feeling. He must have faith in his leaders, believing that they will not throw his life away lightly and that the object is attainable by his organization which he also feels is an efficient one.

Material was the last of the three, though it is important, it is still last. The very highest kinds of morale can sometimes still be met when material conditions are lowest.³⁴ At this part of the foundation, the soldier must feel that he has the best possible equipment from his leaders, who will give him a fair deal, and that his living and working conditions are the best that they can be.

What then does all this mean? Who is correct and what is the correct definition for morale and unit cohesion? The definitions span the spectrum from the dictionary definition to the theorists' and psychologists' definitions to the definitions held by the common soldier. Throughout, **cohesion is defined as the close physical and psychological union or bonding** between members of a group. **Morale is the intangible will, enthusiasm and spirit** that a person or a group maintains. As was ascertained by the French military theorist, Jomini, mentioned earlier, the two definitions are very closely related. They are so closely related as to be labeled merely, military spirit.

As with the definitions for unit cohesion and morale, the traits or characteristics of cohesion and morale also cover a wide spectrum. Researchers from the Army Research

Institute found that a major characteristic displayed by cohesive units of high morale was a mutual attraction and 'liking'.³⁵ F. Wong, writing for the Army War College, speaks of cohesion being characterized by unit pride and loyalty. Within the unit, there is also a shared understanding of a common goal or purpose that is understood by all.³⁶ Edward E. Johnston, an author from the Navy War College, on the other hand, contends that with this shared and understood goal is an enthusiasm to attain this goal which moves from cohesion into the realm of unit morale.³⁷

From the soldiers' standpoint, credible leadership, faith in their leaders, and a sense of unit pride and tradition pervade in units of high unit cohesion and high morale.³⁸ This idea of unit pride and tradition is substantiated by the writings of a Desert Storm veteran who commanded troops during the war. Soldiers who can identify with these traditions in their unit feel a bonding and a closeness with the other soldiers in the unit.³⁹

Now that we know what cohesion and morale are, how do we provide an environment in order to produce these traits? Psychologists tell us that good cohesion and especially morale are the products of environments with good vertical communications.⁴⁰

Based on Department of Defense findings, other conclusions were made on techniques to maximize the environment for cohesion and morale in the unit. To start, DoD could minimize the turbulence in the military teams and maximize the commonality among soldiers that made up these teams. To do this, we should stabilize unit assignments. An essential part of stabilizing unit assignments is to stabilize team assignments themselves, without which, stabilization of unit assignments is useless.⁴¹

The assignments themselves should be based on commonalities if possible, i.e. common denominators such as housing location, marital status, and multiple relationships (age, rank, after-hours socializing). Additionally, cohesion training would have to be conducted consistently and should be focused on building cohesion into everyday training. Lastly, experienced and more senior leaders in units should make themselves available to junior leaders for questions, promoting an open atmosphere to allow these questions without retribution.⁴²

As was mentioned earlier, F. Wong, from the Army War College, states that the level of cohesion and morale can be identified by 'seeing and hearing', i.e., seeing the unit area and the appearance of the soldiers and insuring the welfare of the families of the soldiers. In other words, to develop the optimum environment, Wong emphasizes soldier and family welfare, trustworthy and well-trained leadership, as well as providing good, hard training. We must ensure that the best available training is given to the soldier to bolster confidence in himself and in his unit.⁴³

From the soldiers standpoint, an effective environment to foment the growth of unit cohesion and morale is one in which the importance of the goals of the group are of great significance and importance to the group itself. The importance of the individual to the overall mission of the unit is embodied within the group's mission. The ideal environment according to Slim, is first, one in which there is a belief in the cause (spiritual). This cause must be felt to be a worthy cause, fought for the clean and decent, and for the right for us to live our lives as we see fit. It is fought so that we as well as

our children would be free to worship as we wish and so that we would be free in body and in mind, to think and do as we wish. This would be a truly worthy cause.⁴⁴

Now that the traits for unit cohesion and morale are somewhat defined, we are able to actually apply them to units to test the applicability of the comparison of the traits to groups possessing high unit cohesion and morale. This will be accomplished through a comparative historical analysis of three military entities noted for their high unit cohesion and morale, the 442d Regimental Combat Team (Americans of Japanese descent who fought for the United States during World War II), the United States Marine Corps (known throughout history for their cohesion and morale), and the Waffen SS (a German-Nazi unit that fought during World War II).

The **442d Regimental Combat Team (RCT)** will be the first historical case study to be examined. The 442d RCT was a U.S. Army combat unit that was activated in the early 1940's and consisted of individuals of a homogeneous racial background, i.e., Japanese parentage, and a generally homogeneous socio-cultural upbringing. A high percentage of these individuals came from the United States territory of the Hawaiian Islands.

This unit amassed one of the finest records⁴⁵ of accomplishments as well as actual time in combat during World War II. It was comprised of mostly Japanese-Americans, the Nisei (in the beginning, all of its officers were Caucasians).⁴⁶ Many of these Japanese-Americans had family members interned in one of ten concentration camps⁴⁷ scattered around the continental U.S. These Japanese aliens and these American citizens of Japanese descent were imprisoned for reasons of national security.⁴⁸ From the beginning, the scales were weighted against the soldiers of the 442d RCT who bravely faced the

enemy of their country. Unfortunately, they had to fight enemies from inside the country as well. These internal enemies were racial prejudice and suspicion directed toward Americans of Japanese descent.⁴⁹ These factors had a major impact on their performance, cohesion, and morale in combat.

Prior to the U.S. entrance into and during World War II, the War Department activated and began training, small, cohesive combat units called regimental combat teams. The regimental combat teams often had an authorized personnel strength of approximately 4,500 soldiers, though these numbers varied with the mission. They were structured with a central core of three infantry battalions, artillery, engineer, and administrative support. In the case of the 442d RCT, a band was attached. These RCT's fought alone on a particular mission or were attached to a larger unit.

In comparison to other regimental combat teams, the training, organization and physical structure⁵⁰ of the 442d RCT was not much different. The similarities, however, ended here. The 442d RCT stood out from other RCT's for several major reasons. For one, the 442d RCT was the most decorated combat unit in American history.⁵¹ Soldiers of the 442d RCT fought from Italy through France and into Austria and Germany, compiling an incredible record of accomplishments and awards that included among others, the Congressional Medal of Honor and fifty-two Distinguished Service Crosses.⁵²

The 442d RCT was also unique in that it was almost exclusively led by Caucasians yet was composed entirely of Americans of Japanese descent, commonly known as Nisei.⁵³ Japanese-Americans fighting with the 442d RCT were not persons who had developed

deep roots in American culture and society nor were they members in long standing of the heterogeneous environment that was the melting pot of the United States.

Furthermore, before being called for duty, the American government had stripped Japanese-Americans of their property, their livelihood, and their very dignity and placed them in concentration camps which they labeled internment camps.⁵⁴ The United States justified their actions after Pearl Harbor was bombed in that Japanese-Americans potentially threatened the security of the nation. In a message from Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt,⁵⁵ Commander of the Western Theater of Operations, i.e., the West Coast of the continental U.S., to the War Department he stated, "Records indicate that there are approximately 40,000 of such enemy aliens and it is believed that they constitute an immediate and potential menace to vital measures of defense." He was referring to the 40,869 Japanese on the West Coast. He did not even mention the 58,000 Italians and the 23,000 Germans in his area of operations who were from countries that the U.S. was currently at war with.

For what reason then did the 442d fight the Axis armies in Europe with such determination and fervor? Did specific leadership dynamics or psychological factors cause the 442d RCT to persevere in combat while the Japanese-American soldiers fought their own personal battles? These personal battles were against intolerance, suspicion, and a hatred directed toward Asians following the attack of Pearl Harbor.⁵⁶ These personal battles began long before December 7, 1941.⁵⁷ These very facts assisted the units' strong unit cohesion, i.e., they bonded together against common enemies. These common

enemies were the national enemies - the Axis Powers, and the internal enemy, as mentioned earlier, racial prejudice.

The 442d's strong unit cohesion and high morale was probably exemplified most in one their best known exploits during the Second World War with the relief of the "Lost Battalion"⁵⁸ in October 1944. The 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry Regiment, of the 36th Division, had been cut off from the rest of the division in the Vosges Mountains of eastern France. The German forces were on the verge of destroying the battalion if something was not done quickly. The Germans had heavily fortified the approaches to the hilltop where the 1-141st was entrenched. The 36th Division had sent two other battalions who tried to break the encircled battalion out, without success, taking heavy casualties.

At this point the 442d was called upon to take on this extremely difficult mission. Several factors combined to make the rescue mission almost impossible. They fought an extremely well-trained and determined enemy, contesting every foot of their advance in weather conditions and on rugged terrain which made the mission suicidal at best.

After four days of bitter battle, the soldiers of the 442d reached the base of the hill which held the encircled Texans. The German defense implemented a murderous cross-fire of automatic weapons and devastating artillery fires. The 442d had the choice of either staying where they were and being wiped out or attacking through the fires. Without hesitation, fixing their bayonets, the American 'samurai' charged uphill, yelling the 442d RCT's battle cry, "***Go For Broke!***," as they conducted a *banzai*-like charge up the icy slopes through the deadly fires and drove through the enemy and broke the encircled force out.

The cost of rescuing the 212 men of the 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry Regiment was 814 battle casualties out of less than 1,500 of 442d soldiers who went into the battle.⁵⁹ They lost nearly four times the number that they went in to rescue. The Texans lost 63 soldiers, while one Nisei company returned with 17 men surviving and another company with a mere 9 soldiers and no officers answering the roll call.⁶⁰ What was the glue that held the 442d together as they saw lifelong friends and even family members dropping on all sides? Why didn't they simply just give up? They could not sacrifice their fellow soldiers.⁶¹ These soldiers epitomized the verse from the Bible, "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends . . ."⁶²

The oriental cultural heritage of the 442d was one of the major reasons for the high morale and cohesion of the unit. In the development of the historical platform and origins of the 442d, the culture of ancient Japan should be considered since it was the cornerstone for the Japanese-American culture. The strong unit cohesion and high morale were based on several factors from this ancient culture, the most important of which was the strict oriental upbringing (duty and honor - the samurai⁶³ ethos and ideals).⁶⁴ This was reinforced as the young men went off to war. They were being told by their parents (usually the fathers) that if they brought shame on the family that they should not come back (the mentality of the 'Bushido' heritage).⁶⁵ This shared cultural background gave this small unit a cohesiveness hard to imagine. Their upbringing taught that the worst thing that you can do is bring shame upon your family.

Another factor, was the idea that the individual was not as important as the unit itself. The 442d RCT exemplified this notion in their unhesitating sacrifice of their own lives for

other members of the combat team. We see this theme often repeated in units of strong cohesion and high morale, such as the 442d RCT.

Another reason for their cohesiveness was their was, first, their desire and need to prove their patriotism. They actually were seen smiling as they went into combat because they were happy that they were finally able to prove themselves to the country they loved.⁶⁶ This was the same country that had scorned, imprisoned, and held them in suspicion. They had given their word to serve their country as they were sworn in and nothing, even what might be happening to family members in the internment camps, could dissuade them from fulfilling their obligations.⁶⁷

Their cohesiveness was enhanced since they were a small, close-knit unit, they had to rely on each and every man to do his part in order for them to accomplish their mission. Every individual knew that he was an important and essential part of the unit. They so believed in supporting their fellow soldiers and the unit, that there were many cases where 442d soldiers would go AWOL from the hospitals to get back to their units at the front.⁶⁸ The entire focus and concentration of the unit and individuals was on getting their job done.

Additionally, there was a general belief or faith in the leadership of the 442d. Even down to the privates, the soldiers believed that their leaders would do what was right for them and for the mission.⁶⁹

Lastly, the soldiers themselves were very proficient at what they did. They knew exactly what they had to do to accomplish the mission. An outsider once commented that it was amazing that a unit could function so well in combat with so few orders or

directions given. All of these factors worked together to give the members of the unit a feeling of invincibility and the mindset that there was nothing that they could not do.⁷⁰

These traits exhibited by the 442d fall in line with those described by current clinical psychologists advocating the tripartite structure of cohesion theory. That is, the 442d exhibited horizontal, vertical and organizational bonding, very strong peer cohesion and personal integration, and the three types of bonds, e.g., those that exist between members, those that exist between a member and a leader, and those that exist between a member and his conception of the group as a whole.

Also exhibited by the 442d was the characteristic that Sun Tzu called the unity of will of a unit. In the case of the 442d, this characteristic came out as their group focus on the mission and their collective feeling of invincibility.

The 442d also exhibited major characteristics lauded by the social psychologists. These characteristics were effective vertical communications plus horizontal bonds of strictly peer cohesion, fostering commitment to group goals.

Finally, the 442d falls in line with researchers from the Army and Navy War Colleges, i.e., they shared a common purpose, to prove their patriotism and serve their country, and this purpose bound the individuals together and motivated them. The 442d further characterized its cohesion and morale with their pride, loyalty, and shared understanding of a common purpose and the collective confidence in this shared purpose.

If a measure of the unit cohesion and morale of the 442d Regimental Combat Team was performance or success in combat, it is obvious that this unit possessed each of these vital elements in large quantities.

Is a shared cultural background required for strong unit cohesion and high morale? In the case of the **United States Marine Corps**, our next historical case study, it would not seem to be necessarily so.

It is said that Marines are as old as war at sea. In 480 B.C., as the Persians invaded, Themistocles decreed to his fellow Athenians that every warship would have twenty Marines (*Epibatae*) between the ages of 20 and 30 and who were archers. Later, the Romans made whole legions of these men who were called *milites classarii* or 'soldiers of the fleet'.⁷¹

The first American Marines were formed in 1740 from men of the colonies to fight the Spaniards during the War of the Austrian Succession. From the outset, the attempt was to pattern the American Marines after the historically successful British role model. The actual Continental Marines were authorized on 10 November 1775 by an act of Congress, which established the First and Second Battalions of American Marines.⁷² From this point in the eighteenth century through the nineteenth and twentieth century (and probably through the twenty-first century also), many times has the message been sent from the President to the Department of the Navy to, "Send in the Marines." The locations that Marines were sent to range from Formosa in 1867, Japan and Uruguay in 1868, Korea in 1871, 1888, 1895, & 1950, the Hawaiian Isles in 1874 & 1889, throughout Central America in the 1880-1890's (also 1989), China during the 1930's, Africa and the Middle East, and many other locations too numerous to mention.⁷³

The Marine Corps prior to the Korean conflict was fairly, racially homogeneous, made up primarily of races with European backgrounds. Isaac Walker, Negro, enlisted in the

Continental Marines on August 27, 1776. Others came after him, but when the Marines were reestablished in 1798, recruiting regulations stipulated "no Negro, Mulatto, or Indian to be enlisted." So ended the early enlistment of minorities. It should be noted that even though, early on, minorities were allowed to enlist, they were put into segregated units or used as laborers and stevedores. We see this as the Marines enlisted 1,000 blacks under protest on June 1, 1942.⁷⁴

The Marine Corps is deeply steeped in tradition and history. It is a past that they are very proud of, at times, almost to the point of obsession. The dress blue uniform that they wear is from a 250 year association with the British Marines.⁷⁵ New Marine recruits are historically indoctrinated on three points, to be made to feel a part of the continuing tradition, to give them a yardstick with which to measure themselves, and to inspire them in combat. The duties of the Marines to fight in naval engagements, board enemy ships, and make raids into enemy territory are not unlike the use of fighting men during the time of the Phoenicians. Every maritime country since that time have used the concept of marines.

The early amphibious doctrine originated during the early 1920's with a young Marine officer, Earl Hancock "Pete" Ellis, who felt that the U.S. would be drawn into a war with militaristic Japan with its growing sphere of influence. The key to winning that war, he contended, was amphibious warfare. General John A. Lejeune, a student of military history and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, was determined to not make the fatal mistake of planning to fight the last war over again. Ellis' ideas were like a catalyst in the general's mind and a total restructuring of the way the Marines fought was undertaken.

The Marine Corps, with a 'false-start'⁷⁶ or two, was well on its way to the structure that is much like what they have today.

This structure, though, requires bodies to fill it out. This is where Marine recruiters come in. Old Corps recruiting posters stressed all the great travel opportunities and that the Marines are always the 'First to Fight.' Life in the 'Old Corps' of the nineteenth century was not easy. It was characterized by very low wages and brutal discipline.⁷⁷

How then, did the Marines attract new recruits?

Some of the later Marine recruitment posters used the caption, "The Few. The Proud, The Marines.", stressing the Marines as a very selective and elite unit. The recruiters today stress the intangibles, pride, challenge, and self-discipline.⁷⁸ They try to impress upon prospective recruits that the pride, the honor, and the tradition rests on the shoulders of every Marine.

The physical and psychological indoctrination of the new recruits comes during 'boot camp.'⁷⁹ This is the initial bonding process where recruits share the common experience of the rigors of boot camp. Many of the recruits enlist in the Marines because of a need to prove their manliness and toughness. Marines are well-known for their physical toughness and courage. The Marine Corps exploits the two basic desires of the recruits, to prove their manliness and to believe in something. They additionally learn the most important virtues of spirit and discipline during the process.

The recruits are taught team work (the individual is not as important as the team), courtesy, respect for others and for authority, honesty as a Marine absolute, pride in himself and his uniform, the will to work hard, and probably the most important of all, that

they will must give up or quit. The team concept is the same one that pervaded the spirit of the 442d RCT. The Marines sum up this team concept in the Chinese phrase, *Gung ho*, meaning work together - work in harmony.⁸⁰

Additionally, in the classroom, they learn the history, tradition, and symbolism of the Marine Corps. The ideology of the Marine Corps is epitomized by their motto, *Semper Fidelis*, (Always Faithful). Out on the parade field and during the hand-to-hand combat training the recruits learn a new mental toughness, a pride in themselves, and a self-confidence in their abilities that will last throughout their lifetime. During the span of their basic training, there are some of the recruits that do not fit in for disciplinary, medical, or mental reasons, and are discharged out of the service. This in itself helps to improve the morale by removing dissension in the ranks.

The Corps falls into Sun Tzu's model of cohesion and morale which is manifested within a unity of will and the spirit of the warrior which is strongly emphasized throughout the training. This spirit is developed from the time they step off the buses to the time they graduate. Jomini, as was mentioned earlier, also stressed the 'military' spirit.

The Marines also fall into the tripartite structure of the cohesion theory, mentioned earlier, as well as the bonding that F. Wong wrote about in his research for the Army War College states comes from a common shared purpose. This trait is characterized by pride, loyalty, and the shared understanding of the common purpose and the collective confidence in their common purpose.

The researchers from the Army Research Institute attributed the strong cohesion of the Marines to the Corps' horizontal, vertical and organizational bonding, its very strong

peer cohesion and personal integration, and the three types of bonds that the Marines developed, e.g., those that exist between members, those that exist between a member and a leader,⁸¹ and those that exist between a member and his conception of the group as a whole.⁸² Prior to the integration of the Marines, this cohesion and high morale was experienced by a fairly racially homogeneous unit.⁸³ What was done later as the Marines were forced to become integrated during the Korean War and afterwards to maintain strong unit cohesion and high morale or were they even able to maintain it?

The Marines Corps accepted that full integration was the only direction that the military in a country like the U.S. could move in. The early 1960's and the Vietnam Conflict were the next major events that tested the Marine Corps' ability to integrate and synthesize racial minority groups into its fold. During the same period, the United States was going through a 'cultural revolution' that would further stress the fabric of the Marine Corps. This new revolution would be a turn towards a self-awareness, anti-establishment, and anti-discipline mindset that turned the ideas of many away from the patriotic, self-less service to their country and more towards a "what am I going to get out of it" mentality.⁸⁴

The Marines officially entered the conflict in Vietnam, on March 8, 1965, as two Marine battalions landed at Da Nang to defend the airfield and the surrounding tactical zone - 10,000 square miles of varying, rugged terrain controlled by Viet Cong.⁸⁵ What was evident in the Marine Corps during the period of the Vietnam Conflict was a reflection of the American society at the time. Out of 448,000 Marines to serve in Vietnam, 41,000 were black. They served conspicuously and with honor.

Regardless of the numbers of minorities in the Marines, the Corps, like American society in the 1960's, had its share of ugly, racially motivated altercations. These altercations included robberies, assaults, muggings, and even manslaughter. In the rear areas, the Marines experienced considerable racially related problems. Regardless, once in combat, Marines are trained to fight and die for their fellow Marines. This they did with bravery and valor without regards to color. In Vietnam, there were five black Marines who earned the Congressional Medal of Honor, posthumously, by shielding their fellow Marines from exploding grenades. As with the soldiers of the 442d that sacrificed their lives for their fellow soldiers, these Marines also exemplified the famous verse from the Bible mentioned earlier, "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends . . ." ⁸⁶

An example of the strong cohesion ⁸⁷ of the Marines came during the TET offensive of 1968, in particular, during the bloody battle for the ancient capitol, the Imperial City of Hue. A Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) Headquarters, consisting of a staff of U.S. and Australian advisers was based at HUE along with the HQ of 1st ARVN Division and the Hoc Bao (Black Panther) Reconnaissance Company. The 1st Division was only at 50% strength because of holiday leaves. The MACV and ARVN units were not collocated and consequently would eventually fight separate battles. ⁸⁸

On 30 and 31 January, U.S. Army radio intercepts and sightings confirmed the fact that enemy units were moving towards Hue. ⁸⁹ As happened quite often during the conflict, the intelligence reports did not get down to the units in Hue. As units, whose strength added up to a division's worth of Viet Cong soldiers, began the attack, first one

then another relief column of about a company size of Marines made its eight mile track from Phu Bai U.S. Marine Corps Combat Base, in the south, through a gauntlet of rockets and heavy weapons fire to Hue.⁹⁰

Throughout this battle were examples of personal sacrifice and the sacrifice of small groups of Marines to hold back the enemy long enough for the relief column to get through. Platoon Sergeant Alfredo Gonzales, a Marine of Hispanic descent, was one of those who sacrificed his life for his fellow soldiers and his unit. Sustaining severe shrapnel wounds, Gonzales rushed through a kill zone to rescue wounded Marines. Next, he proceeded to single-handedly knocked out a machine gun position that had his unit pinned down. Four days later, still refusing evacuation and medical treatment, Gonzales, while knocking out a position with massed RPG's (rocket propelled grenades) with a LAW (light anti-tank weapon), was mortally wounded. For his valor he was posthumously awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.⁹¹

Up to 1968, strong unit cohesion and high morale was normally the case for Marine units, but events in 1968 began to make this cohesion and morale much more difficult to maintain even in combat, though one of the great ironies that came out of the war was that the worse the conditions were, the greater the degree of danger and discomfort, the higher the level of morale, cohesion, and harmony. This was a clear indicator that racially integrated units could be cohesive.⁹²

As was mentioned earlier, racial problems often erupted in the rear areas. Much was centered upon the flying of Confederate flags on bunkers and vehicles. The black Marines felt that this was a slap in their face. After the death of Martin Luther King, Jr., and the

ensuing racial turmoil, the Marines, in their continued efforts to promote cohesion and maintain some level of morale, outlawed throughout the Corps, the flying of all but official flags, specifically aimed at the flying of the Confederate flag. A small gesture, yes, but an indicator that the Marines were making positive efforts toward integration.

As the United States entered the racially volatile 70's and an awakening of racial consciousness among blacks, racial tensions in the Marine Corps eased somewhat, but with the implementation of affirmative action measures, other problems arose. The Corps had to have a higher percentage of blacks, consequently, the standard for the required education level was dropped. Problems that emanated from this change were the highest per capita rates of drug abuse, absent-without-leaves, and desertions that the Corps had yet experienced. Consequently, the Commandant reinstated the education standard and even made it more stringent than before. The result was lowering the percentage of black enlistments until, today, there are 15-19 per cent blacks in the Marines. The national population of blacks to the total population is about 12 per cent, a very good mix for the ratio.⁹³

It would not be wise to make the assumption that at this point, that because they are Marines, they enjoy strong cohesion in their units.⁹⁴ They enjoy success because they work diligently to insure the same level of cohesion and morale exists that pervaded the Corps of earlier years. The big plus for the Corps is that because of their small size, as they identify problems, they can more easily act upon them.

The first two historical cases had overall qualities that we can easily respect and attempt to imitate, not just for their strong unit cohesion and high morale but for what

they stood for as men. Can we say the same about our last case, the Waffen SS, the Nazi soldiers of the Third Reich during the Second World War?

The SS (*Schutzstaffel*) was a body of German troops that originated in 1923 as part of Adolf Hitler's headquarters guards (*Sturmabteilung* or SA), who were essentially professional criminals and hoodlums. The SS, which means 'protective element,' was often called the Elite guard. In 1933, the SS was organized into three groups, the third of which was the SS-VT (*Verfügungstruppe*), which eventually became the notorious Waffen SS.⁹⁵

The **Waffen SS** was the fully militarized arm of the SS which eventually consisted of 38 divisions.⁹⁶ The quality of the SS divisions varied from the high quality of the "elite" Panzer and Panzergrenadier divisions to ethnic divisions of much poorer quality.⁹⁷ The elite of the Waffen SS were the 1st SS Panzer (Armor), 2nd SS Panzer, 3rd SS Panzer, 4th SS Panzergrenadier (Armored Infantry), 5th SS Panzer, 6th SS Gebirgs (Mountain), 7th SS Freiwilligen-Gebirgs (Volunteer Mountain), 8th SS Kavallerie (Cavalry), 9th SS Panzer, 10th SS Panzer, 11th SS Freiwilligen-Panzergrenadier (Volunteer Armored Infantry), 12th SS Panzer, 19th Waffen-Grenadier (Infantry Weapons), 23rd Waffen-Gebirgs (Mountain Weapons), and the 23rd SS Freiwilligen Panzergrenadier (Volunteer Armored Infantry).⁹⁸

These fourteen units accounted for 381 (84%) of the total of 417 Waffen SS Knights Cross Awards that were given out during the Second World War. The other twenty-four of the Waffen SS divisions accounted for only a paltry 36 of the awards for valor. The elite of the elite, by far, were the Panzer divisions, who continued to perform throughout

the war to its end. Along with the most awards for valor, these units got the pick of the new recruits as well as the newest equipment.

This arm of the Nazi military was quite different from the regular army (*Reichsheer*). The Reichsheer was based on rigid Prussian tradition, where, who an officer was, i.e., his education and family background was a determinant of how high he would move up the ranks. Though there was an attempt to do away with the social barriers that came with the Prussian traditions, there was still an insistence in 'blind' obedience and unquestioning loyalty. Hitler's army was based on a very strict, almost draconian, discipline. This discipline was founded on an extreme fear of the commander. It doubtlessly played a major role in the maintaining of the unit cohesion under the most difficult of combat situations.

The army of the Third Reich had a spiritual commitment to the Fuhrer and very close ideological ties to the determinants of the regime itself by choice and not necessarily all by coercion.⁹⁹ Hitler used this ideological indoctrination to make full use of already existing mental models, that is, ideas, prejudices, and beliefs, and even frustrations, which he found to be a very effective bonding tool.¹⁰⁰

Prospective candidates for the Waffen SS, besides having to meet all the other requirements, had to spend two years in the ranks before going into the cadet academy. This fostered a closeness and a sense of fellowship among the officers, NCO's, and enlisted soldiers, and throughout the unit, that was generally unknown in the regular army.¹⁰¹ Here once again, we see the tripartite structure of the cohesion theory mentioned in the earlier case studies of the 442d RCT and the U.S. Marine Corps, with the three

types of bonds, between unit members, between members and leaders, and between members and the conception of the group as a whole.

Additionally, the soldiers of the SS were given priority on weapons, e.g., they normally had more than the usual Reichsheer infantry had and the SS Panzer units often had as much as two to four times more armor (tanks) than Reichsheer armor units.

Nationally, as well as within the military, Adolf Hitler promoted the idea of the community of warriors (*Kampfgemeinschaft*), stressing that this concept was based on the idea of the racially pure soldier. The Waffen SS, unlike the Reichsheer, gave no preference to an officer candidate's background or education, though genealogy was very important. In fact, the prospective candidates for the Waffen SS had to be able to prove their lineage as a prerequisite. Starting in 1935, SS enlisted soldiers had to prove the purity of their ancestry back to 1800 and for officers it was back to 1750.¹⁰²

Hitler further fostered the universal belief in the state of mind of the combat soldiers (*Frontkämpferbewusstsein*), in general, but even more so, the idea of the Germanic, Aryan fighter, who sacrifices himself for the Master Race in the struggle against a world of inferior races. From these ideas emerged a new and radical form of cultural and political anti-Semitism and sense of racial superiority over non-Germanic races, in particular, those races of Slavic origins.

In the latter part of the 1930's, the SS contrived five groupings of races: pure Nordic, predominantly Nordic or Phallic, harmonious bastard with slight Alpine, Dinaric or Mediterranean characteristics, bastards of predominantly East Baltic or Alpine origin and

bastards of extra-European origin.¹⁰³ In the beginning, only candidates from the first three categories were allowed in to the SS units.

Heinrich Himmler, the leader of the Waffen SS, in order to increase the cohesion of the unit, made the organization into an Order, patterned on that of the Jesuits. This Order was bound by an oath to a code of honor. Three physical requirements had to be met prior to entrance in to the Order, i.e., racial appearance, physical condition, and general bearing. Himmler wanted a certain size and a certain look for all SS soldiers. The fact that they went through such a stringent selection process in itself bonded the men together in this feeling of being elite. As explained by F. Wong and other researchers from the Army War College, we see cohesion here formed by a common shared purpose that binds individuals together and motivates them. Here the characteristics are pride, a fierce loyalty, and a shared understanding of their racial superiority as a people and as a unit, a common purpose to serve the Fuhrer, a collective confidence in Hitler as their leader, and a feeling of invincibility because of their racial superiority.

Hitler discussed racial superiority in his pamphlet Settling Accounts, which later became a book, My Struggle (*Mein Kampf*), sometimes referred to as a blueprint for the age of chaos.¹⁰⁴ He wrote that the forwarding of the Master (Aryan) Race was not offensive in nature but purely defensive. Those "other races" were more brutal and unscrupulous and were in search of new lands to rapidly colonize and takeover while the culturally superior, but less ruthless races, like the Germanic people, quietly worked within their borders to better themselves and their homelands. Hitler told the German people, that if they did not do something, they would ultimately lose everything because of this

ruthlessness of these other races.¹⁰⁵ Here Hitler attempted to give his cause the moral high ground, convincing his people that what they did was because of outside aggression against their homeland and their families.

In the early-to-mid 1930's, during the formative days of the SS units,¹⁰⁶ SS Major (*Sturmbannfuhrer*) Felix Steiner pushed for the organization of the initial SS regiment¹⁰⁷ into small battle groups that were highly mobile and able to effectively deal with the enemy while still retaining their regimental structure.¹⁰⁸ He felt that a mass army was outmoded and the new German state needed more mobile operational formations of elite troops of the highest class.¹⁰⁹ The physical fitness level of the soldiers was highly stressed. These soldiers could march two miles in twenty minutes, something their contemporaries in the Reichsheer, they were told, could not come close to. The soldier of the Waffen SS was the picture of an athlete, with more emphasis given to work towards greater than normal physical endurance and a very adaptable flexibility of mind as well as body. Here a bond formed through hard training and a sense of unity.

One thing that the Waffen SS lacked in the beginning were officers with a gift for command and social standing. This peasant class unit substituted social standing (only 5 per cent were of traditional military families while 50 per cent of the Reichsheer's officers were from the traditional military families) for an enthusiasm and utter devotion to Adolf Hitler and the Waffen SS. The SS were had an unhesitating obedience and immediate execution of any order from the Fuhrer.¹¹⁰

During the earlier stages of the war, the Waffen SS in battle, feeling themselves to be invincible, fought with a fury and abandon that swept their enemy before them and

brought them the grudging respect of all. Soon, the Waffen SS had distinguished itself in combat, far beyond the exploits of the Reichsheer and far beyond anything that Adolf Hitler had hoped for.¹¹¹ Eventually though, with this reckless style of fighting, came massive casualties.

The Waffen SS fought for the good of the Reich, for their Fuhrer, and for their fellow soldiers, emphasizing that the individual was not as important as the good of the 'whole.' Again we see the theme of self-sacrifice as was evident with the 442d RCT and the U.S. Marines. The cornerstone for this ideal was the relentless lessons at the cadet schools that a soldier's duty was to deal out and accept death.¹¹² The Naval War College researchers spoke of an enthusiasm for a cause and for the men followed. The Waffen SS definitely fit this statement. General von Mackensen, the Commander of the 3rd Panzer Corps, applauded the SS units for their discipline, and refreshing, cheerful energy and unshakable steadfastness in crisis.¹¹³

The Waffen SS methods in battle eventually took their toll. On the Eastern Front, fighting the Russians, they enjoyed early success. Whenever the Reichsheer was in a dire situation, they requested the Waffen SS, who inevitably went in and accomplished the mission.¹¹⁴

In January 1942, during the Soviet counteroffensive at Moscow, the Soviets advanced with 145 divisions to Germany's 76 divisions. In the space of a week and a half, the frontage of the battle went from 820 kilometers to 1,010 kilometers with an addition of only one more division for the Germans. In other words, the German front lines were spread very thin. Through this counteroffensive, the Soviets had hoped to eliminate the

two wedges to the north and south of Moscow that were made by the German panzers and to push the Germans back as far as possible throughout the front. In order to meet their objective, the Soviets had to strike quickly before the Germans could get resupplied, bring up reserves and organize their winter defenses.¹¹⁵

To the west of Moscow, the Soviets were actually able to make a sizable penetration and moved strong forces forward into the rear of the Army Group Center. A unit from the 2nd SS Panzer Division (*Das Reich Division*), the SS Panzergrenadier Regiment 4 (*Der Fuhrer*),¹¹⁶ commanded by 1st Lieutenant (*Obersturmbahnfuhrer*) Otto Kumm, was moved into a bend on the Volga River, southwest of Kalinin in the vicinity of Rzhev.¹¹⁷ Their mission was to form a screen linking the front with army group forces that were positioned further west.¹¹⁸

This unit actually held from January 8th, against a vastly, numerically superior enemy in subzero temperatures (minus 25 degrees Centigrade temperatures), at some points, even driving the Russians back, until relieved by General Model and the 9th Field Army on February 18th. Many times during the battle, the SS regiment was threatened to be encircled by elements of the 22nd, the 29th, the 39th, and the 61st Combined Arms Armies of the Kalinin Army Group.¹¹⁹ Throughout the battle, the regiment fought fearlessly, as though "... possessed by a spell."¹²⁰ The regiment fought hour after hour, in an exhausted stupor, in snow drifts with frozen hands and feet, swollen and black, with very little ammunition and medical supplies and even less food. In these weather conditions, if by chance hot soup was available, troops were given the soup boiling hot. In about ten seconds it would be luke warm and in thirty seconds to a minute it would be

frozen solid. Their food and water, though, were almost always frozen. Only a fundamentally strong form of cohesion and morale binds a unit as tightly as this under these most desperate and hopeless of conditions.

These troops had been fighting for the past six months in this offensive warfare that had killed most of the officers and NCO's of the unit. These soldiers had been under tremendous mental strain for a long period of time. The enemy, though, could not realize its operational plans. Only a strong base of cohesion and morale would motivate these soldiers to continue sacrificing their lives for each other. Their faith in their Fuhrer, each other, and their racial superiority over the Soviets made them invincible and allowed them to hold on the many weeks it took to be relieved.¹²¹

After relieving the regiment, General Model asked Kumm if his regiment could assist immediately in another area. Kumm's answer came as he pointed to the remnants of the regiment on the parade field, 35 men remained out of the original 2,000. Thirty-five men held out against overwhelming odds without a thought to surrender or to pull back. Their mission was to hold and that's exactly what they did. After the battle, a captured Soviet general commented that the regiment had shown greater spirit and intrepidity than any unit on either side and that his men had been relieved when the regular Reichsheer units came in to relieve the SS regiment.¹²²

Is there then anything that we on the brink of the 21st century can learn from these case studies? In our age of high technology, is high morale and strong unit cohesion still a combat multiplier or even a necessity for warfare? Based on the research that has been

conducted in the compilation of this monograph, strong unit cohesion and high morale are still prerequisites for attaining a unit's maximum combat performance.

What then is unit cohesion and morale and what are the means for maintaining unit cohesion and morale in the culturally and racially heterogeneous environments of the world today?

From the standpoint of the military theorists, i.e., Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Jomini, morale and cohesion meld together to form the unity of will that is referred to as the military spirit or the spirit of the warrior. They had no doubt that these two factors greatly increased a commander's advantage on the field of battle. This spirit was very evident in all three cases. The Marines, in particular, actively cultivate this spirit during their training.

The Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, the Army Medical Department, and the Department of Defense psychological researchers found cohesion to be the bonding of the soldiers within a unit and the morale was the adhesive that bonded them. It was the human spirit, vice the military spirit of the theorists, and the will to fight of the individuals of a unit. The will to fight was a major point of indoctrination for the Marines during their boot camp and for the Waffen SS the focus was the protection of the Fatherland. This was not the focus in the case of the training of the 442d. The will to fight for the 442d came from within each soldier to prove his patriotism and was not a product of their training.

The Army and the Navy War College researchers found morale and cohesion (the former identifies the element as cohesion the latter as morale) to be bound up in a common

shared goal or purpose and the enthusiasm for this goal. These factors could be identified by characteristics such as loyalty, pride, and understanding of the common purpose and the collective confidence in this purpose as being valid and right, and the enthusiasm to fulfill this goal as a group. All three cases shared these characteristics within their own groups. The 442d felt that they had to prove their loyalty and shared that as the common underlying purpose. The Marines are taught never to let the Corps down. During Boot Camp, they are also instilled with the pride in their unit's tradition and long, illustrious history, while loyalty is part of their motto.¹²³

Esprit de corps, the common spirit of comradeship, enthusiasm, and devotion to a cause among the members of a group, is very evident in the Marine Corps. It is also very evident in the 442d and in the Waffen SS, though it is manifested in a different form. For the 442d RCT and the Waffen SS, the racial homogeneity (SS-racial purity) of the unit and the need to prove themselves (442d-patriotism and loyalty) became an extension of the individual himself, encompassing all of the factors of his race and culture, into a slightly different form of esprit de corps. The SS soldier's total dedication was expressed in the oath of allegiance and in the SS unit motto¹²⁴ that they pledged:

"I swear to thee Adolf Hitler
As Fuhrer and Chancellor of the German Reich
Loyalty and bravery.
I vow to thee and to the superiors whom thou
shalt appoint
Obedience unto death
So help me God"¹²⁵

Morale and cohesion to the common soldier is more of a spiritual entity, a state of mind, an intangible force that bonds men together and motivates them to push themselves

to their last ounce of strength or ability, to the point of even sacrificing their own life to achieve the goal of the group. The soldiers must feel a respect and trust for each other and their abilities, and feel a part of the group. Morale and cohesion for the common soldier is also related to whether or not they have credible leaders and the level of their training.

These characteristics were in evidence with all three groups. E.B. Sledge, a Marine veteran of World War II, stated that the reason they were able to keep going under the most stressful battle conditions was because of the trust each Marine had in the man next to him, the trust they held in their leadership (credible leadership), and the trust they held in their training and equipment.¹²⁶ This was also true with the 442d as well as the Waffen SS. The Waffen SS continued to perform successfully in combat regardless of the atrocious conditions, lack of supplies, or new, poorly trained recruits. With the Waffen SS, it seemed to become more of an individual spiritual obsession rather than just a shared goal.

A common characteristic found throughout the cases was that of selfless service and self-sacrifice. Of all the writings of the theorists, the studies done by clinical psychologists, research conducted by the different war colleges, the only research that was found to discuss the topic of self-sacrifice, was that of the common soldier.

The intangible force that motivates men to push themselves beyond their limits and capabilities was evident in all three cases. The 442d and the Waffen SS cohesion were based on a common racial bond. At its birth the Marine Corps had a homogeneous racial base, but has since evolved through the years and has survived the anxious times of

integration. The Marine Corps stands as an example of how to take lessons learned and make positive changes. It is a small heterogeneous group that has been able to maintain high morale and strong unit cohesion throughout its history.

There are several lessons to be learned from the cases, with the Marine Corps as a starting base. The first lesson is that of unit pride. Though it may be hard to instill unit pride at the army level, it can be done at the division level. In the past, the army has done this with elite units such as the Rangers, the light divisions ("Lightfighters"), the 82d Airborne Division, the 1st Cavalry Division, etc. At this point in the drawdown, isn't each division *elite* in its own way? Granting a division elite status can bring great dividends. It may be a possible point to look into for improving morale and cohesion in shrinking army of the United States.

Pride in one's unit goes along with the idea of the elite unit. The Marines teach their history and tradition during Boot Camp to instill this pride in each and every recruit. Though some units in the army do emphasize unit history and tradition, the army may want to make it a standard part of a new recruits education and stress this ideas throughout the soldiers career.

A second lesson, the concept of selfless service and self-sacrifice, are difficult ideas to instill in an individual. The culture of the U.S. is focused on winning and on the winner. Within the army, there must be a way to promote the idea of the good of the unit before the good of the individual. If it is possible to reward someone for selfless service once he is in a unit it should be done. This is another concept that needs to have its foundations based early within the training and should be reinforced throughout a soldiers career. The

army's recruiting strategy focuses on what the army can do for the recruit.

Understandably, in order to attract the type of individuals that the army wants, it has had to promote this form of strategy. A possible course of action is to intermix within the current strategy, the ideals of years past, i.e., service to one's country, patriotism, etc.

It is obvious from the case studies, that the 442d RCT¹²⁷ and the Waffen SS had racial homogeneity as cornerstones for their cohesion. The Marines shared this racial homogeneity until the Korean War, when they began to integrate their ranks. Though race does prepare a foundation, it does not necessarily provide the ideal basis for unit cohesion and morale, which ultimately provide the formula for combat effectiveness. Esprit de corps, the military spirit, the warrior spirit, all lead to the human spirit, which is undeniably the strongest of the characteristics of morale and cohesion. It is also the most intangible and least quantifiable of the characteristics. This spirit can be found in the concepts or ideals of pride and selfless service or self-sacrifice. This spirit, that should be our goal for our soldiers, will push an individual far beyond what can be acquired in training or taught in a book. This spirit adds the fog to warfare that will probably be present for a long time to come.

In all the cases, the same forces are going on. Unit cohesion and morale, via esprit de corps, is manifested with each. The Marine Corps is the prime example for the major lesson to learn, i.e., esprit de corps is the one major entity that can transcend the problem of race and prejudice.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-5, (Headquarters, Department of the Army: U.S. Government Printing Plant, 1993).
- ² Michael Howard, "Military Science in the Age of Peace," RUSI Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies, Vol 119, March 1974, 3-9.
- ³ G.E. Lee et al, Proceedings of the Symposium: Psychology in the Department of Defense, (Air Force Academy, Colorado, 1984), 259.
- ⁴ Wordstar, The Standard American Heritage Dictionary, Third Edition. (Novato, CA: Wordstar International Inc., 1993).
- ⁵ Lord Moran, The Anatomy of Courage: The Classic Study of the Soldier's Struggle Against Fear (Garden City Park, New York: Avery Publishing Group, Inc., 1987), 174.
- ⁶ Richard Holmes, Acts of War: The Behavior of men in Battle (New York: The Free Press, 1985), 25.
- ⁷ Chinese general and military theorists (fl. c. 500 B.C.). Wrote *The Art of War*, the earliest known book on strategy and military theory.
- ⁸ J.H. Huang, Sun Tzu - The Art of War - The New Translation (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1993), 41, 46, 52, 99.
- ⁹ Sun Tzu, Sun Tzu: The Art of War - The New Translation, trans. by J.H. Huang, (New York: William Morrow Co., Inc., 1993), 41, 46, 52, 73, 85, 99, 138, 194-196, 261.
- ¹⁰ Swiss-French general, historian, and military theorist (1779-1869). Principal wars: Napoleonic Wars (1800-1815), Russo-Turkish War (1828-1829). Principal battles: Austerlitz (Slakov)(1805); Jena (1806); Eylau Friedland (Bagrationovsk)(1807); the Berezina (1812); Lutzen, Bautzen (1813); siege of Varna (1828).
- ¹¹ Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art of War, (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1992), 178.
- ¹² *Ibid.*, 60-65, 322.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*, 312, 322.
- ¹⁴ Prussian general and military theorist (1780-1831). Principal wars: French Revolutionary Wars (1792-1799); Napoleonic Wars (1800-1815). Principal battles: Auerstadt (near Weimar)(1806), Ligny, Wavre (near Brussels)(1815).
- ¹⁵ C(K)arl von Clausewitz, On War, translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), Cohesion: 201, 231, 241; Morale: 231-235, 244, 249-250, 267-271, 275, 282, 491, 669.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 231.
- ¹⁷ This personnel turbulence was a factor of the one year tour, lack of identification with the unit, poor socialization of soldiers into the units, lack of the soldiers identification with the principles of their nation, etc.
- ¹⁸ L.R. Boice, et al, Leadership for the Nineties: Development of Training and Research Instruments (Alexandria, VA: Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1990), 3.
- ¹⁹ Some may consider the more accurate bombing a factor of training. It is an assumption by this author that they compared units of equal or nearly equal training.

- ²⁰ L.R. Boice, et al, Leadership for the Nineties: Development of Training and Research Instruments (Alexandria, VA: Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1990), 3.
- ²¹ Ibid., i, iii, v, 3. This microfiche included data from research conducted by the following social psychologists: Hauser (1980), George (1971), Griffith & Chupper (1986), Etzioni (1975), Piper, Marrache, Lacroix, Richardson, & Jones (1983), Marlowe (1987), and Stewart (1988).
- ²² R.A. Byrne, Proceedings of the AMEDD (Army Medical Department) Clinical Psychology (San Francisco, CA: Letterman Army Medical Center, 1987), 153-154.
- ²³ This study was conducted on the 8th ID (M), during a REFORGER exercise in Germany.
- ²⁴ G.E. Lee, et al, Proceedings of the Symposium: Psychology in the Department of Defense (Colorado Springs, CO: U.S. Air Force Academy, 1984), 258.
- ²⁵ Ibid., 255-257.
- ²⁶ F. Wong, A Formula for Building Cohesion (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 1985), p. 34.
- ²⁷ Douglas Southall Freeman, Robert E. Lee: Maker of Morale (Philadelphia, PA: Naval War College Review, Summer 1991), p. 76-80.
- ²⁸ The faith and confidence is in one of three different categories, (1) the confidence and memory of victory, (2) the general's faith in the army, (3) the army's faith in the general.
- ²⁹ Edward E. Johnston, Sound Military Decision (Newport, Rhode Island: U.S. Naval War College, 1942), pp. 72, 125.
- ³⁰ K.C. Scull, Cohesion: What We Learned From Cohort (U) (Carlisle barracks, Pennsylvania: Army War College, 1990), 160, excerpts from S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire (Alexandria, VA: Byrrd Enterprises, Inc., 1947), 134.
- ³¹ S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire (Alexandria, VA: Byrrd Enterprises, Inc., 1947), 8.
- ³² Gregory Fontenot, "Fear God and Dreadnought: Preparing a Unit for Confronting Fear" Military Review (May-June 1995) : 13-24.
- ³³ Anthony Kellett, Combat Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle (Boston, Massachusetts: Kluwer - Nijhoff Publishing, 1982), 7.
- ³⁴ William Joseph Slim, Defeat Into Victory (London, England: Papermac, 1987), 182-196.
- ³⁵ L.R. Boice, et al, Leadership for the Nineties: Development of Training and Research Instruments (Alexandria, VA: Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1990), 3.
- ³⁶ F. Wong, A Formula for Building Cohesion (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 1985), p. 34.
- ³⁷ Edward E. Johnston, Sound Military Decision (Newport, Rhode Island: U.S. Naval War College, 1942), pp. 72, 125.
- ³⁸ Anthony Kellett, Combat Motivation: The behavior of Soldiers in Battle (Boston, Massachusetts: Kluwer - Nijhoff Publishing, 1982), 23.
- ³⁹ Gregory Fontenot, "Fear God and Dreadnought: Preparing a unit for Confronting Fear" Military Review (May-June 1995) : 13-24.

⁴⁰ L.R. Boice, et al, Leadership for the Nineties: Development of Training and Research Instruments (Alexandria, VA: Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1990), 3.

⁴¹ E. Lee, et al, Proceedings of the Symposium: Psychology in the Department of Defense (Colorado Springs, CO: U.S. Air Force Academy, 1984), 255.

⁴² Ibid., 258.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ William Joseph Slim, Defeat Into Victory (London, England: Papermac, 1987), 182-183.

⁴⁵ Chester Tanaka, Go For Broke, A Pictorial History of the Japanese American 100th Infantry Battalion and the 442d Regimental Combat Team (Richmond, California: Go For Broke, Inc., 1982), p. 99.

⁴⁶ Nisei-(pronounced nee-say') the term used for the American-born first generation offspring of the Issei. Munson Report: "*Second generation who have received their whole education in the United States and usually, in spite of discrimination against them and a certain amount of insults accumulated through the years from irresponsible elements, show a pathetic eagerness to be Americans. They are in constant conflict with the orthodox, well disciplined family life of their elders. Age group - 1 to 30 years. They are universally estimated from 90 to 98% loyal to the United States. . . They are not Japanese in culture. They are foreigners to Japan. Though American citizens they are not accepted by Americans, largely because they look differently and can be easily recognized. The loyal Nisei hardly know where to turn. . . They are not oriental or mysterious, they are very American and are of a proud, self-respecting race suffering from a little inferiority complex and a lack of contact with the white boys they went to school with.*"

⁴⁷ Allan R. Bosworth, America's Concentration Camps (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1967)

⁴⁸ These individuals were feared because of their cultural ties with Japan. The U.S. Government felt that there were some that might conduct a war of sabotage from within the United States.

⁴⁹ Chester Tanaka, Go For Broke, A Pictorial History of the Japanese American 100th Infantry Battalion and the 442d Regimental Combat Team (Richmond, California: Go For Broke, Inc., 1982), p. 4.

⁵⁰ That is, the task organization for combat, the makeup of its units.

⁵¹ Chester Tanaka, Go For Broke, A Pictorial History of the Japanese American 100th Infantry Battalion and the 442d Regimental Combat Team (Richmond, California: Go For Broke, Inc., 1982), p. 1.

⁵² Lyn Crost, Honor by Fire, Japanese Americans at War in Europe and the Pacific (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1994), p. 326. *The medals and decorations awarded to the 442d RCT included the Congressional Medal of Honor, fifty-two Distinguished Service Crosses, one Distinguished Service Medal, five-hundred and eighty-eight Silver Stars (including oak leaf clusters), five thousand-two hundred Bronze Stars (including oak leaf clusters), nine thousand, four hundred and eighty-six Purple Hearts, and*

eighteen foreign decorations ranging from the French Croix de guerre to Italian medals for military valor.

⁵³ Nisei is the term used for the American-born first generation offspring of immigrant Japanese, the 'Issei'. While most were the Nisei, there were even a few who were the Sansei, or third generation Americans. See endnote on Nisei above.

⁵⁴ On August 10, 1988, President Ronald W. Reagan signed into law the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which probably closed the last legislative chapter of the World War II removal and incarceration of more than 120,000 Japanese-Americans, almost all of them residents of the West Coast. Under terms of that act, each surviving victim-there were then perhaps 60,000 such persons-was entitled to a one-time, tax-free payment of \$20,000. This redress, as it has been called, stemmed from the findings of the federal Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC, established 1980) as expressed in its 1983 report, *Personal Justice Denied*, and its subsequent recommendations in June of that year. The CWRIC's conclusion was: "The promulgation of Executive Order 9066 was not justified by military necessity, and the decisions which followed it-detention, ending detention and ending exclusion-were not driven by analysis of military conditions. The broad historical causes which shaped these decisions were race prejudice, war hysteria, and a failure of political leadership. Widespread ignorance of Japanese-Americans contributed to a policy conceived in haste and executed in an atmosphere of fear and anger at Japan. A grave injustice was done to American citizens and resident aliens of Japanese ancestry who, without individual review or any probative evidence against them, were excluded, removed and detained by the United States during World War II." (*Personal Justice Denied*, p. 18.) "There was a general tendency of educated Americans, including historians, to write off evacuation as a 'wartime mistake' is to obscure its true significance. Rather than a mistake-which, according to the dictionary, is 'an error in action, calculation, opinion or judgment caused by poor reasoning, carelessness, insufficient information...a misunderstanding or misconception'-**the legal atrocity which was committed against Japanese-Americans** was the logical outgrowth of over three centuries of American experience, an experience which taught Americans to regard the United States as a white man's country in which nonwhites 'had no rights which the white man was bound to respect. These infamous words, from Chief Justice Roger B. Taney's 1857 decision in *Dred Scott v. Sanford*, were merely echoed by the United States Supreme Court during World War II." (*Concentration Camps, USA*, p. xiv.) Roger Daniels, ed., AMERICAN CONCENTRATION CAMPS: A Documentary History of the Relocation and Incarceration of Japanese Americans, 1942-1945 Vol. 1. (New York: Garland Publishing, 1989), p. foreword.

⁵⁵ Allan R. Bosworth, America's Concentration Camps (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1967), p. 63.

⁵⁶ Members of the 442nd Combat Team, The Story of the 442nd Combat Team (Washington: Information-Education Section, MTOUSA, 1945), p. 2.

⁵⁷ Prior to the end of the 19th century and up through the late 1940's, the United States literally had hundreds of laws in the books, specifically for controlling the lives of the

Japanese immigrant, one of which did not allow them to become citizens unless they were born in the U.S. making them something less than a second-class citizen.

⁵⁸ Chester Tanaka, Go For Broke, A Pictorial History of the Japanese American 100th Infantry Battalion and the 442d Regimental Combat Team (Richmond, California: Go For Broke, Inc., 1982), 90-101.

⁵⁹ Thelma Chang, "I Can Never Forget" - Men of the 100Th/442ND (Honolulu, Hawaii: Sigi Productions, Inc., 1991), 37, 52, 58-59.

⁶⁰ Chester Tanaka, Go For Broke, A Pictorial History of the Japanese American 100th Infantry Battalion and the 442d Regimental Combat Team (Richmond, California: Go For Broke, Inc., 1982), 101.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 90-101; John Tsukano, Bridge of Love (Honolulu, Hawaii: Hawaiian Hosts, Inc., 1985), 259-267.

⁶² John, Chapter 11, Verse 13, The Bible.

⁶³ Samurai- were professional warriors belonging to the Japanese feudal military aristocracy.

⁶⁴ Ivan Morris, The Nobility of Failure: Tragic Heroes in the History of Japan (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1975), 106-108.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 314-320, Bushido- "The Way of the Warrior", military values as a part of the ethics and attitude, in use within the samurai value system. Bushido was the idea of death before dishonor and stressed loyalty and self-sacrifice over compassion and mercy.

⁶⁶ Chester Tanaka, Go For Broke, A Pictorial History of the Japanese American 100th Infantry Battalion and the 442d Regimental Combat Team (Richmond, California: Go For Broke, Inc., 1982), 79.

John Tsukano, Bridge of Love (Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii, 1980?), 195.

⁶⁷ Shinyei 'Rocky' Matayoshi, Taped interview, November 1994.

⁶⁸ Chester Tanaka, Go For Broke, A Pictorial History of the Japanese American 100th Infantry Battalion and the 442d Regimental Combat Team (Richmond, California: Go For Broke, Inc., 1982), 66.

⁶⁹ Shinyei 'Rocky' Matayoshi, Taped interview, November 1994.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marines Corps, 1775-1962 (Baltimore, Maryland: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1991), 3.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 4-5.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 89.

⁷⁴ Chuck Lawliss, The Marine Book: A Portrait of America's Military Elite (New York, New York: Thames and Hudson, Inc., 1992), 151-163.

⁷⁵ In 1794, when Congress reactivated the Navy and with the Marines, the Marines created a new uniform. The enlisted wore short coats and trousers of blue edged in scarlet. The officers wore long coats of blue with scarlet cuffs and gold epaulettes. Both the officers and the enlisted men wore high, stiff leather collars, which later inspired their nickname, "leatherneck." Chuck Lawliss, The Marine Book: A Portrait of America's Military Elite (New York, New York: Thames and Hudson, Inc., 1992), 28-29.

⁷⁶ 'False-start' is putting it rather mildly when we look at the invasion of Tarawa, which was a devastating loss in lives. The Marine Corps learned much from this invasion and vowed never to make the same mistakes. Some of the lessons they learned were, not to attack an entrenched enemy with a frontal assault, prepare the beach head well in advance of the invasion with massive artillery, air, and naval bombardments, and use much more and improved armored landing craft (ACV's). By the next amphibious assault, Operation Flintlock, Marshall Islands, these problems and many more had been corrected.

⁷⁷ If a Marine fell asleep on guard duty, he was punished by having to spend several months walking guard duty while wearing an iron collar around his neck and dragging a ball-and-chain. Disobeying orders would get you twelve lashes with a cat-o'-nine-tails. No infraction was overlooked.

⁷⁸ Chuck Lawliss, The Marine Book: A Portrait of America's Military Elite (New York, New York: Thames and Hudson, Inc., 1992), 73.

⁷⁹ Basic training.

⁸⁰ A motto introduced by Evans Carlson, of Carlson's Raiders fame during the Second World War. Chuck Lawliss, The Marine Book: A Portrait of America's Military Elite (New York, New York: Thames and Hudson, Inc., 1992), 68.

⁸¹ During this time period in Vietnam, that is, 1968, the Marines, who were only one seventh the size of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), had lost seven times as many officers of the same ranks as the ARVN.⁸¹ The leadership of the Marines, unlike that of the ARVN, were forward with their troops, an important factor of cohesion (credible leadership).

⁸² Without these inbred characteristics, the Marines would have failed during the Peleliu campaign during the Second World War in the Pacific Theater. On the beaches and in the jungles of Peleliu, the 1st Marine Division was victorious but was decimated, suffering 6,526 Marines lost (1,252 dead and 5,274 wounded).⁸² From the common Marine's standpoint, they were able to drive on successfully because of their absolute trust in the Marine to their left and right, their trust in their leadership, and their boot camp training that emphasized the proficient use of their weapons and equipment under very stressful conditions. Notwithstanding, the standard for the campaign was "*uncommon valor was a common virtue.*"

⁸³ The Marine Corps prior to the Korean conflict was made up primarily of races from European backgrounds.

⁸⁴ Chuck Lawliss, The Marine Book: A Portrait of America's Military Elite (New York, New York: Thames and Hudson, Inc., 1992), 151-155.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 63-69.

⁸⁶ John, Chapter 11, Verse 13, The Bible.

⁸⁷ Another example of the cohesion of the Marines was during 1968, the Marines established six Combined Action Platoons (CAP's) which were to be based in separate villages in areas of strong Communist activity. These CAP's were located around Chu Lai, very near the border of Quang Ngai and Quang Tin provinces, in the vicinity of Hue and Da Nang, and eventually further north near the DMZ. These all-volunteer, thirteen man (plus one Navy corpsman) platoons operated autonomously under the command of

an Noncommissioned officer (NCO). The mission of these platoons was to identify and root out Viet Cong shadow governments within the villages.

These platoons often fought under extremely stressful conditions with barely enough ammunition and supplies, in a couple of instances beating back enemy attacks with rocks and rifle butts. During one such battle, eighty Viet Cong with an attached reinforced North Vietnamese company attacked one of the forts set up by a CAP, Fort Page. All six Marines in the fort (the rest were on an ambush patrol) were either killed or wounded but were still able to beat off the attack with the assistance of a Popular Forces Platoon (PF's). When the patrol returned, they refused any relief or reinforcement, they would settle the accounts themselves. Two nights later as the enemy attacked again, they were surprised by a murderous ambush set up by the remaining Marines and PF's. The cohesion of this small unit kept them together through the battle and afterwards allowed them to recover from their devastating losses. By electing to fight with who they had on hand, they did two things. The first, was to prove to the Vietnamese as well as the higher headquarters that their force was capable of handling the mission and secondly, exemplify the cohesion of the unit under some of the most dire of situations. This was just one of many examples of Marine cohesion and morale. Ronald H. Spector, After TET: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam (New York, New York: The Free Press, 1993), 189-196.

⁸⁸James R. Arnold, TET Offensive 1968: Turning Point in Vietnam (London, England: Osprey Publishing, Ltd., 1990), 68-84.

⁸⁹Ibid.

⁹⁰Ibid.

⁹¹Ibid., 73.

⁹²Ronald H. Spector, After TET: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam (New York, New York: The Free Press, 1993), 259.

⁹³Chuck Lawliss, The Marine Book: A Portrait of America's Military Elite (New York, New York: Thames and Hudson, Inc., 1992), 151-155.

⁹⁴Capt William H. Weber, IV, "Unit Cohesion and the Future of the Marine Corps," Marine Corps Gazette, (April 1994): 42-44.

⁹⁵David C. Knight, Shock Troops: The History of Elite Corps and Special Forces (Greenwich, CT: Bison Books Corp., 1983), 85.

⁹⁶Gordon Williamson, SS: Hitler's Instrument of Terror (Osceola, WI: Motorbooks International, 1994), 244-249.

The Waffen SS Order of Battle:

1st SS Panzer (**Armor**) Division *Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler*

2nd SS Panzer (**Armor**) Division *Das Reich*

3rd SS Panzer (**Armor**) Division *Totenkopf*

4th SS Panzergrenadier (**Armored Infantry**) Division *SS - Polizei*

5th SS Panzer (**Armor**) Division *Wiking*, established in May 1940 and consisted of Germans, Dutch, Danes, Norwegians, Flemings, and a small group of *Volksdeutsche* from the Balkans.

6th SS Gebirgs (**Mountain**) Division *Nord*, consisted of volunteers from Hungary, Romania, and Norwegians, established officially in February 1941.

- 7th SS Freiwilligen-Gebirgs (**Volunteer Mountain**) Division *Prinz Eugen*, founded in March 1942 and consisted primarily of *Volksdeutsche* community from Croatia.
- 8th SS Kavallerie (**Cavalry**) Division *Florian Geyer*
- 9th SS Panzer (**Armor**) Division *Hohenstaufen*
- 10th SS Panzer (**Armor**) Division *Fruindsberg*
- 11th SS Freiwilligen-Panzergrenadier (**Volunteer Armored Infantry**) Division *Nordland*, formed in February 1943 and consisted of Germans, Danes, Dutch, Norwegians, Estonians, Finns, French, Swedish, Swiss, and even British volunteers.
- 12th SS Panzer (**Armor**) Division *Hitlerjugend*.
- 13th Waffen-Gebirgs (**Mountain Weapons**) Division Der SS (Kroatische NR 1) *Handschar*, formed of Bosnian Moslems in February 1943.
- 14th Waffen Grenadier (**Infantry Weapons**) Division Der SS (Ukrainische NR 1), was formed in early 1944 of Catholic, Ukrainian volunteers.
- 15th Waffen-Grenadier (**Infantry Weapons**) Division Der SS (Lettische NR 1), formed by Latvian volunteers prior to November 1943.
- 16th SS Panzergrenadier (**Armored Infantry**) Division *Reichsfuhrer-SS*
- 17th SS Panzergrenadier (**Armored Infantry**) Division *Gotz Von Berlinchingen*.
- 18th SS Freiwilligen-Panzergrenadier (**Volunteer Armored Infantry**) Division *Horst Wessel*, formed in 1943 from Hungarian *Volksdeustche*.
- 19th Waffen-Grenadier (**Infantry Weapons**) Division Der SS (Lettisches NR 2), this was the second Latvian division and was formed in March 1944.
- 20th Waffen-Grenadier (**Infantry Weapons**) Division Der SS (Estnische NR 1), formed with Estonians in 1942.
- 21st Waffen-Gebirgs (**Mountain Weapons**) Division Der SS (Albanische NR 1) *Skanderbeg*, this Albanian division was formed in April 1944.
- 22nd Freiwilligen-Kavallerie (**Volunteer Cavalry**) Division Der SS *Maria Theresia*, formed in the fall of 1944 of *Volksdeustche* and Hungarians.
- 23rd Waffen-Gebirgs (**Mountain Weapons**) Division Der SS *Kama*, activated in January 1944 of Bosnian Moslems, plus a cadre of German *Volksdeustche* personnel and a contingent of Croat Moslems.
- 23rd SS Freiwilligen Panzergrenadier (**Volunteer Armored Infantry**) Division *Nederland*, reorganized from other units in December 1944 of Dutch volunteers.
- 24th SS Gebirgs (**Mountain**) Division *Karstjager*, formed in the summer of 1942 with soldiers from south Tirol, Istria, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, and the Ukraine.
- 25th Waffen-Grenadier (**Infantry Weapons**) Division Der SS (Ungarische NR 1) *Hunyadi*, formed in mid-1944 totally of ethnic Hungarians.
- 26th Waffen-Grenadier (**Infantry Weapons**) Division Der SS (Ungarische NR 2) *Hungaria*, formed in September 1944 with a nucleus of Germans with soldiers from Hungary and Romania.

- 27th SS Freiwilligen-Panzer Grenadier (**Volunteer Armored Infantry**) Division (Flamische NR 1) *Langemarck*, the initial brigade was expanded to a division in September 1944, this Flemish unit had a Finnish battalion attached.
- 28th SS Freiwilligen-Panzer Grenadier (**Volunteer Armored Infantry**) Division *Wallonien*, upgraded to a division in the fall of 1944, consisted of Rexists and Walloons.
- 29th Waffen-Grenadier (**Infantry Weapons**) Division Der SS (Russische NR 1), formed in the latter part of 1944 from Russians (Russian Army of Liberation).
- 29th Waffen-Grenadier (**Infantry Weapons**) Division Der SS (Italienische NR 1), was given division status in April 1945, was formed of pro-Fascist Italians.
- 30th Waffen-Grenadier (**Infantry Weapons**) Division Der SS (Weissruthenische NR 1), formed of Belorussians into a division in the fall of 1944.
- 31st SS Freiwilligen Grenadier (**Volunteer Infantry**) Division, formed in the autumn of 1944 from a mix of German and *Volksdeutsche* personnel from the protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia (part of Czechoslovakia).
- 32nd SS Freiwilligen Grenadier (**Volunteer Infantry**) Division *30 Januar*.
- 33rd SS Waffen-Kavallerie (**Cavalry Weapons**) Division Der SS (Ungarische NR 1).
- 33rd Waffen-Grenadier (**Infantry Weapons**) Division Der SS (Französische NR 1) *Charlemagne*, the division was formed in the winter of 1944/45 of French volunteers.
- 34th Waffen-Grenadier Division Der SS *Landstorm Nederland*, formed into an SS division in March 1945, consisting of Dutch conscripts and Dutch Nazi Youth Movement personnel.
- 35th SS Polizei Grenadier (**Police Infantry**) Division Der SS
- 36th Waffen-Grenadier (**Infantry Weapons**) Division Der SS
- 37th SS Freiwilligen-Kavallerie (**Volunteer Cavalry**) Division *Lutzow*, was assembled in February 1945 from remnants of several other German units.
- 38th SS Grenadier Division *Nibelungen*.

⁹⁷ The following units are the elite of the Waffen SS (the Panzer divisions were the elite of the elite):

- 1st SS Panzer (Armor) Division *Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler*, officially became part of the Waffen SS on 1 December 1939.
- 2nd SS Panzer (Armor) Division *Das Reich*, officially became part of the Waffen SS on 1 December 1939.
- 3rd SS Panzer (Armor) Division *Totenkopf*, formed in November of 1939 of a nucleus of three regiments of concentration camp guards, officially became part of the Waffen SS on 1 December 1939. The Death's Head Division was the most notorious of all the Waffen SS divisions.

- 4th SS Panzergrenadier (Armored Infantry) Division *SS - Polizei*, officially became part of the Waffen SS on 1 December 1939.
- 5th SS Panzer (Armor) Division *Wiking*, established in May 1940 and consisted of Germans, Dutch, Danes, Norwegians, Flemings, and a small group of *Volksdeutsche* from the Balkans.
- 6th SS Gebirgs (Mountain) Division *Nord*, consisted of volunteers from Hungary, Romania, and Norwegians, established officially in February 1941.
- 7th SS Freiwilligen-Gebirgs (Volunteer Mountain) Division *Prinz Eugen*, founded in March 1942 and consisted primarily of *Volksdeutsche* community from Croatia.
- 8th SS Kavallerie (Cavalry) Division *Florian Geyer*
- 9th SS Panzer (Armor) Division *Hohenstaufen*
- 10th SS Panzer (Armor) Division *Fruntsberg*
- 11th SS Freiwilligen-Panzergrenadier (Volunteer Armored Infantry) Division *Nordland*, formed in February 1943 and consisted of Germans, Danes, Dutch, Norwegians, Estonians, Finns, French, Swedish, Swiss, and even British volunteers.
- 12th SS Panzer (Armor) Division *Hitlerjugend*.
- 19th Waffen-Grenadier (Infantry Weapons) Division Der SS (Lettisches NR 2), this was the second Latvian division and was formed in March 1944.
- 23rd Waffen-Gebirgs (Mountain Weapons) Division Der SS *Kama*, activated in January 1944 of Bosnian Moslems, plus a cadre of German *Volksdeustche* personnel and a contingent of Croat Moslems. This division was disbanded in late 1944 and the remnants were reformed into the *Nederland*.
- 23rd SS Freiwilligen Panzergrenadier (Volunteer Armored Infantry) Division *Nederland*, reorganized from other units in December 1944 of Dutch volunteers.

⁹⁸ Units listed twice are units that eventually were combined.

⁹⁹ Omer Bartov, Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 59-66.

¹⁰⁰ Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-45, German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare (New York, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), 88-89.

¹⁰¹ David C. Knight, Shock Troops: The History of Elite Corps and Special Forces (Greenwich, CT: Bison Books Corp., 1983), 85-101.

¹⁰² Rupert Butler, The Black Angels: A History of the Waffen - SS New York, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), 20.

¹⁰³ David C. Knight, Shock Troops: The History of Elite Corps and Special Forces (Greenwich, CT: Bison Books Corp., 1983), 87-90.

¹⁰⁴ This idea of racial superiority coupled with the brutal discipline of the German army created a vicious circle of barbarism. The perversion of the discipline created an increasing barbarism in the soldiers towards prisoner's of war and enemy civilians, which in turn lead to further brutalized discipline. This was magnified as the quality of new recruits declined during the latter years of the Second World War. This was especially

evident on the eastern front. The soldiers feared their commanders and were unable to defeat the enemy. Consequently they turned against the prisoners of war (POW's) and the citizens of the occupied territory. Normally, troops punished without inordinate cruelty, treated POW's and the civilians likewise. However, in the cases that applied to the political or racial categories deemed by the regime and the army as not deserving of the accepted rules of war, the story was different.

This ideological brutality was very evident during the invasion of the Soviet Union, where soldiers were officially ordered to commit organized acts of destruction and even murder against POW's, enemy civilians and their property. A result of these legalized criminal acts, the soldiers began indiscriminate shootings and wild requisitions of civilian property that heretofore were very explicitly forbidden by the German army commanders. The soldiers, though, were rarely punished by their commanders for these acts. The commanders were sympathetic to the acts of violence as well as wanting to give the soldiers a vent for their anger and frustration caused by the strict discipline and the heavy cost and hopelessness of the war.

As their numbers were reduced, the problem was exacerbated as more inexperienced soldiers began to fill their ranks. Many of the new recruits were poorly trained, sullen, and prone to disobedience. Many more were involved in reprisals against the Russians for murdered German prisoners or captured German soldiers. These reprisals entailed, in one case, the Viking Division shooting 600 Jewish civilians, and in another case, the soldiers' destruction of a complete village. The former appeal to the Waffen SS to fight for the glory of the Fatherland now fell on the deaf ears of this indifferent or even hostile recruit. Ibid., 98-101.

¹⁰⁵ Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1971), 120-122, 134, 232.

¹⁰⁶ Rupert Butler, The Black Angels: A History of the Waffen - SS (New York, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), 3-20.

¹⁰⁷ This first regiment was the Deutschland Regiment which he later commanded in 1939. Gordon Williamson, The SS: Hitler's Instruments of Terror (Osceola, Wisconsin: Motorbooks International, 1994), 50.

¹⁰⁸ Though the Wehrmacht in some cases organized in these battle groups, they were not always able to retain their regimental identity, which was key to Steiner's plan. By retaining their regimental identity, they would not lose the cohesiveness of the base unit. David C. Knight, Shock Troops: The History of Elite Corps and Special Forces (Greenwich, CT: Bison Books Corp., 1983), 85-86.

¹⁰⁹ Rupert Butler, The Black Angels: A History of the Waffen - SS New York, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), 19.

¹¹⁰ David C. Knight, Shock Troops: The History of Elite Corps and Special Forces (Greenwich, CT: Bison Books Corp., 1983), 86-87.

¹¹¹ Hitler wanted an effective military force that was absolutely faithful to him. What he got was a cohesive unit of high morale that would commit atrocities in the name of Hitler, unhesitatingly. There were some that wanted Hitler out of power. With this unit at his beck and call, Hitler surely slept better at night.

¹¹² David C. Knight, Shock Troops: The History of Elite Corps and Special Forces (Greenwich, CT: Bison Books Corp., 1983), 98.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 99.

¹¹⁴ Eventually, as the SS units were getting thinned out due to attrition, the SS had to recruit outside of Germany, searching for “racial Germans” in neighboring states. In early 1941, the SS Viking Division, the first major, non-German force, composed of Norwegian, Danish, Dutch, and Flemish volunteers, was activated. Though adding numbers to the SS units, they did not necessarily add quality. It became evident that these ethnic, non-German units were not as effective as the pure German SS units. It should be noted that all of the SS Panzer units were ethnically pure soldiers of Germanic descent.

¹¹⁵ T.N. Dupuy, Great Battles on the Eastern front: The Soviet-German War, 1941-1945 (Indianapolis, Indiana: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1982), 46-58.

David C. Knight, Shock Troops: The History of Elite Corps and Special Forces (Greenwich, CT: Bison Books Corp., 1983), 98.

¹¹⁶ Gordon Williamson, The SS: Hitler’s Instruments of Terror (Osceola, Wisconsin: Motorbooks International, 1994), 76 & 244.

¹¹⁷ Marshal Timoshenko and General Zukhnov, interview by Dessloch, in The Winter Battle of Rzhev, Vyazma, and Yuknov, 1941-42, (Headquarters, European Command: Office of the Chief Historian, 1947), 7.

¹¹⁸ Thomas E. Griess, Atlas for the Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean (Wayne, New Jersey: Avery Publishing Group Inc., 1990), 21.

¹¹⁹ Marshal Timoshenko and General Zukhnov, interview by Dessloch, in The Winter Battle of Rzhev, Vyazma, and Yuknov, 1941-42, (Headquarters, European Command: Office of the Chief Historian, 1947), 12.

¹²⁰ David C. Knight, Shock Troops: The History of Elite Corps and Special Forces (Greenwich, CT: Bison Books Corp., 1983), 98.

¹²¹ Leon Degrelle, Campaign in Russia: The Waffen SS on the Eastern Front Torrance, California: Institute for Historical Review, 1985), 163-229.

¹²² David C. Knight, Shock Troops: The History of Elite Corps and Special Forces (Greenwich, CT: Bison Books Corp., 1983), 98.

¹²³ That is, loyalty is a fact of life for the Marines. It is something that is instilled early in training and is reinforced throughout their career, every time they see their Corps crest.

¹²⁴ David C. Knight, Shock Troops: The History of Elite Corps and Special Forces (Greenwich, CT: Bison Books Corp., 1983), 98.

Motto to be recited by each incoming SS soldier:

It is an honor to be an SS man

It is an honor to be an honorary member

Let each continue to do his duty

We SS men and their honorary members

Each in his appointed place

And Germany will be great once more.

¹²⁵ Bruce Quarrie, Hitler’s Samurai: The Waffen - SS in Action (New York, New York: Arco Publishing, Inc., 1983), 26.

¹²⁶ E.B. Sledge, With the Old Breed - At Peleliu and Okinawa (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 157.

¹²⁷ The fact that the officers of the 442d RCT were primarily Caucasian did not negatively or positively effect the cohesion of the 442d as a whole.

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