ARTISTS OF WAR: A HISTORY OF UNITED STATES PROPAGANDA,
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE, PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
AND A PROPOSAL FOR ITS EVER-CHANGING FUTURE

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This qualitative study addresses the current state of transition for United States power projection. It cites the National Defense Strategy and the adversaries that conduct Information Warfare against the United States and its allies. This study provides a historical journey of United States Psychological Operations and develops recommendations for how to structure the Psychological Operations force in the future. Psychological Operations can and will be critical to any potential success as the Army addresses the adversaries of the United States. The Psychological Operations Regiment has an opportunity to address the requirements that the United States' military needs in order to address the current threats and win on future battlefields. This study discovered that, at times, Psychological Operations has been empowered to do so in the past.

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ABSTRACT

ARTISTS OF WAR: A HISTORY OF UNITED STATES PROPAGANDA, PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE, PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND A PROPOSAL FOR ITS EVER-CHANGING FUTURE, by Major Ashley Franz Holzmann, 204 pages.

This qualitative study addresses the current state of transition for United States power projection. It cites the *National Defense Strategy* and the adversaries that conduct Information Warfare against the United States and its allies. This study provides a historical journey of United States Psychological Operations and develops recommendations for how to structure the Psychological Operations force in the future. Psychological Operations can and will be critical to any potential success as the Army addresses the adversaries of the United States. The Psychological Operations Regiment has an opportunity to address the requirements that the United States' military needs in order to address the current threats and win on future battlefields. This study discovered that, at times, Psychological Operations has been empowered to do so in the past.

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A moment must also be taken to thank all of the non-commissioned officers, leaders, and soldiers that have defined my experiences and career.

Finally, my family—who endured my stubbornness—deserves high praise. This study would be twice as long if it weren't for their efforts to keep me grounded in reality.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACRONYMS

AAR	After Action Review
AIM 2.0	Assignment Interactive Module 2.0
ARSOF	Army Special Operations Forces
BBC	British Broadcasting Company
CARL	Combined Arms Research Library
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CPI	Committee on Public Information
CNN	Cable News Network
COR	Contracting Officer's Representative
COTS	Commercial Off the Shelf
DCR	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy Change Recommendation
DoD	Department of Defense
DOTMLPF-P	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy
DTIC	Defense Technical Information Center
FOIA	Freedom of Information Act
GEC	Global Engagement Center
GS	General Schedule
HSC	Headquarters Service Companies
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
IWTF	Information Warfare Task Force

JCIDS	Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
JLLIS	Joint Lessons Learned Information System
JSOU	Joint Special Operations University
JSTOR	Journal Storage
JUSPAO	Joint United States Public Affairs Office
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MIAG	Military Information Support Operations and Analysis Group
MISO	Military Information Support Operations
MISTF-A	Military Information Support Task Force-Afghanistan
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
NDU	National Defense University
NFC	Narrative Fusion Cell
NGA	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
ORO	Operations Research Office
ORSA	Operations Research/Systems Analysis
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
OWI	Office of War Information
POB	Psychological Operations Battalion
POG	Psychological Operations Group
POQC	Psychological Operations Qualification Course
PPEX	Publicly Available Information Exploitation Cell
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
POB	Psychological Operations Battalion
RIAB	Radio in a Box
RAND	Research and Development Corporation

SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOG	Studies and Observations Group
SOJTF	Special Operations Joint Task Force
SOJTF-OIR	Special Operations Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve
SORO	Special Operations Research Office
SPOT	*Système Pour l'Observation de la Terre*
TIS	Technical Information Section
TPO	Tactical Psychological Operations Companies
TTU	Texas Tech University
USAR	United States Army Reserve
USASOC	United States Army Special Operations Command
USIA	United States Information Agency
USIS	United States Information Service
VTED	Validation, Testing, and Evaluations Detachment

ILLUSTRATIONS

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

It is your attitude, and the suspicion that you are maturing the boldest
designs against him, that imposes on your enemy.
—Frederick the Great, *Instructions to His Generals*

Background

The Philippine Government battled a communist insurgency called the

Hukbalahap from 1942 to 1954. At one point, the President of The Philippines by-name

requested an American who had served there before to return in the 1950s. When the

American arrived he walked into the jungles of the Philippines—unarmed save for a

harmonica and an obsession with the people and their culture—unable to speak the

language of the local tribes but possessing a keen understanding of how to diffuse

moments of tension by talking and presenting himself in a kind and objective way.[1] He

later emerged from the jungles possessing much of the information he would need to be

successful, having approached and talked to the Hukbalahap, himself. He was one of the

members of the Office of Policy Coordination, a precursor to what would become

modern Psychological Operations, and his name was Edward Lansdale.[2]

Lansdale was a master practitioner of Psychological Warfare. He often disguised

units as insurgent forces that would then turn on their insurgent "allies"; he was an early

adopter of the aerial loudspeaker systems—using Navy loud-hailers from landing craft to

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[1] Cecil B. Currey, *Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American* (Dulles: Potomac
Books, 1998), 34-42.

[2] Ibid., 56-75.

target populations with messages and curses that exploited, "folk stories . . . taboos, and myths," often resulting in the insurgents killing their own soldiers out of suspicion.[3]

One of Lansdale's most creative moments was when he discovered Filipino vampire folklore known as *asuang*.[4] Lansdale used that knowledge to insert select information into the environment to affect change in the enemy behavior—in this case, the desired behavior change was to end night operations conducted by the insurgents. This was done by exploiting psychological vulnerabilities and existing information. In this case, local lore. Lansdale accomplished this by capturing and killing Hukbalahap on patrol and puncturing holes into their necks to make their deaths appear to have been caused by vampire bites. The bodies were drained of blood and placed on the path of the most recent patrols to be found by the insurgents. This action effectively ended night operations by the Hukbalahap in those areas for long periods of time.

The theory and practice of inserting selected information into the environment to impact and shape that environment was not developed by the United States—but the United States and its First World War Allies shaped the practice and defined the modern applications of such actions.[5] At the time, many of these actions were labeled as propaganda. Today, the collected actions are known as Psychological Operations.

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[3] Edward Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1991), 88; Edward Lansdale, *Memorandum, Edward Lansdale to Don Blackburn, 11 June 1972* (Lansdale Personal Papers, 1972).

[4] Currey, *Edward Lansdale*, 102-103.

[5] Philip M. Taylor, *Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Day*, 3rd ed. (New York: Manchester University Press, 2003), 173-197.

These actions are conducted by small units, sometimes consisting of a single person, similar to how Lansdale operated. International legal agreements and refinement of the Law of Armed Conflict has since categorized Lansdale's specific actions as illegal.[6] The intent of this study is to highlight creative solutions to complex problems. Lansdale's actions, while now considered unlawful, were revolutionary. Understanding such lessons of the past may frame the future.

<p style="text-align: center;">Defining Psychological Operations</p>

> Go on doing with your pen what in other times, was done with the sword: show what reformation is more practicable by operation on the mind than on the body of man.
>
> > —Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Thomas Paine, in
> > Leo W., "The History of Psychological Operations"

Propaganda was best defined in 1950 as a, "planned and organized effort to spread information and ideas through political or social entities."[7] Psychological Operations and its predecessor, Psychological Warfare are,

> Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator's objectives.[8]

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[6] Unit for Relations with Armed and Security Forces, *The Law of Armed Conflict: Basic Knowledge* (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 2002), 9-1.

[7] Robert E. Summers, ed., *America's Weapons of Psychological Warfare* (New York: H.W. Wilson Company, 1951), 13.

[8] Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, January 2020), 142. There are times throughout this study when the terms "Psychological Operations" and "Psychological Warfare" are used interchangeably.

The distinction between propaganda, Psychological Operations, and deception is that deception is often seeking a greater strategic goal with a narrow target.[9]

Justification and Qualifications

The author deployed to Afghanistan twice, once as the lead for a section that measured the effectiveness of Psychological Operations, and again two years later as a Military Deception Officer. In between was a deployment to a United States Embassy in Central America. The fourth deployment was to the United Arab Emirates in support of a conventional force's Security Cooperation mission spanning the Middle East. Each deployment was as a Special Operations Psychological Operations officer.

Research Aspects

This study researches and analyzes the history of United States Army Psychological Operations in order to develop recommendations for the future. United States power projection is in a state of transition. The latest *National Defense Strategy* includes adversaries that conduct Psychological Operations against the United States. Psychological Operations will be critical to any potential success as the Army addresses the adversaries of the United States.

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[9] William R. Harris, *On Countering Strategic Deception: A Report Prepared For Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, November 1973), 1.

Operational Context

The National Defense Strategy

The *National Defense Strategy* was written by the Secretary of Defense to detail how the military will allocate resources and power; it is nested with the President's *National Security Strategy*.[10] Published in 2018, the most recent *National Defense Strategy* implements a realist strategy and names Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea as potential adversaries in an era defined by deterrence, readiness, and the erosion of United States military superiority.[11]

This study relates to aspects from the first and third lines of effort listed within the strategy. Line of effort one is, "rebuilding military readiness as we build a more lethal Joint Force."[12] This line of effort consists of, "prioritize preparedness for war," "modernize key capabilities," "evolve innovative operational concepts," and, "develop a lethal, agile, and resilient force posture and employment," which includes, "Dynamic Force Employment," and the, "Global Operating Model."[13] Finally, this line of effort also lists as a priority the cultivation of workforce talent, which includes, "Professional Military Education," "talent management," and, "civilian workforce expertise."[14]

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[10] Secretary of Defense (SecDef), *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge* (Summary of the 2018 NDS) (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018).

[11] Ibid., 1.

[12] Ibid., 5.

[13] Ibid., 5-9.

[14] Ibid.

Line of effort three is, "rebuilding military readiness as we build a more lethal Joint Force."[15] This line of effort consists of, "deliver performance at the speed of relevance," "organize for innovation," "drive budget discipline and affordability to achieve solvency," as well as streamline, "rapid, iterative approaches from development to fielding," and, "harness and protect the National Security Innovation Base."[16]

<u>Large-Scale Combat Operations</u>

The Army answered the *National Defense Strategy* by initiating changes to doctrine and training, and developing new concepts related to Large-Scale Combat Operations.[17] The current goal of the Army is to be ready to conduct Large-Scale Combat Operations, and to also apply concepts of Multi-Domain Operations by the year 2028.[18]

FM 3-0: Operations is an updated manual published in its current form in October of 2017. It nests its justifications within the Multi-Domain Operations 2028 concept by stating,

> The proliferation of advanced technologies; adversary emphasis on force training, modernization, and professionalization; the rise of revisionist, revanchist, and extremist ideologies; and the ever increasing speed of human interaction makes large-scale ground combat more lethal, and more likely, than it has been in a generation. As the Army and the joint force focused on counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism at the expense of other capabilities, our adversaries watched,

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[15] SecDef, Summary of the 2018 NDS, 5.

[16] Ibid., 10-11.

[17] Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, October 2017).

[18] U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028* (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 2018).

learned, adapted, modernized and devised strategies that put us at a position of relative disadvantage in places where we may be required to fight.[19]

The enemies referenced are the same actors mentioned in the *National Defense Strategy*: Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea.

USASOC Army Special Operations Forces Strategy

The new *United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Strategy* released in 2019 nests with the 2018 *National Defense Strategy*, and emphasizes the need for Special Operations, "to drive evolutionary changes in how we man, train, and equip our formations in the Information Age."[20] It encourages professionals within Special Operations to challenge assumptions, empower the larger conventional force and leadership, and to give leaders options in eroding near-peer influence.[21] Competition below armed conflict is defined in the document as when, "adversaries avoid provoking a conventional military response to fracture our alliances and win without fighting."[22] The document discusses the current state of great power competition, which includes the range of military operations and boils down to actions prior to war, or those, "in

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[19] HQDA, FM 3-0.

[20] U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), *Army Special Operations Forces Strategy* (Fort Bragg, NC: USASOC, 2019), 1.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid.

competition below armed conflict." Adversaries also reference these actions as conflict

"less than war".[23]

According to the strategy, Army Special Operations must develop innovation,

emphasize problem-solving capabilities, integrate units, and empower soldiers.[24] The

strategy also emphasizes the ability for Special Operations to advance partnerships,

influencing adversarial behavior, conducting Special Operations, and continue to serve in

crisis response.[25] The strategy discusses Special Operations in support of Large-Scale

Combat Operations by focusing on preparation of the environment, unilateral and partner

nation supported operations, high value target identification and destruction, and cyber

and space force integration.[26]

A significant inclusion in the strategy is discussion regarding Special Operations'

civilian capacity.[27] Many Special Operations in the United States military rely heavily on

civilian government personnel, contracted civilian support, and civilian relationships with

academia or within partner nations to facilitate mission success.[28] The key takeaway

from the *USASOC Strategy* is the timeline that USASOC laid out for what it wants to

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[23] Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), *Iran Military Power: Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2019), 23.

[24] USASOC, *Army Special Operations Forces Strategy*, 1.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid., 4.

[28] Ibid.

achieve with its strategic approach. First, it lists three lines of effort, which are (1)

people, (2) readiness, which serves as the main effort, (3) and modernization.[29] The

strategy lists a near-term goal of achieving readiness by the year 2022 while continuing to

counter violent extremist organizations, a mid-term goal of achieving an interoperable

force capable of competition below the level of armed conflict by 2028.[30] The USASOC

2035 includes further details related to the far-term goals to achieve by 2035.[31]

The 2015 Psychological Operations Assessment

      The 2015 Psychological Operations Assessment focused on Army Special

Operations capabilities and included several gaps that were later used to develop concepts

within the Psychological Operations Regiment.[32] These gaps were:

> 1. Insufficient target audience analysis training and tools. The Psychological
> Operations Regiment must be able to identify relevant actors in an environment;
> there is a lack of sociological, political, psychological, anthropological, economic,
> or linguist training or resources.
>
> 2. Poor language capability. No way to process data in foreign languages so that
> the Psychological Operations personnel could analyze information.

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[29] USASOC, *Army Special Operations Forces Strategy*, 4.

[30] Ibid., 5-6.

[31] U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), Office of Strategic Communication, *USASOC 2035: Communicating the ARSOF Narrative and Setting the Course to 2035 (*Fort Bragg, NC: USAJFKSWCS, 2017), 34.

[32] Seth Mabus and Jim Fisher, *MIAG Redesign Update and SMART Initial Operating Concept* (Fort Bragg, NC: Eighth Psychological Operations Group, June 11, 2015); The capability gaps were a part of a classified briefing, which contains additional classified gaps and analysis. The briefing was used in 2016 to establish the Narrative Fusion Cells. The gaps included in this study are unclassified and paraphrased.

3. Poor cultural understanding. A lack of cultural understanding for target audiences. No standardized way to improve this lack of understanding.

4. No consistent connection to academia. Insufficient understanding related to emerging capabilities in technology or relevant research in academia that could be applied to Psychological Operations.

5. No standard for data analysis. No standardized system for gathering data, processing data, referencing data, or measuring the effectiveness of operations based on data. There is no hub of continuity or a place to reference historic information within the Psychological Operations Regiment.

6. No standards for measuring effects. There is no continuity for the methods employed.

7. Tactical narratives not nested with strategic narratives. Insufficient understanding of how to synchronize strategic narratives with tactical narratives.[33]

The creation of three separate units in the Psychological Operations Regiment aimed to address these gaps: Special Military Information Support Operations Teams, Narrative Fusion Cells, and Sensitive Activities Operations Sections known as S3Xs.[34] This study will reference the Narrative Fusion Cell and how it may evolve to assist in addressing the gaps. The gaps listed were used to frame the research of this study.

<u>The Research Problem</u>

The Psychological Operations Regiment is not postured to address the multiple requirements identified in the *National Defense Strategy*, Large-Scale Combat Operations doctrine, or the *USASOC Strategy*.

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[33] Rob Rosales, *1st POB (A) Narrative Fusion Cell Concept and Implementation* (Fort Bragg, NC: First Psychological Operations Battalion, August 20, 2018).

[34] Mabus and Fisher, *MIAG Redesign Update and SMART Initial Operating Concept*.

Research Questions

<u>Primary Question</u>

How should the Psychological Operations Regiment be optimized to achieve the *Army Special Operations Forces Strategy* while simultaneously addressing the Army's transition to Large-Scale Combat Operations?

<u>Secondary Questions</u>

There were two sets of secondary questions associated with this thesis:

1. Have Psychological Operations been faced with similar gaps in the past and what were the previous solutions?

2. Could such solutions address the current Operational Context?

The second set is a series of questions paraphrased from the JCIDS manual that were answered through the course of conducting the research:

1. Who would most benefit from the research and recommendations of this study?

2. What could be the impact on the Combatant Commands?

3. What is the relevance of the study?

4. Would there be a return on investment associated with the recommendations?

5. What are the financial impacts?

6. What would be given up in order to implement the findings and recommendations?

7. What missions could not be completed with the current system in place if
    nothing were to change?[35]

Approach

A qualitative approach was used throughout the course of this study. There were several assumptions, limitations, and delimitations that refined the scope of this study.

Assumptions

The first assumption was that the history and sources cited throughout this research were not manipulated and were accurate. The second assumption was that the examples and case studies analyzed were suitable and also predictive of future solutions. Finally, conclusions were drawn from the variety of sources available, and this study incorporated official military documents alongside historical research and investigative reporting. Classified information was not included, and all information included in this study was either unclassified from the outset, released by the government as now unclassified, or information available in the public record; this study assumed that all publicly available information was unclassified information.

Limitations

One limitation of this study was the classification levels related to most Psychological Operations. Many documents concerning Psychological Operations are still classified and will remain so for decades. A method of mitigation was the use of

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[35] Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), *Manual for the Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, August 31, 2018), AA22. Hereafter cited as JCIDS Manual.

documents released through Freedom of Information Act requests. Another means was to incorporate the investigative reporting by journalists.

This study did not seek to become a definitive historical record for Psychological Operations. Similarly, this study touched on Army Design Methodology, Functional Area Analysis, Functional Needs Analysis, and Force Management, but the efforts of this study were not to present itself as any of those documents. This study focused on providing data and analysis for future research and future change within the Psychological Operations Regiment.

There was a breadth of variety in the documents regarding the articulation of ideas. Time was a limitation, and it was not possible to examine all of the existing documents within the National Archive, as an example. Sources were paired down to focus on the research questions. At times, multiple sources were available, and were used to verify events.

Scope and Delimitations

Imposed delimitations were emplaced to further refine what would be included in the study. Eras were defined in this thesis and were organized to facilitate analysis of case studies. This study did not delve into the history of all of Information Operations, all of Special Operations, or every organization that evolved out of the Office of Strategic Services.

This study did, at times, cite the history of propaganda in relation to other nations, but its focus was on the development of the United States Army Psychological Operations Regiment in the modern era. The information available on Psychological Operations was vast, and spanned decades of research. A considerable amount of time

was devoted to reviewing all available information to determine which sources were most relevant to this study.

Significance of the Study

      This study strove to be operationally relevant to the Department of Defense, the Army, and the Special Operations community; not just in its theory, but in its ability to be implemented. Historic precedent and lessons learned were the focus because the intent of the study was to discover moments when the military had already implemented similar solutions to similar problems, gaps, and threats. The academic significance of this research was that it may contribute to the greater understanding of Psychological Operations and empower future research. It was discovered through the course of the literature review that a similar thesis synthesizing historical context for future planning had not yet been completed on Psychological Operations.

<div align="center">Summary and Conclusions</div>

>   Those photographs are not an argument; they are simply a crude statement of fact addressed to the eye. But the eye is connected with the brain; the brain with the nervous system. That system sends its messages in a flash through every past memory and present feeling. When we look at those photographs some fusion takes place within us; however different the education, the traditions behind us, our sensations are the same; and they are violent.
> <div align="right">—Virginia Woolf, Three Guineas</div>

      United States power projection is in a state of transition. The latest *National Defense Strategy* included adversaries that conduct Psychological Operations against the United States. The United States Army has begun to develop doctrine to conduct Large-Scale Combat Operations and Multi-Domain Operations to address those adversaries. Psychological Operations will be critical to any potential success. The Army is

developing new doctrine for an interwar period, while simultaneously still engaged in hostile environments throughout the world.[36] The Psychological Operations Regiment is not currently postured to fulfill those requirements, but it can be.

War is expanding further into the information domain. Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea are focused on increasing strategic depth between them and their perceived threats.[37] The Psychological Operations Regiment has an opportunity to address the requirements that the United States' military needs in order to address the current threats and win on future battlefields. This study discovered that, at times, Psychological Operations has been empowered to do so in the past.

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[36] Chicago Council on Global Affairs, "This Week's Reads – A Return to the Interwar Era," November 15, 2018, https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/blog/global-insight/ivo-daalder-return-interwar-era.

[37] SecDef, Summary of the 2018 NDS, 2.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Related Research Introduction

No great nation group in the modern world can afford to neglect political propaganda.

—F. C. Bartlett, *Political Propaganda*

The thesis of this study is that there is a way to address the gaps within the

Psychological Operations Regiment to empower it to conduct operations in line with the

Army Special Operations Forces Strategy. Two books, *Writing Literature Reviews* and

Practical Research Planning and Design were pivotal for the structure of this chapter.[38]

Literature Review

Understanding the depth of previously written literature of propaganda,

Psychological Warfare, and Psychological Operations was the first focus of this literature

review. The literature's lessons learned and previously suggested solutions to problems

that were faced was the second focus. The literature selected was chosen in order to better

frame the problem statement and to identify patterns to later be explored in-depth in the

research section, "as a basis for advancing research questions or hypotheses."[39] The

review focused on the contrasting criticisms and suggested innovations to identify

patterns and specific points of research that could drive further analysis and research.

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[38] Jose L. Galvan, *Writing Literature Reviews*, 7th ed. (New York: Routledge, 2017); Paul D. Leedy, Jeanne Ellis, Laura Ruth Johnson, *Practical Research: Planning and Design*, 12th ed. (New York: Pearson, 2019).

[39] John W. Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches* (Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2014), 28-31.

Four categories of Psychological Operations, or eras, were identified through the course of this thesis: The Pre-Global War Era, The World Wars Era, The Cold War Era, and The Modern Warfare Era. The Pre-Global War Era includes historical examples from ancient civilizations and up to the World Wars and is not limited to United States activities. The World Wars Era includes both the First and Second World Wars and served as an extension of the use of propaganda as it evolved into Psychological Warfare. These categories are unique to this study.

The Pre-Global War Era (2560 BC – 1903 AD)

> The person who cries "Fire!" in a crowded auditorium, or who starts a false alarm resulting in a panic is spreading a form of propaganda. The results of his act may be such as to lay him liable to a trial for murder.
> —Military Intelligence Branch, *Propaganda in its Military and Legal Aspects*

Critical Literature of the Era

The Pre-Global War Era of Psychological Operations was defined by the genius of military commanders and expert planning. Many accounts still exist of the most famous of these operations throughout the millennia. However, analysis and criticism were not the focus of these writings. Instead, they served as historical vignettes, and brief moments of tactical brilliance relaying the actions taken by nation states, kings, and heads of religions.

The Art of War was written during this period—circa 500 BC.[40] The 323 BC publication of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is viewed as a turning point in the development of

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[40] Sun Tzu, *The Art of War,* trans. Lionel Giles (The Internet Classics Archive, 1910), http://classics.mit.edu/Tzu/artwar.html.

persuasive argument.[41] Herodotus wrote in 425 BC of the use of propaganda by

Themistocles, who etched messages into rocks to influence the Ionians to not participate

in the coming conflict.[42] Kautilya wrote the *Arthashastra* circa 150 AD in which he

addressed the psychological effects of destroying a besieged fortress's crops, supplies,

and livestock.[43] The role of journalism continued to expand through the late 1800s.

Citizens of the United States began to engage in conversations about censorship and the

power of the press to influence populations.[44]

Lessons Learned from the History of the Era

The Revolutionary War

The year 1440 AD was a turning point for information, as the creation of the

printing press made it possible for the mass production of printed material.[45] The

American Revolutionary War would serve as a test bed.[46] Samuel Adams was the war's

most prolific propagandist, managing multiple pen names and going so far as to change

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[41] Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson, *Age of Propaganda* (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2001), 13.

[42] Herodotus, *Herodotus*, Henry Cary, trans. (London: George Bell and Sons, 1908), 499.

[43] Kautilya, *The Arthashastra* (Haryana: Penguin Books, 1992), 693.

[44] Joe B. Fulton, "The Lost Manuscript Conclusion to Mark Twain's 'Corn-Pone Opinions': An Editorial History and an Edition of the Restored Text," *American Literary Realism* 37, no. 3 (Spring 2005): 241.

[45] Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, *The Printing Press as an Agent of Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).

[46] Paul J. Springer, *Propaganda from the American Civil War* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2019), xv.

his writing style to fit the pen name.[47] Adams and his propaganda were recorded as the single greatest contributor to the American independence movement that led to the rebellion of the American colonies and eventual declared independence in 1776.[48] The single most incendiary piece of propaganda from the Revolutionary War was a pamphlet written by Thomas Paine entitled *Common Sense*.[49] The pamphlet stood as an argument for independence from British colonial rule.[50]

Adams and Paine both represented the power of small groups. A single individual, skilled in the arts, may affect the ebb and flow of war. Support from the people was important for the success of the revolution. It was gained through mass communication techniques, and the integration of technology—in this case, the printing press, which facilitated quick production and mass distribution.

Napoleon

Napoleon was very familiar with mass persuasion and adept at turning popular movements into support for his actions, culminating in crowning himself Emperor of France in 1804.[51] The French Revolution preceding Napoleon's rise to power was born

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[47] Martin J. Manning and Clarence R. Wyatt, eds., *Encyclopedia of Media and Propaganda in Wartime America: Volume 1* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2011), 7.

[48] Ibid., 8.

[49] Gordon S. Wood, *The American Revolution: A History* (New York: Modern Library, 2002), 55.

[50] Anthony Di Lorenzo, "Dissenting Protestantism as a Language of Revolution in Thomas Paine's Common Sense," *Eighteenth-Century Thought* 4 (2009): 229-231.

[51] Parker, *The Cambridge History of Warfare*, 201.

of the belief in meritocracy, the will of the people, and ushered in sweeping changes for the right of man.[52] It also affected the way militaries functioned—subordinates had to be inspired to prevail.[53] Napoleon integrated morale into his planning, being quoted as considering the morale of the enemy worth three times that of physical strength or assets of an enemy force.[54] While bulletins existed prior to Napoleon, he is credited with having understood their propaganda potential, reinventing the way information was released during war.[55] Newspapers and print media had begun to surge in metropolitan cities, and journalists relied on such bulletins to gleam what facts they could, though there was a level of frustration involved. Decoding Napoleon became an art form, as he was prone to declaring victory when campaigns were not as successful as he boasted.[56] Napoleon was the first to leverage the movements of equality, framing them to benefit himself.

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[52] Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 124.

[53] MacGregor Knox and illiamson Murray, *The Dynamics of Military Revolution: 1300-2050* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 6-13.

[54] David Owen, *Battle of Wits: A History of Psychology & Deception in Modern Warfare* (London: Leo Cooper LTD, 1978), vii.

[55] Joseph J. Mathews, *Reporting the Wars* (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1957), 12.

[56] Ibid., 20-21.

Desertion

The Battle of Bunker Hill during the Revolutionary War is the most famous

example of the first uses of handbills in conflict, with a printed suggestion that the British

should desert.[57] Other efforts were aimed at mercenaries that the British had hired,

> Hessian mercenaries in particular responded to this appeal later in the war, and a
> considerable number of the present-day Pennsylvania Dutch owe their ancestry to
> the effectiveness of this appeal as these soldiers settled in a language-compatible
> area in which they were unlikely to be turned over to the British authority.[58]

Propaganda continued to be used into the 1800s.[59] Mexico used propaganda to persuade

United States soldiers to defect, with the Mexican government promising 320 acres to

any defector.[60] Some figures claimed up to eighty percent dissertation rates of some

United States Army units during the war.[61] Mexico did more than just communicate; they

provided an incentive. This was a reflection of the increasing complexity of propaganda,

and one of the first instances of Psychological Warfare, though it would not be called that

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[57] Massachusetts Historical Society, "Prospect Hill. Bunker's Hill. Psychological Warfare during the Siege of Boston," April 2019, https://www.masshist.org/object-of-the-month/objects/prospect-hill-bunker-s-hill-pyschological-warfare-during-the-siege-of-boston-2009-04-01.

[58] Frank L. Goldstein and Daniel W. Jacobowitz, "Psychological Operations: An Introduction," *Psychological Operations Principles and Case Studies* (Montgomery: Air University Press, 2004), 12.

[59] R. Arthur Bowler, "Propaganda in Upper Canada in the War of 1812," *American Review of Canadian Studies* 18, no. 1 (1988): 11-32, DOI: 10.1080/02722018809480915.

[60] Stanley Sandler, "Cease Resistance: It's Good for You: A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations," 2nd ed. (Secretary of the Army Research and Writing Fellowship, 1999), 16.

[61] Ibid.

for many decades. The message was so successful that entire United States artillery

batteries defected and fired upon their comrades outside of Mexico City in 1847.[62]

The World Wars Era (1903 – 1945)

> In this war, which was total in every sense of the word, we have seen many great changes in military science. It seems to me that not the least of these was the development of Psychological Warfare as a specific and effective weapon.
> —Dwight D. Eisenhower, Campaign Speech in San Francisco, in Curtis Boyd, "The Future of MISO"

Critical Literature of the Era

Leonard Doob published *Propaganda: Its Psychology and Technique* in 1935.[63]

Doob's work represented the first attempt to understand propaganda in its totality. He

broke down psychological concepts, motivations, stereotypes, social values, suggestions,

prestige, and even language and education; then he applied scientific rigor to express how

propaganda could influence groups of people by addressing such concepts with

communication.[64] Doob concluded his writing by establishing what he labeled as "The

Principles of Propaganda," a series of fundamentals for how to conduct propaganda.[65]

After the Second World War, several individuals who were a part of the war

efforts sought to write down their experiences. Before dissolving, the Psychological

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[62] Paul M.A. Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare* (Darke County: Coachwhip Publications, 2010), 29.

[63] Leonard W. Doob, *Propaganda: Its Psychology and Technique* (Henry Holt and Company, Inc., February, 1943).

[64] Ibid.

[65] Ibid., 413-417.

Warfare Division Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force created a report of their operations and the techniques their organization used throughout the war.[66] While not complete in its analysis of the use of Psychological Warfare, it provided a depth of information and did not shy away from objective criticism of the operations; concluding that further research would have to be conducted.[67] One critique was that western countries were slow to mobilize their all-out Psychological Warfare efforts, to include the personnel, equipment, and organization required to conduct such operations.[68]

Lessons Learned from the History of the Era

The United States General Staff of 1903

This era began with the creation of the United States General Staff in 1903; an Act of Congress that replaced the office of Commanding General of the Army.[69] The General Staff served in many capacities, including as lobbyists for military intervention, expansionist concepts, and preparedness.[70] Their efforts were submitted as studies to the Chief of Staff. General Officers on the staff were allowed to be interviewed by journalists

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[66] The Psychological Warfare Division Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (PWD SHAEF), *An Account of its Operations in the Western European Campaign, 1944-1945* (Bad Homburg: PWD SHAEF, October 1945), 13, accessed March 21, 2020, https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/2857.

[67] Ibid., 5.

[68] Ibid., 21.

[69] Elihu Root, *Annual Report of the Secretary of War* (Washington, DC: War Department, 1902), 46.

[70] Marry Reynolds, "The General Staff as a Propaganda Agency, 1908-1914," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 3, no. 3 (July 1939): 391-408.

with the desire to influence reporting, and testimonies were given to Congress to impress

upon them the importance of certain decisions that would be beneficial to military

preparedness.[71]

The Committee on Public Information

        The Committee on Public Information (CPI) was led by George Creel to

champion the war as the war to end all wars.[72] It was comprised of journalists, the

founders of the theory of public relations, a professor of political science, fiction writers,

and filmmakers.[73] Creel's objective was to reach as many audiences as he could to

increase support for the war effort,

> Sections were set up for posters, advertising, "Four Minute Men" (volunteer local speakers in all American communities), films, American minority groups and bureaus, syndicated features, and cartoons. The young but already large American motion picture industry was made a channel whereby American propaganda movies went to both the United States and overseas audiences. In one instance Creel got the American producers to threaten Swiss exhibitors with a boycott unless they showed American propaganda film along with the features.[74]

Creel believed in advertising the United States as an idea, inviting foreign delegations

and journalists to the United States for tours and conferences.[75]

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[71] Reynolds, "The General Staff as a Propaganda Agency, 1908-1914," 391-408.

[72] Sue Curry Jansen, "'The World's Greatest Adventure in Advertising': Walter Lippmann's Critique of Censorship and Propaganda," in *The Oxford Handbook of Propaganda Studies,* ed. Jonathan Auerbach and Russ Castronovo (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 301-302.

[73] George Creel, *How We Advertised America; The First Telling of the Amazing Story of the Committee on Public Information that Carried the Gospel of Americanism to Every Corner of the Globe* (Miami: HardPress Publishing, January, 2013).

[74] Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 100.

[75] Creel, *How We Advertised America*, 227-234.

Members of the CPI, like Edward Bernays, were encouraged to consider creative solutions. Bernays understood that propaganda was not simply advertising and messaging.[76] Bernays believed that propaganda experts must appeal to the influencers that already existed within populations, and that winning over those individuals would spread the propaganda message naturally; when Bernays saw the concept for the Four Minute Men, his opinion was further reinforced.[77]

Bernays would become the mind behind the momentum of success of the Four Minute Men.[78] At its height, 75,000 individuals were employed as Four Minute Men.[79] By the end of the war, over 755,190 speeches were given by the Four Minute Men, reaching an estimated audience of over three hundred million individual attendees.[80] Press releases to foreign audiences were also championed and Bernays was instructed to lead the efforts to influence foreign presses abroad.[81]

Academia

Several moments of innovation concerning the study of Psychological Warfare occurred following the First World War. This began with the establishment of the Office

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[76] Alan Axelrod, *Selling the Great War: The Making of American Propaganda* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 115-116.

[77] Ibid., 116.

[78] Ibid., 115-121.

[79] Ibid., 120.

[80] Creel, *How We Advertised America*, 94.

[81] Ibid., 266.

of Radio Research at Princeton University in 1937.[82] The office studied several events in the United States, the most well-known being the 1938 radio broadcast of *War of the Worlds*.[83] The Office of Radio Research later established Paul Lazarsfeld's Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University.[84] These two organizations represented a larger shift in the funding of social science research.[85] Columbia University, Princeton, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology represented just some of the larger shift toward government funded research into Psychological Warfare.[86] Leaders within the social science community believed in Psychological Warfare as a tool to address international conflict using means "less than war".[87]

The Office of Strategic Services

The United States was slowly drawn into the Second World War and had to reestablish offices to conduct propaganda. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was established in June of 1942, and William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan fell under the command

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[82] Jefferyson D. Pooley and Michael J. Socolow, "Checking Up on The Invasion from Mars: Hadley Cantril, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and the Making of a Misremembered Classic," *International Journal of Communication* 7 (2013): 1920-1948, https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/viewFile/2117/980.

[83] Jennings Bryant and Dolf Zillmann, eds., *Media Effects: Advances in Theory and Research* (Mahway: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 2002), 202.

[84] Christopher Simpson, *Science of Coercion: Communication Research and Psychological Warfare 1945-1960* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 4.

[85] Ibid.

[86] Ibid.

[87] Ibid.

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as its leader, but reported directly to the President.[88] Donovan

believed, "intelligence gathering, propaganda, and [Psychological Warfare]," would each

be conducted in that order prior to military operations.[89] Special Operations would be

conducted after Psychological Warfare to prepare the battlefield.[90] Special Operations

would then be followed by conventional operations.[91]

The Office of War Information

The Office of War Information (OWI) was established on June 13, 1942.[92] Every

theater was different, and some theaters integrated the OWI with the OSS very closely,

with others relying heavily on the OWI without support from the OSS.[93] The Pacific

theater was an example, as General MacArthur was opposed to the idea of the OSS, so he

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[88] Christopher Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (New York: Harper Perennial, January 31, 1996), 85.

[89] Allison B. Gilmore *You Can't Fight Tanks with Bayonets: Psychological Warfare against the Japanese Army in the Southwest Pacific* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 89.

[90] Alfred H. Paddock Jr., "Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941-1952: Origins of a Special Warfare Capability for the United States Army" (Individual Study Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1979), 9.

[91] Ibid.

[92] Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Executive Order 9182 Establishing the Office of War Information," June 13, 1942, The American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-9182-establishing-the-office-war-information.

[93] Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 136.

only permitted the OWI.[94] In Europe, the OWI worked closely with the British Broadcasting Company to develop radio stations.[95]

The greatest example of effectively planned Psychological Operations from the war came when the OWI dropped thousands of well-timed leaflets informing the Japanese of the Japanese government's terms for surrender while they were still attempting to negotiate.[96] The Japanese government was left without any recourse but to formally surrender. It was a moment of great achievement for propaganda, as, "Nowhere else in history can there be found an instance of so many people being given so decisive a message, all at the same time, at the very dead-point between war and peace."[97] As Linebarger later wrote, the operation alone, "probably repaid the entire cost of OWI throughout the war."[98]

Artists of War

The apex of propaganda came from America's entertainment industry, which had the infrastructure to reach the audiences of the world.[99] The First Motion Picture Unit was established during the Second World War and nested within the then named U.S.

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[94] Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 136.

[95] Paddock, "Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941-1952," 21.

[96] Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 143.

[97] Ibid.

[98] Ibid.

[99] Taylor, *Munitions of the Mind*, 227.

Army Air Forces.[100] The motion picture infrastructure established and dominated by

Hollywood would continue to be a pillar of influence throughout the world into the

modern era.[101] Hollywood was not the only media participant in the Allied efforts. John

Steinbeck, already a famous literary author at the time, approached Wild Bill Donovan

with a proposal to write a novel as a tool to influence support for the war.[102] The result

was *The Moon is Down*, an epic about the invasion and occupation of a Northern

European town and the psychological effects on the displaced persons that he interacted

with during the war while working for the Coordinator of Information.[103]

The strategic deceptions of the British led to the formation of the 23rd

Headquarters Special Troops.[104] Also known as the Ghost Army, it was the United

States' Special Plans Branch in London.[105] The Ghost Army, itself, consisted of engineer

battalions, signal units, and radio operations.[106] They were once called upon to fill a gap

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[100] George J. Siegel, "Hollywood's Army: The First Motion Picture Unit, US Army Air Forces Culver City, California," Military Museum, July 19, 2017, http://www.militarymuseum.org/1stmpu.html.

[101] Taylor, *Munitions of the Mind*, 227.

[102] Donald V. Coers, "Introduction," in John Steinbeck, *The Moon is Down* (New York: Penguin Books, 1995).

[103] Ibid.

[104] National Army Security Agency Association, "The 23rd Headquarters Special Troops (World War II)," Internet Archive, 2019, https://web.archive.org/web/20160105200438/http://nasaa-home.org/23rdhqs.htm.

[105] Ghost Army Legacy Project, "Overview," accessed February 27, 2020, http://www.ghostarmylegacyproject.org/overview.html.

[106] Ibid.

in General Patton's lines for Operation Bettembourg.[107] They were later used to channel German forces in directions favorable to the Allies during the Battle of the Bulge for Operation Kodak.[108] Many of the soldiers in the Ghost Army would later become famous following the war, "like fashion designer Bill Blass, minimalist painter Ellsworth Kelly, [and] wildlife artists Arthur Singer and photographer At Kane."[109]

"The INC" and the Psychological Warfare Division

Lieutenant General Eisenhower appointed Brigadier General Robert A. McClure as the head of his Psychological Warfare operations in 1942.[110] McClure, in a letter to his wife from an unknown location in Africa, wrote,

> My Psychological Warfare Staff—radio, leaflet, signals, front line, occupation, domestic propaganda personnel, exceed 700. In censorship—troop, mail, and cables, civilian mail, radio, press, cables, telephone for all of North & West Africa, Sicily… over 400 personnel [and] supervising 400 French. Public relations—press and correspondents—150 correspondents—250 personnel—a total "command" of 1500 in an organization never contemplated in the Army.[111]

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[107] Ghost Army Legacy Project, "Overview."

[108] Ibid.

[109] Ibid.

[110] Jared M. Tracy, "Major General Robert A. McClure," *Veritas* 7, no. 2 (2011), https://arsof-history.org/articles/v7n2_mcclure_page_1.html.

[111] Ibid.

The operation was massive, and it was mobile. At the time, McClure's section was called the Information and Censorship Section, and was often referred to as "The INC".[112] It evolved into the Psychological Warfare Division to fight in the European Theater.[113]

The Psychological Warfare Division pioneered leaflet distribution during the war.[114] Parts of the unit had mobile printing capabilities to move with the ground forces.[115] Other teams under the Psychological Warfare Division functioned specifically as consolidation teams, which reopened radio stations, newspapers, and functioned as public relations nodes between the population and the Allies.[116] They also conducted detailed interrogations with captured enemies, interestingly using historians and social scientists instead of psychologists to do the debriefings.[117]

The Psychological Warfare Division pioneered aspects of social science research. A psychiatrist, Henry Dicks, contributed to the study of interrogations by developing a questionnaire in order to illicit opinions to determine the percentage of the prisoner's affiliation and belief in the Nazi party.[118] The data helped to frame the German soldiers

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[112] Tracy, "Major General Robert A. McClure."

[113] Ibid.

[114] Sandler, "Cease Resistance," 117-119.

[115] Ibid., 86.

[116] Ibid., 89.

[117] Ibid., 120-121.

[118] Ellen Herman, *The Romance of American Psychology: Political Culture in the Age of Experts* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995), 39.

based upon a theory that the German population was experiencing psychological trauma that suppressed their true beliefs.[119]

The Cold War Era (1945 – 1985)

We are in a war of ideas.

—Murray Dyer, *The Weapon on the Wall*

Critical Literature of the Era

The Weapon on the Wall was published in 1959 and detailed the shortsightedness of the United States' insistence on dismantling the military's Psychological Warfare organizations it had stood up time and again.[120] The CPI, OSS, OWI, and all other organizations ended following the First and Second World War. The analysis within *The Weapon on the Wall* discussed how there was often no overarching plan to conduct Psychological Warfare, and that such plans should be established.[121] Solutions included the creation of a national college on political communication, concluding that the most effective solution would be for the President to be involved.[122] However, the distinction was made earlier in the book that a single agency to conduct all forms of influence was already proven to be too powerful, and therefore ineffective.[123]

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[119] Herman, *The Romance of American Psychology,* 39.

[120] Murray Dyer, *The Weapon on the Wall: Rethinking Psychological Warfare* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, November 1, 1959), 98.

[121] Ibid., 132-141.

[122] Ibid., 179-238.

[123] Ibid., 87.

The now defunct Goodyear Aircraft Corporation published Cacioppo's *A Systematic Theory for Psychological Warfare* in 1960.[124] The publication was a part of the growing movement within academia to incorporate scientific theory and psychological research into Psychological Warfare.[125] It acknowledged the need for a theory to assist in defining the Western objectives during the Cold War.[126] He also emphasized the need for the government to empower Psychological Warfare organizations.[127] Cacioppo's model for such Psychological Warfare organizations emphasized the need for a repository of lessons learned and files that, "would include historic and current intelligence regarding the cultural, political, economic, behavioral, and physical characteristics that define the area."[128]

It was also suggested that such an organization possess the ability to process intelligence specifically targeting the attitudes of populations, geo-political interest, and group sentiments concerning, "family, economic structure, government, and education."[129] The study posited that for any such organization to be successful it must be appropriately staffed with, "social psychologists, political scientists, economists, area

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[124] Anthony J. Cacioppo, *A Systematic Theory for Psychological Warfare* (Akron: Goodyear Aircraft Corporation, 1960).

[125] Ibid., 1.

[126] Ibid.

[127] Ibid., 34.

[128] Ibid.

[129] Ibid., 34-35.

specialists, and military scientists."[130] The study also stated that such individuals would

need to be empowered to composite all of the information together in order to conduct

evaluations.[131]

McLaurin edited and developed his *Military Propaganda* in 1982, another body

of work similar to Doob's original work from 1935.[132] Its publication was the

culmination of research from similar writings, which included William E. Daugherty's *A*

Systematic Framework for Psychological Operations from 1966, and *The Case for*

Reappraisal of U.S. Overseas Information Policies and Programs by Edward Bernays

and Burnet Hershey.[133] It provided examples of methods to employ, the origins of

concepts, and even how to man such concepts.[134] McLaurin and his team stood as an

example of how to add to the body of research and develop proper paths forward within

the military. McLaurin wrote,

> Should Psychological Operations enjoy a renaissance in the military—and such a
> renaissance is quite likely at some point—indications are that organizational

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[130] Cacioppo, *A Systematic Theory for Psychological Warfare*, 34.

[131] Ibid., 35.

[132] Ron D. McLaurin, ed., *Military Propaganda: Psychological Warfare and Operations* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), iv.

[133] William E. Daugherty, *A Systematic Framework for Psychological Operations* (Washington, DC: ODCSOPS, 1966), 1; Edward L. Bernays and Burnet Hershey, eds., *The Case for Reappraisal of U.S. Overseas Information Policies and Programs: Incorporating Congressman Fascell's Report* (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1970).

[134] McLaurin, *Military Propaganda*, iv.

lessons, just like the operational lessons discussed elsewhere in this book, will have to be learned all over again—the hard way.[135]

Other suggestions included improved optimization of recruiting, effective planning, systematic approaches to intelligence in support of Psychological Operations, and science-based methods of measuring effectiveness.[136]

Lessons Learned from the History of the Era

The Korean War and Psychological Warfare

The Korean War led to the creation of Eighth Army's Intelligence Branch, G3 Psychological Warfare Division on February 1, 1951.[137] The Korean War Psychological Warfare units hired Korean and Chinese artists to better appeal to their target audiences.[138] May of 1951 stood as the apex of traditional Psychological Warfare during the Korean War, with 48 loudspeaker missions performed and 2,943 documented surrenders.[139] Prisoners of War (POWs) were interviewed in order to better understand the enemy, and even to gauge the effectiveness of certain products.[140] At the end of the

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[135] McLaurin, *Military Propaganda*, 76.

[136] Ibid., 103-139.

[137] G3 Psychological Warfare Division, First Loud-speaker and Leaflet Company, "Report on the Psychological Warfare Conducted by the Eighth Army Units in Korea: 25 June 1950 thru 27 July 1953" (Headquarters, Eighth Army, February 1954), 4.

[138] Ibid., Section III, 15.

[139] Ibid., Section V, Part I, 35.

[140] Albert C. Brauer, "Psychological Warfare Korea 1951" (Paper, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 1953), 22.

war, it was estimated that one third of the POWs surrendered due to the efforts of Psychological Warfare.[141]

Multiple reports were commissioned to better understand Psychological Warfare. Studies found that Psychological Warfare had to be practiced by experts, not simply normal soldiers; that effectiveness of messages was not assessed correctly.[142] The need for liaison officers to facilitate operations with the Air Force was also identified.[143]

The Central Intelligence Agency

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) formed out of the remnants of the OSS alongside the Army's Psychological Warfare units.[144] The CIA possessed the authority for covert actions, which included similar authorities that the OSS had: Psychological Warfare, deception operations, sabotage, as well as the collection of intelligence.[145] By

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[141] Christopher J. Lamb, *Review of Psychological Operations Lessons Learned from Recent Operational Experience,* Report (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, September, 2005), 27-28.

[142] Herbert B. Avedon *Psychological Warfare Operational Deficiencies Noted in Korea – A Study* (Fort Bragg, NC: Psychological Warfare Center, November 10, 1953), 94-109.

[143] Ibid., 44.

[144] Annie Jacobsen, *Surprise, Kill, Vanish: The Secret History of CIA Paramilitary Armies, Operators, and Assassins* (New York: Hachette Book Group, 2019), 35.

[145] Glen W. LaFantasie, ed., "292. National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects," in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment,* ed. C. Thomas Thorne, Jr., and David S. Patterson (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d292.

1948, it was officially granted authorities to conduct covert and counter-espionage efforts in periods of peace within the Office of Special Projects.[146]

The CIA grew while the military drew their Psychological Warfare capabilities down following the Korean War.[147] One of the CIA's now declassified methods of the era was their use and dissemination of material that already existed, specifically art. Their efforts to introduce *Doctor Zhivago* into the Soviet Union in 1958 were extensive.[148] *Doctor Zhivago* told the Russian story of disillusionment from revolution and loneliness in an objective and nuanced way. The use of art to influence was significant, as it was a relevant craft continued from the Second World War.

The United States Information Agency

The United States Information Agency (USIA) was created on August 1, 1953 and known overseas as the United States Information Service (USIS).[149] It was the third organization given the authority to conduct Psychological Operations and complemented the Army's Psychological Warfare units and the CIA. The mission of the USIA was to

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[146] LaFantasie, "292. National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects."

[147] Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., "No More Tactical Information Detachments: US Military Psychological Operations in Transition," in *Psychological Operations Principles and Case Studies,* ed. Frank L. Goldstein (Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, AL: Air University Press, 2004), 28.

[148] The Washington Post, "The CIA and 'Doctor Zhivago': Memo from April 24, 1958," April 5, 2014, http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/the-cia-and-doctor-zhivago-memo-from-april-24-1958/922/.

[149] Thomas C. Sorensen, *The Word War* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 45-47.

influence foreign public opinion and also to advise the President in the foreign opinions

of other nations.[150] Some of its initial operations included news broadcasts, libraries,

businesses, cartoons, films, and even ballets—all of which would eventually be

formalized and sent throughout the world.[151]

Many programs existed under USIA, from the Fulbright Scholar Program, an

academic exchange program; to Voice of America, which included several foreign radio

broadcasts; as well as book translation programs to translate popular and important

English works to distribute to other countries.[152] At its height the USIA employed 10,000

personnel and had a $1 billion annual budget.[153] The USIA ended in 1999.[154]

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[150] Office of the Director, U.S. Information Agency, Memorandum For The Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Subject: Presidential Statement of USIA Mission, U.S. Information Agency, Washington, DC, February 11, 1963, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R002900180012-1.pdf.

[151] Summers, *America's Weapons of Psychological Warfare*, 39-62.

[152] U.S. Information Agency (USIA), *The United States Information Agency: A Commemoration* (Washington, DC: USIA, 1998), https://web.archive.org/web/20110607062001/http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/usia/abtusia/commins.pdf#.

[153] Threat Knowledge Group, *The Islamic State and Information Warfare: Defeating ISIS and the Broader Global Jihadist Movement,* Threat Knowledge Group Special Report, *Information Warfare in the New Threat Environment* (Fort Bragg, NC: John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, US Army Special Operations Command, January 2015), 6.

[154] Association for Diplomatic Studies & Training, "The ACDA-USIA Merger into State – The End of of an Era," October 18, 2016, https://adst.org/2016/10/acda-usia-merger-into-state-end-of-an-era/.

The Operational Research Office and Special Operations Research Office

The Operational Research Office (ORO) of Johns Hopkins University was established during this era and was tasked with auditing Psychological Warfare capabilities to determine what methods achieved the best effects.[155] ORO existed as civilian offices within academia, contracted to assist the military with studies, analysis, and assessments. One such study found that the lessons learned from the World Wars were mostly relearned time and again in the field, that there was no hub of understanding concerning Psychological Warfare, and that there was not even properly constructed doctrine on the practice.[156]

The Special Operations Research Office (SORO) was founded at American University in 1956.[157] SORO's focus was on doctrine and the operational needs of officers and it was similar in structure to ORO.[158] One SORO project referenced as Prosyms, or "propaganda symbols", led to the creation of over ten manuals for countries edging toward communism.[159] The manuals included entire Psychological Operations campaigns, analysis of the governments, and detailed studies of the populations.[160] ORO and SORO demonstrated the potential of academic integration. SORO was most active in

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[155] Dyer, *The Weapon on the Wall*, 113.

[156] Ibid., 114.

[157] Joy Rohde, *Armed With Expertise: The Militarization of American Social Research During the Cold War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018), 4.

[158] Ibid.

[159] Ibid., 42.

[160] Ibid.

the 1950s and 1960s, and eventually transitioned into a research group called Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies.[161]

Other Academia

The 1950s were also an interesting time for academic research. Several large social science studies were funded by the government between 1945 and 1955.[162] Only one similar study during those years was found that was not funded by the government.[163] All others received funding from the Air Force, Army, CIA, USIA, or the Office of Naval Research.[164] The research contributed to military documents and also civilian publications and studies, in many ways culminating in *The Process and Effects of Mass Communication*, a watershed publication on government propaganda programs.[165] The author, Wilbur Schramm, contributed a wealth of knowledge and research to training material on Psychological Warfare for the CIA and USIA.[166] Schramm was one of the most influential figures in communication between the 1930s until the 1970s, and his

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[161] U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), "Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) Studies," accessed April 28, 2020, https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/ARIS.html.

[162] Simpson, *Science of Coercion*, 53.

[163] Ibid.

[164] Ibid.

[165] Ibid., 108.

[166] Ibid., 108-109.

influence upon research is still being uncovered, as many of his contributions become declassified with time. [167]

The Vietnam War Psychological Operations

     All organizations conducting Psychological Warfare in Vietnam did so independently of each other for years. [168] President Lyndon B. Johnson corrected the stovepipes by integrating organizations and preventing the duplication of efforts. [169] That materialized on July 1, 1965, when the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) was established to coordinate all propaganda activities among USIS, and Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) with the USIA in a supervisory role. [170]

     General Westmoreland heavily emphasized the use of Psychological Operations. [171] The support did not translate to effect, though, as emphasis was placed on the amount of material created and disseminated. [172] Many operations were conducted

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[167] Simpson, *Science of Coercion*, 107.

[168] Robert W. Chandler, *War of Ideas: The U.S. Propaganda Campaign in Vietnam* (Boulder: The Westview Press, Inc., 1981), 26.

[169] Benjamin F. Findley, Jr., "US and Vietcong Psychological Operations in Vietnam," in *Psychological Operations Principles and Case Studies,* ed. Frank L. Goldstein (Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, AL: Air University Press, 2004), 233.

[170] Chandler, *War of Ideas*, 26; Some of the material researched referenced the Military Assistance Group, Vietnam (MAGV) instead of calling it the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). This study will reference the MACV only.

[171] Michael G. Barger, "Psychological Operations Supporting Counterinsurgency: 4th Psychological Operations Group in Vietnam" (Master's Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, June 2007), 2.

[172] Ibid.

without proper analysis.[173] The results of the collective Psychological Operations were,

"60 [enemy] soldiers per 114,000,000 leaflets, per 1,400 hours of loudspeaker time, per

six-week multi-unit, multi- organization effort seemed to represent far less than success if

not failure."[174]

A critical lesson from the Vietnam War was the lack of training that

Psychological Operations personnel possessed. Chandler wrote in 1981,

> JUSPAO's "white lie" of producing communications on behalf of the Republic
> (and, on a lesser scale, the Royal Laotian government) made it vital that all
> elements of foreignness be eliminated in "light-gray" [Psychological Operations].
> Paradoxically, the American weaknesses—insufficient numbers of behavioral
> scientists and Vietnamese language, history, and culture specialists—had a
> positive effect in that they *forced* Americans to rely heavily on their native
> employees. As a result of this collaboration, most communications probably were
> in general accord with indigenous predispositions and largely devoid of
> foreignness. On the other hand, it is arguable whether this reliance on local talent
> provided sufficient inspiration for high-quality [Psychological Operations].[175]

Relying on local hires could dramatically improve the potential capabilities of any

Psychological Operations organization. Without proper training for Psychological

Operations personnel, however, they could not adequately manage effects.

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[173] Barger, "Psychological Operations Supporting Counterinsurgency," 2.

[174] Ernest F. Bairdain and Edith M. Bairdain, *Volume I, Final Technical Report: Psychological Operations Studies—Vietnam* (Arlington, VA: Advanced Research Projects Agency, May 25, 1971), 113.

[175] Chandler, *War of Ideas*, 247.

Few individuals had advanced degrees in behavioral sciences.[176] Nearly two thousand personnel were a part of the JUSPAO, demonstrating that quantity does not make up for lack of quality.[177] The most revealing study of the conflict came at its end,

> The modest results achieved, combined with the inferior persuasive power of most "light-gray" message appeals, clearly suggests that any attempt by one government to substitute for another in communicating with its own people is probably destined to fail. Thus, the most significant lesson to be learned from the propaganda campaign is . . . [a] nation clearly should not try to conduct such an unorthodox communications effort as that attempted by the U.S. in Vietnam.[178]

Much of the Psychological Warfare was ineffective against the civilian population because it was very blatantly propaganda.[179]

The effects that did exist were fiscally significant. The clearest breakdown of the effects included a cost comparison to ground operations,

> In 1966 there were over 20,000 defectors, double the number of the preceding year. Total defections of Vietcong returning under [the Chieu Hoi Program] numbered more than 75,000. If we accept the ratio of 10 government soldiers needed for each insurgent guerrilla, this program saved the GVN and the US a troop strength of over 750,000 soldiers. From the dollars-saved angle, the total cost of the program, using a figure of $127 to bring in a Vietcong defector, was around $9.5 million. Since the cost to kill a Vietcong is estimated at $300,000, killing this number of soldiers would have cost $2.25 billion.[180]

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[176] Bairdain and Edith M. Bairdain, *Volume I, Final Technical Report*, 239.

[177] Ibid.

[178] Ibid., 253.

[179] Ibid., 221.

[180] William J. Johnston, "Some Thoughts on Psychological Operations," in *Psychological Operations Principles and Case Studies,* ed. Frank L. Goldstein (Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, AL: Air University Press, 2004), 100.

The numbers were more likely reflective of non-combatants escaping the conflict. Regardless, the results of the program stood as a testament to the constraints imposed upon Psychological Operations. They possessed poor doctrine, were given poor training in language and culture, but still achieved some measurable effects, however flawed.

OPS-33

On January 24, 1964, the MACV officially formed and stood up the Studies and Observations Group (SOG), a Joint organization and the first clandestine military unit since the OSS dissolved post-World War Two.[181] SOG contained its own Psychological Warfare unit: OPS-33.[182] OPS-33's chief function was to create black propaganda.[183] The black propaganda reinforced negative rumors, such as Chinese men sleeping with the wives of the Chinese troops stationed in Vietnam, or that the Chinese were supplying poorly made ammunition.[184]

One of the more elaborate projects from SOG was Project Eldest Son, which was established to dissuade enemy forces from using their weapons caches.[185] This was reinforced through AK-47 ammunition and mortar rounds designed to explode upon usage, destroying the weapon system and the operators.[186] Project Eldest Son was one of

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[181] John L. Plaster, *SOG: The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in Vietnam* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 23.

[182] Ibid., 118.

[183] Ibid.

[184] Ibid.

[185] Ibid., 125.

[186] Ibid., 126.

the programs that could measure its effects accurately; many accounts existed from the Vietnam War in which American soldiers happened upon North Vietnamese with AK-47s that had exploded, and mortar tubes peeled open like bananas with diseased enemy soldiers surrounding the weapon.[187]

The Active Measures Working Group

In the background of the 1980s was an increase in disinformation provided by the Soviet Union against the United States. One example was a Soviet operation that claimed the United States created the AIDS virus.[188] The Soviet Union also spread rumors through their media that the United States disposed of nuclear waste in Africa.[189] The operation was a part of the active Soviet campaign to discredit United States science; these efforts continue today.[190]

The Active Measures Working Group was initially formed in 1981, and lasted for roughly a decade.[191] Attendees included members of the Department of Defense (DoD),

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[187] Plaster, *SOG*, 127.

[188] Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb, *Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference,* Strategic Perspectives 11, ed. Nicholas Rostow (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2012), 6.

[189] DeWitt S. Copp, "Soviet Active Measures," in *Psychological Operations Principles and Case Studies,* ed. Frank L. Goldstein (Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, AL: Air University Press, 2004), 156.

[190] Henry I. Miller, "Putin is Mounting Sly, Self Serving Attacks on American Science," *Newsweek,* November 1, 2018, https://www.newsweek.com/putin-mounting-sly-self-serving-attacks-american-science-778348.

[191] Michael Dhunjishah, "Countering Propaganda and Disinformation: Bring Back the Active Measures Working Group?," *War Room,* U.S. Army War College, July 7,

the CIA, USIA, as well as the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.[192] The nature of the group was that of a collaboration. The group concentrated on illuminating the techniques of the Soviets, publishing several papers of analysis while also working with the newly established strategic Psychological Operations office in 1986—chaired by Alfred H. Paddock Jr., a former commander of the 4th Psychological Operations Group.[193] The Active Measures Working Group achieved great successes during their "road show" operation, which had members travel to U.S. Embassies around the world, exposing Soviet deceptions and influence activities.[194] The group officially met until 1992, when it issued its final report.[195] The working group recently reentered the conversation as an employment option to counter Russian efforts.[196]

The Modern Warfare Era (1985 – Today)

Nations rarely change their basic character in time of war. When war starts it is usually too late to re-educate generations already grown up, teach them

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2017), https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/countering-propaganda-disinformation-bring-back-active-measures-working-group/.

[192] Ibid.

[193] Schoen and Lamb, *Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications*, 35.

[194] Ibid., 36.

[195] Ibid., 80.

[196] Seth G. Jones, "Russian Active Measures: Past, Present, and Future," Center for Strategic & International Studies, June 12, 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-active-measures-past-present-and-future.

wholly new skills, or develop administrative or operational procedures unknown in peacetime life.

—Paul M.A. Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*

Critical Literature of the Era

President Reagan, having served himself within the ranks of the First Motion Picture Unit, understood the importance of Psychological Operations and directed the Department of Defense to rebuild the capability.[197] A total evaluation of the state of Psychological Operations uncovered a series of gaps.[198] The solution was the *1985 Psychological Operations Master Plan*.[199] The Cold War may have ended with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, but the Cold War Era of Psychological Operations ended in 1985 with the publication of this era-defining document.[200] The plan included over two hundred actions to be taken over the course of several years.[201] Some of the suggestions included the increase of Psychological Operations personnel in the rest of the Joint force, a suggestion that was not addressed for decades to come.[202]

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[197] Christopher Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (New York: Harper Perennial, January 31, 1996), 457-502; Paddock, "No More Tactical Information Detachments," 30; National Museum of the USAF, "President Ronald Reagan," Internet Archive, accessed March 20, 2020, https://web.archive.org/web/20071222110350/ http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=1660.

[198] Paddock, "No More Tactical Information Detachments," 30.

[199] Ibid.

[200] Ibid.

[201] Ibid., 31.

[202] Ibid., 32.

Other suggestions included education of conventional forces, which had little understanding of Psychological Operations.[203] The plan also disparaged the transition away from Foreign Area Officer training for Psychological Operations officers.[204] The Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs functional areas were initially included in the training for Foreign Area Officers, with advanced degrees and cultural training provided.[205] The *1990 Psychological Operations Master Plan* took the efforts of the 1985 plan even further, with six areas of concentration: doctrine, unique functions of a Psychological Operations staff, force structure, a Joint Psychological Operations Center, planning, as well as education and training.[206]

One Psychological Operations officer wrote in 1998 that he believed there should exist a Joint Psychological Operations Command under USSOCOM led by a general officer.[207] This was just one of a multitude of examples of the 1985 plan rippling through the era. Another identified the need in 2005 for Psychological Operations to modernize beyond the Cold War, citing doctrine that concentrated on the tactical level, and recommendations that Psychological Operations address individual training

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[203] Paddock, "No More Tactical Information Detachments," 33.

[204] Ibid., 37.

[205] Ibid.

[206] The Undersecretary of Defense, *Department of Defense Psychological Operations Master Plan: March 1990* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, August 23, 1990), iii.

[207] Jack N. Summe, "Information Warfare, Psychological Operations, and a Policy for the Future" (Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1999), 33-36.

recommendations.[208] More input concerning Psychological Operations was written in 2007, which discussed how maximizing the psychological battlespace could benefit operations in the future. Campaign plans and integration were a focus of the study, which insisted that Psychological Operations conduct proper target audience analysis to empower detailed and overarching plans.[209]

That same year, RAND published a deep analysis of public support in war with their *Enlisting Madison Avenue*.[210] In their analysis, they called for lessons learned from the marketing community to be intermixed with the separate lessons learned from military actions.[211] The analysis concluded that training needed to be improved upon.[212] In their recommendations section, the authors encouraged analytic, data driven joint operations that would complement the greater needs of the military missions.[213]

RAND followed up *Enlisting Madison Avenue* with the most comprehensive and impactful study of Psychological Operations in the modern era: *U.S. Military Information*

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[208] Jeremy S. Mushtare, "PSYOP in Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations: Preparing for Korean Reunification" (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2005), 81-84, 113.

[209] Chadwick D. Barklay, "Maximizing the Psychological Battlespace: Effectively Planning and Integrating Operational-Level Psychological Operations (PSYOP) into Full-Spectrum Operations" (Final Report, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 2007), 1-3.

[210] Todd C. Helmus, Chrostpher Paul, and Russell W. Glenn, *Enlisting Madison Avenue: The Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operation* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 2007).

[211] Ibid., 176.

[212] Ibid., 43.

[213] Ibid., 171-179.

Operations in Afghanistan.[214] The study was conducted over several years and primarily

covered the operations conducted in Afghanistan up to 2010.[215] What the study found

was that several operations achieved great effect, and just as many operations did not.[216]

The most successful Psychological Operations were integrated cohesively at all levels of

operations, with soldiers at the lowest level empowered to influence using face-to-face

engagements with key leaders to build relationships.[217] The failures cited within the 2012

RAND study included a lack of measures of effectiveness, poor integration, and

ineffectively countering the enemy's campaigns to influence.[218] The suggestions on

methods of improvement included testing messages before disseminating them, surveys

to measure effectiveness, using key communicators, and rewriting doctrine to fit the

realistic needs of the organizations.[219] The study also suggested information be released

in order to better inform the population.[220]

In 2016 a group of Psychological Operations officers attended the Navy

Postgraduate School where they took part in a study on the state of Psychological

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[214] Arturo Muñoz, *U.S. Military Information Operations in Afghanistan: Effectiveness of Psychological Operations 2001-2010* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 2012).

[215] Ibid.

[216] Ibid., xv.

[217] Ibid., xvi.

[218] Ibid., xvi-xix.

[219] Ibid., xix-xx.

[220] Ibid., 141.

Operations.[221] Their analysis found some common threads similar to past findings. These included a lack of guidance for Psychological Operations at the strategic level, in part due to the dissolving of the United States Information Agency.[222] They also identified a lack of an assigned lead for any such strategic influence, or a synchronization mechanism to nest and manage operations.[223]

Another article from 2016 was written by the author of this study and an Air Force Behavioral Scientist, Whitney O'Connel.[224] The article emphasized that Psychological Operations could better measure effectiveness by standardizing operations with cognitive models and frameworks.[225] The article highlighted the repercussions of Psychological Operations personnel measuring effects incorrectly, and also suggested the Validation, Testing, and Evaluations Detachment (VTED) in Afghanistan could be used as a model by placing such a section within each Psychological Operations Group.[226]

A study was completed by Bradley M. Carr in 2017 on the need to implement the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) concept with the Global Engagement Center

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[221] David B. Quayle, Justin J. Schiltz, and Shawn A. Stangle, "Rethinking PSYOP: How DoD Could Restructure to Compete in the Information Environment" (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, December 2016), 1.

[222] Ibid., 25-31.

[223] Ibid.

[224] Ashley Franz Holzmann and Whitney O'Connell, "Falling Short in Measures of Effectiveness," *Small Wars Journal* (2016), accessed March 20, 2020, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/falling-short-in-measures-of-effectiveness.

[225] Ibid.

[226] Ibid.

(GEC).[227] The study acknowledged the issues that the GEC has experienced, but also

spoke of its potential as a concept.[228] Most importantly, the author referenced a

framework developed by Henry Mintzberg about organizational fit.[229] In essence, the

argument posited by the study was that the environment necessitated a shift and that,

> According to Mintzberg, the best organization for dealing with an unstable, complex, diverse, and potentially hostile environment is an adhocracy. An adhocracy is a "flat" organization with a focus on mutual adjustment and extensive liaison devices having a decentralized organic structure and horizontal job specialization.[230]

The tradeoff for an adhocracy was a need to constantly innovate.[231] Carr concluded that

an ahocracy could exist within a bureaucracy.[232]

Most recently, criticism echoing the past discussed the United States military's

ability to counter the misinformation campaigns related to the COVID-19 virus.[233] The

argument of "Battling COVID-19, Is DoD Prepared for an Onslaught of Disinfo and

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[227] Bradley M. Carr, "Joint Interagency Task Force – Influence: The New Global Engagement Center" (Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2017).

[228] Ibid., 5.

[229] Ibid., 15.

[230] Ibid., 16.

[231] Ibid., 17.

[232] Ibid., 16.

[233] Matthew Coughlin, Paul Lieber, "Battling COVID-19, Is DoD Prepared for an Onslaught of Disinfo and Propaganda From Foreign Competitors?," *Military Times* April 10, 2020, https://www.militarytimes.com/opinion/commentary/2020/04/10/battling-covid-19-is-dod-prepared-for-an-onslaught-of-disinfo-and-propaganda-from-foreign-competitors/.

Propaganda From Foreign Competitors?" was that the military would not be capable of

affecting such misinformation campaigns, even if the authority to do so was granted,

> Looking inward and under the umbrella, even the more focused Army
> Psychological Operations professional is limited by doctrine and supporting
> education. They learn basic marketing principles nested around themes and lines
> of persuasion, but instruction doesn't overly highlight the human dimension,
> cognitive/cultural reasoning, and/or measuring influence over time. Many of the
> criticisms of Psychological Operations can be traced to this divide.[234]

The proposal from the article was to improve Psychological Operations training to

include social science theory, survey methodology training, data-driven measurement of

effectiveness, and, "Contract vehicles employed to address the current and future fight

are not the panacea, written by officers not specifically trained in above gaps."[235] The

article concluded that organizations like the GEC did not need to be replaced, but

empowered to integrate with the other organizations.[236]

Lessons Learned from the History of the Era

The 1985 Psychological Operations Master Plan

The master plans led to the creation and end of several commands, sections, and

plans to create a Joint Psychological Operations structure. The Joint Psychological

Operations Center stood up for a time.[237] Subsequent iterations included the Joint

Psychological Support Element in 2004, renamed the Joint Military Information Support

Command in 2009 and later dismantled in 2011 when the Military Information Support

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[234] Coughlin, Paul Lieber, "Battling COVID-19."

[235] Ibid.

[236] Ibid.

[237] Paddock, "No More Tactical Information Detachments," 30.

Operations Command was established for three years before also dissolving.[238] The

criticisms from literature were not addressed by those organizations.

Panama

The Psychological Operations Group in charge of Central American operations

was aware of the tensions in Panama prior to the invasion and it conducted early target

audience analysis to build contingency plans two years prior to the conflict.[239] This

included "pre-recorded TV, radio, and loudspeaker tapes; radio and loudspeaker scripts;

music, and designs for printed leaflets and posters," and would later prove to be

invaluable upon deploying in 1989 for Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty.[240]

Psychological Operations forces developed and disseminated hundreds of thousands of

products, facilitating surrenders throughout the entire country.[241] The Psychological

Operations efforts led to the surrender of 2,000 enemy soldiers in ten days without any

United States casualties received from the units that employed the Psychological

Operations personnel.[242]

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[238] Richard B. Davenport, "The Need for an Innovative Joint Psychological Warfare Force Structure," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 88 (1st Quarter 2018): 67.

[239] Dennis P. Walco, "Psychological Operations in Panama during Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty," in *Psychological Operations Principles and Case Studies,* ed. Frank L. Goldstein (Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, AL: Air University Press, 2004), 252.

[240] Ibid.

[241] Ibid., 270.

[242] U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) History and Research Office, *History: 1987-2007* (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: USSOCOM, 2007), 43.

The Gulf War

       The Gulf War encompassed Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm. Some initial concepts for the invasion of Iraq templated a massive air campaign combined with Psychological Operations alongside additional international sanctions intended to force Iraq to the negotiation table.[243] An amphibious assault from the east was also discussed.[244] This was not the plan that was executed, but it spoke volumes of the appeal of Psychological Operations. Radio stations, deception, and leaflets defined the environment.[245] The leader of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, became the primary target for Psychological Operations.[246] General Schwarzkopf participated in the efforts to seed deception by publicly visiting the Marine units that were rumored to be training for a false beach landing. Members of the Media were allowed to accompany Schwarzkopf, which added more rumors and speculation reinforcing the beach invasion.[247] Schwarzkopf was adamant that Psychological Operations be done well and incorporated,

    [243] Robert H. Scales, Jr., *Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War* (Dulles: Potomac Books, 2006), 111.

    [244] Christopher M. Rein, ed., *Weaving the Tangled Web: Military Deception in Large-Scale Combat Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army University Press, 2018), 223.

    [245] Ibid., 350-353.

    [246] Ibid., 223.

    [247] Ibid.

saying, "If we do go to war, psychological operations are going to be absolutely a critical, critical part of any campaign that we must get involved in."[248]

Other reinforcing efforts in the deception included Psychological Operations teams postured along the border with Kuwait.[249] The teams were attached to a joint effort alongside signal and smoke units. Together, a group of a few hundred looked like thousands of soldiers postured to support the Marines once they landed to the east.[250] Global Positioning and space assets were a complication.[251] Iraq purchased its space imagery from the *Système Pour l'Observation de la Terre* (SPOT), a commercial French satellite constellation.[252] What Iraq did not realize was that France agreed to delay the imagery from SPOT, so the images that Iraq received were not accurate.[253]

The result was that Saddam had to rely on his intelligence network on the ground and on the United States' Cable News Network (CNN), which did not realize it was

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[248] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 5, 2003), IV-3.

[249] Rein, *Weaving the Tangled Web*, 223-225.

[250] Ibid.

[251] Larry Greenemeier, "GPS and the World's First 'Space War': Satellite-based navigation proved its mettle during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, leading to what some say is an overdependence on 'jammable' GPS technology," *Scientific American,* February 8, 2016, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/gps-and-the-world-s-first-space-war/.

[252] Cynthia A.S. McKinley, "When the Enemy Has Our Eyes" (Paper, School of Advanced Aerospace Studies, Maxwell AFB, Montgomery, AL, September 18, 1997).

[253] Edwin C. Swedberg, "The Effect on Operational and Technical Surprise by U.S. Military Forces Due to the Proliferation of Unclassified Satellite Imaging Systems" (Master's Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1995), 73.

feeding Saddam misconstrued information.[254] As with previous conflicts, the acceptance of Psychological Operations by conventional forces was slow. Jack Summe, a liaison planner that coordinated Psychological Operations leaflets, was initially met with skepticism and would often be openly mocked, "However, when reports filtered into [the United States Central Command Air Forces] of thousands of Iraqis surrendering, opinion changed. When Jack Summe walked into the targeting cell on February 25, he received a standing ovation."[255] The success was earned, and, "Ninety-eight percent of the 87,000 POWs captured either possessed or had seen Psychological Operations leaflets that provided them with instructions on how to approach U.S. troops to surrender."[256] The success was unprecedented. When the Coalition had massed forces to the west, preparing for a massive flanking maneuver from the opposite direction, the Iraqi forces were unprepared. The ground battle was over within 100 hours.

The Strategic Studies Detachment and the Cultural Intelligence Element

During this period the Strategic Studies Detachment was established within Psychological Operations. Each regionally aligned Psychological Operations Battalion

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[254] Andrew F. Smith, *International Conflict and the Media: A Curriculum Guide* (Accokeek: Longview Foundation for Education in World Affairs and International Understanding, 2000), 157.

[255] Scales, *Certain Victory*, 197.

[256] Lamb, *Review of Psychological Operations Lessons Learned from Recent Operational Experience*, 28.

had several of the analysts that would produce Psychological Operations studies and

assist in operations when needed.[257] Defined most accurately in a 2015 manual,

> [The Strategic Studies Detachment] is an important source of finished analytical
> intelligence products that are tailored to the needs of the entire [Psychological
> Operations] force, the [Global Combatant Commands], and the intelligence
> community. Finished products are primarily intended and designed to support the
> operational requirements of the combatant com-mands and of U.S. [Psychological
> Operations] forces worldwide, although they also are used by a variety of other
> organizations, such as the [Department of State]. These studies provide combatant
> commanders with [Psychological Operations] perspectives on issues of direct
> significance to peacetime strategy, joint operation planning, and operational
> preparations.[258]

The name of the detachment would later change to the Cultural Intelligence Cell and also

the Cultural Intelligence Element.[259] Civilian analysts from the section deployed

alongside uniformed members during Operation Restore Hope in Somalia.[260] Some

operations included leaflets, consolidation operations, newspaper, and radio efforts, and

language capabilities.[261]

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[257] U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), *SOF Reference Manual,* version 2.1 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CGSC, 1999), https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/socom/sof-ref-2-1/SOFREF_Ch3.htm.

[258] Joint Special Operations University and the Center for Special Operations Studies and Research, *Special Operations Forces Reference Manual*, 4th ed. (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: The JSOU Press, June, 2015), 3-12.

[259] Alex Dehgan, Mark Luce, Laura Jean Palmer-Moloney, Payam Mohseni, Daniel Serwer, and Allison Astorino-Courtois, *Alleviating US-Iran Tensions* (Arlington, VA: Strategic Multi-layer Assessment (SMA) Reach-back Cell, June 8, 2017), http://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/R4_6-Iran-US-interests-Jun17.pdf.

[260] Charles P. Borchini and Man Borstelmann, "PSYOP in Somalia: The Voice of Hope," *Special Warfare* (October 1994): 9.

[261] Ibid., 3-9.

The United States budget changes in 2013 under what was then called "sequestration" impacted the Cultural Intelligence Element.[262] Chief among the personnel affected in Special Operations were the civilians.[263] The cuts removed 14% of the civilians from the Army.[264] The events led to some actions to freeze civilian hiring, to include the Cultural Intelligence Element.[265] Even though the Cultural Intelligence Element continued to be identified as a force multiplier to be emulated by the military, the hiring freeze in 2013 was never lifted for the section.[266] As of the writing of this study, all members of the Cultural Intelligence Element that retire are no longer replaced, slowly removing the traces of academia from within the Psychological Operations Regiment.

Despite this hiring freeze, the Army Special Operations Forces 2022 plan included the revitalization of the Cultural Intelligence Element as one of the key

[262] Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., "Adm. Bill McRaven: SOCOM Struggles with CR, Sequester," *Breaking Defense,* January 29, 2013, https://breakingdefense.com/2013/01/adm-bill-mcraven-socom-struggles-with-cr-sequester/.

[263] U.S. Congress, Senate, *The Impacts of Sequestration and/or a Full-Year Continuing Resolution on the Department of Defense: Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services,* 113th Cong., 1st sess., February 12, 2013.

[264] U.S. Congress, Senate, *The Impact of Sequestration on the National Defense: Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services,* 113th Cong., 1st sess., November 7, 2013, 10.

[265] U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), GAO-14-177R, *Sequestration: Observations on the Department of Defense's Approach in Fiscal Year 2013* (Washington, DC: GAO, November 7, 2013), 14.

[266] Salil Puri, "Army Shuts down Human Terrain System," *SOFREP,* August 12, 2015), https://sofrep.com/news/army-shuts-down-hts-cultural-awareness-program/.

objectives for the Psychological Operations Regiment.[267] The latest Army Special

Operations Forces plan for 2035 does not mention the Cultural Intelligence Element.[268]

The 2035 plan mentions how important it is for Special Operations to understand and

influence foreign culture 15 separate times.[269] Despite the situation, the Cultural

Intelligence Element continues to receive accolades as a model to emulate and

reference.[270]

The Joint Interagency Task Force

The relationships between the Department of State and the Department of

Defense would strengthen when the War on Drugs began to gain traction at the end of the

1980s.[271] The Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South) was developed to

facilitate drug interdiction in multiple domains, which led to interagency

apprehensions.[272] JIATF-South was a national task force, meaning it could legally be

[267] "ARSOF 2022: Part II." *Special Warfare* 27, no. 3 (July-September 2014): 27, accessed January 12, 2020, https://www.soc.mil/SWCS/SWmag/archive/SW2703/SW_2703.pdf.

[268] USAJFKSWCS, *USASOC 2035*.

[269] Ibid.

[270] SOFREP, "Army Wrong: The Combined Arms Center's Embarrassing Culture Manual," May 16, 2015, https://sofrep.com/news/army-wrong-combined-arms-centers-embarrassing-culture-manual/.

[271] Evan Munsing and Christopher J. Lamb, *Joint Interagency Task Force–South: The Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success,* Strategic Perspectives 5, ed. Nicholas Rostow (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, June 2011), 10-12.

[272] Joint Interagency Task Force South, "About Us," accessed March 11, 2020, https://www.jiatfs.southcom.mil/About-Us/.

allotted billets from other government organizations to facilitate shared missions

leverage the authorities of each organization.[273] JIATF-South was a flat organization,

which led to improved networking, communication, and team cohesion abnormal within

bureaucracies.[274] Of significance was its ability to expand and integrate partner nations

into its operations when needed, because of the adaptability provided by its flat

construct.[275] Later, during a 2012 Committee on the Armed Services hearing,

Congressmen asked if the model of JIATF-South could be replicated.[276] The response

was that it was believed the JIATF-South model could be replicated to address complex

threats by decentralizing command and control and providing general oversight through

the combatant commands.[277]

Joint Special Operations University and Academia

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) was established in 2000 in order

to provide specific training courses to the Joint Special Operations community.[278]

Academia continued to maintain organizations to study the influence and information

[273] Munsing and Lamb, *Joint Interagency Task Force–South*, 19.

[274] Christopher Lamb, "Global SOF and Interagency Collaboration," *Journal of Strategic Security* 7, no. 2 (2014): 12.

[275] Joint Interagency Task Force South, "About Us."

[276] U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities of the Committee on Armed Services, *The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities of the Committee on Armed Services,* 112th Cong., 2nd sess., July 11, 2012.

[277] Ibid.

[278] Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), *Course Catalogue* (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: JSOU, 2019), 9.

environment. Stanford's Internet Observatory was developed in order to track and understand the variety of information that was present in the environment.[279] Others, such as Hamilton 2.0, aimed to identify fake news.[280] Other examples of successful academic integration include USASOC's partnership with Notre Dame. The pilot program paired Notre Dame's Business on the Frontlines program with members of USASOC by addressing threats and violent actors in unstable countries by addressing economic needs to affect change.[281]

Lessons Lost

Psychological Operations were employed improperly in the Battle of Fallujah. In one case, they used loudspeakers to try and induce a surrender, but instead of using messaging they used the theme song from the movie *Team America*.[282] The practice led to moments of confusion between United States forces and aggravated the potential for friendly fire, continually revealing friendly locations to the enemy.[283] By the end of the

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[279] Stanford Cyber Policy Center, "Internet Observatory," accessed May 1, 2020, https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/content/io-landing-page-2.

[280] The RAND Corporation, "Hamilton 2.0," accessed March 3, 2020, https://www.rand.org/research/projects/truth-decay/fighting-disinformation/search/items/hamilton-20.html.

[281] Viva Bartkus, "AUSA Panel," USASOC Talks, 2015, https://www.soc.mil/USASOCTalks/library.html.

[282] Kendall D. Gott, ed., *Eyewitness to War*, vol. 2, *The US Army in Operation AL FAJR: An Oral History* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, January 1, 2006), 33.

[283] Ibid., 260.

battle, Psychological Operations was discounted by the ground forces as ineffective.[284]

No enemy surrenders were recorded resulting from the loudspeaker operations. Rewards

programs in Afghanistan to capture Taliban leadership were deemed ineffective.[285] Many

themes associated with Psychological Operations programs were effective initially but

failed to align with reality. After 2005, it was nearly impossible for Psychological

Operations to argue that the Coalition was bringing peace, but it still maintained that

theme for years.[286]

Successes in the Global War on Terror

One of the most prolific operations was the use of Radios In A Box (RIABs),

which were deployable FM radio stations.[287] Seventy RIABs were operating at the height

of the war in Afghanistan.[288] Hand crank radios were disseminated in order to facilitate

listenership.[289] Studies on the effectiveness of Psychological Operations found RIABs to

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[284] Gott, *The US Army in Operation AL FAJR*, 260.

[285] Muñoz, *U.S. Military Information Operations in Afghanistan*, xviii.

[286] Ibid.

[287] Peter Cary, *The Pentagon, Information Operations, and International Media Development: A Report to the Center for International Media Assistance* (Washington, DC: Center for International Media Assistance, November 23, 2010), 27.

[288] Ibid.

[289] Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), CALL Newsletter 11-35, *Army-Marine Integration: Observations, Insights, and Lessons,* vol. 3 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, July 2011), 40.

be one of the most effective Psychological Operations conducted during the conflicts.[290]

The greatest successes beyond the RIABs were when conventional force commanders

understood the need to integrate Psychological Operations into their forces.[291]

Palantir

Palantir was founded in 2004 as a big-data company that was able to process large

amounts of classified information.[292] The Army was initially hesitant at the growth of the

relationship, taking Palantir to court to dispute a contract, ending in Palantir provide a

multitude of reasons for why it could support the requirements of the Army mission using

commercial solutions.[293] The hesitation of the Army was not reflective of the relationship

with SOCOM, which used the precedent of the case—resulting in Palantir being granted

a sole-source contract in 2016.[294] Palantir offers many functions, but is most famous for

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[290] Arturo Muñoz and Erin Dick, "Information Operations: The Imperative of Doctrine Harmonization and Measures of Effectiveness," Perspective (The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2015), 1.

[291] Muñoz, *U.S. Military Information Operations in Afghanistan*, xviii-xix.

[292] Jacques Peretti, "Palantir: the 'special ops' tech giant that wields as much real-world power as Google," *The Guardian,* July 30, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/30/palantir-peter-thiel-cia-data-crime-police.

[293] Johana Reed, "Palantir USG, Inc. v. United States, Gives New Teeth to the Government's Preference for Buying Commercial," McMahon, Welch and Learned, PLLC, October 4, 2018, https://www.mwllegal.com/palantir-usg-inc-v-united-states-gives-new-teeth-to-the-governments-preference-for-buying-commercial/.

[294] Hannah Lang, "Palantir wins $222M contract to provide software licenses to SOCOM," *Washington Technology,* May 26, 2016, https://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2016/05/26/palantir-socom.aspx.

its reported All Source Information Fusion software.[295] That software was designed to, "bring together intelligence and other information gathered by SOCOM."[296] Palantir later became a Defense Program of Record, and was awarded an even larger contract with the Pentagon in 2019.[297]

The "Great Divorce"

Several upsets occurred between the 1985 and 1990 master plans. The authors of the *1985 Psychological Operations Master Plan* believed that Psychological Operations were being hindered within the Special Operations community, and not given the recognition they deserved.[298] Their efforts drove them to attempt to remove Psychological Operations from any association with Special Operations.[299] This would later be granted, to a degree.[300] Psychological Operations was separated into an active duty component and a United States Army Reserve (USAR) component.[301] The

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[295] United States Department of Defense, "Contracts for May 25, 2016," May 25, 2016, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Contracts/Contract/Article/781719/.

[296] Kate Fazzini and Amanda Macias, "Peter Thiel's company Palantir just won a major Pentagon contract, beating out traditional military vendors," *CNBC Disruptor 50,* March 27, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/27/palantir-in-multi-million-dollar-pentagon-deal-ipo-on-horizon.html.

[297] Ibid.

[298] Paddock, "No More Tactical Information Detachments," 37.

[299] Ibid.

[300] Quayle, Schiltz, and Stangle, "Rethinking PSYOP," 37.

[301] Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., "The 2006 'Divorce' of US Army Reserve and Active Component Psychological Operations Units," *Small Wars Journal,* 2012, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-2006-%E2%80%9Cdivorce%E2%80%9D-of-us-army-reserve-and-active-component-psychological-operations-units.

Psychological Operations Groups on active duty would serve within Special Operations and the USAR units would support conventional units.[302]

The Human Terrain System

The Human Terrain System was launched in 2005 and was first deployed in 2007.[303] The program was partially modeled from the Cultural Intelligence Element.[304] It was to exist as a support mechanism for conventional forces, integrating anthropologists and other social scientists.[305] The program was met with great debate, as many academics distanced themselves from the program as politicians and the media weighed in.[306] The result was a lack of support for the program by academics.[307] The Human Terrain System cost a total of $700 million and it deployed over 1,000 social scientists at

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[302] Paddock, "The 2006 'Divorce' of US Army Reserve and Active Component Psychological Operations Units."

[303] Sharon Weinberger, "Pentagon's Project Minerva Sparks New Anthro Concerns," *Wired,* May 1, 2008, https://www.wired.com/2008/05/project-minerva/.

[304] Christopher Sims, "Academics in Foxholes: The Life and Death of the Human Terrain System," *Foreign Affairs,* February 4, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2016-02-04/academics-foxholes.

[305] Scott Jaschik, "Embedded Conflicts: U.S. Army quietly shuts down Human Terrain System, which placed anthropologists and other scholars with military units in Iraq and Afghanistan and set off huge debate over scholarly ethics," *Inside Higher ED,* July 7, 2015, https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/07/07/army-shuts-down-controversial-human-terrain-system-criticized-many-anthropologists.

[306] Salil Puri, "Army Shuts down Human Terrain System," *SOFREP,* August 12, 2015, https://sofrep.com/news/army-shuts-down-hts-cultural-awareness-program/.

[307] Jaschik, "Embedded Conflicts."

its height.[308] It was not replaced by any other programs once it ended.[309] There were

claims that the capability would be transferred further into Special Operations, but that

did not lead to further support to the Cultural Intelligence Element.[310]

Afghanistan

A report by USA Today in 2012 included a deep level of investigative journalism

concerning a contracting company in Afghanistan.[311] According to the article, "The

company produces leaflets and broadcasts urging Afghans to support their government

and eschew the Taliban."[312] The company discussed, Leonie, was the contracting

company that worked with the Military Information Support Task Force-Afghanistan

(MISTF-A)— the Psychological Operations command in Afghanistan.[313] The

investigative reporting described MISTF-A's mission and its relationship with Leonie,

> Contractors like Leonie plant unattributed broadcasts, plaster the countryside in
> war zones with billboards, stage concerts and drop leaflets with the intent of
> bending the will of civilians and combatants to U.S. aims. Contracts show that the

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[308] Sims, "Academics in Foxholes."

[309] Ben Connable, "Human Terrain System is Dead, Long Live… What?,"
Military Review (January-February 2018): 24-33.

[310] Puri, "Army Shuts Down Human Terrain System."

[311] Tom Vanden Brook, "Pentagon inspector starts criminal probe of contractor,"
USA Today, October 28, 2012, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/10/28/
pentagon-propaganda-investigation-leonie/1662153/.

[312] Ibid.

[313] U.S. Department of Defense, Inspector General (DOD IG), *Contract and
Controls over Information Operations Assessments in Afghanistan Should be
Strengthened* (Alexandria, VA: DOD IG, November 7, 2013), https://media.defense.gov/
2019/Jun/26/2002150522/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2014-008-REDACTED.PDF.

companies often measure the effects of the propaganda they produce, essentially grading their own work, although the military reviews the metrics.[314]

The report was critical of the efforts, which appeared to be very similar to the JUSPAO's failed model.

Other notable points from the report were the focus on production instead of effectiveness.[315] A since partially-unclassified Inspector General report was completed around the same time that verified that Leonie was measuring its own effectiveness with the Validation, Testing, and Evaluations Detachment (VTED).[316] Many of the problems were addressed and successful iterations of the VTED followed.[317] The Inspector General report emphasized the importance of the contracting officer's representative (COR), who was responsible for shaping the way the civilian contracting company executed the mission and what standards would need to be upheld to determine success.[318] It was clear that the VTED should still assist in driving analysis of the

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[314] Tom Vanden Brook and Ray Locker, "U.S. 'info ops' programs dubious, costly," *USA Today,* February 29, 2012, https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/military/story/2012-02-29/afghanistan-iraq-military-information-operations-usa-today-investigation/53295472/1.

[315] Ibid.

[316] DOD IG, *Contract and Controls over Information Operations Assessments in Afghanistan Should be Strengthened.*

[317] Holzmann and O'Connell, "Falling Short in Measures of Effectiveness."

[318] DOD IG, *Contract and Controls over Information Operations Assessments in Afghanistan Should be Strengthened,* i.

products and assisting in development, but that it should act as a third party for assessments.[319]

The Special Operations Joint Task Force

The Special Operations Joint Task Force (SOJTF) concept evolved out of the need for an adaptable and deployable command under USASOC. The First Special Forces Command was stood up on September 30, 2014.[320] The intent behind the First Special Forces Command was to build a command within Special Operations that could deploy at any moment and represent the core of a SOJTF—a Two Star Special Operations command that could nest other Special Operations task forces within it and liaise with conventional forces as needed.[321] SOJTFs were conceptualized to be scalable, modular, and tailorable to any assigned mission sets, to include Large-Scale Combat Operations.[322] They were also designed to incorporate Information Warfare Task Forces.[323] The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) rose out of the remnants of al Qaeda

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[319] Ibid.

[320] Jason Wesbrock, Glenn Harned, and Preson Plous, "Special Operations Forces and Conventional Forces: Integration, Interoperability, and Interdependence," *Prism* 6, no. 3 (December 7, 2016): 85-95.

[321] Ibid.

[322] Capability Developments Integration Directorate, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), *Handbook: Special Operations Joint Task Force.* Version 1.0 (Fort Bragg, NC: USSOCOM, September 27, 2019), 5.

[323] Ibid., 45-47.

following the United States withdrawal from Iraq.[324] Much of the land taken by ISIS was recaptured by 2017.[325] This was due to many factors, chief among them was the deployment of the SOJTF at the beginning of the conflict.

Effects Cells

The fight against ISIS necessitated innovation within Psychological Operations.[326] Deployable Effects Cells were developed and subsequently used at various levels, designed to address complicated problems that ISIS presented. One was deployed in 2019 to support Special Operations Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (SOJTF-OIR).[327] The cell's official name was the Psychological Operations Publicly Available Information Exploitation Cell (PPEX), which leveraged their authorities to conduct target audience analysis research by mapping the information environment.[328] The PPEX did so with the help of a behavioral scientist and provided a

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[324] Cameron Glenn, Mattisan Rowan, John Caves, and Garrett Nada, "Timeline: The Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic State," The Wilson Center, October 28, 2019, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the-rise-spread-and-fall-the-islamic-state.

[325] Glenn et al., "Timeline: The Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic State."

[326] Sarah Anwar, "190212-A-HO756-005," Baghdad, February 10, 2019, U.S. Central Command Photo Gallery, https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/igphoto/ 2002185548/.

[327] Robert Kava, Evan Anderson, Garret Mathews, Cole Alexander, Christian Armstrong, and Marcus B. Griffin, "PSYOP's Analytical and Systematic Approach to Publicly Available Information: The experiences of a PSYOP detachment concerning how information actors leverage content and community to maneuver in the narrative space," Special Operations Joint Task Force Operations Inherent Resolve J39, October 23, 2019, 1.

[328] Ibid.

framework that other Psychological Operations personnel could replicate.[329] The PPEX was also not the only time in recent years that the Psychological Operations Regiment attempted to integrate modeling. An iteration of the VTED did so in Afghanistan in 2015.[330]

The Global Engagement Center

On March 14, 2016, President Obama signed an executive order establishing the Global Engagement Center (GEC) under the State Department, and giving it the responsibility of counterterrorism messaging.[331] The GEC first answered its mission by turning to academia to fund research.[332] In theory, the GEC would counter ISIS, address misinformation, and be the modern equivalent of the USIA or the CPI.[333] The GEC did not receive praise for its operations or attempts to affect the information environment.[334] Investigative journalism reported that, as of 2018, the GEC had not used any of its

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[329] Ibid.

[330] Holzmann and O'Connell, "Falling Short in Measures of Effectiveness."

[331] Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, "Global Engagement Center," U.S. Department of State, accessed March 21, 2020, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/gec/index.htm.

[332] Duke University, "Global Engagement Center - Statement of Interest and Capacity - Deadline Extended," 2016, https://researchfunding.duke.edu/global-engagement-center-statement-interest-and-capacity-deadline-extended.

[333] Michael D. Lumpkin, "Engaging through Messaging - The New Global Engagement Center," *American Ambassadors Review* (Spring 2016): 1-3, https://www.americanambassadors.org/publications/ambassadors-review/spring-2016/engaging-through-messaging-the-new-global-engagement-center.

[334] Gardiner Harris, "State Dept. Was Granted $120 Million to Fight Russian Meddling. It Has Spent $0," *New York Times,* March 4, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/04/world/europe/state-department-russia-global-engagement-center.html.

funding to pay for methods to counter information from Russia or China, two of its named adversaries.[335] The result was analysts began to leave the GEC, reportedly frustrated at the lack of support and high levels of bureaucracy.[336]

Modern Special Forces Training

Special Forces first established military occupational specialties (MOSs) in 1958.[337] They together formed a single unit of action—a team of 12 individuals.[338] The MOSs remain the same and include 18A, the officer; 18B, weapons sergeants; 18C, engineer sergeants; 18D, medical sergeant; 18E, communications sergeant; and 18F, the intelligence and combat support sergeant.[339] Each Special Forces team also has a Warrant Officer, the 180A, which are recruited from already trained Special Forces

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[335] Asha Sanaker, "Global Engagement Center Tasked With Combating Russian Propaganda Despite Funding Challenges," *Countable,* March 6, 2018, https://www.countable.us/articles/3030-global-engagement-center-tasked-combating-russian-propaganda-despite-funding-challenges.

[336] Patrick Tucker, "Analysts Are Quitting the State Department's Anti-Propaganda Team," *Defense One,* September 12, 2017, https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/09/analysts-are-quitting-state-departments-anti-propaganda-team/140936/.

[337] Matthew R. Wood, "Special Warfare: Restructuring for the Future" (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, December 2016).

[338] Ibid.

[339] U.S. Army, "Special Forces Intelligence Sergeant (18F)," accessed March 29, 2020, https://www.goarmy.com/careers-and-jobs/browse-career-and-job-categories/intelligence-and-combat-support/special-forces-intelligence-sergeant.html.

sergeants.[340] The Warrant Officer MOS was added in the early 1980s.[341] The current

training pipeline consists of 65 weeks of training.[342] The training includes 6 weeks of

instruction in Unconventional Warfare, theory, history and concepts; 9 weeks of small

unit tactics and survival training; 16 weeks of specialized training for the separate MOSs;

4 weeks for their culmination exercise; 25 weeks for language training; and an additional

5 weeks of added regional training, concepts, and credentialing.[343]

The MOSs necessitated further advanced training conducted for Special Forces

under their Advanced Skills Detachments.[344] MOS training specialized each Special

Forces member, Advanced Skills Detachment courses provided continuing education to

further specialize personnel within Special Forces to hone their crafts.

Modern Psychological Operations Training

There are currently two MOSs for Psychological Operations: 37A, the

Psychological Operations officer, and 37F, or the Psychological Operations NCO.[345]

There is not a single type of Psychological Operation team as found in Special Forces;

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[340] U.S. Army Recruiting Command, "Warrant Officer Prerequisites and Duty Description," February 5, 2020, https://recruiting.army.mil/ISO/AWOR/180A/.

[341] J. H. Crerar, "The Special Forces Warrant Officer, the Beginnings," Warrant Officer History, June 1, 2015, https://warrantofficerhistory.org/Hist_SF_WO.htm.

[342] Burton, *FY 2019 Academic Handbook: Special Warfare*, 24-25.

[343] Ibid.

[344] Ibid.

[345] U.S. Army, "PSYOP Teams," accessed March 25, 2020, https://www.goarmy.com/careers-and-jobs/special-operations/psyop/psyop-team-members.html.

the two most common are Regional Psychological Operations Teams, and Tactical Psychological Operations Teams.[346] Teams have been subsidized with attached 25M—the graphic design MOS—soldiers in the past.[347] Cultural Intelligence Element personnel have also deployed with the teams.[348]

Training for active duty Psychological Operations personnel consists of 43 weeks of training.[349] It includes two weeks of history and orientation, 25 weeks of language training, 8 weeks of training in conducting Psychological Operations, 4 weeks of regional and cultural training, and 4 weeks of exercises.[350] USAR Psychological Operations training is 17 weeks of distance learning, with a 4 week residence portion that includes a culmination exercise.[351] It does not include language or cultural training.

Psychological Operations Recruiting

Current recruiting focuses on physical fitness, and interest in culture over other traits. The Go Army page for Psychological Operations officers lists: intelligent, physically fit, and, "Able to perform under physical and mental pressure," as the most

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[346] Ibid.

[347] Army-Portal, "Qualifications for initial award of MOS 25M, Multimedia Illustrator," February 24, 2011, http://www.army-portal.com/jobs/signal/25m.html.

[348] Borchini and Borstelmann, "PSYOP in Somalia," 9.

[349] Burton, *FY 2019 Academic Handbook: Special Warfare*, 18-19.

[350] Ibid., 18-19.

[351] Ibid., 21.

helpful attributes an officer could have to pursue Psychological Operations.[352] There is

no mention of the need for artists and graphic designers, no mention of behavioral

science degrees being incredibly useful, and little discussion on culture.[353] This could

improve as the Army has begun a push to improve talent management.[354] The result is a

system designed to better identify expertise within the force.

The Narrative Fusion Cell

The Psychological Operations Regiment began integrating several concepts

starting in 2015 when USASOC determined that the Psychological Operations Regiment

had several gaps that would need to be addressed.[355] The result was the establishment of

three separate entities within Psychological Operations: the S3X to conduct and facilitate

sensitive activities within each Psychological Operations Group; the Special Military

Information Support Operations Teams, which concentrated on Sensitive Activities; and

the Narrative Fusion Cells, to address essentially four pillars of functionality.[356] The

Narrative Fusion Cells were to reside within each regionally aligned Psychological

Operations Battalion, and they were given four tasks as their primary mission:

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[352] U.S. Army, "Psychological Operations Officer (37A)," accessed March 29, 2020, https://www.goarmy.com/reserve/jobs/browse/intelligence-and-combat-support/psychological-operations-officer.html.

[353] U.S. Army, "Psychological Operations Officer (37A)."

[354] U.S. Army Talent Management, "Home," accessed April 25, 2020, https://talent.army.mil/.

[355] Rosales, *1st POB (A) Narrative Fusion Cell Concept and Implementation.*

[356] Mabus and Fisher, *MIAG Redesign Update and SMART Initial Operating Concept.*

1. Repository of information. Manage resources, historical information, lessons learned series data, and all data related to operations with a focus on integrating those lessons into operations.

2. Academic resource. Manage regional narratives throughout the missions, which would include cultural analysis, Center of Gravity analysis, Psychological Operations assessments, debriefing missions, and conducting after action reviews to assist in future operations planning.

3. Sensitive activities capability. Training and support to serve as a node for expertise in military deception, Special Technical Operations, Cyber and Electromagnetic Spectrum support to Psychological Operations, intelligence, and social media integration, as well as the ability to study emerging needs and capabilities, provide liaison support to the Global Combatant Commands and Theater Special Operations Commands when needed, and interagency or joint coordination.

4. Deployable. Deploy and form the nucleus for a Joint or Army-specific Psychological Operations Task Force, to include pre-positioning, and support to emerging threats.[357]

The final task, "Deployable" was similar to the First Special Forces Command's ability to deploy as a SOJTF. The Narrative Fusion Cell was informally organized separately by each Psychological Operations battalion, manned with the personnel that were available.[358] The manning was inconsistent due to the operational needs of the Psychological Operations Regiment—many of the personnel were dedicated to missions and could not fill the positions (see figure 1).[359]

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[357] Rosales, *1st POB (A) Narrative Fusion Cell Concept and Implementation*.

[358] Ibid.

[359] Ibid.

Figure 1.   The First Battalion Narrative Fusion Cell

Source: Created by author referencing information from Rob Rosales, *1st POB (A) Narrative Fusion Cell Concept and Implementation* (Fort Bragg, NC: First Psychological Operations Battalion, August 20, 2018).

Steps were taken this year to formalize the Narrative Fusion Cells, now called the Technical Information Section. The concept was determined to be a partial solution to the 2015 gaps if supported properly.

The 2020 DOTMLPF-P Change Recommendation

A DOTMLPF-P Change Recommendation (DCR) is in the submission and approval process.[360] It is not yet formally approved. The recommendations of this study account for the DOTMLPF-P Change Recommendation restructure—which include formal positions for the Technical Information Section, Special Psychological Operations

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[360] Lock, *DOTmLPF-P Change Recommendation for PSYOP Unit of Action Redesign* (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2020).

Teams, and a shift in the structure of Psychological Operations battalions within both

Groups (see figures 2 and 3).[361]


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                          └─────────────┘
           ┌──────────────────┴──────────────────┐
    ┌──────────────┐                       ┌──────────────┐
    │  4th PSYOP   │                       │  8th PSYOP   │
    │   GRP (A)    │                       │   GRP (A)    │
    └──────────────┘                       └──────────────┘
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Figure 2.   Current Special Operations Psychological Operations Force Structure

Source: Lock, *DOTmLPF-P Change Recommendation for PSYOP Unit of Action Redesign* (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2020), 4.

The DOTMLPF-P Change Recommendation will place each TIS within a

battalion, with another TIS at each Psychological Operations Group.[362] Each TIS is so far

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[361] The Special Psychological Operations Teams were previously called Special MISO Teams.

[362] Lock, *DOTmLPF-P Change Recommendation for PSYOP Unit of Action Redesign*.

directed to execute the same four tasks in order to address the gaps identified from the *2015 Psychological Operations Assessment*.

The current force structure includes Psychological Operations Groups (POGs), Headquarters and Headquarters Companies (HHC), Psychological Operations Battalions (POBs), Headquarters Service Companies (HSCs), Regional Psychological Operations Companies (RPOs), and Tactical Psychological Operations Companies (TPOs). The proposed force structure will standardize the Psychological Operations companies to a single unit of action (see figure 3).[363] The DOTMLPF-P Change Recommendation will also introduce a team concept, called a Psychological Operations Detachment.[364] Psychological Operations Detachments will become a standard unit of action similar to how the Special Forces 12-individual teams are a standard unit of action. A recommendation for the future of those teams is included in chapter 5 of this study.[365]

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[363] Lock, *DOTmLPF-P Change Recommendation for PSYOP Unit of Action Redesign*.

[364] Ibid.

[365] Ibid.

Figure 3.   Proposed Special Operations Psychological Operations Force Structure

Source: Lock, *DOTmLPF-P Change Recommendation for PSYOP Unit of Action Redesign* (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2020), 5.

This study assumes that the above changes will be approved.

Information Warfare and Multi-Domain Operations

> Military psychological operations are inherently joint operations.[366]
> —Frank L. Goldstein and Daniel W. Jacobowitz,
> *Psychological Operations Principles and Case Studies*

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[366] Frank L. Goldstein and Daniel W. Jacobowitz, "Psychological Operations: An Introduction," in *Psychological Operations Principles and Case Studies,* ed. Frank L. Goldstein (Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, AL: Air University Press, 2004), 6.

The military is developing the ability to conduct Multi-Domain Operations.[367] The Department of Defense has begun to address the need to conduct Information Warfare, or war in the domains of, "space, cyberspace, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment."[368] Special Operations is a part of the solution,

> The Information Warfare Task Force (IWTF) is a concept under development. It does not conflict with the joint doctrinal concept of [Information Operations]. Rather, it couches [Information Operations] in warfighting language as a means to address the challenges outlined in the national security documents.[369]

Psychological Operations are the core of Information Warfare.[370] The IWTF concept integrates Psychological Operations with military deception, Civil Affairs, Space, Operational Security, Social Media Operations, and Special Technical Operations under a single task force.[371] The IWTF concept would fall within a SOJTF as one of its subordinate task forces.[372]

The IWTF now may function to bring the many capabilities within the Joint force together. Concepts like intelligence integrators and Irregular Warfare Analysis now exist.[373] The Air Force has formally established the Behavioral Science/Human Factors

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[367] USSOCOM, *Handbook: Special Operations Joint Task Force*, 7.

[368] Ibid.

[369] Ibid., 45.

[370] Jeremy S. Mushtare. (Lecture to the Psychological Operations Officers, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, November 12, 2019).

[371] USSOCOM, *Handbook: Special Operations Joint Task Force*, 46.

[372] Ibid.

[373] General Dynamics Information Technology, "JIDO Intelligence Integrator (Task 5) must have TS/SCI eligibility," GDIT.com, accessed May 1, 2020,

Scientists with a focus on research and analysis.[374] The United States Navy has

developed their Information Warfare Community concept.[375] Synchronizers of

information related capabilities in the form of Information Operations officers exist

within the Army and the Marine Corps.[376] Foreign disclosure officers can approve the

declassification of previously classified information.[377] Public Affairs officers release

truthful information and liaise between the media and military.[378] Judge advocates have

been writing extensively of the ability for the law to be used as a tool of influence—

known as "Lawfare", or the, "use of law as a means of accomplishing what might

otherwise require the application of traditional military force."[379]

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https://www.gdit.com/careers/job/857777ea5/jido-intelligence-integrator-task-5-must-have-tssci-eligibility/.

[374] U.S. Military MOS Database, "Air Force Behavioral Science/Human Factors Scientist," accessed April 17, 2020, http://www.mosdb.com/air-force/61BX/mos/3460/.

[375] Center for Cyber Security Studies, "Information Warfare Community," United States Naval Academy, accessed April 18, 2020, https://www.usna.edu/CyberCenter/Outreach/index.php.

[376] U.S. Army Information Operations Proponent, "Information Operations Officer," U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, accessed May 3, 2020, https://usacac.army.mil/organizations/mccoe/iop/career.

[377] CECOM LCMC G2, "Security awareness - Understanding foreign disclosure," U.S. Army, accessed April 24, 2020, https://www.army.mil/article/28810/security_awareness_understanding_foreign_disclosure.

[378] U.S. Army, "Public Affairs Officer," accessed March 26, 2020, https://www.goarmy.com/careers-and-jobs/browse-career-and-job-categories/arts-and-media/public-affairs-officer.html.

[379] Charles Dunlap Jr., "Lawfare 101: A Primer," *Military Review* (May-June 2017): 8-17.

Targeting Warrant Officers have continued to function as critical capabilities in the Joint environment as experts in target acquisition, methodology, and synchronization or coordination of Joint Fires.[380] The interrogator MOS has transitioned into the Human Intelligence MOS.[381] Strategic Debriefers also complement those efforts.[382] Functional Area 49, Operations Research/Systems Analysis (ORSA) personnel conduct operational research as, "organic experts in data science, data analytics, data visualization, and other big data specialties."[383] Contracting Officer's Representatives are critical to contracts being written and executed correctly.[384] Functional Area 57, Simulation Operations Officers, are the proponent for Knowledge Management and lessons learned within the Army.[385] The Army also has other programs to ensure the lessons learned are maintained, to include its Field Historians program.[386]

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[380] U.S. Army Recruiting Command, "Warrant Officer Prerequisites and Duty Description."

[381] U.S. Army, "Special Forces Intelligence Sergeant (18F)."

[382] Greg Boudonck, "Army ASI 3Q: Strategic Debriefer and Interrogator," Part-Time-Commander, accessed April 9, 2020, https://www.part-time-commander.com/army-asi-3q-strategic-debriefer-and-interrogator/.

[383] U.S. Army Functional Area 49 Operations Research/Systems Analysis, "Functional Area 49 Personnel Proponent Office Mission, Vision and Objectives," accessed April 17, 2020, https://www.fa49.army.mil/.

[384] Defense Pricing and Contracting, "Contracting Officer's Representative (COR)," December 23, 2014, https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/ccap/cc/jcchb/HTML/Topical/cor.html.

[385] U.S. Army Modeling and Simulation Office, "Military Program - FA57," accessed April 2, 2020, https://www.ms.army.mil/sp-div2/fa57/index.html.

[386] U.S. Army Center of Military History, "Field Historians," accessed April 5, 2020, https://history.army.mil/fieldHistorians/index.html.

Modern Government Innovation

The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) has also acknowledged the emerging needs of great power competition and modernization.[387] The "Next NGA West" concept is an effort that the NGA began in order to modernize.[388] The project began in 2015 and construction of their new integrated facilities is projected to be completed by 2025.[389] The concept also includes facilities that will have a little over half of the space dedicated to their classified work, with the rest of the space divided into flex space as needed for conferences, collaboration, or exercises, unclassified areas, and an area available to the public in order to facilitate their relationships with academia and industry.[390]

The United States military has also acknowledged the need for continued innovative and adaptive thinking. Concepts like Red Teams have emerged, discussing methods to facilitate objective problem solving and adaptive organizations.[391] Red Teaming is, "a flexible cognitive approach to thinking and planning that is specifically

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[387] Robert D. Sharp (Speech, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, August 27, 2019).

[388] National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), "Next NGA West: Home," accessed April 18, 2020, http://nextngawest.com/#/home.

[389] National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), "Next NGA West: About," accessed April 18, 2020, http://nextngawest.com/#/about.

[390] Sharp Speech.

[391] Micah Zenko, *Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking Like the Enemy* (New York: Basic Books, 2015), 23.

tailored to each organization and each situation."[392] The University of Foreign Military

and Cultural Studies under the Combined Arms Center offers courses to military

servicemembers to receive Red Team training.[393] Red Team organizations have been

developed from the same scientific research—such as Google's Project Aristotle—that

many innovative organizations throughout industry have adopted.[394]

Summary and Conclusions

> From a tactical perspective, [Operation] Just Cause demonstrated that the
> joint operations were not only possible but imperative in future wars so long as all
> units involved could talk to each other and operate together under a single chain
> of command . . . Just Cause showed what a combat multiplier [Psychological
> Operations] can be when fully integrated into the tactical plan.
>
> —Robert H. Scales, Jr., *Certain Victory*

This literature review first sought to understand the depth and scope of the

literature written about Psychological Operations. Several lessons learned were briefly

discussed as they applied to this study. This literature review assisted in framing

Psychological Operations in the present day. The uniqueness of this study was clear.

Many theses have contributed to the growing knowledge and understanding of

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[392] University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies, *The Red Team Handbook: The Army's Guide to Making Better Decisions*, Ver. 9.0 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: TRADOC G–2 Operational Environment Enterprise, 2018), 3.

[393] University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies, "University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies/Red Teaming," U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, September 26, 2018, https://usacac.army.mil/organizations/ufmcs-red-teaming.

[394] Charles Duhigg, "What Google Learned from Its Quest to Build the Perfect Team: New research reveals surprising truths about why some work groups thrive and others falter," *New York Times Magazine,* February 25, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/28/magazine/what-google-learned-from-its-quest-to-build-the-perfect-team.html?_r=0.

Psychological Operations. Few works attempted to analyze the history of Psychological Operations and none synthesized the lessons of the past beyond the literature reviews.

The *1985 Psychological Operations Master Plan* developed many concepts that were implemented and contributed to the success of the Psychological Operations Regiment. Those successes were in the past. This study found that a Joint-level Psychological Operations functionality, branch, or organization cannot be developed out of nothing. Every attempt to do so led to failure, either because of funding, personalities, or a lack of authorities given to exercise the capabilities. That realization greatly impacted the recommendations of this study. If the review of literature did not include the eras preceding the *1985 Psychological Operations Master Plan*, then the recommendations of this study would have been similar to other theses written since 1985.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Methodology Introduction

This section of the study synthesized military doctrine with academic research design methodology. The methodology selected for this study was rooted in *Research Design.*[395] *Qualitative Research Methods* was also critical in justifying the qualitative research approach.[396] *Practical Research* fleshed out some of the concepts described by Tracy.[397] The military doctrine component was primarily referenced from *The Manual for the Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)*, and the *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01I.*[398]

Addressing the Questions

Documents and data on the subject were retrieved from a variety of sources. The reviewed materiel includes books, scholarly journals, previously published theses, government documents, past and present military doctrine, After Action Reviews (AARs), declassified Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) documents released through the CIA, and journalists. Much of this research was conducted by gathering information from the following locations:

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[395] Creswell, *Research Design.*

[396] Sarah J. Tracy, *Qualitative Research Methods: Collecting Evidence, Crafting Analysis, Communicating Impact* (Hoboken: Blackwell Publishing, 2013).

[397] Leedy, Ellis, and Johnson, *Practical Research.*

[398] CJCS, JCIDS Manual.

1. Presidential Libraries

2. The National Archive

3. The Combined Arms Research Library (CARL)

4. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)

5. Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS)

6. The USASOC Historian

7. USASOC Psychological Operations Lessons Learned Proponency

8. Journal Storage (JSTOR)

9. The Vietnam Center & Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive (TTU)

10. National Defense University (NDU)

11. Joint Special Operations University (JSOU)

12. Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC)

13. The Federation of American Scientists

14. Center for Naval Analyses

15. The RAND Corporation

Criteria

Criteria were used to verify the validity of sources. Primary sources were sought out whenever possible in order to mitigate any potential inaccuracies. When not available, peer reviewed bodies of work and historical analysis were sought. Journalist bodies of work were referenced. Journalist material was used primarily for the modern era. Methods of mitigation were discussed in chapter 1 of this study.

Research Methodology

This study began with an *a priori* hypothesis and then proceeded through a qualitative design approach. An *a priori* hypothesis is an initial hypothesis proposed prior to research.[399] A deductive reasoning framework was used to systematically sift through the research, complemented with a pragmatic worldview, which also empowered a bricolage approach. The research was then broken down into case studies for analysis, which were each of the four eras of Psychological Operations. Specific examples from the eras were presented for analysis. Analysis was conducted through DOTMLPF-P. Finally, a concluding hypothesis was made and followed by recommendations. This is represented in Methodological Flow figure (see figure 4).

| A Priori Hypothesis	Design	Framework	Worldview	Data Synthesis	Analysis	Hypothesis
Initial Hypothesis	Qualitative Design	Deductive Reasoning	Pragmatic	Case Studies	DOTMLPF-P	Concluding Hypothesis
						Research Questions Answered
2015 Gaps	Research Questions and Addressing the Questions			Eras of Psychological Operations		Recommendations

Figure 4.   Methodological Flow

Source: Created by author. This figure demonstrates how the 2015 Gaps, Research Questions were addressed and synthesized within the eras prior to analysis.

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[399] Leedy, Ellis, and Johnson, *Practical Research*, 5.

A Priori Hypothesis

The *a priori* hypothesis was that the Army Psychological Operations Regiment has not

heeded the lessons learned from history and if those lessons were incorporated, they

could be used to address the Operational Context presented in chapter 1 of this study. A

proposed solution is to optimize the already presented solutions within the Psychological

Operations organization, specifically the Narrative Fusion Cell concept. This study was a

systematic journey of objective reasoning to remove bias from the *a priori* hypothesis.

Design

The qualitative variables that became the focus of this research were defined in

the first chapter of this study and included the gaps from the *2015 Psychological*

Operations Assessment, as well as information that could answer the research questions.

Qualitative design approaches empower experiences through context and facilitate insight

into events that would not be identified through quantitative approaches.[400] This design

approach also led to the identification of potential follow-on research that would not have

been recognized using other approaches.[401]

Framework

Deductive reasoning is "valuable for generating research hypotheses and testing

theories."[402] Deductive reasoning is defined as, "a 'top-down' type of reasoning that

begins with broad generalizations and theories and then moves to the observation of

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[400] Tracy, *Qualitative Research Methods*, 5.

[401] Ibid.

[402] Leedy, Ellis, and Johnson, *Practical Research*, 21.

particular circumstances in order to confirm or falsify the theory."[403] Deductive

reasoning was chosen because it is a structure,

> In which researchers (a) begin with a broad or general theory; (b) make an educated guess or a hypothesis about the social world on the basis of this theory; (c) conduct research that tests the hypothesis; and (d) use the evidence gathered from that research to confirm or disconfirm the original theory.[404]

This aspect of the research was demonstrated in the presentation of information. It was

the reasons an *a priori* hypothesis was selected. The gaps identified in the *2015*

Psychological Operations Assessment were used to frame the research and identify

lessons learned that could also nest within the gaps. The gaps were:

1. Insufficient target audience analysis training and tools.

2. Poor language capability.

3. Poor cultural understanding.

4. No consistent connection to academia.

5. No standard for data analysis.

6. No standards for measuring effects.

7. Tactical narrative not nested with strategic narratives.[405]

Care was taken to identify if those gaps occurred in the past. The research

questions were framed by considering the gaps.

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[403] Tracy, *Qualitative Research Methods*, 36.

[404] Ibid., 22.

[405] Rosales, *1st POB (A) Narrative Fusion Cell Concept and Implementation*.

Worldview

The worldview and philosophy chosen was the pragmatic worldview, as it empowered the study to focus on the research question and was not focused narrowly on any one system.[406] Pragmatism is, "a philosophical tradition that—very broadly— understands knowing the world as inseparable from agency within it."[407] Pragmatism allowed for the integration of aspects of the scientific method, historical research method, and grounded theory research.[408]

Pragmatism has also been defined as, "clarifying concepts and hypotheses and for identifying empty disputes."[409] Pragmatism acknowledges the nature of Psychological Operations as human constructs that would not exist without the acceptance of the effects of individuals and societies. Psychological Operations must be studied with a pragmatic worldview in order to remove bias from the researcher's pre-established phenomenology. Phenomenology is the way individuals, "experience themselves and their world."[410]

Aspects of the scientific method that were integrated included the selection of the *a priori* hypothesis, and also justified the framework,

> Traditionally, the term scientific method has referred to an approach in which a researcher (a) identifies a problem that defines the goal of one's quest; (b) posits a hypothesis that, if confirmed, resolves the problem; (c) gathers data relevant to the

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[406] Creswell, *Research Design*, 11.

[407] Christopher Hookway, "Pragmatism," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, March 14, 2019, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/.

[408] Creswell, *Research Design*, 11.

[409] Hookway, "Pragmatism."

[410] Leedy, Ellis, and Johnson, *Practical Research*, 9.

hypothesis; and (d) analyzes and interprets the data to see whether they support the hypothesis and resolve the question that instigated the research.[411]

Historical research is, "An effort to reconstruct or interpret historical events through the gathering and interpretation of relevant historical documents and/or oral histories."[412] Grounded theory research is defined as, "A type of qualitative research aimed at deriving theory through the use of multiple stages of data collection and interpretation."[413] Bricolage—the piecing differing aspects of research into a complex but understandable whole—was the method of qualitative inquiry best suited for this study.[414]

Data Synthesis

Case study design of inquiry allowed for the historical events to be categorized.[415] The cases studied were limited to determined eras of Psychological Operations; specifically—The Pre-Global War Era, The World Wars Era, The Cold War Era, and The Modern Warfare Era. This process assisted in developing a complex understanding of the problem and potential patterns to discuss recommendations.

Analysis

The case studies were analyzed through the observation of collated information and synthesized conclusions. The Joint military framework called DOTMLPF-P was used

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[411] Leedy, Ellis, and Johnson, *Practical Research*, 22.

[412] Ibid., 93.

[413] Ibid., 93.

[414] Tracy, *Qualitative Research Methods*, 26.

[415] Creswell, *Research Design*, 14.

to categorize the data and provide a framework for analysis. DOTMLPF-P analysis is the first step in the functional needs process.[416] DOTMLPF-P data and analysis may contribute toward a Joint DOTMLPF-P Change Recommendation (DCR) document within the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process, which is how the military manages change.[417]

DOTMLPF-P empowers the constructed vignette data analysis approach for qualitative exploration.[418] This is why the secondary research questions that related to military doctrine were selected, as each addressed an aspect of DOTMLPF-P. According to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction document on the implementation of DCRs, "In certain cases, Joint [DOTMLPF-P Change Recommendations], [Capability Development Documents], and [Capability Production Documents] are generated directly from studies or other analyses, or lessons learned, without." other related documents normally associated with a Joint DCR.[419] This means that the information included in this study may be used to affect change immediately within the Joint force.

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[416] Berton Manning, "DOTMLPF-P Analysis," AcqNotes, June 15, 2018, http://acqnotes.com/acqnote/acquisitions/dotmlpf-analysis.

[417] CJCS, JCIDS Manual.

[418] Tracy, *Qualitative Research Methods*, 207-208.

[419] Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), CJCS Instruction 3170.01I, *Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, January 23, 2015), A-5.

Summary and Conclusions

This study was conducted in order to facilitate change within the military. While addressing Army Psychological Operations was the subject of change, the greater implications possessed the potential to affect strategic efforts, address the threat environment that the United States currently faces, and also assist the Special Operations community in its planned development.

This study was not intended to be the final note in the process of further developing Psychological Operations. The methods chosen to frame this research were meticulously explored so that future research may have a foundation to build upon. This chapter detailed the methods of research that framed this study. Not all will be evident beyond the explanations above, but they were ever present. The next chapter synthesizes the information.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

We need to move beyond our 20th century approach to messaging and
start looking at influence as an integral aspect of modern irregular warfare.[420]
—Andrew Knaggs, Speech at the Defense
Industry Symposium, in *Military Times*

Introduction

This study's focus dove into the history of each era of Psychological Operations

in the United States. This chapter will include the results of that review and discuss the

patterns that emerged. First, the gaps and four tasks given to the TIS will be restated.

Then the literature will be reviewed through each of the four eras, before the information

is categorized for analysis within each applicable segment of DOTMLPF-P.[421]

The 2015 Psychological Operations Assessment Gaps Restated

The gaps of the *2015 Psychological Operations Assessment* listed several

insufficiencies that needed to be addressed.

1. Insufficient target audience analysis training and tools.

2. Poor language capability.

3. Poor cultural understanding.

4. No consistent connection to academia.

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[420] Kyle Rempfer, "SOCOM needs to step up its propaganda game, Pentagon deputy says," *Military Times,* February 6, 2019, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2019/02/06/socom-needs-to-step-up-its-propaganda-game-pentagon-deputy-says/.

[421] Creswell, *Research Design*, 197.

5. No standard for data analysis.

6. No standards for measuring effects.

7. Tactical narrative not nested with strategic narratives.[422]

The Psychological Operations Regiment established the NFC—now named the TIS—to address the gaps with four key tasks:

1. Repository of information.

2. Academic resource.

3. Sensitive activities capability.

4. Deployable.[423]

This study will synthesize those gaps and tasks with the research of this study.

Framing of Literature

The Pre-Global War Era (2560 BC – 1903 AD)

> We are governed, our minds modeled, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely by men we have never heard of.
>
> —Edward Bernays, *Propaganda*

Aspects of the Literature that Frame This Study

The integration of technology and art during the Revolutionary War was incredibly effective in building support for the revolution.[424] Samuel Adams' use of the printing press complemented by the writing abilities of Thomas Paine truly demonstrated the importance of both integrating emerging technology in propaganda as well as the

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[422] Rosales, *1st POB (A) Narrative Fusion Cell Concept and Implementation*.

[423] Ibid.

[424] Springer, *Propaganda from the American Civil War*, xv.

need for artists to assist in conveying messages.[425] Napoleon possessed a deep

understanding of his target audience. He was able to manipulate the will of the people

and the French Revolution to shape his efforts.[426] He also understood the importance of

narratives. Desertion and surrender—as discussed during the United States' war with

Mexico—would become a proven tool in the Psychological Operations kit bag for

decades to come.[427]

The World Wars Era (1903 – 1945)

> Psychological Warfare has been firmly recognized as an integral member of our family of weapons. While we realize fully that this mode of operation is not decisive by itself, it is also certain that, in combination with the conventional combat weapons, Psychological Warfare will contribute materially to the winning of war.
>
> —Robert A. McClure, Letter to Doyle O. Hickey, in
> Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., *US Army Special Warfare*

<u>Aspects of the Literature that Frame This Study</u>

Multiple examples throughout the era helped to frame this study. The efforts of

the General Staff of 1903 demonstrated how such an organization could exist to pose

logical arguments in support for its own evolution.[428] The thread of that could also be

seen with the incorporation of academia both in research off the battlefield and through

the hiring of academics for specific work during conflict.[429] The depth of understanding

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[425] Manning and Wyatt, *Encyclopedia of Media and Propaganda in Wartime America*, 7; Wood, *The American Revolution*, 55.

[426] Mathews, *Reporting the Wars*, 12.

[427] Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 29.

[428] Reynolds, "The General Staff as a Propaganda Agency, 1908-1914," 391-408.

[429] Herman, *The Romance of American Psychology*, 39.

concerning the enemies faced during the Second World War would have never occurred without academic expertise.[430]

The scale of the organizations required to conduct Psychological Operations during the Large-Scale Combat Operations of the First and Second World War was considerable.[431] The empowered creative solutions were also notable, such as the implementation of tens of thousands of Four Minute Men.[432]

There was no time to scale to the numbers of Large-Scale Combat Operations by relying on military training alone during both World Wars.[433] Contracting, commissioning, and empowering experts from the arts and behavioral sciences was a critical model used in the First World War replicated in the Second World War.[434] The OWI's successful operation to force the Japanese surrender was a masterstroke in understanding the choices of the target audience.[435] Models for operations, such as when to conduct Psychological Warfare, how to apply it following combat operations, and also the use of research were significant lessons.

The Cold War Era (1945 – 1985)

Because of urgent operational demands, knowledge has not been consolidated, and it has not been possible to measure the effectiveness of

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[430] Ibid.

[431] Creel, *How We Advertised America*, 94.

[432] Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 100.

[433] PWD SHAEF, *An Account of its Operations in the Western European Campaign, 1944-1945*, 21.

[434] Ghost Army Legacy Project, "Overview."

[435] Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 143.

[Psychological Operations] programs with any degree of accuracy. There is an urgent need to institutionalize what is being learned by experience to improve the quality of [Psychological Operations].
—Ernest Bairdain and Edith Bairdain, *Final Technical Report*

Aspects of the Literature that Frame this Study

The use of Chinese and Korean artists was a highlight of the Korean War, and the CIA best represented the understanding of the importance of artists with their ongoing operations throughout the era, relying on artists and material already present in the environment instead of teaching it to their own personnel.[436] The practice of conducting POW interviews during the Korean War to better understand the target audience was also significant.[437] The Army did a poor job of measuring effectiveness and identified the need for liaisons between organizations.[438]

The USIA represented what could be achieved diplomatically with sustained budgets.[439] Academics led their training, and it was cited that USIA personnel were some of the most competent operating within Vietnam because they were educated and properly trained.[440] The ORO and SORO organizations highlighted the importance of

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[436] G3 Psychological Warfare Division, First Loud-speaker and Leaflet Company, "Report on the Psychological Warfare Conducted by the Eighth Army Units in Korea: 25 June 1950 thru 27 July 1953," Section III, 15; The Washington Post, "The CIA and 'Doctor Zhivago': Memo from April 24, 1958," April 5, 2014, http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/the-cia-and-doctor-zhivago-memo-from-april-24-1958/922/.

[437] Brauer, "Psychological Warfare Korea 1951," 22.

[438] Avedon, *Psychological Warfare Operational Deficiencies Noted in Korea – A Study*, 94-109.

[439] Simpson, *Science of Coercion*, 108-109.

[440] Chandler, *War of Ideas*, 26.

academia in the study of Psychological Operations, target audience analysis, and long-term contingency planning.[441]

ORO identified the need for an integrated hub of information regarding Psychological Operations.[442] Unfortunately, McLaurin was correct when he wrote that Psychological Operations would be doomed to relearn lessons of the past time and again because the moment the contract with ORO concluded the benefits of that relationship ended.[443] The Psychological Operations Regiment did not maintain its own internal hub. The need for one was also identified in Cacioppo's *A Systematic Theory for Psychological Warfare* in 1960.[444] He also laid out the need for behavioral scientists and academics to be included in any operations.[445] ORO and SORO had potential to lead to national colleges of study and academic hubs for Psychological Operations like Dyer proposed in *The Weapon on the Wall*, but the growth never occurred.[446]

The support of general officers in Vietnam greatly empowered operations, but critical lessons from Vietnam are that mass production of products and large numbers of personnel do not lead to effective Psychological Operations.[447] Effects are achieved by

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[441] Rohde, *Armed With Expertise*, 42.

[442] Dyer, *The Weapon on the Wall*, 114.

[443] Ron D. McLaurin, ed., *Military Propaganda: Psychological Warfare and Operations* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), 76.

[444] Cacioppo, *A Systematic Theory for Psychological Warfare*.

[445] Ibid., 34.

[446] Dyer, *The Weapon on the Wall*, 187.

[447] Barger, *Psychological Operations Supporting Counterinsurgency*, 2.

conducting thorough target audience analysis with academic rigor, measuring the results, and shaping future operations based off of the data. Hiring local support for Psychological Operations proved to be both a contribution and a detriment, as local supporters are not necessarily trained in Psychological Operations but were still tasked with driving operations.[448] The greatest lesson was that a Psychological Operations organization cannot function as a mouthpiece for a foreign government using "gray" techniques, effectively removing the foreign government from the messaging.[449] Creativity is paramount for effective Psychological Operations, and outside-the-box solutions must be encouraged over messaging platforms.

The JUSPAO demonstrated the ineffectiveness of improper growth and expansion of Psychological Operations without proper training, doctrine, measurements of effectiveness, analysis, and language training.[450] It seemed that Dyer, again, served as a conduit for the lesson, as he posited in 1959 that a single entity such as the CPI or OWI was too powerful to effectively manage Psychological Operations.[451] The JUSPAO was bureaucratic and hierarchical, contrasted with the success of the Active Measure Working Group, which was a flat organization with little hierarchy, applauded by many.

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[448] Chandler, *War of Ideas*, 247.

[449] Ibid., 253.

[450] Ibid., 239.

[451] Dyer, *The Weapon on the Wall*, 87.

The JUSPAO was not successful, but there were some positive lessons learned, like the integrated operations and efforts to deconflict redundant operations.[452] However, the lesson was better represented with the establishment of the Active Measures Working Group, which functioned as a network of organizations working together as a flat organization.[453] The integration between the DoD and the interagency proved to be a model worth emulating. The MOSs of the Special Forces were an example of another successful model that could be duplicated by the Psychological Operations Regiment.[454]

<center>The Modern Warfare Era (1985 – Today)</center>

> In addition to the problems created by having insufficient numbers of bi-lingual, experienced, and competent propagandists, especially in the military, there was what was known in Vietnam as the "revolving door" syndrome. This referred to the fact that tours of duty for the armed forces were one year long. By the time an inexperienced and partially trained neophyte psychological warrior had gained sufficient expertise to begin contributing to the communications campaign in a meaningful way, his tour was completed and he returned to the U.S. – his replacement arrived and the cycle began again.
>
> —Robert W. Chandler, *War of Ideas*

<u>Aspects of the Literature that Frame this Study</u>

The *1985 Psychological Operations Master Plan* accomplished much for the Psychological Operations Regiment, but also has continued to serve as a detriment.[455] This study found that continued reference to the 1985 plan led to repeated conclusions that did not improve the state of the Regiment; which seemed evident by the continued

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[452] Findley, "US and Vietcong Psychological Operations in Vietnam," 233.

[453] Dhunjishah, "Countering Propaganda and Disinformation."

[454] Wood, "Special Warfare."

[455] Paddock, "No More Tactical Information Detachments," 30.

<center>103</center>

criticisms from third parties like RAND, Inspectors General, and even investigative reporters, who all repeated criticisms that first emerged in the literature during the World Wars.[456]

Many suggestions were made during the era, to include Psychological Operations instruction at the general staff colleges, establishing target audience analysis sections in Psychological Operations units, the need to improve doctrine, properly measuring effectiveness using third parties within the organizations, properly written contracts, the ability to rapidly deploy, and a striking need for a unit to synchronize efforts within the Regiment and with other organizations.

Those criticisms were still prevalent as recently as this year in reviews of the doctrine and training of Psychological Operations.[457] Other shortcomings included the need to conduct contingency planning for potential missions, as well as larger strategic plans that tactical and operational level missions could nest within.[458] The success of such contingency planning was evident during Operation Just Cause in Panama.[459] The

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[456] Muñoz, *U.S. Military Information Operations in Afghanistan*, xvi-xix; DOD IG, *Contract and Controls over Information Operations Assessments in Afghanistan Should be Strengthened*.

[457] Coughlin and Lieber, "Battling COVID-19, Is DoD Prepared for an Onslaught of Disinfo and Propaganda from Foreign Competitors?"

[458] Ibid.

[459] Walco, "Psychological Operations in Panama during Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty," 252.

success of that operation and the Gulf War stood as testaments to properly executed Psychological Operations.[460]

Cultural training has been recently highlighted as an important aspect of both Special Operations and Psychological Operations, but it was identified that such training is not extensive.[461] The one unit that had such training and expertise was the Cultural Intelligence Element, which has not received funding on par with organizations such as the Human Terrain System.[462] There is a need for such expertise, which has been highlighted time and again dating back to the World Wars, through suggestions from researchers, to the lessons learned of the past successful implementation of academics.[463]

RAND cited the effectiveness of the face-to-face engagements in Afghanistan as one of the two most effective implementations of Psychological Operations, alongside the RIABs and their radio operations to control the narrative.[464] When information was properly released to the public in a timely manner the narrative was controlled by the Coalition forces. Several missteps were identified through the review of the era. Other examples of a lack of training manifested with the "Great Divorce," resulting in

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[460] Lamb, *Review of Psychological Operations Lessons Learned from Recent Operational Experience*, 28.

[461] Rosales, *1st POB (A) Narrative Fusion Cell Concept and Implementation.*

[462] Puri, "Army Shuts Down Human Terrain System."

[463] "ARSOF 2022: U.S. Army Special Operations Command," 27.

[464] Cary, *The Pentagon, Information Operations, and International Media Development*, 27.

significantly less training provided to both USAR Psychological Operations Groups.[465] The greatest misstep was the implementation of MISTF-A, which appeared to disregard the lessons learned from Vietnam.[466]

The Special Forces and Psychological Operations Regiments both formed out of the OSS but have not grown consistently over time.[467] Psychological Operations, at its most successful, included advanced degrees and deep cultural training while it was a part of the Foreign Area Officer training pipeline.[468] Now the training for Psychological Operations is 22 weeks shorter than the 65 weeklong Special Forces pipeline, and USAR training is even shorter.[469] The decrease in—and consistent criticism of—the training is likely a large contributing factor to the lack of effective Psychological Operations that occurred in missions such as the MISTF-A in Afghanistan.[470] The positive outliers of the era were often scientifically based solutions, offered by Psychological Operations personnel who taught themselves, networked effectively with experts, or self-financed additional education.[471]

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[465] Quayle, Schiltz, and Stangle, *Rethinking PSYOP*, 37.

[466] Vanden Brook and Locker, "U.S. 'info ops' programs dubious, costly."

[467] Wood, "Special Warfare."

[468] Paddock, "No More Tactical Information Detachments," 37.

[469] Burton, *FY 2019 Academic Handbook: Special Warfare*.

[470] Vanden Brook and Locker, "U.S. 'info ops' programs dubious, costly."

[471] All Partners Access Network, "Cognitive Engagement Bios," Mad Scientist Speaker Series, TRADOC G-2, accessed January 14, 2020, https://community.apan.org/cfs-file/__key/telligent-evolution-components-attachments/01-9016-00-00-00-13-81-08/Mad-Sci-Speaker-Series_5F00_BIOS_5F00_Cognative-Engagement.pdf < Caution-

The development of JSOU as a growing hub of academic integration and the other

academic institutions such as the Internet Observatory, Hamilton 2.0, and Business on the

Frontlines led to additional opportunities to integrate.[472] Organizations like the GEC are

still developing, providing yet another opportunity for Psychological Operations to grow

with emerging organizations and capabilities as a cohesive team similar to the Active

Measures Working Group structure of the past.[473] Additionally, Palantir appears to

present another opportunity as the hub of information that Psychological Operations has

needed for decades.[474]

Several opportunities were also apparent through the end of the era. The Narrative

Fusion Cell (NFC) concept that evolved into the Technical Information Section (TIS) was

still being experimented with informally at the beginning of the writing of this study in

2019.[475] The potential for the section is apparent, as it has been given the responsibility

of filling the gaps identified from the *2015 Psychological Operations Assessment*.[476] The

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https://community.apan.org/cfs-file/__key/telligent-evolution-components-
attachments/01-9016-00-00-00-13-81-08/Mad-Sci-Speaker-
Series_5F00_BIOS_5F00_Cognative-Engagement.pdf.

[472] JSOU, *Course Catalogue*, 9.

[473] Asha Sanaker, "Global Engagement Center Tasked With Combating Russian
Propaganda Despite Funding Challenges."

[474] Fazzini and Macias, "Peter Thiel's company Palantir just won a major
Pentagon contract, beating out traditional military vendors."

[475] Lock, *DOTmLPF-P Change Recommendation for PSYOP Unit of Action
Redesign*.

[476] Mabus and Fisher, *MIAG Redesign Update and SMART Initial Operating
Concept*.

TIS is tentatively going to be manned to accomplish its mission, and this study proposes

recommendations for how the Psychological Operations Regiment may further improve

the TIS concept and further address the gaps from 2015.

<u>Converting the Data and Analysis</u>

> Today, there is no single government institution whose sole responsibility is the conduct of the war of ideas. As a result, no government agency feels responsible for it. As mentioned, this mission used to belong to the United States Information Agency, which at the height of the Cold War had some 10,000 employees (including foreign nationals) and a $1 billion budget.
> —Threat Knowledge Group, "The Islamic State and Information Warfare"

Several documents and lessons learned were reviewed that could benefit current

and future operations.[477] The information reviewed has been applied to the DOTMLPF-P

model for military analysis. This section is not an attempt to rewrite Psychological

Operations doctrine, organizations, or the other aspects of DOTMLPF-P, but an effort to

contribute a body of research for future DOTMLPF-P Change Recommendations. Effort

was made to identify recommendations and potential efforts that could address

insufficiencies.[478] All discussion in this chapter and the next is rooted in the research that

was conducted through the course of this study. This study acknowledges that, in some

cases, further analysis would need to be conducted.

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[477] Manning, "DOTMLPF-P Analysis."

[478] CJCS, JCIDS Manual, B-G-F-2.

Doctrine

Doctrine is defined as, "fundamental principles that guide the employment of U.S. military forces in coordinated action toward a common objective."[479] This section addresses existing doctrine related to Psychological Operations.

Insufficiencies or Capabilities Gaps

Standardizing target audience analysis, cultural research models, integrating instruction with academic resources, and standardizing methods of measuring effectiveness were cited in the research and the 2015 gaps.[480] The lack of instruction within doctrine on measuring effects is likely a contributing factor to inconsistent performance.[481] To quote Lorne Segerstrom, in a study he conducted that included a series of interviews with Psychological Operations personnel—the, "Army leadership should note the fact that almost half of the participants believe doctrine did not play a role in the effective employment of [Tactical Psychological Operations Teams]."[482]

The most recently published doctrine includes two paragraphs concerning assessments.[483] Capabilities listed in doctrine state Psychological Operations personnel

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[479] CJCS, JCIDS Manual, B-G-F-2.

[480] Rosales, *1st POB (A) Narrative Fusion Cell Concept and Implementation*.

[481] Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-53.1, *Military Information in Special Operations* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence, April 23, 2015).

[482] Lorne R. Segerstrom, "Winning the Soft War: The Employment of Tactical PSYOP Teams in Combat Operations" (Master's Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, June 8, 2012), 60.

[483] HQDA, ATP 3-53.1, 1-2 to 1-3.

are able to: analyze relevant information, conduct target audience analysis, provide linguistic support, produce messaging, and measuring effectiveness.[484] However, details and methods are very limited, and pale in comparison to any of the academic writing published since the Second World War.[485] The current structure of Psychological Operations does not reference potential units dedicated to research and analysis, units dedicated to measuring effects, units dedicated to the debriefing of POWs, and no templated consolidation operations units.[486] All of those activities were identified as best practices and lessons learned from the literature. Current and draft doctrine is still missing much of the needed information.[487]

Analysis, Lessons, and Solutions Based on the Research

Solutions of the past included ignoring the poorly written doctrine and instead funding civilian education for all officers under the Foreign Area Officer program.[488] Other solutions were proposed in the variety of literature cited throughout this study and were designed to specifically improve doctrine, though they appeared to be ignored—such as McLaurin's *Military Propaganda* from 1982.[489] History provides a wealth of

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[484] HQDA, ATP 3-53.1, 2-2.

[485] Cacioppo, *A Systematic Theory for Psychological Warfare*.

[486] HQDA, ATP 3-53.1.

[487] Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 3-53, *Psychological Operations Forces Draft* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence, January 2020).

[488] Paddock, "No More Tactical Information Detachments," 37.

[489] McLaurin, *Military Propaganda*, 76.

examples to emulate.[490] Effective solutions such the OPS-33's achievements in Vietnam could serve doctrine well.[491] JSOU has expertise and may serve to leverage academia as USIA did in the past.[492] Those remaining in the Cultural Intelligence Element are also versed in both social science and Psychological Operations.[493]

Potential Second and Third Order Effects to Consider

Cascading effects could be achieved by properly updating and designing doctrine to fit the needs of the Regiment. Such changes would also likely positively affect the Psychological Operations Qualification Course, which is based on doctrine. This change alone is the most likely to lead to the renaissance McLaurin referenced in the 1980s. The cost of doing so would be that of time and the need to potentially fund academic support. Further study would need to be done, but this study has provided a starting point for such work to be completed.

Organization

Organization is defined as, "a joint unit or element with varied functions enabled by a structure through which individuals cooperate systematically to accomplish a common mission and directly provide or support joint warfighting capabilities."[494]

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[490] Daugherty, *A Systematic Framework for Psychological Operations*, 1; Bernays and Hershey, *The Case for Reappraisal of U.S. Overseas Information Policies and Programs*.

[491] Plaster, *SOG*, 118.

[492] JSOU, *Course Catalogue*, 9.

[493] Borchini and Borstelmann, "PSYOP in Somalia," 3-9.

[494] CJCS, JCIDS Manual, B-G-F-2.

Insufficiencies or Capabilities Gaps

The capability gaps that could be addressed by changes to organization would be cultural understanding, connection to academia, and the lack of nested narratives.[495] Every conflict involving Psychological Operations experienced a different iteration and structure for executing those operations. Some were effective, like the Ghost Army or OPS-33; others were not. Psychological Operations must establish standard units of action to assist in addressing the persistent gaps in capabilities. In its present, verbally agreed upon form, the current DCR does just that, by including a standard team of 12 individuals.[496]

Developing the TIS concept further and empowering it to be successful is also a further requirement. The need for such a node was identified in the literature starting in the 1970s—such as Ernest and Edith Bairdain's assessment of Psychological Operations in Vietnam, where they wrote,

> Establishment of a Psychological Operations research center . . . responsible for directive consultation on current operations and for research to consolidate and extend Psychological Operations knowledge is an immediately obvious suggestion that would meet many needs.[497]

Other academic research has continued to encourage the requirement, stating, "In addition, integrate communication across the operational environment by implementing coordination cells that ensure that messages tailored to diverse audiences are well

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[495] Rosales, *1st POB (A) Narrative Fusion Cell Concept and Implementation*.

[496] Lock, *DOTmLPF-P Change Recommendation for PSYOP Unit of Action Redesign*.

[497] Bairdain and Bairdain, *Volume I, Final Technical Report*, xvii.

synchronized."[498] The gaps of the 2015 assessment reveal that the need still exists, having also been identified in 1971 and 2007.[499] The requirement for academic integration existed during the World Wars, and many scientists joined the ranks of the organizations.[500] The TIS's tentative approval should be considered a step in this direction, but not the final step, as the tasks given to the section are varied and complex.

Chandler first wrote about the continuity of personnel on missions that took place in Vietnam.[501] The "revolving door" syndrome of year-long deployments meant that by the time anyone became proficient at their job they left.[502] That was for year-long deployments.[503] Current USASOC deployments for Psychological Operations are half that length. Individuals transferring to the TIS would need to remain in those positions for longer than a single year.

Finally, if the TIS is to be truly successful and be capable of developing into an adaptable IWTF to suite the various requirements from the *National Defense Strategy*, USASOC strategies, and the future requirements for Large-Scale Combat Operations and Multi-Domain Operations, then it must heed the lessons of the past to do so.

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[498] Helmus, Paul, and Glenn, *Enlisting Madison Avenue*, 170.

[499] Rosales, *1st POB (A) Narrative Fusion Cell Concept and Implementation*; Bairdain and Bairdain, *Volume I, Final Technical Report*, 23; Helmus, Paul, and Glenn, *Enlisting Madison Avenue*.

[500] Herman, *The Romance of American Psychology*, 39.

[501] Chandler, *War of Ideas*, 242.

[502] Ibid.

[503] Ibid.

Analysis, Lessons, and Solutions Based on the Research

Solutions for analysis have existed as early as 1960, when Cacioppo wrote *A Systematic Theory for Psychological Warfare*.[504] Of significance was the inclusion of modeling concepts and a need to man a Psychological Operations organization with, "trained behavioral scientists such as social psychologists, political scientists, sociologists, geo-political specialists, economists, area specialists, and military sciences."[505]

Multiple volumes detailing the science and methods of Psychological Operations over the years were published by the military.[506] Buunk and Van Vugt wrote about analysis of problem sets that could lead to theories and explanations of problems in social psychology.[507] Edward Waltz wrote of ways to apply information theory, decision theory, and semiotic theory to Psychological Operations and Information Warfare in 1998.[508] Orkins and Kiernan wrote of methods of integrating social network analysis

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[504] Cacioppo, *A Systematic Theory for Psychological Warfare*, 34.

[505] Ibid.

[506] Daniel C. Pollock, Ronald De McLaurin, Carl F. Rosenthal, and Sarah A. Skillings, eds., *The Art and Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of Military Application* (Washington, DC: American Institute for Research, 1976); Bernays and Hershey, *The Case for Reappraisal of U.S. Overseas Information Policies and Programs*; McLaurin, *Military Propaganda*.

[507] Abraham P. Buunk and Mark Van Vugt, *Applying Social Psychology: From Problems to Solutions* (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2008).

[508] Edward Waltz, *Information Warfare: Principles and Operations* (Norwood: Artech House, Inc., 1998).

with current processes of Psychological Operations target audience analysis in 2014.[509]

Finally, Linera, Seese, and McQuagge wrote multiple articles on the nature of measuring effects for Psychological Operations.[510]

One example to reference is the VTED concept in Afghanistan, which exists as the only semi-formal organization within Psychological Operations currently directed to measure effectiveness of operations.[511] When it was running effectively, it was able to analyze and synthesize trend data with intelligence like Cacioppo espoused in 1960.[512] Effects Cells have been tested and proven capable of conducting complex analysis of the information environment.[513] An academic opportunity would be to replicate Bartkus' use of economic influence as demonstrated between USASOC and Notre Dame's Business on the Frontlines.[514] These concepts should be synthesized into the TIS.

The concept of Red Teams has continued to yield effects throughout United States industry and could be applied to the sections within the TIS given the task of measuring

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[509] William R. Orkins and Carla A. Kiernan, "CORENET: The Fusion of Social Network Analysis and Target Audience Analysis" (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, December 2014).

[510] Gregory S. Seese, Rafael E. Linera, and Erinn McQuagge, "Effects-Based Psychological Operations Measures of Effectiveness: Measuring Change and Impact," ResearchGate, March 2018.

[511] Holzmann and O'Connell, "Falling Short in Measures of Effectiveness."

[512] Ibid.

[513] Kava et al., "PSYOP's Analytical and Systematic Approach to Publicly Available Information."

[514] Viva Bartkus, "'Untapped Resources' for Building Security from the Ground Up," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 93 (2nd Quarter 2019): 6-13.

effects and lessons learned.[515] The reinstatement of recruiting for the Cultural

Intelligence Element would greatly improve the ability for Psychological Operations to

conduct their mission. Such a revival could be initiated now with the use of contracted

employees similar to how MISTF-A contracted portions of their efforts. This study

suggests that, if revived, the Cultural Intelligence Element personnel would be best suited

in the TIS, functioning as permanent personnel to mitigate turn-over that was identified in

Vietnam as a severe detriment to missions, while also providing academic expertise.

Because the Cultural Intelligence Element employs General Schedule (GS) employees,

they are able to remain in the same location for their entire careers.

The means of addressing the turnover issues among the active duty ranks already

exists in other institutions such as West Point, which uses inter-post transfers to maintain

personnel at West Point for multiple years.[516] The transfer transitions the individual from

their training unit during education to an operational unit when they have completed

school and are ready to become members of the academy faculty.[517] The potential

solution for the TIS would be to move the TIS billets under the First Special Forces

Command headquarters in such a way as to facilitate an inter-post transfer. Doing so

would address the high turn-over by stationing personnel within the TIS for

approximately three years at a time, and also empower the ability for the TIS to function

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[515] Zenko, *Red Team*, 23.

[516] United States Military Academy, "Eisenhower Program & Benavidez Program," accessed March 21, 2020, https://www.westpoint.edu/academics/academic-departments/behavioral-sciences-and-leadership/masters_executive_education/eisenhower-program.

[517] Ibid.

as a proper Red Team, with personnel not being rated by the commands they would be evaluating and attempting to improve with objective solutions.

This year's Directed Readiness Tables—how the Department of Defense manages readiness of the Joint force—includes the directive for, "DoD language, regional expertise, and culture capability management and skill tracking, in accordance with DoDD 5160.41E."[518] Restoring readiness has been a large focus in recent years, which was mentioned in the Defense Budget Overview published in February of 2020.[519] It stated the need for SOCOM to, "compete with strategic adversaries below the level of armed conflict, and conduct global crisis response missions."[520]

Dyer insisted on the creation of a national college that would serve as an institution of Psychological Operations education in 1959.[521] He suggested such an institution could exist for all members of the government to attend, which would improve interoperability and lead to shared understanding.[522] The Special Operations Research Office at American University and the Operational Research Office at Johns Hopkins University both served as hubs of academic knowledge for the Special Operations

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[518] Secretary of Defense (SecDef), Office of the Chief Management Officer, Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5124.11, *Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness* (Washington, DC: DOD, September 6, 2019), 4.

[519] Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, *Defense Budget Overview: Irreversible Implementation of the National Defense Strategy: Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February, 2020).

[520] Comptroller, *Defense Budget Overview*, 3-11.

[521] Dyer, *The Weapon on the Wall*, 187.

[522] Ibid., 187-189.

community and the Psychological Operations community.[523] JSOU now stands as the closest potential asset and should be considered as such.[524]

The lessons from Special Forces, though only briefly covered, appeared to be that early development of MOSs led to standard capabilities.[525] Because their teams were designed as a single unit of action that has not changed dramatically since 1958, they were able to focus on optimizing those teams.[526] The teams eventually further specialized through advanced training. Psychological Operations is uniquely established to greatly contribute to the future of Multi-Domain Operations, but it must be able to provide consistent effects. Standardizing a unit of action is a step in that direction.

Advanced Skills Detachments have been included in the pending DCR.[527] Those detachments should be empowered to begin developing courses alongside academics within Special Operations—such as JSOU and the Cultural Intelligence Element. The courses should be tailored to further address the 2015 gaps.[528] The intent should be to shape those courses into what could be used as the basis for MOS-specific training for Psychological Operations personnel. The TIS will require expertise, and changes to the organization must occur to develop that expertise consistently. There is a model to

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[523] Dyer, *The Weapon on the Wall*, 113; Rohde, *Armed With Expertise*, 4.

[524] JSOU, *Course Catalogue*, 9.

[525] Wood, "Special Warfare."

[526] Ibid.

[527] Lock, *DOTmLPF-P Change Recommendation for PSYOP Unit of Action Redesign*.

[528] Rosales, *1st POB (A) Narrative Fusion Cell Concept and Implementation*.

emulate, a tentative path approved, and a solution that is evident from the review of the literature. MOSs are suggested in this study and discussed in-depth in the personnel section of this chapter.

The *Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) 2022 Strategy*, published in 2012, included the intent to, "Reinvigorate the Cultural Intelligence Element," stating that it should include, "subject-matter experts in marketing, persuasive and traditional communication, use of social media and other cyber-based tools."[529] It also included the objective of, "Develop capabilities focused on providing enhanced cultural intelligence to globally deployed [Special Operations Forces], both in real time and leveraging reach back to [stateside] expertise, including Department of Defense, U.S. government agencies and academia." Both *Army Special Operations Forces Strategy* and *USASOC 2035* strategies do not mention the Cultural Intelligence Element, but *USASOC 2035* includes the statement, "Review unfinished ARSOF 2022 objectives; complete valid unfinished requirements."[530]

The Cultural Intelligence Element was cited as a force multiplier in 2005 and 2006 by the United States Government Accountability Office.[531] At that time, just 36 personnel were in the detachment, and it cost the military $175,000 annually—though the funding, "is not tracked separately from the overall budget," for the Psychological

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[529] "ARSOF 2022: U.S. Army Special Operations Command," 27.

[530] USAJFKSWCS, *USASOC 2035*.

[531] U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), *U.S. Public Diplomacy: Actions Needed to Improve Strategic Use of Coordination of Research,* Report to the Ranking Member, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate (Washington, DC: GAO, July 2007), 34.

Operations Group and likely does not include both operations and personnel costs.[532]

Additional funding was allotted to SOCOM for civilian growth in 2019.[533] Civilian

personnel within SOCOM increased from 6,334 in 2016 to 6,552 in 2019.[534] Those

numbers did not include a growth of the Cultural Intelligence Element.

The suggested growth of the TIS and the Cultural Intelligence Element may be

best framed by comparing the potential cost associated with the sections to the current

threat environment. It has been reported that a single Russian "Troll Farm" contains 400

people and costs roughly $400,000 a month—or $4.8 million, annually.[535] China spent

roughly $158 million on funding to Confucius Institutes to influence United States

citizens throughout hundreds of academic institutions across the country between 2006

and 2017—when it then ceased reporting how much it spent.[536]

The return on investment would be significant. The entirety of SOCOM—

spanning the Army, Air Force, Marines, and the Navy—requested $16.6 billion during

the most recent budget request on March 11, 2020.[537] SOCOM accounted for roughly 2

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[532] GAO, *U.S. Public Diplomacy*, 33-34.

[533] Comptroller, *Defense Budget Overview*, 107.

[534] Ibid., 190-195.

[535] Carr, "Joint Interagency Task Force – Influence," 6-7.

[536] U.S. Congress, Senate, *China's Impact on the U.S. Education System, Staff Report: Hearing before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs United States Senate,* 113th Cong., 1st sess., February 28, 2019.

[537] Andrew Feickert*, Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress,* Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Library of Congress March 11, 2020).

percent of the Pentagon's budget in 2018.[538] The White House recently increased the

defense budget by 5 percent to account for growth, citing Special Operations as one of

the specific locations of growth.[539] This also came at a time when SOCOM had requested

additional funds for research and development purposes in order to prepare for the next

fight.[540] At its height, the USIA had roughly 10,000 employees and a $1 billion

budget.[541] A fraction of that could further develop the TIS, return the Cultural

Intelligence Element to a period of growth, and achieve synchronized effects. Patterns of

successful Psychological Operations organizations that could adapt to the variety of

requirements fielded consistently similar sections that should form the basis of the TIS as

it develops. Reframed with modern terminology, these sections would be named: Target

Audience Analysis, Development, Effects, Key Influencer, Measures of Effectiveness,

Lessons Learned, Consolidation and Future Operations, POW Operations, Intelligence,

and the Headquarters element.

Finally, in order to address the needs of the Operational Context discussed in

chapter 1, the evidence presented in this study suggests that the TIS should look to the

times when Psychological Operations were most successful and integrate each of those

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[538] Jon Harper, "SOCOM Aiming for Big Boost in R&D Funding," *National Defense Magazine,* April 30, 2019, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/ articles/2019/4/30/socom-aiming-for-big-boost-in-rd-funding.

[539] U.S. President, *A Budget for a Better America: Promises Kept. Taxpayers First: Budget of the United States Government* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2020),

[540] Harper, "SOCOM Aiming for Big Boost in R&D Funding."

[541] Threat Knowledge Group, *The Islamic State and Information Warfare*, 6.

lessons into the organizational structure of the TIS. Such lessons could address the gaps

identified in 2015.

The TIS should also incorporate the JIATF lessons learned and synthesize those

with the Active Measures Working Group best practices and Red Team lessons learned,

as well. A properly developed TIS should incorporate the PPEX and Business on the

Frontlines concepts for both mapping and unique achieving effects.[542] The effectiveness

of the use of key influencers came up in two significant case study examples in the form

of the Four Minute Men and also cited as one of the most successful aspects of the war in

Afghanistan.[543] The need to measure effects came up time and again and the model of the

VTED could be replicated—Psychological Operations has already integrated such

models successfully and the concept could be improved.[544]

The repository of lessons learned was identified as a requirement for decades, and

the TIS has been tasked with the responsibility, so it should logically allot a section to

address the requirement.[545] The lessons of the Second World War included the need to

integrate consolidation operations with Psychological Operations, but to do so by

empowering sections to do so while simultaneously still conducted operations at the front

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[542] Kava et al., "PSYOP's Analytical and Systematic Approach to Publicly Available Information," 1; Bartkus, "AUSA Panel."

[543] Muñoz, *U.S. Military Information Operations in Afghanistan*, xvi; Creel, *How We Advertised America*, 94.

[544] Holzmann and O'Connell, "Falling Short in Measures of Effectiveness."

[545] Cacioppo, *A Systematic Theory for Psychological Warfare*, 34.

lines.[546] POW operations were practiced for decades and what few measures of effectiveness that were conducted during the Korean War were done so through POW interviews.[547] Systematic approaches to incorporate intelligence sections were identified as significant requirements by McLaurin.[548] The need to incorporate proper target audience analysis was identified so frequently throughout history that specific sections within each TIS should address that gap.[549] Development and the incorporation of the arts as was done with the Ghost Army and the First Motion Picture Unit should also be replicated.[550] This study recommends the TIS be broken down into sections to address each of those lessons learned. Each section can be manned as required for the missions the TIS is supporting, to include Large-Scale Combat Operations.

Potential Second and Third Order Effects to Consider

Organizational changes would empower the TIS to execute all four tasks given to it. Such changes would also empower the Regiment to achieve consistent effects. Redeveloping the relationship with academia through the revitalization of the Cultural Intelligence Element could lead to improved success and opportunities for both Special Operations, as well as the academic institutions involved. Organizational changes will

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[546] Sandler, "Cease Resistance," 89.

[547] Brauer, "Psychological Warfare Korea 1951," 22.

[548] McLaurin, *Military Propaganda*, 103-139.

[549] Barklay, "Maximizing the Psychological Battlespace," 1-3.

[550] Terry Lee Rioux, *From Sawdust to Stardust: The Biography of DeForest Kelley, Star Trek's Dr. McCoy* (New York: Pocket Books, 2005), 60; The Ghost Army Legacy Project, "Overview."

come with a cost, though, and growth is difficult. The suggestion that the TIS be developed into a Joint organization underneath the First Special Forces Command would allow for the Joint force to share in the burden of growth, while also benefiting from the network provided by such a hub of expertise, designed to rapidly deploy under the First Special Forces Command. This study acknowledges that further analysis would need to be conducted in order to determine feasible courses of action.

Training

Training is defined as, "individuals, units, and staffs using joint doctrine or tactics, techniques, and procedures to prepare joint forces or joint staffs to respond to strategic, operational, or tactical requirements considered necessary by the [Combatant Commands] to execute their assigned or anticipated missions."[551]

Insufficiencies or Capabilities Gaps

The *2015 Psychological Operations Assessment* gaps that could be addressed with training included target audience analysis, language capabilities, cultural understanding, data analysis, measuring effectiveness, and narrative design.[552] Robert Chandler discussed the need to measure effects in 1981,

> Adequate feedback is vital to the source of the communication process because it provides the stimulus for "course correction." These signals from the target audiences and the messages themselves prevent the propagandist from "flying blind."[553]

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[551] CJCS, JCIDS Manual, B-G-F-3.

[552] Rosales, *1st POB (A) Narrative Fusion Cell Concept and Implementation*.

[553] Chandler, *War of Ideas*, 242.

Inadequate training concerning both target audience analysis and measuring effectiveness is reflected throughout history and identified in reviews of the Vietnam conflict and more recently in the Battle of Fallujah and Afghanistan.[554]

The Psychological Operations training pipeline used to be in line with that of the Foreign Area Officer and included advanced cultural training and graduate degrees for officers.[555] The cultural training was replaced by a single four weeklong regional analysis course.[556] The only program that balanced out the poor training was the Cultural Intelligence Element, but its personnel are aging out of the program. Psychological Operations personnel in USAR components receive little cultural training, but still deploy as Psychological Operations personnel tasked with culture expertise. There are currently four Psychological Operations Groups; two active, two USAR.[557]

The advent of Information Warfare and Multi-Domain Operations is necessitating further requirements for specialization. Psychological Operations training is not currently enough to fulfill those requirements. There were too many gaps identified throughout history and in the 2015 assessment to believe that a single section could be implemented to address the gaps.

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[554] Chandler, *War of Ideas*, 26; Gott, *The US Army in Operation AL FAJR*, 33; Muñoz, *U.S. Military Information Operations in Afghanistan*.

[555] Paddock, "No More Tactical Information Detachments," 37.

[556] Burton, *FY 2019 Academic Handbook: Special Warfare*, 18-19.

[557] U.S. Army Reserves, "U.S. Army Civil Affairs & Psychological Operations Command (HQ)," accessed March 16, 2020, https://www.usar.army.mil/Commands/ Functional/USACAPOC/USACAPOC-Units/; U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), "United States Special Operations Command," accessed April 28, 2020, https://www.soc.mil/USASFC/HQ.html.

Psychological Operations did face many similar gaps in the past. Doob was one of the first to define the potential of motion pictures as a form of propaganda.[558] He first discussed, "coupling art and propaganda," in 1935 and he understood the importance of being able to use art in Psychological Operations.[559] Those discoveries were represented in the integration of artists, writers, and other creators in The First Motion Picture Unit of the Second World War and the Ghost Army, both of which focused heavily on the recruitment of artists to conduct effective Psychological Operations.[560]

The arts were tied to many significant Psychological Operations of the past. Artists were able to best understand the nature of emerging applications of the arts, and academics were able to best understand methods of implementation.[561] Academics were leveraged time and again to great effect throughout the history of Psychological Operations. Theodor Geisel, better known as Dr. Seuss, was a propaganda film director for The First Motion Picture Unit during the Second World War.[562]

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[558] Doob, *Propaganda*, 373.

[559] Ibid., 384.

[560] Rioux, *From Sawdust to Stardust*, 60; The Ghost Army Legacy Project, "Overview."

[561] Cacioppo, *A Systematic Theory for Psychological Warfare*, 34.

[562] *Our Job in Japan*, directed by Theodor S. Geisel (Army Pictorial Service, 1945).

The Ghost Army of the Second World War was comprised of hundreds of creators and artists.[563] John Steinbeck worked for the OSS and wrote *The Moon is Down* as an intentionally developed work of propaganda.[564] Two types of training should be developed to acknowledge the lessons of the Second World War. First, advanced training in the arts should be given to Psychological Operations personnel that already possess such talents in film, graphic design, audio production, etc. Second, other training should empower personnel to identify such artists in whatever environment they deploy to. Properly trained Psychological Operations personnel may illuminate the voices of such artists that are already expressing messages in line with the planned Psychological Operations. Not every Psychological Operations practitioner should be an artist or a writer—some may better serve as producers.

Creativity was also emphasized by Dyer in 1959, who wrote that, "There is a requirement for leadership and, moreover, creative leadership."[565] Previous organizations such as the Active Measures Working Group were established to address the complex threat of Soviet misinformation by leveraging the military alongside interagency organizations.[566] The results were a series of successes, as the information was spread throughout the United States.

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[563] The Ghost Army Legacy Project, "Overview."

[564] Coers, "Introduction."

[565] Dyer, *The Weapon on the Wall*, 83-84.

[566] Schoen and Lamb, *Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications*, 6.

A solution could be to incorporate models that Special Forces have implemented, such as the pending Advanced Skills Detachments. The Special Forces Advanced Skills Detachments provide additional training not offered in-depth during the Special Forces Qualification Course. Another option could be to liaise with JSOU to build training that may address the gaps. Training may also be eventually integrated into the Psychological Operations Qualification Course (POQC), which is 43 weeks long compared to the Special Forces 65-week pipeline.[567] The Special Forces National Guard personnel receive the same training as their active duty counterparts.[568] A cost benefit analysis may be required to determine if extending the POQC is a viable option.

Finally, the Advanced Skills Detachment courses should be as step toward developing MOSs within the Psychological Operations community. Therefore, the Advanced Skills Courses should assist in addressing the gaps from the *2015 Psychological Operations Assessment* and be a synthesis of the lessons learned from history—based on the types of Psychological Operations organizations that were most successful. Some of the analysis and justification for the proposed MOSs was used as the basis for the following analysis. Each separate course will be listed and identified by which gap it addresses or which lesson from history it represents and what MOS it could develop into:

1. *Advanced negotiations training and face-to-face engagement training*. This was chosen based off of the need for experts in the practices that have proven

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[567] Burton, *FY 2019 Academic Handbook: Special Warfare*, 18-25.

[568] Army National Guard, "Special Forces: Become a Green Beret," 2020, https://www.nationalguard.com/special-forces.

most effective throughout time. Both the Four Minute Men of the First World War and the face-to-face engagements in Afghanistan were identified as critical lessons to replicate.[569] This course would best serve as a basis for the 37A MOS, or the officer, who would be the primary networker for the section and expected to lead from the front. Officers are also more likely to need the training to improve an individual's ability to articulate the complexity of Psychological Operations in a way relevant to those working alongside Psychological Operations personnel such as Embassy environments or while briefing general officers.[570]

2. *Advanced application of Psychological Operations-related theories*. This was chosen based off several gaps related to poor target audience analysis, cultural understanding, standards of measuring effects and data analysis, as well as the need to connect with academia.[571] Theory has also been identified as a requirement since 1960.[572] This course would best serve as a basis for the 37A MOS, or the officer, who would already be required to have a college education to be an officer.[573]

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[569] Axelrod, *Selling the Great War*, 116; Muñoz, *U.S. Military Information Operations in Afghanistan*, xvi.

[570] Munsing and Lamb, *Joint Interagency Task Force–South*.

[571] Rosales, *1st POB (A) Narrative Fusion Cell Concept and Implementation.*

[572] Cacioppo, *A Systematic Theory for Psychological Warfare.*

[573] U.S. Army, "PSYOP Teams."

3. *Psychological Operations and Military Deception operations*. This was chosen based off the original Narrative Fusion Cell briefing.[574] Deception has been a common thread intertwining throughout the history of Psychological Operations.[575] This course would best serve as a basis for the 37A MOS, or the officer, who is most likely to fill future Military Deception billets, which are more often filled by officers in the Joint force.[576]

4. Sensitive activities integration with Psychological Operations, to include review methods to integrate with Space, Special Technical Operations, and other sensitive activities. The need for Special Technical Operations integration was first formally identified in the Narrative Fusion Cell brief from 2016.[577] Space Force integration and influence has been taking place since the Gulf War when France's SPOT constellation was used to deceive Saddam Hussein.[578] This course would best serve as a basis for the 37A MOS, or the officer for the same reasons that the Military Deception training is suited for the 37A MOS.

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[574] Rosales, *1st POB (A) Narrative Fusion Cell Concept and Implementation*.

[575] The Ghost Army Legacy Project, "Overview."

[576] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-53.4, *Military Deception* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 26, 2012), x.

[577] Rosales, *1st POB (A) Narrative Fusion Cell Concept and Implementation*.

[578] Swedberg, "The Effect on Operational and Technical Surprise by U.S. Military Forces Due to the Proliferation of Unclassified Satellite Imaging Systems," 73.

5. *Advanced equipment training for all Psychological Operations-specific equipment*: from portable radios, to print capabilities, loudspeakers, satellite equipment, and current commercial off-the-shelf solutions. This requirement was realized while reviewing doctrine, which does not include standard lists of equipment or Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) solutions for Psychological Operations. This course and the subsequent MOS would also be the means for Psychological Operations to connect to 2015 gap related to emerging materiel solutions for emerging capabilities.[579] An example of the use of COTS solutions with Psychological Operations was provided in the review of the PPEX.[580] This course would best serve as a basis for the 37B MOS, or the Equipment Specialist MOS.

6. *Network effects training specific to Psychological Operations*, to include physical network systems, social media platforms, and cyber and electromagnetic spectrum integration. This course and the eventual MOS would be based off of the lessons learned from the PPEX concept.[581] It would address the 2015 gaps related to standardizing measures of effects, analysis, and target audience analysis because it would standardize means of

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[579] Rosales, *1st POB (A) Narrative Fusion Cell Concept and Implementation*.

[580] Kava et al., "PSYOP's Analytical and Systematic Approach to Publicly Available Information," 6.

[581] Kava et al., "PSYOP's Analytical and Systematic Approach to Publicly Available Information," 6.

employment.[582] Standard operations are easier to measure than unique ones—though unique solutions would not be foregone. This course would best serve as a basis for the 37C MOS, or the Networks Effects MOS.

7. *Design solutions, graphic design, film, copy writing, and advertising techniques*. This course is based off of the successful integration of artists throughout the conflicts—specifically the Second World War's Ghost Army and the First Motion Picture Unit.[583] The need is apparent, as the 25M MOS for graphic design attaches to Psychological Operations teams.[584] This course would best serve as a basis for the 37D MOS, or the Product Design and Development MOS.

8. *Advanced language and cultural training* designed to instruct Psychological Operations personnel in the nuance of cultural references, humor, and folklore. The need for expertise in folklore was best demonstrated by Edward Lansdale's applications of Psychological Warfare.[585] The lack of cultural understanding was highlighted throughout history and an acknowledged gap in 2015.[586] This course would best serve as a basis for the 37E MOS, or the

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[582] Rosales, *1st POB (A) Narrative Fusion Cell Concept and Implementation*.

[583] Rioux, *From Sawdust to Stardust*, 60; The Ghost Army Legacy Project, "Overview."

[584] Army-Portal, "Qualifications for initial award of MOS 25M, Multimedia Illustrator."

[585] Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars*, 88; Lansdale, *Memorandum*.

[586] Rosales, *1st POB (A) Narrative Fusion Cell Concept and Implementation*.

Cultural Expert, who would need such niche training not provided elsewhere in the military and not provided in the Psychological Operations pipeline.[587]

9. Integration of Psychological Operations with Special Forces, Civil Affairs, other Special Operations organizations and Conventional Forces. The need to integrate is described in detail in the USASOC Army Special Operations Forces Strategy.[588] This course would best serve as a basis for the 37E MOS, or the Cultural Expert, who could be attached to other Special Operations units or conventional units to provide cultural insight, language capability, and assist in the consolidation of gains or in POW analysis—similar capabilities were used within the OWI during the Second World War.[589]

10. *Network analysis specific to Psychological Operations*, with a focus on key communicators, centers of gravity, social media analysis, the targeting process, advertising and marketing data, and synthesis of intelligence with publicly available information. This course and the subsequent MOS would be based off of the lessons learned from the VTED in Afghanistan.[590] It would assist in addressing the 2015 gaps related to data analysis, measuring effects,

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[587] Burton, *FY 2019 Academic Handbook: Special Warfare*, 18-19.

[588] USASOC, *Army Special Operations Forces Strategy*, 1.

[589] Sandler, "Cease Resistance," 89.

[590] Holzmann and O'Connell, "Falling Short in Measures of Effectiveness."

and target audience analysis.[591] This course would best serve as a basis for the 37F MOS, or the Networks Analysis MOS.

These courses could be initially designed alongside academia through JSOU alongside the Cultural Intelligence Element so that experts can be leveraged alongside expert practitioners from within the Psychological Operations Regiment. Once refined, these courses can be used as the basis for Psychological Operations MOS training. Further discussion on the MOSs occurs in the personnel section of this chapter.

Potential Second and Third Order Effects to Consider

Quality personnel will be a commitment and time spent training means that time may be taken away from operations. The solution cannot be a return to the Foreign Area Officer model, which produced expertise but took personnel years to complete the training—increasing training by a margin no greater than what other Special Operations personnel experience, such as the Special Forces, is a pragmatic decision. A positive result could be the alignment of both courses, which could facilitate integrated training during both pipelines. There would be an adjustment period, and changes to training would also need to be rooted in positive changes to doctrine, as well as rely on the other recommendations in this study if such a change is to be successful. Failing to do so and simply extending training would not result in positive secondary and tertiary effects.

Throughput in the schools could also be affected, which would have to either be addressed by increasing class sized, the number of instructors, or conducting multiple courses in tandem with each other. There would be costs associated with any of those

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[591] Rosales, *1st POB (A) Narrative Fusion Cell Concept and Implementation.*

decisions, but it is the belief of this study that improving the end product of a better

individual Psychological Operations practitioner is the primary takeaway from this study.

Adjustments to training will require fiscal solutions. The second and third order

effects could also lead to further integration with academia if JSOU is involved in the

solution, and also clearly developed methods to directly address many of the gaps within

the Regiment. Training also takes time to develop, so time would be a limiting factor, and

it one of the reasons this study suggests the early integration of the Advanced Skills

Detachments. Those detachments and the training they develop should be used to frame

the development of an increase to the POQC. Doing so could facilitate a gradual and

pragmatic implementation to mitigate the impact of the recommendations. Some of these

changes also feed into the leadership and education segment of the DOTMLPF-P

analysis, however, the majority of the analysis and recommendations were done in this

section.

<div align="center">Materiel</div>

Materiel is defined as, "items, systems, or equipment needed to support the

required capability."[592] The TIS will need to be given the ability to purchase emerging

COTS equipment and integrate with emerging research and technology.

<u>Insufficiencies or Capabilities Gaps</u>

The gaps identified in the 2015 assessment included target audience analysis

tools, language capabilities, cultural understanding, data analysis, narrative control, and

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[592] CJCS, JCIDS Manual, B-G-F-3 to B-G-F-4.

standards for measuring effects.[593] The First Motion Picture Unit used equipment unique

to filmmaking.[594] There is a need for an organization within Psychological Operations to

identify unique needs that would arise.[595]

The *2015 Psychological Operations Assessment* identified the need for tools to

assist in target audience analysis and many of the other capability gaps that integrated

with the need for a hub of information.[596] History identified the need for a hub of

information to be operational in nature.[597] Storing the lessons learned without

aggressively sharing the lessons would negate the purpose of the storage.

Analysis, Lessons, and Solutions Based on the Research

The TIS was given the directive to function as a hub of lessons learned and best

practices.[598] That effort could assist in addressing gaps relating to standard methods of

data analysis, target audience training tools, cultural training, measuring effects, and

developing narratives.[599] Palantir is the most viable option for addressing the materiel

needs of Psychological Operations.[600] If a Red Team existed within Psychological

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[593] Rosales. *1st POB (A) Narrative Fusion Cell Concept and Implementation*.

[594] Siegel, "Hollywood's Army."

[595] Rosales. *1st POB (A) Narrative Fusion Cell Concept and Implementation*.

[596] Ibid.

[597] Cacioppo, *A Systematic Theory for Psychological Warfare*, 34.

[598] Rosales, *1st POB (A) Narrative Fusion Cell Concept and Implementation*.

[599] Ibid.

[600] Fazzini and Macias, "Peter Thiel's company Palantir just won a major
Pentagon contract, beating out traditional military vendors."

Operations, then analysis of the JUSPAO and MISTF-A would have discovered several of the lessons from the Second World War and Korean War. Palantir could facilitate the hub requirement for the TIS. The PPEX used a variety of COTS solutions to function during its operations.[601] Additional research would need to be conducted to best understand how emergent innovative solutions could be leveraged to address the gaps.

<u>Potential Second and Third Order Effects to Consider</u>

Such solutions would need to be identified by the units, be locally purchased or compete through the JCIDS process to receive funding and training.[602] Palantir is a Defense Program of Record, and SOCOM has an existing contract with Palantir, which means that the information could potentially be shared easily within the Joint force.[603] Training involving Palantir will likely cost the military money, but because this recommendation is based off of an already approved program this study finds that the solution is very feasible.

<center>Leadership and Education</center>

Leadership is defined as, "professional development of joint leaders that is the product of a learning continuum that comprises training, experience, education, and self-

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[601] Kava et al., "PSYOP's Analytical and Systematic Approach to Publicly Available Information," 6.

[602] CJCS, JCIDS Manual, B-G-F-4.

[603] Ibid.

improvement."[604] There were some related findings concerning leadership and education. Improvement may be necessary.

Insufficiencies or Capabilities Gaps

The gaps identified in both the *2015 Psychological Operations Assessment* and also throughout history could be addressed partially through the education of the personnel within the Psychological Operations Regiment. This study found that many mistakes that were repeated were likely because personnel were not aware of the previous lessons learned concerning Psychological Operations. The Psychological Operations pipeline is a total of 43 weeks.[605] It includes two weeks of history and orientation, 25 weeks of language training, 8 weeks of training in conducting Psychological Operations, 4 weeks of regional and cultural training, and 4 weeks of exercises.[606]

Analysis, Lessons, and Solutions Based on the Research

The section concerning training already discussed gaps concerning education and knowledge of lessons learned from the past. This section will further address the gaps identified concerning the POQC and training and further propose leadership and education recommendations to further mitigate.

This study recommends that a reading list of mandatory books be assigned to all personnel attending the POQC. If Psychological Operations personnel read more books

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[604] CJCS, JCIDS Manual, B-G-F-4.

[605] Burton, *FY 2019 Academic Handbook: Special Warfare*, 18-19.

[606] Ibid.

concerning their profession they would have a clearer understanding of the capabilities, a basis for writing further on the nature of their profession, and a common operating picture that would expand beyond the lessons of the POQC. It is suggested that several books predate the *1985 Psychological Operations Master Plan*. Such a reading list would establish a baseline of education to further build each individual's expertise.

The POQC consists of 16 of the 43 weeks that span the Psychological Operations pipeline. There is also an opportunity to assign the reading list and have personnel learning of their profession outside of the classroom and beyond the 16 weeks. Using all 43 weeks to the fullest could lead to a better practitioner. The reading list and rationale behind each selection is included in the next chapter.

Potential Second and Third Order Effects to Consider

As stated in chapter 1 and chapter 3, this study was completed in order to better understand what solutions were available from history. The research for this study has been completed, but implementation will involve further analysis. Qualified individuals take longer to make, educating the entire Psychological Operations Regiment will take time, throughput in the schools would slow down. This study acknowledges the need for further analysis.

Personnel

Personnel is defined as identifying if "qualified personnel exist to support joint capability requirements."[607] Of note, "The number or quantity of personnel is a function

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[607] CJCS, JCIDS Manual, B-G-F-5.

of organization, while the quality, type, or skills of personnel is considered in the personnel function."[608]

Insufficiencies or Capabilities Gaps

It is evident from the literature available that Psychological Operations Assessment and Selection is working and properly identifying the right individuals.[609] Recruitment was not a major focus of this study but was briefly addressed because this study found that some of the greatest successes occurred when uniquely skilled personnel were recruited for Psychological Operations. Recruitment efforts should be tailored to the requirements of the Psychological Operations Regiment—and clearly delineated capabilities must be codified.

Analysis, Lessons, and Solutions Based on the Research

The Army's move toward talent management is an opportunity for Psychological Operations recruiting to discover individuals who self-identify key skills that the Regiment could use.[610] The future of recruiting for Psychological Operations could include identifying officers and enlisted personnel with advanced degrees in behavioral sciences, knowledge or skills such as graphic design or computer technology proficiency,

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[608] CJCS, JCIDS Manual, B-G-F-5.

[609] David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, *United States Special Operations Forces* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 46.

[610] Jarod A. Taylor and Agustin M. Gonzalez, "AIM-ing for the Best Assignment: How to Make the Most Out of AIM 2.0," *The Field Grade Leader,* March 30, 2019, http://fieldgradeleader.themilitaryleader.com/aim/.

and unique cultural experiences.[611] The Army's new Assignment Interactive Module (AIM) 2.0 now allows Army officers to put in unique, "self-identification of knowledge, skills, and behaviors."[612] Enlisted personnel are recruited for active duty Psychological Operations after they have already entered service, so individuals currently serving may be identified and contacted to share the opportunities for them to use their unique skills within the Army.[613]

Additionally, this study recommends that additional MOSs be established within the Psychological Operations Regiment. Developing such MOSs will also assist recruiting efforts, as self-identified skills may already exist in potential recruits. The 12-person Special Forces teams and the vocally approved DCR serve as a model for this study's recommended MOSs.[614] The MOSs within Special Forces include a range of specialties established to function as an optimized team to conduct Unconventional Warfare.[615] This study's proposed MOSs would be developed from the already suggested courses to be established by the Advanced Skills Detachments. The MOSs would assist in addressing systemic issues identified throughout decades of research concerning

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[611] David Vergun, "Army moving to talent management approach to guide career paths," *Army News Service,* October 15, 2018, https://www.army.mil/article/212245/army_moving_to_talent_management_approach_to_guide_career_paths.

[612] Taylor and Gonzalez, "AIM-ing for the Best Assignment."

[613] U.S. Army Special Operations Recruiting, "Psychological Operations Unconventional Minds for Unconventional Warfare," accessed January 12, 2020, https://goarmysof.com/PsyOp/PsyOprecruiting.html.

[614] Wood, "Special Warfare," Lock, *DOTmLPF-P Change Recommendation for PSYOP Unit of Action Redesign.*

[615] U.S. Army, "Special Forces Intelligence Sergeant (18F)."

Psychological Operations, leading up to the most recently published *2015 Psychological Operations Assessment*. The suggested MOSs are:

1. *37A, Psychological Operations Officer*: receives additional face-to-face training, Psychological Operations theory and history, and integration with other units. Is responsible for Space Force integration, Sensitive Activities, Special Technical Operations integration, and Military Deception integration. These last three aspects were chosen because the majority of billets for those operations are officer billets throughout the Joint force.[616]

2. *37B, Equipment Specialist*: receives additional training on all Psychological Operations-specific equipment. Is responsible for maintaining relevancy with the most recent COTS equipment integrated throughout the Regiment.[617]

3. *37C, Network Effects*: receives additional training on ways Psychological Operations' target audience analysis research authorities may be used to understand, analyze and affect physical network systems, social media

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[616] Axelrod, *Selling the Great War*, 116; Muñoz, *U.S. Military Information Operations in Afghanistan*, xvi; U.S. Army, "PSYOP Teams,"; Rosales, *1st POB (A) Narrative Fusion Cell Concept and Implementation*; Swedberg, "The Effect on Operational and Technical Surprise by U.S. Military Forces Due to the Proliferation of Unclassified Satellite Imaging Systems," 73; Munsing and Lamb, *Joint Interagency Task Force–South*.

[617] Rosales, *1st POB (A) Narrative Fusion Cell Concept and Implementation*; Kava et al., "PSYOP's Analytical and Systematic Approach to Publicly Available Information."

platforms, and cyber and electromagnetic spectrum integration. Is responsible for continued understanding of emerging technologies.[618]

4. *37D, Product Design and Development*: receives additional training concerning design solutions, graphic design, film and audio production, film and audio editing, copy writing, and advertising techniques. Responsible for continually developing their understanding of the arts, media, and culturally unique entertainment.[619]

5. *37E, Cultural Expert*: receives additional language and cultural training designed to instruct Psychological Operations personnel in the nuance of cultural references, humor, and folklore. Responsible for continually developing their language and cultural understanding.[620]

6. *37F, Network Analysis*: receives additional training on discovering key communicators and centers of gravity, receives in-depth training on how advertising and marketing data may synthesize with intelligence and publicly available information. Is also trained extensively in theories required to measure effects, models for measuring effects, and survey methodology.

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[618] Rosales, *1st POB (A) Narrative Fusion Cell Concept and Implementation*; Kava et al., "PSYOP's Analytical and Systematic Approach to Publicly Available Information."

[619] Rioux, *From Sawdust to Stardust*, 60; The Ghost Army Legacy Project, "Overview,"; Army-Portal, "Qualifications for initial award of MOS 25M, Multimedia Illustrator."

[620] Burton, *FY 2019 Academic Handbook: Special Warfare*, 18-19; Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars*, 88; Lansdale, *Memorandum*; Rosales, *1st POB (A) Narrative Fusion Cell Concept and Implementation*.

Responsible for continually developing their understanding of the social

sciences, emerging theories, academic research, and platforms for analysis.[621]

This study has found that a single prolific Psychological Operations professional

can change the course of a conflict—such as Samuel Adams, Edward Lansdale, or Jack

Summe. Identifying potential within the force could lead to great successes in the future.

This study acknowledges that an in-depth analysis would need to take place to apply

force management concepts. Career paths, career development, promotion potential

would all need to be fully addressed prior to implementation. However, the requirements

are apparent, the lessons from history are consistent, and the opportunity to address the

requirements has arrived. The recent developments within the Psychological Operations

Regiment are steps in the right direction, and the MOSs are the next step.

Potential Second and Third Order Effects to Consider

The second and third order effects of such recommendations are similar to the

effects of the other related suggestions. This study acknowledges that further analysis

must be conducted in order to further understand the second and third order effects of

such changes.

Facilities

Facilities are defined as, "buildings, structures, ranges, utility systems, associated

roads and other pavements, and underlying land."[622] While facilities were not the

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[621] Rosales, *1st POB (A) Narrative Fusion Cell Concept and Implementation*; Holzmann and O'Connell, "Falling Short in Measures of Effectiveness."

[622] CJCS, JCIDS Manual, B-G-F-5.

primary focus of this study, some developments in recent years have led the government

and the military to innovate, despite its hierarchical structure.[623]

Insufficiencies or Capabilities Gaps

The literature reviewed did not cite facilities as a significant gap. The research did

discover opportunities for further innovation. Facilities could play an important role in

the training and function of Psychological Operations and their integration with other

information-related capabilities.[624]

Analysis, Lessons, and Solutions Based on the Research

Concepts reviewed on Red Teams discusses liberating structures and explains the

look of the Google campus that has become popularized in the media.[625] Such innovation

can be replicated, and the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies under the

Combined Arms Center offers tailorable Red Team training and resources to develop

concepts within military organizations.[626] An example of leveraging such training would

be to observe the NGA's efforts to develop facilities that incorporate Red Team concepts

to optimize flat organizations.[627] The NGA's plan for innovation includes facilities that

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[623] Manning, "DOTMLPF-P Analysis."

[624] Zenko, *Red Team*, 23.

[625] Duhigg, "What Google Learned from Its Quest to Build the Perfect Team,"; University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies, *Liberating Structures* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: TRADOC G–2 Operational Environment Enterprise, 2018).

[626] University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies, *The Red Team Handbook*, 3.

[627] NGA, "Next NGA West: Home."

could be used as a model to emulate on a smaller scale for the TIS.[628] This study

recommends further analysis and as the TIS concept grows it should grow using Red

Team concepts and the precedent established by the NGA to develop an innovative

organization.

Potential Second and Third Order Effects to Consider

Additional research would need to be conducted in order to fully understand the

potential costs and effects associated with these facilities recommendations. There is time

to develop this concept; this study suggests the target date for such a facility to be 2035.

Policy

Many theses were read through the course of this study that addressed policy.

Policy is defined as "interagency or international policy issues that may impact effective

implementation of changes in the other DOTMLPF-P considerations."[629]

Insufficiencies or Capabilities Gaps

Psychological Operations personnel have a wide variety of authorities allocated

them within the current military structure an under Titles 10, 22, 17, 42, and 18 as

required by the mission that Psychological Operations must execute or support.[630] This

study found no need to address those. However, many Psychological Operations

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[628] NGA, "Next NGA West: About."

[629] CJCS, JCIDS Manual, B-G-F-5.

[630] Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Graphic Training Aide
(GTA) 33-01-004, *Military Information Support Operations Authoritative Reference*
(Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence, November 2017),
i-iii.

personnel have insisted on returning to the *1985 Psychological Operations Master Plan*, arguing for higher and higher levels of responsibility and command, with multiple theses and articles believing the future of Psychological Operations to be either as its own branch of the military, at its own table within government as the CPI once held, or some other similar high-level organization.[631]

Dyer identified in 1959 that the CPI and OWI were both examples of top-down bureaucracies that were too large to be effective.[632] The JUSPAO of the 1960s and 1970s demonstrated Dyer's beliefs to be accurate.[633] The Joint Psychological Operations Center, Joint Psychological Support Element, Joint Military Information Support Command, and Military Information Support Operations Command had over a decade combined to achieve success, but those organizations existed at the height of the criticism regarding the conduct of Psychological Operations in Afghanistan.[634] The existence of those organizations did not appear through the review of literature to lead to the effective conduct of Psychological Operations.[635]

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[631] Davenport, "The Need for an Innovative Joint Psychological Warfare Force Structure," 67.

[632] Dyer, *The Weapon on the Wall*, 87.

[633] Chandler, *War of Ideas*, 247.

[634] Paddock, "No More Tactical Information Detachments," 30.

[635] Muñoz, *U.S. Military Information Operations in Afghanistan*.

<u>Analysis, Lessons, and Solutions Based on the Research</u>

There is no need for greater authority for the Psychological Operations units to conduct CIA or USIA-like activities. Instead, relationships must form to facilitate cooperation between the DoD and interagency efforts. The OSS of the Second World War was split up into the various organizations for a reason, and as *The Weapon on the Wall* postulated, and the JUSPAO demonstrated, there are incorrect ways to seek unlimited hierarchical control for nebulous operations.[636] However, the permission to use those authorities should be considered and further analyzed. Many authorities exist but empowering the Psychological Operations Regiment to "turn on" those authorities is a separate situation that this study did not address.

The TIS could function as a critical node of relationships like the United States General Staff in 1903 did. The General Staff's function facilitated readiness and provided support to decision makers.[637] It provided logical and reasoned evidence when necessary to give options to the leaders who wrote policy.[638] Finally, the prevalence of the *1985 Psychological Operations Master Plan* may be addressed by developing a new master plan to frame future research and development. The TIS could develop such a plan and be the section that empowers the plan's execution.

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[636] Chandler, *War of Ideas*, 247.

[637] Reynolds, "The General Staff as a Propaganda Agency, 1908-1914," 391-408.

[638] Ibid.

<u>Potential Second and Third Order Effects to Consider</u>

The requirements of Multi-Domain Operations are Joint needs to address a complex environment. If the TIS becomes an integration hub of lessons learned, capable of operationalizing and sharing those lessons, then it could similarly empower whole of government approaches to complex problems. Unity of effort without the need for unity of command has the potential to be overwhelmingly successful.

<u>Summary and Conclusions</u>

> Psychological Warfare and Civic Action are the very essence of the counterinsurgency campaign here in Vietnam . . . you cannot win this war by military means alone.[639]
> —William C. Westmoreland, Eighth Quarterly Psychological Operations/ Civil Affairs Conference, in Stanley Sandler, *Cease Resistance*

The analysis of the research found that there are clear steps that can be taken to truly innovate the Psychological Operations Regiment by following models from history and integrating them with emerging efforts. Improvements to doctrine may facilitate adequate baseline training during the POQC, changes to the organizational structure could empower the TIS and the rest of the Regiment to function at the levels required to conduct Multi-Domain Operations. Training may lead to the development of additional Psychological Operations MOSs, which would then also improve the organization, as those MOSs could feed the TIS concept. Materiel solutions are already available in the form of existing contracting with companies like Palantir. There are also personnel opportunities with new programs being initiated by the Army.

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[639] Sandler, "Cease Resistance," 264.

The TIS should be further developed and base its development off of the lessons of the past. Models to emulate appear in the form of the VTED, the PPEX, JIATFs, the Active Measures Working Group, Business on the Frontlines, and the Cultural Intelligence Element. All provide a framework and precedent for the TIS to function in ways that the United States has previously implemented. The result could be a flat organization such as the JIATFs, mixed with the science-based components of the Cultural Intelligence Element, Business on the Frontlines, PPEX, and the VTED— potentially using contractors to supplement as the VTED did. Such an organization would be capable of executing the tasks of the TIS and adequately addressing the 2015 gaps.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

This study's focus dove into the history of each era of Psychological Operations in the United States. The previous chapters listed how the information researched was processed before analyzing the research and developing solutions. This chapter will present the formal findings and recommendations of the study.

Findings and Recommendations

Concluding Hypothesis

The concluding hypothesis was that the Army Psychological Operations Regiment has not incorporated the lessons learned from history and if those lessons were heeded, they could be used to address the Operational Context. A proposed solution is to optimize the already presented solutions within the Psychological Operations organization by confronting the root causes of the gaps.

This study has determined that those root causes are: (1) insufficient doctrine, (2) a need for improved training, (3) a lack of specialization that could be addressed by developing additional MOSs, and (4) the decrease in academic expertise due to the removal of growth from the Cultural Intelligence Element, and (5) a need for the TIS to be further developed.

The scope of the solution provided by the hypothesis changed through the course of this study, which was initially: (1) based on biased personal experience, and therefore inadequate, (2) not sufficient enough to guide the direction of the Regiment, and (3) not

steeped in enough history, and therefore not enough to establish precedent. The review of the literature greatly assisted in the removal of bias, and patterns emerged during the analysis of the research.

Addressing the Questions

Primary Question

Restating the Question

The primary research question was: how should the Psychological Operations Regiment be optimized to achieve the *Army Special Operations Forces Strategy* while simultaneously addressing the Army's transition to Large-Scale Combat Operations?

This study found that the TIS will play a critical role in the development of Psychological Operations capabilities, but it cannot do so alone. Doctrine and the Psychological Operations Qualification Course must also be further developed in order to improve the Regiment. Additionally, training and personnel changes were identified through the course of this study, which will be further discussed in this chapter. These improvements could establish standard methods to approach analysis, assessments, and cultural understanding. Such efforts could establish a baseline upon which the TIS could build.

The 2015 Psychological Operations Assessment Gaps Restated

The gaps and the tasks of the TIS will be restated before describing how each may be addressed with the findings of this study, which answers the research question:

1. Insufficient target audience analysis training and tools.

2. Poor language capability.

3. Poor cultural understanding.

4. No consistent connection to academia.

5. No standard for data analysis.

6. No standards for measuring effects.

7. Tactical narrative not nested with strategic narratives. [640]

The key tasks given to the TIS are:

1. Repository of information.

2. Academic resource.

3. Sensitive activities capability.

4. Deployable. [641]

Addressing the Gaps

The revival of the Cultural Intelligence Element and the recommendation that additional Psychological Operations MOSs be established will form the nexus of the TIS. Approving the MOS concept would establish a base that could be further developed. Together, both efforts could assist greatly in providing the expertise needed to conduct advanced and consistent analysis, assessments, narratives, cultural understanding, a connection to academia, and language capability. Finally, the TIS should develop a master plan for the future, which would serve as a guiding document for future development and implementation.

The tasks given to the TIS would be addressed with those changes, along with the development of the TIS into a Joint Red Team section, allocated to each regionally aligned Psychological Operations battalion, but residing within First Special Forces

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[640] Rosales. *1st POB (A) Narrative Fusion Cell Concept and Implementation*.

[641] Ibid.

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Command. Doing so would empower it to be deployable as an IWTF underneath First

Special Forces Command, just as that command is deployable as a SOJTF (see figure 5).

Figure 5.   Technical Information Section 2028

Source: Created by author using information from Lock, *DOTmLPF-P Change Recommendation for PSYOP Unit of Action Redesign* (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2020), 5.

Moving the TIS to reside formally within First Special Forces Command would

benefit the objectivity of the sections and allow for inter-post transfers to occur for

Psychological Operations personnel to move from the operational battalions to the TIS

without the danger of losing the personnel after six months to a year. Similar to the

lessons learned from the VTED, moving the billets of the TIS under First Special Forces

Command would remove a layer of bias within the measurement of effects, and free up

personnel on Psychological Operations missions to conduct their operations without having to allocate time and effort to also measuring their own effectiveness.

Measuring effects, gathering historical information, and assisting in target audience analysis would mean that each TIS would need to be conducting continuous studies of countries of interest, understand the nature of operational art and operations design, and receive information. The TIS would be further empowered to conduct its mission by establishing Palantir as its means of serving as a hub of lessons learned and Psychological Operations coordination. The TIS should combine the lessons learned from the PPEX, the VTED, the NFCs, and all of the lessons of the past from the Active Measures Working Group and Business on the Frontlines, to the shortfalls of the JUSPAO. It should be an adhocracy, with the ability to scale it into a JIATF-like IWTF if ever the need would be required.

The DCR is pending approval and has proposed the integration of Advanced Skills Detachments. These detachments have an opportunity to develop training that could be used as models for Psychological Operations MOS pipelines. This study recommends the following training as necessary in order to develop the Psychological Operations Regiment in such a way as to address the 2015 gaps, further develop the TIS, and meet the requirements of Multi-Domain Operations:

1. Advanced negotiations training and face-to-face engagement training.

2. Advanced application of Psychological Operations-related theories.

3. Psychological Operations and Military Deception operations.

4. Sensitive activities integration with Psychological Operations, to include review methods to integrate with Space, Special Technical Operations, and other sensitive activities.

5. Advanced equipment training for all Psychological Operations-specific equipment.

6. Network effects training specific to Psychological Operations.

7. Design solutions, graphic design, film, copy writing, and advertising techniques.

8. Advanced language and cultural training.

9. Integration of Psychological Operations with Special Forces, Civil Affairs, other Special Operations organizations and Conventional Forces.

10. Network analysis specific to Psychological Operations.

Once refined, these courses could be used as the basis for Psychological Operations MOS training. The Special Forces Regiment has had MOSs since 1958, and that model could potentially be integrated into the Psychological Operations Regiment, tailored to meet the needs of Psychological Operations. The proposed MOSs are:

1. 37A, Psychological Operations Officer.

2. 37B, Equipment Specialist.

3. 37C, Network Effects.

4. 37D, Product Design and Development.

5. 37E, Cultural Expert.

6. 37F, Network Analysis.

The DCR and analysis from chapter 4 were synthesized in order to propose a future model for Psychological Operations Detachments (see figure 6).


Figure 6.   Proposed Psychological Operations Military Occupational Specialties

Source: Created by author using information from Lock, *DOTmLPF-P Change Recommendation for PSYOP Unit of Action Redesign* (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2020).

The development of Psychological Operations MOSs would greatly impact consistent Psychological Operations performance. The following MOSs are suggested, based upon the lessons learned from history, the gaps identified in 2015, and the duties of the TIS that will necessitate consistent levels of advanced training:

1. 37A, Psychological Operations Officer: receives additional face-to-face training, Psychological Operations theory and history, and integration with other units. Is responsible for Space Force integration, Sensitive Activities,

Special Technical Operations integration, and Military Deception integration. These last three aspects were chosen because the majority of billets for those operations are officer billets throughout the Joint force.

2. 37B, Equipment Specialist: receives additional training on all Psychological Operations-specific equipment. Is responsible for maintaining relevancy with the most recent COTS equipment integrated throughout the Regiment.

3. 37C, Network Effects: receives additional training on ways Psychological Operations' target audience analysis research authorities may be used to understand, analyze and affect physical network systems, social media platforms, and cyber and electromagnetic spectrum integration. Is responsible for continued understanding of emerging technologies.

4. 37D, Product Design and Development: receives additional training concerning design solutions, graphic design, film and audio production, film and audio editing, copy writing, and advertising techniques. Responsible for continually developing their understanding of the arts, media, and culturally unique entertainment.

5. 37E, Cultural Expert: receives additional language and cultural training designed to instruct Psychological Operations personnel in the nuance of cultural references, humor, and folklore. Responsible for continually developing their language and cultural understanding.

6. 37F, Network Analysis: receives additional training on discovering key communicators and centers of gravity, receives in-depth training on how advertising and marketing data may synthesize with intelligence and publicly

available information. Is also trained extensively in theories required to measure effects, models for measuring effects, and survey methodology. Responsible for continually developing their understanding of the social sciences, emerging theories, academic research, and platforms for analysis.

Those MOSs would be capable of filling the sections required for an adequate IWTF, capable of scaling and tailorable to any need the government would identify. These sections are a synthesis of the most effective sections reviewed through the course of the research for this study (see figure 7). This model is a theoretical example and demonstrates a truly Joint IWTF that could leverage the range of information related capabilities discussed in chapter 2.

The key takeaway from the example provided in figure 7 is the sections, themselves, which could include Joint billets, but would additionally be manned by the aligned and proposed MOSs, the Cultural Intelligence Element personnel, and structured based off of the lessons of the past.

Figure 7.　Future Joint TIS Manning 2035

Source: Created by author.

The result of such a hypothetical development would be a truly adaptable organization. Information related capabilities were briefly discussed at the end of chapter 2. Information Warfare is complicated, and currently involves and will involve individuals who previously were not aligned to such tasks. The example of the "LAWFARE" Officer is one opportunity to integrate an emerging practice prior to the needs and requirements of war. As Linebarger wrote after the Second World War, "Nations rarely change their basic character in time of war. When war starts it is usually

too late to re-educate generations already grown up, teach them wholly new skills, or develop administrative or operational procedures unknown in peacetime life."[642]


Figure 8.   TIS Integration

Source: Created by author.

[642] Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 94.

Establishing such positions within the TIS now will empower First Special Forces Command, USASOC, and SOCOM to prepare now for the threats of tomorrow that are present today (see figures 8 and 9). A TIS may form the basis of an IWTF and may be based off of the lessons of the four eras of Psychological Operations. The IWTF is an emerging concept, but the nature of the IWTF is not new, and Large-Scale Combat Operations have been successfully conducted with Psychological Operations organizations in the past.


Figure 9.   TIS Integration

Source: Created by author.

Developing the TIS as a Red Team would facilitate objectivity and also cooperation. The successes of the Active Measures Working Group were its lack of hierarchy and its effort to empower innovative solutions (see figure 10). The TIS will not need to wage war alone against the threat actors identified in the *National Defense Strategy*. Success should not be defined by what the TIS can organically do, though this study does suggest that organic capability can and should empower the Psychological Operations Regiment and the rest of the Special Operations community. Permitting the TIS to properly perform the tasks assigned to it would make it a force multiplier within the United States government, able to facilitate unique approaches.


Figure 10. TIS Integration

Source: Created by author.

Because the TIS would be conducting the tasks assigned to it, it may also be used to develop Psychological Operations exercises and training within the Psychological Operations battalions. Those training events would be further opportunities to brief personnel on emerging capabilities and research, emerging patters, integrate lessons learned into the training, and even incorporate Special Operations training alongside conventional forces training, Joint influence organizations, the interagency, and academia.

<u>Secondary Questions</u>

Restating the Questions

1. Have Psychological Operations been faced with similar gaps in the past and what were the previous solutions?

2. Could such solutions address the current Operational Context?

3. Who would most benefit from the research and recommendations of this study?

4. What could be the impact on the Combatant Commands?

5. What is the relevance of the study?

6. Would there be a return on investment associated with the recommendations?

7. What are the financial impacts?

8. What would be given up in order to implement the findings and recommendations?

9. What missions could not be completed with the current system in place if nothing were to change?

Addressing the Questions and Recommendations

The first of the secondary research questions was answered while answering the primary research question. This study has determined that the solutions discussed can address the Operational Context, to include the directives of the *National Defense Strategy*, the requirements to support Large-Scale Combat Operations initiatives, and the *USASOC Strategy*. The *National Defense Strategy* emphasizes the building of capacity and readiness through modernization, and innovation.[643] Three specific factors within the first line of effort are education, the management of talent, and emphasis on the civilian workforce.[644] The second line of effort is preparing the Joint Force to be consistently relevant and innovative in its organization while maintaining affordable solutions.[645]

It was determined through the course of this study that the gaps within the Psychological Operations Regiment must be addressed if the Special Operations community is to properly conduct Multi-Domain Operations. The further development of the TIS would empower it to become a section of innovation designed to enable readiness. It would do so by encouraging education, talent management, and emphasize the importance of the civilian workforce in Special Operations. It would develop into an inherently Joint capability and would be an affordable solution to the needs of the government.

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[643] SecDef, Summary of the 2018 NDS, 5-9.

[644] Ibid.

[645] Ibid., 10-11.

Doing so would therefore benefit the Joint Special Operations community and dramatically empower both the Psychological Operations Regiment to fulfill its missions as well as the First Special Forces Command. USASOC developed the SOJTF concept to nest within the requirements for Large-Scale Combat Operations and Multi-Domain Operations. That model includes being able to establish IWTFs. Doing so would prevent the mistakes of rapid mobilization that occurred in the past, when Psychological Operations units were built out of nothing for conflicts like the World Wars and Korea. Maintaining an operational IWTF within itself at all times, suited to adapt to the needs of the government will empower the First Special Forces Command to be prepared for any contingency as the United States reenters an era of great power competition.[646]

The benefit to the Combatant Commands would be the ability to leverage the separate or collective TIS sections the same way they leverage the First Special Forces Command through the Theater Special Operations Commands (see figures 9 and 11). The return on investment would be significant, as Special Operations provide adaptive and affordable solutions to complex problems. The Army would require some level of growth to achieve the organization, but because the recommendation is for the TIS to develop into a Joint capability it would share the manning with the Joint force.

The threats to the United States are complex, and necessitate complex, integrated solutions. Ideally, each TIS would function within the regionally aligned Psychological Operations battalions under a single TIS within the First Special Forces Command. The

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[646] Wesbrock, Harned, and Plous, "Special Operations Forces and Conventional Forces," 90.

secondary and tertiary effects would be further integration, as Joint service members

would be able to serve as nodes to their respective information related organizations.

Theater Special Operations Commands and Global Combatant Commands would

not need to change their models of deployment or integration with the Special Operations

community in order to empower and facilitate the TIS. Instead, the TIS would function to

flatten Special Operations' collaborative efforts to achieve timely effects that could span

the globe, using the permissions and authorities that already exist.

Figure 11. Strategic Narratives

Source: Created by author.

Each TIS would be gathering data from each Psychological Operations

Detachment deployed around the globe. The psychologically oriented data provided, and

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analysis conducted will logically reveal opportunities that would not otherwise be observed. Many operations within the Special Operations community are kinetic in nature. Those operations still may lead to a psychological effect. As the TIS continues to evolve, it may expand its analysis and measures of effectiveness to observe the psychological effects of all Special Operations missions. The potential for Psychological Operations to become a hub of knowledge and analysis for Special Operations is great. Developing the concept may lead to increased adaptability, effects, and planning.


Figure 12. Recommendations Timeline

Source: Created by author.

This study recommends that the Psychological Operations Regiment: (1) develop the Advanced Skills Detachment courses into new Psychological Operations MOSs, eventually necessitating a longer POQC, (2) improve doctrine based off of historical precedent and the wealth of research available, (3) revive the Cultural Intelligence Element, (4) further develop the TIS concept into a Joint capability (see figure 12). The timeline suggested is in line with the *USASOC Strategy*, and *USASOC 2035*, which nest within the Army's development of Large-Scale Combat Operations doctrine and the need to be able to conduct Multi-Domain Operations by 2028.

Further Recommendations

Recommended Research

Many lessons from this study occurred because individuals did not understand the nuance of Psychological Operations, its history, or best practices. This study proposes the following reading list to be completed by all personnel attending the POQC. These books will give each Psychological Operations practitioner a clearer understanding of the capabilities of their profession, a basis for properly researching and writing on the nature of their profession, and a common operating picture that would expand beyond the lessons of the POQC:

1. Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Day written by Philip M. Taylor.

2. A Systematic Theory for Psychological Warfare written by Anthony J. Cacioppo.

3. Military Propaganda: Psychological Warfare and Operations edited by Ron D. McLaurin.

4. Propaganda: Its Psychology and Technique written by Leonard W. Doob

5. The Art and Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of Military Application edited by Daniel C. Pollock.

6. The Weapon on the Wall: Rethinking Psychological Warfare written by Murray Dyer.

7. Weaving the Tangled Web: Military Deception in Large-Scale Combat Operations edited by Christopher M. Rein.

8. Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American written by Cecil B. Currey.

9. Information Warfare: Principles and Operations written by Edward Waltz.

10. The Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion written by Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson.

Excerpts should also be retrieved from:

1. *Propaganda* by Ellul.

2. *Propaganda* by Bernays.

3. *Public Opinion* by Walter Lippmann.

These writings greatly impacted the conversation related to Psychological Operations and its development. The philosophy and conversation related to Psychological Operations is important, because it provides context for the actions of the practitioners.

There were several incidents identified through the literature of successful Psychological Operations conducted against soldiers of the United States. A deeper analysis of the vulnerabilities of Americans in war could benefit the force and assist in developing lessoned learned and training to prepare soldiers prior to the conduct of

Large-Scale Combat Operations. Incidents like the mass surrenders during the war with Mexico could pose significant losses in the event of Large-Scale Combat Operations. This study suggests that any such study remain classified for operational security purposes.

Other points of interest for future research could be analysis into the long-term effects of the "Great Divorce", the rank structure proposed in the theoretical TIS suggested in figure 7, and a deeper study of how to integrate the literature reviewed and suggested as opportunities for more advanced doctrine. Additional studies may be identified by individuals who review this study.

Summary and Conclusions

> Propaganda will never die out. Intelligent men must realize that propaganda is the modern instrument by which they can fight for productive ends and help to bring order out of chaos.
> —Edward Bernays, *Propaganda*

The world is experiencing significant changes. Russia has effectively returned to the world stage, China continues to expand its economic and military influence, Iran aggressively projects surrogate forces, and North Korea continues to conduct subversive actions to affect the influence of the United States. The *National Defense Strategy* has required changes to be made to doctrine. The Army and the Joint force are now preparing to conduct Large-Scale Combat Operations and Multi-Domain Operations to counter the threats to the United States. USASOC has developed a strategy to nest with those requirements and has projected that it will be able to conduct Multi-Domain Operations by 2028.

Psychological Operations are critical to the successes of such operations. This study has analyzed the history of propaganda, Psychological Warfare, and Psychological Operations in order to determine how the Psychological Operations Regiment could be optimized to achieve the *Army Special Operations Forces Strategy* while simultaneously addressing the Army's transition to Large-Scale Combat Operations. It found that the TIS could serve as the conduit for success, but that other changes must also be considered. This thesis established research questions that framed the literature reviewed. The literature was segmented into four separate eras and analyzed by applying DOTMLPF-P. It was determined that the Psychological Operations Regiment must develop additional MOSs and consider extending the POQC, improve doctrine with an emphasis on historical lessons learned in the application of Psychological Operations, revive the Cultural Intelligence Element and allow it to grow, and, finally, develop the TIS further to become a Joint capability within the First Special Forces Command.

This study strove to be operationally relevant to the force, grounded in theory and precedent. The recommendations are not wholly the opinion of the author, but pragmatic conclusions based off of the qualitative methods of research and analysis applied to this study. The author believes that McLaurin's projected renaissance of Psychological Operations is upon us.[647] The expansion of threats such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea have necessitated the development of doctrine for Large-Scale Combat operations, Multi-Domain Operations, and Information Warfare Task Forces. The modern era has not ended—it is evolving. The Psychological Operations Regiment is the foundation of

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[647] McLaurin, *Military Propaganda*, 75-76.

Information Warfare. This study proposes a roadmap toward successful implementation

of Information Warfare. History's lessons must be maintained, and organizations must be

optimized to empower the artists of war to adapt to the battlefields of the future.

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