

- 4 Sept. 1905, FO 800/121.
171. Satow diary, 25 July 1906, 16/9.
  172. Grey to Campbell-Bannerman (private), 23 March 1907, Grey Mss, FO 800/100; cf. Satow diary, 7 Nov. 1906, PRO 30/33/16/9.
  173. K. Neilson, "'Only a d...d marionette'?": The Influence of Ambassadors on British Foreign Policy, 1904–1914', in M.L. Dockrill and B.J.C. McKercher (eds.), *Diplomacy and World Power: Studies in British Foreign Policy, 1890–1950* (Cambridge: CUP, 1996), pp.77–8.
  174. Campbell-Bannerman to Grey, 24 March [1907], FO 800/100.
  175. For an interesting thumbnail sketch of Satow cf. Lady S. Townley, *'Indiscretions' of Lady Susan* (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1922), p.84.
  176. Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, *Old Diplomacy* (London: John Murray, 1947), p.132; E. Ions, *James Bryce and American Democracy, 1870–1922* (London: Macmillan, 1968), pp.199–202.
  177. Fitzroy, *Memoirs*, vol.i, p.298; diary, 25 July 1906, PRO 30/33/16/9. In the period 1868–1914 only six ministers were appointed privy councillors: Sir C. Murray (1868), Sir E. Thornton (1871), Sir H.D. Wolf (1885), Sir J. Drummond-Hay (1886), Sir C. Wyke (1886), and Sir H. MacDonell (1902); none of them had served in China.
  178. Satow diary, 10 March 1901, PRO 30/33/16/4; Satow to Dickins, 26 Jan. 1902 and 27 Jan. 1905, 11/6.
  179. Satow to Grey (no.209), 3 May 1906, FO 371/37/20647; Campbell to Satow (private & confidential), 12 Oct. 1906, and Grey to Satow, 25 Oct. 1906, PRO 30/33/7/5.

## Sir Ernest Satow and the 1907 Second Hague Peace Conference

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Based on Satow's own account of the conference in his diaries, this article examines the role played by Sir Ernest Satow as the second plenipotentiary on the British delegation at the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907. His previous experience at the post-Boxer conference at Peking in 1900–1901 stood Satow in good stead during the preparations for the conference as well as once the actual negotiations commenced. His main contribution to the proceedings at The Hague, however, was the preparatory work for the London Naval Conference of 1909. Satow's stance towards the negotiations of 1907 marks him out as a predecessor of twentieth-century internationalists.

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In fact they [at the London Naval Conference] are trying to come to an agreement on points as to which the last Peace Conference was at hopeless variance. I begin to doubt however whether it would be discreet on my part to print anything on these subjects as I have been so much behind the scenes, and the Quarterly [Review] Editor at any rate would not allow me to write anonymously.

So wrote Sir Ernest Satow to an old friend, apparently towards the end of 1908, with respect to the Second Hague Peace Conference the previous year.<sup>1</sup> And in Britain at least, the conference has not gone down in history as a very important event. Almost as much as its 1899 predecessor, it is seen as little more than a footnote *en route* to the 1914–18 war. However, this could be ascribed principally to a hostile witness, Eyre Crowe, responsible as Secretary to the British delegation for the main British documentary source for the conference.<sup>2</sup> And although Satow was Britain's second delegate, as a diplomat of entirely extra-European experience, in some recent accounts he is not even mentioned.<sup>3</sup> He might anyhow seem an obvious target for the criticism that diplomats, suspicious and unambitious, and 'long inured to the

stifling atmosphere of Courts',<sup>4</sup> were all too dominant among the delegates to the conference. Even worse, some might well view him as a natural 'fall-guy' in the cause of an always hopeless enterprise. Yet so far his account has barely been considered, and if the conference was still not a genuine historical 'might-have-been', through his diary it can at least be seen as, in various respects, a fore-runner of developments in the field of international cooperation later in the century, particularly post-1945.<sup>5</sup>

If indeed he never did appear in print on the subject, Satow wrote at length about the conference in his diaries, and his appointment was almost acclaimed by the *New York Tribune*, which seems to have had its own, somewhat quaint, private sources with regard to his character and career. The 'Pundit', as they called him, was credited with an almost unique knowledge of Eastern Asia, and 'the gift of charming every one by his brilliant conversation and perfect manners, the latter imbued with something of the stately dignity of true Oriental courtesy'.<sup>6</sup> Of course, his principal colleagues, the distinguished and idealistic Bristolian Quaker former judge, Sir Edward Fry, exclusively designated 'ambassador' for the purpose, and Donald Mackay, eleventh Baron Reay, Liberal politician and first President of the British Academy, did not suffer from similar 'exotic' associations.<sup>7</sup>

But as was to become apparent, far more than the much anticipated issues of disarmament, or the formation of a proto-League of Nations 'League of Peace' or 'Parliament of Man', the conference was to concern itself with security matters, particularly the maritime warfare implications of the recent Russo-Japanese War, of which Satow, as British Minister in Peking 1900–1906, had been an almost first-hand observer. In London, he was still considered close to the Japanese, and therefore able to build on the recent extension of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. And he was a man with established naval links,<sup>8</sup> who also had experience of large-scale conference conditions in the form of the post-Boxer China conference of 1900–1901. He could be expected to cope as well as anyone with any likely complaints from Asian states regarding their relations with Britain and the other Western powers, unhappy though he might personally be in such a role. But as a diplomat who had invariably obeyed orders when it came to the crunch, his whole career presumably marked him out as a 'safe pair of hands'.

### Conference Preparations

Yet Satow's appointment was rather last-minute, like that of most members of the British delegation, pointing to considerable uncertainty behind the scenes in Whitehall about the purpose of the conference. Already nominated back in November 1906 as one of Britain's three representatives on the International Court of Arbitration set up by the 1899 First Hague Peace Conference, it was not until the beginning of April 1907, nearly a year after leaving his post at Peking, that he was invited to be a delegate, some ten weeks before the new conference was due to open.<sup>9</sup> By contrast, as the only experienced British member of the International Court, the elderly but rather unworldly Fry had apparently been under consideration for some months, and was offered the job on 8 March by premier Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman personally.<sup>10</sup> Baron Reay, from the same mainstream section of the Liberal Party as the Prime Minister, like the rest of the delegation, was selected even later than Satow, and the full list was only published in late April.<sup>11</sup>

C.D. Davis, in his study of *The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference*,<sup>12</sup> stresses that during the winter of 1906–7, Britain's Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, had been in extended personal communication with President Theodore Roosevelt. And it is Roosevelt who is portrayed by Davis as a, perhaps the, major driving-force over several years behind the summoning of the conference, through pressure on the Russians, the anticipated organizers of the 1907 conference like its predecessor in 1899. However, delays had been caused by the outbreak and duration of the Russo-Japanese War, February 1904–September 1905, and the priority thereafter accorded the Geneva (Red Cross) Conference held in 1906, and by early 1907, the United States was committed to a programme of substantial naval expansion, including dreadnoughts, in the context of deteriorating relations with Japan.<sup>13</sup> Thus, while the disinterested credentials of Secretary of State Elihu Root do not seem to be in question, President Roosevelt's sincerity as a 'big navy' man and believer in the Pacific Ocean as 'America's Lake' certainly is.<sup>14</sup> At the same time, Campbell-Bannerman, at what might be considered the peak of his administration, and despite reservations expressed in various quarters, made his contribution in early 1907, in the form of a fairly explicit personal article in a Radical periodical called *The*

*Nation*, entitled 'The Hague Conference and the Limitation of Armaments'. This followed up his talk soon after his accession to the premiership in late 1905 of a 'League of Peace', and other subsequent encouraging comments. And he was even reported to have been planning to attend in person the conference sessions concerned with disarmament.<sup>15</sup>

But thereafter, it has always been claimed, Germany, abetted by Russia, resolved to sabotage the conference, and on 30 April 1907 Chancellor von Bülow indicated in a policy statement that his representatives would not even discuss disarmament.<sup>16</sup> Yet this was amidst very considerable international controversy prompted by Campbell-Bannerman's article. In Britain, R.B. Haldane as Minister of War was busy presenting his new plans for army reorganization. On 17 April, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Tweedmouth, had declared that Britain 'must keep the command of the sea without any regard to the cost'.<sup>17</sup> And there was a virtual panic in Berlin over the implications of Britain launching its 'Dreadnought' shipbuilding programme.<sup>18</sup> It was already known that Germany's representation was to be at as high a level as that of any other major power (bar Britain if Campbell-Bannerman did turn up), in the person of ex-Foreign Minister Baron Marschall von Bieberstein.<sup>19</sup> And von Bulow's statement was made in the knowledge that all too many other Western governments, particularly the French, shared his scepticism about disarmament.<sup>20</sup>

This then was the context in which the Foreign Office, through Eyre Crowe and the legal adviser Cecil Hurst, began in early May to pass on to Satow advice derived from the interdepartmental Walton committee which had been in action for some time.<sup>21</sup> Even during March, an unholy alliance of Admiralty representatives and Eyre Crowe had sought to preclude the delegation making any attempt to discuss the question of armaments,<sup>22</sup> and evidently all idea of the premier's direct involvement had by then been abandoned. At a Buckingham Palace banquet on 7 May, Satow met a whole set of government leaders, headed by Grey and Campbell-Bannerman, the latter evidently greatly deflated by the indications that his hopes of restricting armaments had already failed.<sup>23</sup> By contrast, the King was dismissive of the conference as likely to be 'just a good deal of talk without much result', and his brother, the Duke of Connaught,

thought that it would simply 'afford interesting reminiscences'.<sup>24</sup> Yet there is no sign in Ernest Satow's diaries that he accepted that he was being sent on a fool's errand.

Indeed, in terms of their now modified agenda, it was Satow who took the initiative in conferring with his two main delegation colleagues, first Reay in London, and then Fry, visiting him at his Failand house near Bristol. Not till 3 June did all three principal delegates come together over lunch in London, and then at a Foreign Office conference presided over by Sir Edward Grey. On the 10th, there was a further meeting at the FO to consult with Professor Louis Renault, the French international law expert who, like ex-premier Leon Bourgeois and the Baron d'Estournelles de Constant of the 1907 French delegation, had also attended the First Hague Conference in 1899.<sup>25</sup> And on the 12th there was a final meeting with Grey to consult with members of the American delegation, Joseph Choate who had until recently been American ambassador in London, and his adviser J.B. Scott, accompanied by Choate's successor as ambassador, Whitelaw Reid.<sup>26</sup> Even this seems to have been a matter of merely confirming certain limited understandings with the Americans reached at the Foreign Office during the previous week, in which the delegates had played no part. On the 14th, Satow left with Reay for The Hague via Harwich and The Hook, only meeting up with Fry and the rest of the delegation at their destination. A common complaint on the part of many of the delegates as the conference wore on was the lack of preparation their respective governments had given them for what turned out to be a substantial programme. But 44 states had sent delegations, including for the first time nearly all the South Americans, almost doubling the representation in 1899, though this in itself, the way the conference seemed swamped by the South Americans, seemed to cause some resentment amongst the Europeans. The five 'Asian' states present were the same as in 1899.<sup>27</sup>

#### Satow's Account of the Conference versus Eyre Crowe's

As already indicated, there are just two principal insider accounts of the British role at the 1907 Hague Conference, both by individuals with important German connections which ought to have been of

assistance in breaking the impasse that developed.<sup>28</sup> Though the son of a British Consul-General and Commercial Attache, Eyre Crowe had a German mother who was half-sister to Admiral von Holtzendorff, chief of the German Naval Staff in the 1914–18 war. Eyre Crowe himself only came to England for the first time in 1882, as an 18-year-old, to learn English as his second language, and qualified to enter the Foreign Office three years later. Sir Ernest Satow's merchant father was born in Mecklenburg in 1801, settling in London in 1825, marrying an English wife, but still speaking German on his deathbed in 1874. Up to that point, the family was accustomed to visit Germany regularly, but after a summer studying law at the University of Marburg in 1875, Sir Ernest returned only twice more, very briefly, in the subsequent 40 years. By 1907, both were equally firm believers in Britain's global role, but Eyre Crowe obviously wrote his reports to William Tyrrell, Sir Edward Grey's private secretary, to be read, and thus they are inevitably self-serving to a degree. By contrast, Satow's diaries were composed essentially as a private record, with no expectation that they would be read, at any rate for years, and are much more detailed.<sup>29</sup>

According to Crowe's account, immediately on arrival at The Hague – and as he saw it evidently on behalf of the Foreign Secretary and the FO and Admiralty which had provided the main input into the interdepartmental committee – he set about badgering the unfortunate Fry. To begin with, he persuaded him to initiate daily staff conferences before the official business began, to enable the advisers to exert maximum influence over the 'plenipotentiary' delegates. Then he induced Fry to upgrade him to an assistant as well as technical delegate so that he could participate fully in conference sessions, and seems rapidly to have encroached on the old man's role on the First Commission, for instance with respect to the Prize Court proposal. Here he even pushed him into taking first a stance one way, and then reversing himself when the Admiralty back home also changed its mind. Hampered by inadequate command of French, the official language of the conference, in which Crowe was at least very capable, Fry was soon relying on him, as we have seen, even to draft all his reports back to London.<sup>30</sup>

Fry was permitted his one fine day, at the plenary session on 17 August, to express his special concern for armament limitation, but

only as a consequence of lengthy behind-the-scenes negotiations apparently conducted mainly by his 'minder' Crowe.<sup>31</sup> Bourgeois then delivered a brief, unscripted response on behalf of France, while a written one was read out by Villa-Urrutia of Spain, before the conference moved on. Even the 21 September resolution to hold a further conference, adopted in lieu of making the conference permanent, was eventually to be interpreted as signifying another eight-year delay like that subsequent to 1899, and ensured that it never did take place. And, as Davis indicates, the First Commission of the conference covering arbitration and commissions of inquiry was slow to meet and achieved little, and the Second concerned with the laws of land warfare dealt only with a variety of minor matters.<sup>32</sup>

Yet Lord Reay, however inexpert technically, was not quite an 'old lady', as Crowe dismissively termed all four of Britain's plenipotentiary delegates. He was clearly anguished by the cost of the arms race, and doubtless his Radical political credentials had from the start made him in the eyes of the Foreign Office a dangerous quantity, which they expected partly to neutralize through Satow. Reay evidently was, and remained, a firm critic of Grey's foreign policy as excessively anti-German.<sup>33</sup> The big disappointment encountered by Crowe was his inability to persuade Satow to toe the official line, and his tendency instead, as Crowe represented it, to follow 'weakly' in the wake of Reay. But far more than Crowe, Satow seems to have been caught up in the atmosphere of the conference as it developed a life of its own. Long a secret critic of his Foreign Office masters, he began to give way to internationalist inclinations, thereby signing his death-warrant as a servant of 'New Diplomacy' Whitehall.<sup>34</sup>

A striking feature of Satow's diary account of the conference is the small part played in it by Crowe, at least in the earlier stages. As much as anything, this seems to reflect the separateness of their activities at The Hague, and thereby the separateness of the matters discussed by the First Commission, and those by the Third and Fourth Commissions. So far as Satow was concerned, within the delegation consultation was necessary mainly with Captain Ottley, the principal representative of the Admiralty, alone – although Commander Segrave and the legal adviser Hurst also gave him invaluable help.<sup>35</sup> But at one time or another, as an indication of his independence of

view, Satow was critical of most of his other colleagues, for instance, Fry – and Reay – for naivety, and Hurst and Ottley for not knowing their own minds,<sup>36</sup> though when the last was excluded by Satow from a debate in which they were both interested, concerned with the use of mines solely for defensive purposes, he had his own back by publicizing his complaints through George Saunders of *The Times*. Amongst the journalists, it was Saunders who was singled out by Baron Marschall at the end of the conference for his hostility to Germany.<sup>37</sup>

Nevertheless, there seems some reason to suppose that, on the British side, Satow increasingly became the decisive figure, albeit in the most discreet way. Perhaps due to Crowe's hostility, Baron Reay soon began to absent himself, pursuing private and family affairs in the land of his birth. Minister Howard evidently played little more than an intermediary and entertainment role, even if the latter in particular was of no little importance. And it was above all the Third and Fourth Commissions which involved Satow, concerned with naval warfare, that held centre-stage.<sup>38</sup>

As much as anyone, Satow seems to have been involved in the behind-the-scenes manoeuvring and dealing at the conference. And in particular he also maintained contact throughout the conference with the Japanese delegation headed by Tsuzuki Keiroku, and coordinated support for it with the Americans in face of a motion they found most disturbing, requiring 24 hours' notice of going to war with another state.<sup>39</sup> This motion was proposed by Britain's French allies. And despite the recent Franco-Japanese friendship treaty and imminent Anglo-Russian and Russo-Japanese ones<sup>40</sup> it was clearly designed as a condemnation of Japan's action in February 1904 in attacking Russia's Port Arthur base unannounced, and also as a warning against a possible Japanese attack on French Indochina. The French had been unhappy from the start with Britain's 1902 alliance with Japan, and even if it had proved a major factor in pushing Paris in the direction of the Entente rapprochement with Britain, to avoid the alternative of an Anglo-French war, the French remained unhappy, and suspicious of Japanese ambitions in the East. By contrast, back in 1905, Satow had seemed almost to welcome this new challenge to France!<sup>41</sup> At all events, Satow's role saved Japanese face without disturbing good relations with the French. And he seems to make no

reference either in his diaries or elsewhere to the Koreans, who turned up at The Hague to argue that they should have independent representation and not be treated as part of Japan.<sup>42</sup> Satow's personal interest in Korea went back to the early 1880s, but he had long since abandoned any sympathy he had had for their sovereign claims.

Beyond that, and maybe particularly as a sceptic about First Sea Lord Fisher with his experience as one of Britain's delegates at the 1899 First Hague Conference, Satow also showed a great sensitivity from early on regarding the influence over conference decisions of the Admiralty via Fisher's representative, Captain Ottley.<sup>43</sup> Only two days after their arrival at The Hague, Fry, Reay, and Satow were proposing to include the Germans in a preliminary 'conciliabule' with the French, which Baron Marschall's 'shyness' supposedly discouraged.<sup>44</sup> But simultaneously Satow was noting Ottley's efforts to exploit a previous narrow Cabinet majority against the Lord Chancellor, Lord Loreburn, in the cause of British chauvinism. Later on, in July, Hurst and Ottley were sent back to London to argue out various matters in dispute, for fear that the King along with his friend, the Marquis de Soveral, chief Portuguese delegate in his capacity as Minister in London, were having greatest influence over Grey and the FO.<sup>45</sup>

The ostensible outcome was that Hurst returned with news that Grey proposed to support the plenipotentiary delegates even in a number of disputes with the Admiralty. Towards the end of the month, however, an evidently distrustful Lord Reay attempted to convey their concerns direct to Campbell-Bannerman, who simply passed his letter of complaint direct to Grey.<sup>46</sup> Finally, at his first post-conference visit to the FO, Satow protested vigorously to undersecretary Lord Fitzmaurice at the reported view of Grey that regarding the various outstanding issues the British government was in the hands of the Admiralty: 'I urged that the Admiralty sh[ou]ld not be allowed to have the only voice in the matter.' And to Reay he declared: 'I protested against the idea of leaving everything to be decided by the Admiralty, and said that Ottley was a man who did not know his own mind.'<sup>47</sup> According to Merze Tate in *The Disarmament Illusion*, there was one issue at the conference which had made Britain's lone advocacy of armament limitation seem 'hypocritical'.<sup>48</sup> This was the blocking at the instigation of the Admiralty of an

American proposal to prohibit wartime capture of merchant ships on the high seas, that is, in pursuit of traditional economic warfare strategy.<sup>49</sup> Ironically, this rather rebounded in the forthcoming war, in the form of the unanticipated German U-boat campaign against British merchant shipping. And Tate specifically identifies Lord Reay as complaining that as a result of the Admiralty's 'obduracy', what he called the 'beau role' had passed to Germany, something which gave Baron Marschall every reason for satisfaction.

Satow also served as vice-president of the conference fourth commission, and Reay was eventually chosen as chairman of a special select committee charged with considering the principal British proposal of abolishing contraband. Under the Italian Count Tornielli as president, the Third Commission quickly accumulated a set of conventions 'which were to prove useful additions to international law'.<sup>50</sup> The fourth, by contrast, which gave the Russian legal expert Feodor de Martens the stage,<sup>51</sup> while apparently working the hardest, suffered from 'considerable tension ... for all its members were imbued with the nationalism of the time, and the group was studying doctrines of sea warfare which some countries had held for centuries'.<sup>52</sup> Satow's established dislikes expressed themselves in distrust of all the Russians present at the conference (and most of all of Martens), generally and with particular reference to their organizing role, despite the contemporary preoccupation of the Foreign Office with the negotiation of the Anglo-Russian entente treaties, ostensibly aligning Russia against Germany, announced on 31 August. And he also noted various disparaging remarks about Martens by his fellow delegates.<sup>53</sup>

One of the most interesting aspects of Satow's account of the conference are his notes of various private comments and reproaches by small-country delegates, who might have been expected to express the most independent, and most genuinely internationalist sentiments. Small countries always needed peace in a way that the large ones, able enough to look after themselves, generally did not. Thus Satow supplies important context to the complaints of such as Crowe about them. Count Tornielli of Italy, formerly ambassador in London, by the end something of a British *bete noire* as having, even in Satow's words, 'not behaved well to us', is cited earlier on as 'despondent; thinks we or rather our gov[ernmen]ts will cut a poor

figure owing to the small results of the conference. Instead of sending us here to thrash out subjects, they ought to have settled amongst themselves beforehand & summoned the conference to register the conclusions'.<sup>54</sup>

However, later on, Satow reports him in line with objections often voiced about Britain's role in this period by Germany, making 'the usual unreasonable remarks about a power w[hi]ch has ports all over the world, while others have none'.<sup>55</sup> For that matter, Satow had also felt bound to retort to Count Tcharikov of Russia:

that the complaints made by certain powers of our keeping up a preponderant navy were unjustifiable so long as they insist on retaining the right to declare foodstuffs and raw materials of industry contraband of war. Once that right were abandoned we should no longer find it necessary to maintain such a large fleet, w[hich] was imposed on us partly by our geographical position, partly by current doctrines as to contraband.<sup>56</sup>

Again, he had already cited Eysinger, the Chef de Direction Politique at the Dutch FO, as repeating 'what our opponents have been saying ab[ou]t our taking back with one hand what we offer with the other', presumably in terms of Britain's Admiralty-inspired approach with respect to the abolition of contraband as outlined by Davis.<sup>57</sup> And at an even earlier stage, at a dinner given by the Belgians, attended amongst others by Tornielli and Zorn of Germany and Streit of Austria:

I told van den H[euvel] & the rest that people were going ab[ou]t saying that England intended to wreck the Conference; that on the contrary we had done all in our power to expedite the business, had not wasted our time or that of the commissions in making long speeches & had made our attitude as clear as possible from the beginning.<sup>58</sup>

Yet there is some evidence here of the unpopularity of Britain on the continent so notorious back in the 1890s. By contrast, Satow's contemporary diary makes reference only to factional conflicts at the conference, not to any broad distrust of Germany. His impression seemed to be that attitudes were not generally entrenched and voting positions were highly negotiable, albeit in the context of constant

reporting back to home governments. But he does seem to indicate, without supplying detail, that Germany was able to depend on the support of a 'bloc' of other countries, thanks perhaps to a mixture of political self-interest and genuine sympathy with the German stance on various issues.<sup>59</sup>

Satow, meanwhile, seems to have felt no great closeness to the American delegation, though employing nothing comparable with Eyre Crowe's language. Indeed, he seems to have felt special sympathy for the Colombian delegation in its resentment of recent American encouragement of the secession of its Panama province. By contrast, the voluble Ruy Barbosa of Brazil, of whom he heard various disreputable stories later, came to be referred to on occasion in the diaries as 'Muy Verboso'.<sup>60</sup> Rechid Pasha of Turkey, and Turkhan Pasha and Samadh Khan of Persia he was happy to socialize with, but he was forced, towards the end of the conference, to oppose vainly their joint motion with the Italian Swiss d'Orelli representing Siam, and Lu Tseng-tsiang of China attacking extraterritorial jurisdiction. The United States along with most of the European powers united against Britain in support of the motion.<sup>61</sup> Most surprising of all, perhaps, his diaries contain no reference to the earlier protest by Colonel Ting at the more general Western violations of Chinese sovereignty.<sup>62</sup>

Understandably, Satow, like all other members of his delegation, seems to have felt most friendly now to Britain's French allies, and developed a special affection for the hyperactive Professor Louis Renault.<sup>63</sup> As for Britain's expected closest allies pre-conference, Spain and Italy, whatever the feelings about Count Torielli, his colleague Guido Fusinato proved very helpful in promoting the idea of the subsequent Great Powers Naval Conference in London in 1908. Evidently Satow had little to do with the Spaniards, but Villa-Urrutia did his best to support Fry's plea for armament limitation.

With experience of the nearly year-long China 'Boxer' conference behind him, probably more philosophical than most about The Hague's value, and the unexpected period of time he found himself having to devote to it, as late as 7 September, Satow was declaring that they had nearly disposed of all the non-contentious questions, and it was inevitable that things would now get more difficult. But as it extended through September into October, there are signs that

even he gradually began to feel worn down. As he subsequently claimed, the conference might have ended much earlier but for the indecisive debate in the First Commission over the American proposals for a court of jurists alongside the existing Court of Arbitration, and obligatory arbitration when war was threatening: 'For my own part, I think we have nothing to regret. We supported the original proposal to please the Americans, but a month ago Sir Ed[ward,] Howard [and] I had come to the conclusion that it was hopeless to get it thro[ugh] the conference'.<sup>64</sup> Yet when the conference's president, Count Nelidov, sought in a plenary session on 27 September to defend it 'against the attacks made on it by pacifists in the press [and] public meetings', though not, it seems, the militarists, Satow described it as 'a weak and foolish thing on his part. The contest is too unequal, better not engage in it, where your foe can [and] does make use of poisoned weapons'.<sup>65</sup>

In addition to George Saunders of *The Times*, Satow had to deal with a variety of other representatives of the generally hostile British press. Those he specifies were the reporters for *The Standard*, *The Tribune*, *Daily Mail*, and *Scotsman*, along with the Reuters correspondent and the always critical W.T. Stead.<sup>66</sup> And the latter, presumably one of the 'pacifists' cited above, aided by his son, was to carry on well after the conference ended the feud he had fastened on Sir Edward Fry.<sup>67</sup> But Satow enjoyed a good deal of press approval, probably more than for any of his colleagues, for instance, on the part of R.M. Collins of the Associated Press and Valentine Chirol, Foreign Editor of *The Times*.<sup>68</sup> For that matter, Satow, and doubtless the other official British delegates too, found themselves having increasing difficulty with some of their younger assistants, albeit in the context of postponing discussion of certain topics that might have been dealt with at The Hague. And in these terms, Satow's main contribution to the conference might seem to have been to its demise.

### The Conference Aftermath

It would appear to have been at a dinner given by the Colombian delegation on 12 August that Satow first suggested to Professor Martens that such questions as the transformation of merchant ships

into ships of war, and the powers of belligerents and neutrals 'sh[ou]ld be left to a special Commission of the great Powers, who might take as a basis of discussion the draft code of the Institut de Droit international'.<sup>69</sup> And in a striking commentary on the work he and Reay had been involved in, he even proposed 'throwing overboard the work of the 3rd & 4th commissions, as the Prize Court, permanent Court & compulsory arbitration are the only matters which will do credit to the Conference'. Four days later, he repeated the former in a Fourth Commission open session on blockade.<sup>70</sup> Martens was unenthusiastic, but Italian dislike of Russian direction of affairs seems soon to have prompted their support, and by late September it was agreed, thereby ensuring that the conference only doubled its original expected duration.<sup>71</sup> But the crucial step in this process would appear to have been a meeting between Eyre Crowe and Louis Renault on 19 September, which presumably led on directly to the Foreign Office's somewhat strange choice of the French professor to chair the London Naval Conference the following year. It was shortly after this that Satow found himself overruled on the question of blockade and had his dispute with Ottley over the use of mines.<sup>72</sup> And, in the meanwhile, there had been arguments within the delegation over an offer made by the Russians to compromise over mines if Britain would do the same over rights and duties of neutrals.<sup>73</sup>

Possibly there is reason to attribute to Satow in this matter precisely the policy of 'shilly-shally' of which he so much disapproved himself. But it seems that he and his senior colleagues were simply attempting to maintain the degree of international cooperation that had been expected of diplomats up to this time, to make the conference work, oblivious to established prejudices at home. By contrast, their chauvinist juniors appear to have been in the process of a hijack of the delegation as the conference came to an end on 18 October. What seems for the most part to have been a quite convivial affair, which could have contributed much to the international atmosphere, instead ended on a distinctly sour note, as a second Algeciras, with Germany supposedly in the dock.<sup>74</sup> *The Times*, apparently sceptical from the outset despite detailed and for some time friendly coverage, finally turned on it at the end in fiercely nationalist language in its leader of 19 October, condemning it as 'a

sham [which] has brought forth a progeny of shams, because it was founded on a sham'.<sup>75</sup>

Thus it is no surprise that on his return to England the next day, amidst news of the revised German naval building programme with which von Tirpitz had presumably been wrestling all summer,<sup>76</sup> Satow took himself straight off home to Devon, only returning to the FO on 28 November to discuss his feelings about the conference. At this point, Fry had still made no contact with anyone, although a substantial report from him was expected, whereas Ottley already reporting to Fisher, Crowe and Hurst had of course all been before them, and only Reay of the official delegates had made his views known. However, preferring to cede responsibility to the Admiralty, Grey was already opposing Reay taking the role of intermediary with Renault on a forthcoming visit to Paris, and their views seem in consequence to have been counting little in Whitehall. Not until 28 February 1908, on a further visit to London, did Satow get to see the Foreign Secretary himself, and Grey was then brief enough with him.<sup>77</sup>

What appears really to have been the most important product of The Hague for which Satow was substantially responsible, the London Naval Conference of December 1908–February 1909,<sup>78</sup> might perhaps still have led to his having further contacts even with Grey, but for him requiring a serious stomach operation two months before. As a result, he was able only to attend the post-conference dinner on 8 February 1909, when all issues had been settled,<sup>79</sup> and in an international sense most talk had turned to the approaching Casablanca Franco-German arbitration of 1909.<sup>80</sup> The Hague Conference might for that matter be seen as one of the last expressions of the 'old diplomacy'. Admittedly, the special partnership between Renault and Kriege of the Wilhelmstrasse that helped to prevent the established Franco-German antagonism going too far over the next few years, seems to have been cemented at the London conference,<sup>81</sup> but the new chauvinist set of organizing British officials set their stamp on it. They took this opportunity of developing their anti-German stance a stage further, and in the process, despite evidence of greater compromise on the part of Kriege, ensured that there was little of the socializing that so characterized the discussions at The Hague, on the puritanical



grounds that it obstructed the serious work of arriving at decisions.<sup>82</sup> In any case, the Declaration of London that was its product was never to be ratified. Other nations proved unhappy enough with it, and the Foreign Office claimed it could not submit it to the House of Commons in the 1909–10 session due to its congested programme. In the 1910–11 session, with feelings about relations with Germany running higher, even the Lords rejected it.<sup>83</sup>

Involvement in The Hague Conference would seem to have been for Satow, Fry, and Reay, elderly men though they all were, a defining experience, for they kept in touch till their deaths. Satow and Fry living sufficiently close, visited each other almost every year up to 1914, Satow invariably staying over at Failand. Whether Fry and Reay visited each other is not clear, and Reay seems not to have visited Satow either. But it was Satow's custom to pay an extended visit to one or other of Reay's Scottish estates each autumn, and also to dine with him at his London house when convenient. More than that, the surviving correspondence between the two of them is of particular value in following Satow's increasingly anti-German views after 1908, partly in the context of scholarly work he was doing on the career of Frederick the Great, which prompted repeated reference to Prussian militarism.<sup>84</sup> Up to 1914, they also made regular reference back to the 1907 Conference, and indicated their expectations of the next one.<sup>85</sup> But in January 1914, when there was still little expectation of the outbreak of war, Eyre Crowe responded to an enquiry from Satow on behalf of the Bishop of Winchester, that 'The cause of peace has nothing whatever to gain from these peace conferences', and that the next one, in 1915, was likely merely to feature a renewed effort 'to undermine in every possible way the naval rights of England'. His lack of internationalist awareness was evident once again in the special blame he awarded to the Americans, North and South, for the outcome of the 1907 conference.<sup>86</sup>

Two other diary entries are of special interest. At Oxford in 1911, Satow found himself dining in the Common Room of Wadham College with his nephew Percy Allen:

Opposite was a young man named Robertson who declared himself a Socialist. He admitted however that their ideals were not likely to be realized for some time to come. But he was in favour of sending representatives to advocate peace [and]

retrenchment of military preparations to all the Powers of Europe. I pointed out the failure of our proposals to limit naval armaments in 1907, to w[hi]ch he replied that our delegates were too weak. I rejoined that I was one of them; the cause of our weakness was the opposition of all the other Powers. He explained that what he meant was that we had not a strong public opinion behind us. Percy thinks we ought to give Germany something to content her, e.g. East Africa.

By contrast, almost a year later, Satow found himself a fellow house-guest at Sir Edward Fry's at Failand of the Minister of War, R.B. Haldane, an acquaintance since back in 1903 and himself originally quite friendly to Germany:

Haldane said that the present cabinet when they came into power, knowing nothing of foreign affairs, committed the blunder of insisting on proposing the limitation of armaments at the Hague, and striking out one battleship in the hope of inducing the Germans to follow suit, but they fancied that we were tired of the contest, put on steam with the object of catching us up, and that had ultimately forced us to build more ships, so that proposal, w[hi]ch C-B had promised to put forward in the article on disarmament w[hi]ch he wrote for the 1st number of the "Nation" had cost us 3 or 4 million [pounds] ... He is very clear that for the next 2 or 3 years we shall have to spend more money on the navy.<sup>87</sup>

#### Satow and International Law

For Satow personally, there were also other repercussions to his involvement with the conference, even if it failed to mark what it should have been, the real climax to his career. In early 1909, he set himself seriously to study international law with particular respect to various controversies in maritime law,<sup>88</sup> and seems to have found himself confirmed in the view that 'there is very little law but a good deal of expediency as it appears to the stronger party in these questions. One may talk of international law in peacetime, but in war there is little but the mailed fist to appeal to.'<sup>89</sup>

One of the slightly surprising features of both Hague Conferences is that Britain was apparently the sole leading nation not represented

at all by a scholar of international law.<sup>90</sup> In addition to the always prominent Martens of St Petersburg, France sent Professor Renault of Paris, Germany P. Zorn of Koenigsberg, and Austria Heinrich Lammasch of Vienna. Similarly, Belgium had Auguste Beernaert present, a parliamentarian specializing in international law, the host nation, the Netherlands, Professor T.M.C. Asser, current President of the Institut de Droit International, and the United States two relatively young men, F.W. Hollis in 1899, and with his death shortly after, J.B. Scott, formerly Professor of International Law at Columbia, in 1907. Britain was not totally devoid of comparable figures, although the Whewell Professor of International Law at Cambridge since 1888, John Westlake, was barely younger than Sir Edward Fry. And he had already ceded in Satow's favour his eligibility to serve on the International Court of Arbitration, and was also about to retire from his Cambridge post. His prime responsibility as Whewell Professor and head of the Cambridge Whewell centre was to 'contribute to the extinction of war', and as long ago as 1869 he had been involved with Asser and Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns, the subsequent Belgian Interior Minister and Siamese Government adviser, in setting up in Ghent the latter's *Revue de Droit International et de Legislation Comparée*. And the *Revue* had been followed four years later by the Institut de Droit International, headed by a whole set of leading continental international lawyers, amongst whom Westlake took his turn as president in 1895. He was the author of *International Law: Peace and War (1904-7)*, and in late 1907 he wrote on the Hague conference, albeit rather unsatisfactorily in Satow's view. Satow at once sent him a set of the conference papers to put him right.<sup>91</sup>

The other likely figure was T.E. Holland KC, Chichele Professor of International Law at Oxford, but also not much younger than Fry and nearing retirement. Moreover, the Foreign Office had already employed him as its expert adviser to the Geneva Conference the previous year.<sup>92</sup> Apparently, other considerations were uppermost in Whitehall minds when the delegation was chosen.

The sequel to this was that, during 1908, Satow himself came under increasing pressure to stand for election as Westlake's successor at Cambridge. In his diary, Satow explains that even if 'it w[ou]ld be a flattering thing to receive the offer, and perh[aps] I

could deliver some useful lectures, as e.g. on Extraterritoriality', ultimately he decided that he was too much the practical man, and 'I did not feel sufficiently strong in the subject to put myself forward'.<sup>93</sup> Cambridge then awarded the chair to the German-born L.F.L. Oppenheim. Thereafter, in 1910, the Chichele chair at Oxford fell vacant, and this time, simultaneous with the writing of his *Quarterly Review* article on 'The Immunity of Private Property at Sea',<sup>94</sup> Satow voluntarily put his name forward. This appointment was in the hands of a committee of three cabinet ministers, the Lord Chancellor, Attorney-General and Foreign Secretary, the Archbishop of Canterbury and a nominee of All Souls College, but eventually Satow heard that the choice had fallen on a younger rival and practising lawyer, recently legal member of the Viceroy of India's Council, Sir H.E. Richards KC. But the historian Charles Firth, who Satow met in Oxford in 1909, seemed to feel that at best in the England of that time, international law existed only as a kind of poor relation of history, while Satow himself had commented dismissively at an early stage: 'there must be a great dearth of eminent international lawyers in this country'.<sup>95</sup>

Another comment of Satow's, to Firth, was that 'the textwriters evolved theories out of the chambers of their own minds, while the principles on which gov[ernmen]ts acted and the precedents were unknown outside the Foreign Offices'.<sup>96</sup> Of course, it was also claimed that the whole set of generally elderly scholars at The Hague, only too happy to dispute the finer points of law, were of little more help than the diplomats in making the 1907 conference worthy of its name. Many were there – for instance, in large measure, the South Americans, who had been excluded in 1899 – to 'cut a figure'. It was others, such as Count Tornielli of Italy, and perhaps the genuine politicians, such as the future premier of Norway, Francis Hagerup, and Leon Bourgeois of France,<sup>97</sup> who were most concerned about public disappointment. But Martens, whose role at such conferences went back to Brussels in 1874, had also aroused suspicion by seeming to try to maintain a firm control over the discussions in line with presumed instructions from his government. And this supposedly reflected in turn St Petersburg's desire not to antagonize Berlin.

The importance of the 1914-18 war for the years since is surely so great that any event that could conceivably have prevented it is of

the greatest interest. And Satow's account suggests that a good deal more of value could be said about the 1907 Peace Conference as to why it did not. However, it is not that it did really show any sign of such potential, either on the part of those who opposed it or those who promoted it, mostly with patent lukewarmness. Even Tate, writing mainly during the 1930s, declares: 'Already, even before the final invitation[s] had been issued, the proposal for a limitation of armaments was moribund.'<sup>98</sup> Instead, the Conference serves to reveal the almost total lack of foresight amongst people for whom the war was really just around the corner. The horrors of the Russo-Japanese War were talked of readily enough, but the implications for Europe seem to have been ignored on all sides.<sup>99</sup> Nonetheless, amongst the Great Powers, most notably now the United States, the debate about the value of small and smaller countries' representation on international bodies still continues today, and the experience of the years 1918–45, with the aid of the development of international law, might be said to have worked a revolution in it compared with 1907.

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#### NOTES

1. Satow to W.G. Aston, fragment, ?Dec. 1908, misplaced to June. Satow Papers, Kew Public Record Office, PRO 30/33/11/3; a characteristic example of his professional discretion. The editor mentioned was George Prothero.
2. As was later claimed by the Foreign Office as grounds for special post-conference recognition, Crowe had had a direct hand in all Sir Edward Fry's despatches later printed when Crowe had only recently died, still in harness as F.O. Under-Sec., in G.P. Gooch and H.V. Temperley (eds.), *British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898–1914*, Vol. VIII, *Arbitration, Neutrality and Security* (London: HMSO, 1932), chap. 65. Cf. his daughter S. Crowe and E. Corp, *Our Ablest Public Servant: Sir Eyre Crowe, 1864–1925* (Braunton, Devon: Merlin, 1993), p.214. These documents, possibly chosen with the assistance of Satow who lent sections of his diary and some private correspondence, along with Crowe's letters, have been widely used by writers making merely passing reference to the conference, e.g. K.G. Robbins, *Sir Edward Grey* (London: Cassell, 1972), pp.175–6. But for Robbins's reservations regarding Crowe, see his 'Exploring the foreign', in M.L. Dockrill and B.J. McKercher (eds.), *Diplomacy and World Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.27.
3. E.g. A.J.A. Morris, *Radicalism against War, 1906–1914: The Advocacy of Peace and Retrenchment* (London: Longman, 1972), Chap. III, 'The Hague Conference', previously published as 'The English Radicals' Campaign for Disarmament and the Hague Conference of 1907', *Journal of Modern History*, 43/3 (Sept. 1971), pp.367–93; J. Dülffer, *Regeln gegen den Krieg? Die Haager Friedens-Konferenzen 1899*

*und 1907 in der Internationalen Politik* (Frankfurt-am-Main: Ullstein, 1981). Satow had previously been trying to persuade Prothero to publish an article of his about the French Third Republic anonymously in the *Quarterly*, 'as many people think of me as nothing but a Japanese or Chinaman, and w[ou]ld be disposed to say, what can this fellow know about the French Republic[?]'. Diary, 23 Sept. 1908. PRO 30/33/16/10. Of the vols. used here, 16/9 covers 30 Sept. 1905–25 Jan. 1907, 16/10, 26 Jan. 1907–22 April 1909, 16/11, 23 April 1909–11 June 1911, 16/12, 12 June 1911–5 Dec. 1912, 17/1, 6 Dec. 1912–28 May 1914. For his earlier career, see my 'Sir Ernest Satow, Japan and Asia: The Trials of a Diplomat in the Age of High Imperialism', *Cambridge Historical Journal*, 35/1 (1992), pp.115–50.

4. Morris, *Radicalism against War, 1906–1914*, pp.120, 115.
5. In effect, this is how C.D. Davis justifies his *The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference: American Diplomacy and International Organization, 1899–1914* (Durham, NC: Duke University, 1975), p.viii, which subsumes much of the content of an earlier work on the 1899 conference.
6. NYT, 27 April 1907. They actually described him as having a 'knowledge of Buddhism, acquired in Japan and Siam ... so extensive that he is regarded by the high dignitaries of this creed in the Orient, as one of its most learned doctors', and 'Reticent and reserved in manner, with the most perfect control of his impulses and utterances', 'one of the most remarkable men of the English diplomatic service'.
7. Oddly enough, the above NYT article described Satow as only Britain's third delegate (cf. also Gooch and Temperley, *British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898–1914*, Vol. XV, describing Reay as 'the second British representative'), and ascribed to him Dutch connections like Lord Reay, instead of his actual Baltic family background. See my introduction to *The Collected Works of Sir Ernest Satow*, 12 vols (Bristol: Ganesha, 1998), Vol. I, pp.v–xx. The Dutch-born Reay was a former Governor of Bombay who always maintained his oriental interests, president of the International Institute of Law, and chairman of the London Board of Education, who had been considered by Campbell-Bannerman for the Secretaryship of Education when forming his cabinet in 1905. Like many foreign diplomats at The Hague, the British Minister, Henry Howard, was again appointed a delegate, as he had been in 1899, apparently securing a knighthood for agreeing to defer in rank to Reay. Satow Diary, 28 Nov. 1907.
8. Though his closest naval friends at this time, Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, for whom he tried in vain to secure a place in the delegation, and Admiral Sir Gerard Noel, both recent commanders of Britain's China Squadron and unhappy with its withdrawal, were strong critics of Jackie Fisher, the current First Sea Lord. See diaries, 8 Dec. 1906, 15 March, 13 May, 1907, and Eyre Crowe to Satow, 15 April 1907. PRO 30/33/10/13. Despite attendance as naval delegate at the 1899 conference, Fisher seems to have shown no interest in the 1907 conference. Cf. R. Mackay, *Fisher of Kilverstone* (Oxford: OUP, 1973).
9. Satow Diaries, 7 Nov., 13 Dec. 1906, 3 April 1907.
10. Fry's memoirs subsumed in Agnes Fry, *A Memoir of the Rt. Hon. Sir Edward Fry GCB* (Oxford: Humphrey Milford, 1921), p.194.
11. *The Times*, 30 April 1907. It seems that the Foreign Office mandarins had wanted to impose a diplomat as leader almost alone amongst Great Power delegations. However, their choice had not been Satow but the future Permanent Under-Secretary, Arthur Nicolson. He was of somewhat similar experience to Satow, having succeeded him as Minister in Morocco, then made his name as British representative opposing the Germans at the Algeiras Morocco Conference in 1906, and been appointed Ambassador to Russia. Crowe and Corp, *Our Ablest Public Servant*, p.205n. When the FO was persuaded that a diplomat as leader was impossible, and Fry unavoidable,

- apparently Satow was chosen as a safe deputy.
12. Davis, *The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference*, pp.152, 158–9. The only serious studies of the conference in recent decades have been those of Davis and Dülffer. A. Sidorowicz, 'The British Government, the Hague Peace Conference of 1907, and the Armaments Question', in B.C. McKercher (ed.), *Arms Limitation and Disarmament* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992), pp.1–19, like its companion essay, K. Neilson, "'The British Empire Floats on the British Navy'", British Naval Policy, Belligerent Rights, and Disarmament, 1902–1909', in *ibid.*, pp.21–41, is mainly about British Admiralty policy. But see also Merze Tate, *The Disarmament Illusion: The Movement for a Limitation of Armaments to 1907* (Cambridge, MA: Radcliffe, 1942; New York: Russell & Russell, 1971), chap. 17, and the interest of J. Joll displayed in his *The Origins of the First World War* (London: Longmans, 1992 edn.), pp.203–4. Elsewhere in his *Europe since 1870* (London: Weidenfeld, 1973), p.186, Joll describes the conference as an 'international congress'.
  13. *The Times* was suggesting uncertainty in The Hague itself as late as October 1906, and that the distraction of the American Congress held in Rio de Janeiro in 1906, was still affecting President Roosevelt in January 1907. Reports of 6, 8 October 1906, 11 January 1907. But cf. report of 18 March, of Canadian Ontario legislature support for the Conference as 'a permanent congress of nations'.
  14. See K. Wimmel, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Great White Fleet: American Sea Power Comes of Age* (Washington: Brassey's, 1998), or Tate, *The Disarmament Illusion*. King Edward VII's attitude was attributed by some to the influence of the President.
  15. *The Nation*, 2 March 1907, cf. *The Times* coverage, 2, 4, 6, 7 March, W.T. Stead letter to same, 1 Jan. ('Parliament of Man' was his idea) and Almeric Fitzroy, *Memoirs* (London: Hutchinson, 1925 edn.), Vol.1, p.317, entry for 19 March. According to J.A. Spender, *The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman* (London: Hodder, 1923), Vol.2, p.330, the article was 'specially addressed' to Germany, and the conference itself saw every possible effort made to accommodate it.
  16. John Wilson, *CB: A Life of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman* (London: Constable, 1973), p.540; Davis, *The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference*, pp.160–61.
  17. *The Times*, 18 April.
  18. The construction of two battleships was put on hold while von Tirpitz and his advisers at the German Navy Ministry reconsidered their plans. *The Times*, 30 April 1907. But see also issues for 25 March, regarding German domestic political and financial difficulties, 22 April, regarding growing estrangement between Germany and its second Triple Alliance partner, Italy, and 29 April, for a rising anti-British and French press campaign, mirrored in Paris by the French newspapers.
  19. Reported in *The Times*, 11 March 1907, along with his prospective assistance by J. Kriege. For Germany's full team at The Hague, see *The Times*, 20 May 1907.
  20. Von Bülow's lengthy statement, couched in what even *The Times*, 1 May 1907, called 'eminently peaceful utterances', hinted at Germany's special strategic vulnerability, and also its fear of resuming the disunity that characterized its history prior to the late nineteenth century. Considerable political and financial instability still prevailed following a hard-fought general election in January. But Campbell-Bannerman's meeting with an irate French premier Clemenceau in Paris at the end of March, apparently nearly caused an international incident. K. Hamilton, *Bertie of Thame: Edwardian Ambassador* (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Royal Historical Society, 1990), pp.152–3. And there seems little reason to suppose that Clemenceau had any sympathy with the 'Liberal solutions' favoured by the French delegates to the conference.
  21. Satow later described this committee to Reay, 26 Dec. 1907, 30/33/11/15, as 'not well

- constituted ... There ought to be an undersecretary of State on such an important body, and the chairman ought to be some one who can give his whole time to it'. Reay to Satow, 21 Jan. 1908, 21 Dec. 1909, 30/33/11/12, indicates the ongoing character of this committee, albeit chaired by Lord Desart in place of the Attorney-General, Sir J. Walton. Cf. Neilson, "'The British Empire Floats on the British Navy"'.
22. Crowe and Corp, *Our Ablest Public Servant*, p.204.
  23. He effectively acknowledged it publicly in a Manchester speech three days later. See Spender, *The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman*, p.331. Satow says of a Downing Street dinner soon after, 'C.B. made a poor, halting speech in proposing [Japanese] Prince Fushimi's health, a great contrast to Sir Ed. Grey the previous evening; C.B. must strike every one as being commonplace in the extreme'. Later in 1909, however, following the premier's intervening decline and death, he was declaring, 'So C-B's idea of proposing to Germany to limit our armaments was ridiculous, and only excited German laughter'. Diaries, 11 June 1907, 28 Oct. 1909. 30/33/16/10-11. By contrast, Grey seems to have responded to the German declarations with some relief if not satisfaction. Grey to Nicolson, 1 May 1907, in Gooch and Temperley (eds.), *British Documents*, Vol.8, p.228.
  24. In a rare show of unanimity with his much disliked nephew, Kaiser Wilhelm, Edward VII had apparently from back in 1906 viewed discussion of disarmament at the conference as a threat to the royal prerogative! Davis, *The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference*, pp.152–3.
  25. Apart from Howard, the British delegation seems to have been entirely new, and death had in the meanwhile rendered Lord Pauncefote, former Permanent Under-Secretary at the FO and ambassador to Washington, leader of the 1899 delegation, inaccessible even for consultation. Neither of Britain's 1899 service delegates, Admiral Fisher, now First Sea Lord, or Sir John Ardagh, former Chief of Army Intelligence, who led the 1906 Geneva delegation, seem to have shown any interest.
  26. Fry missed this, being *en route* to Cambridge to receive his LL.D. in the company of the Prime Minister and R.B. Haldane. Fry, *A Memoir of the Rt. Hon. Sir Edward Fry GCB*, p.197.
  27. See especially *The Times* concluding leader, 19 Oct. 1907.
  28. This is said in the light of the very comprehensive survey of all available documentary sources contained in Davis, *The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference*, bibliography, pp.369–71.
  29. Crowe's letters are contained in the Grey Papers, FO 800, and appear to be the main source for the discussion in Crowe and Corp, *Our Ablest Public Servant*, pp.203–14. Satow's diaries extend to forty manuscript volumes covering the years 1862–1926, and bar G.A. Lensen (ed.), *Korea and Manchuria between Russia and Japan 1895–1904: The Observations of Sir Ernest Satow* (Tallahassee, FL: Diplomatic Press, 1966) have never been much used. Even they display his usual discretion.
  30. Crowe and Corp, *Our Ablest Public Servant*, pp.205–14.
  31. The speech was acclaimed by *The Times*, 19 Aug. Satow, diary, 13 July, reports Count Nelidov's originally very accommodating approach in this matter on behalf of Russia. See also 21 July, for Austro-German views.
  32. Presumably the unimportance of the second commission is indicated by the small part in the conference played by Major-General Elles (misspelt 'Miles' by Crowe and Corp, *Our Ablest Public Servant*, p.205) and Col. Yarde-Buller amongst the British delegation.
  33. As he was still insisting two years later, 'I think we have given a provocation to Germany by our triple entente and that Germany means to retaliate. We could have obtained an entente with Germany which the Emperor desired'. Reay to Satow, 14 April 1909. PRO 30/33/11/12. Admittedly, even he changed his tune in line with

prevailing sentiment at the outbreak of war in 1914. But cf. also the views of Sir John Barran (Liberal MP for Hawick Boroughs) whom Satow met at Reay's Laidlawstiel residence, diary, 30 Sept. 1912, regarding 'Sir Ed[ward] Grey's foreign policy, w[h]ich he seems to distrust as not in accord with Liberal principles'.

34. There is a good case for arguing that, at least where Britain was concerned, the 'Old Diplomacy' so bemoaned after 1918, was actually displaced around 1907, with the advent of Sir Charles, later Lord Hardinge, as Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, and the growing grip of Eyre Crowe over office affairs. See the memoir of the historian of the FO, Sir J. Tilley, *London to Tokyo* (London: Hutchinson, 1942), pp.69-70. However, Satow remained an admirer of Crowe until the latter's death, even though his admiration was clearly not reciprocated.
35. Essentially, Satow's view seems to have been that the technical delegates were there simply to assist the 'plenipotentiary' delegates. As Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) at the Admiralty who had participated in Admiralty deliberations preparatory to the Conference, Ottley, a former subordinate of Satow when military attaché at the Tokyo Legation in 1900-1901, was a somewhat special case. In September, promoted a Rear-Admiral, he was appointed Sir George Clarke's successor as Secretary to the interservice Committee of Imperial Defence (CID), and thereby left the Admiralty.
36. Satow diaries, 28 June, 8, 14, 30 Aug., and 4 Oct. cf. 29 Sept., 28 Nov. 1907.
37. Diary, 9 Oct. 1907.
38. Davis, *The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference*, p.220, declares 'Most delegates regarded these latter matters [submarine mines, bombardment of undefended ports, adaptation of the new Geneva Convention to the sea] as among the most urgent before the conference, and most delegations had representatives on the third and fourth commissions'. And again, 233-4, that the British proposal to abolish contraband in the fourth commission, 'quickly ... became the single most interesting maritime question before the conference', to the extent that any were of real importance.
39. In view of the currently sensitive relationship between the two countries, as well as the 'infamy' judgement on the 1941 Pearl Harbor attack, the US stance at this point is noteworthy. For that matter, Tsuzuki had been an old adversary of Satow in Japan. He was assisted by the American adviser Denison, and the Japanese Minister at The Hague, Sato Aimaro.
40. For the first, see *The Times*, 11 June 1907.
41. See my 'Sir Ernest Satow, Japan and Asia: The Trials of a Diplomat in the Age of High Imperialism', *Cambridge Historical Journal*, 35/1 (1992), p.147.
42. Davis, *The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference*, pp.193-5. Of course, the Korean situation stemmed as much as anything from the Treaty of Portsmouth, NH, which concluded the Russo-Japanese War. See R.A. Esthus, *Theodore Roosevelt and Japan* (Seattle: University of Washington, 1967). However, Satow was guilty at the conference of dropping certain dark hints about Japan, unexplained even in his diaries, while at the same time, dismissing all suggestions that China could ever in the foreseeable future emulate Japan's achievements. This was despite his much more friendly stance towards China resulting from the six years he had spent as British Minister in Peking. Diaries, 2, 23 July, 20 June.
43. Back in London at an FO dinner, he had felt Fisher 'seemed to affect the jolly old sea-dog'. Diary, 10 June. This doubtless simply reflected his unconcern about The Hague. Ottley, by contrast, seemed strongly anti-German. Davis, *The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference*, p.241. But quite who was responsible for the Admiralty stance is not clear. See also A.J. Marder, *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow I* (London: OUP, 1961), pp.130-33.
44. Diary, 16 June.

45. This seems akin to the later issue of the Portuguese 'catalogue system' of arbitration, to which Fry originally agreed, only to reverse his stance later under advice from Crowe. Crowe and Corp, *Our Ablest Public Servant*, p.207. Cf. Gooch and Temperley, *British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914*, pp.266-8. Several's letters of protest emanated from Edward VII's royal yacht, the Victoria and Albert. Satow was clearly highly sensitive to any evidence of what he considered questionable pressure on the 'plenipotentiary' delegates, from whatever quarter.
46. Diaries, 23, 26 July, and Spender, *The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman*, Vol.1, p.333.
47. Diary, 28 Nov., and Satow to Reay, 29 Nov. 1907. PRO 30/33/11/15.
48. Tate, *The Disarmament Illusion*, pp.343-4.
49. A long-time American concern, the United States was supported in this by Italy, Austria, and, in slightly qualified form, Germany, and Britain in its opposition by all the other principal naval powers, France, Russia, and Japan. The 'militarist' Admiral Mahan as Tate calls him, talked of 'the right of maritime capture' as Britain's 'principal, if not ... only, strong weapon of offence'. *The Times*, 4 Nov. 1910.
50. Davis, *The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference*, p.243.
51. Though somewhat insubordinate, he had nonetheless been responsible for much of the planning of the conference.
52. Davis, *The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference*, p.239. For an analysis of British policy, cf. pp.221-2, 233-6.
53. For instance, Fusinato of Italy and Prof. Zorn of Bonn. Diaries, 27 July, 17 Aug. 1907. Constant 'trickiness' seems to have been the least he was inclined to ascribe to Martens, otherwise accusing him of treating issues 'in such a disgraceful manner'. Diaries, 2, 6, 8 Aug. The United States, Italy, and Serbia(?) seem to have seen the most advantage in making the conference permanent as a means of separating it from Russian direction. Diaries, 13 July, 12 Aug. Satow apparently accepted that a British role in arranging this was inhibited by the need to accommodate Russia while negotiating the Anglo-Russian Entente treaty, not concluded until 31 August.
54. Diaries, 4 Sept., 10 July. In the meanwhile, 18 July, an undiplomatic speech by Captain Ottley had 'made the old man very angry'.
55. Diary, 10 Sept.
56. Diary, 1 Sept.
57. Diary, 23 July.
58. Diary, 17 July.
59. Eyre Crowe linked Italy with its Triple Alliance partners, Germany and Austria-Hungary, and with them, Greece, Romania, and Belgium, despite Satow's evidence that Belgium and the Netherlands were concerned to stand together in face of German pressure. Diary, 6 Sept, cf. 7, 12 Sept. for other indications of their independence, and Davis, *The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference*, p.290. Both Crowe and Reay stressed the degree to which the American delegates, in emulation of their President, were inclined at times to cooperate with Germany. Later on, diary, 8 Oct. 1908, Satow claimed he had been widely advised by other delegates at The Hague that Germany was already preparing to attack Britain, but there is little evidence for this in the contemporary diaries, and Tate, *The Disarmament Illusion*, chap. XVIII, while viewing the unsatisfactory outcome of the conference as quite critical, apports blame to Britain and Germany even-handedly.
60. Diary, 23 July. But even in Satow's estimation, from amongst the South Americans, he and Triana of Colombia made the main contribution in the end. The post-conference gossip about Barbosa appears in Reay to Satow, 21 Jan. 1908. 30/33/11/12.
61. Diaries, 6, 7 Oct.
62. Davis, *The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference*, p.211.

63. 'Dear old Renault' as he was later calling him, diary, 8 Feb. 1909.
64. Diary, 11 Oct. 1907. Later, to Grey, 28 Feb. 1908, he claimed that the extra time taken was six weeks. Cf. also Davis, *The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference*, chap. 14. When Fry on behalf of Choate offered him nomination to the proposed court of jurists, Satow took the view that simultaneous membership with that of The Hague tribunal would be 'quite preposterous'. Diary, 4 Sept. 1907. Beernaerts of Belgium, chairman of the Second Commission, along with Barbosa and various other South Americans, anyhow considered such an arrangement as likely to militate against the interests of small powers, and Satow supported them. *Ibid.*, 30 Aug., 6, 12, 24 Sept.
65. Diary, 27 Sept.
66. Maxwell of *The Standard* transferred to 'that rag' the *Daily Mail* during the course of the conference. Diary, 4 July 1907.
67. Diary, 4 Dec., and Satow to Reay, 8 Dec. 30/33/11/15. Alfred Stead, the son, had come to Satow with a letter from his old friend, Admiral Bridge. Diary, 18 July. W.T. Stead's campaign against Fry seems to have been due as much to the latter's old-fashioned unfriendliness to the press, as to disappointment with his 17 August contribution to the cause of disarmament, the constraints on which Stead apparently ignored. Indeed, following his visit to Bülow in Berlin at the end of January, he seems to have been convinced that Germany was quite sympathetic to his own view of the conference as the 'Parliament of Man'. But widespread hostility to the press on the part of delegates at The Hague in no way helped its business. Only once before, 15 Sept., with Saunders of *The Times*, and then rather dismissively, does Satow acknowledge press opinion as a conference issue.
68. See Collins and Chirol to G.E. Morrison, 22 and 19 July 1907, in Morrison Papers vols. 52, 149, Mitchell Library, Sydney. Collins was especially contemptuous of Fry for his attitude to the press, while Capt. Ottley was Chirol's real hero, albeit too junior to do his job thoroughly effectively.
69. Admittedly some such idea for a 'Great Powers' conference had been raised by the Austrians way back in the spring. See report emanating from the Vienna *Pester Lloyd* in *The Times*, 12 March.
70. Diaries, 12, 16 Aug.
71. Diaries, 12, 22, 26 Aug, 17 Sept.
72. Regarding the overruling, which involved telegraphing the FO unbeknown to Satow, see his diary, 19, 20 Sept. This was in connection with a compromise offer made by Kriege of Germany, which persuaded Satow that contraband and blockade should be taken together and dealt with by the same man, by Reay in the event.
73. Diaries, 20, 24, 25 Sept.
74. Even Satow talked latterly of Marschall 'trying to bully the conference', 'looking sulky', and having 'to speak against the grain'. Diaries, 9, 11, 16 Oct.
75. Chirol to Morrison, 5 April 1907, Morrison Papers vol. 149, had already been talking of the government getting 'rather into a mess over it. They have raised expectations amongst the most extreme sections of their followers which it will be quite impossible for them to realise. They have no proposals to make, and cannot possibly make any of any practical value'. Cf. *ibid.*, 5 June.
76. See Morris, *Radicalism against War, 1906-1914*, p.122, and note 17 above. Satow's diaries make no reference to it. Tate, *The Disarmament Illusion*, p.343, argues that the outcome of the conference provided the German government with just the 'excuse' that it needed to justify the expansion of the navy to an unenthusiastic public.
77. Satow diaries, 28 Nov. 1907, 28 Feb. 1908, Satow to Reay, 29 Nov., 1907. Reay to Satow, 21 Jan. 1908, 30/33/11/12, reported that the now retired Sanderson regarded the conference outcome as 'not insignificant', while all the issues, non-controversial

- conventions and those outstanding, were to be reconsidered by different committees, the latter by a new one, half of whose six members would derive from the Admiralty. Two years later, 21 Dec. 1909, Reay was reporting to Satow regarding Sanderson's rather more imperious successor as Permanent Undersecretary on the eve of his translation to the Indian Viceroyalty: '[Sir Charles] Hardinge was annoyed that Germany had wrecked everything at the Conference and told me that they had even warned that if we passed Compulsory Arbitration Germany would resist it! He wants to exclude the small Powers at the next Conference[;] "they are too good" ... At the next Conference I suppose the Great Powers will settle a definite set of resolutions in advance so that the Conference will simply ratify'.
78. Satow to Aston, 6 Feb. 1909 (30/33/11/3): 'It owes its being called together partly to a suggestion I made at the Hague Conference, in order to avoid having to discuss questions for which we were not fully prepared'.
79. Blockade and contraband were settled to British satisfaction, sinking of neutral prizes only compromised, and the right to treat neutral ships performing unneutral service as enemy was left open. Davis, *The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference*, pp.309-12.
80. Amongst other old acquaintances from The Hague involved in the London Conference, Satow met Fusinato of Italy, Admiral Roell of the Netherlands, Villaurrutia of Spain, Renault and Fromageot of France, and Capt. Behr and Col. Ovtchinnikov of Russia. Martens was now too ill and replaced by Baron von Taube, also of the University of St. Petersburg. The American delegation was almost completely changed. The ten countries represented were Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, the United States, Italy, Spain and Japan, with the Netherlands included as an afterthought. For the arrangements for the 'Casabranca' arbitration at The Hague as he called it, see Reay to Satow, 16 Dec. 1908. 30/33/11/12.
81. Hamilton, *Bertie of Thame*, pp.201-12, discusses how far it went in terms of the 1910 Paris International Aerial Conference, and see Satow to Reay, undated (14 June?) 1908. 30/33/11/15. For Reay (to Satow, 14 April 1909): 'The Naval Conference I think was a success'. 30/33/11/12.
82. Davis, *The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference*, p.309.
83. Morris, *Radicalism against War, 1906-1914*, pp.219, 232, Davis, *The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference*, pp.313, 344-5, Satow diaries, 25 Oct., 1 Nov. 1911, and Reay to Satow, 25 Aug. 1909. Satow seems to have maintained an almost proprietary interest in it for years afterwards.
84. Satow's letters to Reay appear in PRO 30/33/11/15, and Reay's to Satow in 30/33/11/12. Satow also contributed a two-part unattributed review article on 'The Immunity of Private Property at Sea, to the *Quarterly Review*, vols. 214-15, 1-23, 1-22, in 1911, in which he was still looking to British acceptance of the Treaty of London, and also the somewhat terse entry for Reay in the 1912-21 volume of the *British Dictionary of National Biography*.
85. Satow to Reay, 6 May 1912, Satow diary, 14 Jan., Reay to Satow, 20 July 1914.
86. T.G. Otte, 'Communication: The Crowe-Satow Correspondence (1907-14)', *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 7/3 (Nov. 1996), pp.770-92.
87. Diaries, 23 July 1911, 13 July 1912.
88. He had read a few relevant books immediately before and during the conference, e.g., C. Dupuis, *Le Droit de la Guerre Maritime d'après les doctrines anglaises contemporaine* (Paris, 1899), republished in 1911 *d'après les conférences de la Haye et de Londres*, along with current magazine essays by Mahan and Corbett.
89. Satow to Aston, 29 Jan. 1909. 30/33/11/3. Comments like these and others cited below chime with much that appears in Clive Parry, 'Foreign Policy and International

- Law', in F.H. Hinsley (ed.), *British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp.89–110.
90. The announcement of the 1907 delegation, 29 April, did stress that Reay was a past president of the International Institute of Law.
  91. W.J. Tips, *Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns and the Making of Modern Siam* (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1996), foreword and p.12, Satow Diaries, 28 Nov, 14 Dec. 1907, and Satow to Reay, 8, 26 Dec. 1907, 25 Jan., 11 Aug. 1908. 30/33/11/15
  92. Davis, *The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference*, p.131. But both Martens and Zorn attended at Geneva as well as The Hague, and Holland was clearly not uninterested in the conference, see his letter to *The Times*, 1 April 1907, regarding an international prize court.
  93. Diaries, 14 Dec. 1907, 5 July 1908, 8 Feb. 1909.
  94. See above, note 84.
  95. Diaries, 5 July 1908, 13 Sept., 15 Oct. 1909.
  96. Diary, 15 Oct. 1909.
  97. Bourgeois was to be much involved in the organization of the League of Nations in 1919. Davis, *The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference*, pp.361–2.
  98. Tate, *The Disarmament Illusion*, p.327. Pursuing her researches widely on both sides of the Atlantic, she enjoyed assistance from amongst others such internationalists as Sir Alfred Zimmern and James L. Brierly at Oxford, and Payson S. Wild Jr. at Harvard.
  99. For the awareness of 'that terrible fray', the Russo-Japanese War, see *The Times* second leader, 14 Feb. 1907. And compare the same newspaper's Paris correspondent's talk of the next European war as 'a fight for national existence', 21 May, or the comments of the French politician Georges Leygues, with his references to President Roosevelt and Lord Rosebery, 1 June.

## 'A Manual of Diplomacy': The Genesis of Satow's *Guide to Diplomatic Practice*

T.G. OTTE

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Often referred to as simply 'Satow', the *Guide to Diplomatic Practice* stands as a lasting monument to Satow's 'second career' as a scholar of international law and diplomacy. However, there was more to this phase in Satow's life than the *Guide's* two stout volumes. This article argues that in reconstructing the origins and genesis of this work, Satow's own conception of diplomacy as an historically evolved tool of international politics can be examined much more comprehensively than is possible on the basis on the current fifth edition of the *Guide*. Moreover, this examination will also offer further insights into the evolution of diplomatic studies as an academic discipline in the early twentieth century.

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*'Habent sua fata libelli.'*

Trained to write despatches and memoranda for their entire active career in diplomacy, many diplomats turn to literary work in their retirement.<sup>1</sup> Ernest Satow was no exception; indeed, when he retired, he already had a series of learned papers on mostly Oriental philology and early Japanese history to his name, as well as an English-Japanese dictionary and an edition from contemporary records of John Saris's voyage to Japan in the early seventeenth century.<sup>2</sup> To his contemporaries he was known for his scholarly and bibliophile tastes. The English-born wife of the Belgian Minister at Tokyo described him as 'a tall, slight, rather careworn-looking man, with an intellectual face and the stoop of a student. ... He possesses a delightful collection of interesting books and wonderful editions. One of the best rooms in the Legation is devoted to the object.'<sup>3</sup> His French colleague there, too, described him as '*un peu "livresque"*'; and the wife of his first secretary at Peking noted that 'he cared for his Oriental studies and his old Japanese manuscripts far more than he did for entertaining, which formed part of his social duties as