

CELEBRATING FASCISM AND WAR CRIMINALITY IN EDMONTON

The Political Myth and Cult of Stepan Bandera in Multicultural Canada

Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe (Berlin)

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1 For "thick description", cf. Geertz, Clifford: *Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture*. In: Geertz, C.: *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*. New York: Basic Books 1973, pp. 3-30. For the critique of ideology, see Grabner-Haider, Anton: *Ideologie und Religion. Interaktion und Sinnsysteme in der modernen Gesellschaft*. Wien: Herder 1981; Schleichert, Hubert: *Wie man mit den Fundamentalisten diskutiert, ohne den Verstand zu verlieren. Anleitung zum subversiven Denken*. München: Beck 2005, pp. 112-117.

2 For a discussion of the »Ukrainian National Revolution« in the summer of 1941, cf. Rossoliński-Liebe, Grzegorz: *The »Ukrainian National Revolution« in the Summer of 1941: Discourse and Practice of a Fascist Movement*. In *Kritika: Explorations of Russian and Eurasian History* 12/1 (2011), pp. 83-114.

3 To my knowledge, there are no scholarly works concerning the demonization of Stepan Bandera by the Soviet propaganda machine.

4 For the problem of fascism in the OUN, cf. Golczewski, Frank: *Deutsche und Ukrainer 1914–1939*. Paderborn: Schöningh 2010, pp. 571-591; Rossoliński-Liebe 2011.

5 Golczewski 2010; Golczewski, Frank: *Die Kollaboration in der Ukraine*. In: Dieckmann, Christoph (Ed.): *Kooperation und Verbrechen. Formen der »Kollaboration« im östlichen Europa*. Göttingen: Wallstein 2003, pp. 151-182.

6 Pohl, Dieter: *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941–1944: Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens*. München: Oldenburg 1997.

7 Motyka, Grzegorz: *Ukraińska partyzantka 1942–1960: działalność Organizacji Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów i Ukraińskiej Powstańczej Armii [The Ukrainian Guerilla 1942–1960: The*

Introduction

Canadian history, like Canadian society, is heterogeneous and complex. The process of coping with such a history requires not only a sense of transnational or global historical knowledge, but also the ability to handle critically the different pasts of the people who immigrated to Canada. One of the most problematic components of Canadian's heterogeneous history is the political myth of Stepan Bandera, which emerged in Canada after Bandera's assassination on October 15, 1959. The Bandera myth stimulated parts of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada and other countries to pay homage to a fascist, anti-Semitic and radical nationalist politician, whose supporters and adherents were not only willing to collaborate with the Nazis but also murdered Jews, Poles, Russians, non-nationalist Ukrainians and other people in Ukraine whom they perceived as enemies of the sacred concept of the nation.

In this article, I concentrate on the political myth and cult of Stepan Bandera in Edmonton, exploring how certain elements of Ukrainian immigrant groups tried to combine the policies of Canadian multiculturalism with the anti-communist rhetoric of the Cold War in order to celebrate the »heroism« of Stepan Bandera as part of their struggle against the Soviet Union and for an independent Ukraine. Investigating the political myth and cult of Stepan Bandera, I firstly provide a short theoretical introduction into the political myth. Secondly, using the method of »thick description« and critique of ideology,¹ I analyse how Ukrainians celebrated Bandera in Edmonton and some other Canadian cities under the influence of his political myth.

Since this article focusses on the political myth rather than the person of Stepan Bandera, I do not consider his biography in detail. Similarly, I do not explore earlier forms of the Bandera myth which emerged in the Second Polish Republic and during World War II, especially during the OUN-B's »Ukrainian National Revolution« in the summer of 1941,² or indeed the negative image of Stepan Bandera created in the Soviet Union, which still helps fuel Bandera's reputation as a hero among numerous Ukrainian nationalists, including some scholars in Canada and Western Ukraine.³ While there is not enough space here to outline the history of such organisations as the OUN (Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists – *Orhanizatsia Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv*) and the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army – *Ukraïns'ka Povstans'ka Armiia*), or to analyse issues surrounding the collaboration between the Nazis and Ukrainian nationalists, the Polish-Ukrainian conflict, the ethnic cleansing of Poles by the UPA, and the importance of fascism⁴ and anti-Semitism in the OUN, these questions have been explored at length by such scholars as Frank Golczewski,⁵ Dieter Pohl,⁶ Grzegorz Motyka,⁷ Franziska Bruder,⁸ Karel Berkhoff,⁹ Jeffrey Burds,¹⁰ and Timothy Snyder.¹¹

The Person and the Political Myth of Stepan Bandera

In this article the myth is not defined as the opposition of truth or reality as historians or other scholars occasionally claim in order to stress their validity. I define myth as a »story« which mobilizes emotions and immobilizes minds. A political myth is a more modern version of a myth which is related to politics or ideology. In this article I follow a cultural, non-evaluative concept of ideology, which Clifford Geertz elaborated on in his essay *Ideology as a Cultural System*. For Geertz it is »a loss of orientation that most directly gives rise to ideological activity, an inability, for lack of usable models, to comprehend the universe of civic rights and responsibilities in which one finds oneself located«. ¹² This loss of orientation certainly occurred in Western Ukraine after World War I. It manifested itself in organisations such as the OUN, which radicalised Ukrainian nationalism orientating it towards Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and other extreme and radical nationalistic movements. This applied to terrorism that occurred in the interwar period and mass violence and murder conducted during World War II in an attempt to eke out a state. A loss of cultural orientation also occurred amongst the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada and other countries around the world,

Activity of the OUN and the UPA]
Warszawa: Inst. Studiów Historycz-
nych PAN 2006.

8 Bruder, Franziska: »Den Ukraini-
schen Staat erkämpfen oder sterben!«
Die Organisation Ukrainischer Nati-
onalisten (OUN) 1929–1948. Berlin:
Metropol 2007.

9 Berkhoff, Karel C.: Harvest of Des-
pair. Life and Death in Ukraine under
the Nazi Rule. Cambridge: Belknap
2004.

10 Burds, Jeffrey: AGENTURA:
Soviet Informants' Networks & the
Ukrainian Underground in Galicia,
1944–48. In: East European Politics
and Societies 11/1 (1997),
pp. 89–130.

11 Snyder, Timothy: The Reconstruc-
tion of Nations: Poland, Ukraine,
Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999.
New Haven: Yale UP 2003; Snyder,
Timothy: To Resolve the Ukrainian
Question Once and for All: The Ethnic
Cleansing of Ukrainians in Poland,
1943–1947. In: Journal of Cold War
Studies, 1/2 (Spring 1999), pp. 86-
120. However, cf. also Jeffrey Burds'
review of Snyder's article on [http://
www.fas.harvard.edu/~hpcws/com-
ment13.htm](http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~hpcws/comment13.htm) (accessed: 14.12.2010).

12 Geertz, Clifford: Ideology as a Cul-
tural System. In: Geertz 1973,
pp. 193–233, here p. 219.

13 Flood, Christopher G.: Political
Myth. A Theoretical Introduction. New
York, London: Gerland Pub. 1996,
pp. 15–26.

14 Hein, Heidi: Historische Kult-
forschung. Digitales Handbuch zur
Geschichte und Kultur Russlands
und Osteuropa. In: [http://pub.
ub.uni-muenchen.de/636/1/hein-
kultforschung.pdf](http://pub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/636/1/hein-kultforschung.pdf), pp. 4–5 (accessed:
30.10.2009).

15 Masaryk was neither a fascist nor
an authoritarian dictator but his cha-
risma was used to create a cult which
helped to legitimise the existence of
Czechoslovakia. Cf. Orzoff, Andrea:
The Husbandman: Tomáš Masaryk's
Leader Cult in Interwar Czechoslova-
kia. In: Austrian History Yearbook 39
(2008), pp. 121–137.

16 There are many publications
concerning Hitler's charisma. The
problematic of the Hitler myth is well
explained in Kershaw, Ian: The »Hitler
Myth: Image and Reality in the Third
Reich. Oxford: Clarendon Pr. 1987. Cf.

although it was different in form than the loss that occurred in 1930s and 1940s Western Ukraine. At this time these communities began to celebrate Stepan Bandera and war criminals such as Roman Shukhevych as heroes of the Ukrainian nation.

The political myth of Stepan Bandera has not been solely based on the person of Stepan Bandera. Generally, political myths are embedded in an ideology that provides them with meaning. In the case of the Bandera myth, this meaning is provided by the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism that, in its radical version, appeared after World War I in Western Ukraine. Furthermore, embodiments of political myths can be understood as the visual component of an ideology, as a captivating story or an image that is also a part of the propaganda of this ideology, which consists of many interconnected political myths.¹³ Apart from ideology, a political myth is interrelated to cults, rituals and symbols.

The cult of Stepan Bandera and rituals based around his person are on the practical side of the political myth of Stepan Bandera.¹⁴ The cult and rituals are practiced by those who believe in the myth, acting as its producers, receivers, or both. In the case of the political myth of Stepan Bandera, it is a political cult of personality. The interwar period witnessed the rise of a range of cults of personality in Europe. While some of them were not fascist or authoritarian, including the cult of Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk in Czechoslovakia,¹⁵ all of them relied on charisma to legitimate power. The leaders' charisma was seldom »natural«, but was often fabricated by extensive propaganda measures. These cults sprang up in different political, cultural and social circumstances, accomplishing different purposes in the societies where they were applied. It would thus be wrong to equate them, but it is possible to compare them given that comparing does not only mean looking at similarities but also differences. The most well-known European cults of personality were established around the most anti-Semitic European leader, Adolf Hitler in Germany,¹⁶ the prototype of the fascist leader Benito Mussolini in Italy,¹⁷ Francisco Franco in Spain,¹⁸ Antonio Salazar and Rolão Preto in Portugal,¹⁹ Philippe Pétain in France,²⁰ Ante Pavelić in Croatia,²¹ Corneliu Zelea Codreanu and Ion Antonescu in Romania,²² Józef Piłsudski²³ and Roman Dmowski in Poland, Vidkun Quisling in Norway,²⁴ Iosif Stalin in the Soviet Union,²⁵ Miklós Horthy in Hungary,²⁶ Engelbert Dollfuß and Kurt Schuschnigg in Austria,²⁷ Andrej Hlinka and Jozef Tiso in Czechoslovakia and Slovakia,²⁸ Antanas Smetona in Lithuania,²⁹ Ahmed Zog in Albania,³⁰ Aleksandar I. Karadordević in Yugoslavia,³¹ Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Turkey,³² Anastasii Vonsiatskii and Konstantin Rodzaevskii among Russian émigrés,³³ and several others.³⁴

However, the myth of Stepan Bandera cannot be reduced to the cult of personality. The myth also relates to events that Bandera did not participate in, as well as persons who identified themselves and were recognized by others as the banderites (Ukrainian *banderivtsi*), referring thereby to the name of Stepan Bandera. The symbol of Bandera was also frequently used to denote an epoch in which, as the believers of the myth would purport, the »Bandera generation« had struggled for Ukraine.

The development of the political myth of Stepan Bandera began before World War II in the South-Eastern territories of the Polish Republic, inhabited primarily by Ukrainians. In the beginning, the myth was shaped by the Polish-Ukrainian conflict and Warsaw's nationalistic politics against the Ukrainian minority. In particular, the Bandera myth evolved following the assassination of the Polish interior minister, Bronisław Pieracki, by the OUN-activist Hryhorii Matseiko in June 1934, and the subsequent trials of OUN members in 1935 and 1936 in Warsaw and L'viv. Advocates of Ukrainian nationalism perceived these trials as part of their ongoing struggle for the liberation of Ukraine, linking them explicitly with Bandera's name and helping to symbolise him as the »brave Ukrainian heart«.

During World War II the myth evolved and spread amongst members of different nationalities and religious groups that inhabited or occupied the territories of Western Ukraine, including groups of Galician Ukrainians, Jews, Poles, Germans and Soviet Russians and Ukrainians. One of the most important events that propelled the rise of the political myth and cult of Stepan Bandera during World War II was the »Ukrainian National Revolution« of the summer of 1941, which began at the outset of the German-Soviet war on June 22, 1941. It was then that the OUN-B proclaimed a Ukrainian state in L'viv on June 30, 1941, trying to convince Nazi politicians to recognise it in hopes of becoming part of the New Fascist Europe under the aegis of Nazi Germany. Stepan Bandera, as the *providnyk* (leader) of the OUN-B, was supposed to be the *providnyk* of the new Ukrainian fascist state. According to

also Lepsius, M. Rainer: *The Model of Charismatic Leadership and Its Applicability to the Rule of Adolf Hitler*. In Pinto, António Costa/Eatwell, Roger/Larsen, Stein Ugelvik (Eds.): *Charisma and Fascism in Interwar Europe*. London: Routledge 2007, pp. 37-52.

17 Gentile, Emilio: *Mussolini as the Prototypical Charismatic Dictator*. In: Pinto/Eatwell/Larsen 2007, pp. 113-127.

18 Payne, Stanley G.: *Franco, the Spanish Falange and the Institutionalisation of Mission*. In: Pinto/Eatwell/Larsen 2007, pp. 53-62.

19 Pinto, António Costa: *«Chaos» and «Order»: Preto, Salazar and Charismatic Appeal*. In: Pinto/Eatwell/Larsen 2007, pp. 65-75.

20 Baruch, Marc Olivier: *Charisma and Hybrid Legitimacy in Pétain's État français (1940–1944)*. In: Pinto/Eatwell/Larsen 2007, pp. 77-85.

21 Goldstein, Ivo: *Ante Pavelić: Charisma and National Mission in Wartime Croatia*. In: Pinto/Eatwell/Larsen 2007, pp. 87-95; Cox, John K.: *Ante Pavelić and the Ustaša State in Croatia*. In: Fischer, Bernd J. (Ed.): *Balkan Strongmen. Dictators and Authoritarian Rulers of South Eastern Europe*. West Lafayette: Purdue UP 2007, pp. 199-238.

22 Fisher-Galati, Stephen: *Codreanu, Romanian National Traditions and Charisma*. In: Pinto/Eatwell/Larsen 2007, pp. 107-112.

23 Hein, Heidi: *Der Piłsudski-Kult und seine Bedeutung für den polnischen Staat 1926–1939*. Marburg: Herder Inst. 2002.

24 Larsen, Stein Ugelvik: *Charisma from below? The Quisling Case in Norway*. In: Pinto/Eatwell/Larsen 2007, pp. 97-106.

25 Apor, Balázs/Behrends, Jan C./Jones, Polly/Rees, E.A. (Eds.): *The Leader Cult in Communist Dictatorships: Stalin and the Eastern Bloc*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2004.

26 Fenyo, Mario D.: *Hitler, Horthy and Hungary*. New Haven: Yale UP 1972, p. 26f., p. 77f., pp. 140-143, p. 207f.

27 Pauley, Bruce F.: *Fascism and the Führerprinzip: The Austrian Example*. In: *Central European History* 12/3 (1979), pp. 281-286.

the *Führerprinzip*, applied by the OUN-B, Bandera's word would be above all written law in the OUN-B state – he would become the embodiment of this fascist Ukrainian state. The Nazis, however, did not accept the state and took Bandera into captivity on July 5, 1941. He was transported to Berlin, where he stayed under house arrest until September 15, 1941. He was subsequently arrested and kept in a Berlin prison as an honorary prisoner (*Ehrenhäftling*) until October 1943. From October 1943 to October 1944 Bandera stayed in Zellenbau, a part of the concentration camp Sachsenhausen for political prisoners. After Bandera was released he was once more allowed to collaborate.³⁵

What happened in Ukraine while Bandera was in Berlin was extremely significant for the political myth of Stepan Bandera. During the »Ukrainian National Revolution« the OUN-B established a militia that, together with German troops, organized and conducted pogroms. As a result of these activities between 13,000 and 35,000 Jews were killed by the perpetrators of the pogroms. The UPA, an army established by the OUN-B, conducted in 1943 in Volhynia and in 1944 in Eastern Galicia a campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Polish population; as a result, between 70,000 and 100,000 people were killed. Simultaneously, the UPA partisans also killed several hundred Jews who had survived previous repressions until then. Between 1944 and 1953, the UPA killed Ukrainians who were accused of collaborating with the Soviets. Altogether at this time the OUN-UPA killed more than 20,000 civilians. During their war against the OUN-UPA the Soviets killed 153,000, arrested 134,000 and deported 203,000 members of the OUN-UPA, members of their families and random Western Ukrainian civilians. The fanatical and irresponsible fight of the OUN-UPA against the much more powerful Soviets certainly contributed to the massive and violent scale of Soviet atrocities against Western Ukrainians. However, ultimately no one can be held more responsible for killing between 10,000 and 20,000 Ukrainians (both OUN-UPA members and civilians) during and after World War II.³⁶

The OUN-B activists and the UPA partisans who committed these atrocities were known as banderites: Bandera's people. This term was not invented by Soviet propaganda but dates back to the split of the OUN in late 1940 and early 1941, distinguishing members of the OUN-B from members of the OUN-M faction, who became known as *melnykites* (*mel'nikivtsi*) after their leader Andrii Mel'nyk. Thus Bandera became the main symbol of the OUN-B and the UPA although he himself did not participate in the atrocities of the OUN-B and the UPA. However, he is certainly responsible at least for the pogroms in June and July 1941 as he prepared the »Ukrainian National Revolution« and planned the OUN-B militia.

Since 1944, Soviet propaganda helped to establish Stepan Bandera as the most tangible symbol of Ukrainian fascism and radical nationalism not only in Soviet Ukraine but also in many other Soviet republics and satellite countries. By creating a narrative that portrayed Bandera as an enemy of the »decent« Soviet Ukrainians and condemning Ukrainian nationalism which celebrated Bandera's »anti-Sovietness«, Soviet propaganda encouraged nationalist Ukrainian emigrants in Canada to glorify the person of Stepan Bandera, leading to a propagandistic campaign by the émigrés community against the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War. This effective engagement of the Ukrainian diaspora did not leave space for a critical sense of coming to terms with the Ukrainian nationalists' collaboration with the Nazis and their involvement in the Holocaust, the ethnic cleansing of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia in 1943/44, and the massacres of civilian Ukrainians who supported or were accused of supporting Soviet power in Western Ukraine between 1944 and 1951. The Ukrainian diaspora completely suppressed the memory of all the nationalistic, fascist and anti-Semitic features of Stepan Bandera, including such embarrassing rituals conducted by the leaders of the »Ukrainian National Revolution« of 1941 as the greeting with the right arm »slightly to the right, slightly above the peak of the head« while calling »Glory to the Ukraine!« (*Slava Ukraïni!*) and responding »Glory to the Heroes!« (*Heroiam Slava!*).³⁷

Canadian Believers of the Bandera Myth

The assassination of Bandera by the KGB agent Bohdan Stashynskyi allowed nationalist elements of the diaspora to blame the communist Soviet leaders, mainly Nikita Khrushchev, for his death. Immediately after the assassination, the Bandera myth re-emerged amongst the Ukrainian diaspora in Australia, Argentina, Canada, West Germany, Great Britain, the USA

28 Besier, Gerhard: ›Berufsständische Ordnung‹ und autoritäre Diktaturen. Zur politischen Umsetzung einer ›klassenfreien‹ katholischen Gesellschaftsordnung in den 20er und 30er Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts. In: Besier, G./Lübbe, Hermann (Eds.): Politische Religion und Religionspolitik. Zwischen Totalitarismus und Bürgerfreiheit. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2005, pp. 79-110, here p. 107f.

29 Kasparavičius, Algimantas: The Historical Experience of the Twentieth Century: Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism in Lithuania. In: Borejsza, Jerzy W./Ziemer, Klaus (Eds.): Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes in Europe: Legacies and Lessons from the Twentieth Century. New York, Oxford: Berghahn 2006, pp. 304-308.

30 Fischer, Bernd J.: King Zog, Albania's Interwar Dictator. In: Fischer 2007, pp. 19-49.

31 Farley, Brigit: King Aleksandar the Royal Dictatorship in Yugoslavia. In: Fischer 2007, pp. 51-86.

32 Ahmad, Feroz: Kemal Atatürk and the Founding of the Modern Turkey. In: Fischer 2007, pp. 141-163.

33 For Anastasii Vonsiatskii, cf. Stephan, John J.: The Russian Fascists. Tragedy and Farce in Exile 1925-1945. New York: Hopper & Row 1978, pp. 91-140. For Konstantin Rodzaevskii, cf. Stephan 1978, pp. 73-90.

34 In Canada fascist movements occurred as well, cf. Betcherman, Lita-Rose: The Svastika and the Maple Leaf. Fascist Movements in Canada in the 1930s. Toronto: Fitzhenry & Whiteside 1975.

35 Motyka 2006, pp. 231-234; FSB (Federal'naia Sluzhba Bezopasnosti), Moscow, N-19092/T. 100, l. 233 (Stepan Bandera's prison card).

36 On the pogroms in western Ukraine, cf. Pohl, Dieter: Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Western Ukraine – A Research Agenda. In: Barkan, Elazar/Cole, Elizabeth A./Struve, Kai (Eds.): Shared History – Divided Memory: Jews and Others in Soviet-Occupied Poland, 1939-1941. Leipzig: Leipziger Univverl. 2007, pp. 305-313; Lesser, Gabriele: Pogromy w Galicji Wschodniej w 1941 r. [Pogroms in Eastern Galicia in 1941]. In: Traba, Robert (Ed.): Tematy polsko-ukraińskie [Polish-Ukrainian Subjects]. Olsztyn: Wspólnota Kulturowa Borussia

and several other countries. Meanwhile, Soviet censorship and propaganda prevented the spread of the myth in Soviet Ukraine, promoting instead a radically different set of cultural and political activities, specifically the demonization of Stepan Bandera as well as all other Ukrainian fighters who at the same time had been glorified by the diaspora.

The most significant places where the myth was reinvented and most rituals were performed were London, Munich, and Toronto. Influential newspapers were published in these centres. After Bandera's assassination, the Munich-based *The Way to Victory (Shliakh Peremohy)*, *Ukrainian Thought (Ukrains'ka Dumka)* in London and the Toronto-based *Ukrainian Echo (Homin Ukraïny)* acted to revitalize, in a very intensive manner, the political myth of Bandera, thereby influencing subscribers in other cities and countries. The Edmonton-based weekly *Ukrainian News (Ukrains'ki visti)* was less prominent in the process of making the political myth of Stepan Bandera.

It is difficult to elucidate which individuals or what parts of the Ukrainian diaspora were influenced by the political myth of Stepan Bandera, or who celebrated the Bandera cult in Edmonton. Ukrainians have been immigrating to Canada since the 1890s and as a result the Ukrainian diaspora has been divided along generational lines, as well as levels of political exposure. The first stage in the development of the Bandera myth in the 1930s and the 1940s influenced mostly Ukrainians in Poland. Concurrently, the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada was only marginally exposed to the Bandera myth. Due to the fact that this wave of the diaspora was less politicised or nationalist, it was not particularly enthusiastic about this myth. The ideology of Ukrainian nationalism reached Canada and other places with a large diasporic community only with the arrival of the DPs (displaced persons) after World War II. Many of them refused to return to Soviet Ukraine as they feared being persecuted for their collaboration with the Nazis.³⁸

Many DPs had grown up in interwar Poland and became acquainted with the Bandera myth during World War II. When these Ukrainians arrived in Canada even the more nationalist components of the Ukrainian diaspora did not adopt their very radical values and refused to work with them. The new political diaspora was on average more educated and more politically active than the older generation that mainly consisted of farmers. The younger members of the diaspora organized youth groups, parishes, political parties, newspapers, Saturday schools, veteran associations, scholarly societies, credit unions, resorts, encyclopaedia projects, museums and archives, radio programs, sports, hobby clubs, etc.³⁹ The Cold War motivated Canadian politicians not to interfere with the anti-Soviet activities of these communities. The politics of multiculturalism, officially applied in the 1970s, a decade after the Bandera myth re-emerged, encouraged Canadian politicians to interpret the events organized by radical nationalistic elements of the Ukrainian diaspora as an expression of Ukrainian culture.⁴⁰

The community of the banderites (mainly, but not exclusively consisting of former members of the OUN-B) had the strongest ideological roots. They acted radically and gained increasing numbers of members who became enthusiastic about the OUN-B's plan to liberate Ukraine from the Soviets and to clear its territory of ›enemies‹. The banderites established influential centers in Germany, the United Kingdom and Canada. In the United Kingdom they took over the Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain.⁴¹ In Canada, on December 25, 1949, they founded the LVU (League for the Liberation of Ukraine – *Liga Vyzvolennia Ukraïny*). The League established some 20 community centres for its more than 50 branches in Canada. The most important medium that the banderites used to spread their ideas and to influence the mindset of Canadian Ukrainians was the newspaper *Ukrainian Echo*, published in Toronto. The official website of the League shows that the League has been willing to combine Ukrainian nationalism with the policy of multiculturalism in Canada:

The League's main focus, however, was on the promotion of national independence for Ukraine and human rights for the Ukrainian people, while advancing the interests of the Ukrainian Canadian community within the framework of multiculturalism in Canada. Public actions included rallies, demonstrations, political mass meetings, seminars, conferences, public lectures, petitions and mass mailings.⁴²

The League also organized women's, youth's and veteran's organizations like the SUM (Ukrainian Youth Association – *Spilka Ukrains'koï Molodi*) or the OZhLVU (Women's Association of the Canadian League for the Liberation of Ukraine – *Obiednannia Zhinok*

2001, pp. 103-126. Similar waves of pogroms also broke out shortly after the start of the German-Soviet war in North-Eastern Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Bessarabia and Bukovina. For pogroms in Poland, cf. Żbikowski, Andrzej: Pogroms in Northeastern Poland – Spontaneous Reactions and German Instigations. In: Barkan/Cole/Struve 2007, pp. 315-354. For pogroms in Lithuania, cf. Dieckmann, Christoph: Lithuania in Summer 1941. The German Invasion and the Kaunas Pogrom. In: Barkan/Cole/Struve 2007, pp. 355-385. For Latvia and Estonia, cf. Bundesarchiv Berlin Lichterfelde R58/215, l. 134. (Ereignismeldung UdSSR, Nr. 40, 01.08.1941). For Bessarabia and Bukovina, cf. Solonari, Vladimir: Patterns of Violence. The Local Population and the Mass Murder of Jews in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, July-August 1941. In: Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 8/4 (2007), pp. 749-787. The first pogrom actions in L'viv started probably on 30 June 1941 or even before. For testimonies that date the beginning of the violent actions to July 1, 1941, cf. Lewin, Kurt I.: Przejście. Saga Świętego Jura spisana w roku 1946 [I Survived. The Saga of Saint George Written in the Year 1946]. Warszawa: Zeszyty Literackie 2006, pp. 56-57; AŻIH (Archiwum Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego w Warszawie) 229/54, Teka Lwowska [L'viv portfolio], l. 2. For the course of the pogrom in L'viv, cf. Mick, Christoph: Ethische Gewalt und Pogrome in Lemberg 1914 und 1941. In: Ost-europa 53 (2003), pp. 1810-1829, here p. 1810f., pp. 1824-1829; Heer, Hannes: Einübung in den Holocaust: Lemberg Juni/Juli 1941. In: Zsf. f. Geschichtswissenschaft 49 (2001), pp. 409-427, here p. 410, p. 424; Bruder 2007, pp. 140-150; Grelka, Frank: Die ukrainische Nationalbewegung unter deutscher Besatzungsherrschaft 1918 und 1941/1942. Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz 2005, pp. 276-286; Pohl 1997, pp. 60-62; Wachs, Philipp-Christian: Der Fall Theodor Oberländer (1909-1998). Frankfurt/M: Campus 2000, p. 71, pp. 78-80. For the violent actions against Poles in Volhynia and Galicia, see Motyka 2006, pp. 298-400; Snyder 1999, pp. 93-100. For the second Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine, the brutal conflict between the Soviets and the OUN-UPA, and the terror conducted by the Soviets and the OUN-UPA against the civil population, cf. Burds 1997, pp. 104-115; Bruder 2007, p. 231f., p. 261f.; Motyka 2006, pp. 503-574, p. 649f.; Boekh, Katrin: Stalinismus in der Ukraine. Die Rekonstruktion

Ligy Vyzvolennia Ukraïny). The deeper meaning and main purpose behind the organizational activities of the banderites was to prepare their children for an eventual battle for an independent Ukrainian state. This battle would be the continuation of the fascist Ukrainian revolution of the summer of 1941 and the struggles of the UPA between 1943 and 1953. For this purpose, in 1962 a monument to the heroes of Ukraine was erected at a newly opened recreation camp in Ellenville located in upstate New York. The monument consisted of a giant spear with the Ukrainian trident on it and the busts of Symon Petliura and Ievhen Konovalets', as well as Roman Shukhevych and Stepan Bandera, on either side of the spear. Ukrainian children of the diaspora congregated in front of the monument to recite poems glorifying the Ukrainian heroes or to perform folkloric dances.⁴³

Similar camps were established in Canada. In Ontario, the camp Veselka was opened in 1954 and the camp Verkhovyna was inaugurated in 1955 at St. Theodore in Quebec. The SUM of Sudbury opened a camp called Bilohorsha and the SUM of Thunder Bay set up two more camps (Karpaty and Dibrova). The camps had an educational purpose, aiming to teach diaspora children to love their country and to hate the enemies of Ukraine. OUN activists and UPA partisans were introduced as heroes to the children, while UPA war crimes and the anti-Semitism and fascism of the OUN activists were denied. The long-term aim was to recruit a new generation that would continue their struggle for the Ukrainian state: as the organizers put it, »to educate Ukrainian youth about their history and culture, as well as cultivating them to become active members of their Ukrainian and local communities while serving God and their Ukrainian homeland.«⁴⁴

Canadian Multiculturalism, Ukrainian Nationalism and Political Activism

The Canadian parliament adopted multiculturalism as official policy in 1971. At this time, multiculturalism in Canada was understood as a counterbalance to the earlier supremacy of English culture. Like other countries, Canada sought to liquidate cultural or ethnic inequalities and to establish more tolerance for the ›Other‹. In this regard, the politics of multiculturalism was successful. On the one hand, it helped make Canadian society more conscious of its own cultural and ethnic diversity and of ›Otherness‹ in society in general. Multiculturalism encouraged and allowed Canadian citizens with a non-English or non-French background to identify themselves with Canada through their respective home cultures. It made possible to open German, Italian, Ukrainian and other national schools and to enrich Canadian society in other ways. On the other hand, the same politics helped to build a climate in which it was difficult to cope critically with the histories on which the identities and the folklore of the various ethnic groups were based. The existence of ›authentic‹ or ›primordial‹ ethnic groups was assumed by the theories of both multiculturalism and nationalism. This assumption turned a multicultural society into a multi-ethnic or multi-national community in which a critical coping with the past of a given group, regardless of its intention, was understood as an illegitimate and often mischievous intervention into its unique culture. This, combined with the anti-Soviet and anti-communist climate of the Cold War, enabled some of these groups to cultivate and work on rituals that were related to radical nationalism, fascism and anti-Semitism that occurred in their ›external homelands‹ between the 1920s and 1940s.⁴⁵

Canadian multiculturalism did not generate or re-establish the Bandera myth in Canada; indeed, the myth had developed ten years before the official introduction of the policy of multiculturalism. Moreover, multiculturalism cannot be blamed for the rise of Ukrainian fascism in Canada, for it had already spread in the 1920s and the 1930s amongst Ukrainians in Poland. However, multiculturalism did facilitate the process of celebrating anti-Semites, fascists and radical nationalists as being an essential part of Ukrainian culture that, according to the notion of multiculturalism, belonged in the heterogeneous Canadian culture. Ukrainians celebrating Bandera in Canada did not celebrate and remember him as an anti-Semite, fascist and radical nationalist. They repressed these ›dark sides‹ of Bandera and the banderites, focusing instead on their role as national heroes who struggled for an independent Ukraine against the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, supposedly without ever collaborating with the Nazis or committing war crimes.⁴⁶

Certain elements of the Ukrainian community in Canada embraced the policy of multiculturalism for the possibilities that it offered. One of these opportunities was the preser-

des sowjetischen Systems nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz 2007, pp. 339-367. For the number of Ukrainians killed by Poles, see Motyka 2006, p. 411f.

37 Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromads'kykh ob'iednan' Ukrainy (TsDAHO) f. 1, op. 23, spr. 926, l. 199 (Postanovy II. Velykoho Zboru Orhanizatsii Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv, l. 37). This salute later embarrassed the OUN. In post-war publications reprinting the resolutions of the second OUN conference, the resolution about the fascist salute was deleted from the text. Compare, e.g., OUN v svitli postanov Velykykh Zboriv [The OUN in the Light of the Resolutions of Grand Assemblies] (n.p.: Zakordonni Chastyny Orhanizatsii Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv, 1955), pp. 44-45 with the original publication of 1941 in: TsDAHO f. 1, op. 23, spr. 926, l. 199 (Postanovy II. Velykoho Zboru Orhanizatsii Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv, 37).

38 Not all DPs left Ukraine together with the withdrawing German army in 1944. Some of the DPs were sent to Germany as forced labourers earlier during the war.

39 Himka, John-Paul: A Central European Diaspora under the Shadow of World War II: The Galician Ukrainians in North America. In: Austrian History Yearbook 37 (2006), pp. 17-31, here p. 18.

40 Satzewich, Vic: The Ukrainian Diaspora. London, New York: Routledge 2002, p. 105.

41 Ibid.

42 V Avangardi Ukraïns'koi spravy. Liga vyzvolennia Ukraïny [In the Vanguard of the Ukrainian Matter]. In: http://www.lucorg.com/luc-history_174.htm (accessed: 23.10.2009).

43 Sawa-Priatka, Tania: A Short History of the Ukrainian American Youth Association's »Oselia« on the Occasion of its 50th Anniversary. In: http://www.cym.org/us/ellenville/Oselia50_UWar-ticle.asp (accessed: 09. 12.2009).

44 Sawa-Priatka, Tania: unnumbered manuscript. For the organisation of banderivtsi in Canada, cf. Lalande, Julia: »Building a Home Abroad«. A Comparative Study of Ukrainian Migration, Immigration Policy and Diaspora Formation in Canada and Germany after the World War II (Diss., Univ. of Hamburg, 2006). In: <http://www.sub.uni-hamburg.de/opus/volltext->

vation of Ukrainian language and culture. The UCC (Ukrainian Canadian Committee), an umbrella organisation founded in November 1949 which brought nationalist Ukrainians together stated on one occasion:

[...] as descendents of 50 million Ukrainians who are exposed to drastic Russification under the present Soviet rule, we in Canada have the opportunity and a sacred duty to preserve the Ukrainian language and the Ukrainian culture outside our native land.⁴⁷

This preservation also meant the continuation of Ukrainian nationalism as can be illustrated by the image on the cover of *The Politics of Multiculturalism. A Ukrainian-Canadian Memoir*,⁴⁸ written by an activist of multiculturalism, Manoly R. Lupul. The photograph (fig. 1) shows six men. Three of them are sitting at a table, while three others are standing behind them. Two of the men sitting, the one in the middle and the one farthest to the right have pens in their hands and are signing a document. The document is a contract between the University of Alberta's CIUS (Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies), an academic institution established in the summer of 1976, and the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Europe, in which both sides agreed to collaborate on the *Encyclopaedia of Ukraine* in December 1976.⁴⁹ The men sitting in the picture are, from the left, Georg Luckyj, Volodymyr Kubiiovych and Manoly Lupul. The men standing, from left to right, are Petro Savaryn, Antanas Figol', and Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky.

As mentioned, Manoly Lupul was the author of *The Politics of Multiculturalism* as well as a member of the Alberta Council of Multiculturalism and the first director of the CIUS. He decided to put this picture on the cover as it likely symbolized, for him, an important act, showing prominent Ukrainian activists of both multiculturalism and Ukrainian nationalism.



Fig. 1: The photograph from the cover of Lupul, Manoly R.: *The Politics of Multiculturalism. A Ukrainian-Canadian Memoir*. Edmonton, Toronto: Canadian Inst. of Ukrainian Studies Pr. 2005.

After World War II, Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky was quite an open-minded and liberal historian at the Department of History at the University of Alberta, while also serving as the associate director of the CIUS. He was critical of Bandera and Ukrainian and other fascist movements. During the war, however, Lysiak-Rudnytsky, like some other Ukrainian intellectuals, produced nationalistic articles for the newspaper *Krakivs'ki visti*, a Ukrainian wartime newspaper. Although he never belonged to the OUN-B, he had certainly been uncritical of the nationalistic and anti-Semitic stream of European fascism, perceiving the Nazis as liberators.⁵⁰

Georg Luckyj was the second associate director of the CIUS. He administered the Institute's *Encyclopaedia of Ukraine* Project Office, housed in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures at the University of Toronto.⁵¹ In his 1992 published memoir Luckyj wrote: »I was one of the few boys in our school who was not deeply stirred by Ukrainian nationalism. The nationalist rhetoric seemed to me full of clichés, and as for various nationalist youth groups (Plast, etc.), I refused to take part in them.«⁵² Despite these statements from 1937 to 1939 Luckyj studied in Berlin and received a scholarship from Nazi Germany. In 1939 he left for England where in 1943 he enlisted in the British army and served in the intelligence, partly with translation work.⁵³ In 1941–1945, Antanas Figol' was the representative of the UTsK (Ukrainian Central Committee – *Ukraïns'kyi Tsentral'nyi Komitet*) in Berlin. Since 1955 Figol' worked as an economical advisor for the Shevchenko Scientific

te/2007/3265/pdf/Lalande_Dissertation_2006.pdf, pp. 184-190 (accessed: 24.10.2009).

For the camp in Ellenville, the monument of the Ukrainian heroes and the reproduction of banderits in this camp, see <http://www.cym.org/us/archives/2009/2009PamyatnykProj.asp> (accessed: 24.10.2009). For the camps in Canada, cf. Mycak, Iryna: *The Ukrainian Youth Association of Canada 1948–1988*. Toronto: Beskyd Graphica 1990, p. 8.

45 On multiculturalism in general and debates about multiculturalism, cf. Powell, Timothy B.: *All Colors Flow into Rainbows and Nooses. The Struggle to Define Academic Multiculturalism*. In: *Cultural Critique* 55 (2003), pp. 152-181. For multiculturalism in Canada, cf. Cameron, Elspeth (Ed.): *Multiculturalism and Immigration in Canada. An Introductory Reader*. Toronto: Canadian Scholar's Pr. 2004; Bissoondath, Neil: *Selling Illusions. The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada*. Toronto: Penguin 2002; Žižek, Slavoj: *A Leftist Plea for «Eurocentrism»*. In: *Critical Inquiry* 24 (1998), pp. 988-1009; Žižek, Slavoj: *Multiculturalism, or The Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism*. In: *New Left Review* 225 (1997), pp. 28-51.

46 For a critique of national representation of World War II in Ukraine, cf. Himka, John-Paul: *Victim Cinema. Between Hitler and Stalin: Ukraine in World War II – The Untold Story*. In: Kasianov, Georgiy/Ther, Philipp (Eds.): *A Laboratory of Transnational History. Ukraine and Recent Ukrainian Historiography*. Budapest: Central European UP 2009, pp. 211-220.

47 Cit. Lalande 2006, p. 257.

48 Lupul, Manoly R.: *The Politics of Multiculturalism. A Ukrainian-Canadian Memoir*. Edmonton, Toronto: Canadian Inst. of Ukrainian Studies Pr. 2005.

49 Ibid., p. 322.

50 For Lysiak-Rudnytsky after the war, cf. Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies. *A Brief History from 1976 to 1996*. In: <http://www.ualberta.ca/CIUS/about/about-history.htm> (accessed: 29.07.2010). For Rudnytsky during the war, cf. Himka, John-Paul: *Ethnicity and the Reporting of Mass Murder: Krakivs'ki visti, the NKVD Murders of 1941, and the Vinnytsia Exhumation* (forthcoming in a volume on violence in the borderlands, ed. by Omer Bartov and Eric Weitz).

Society in emigration of which the Secretary General was between 1947 and 1963 the former director of the UTsK, Volodymyr Kubiivych.

Petro Savaryn was a member of the University of Alberta board of governors and vice-president of the Alberta Progressive Conservative Party, and one of the leading figures of the Ukrainian community in Edmonton. In 1983, seven years after the picture was taken, Savaryn became president of the Ukrainian World Congress and stayed in this position until 1988. From 1982 to 1986, he was the chancellor of the University of Alberta. In World War II Savaryn volunteered for the 14th Grenadier Division of the Waffen SS, known also as Waffen-SS Galizien. In this military formation he was trained and indoctrinated by Himmler's SS. After the war, Savaryn was proud of his SS past. He was a representative of the association of the veterans of the Waffen-SS Galizien in Edmonton. As representative of the association of the veterans in Edmonton, he made his SS past an important part of his Ukrainian identity and probably understood it as a contribution to Canadian multiculturalism. Furthermore he was probably the first and the only chancellor of a North American University with an SS past who was proud of it.⁵⁴

The most interesting aspect of this picture, however, is the presence of Volodymyr Kubiivych. He did not belong to the OUN-B but he did actively collaborate with the Nazis causing him to become close with Bandera towards the end of World War II. From April 1940 to January 1945, he headed the UTsK in Kraków, which formed part of the General Government. The committee was associated with the newspaper *Krakivs'ki visti* that not only reprinted German anti-Semitic propaganda but also featured articles written by Ukrainian intellectuals who responded to German requests to write nationalistic and anti-Semitic materials. Indeed, Kubiivych contributed an article to the newspaper.⁵⁵ Furthermore, he asked the head of the General Government, Hans Frank, to see »a very significant part of confiscated Jewish wealth turned over to the Ukrainian people«. According to Kubiivych it belonged to the Ukrainians and ended up in Jewish hands »only through ruthless breach of law on the part of the Jews and their exploitation of members of the Ukrainian people«.⁵⁶ In addition to taking charge of *Krakivs'ki visti* and encouraging the leading Nazis to allow Ukrainians to participate in Aryanization, Kubiivych also supported the formation of the Waffen-SS Galizien, which was mainly made up of Ukrainians. This division fought in July of 1944 against the Soviet Army. Parts of these divisions were also involved in anti-partisan activity and committed crimes against the civilian population.⁵⁷ In February and March 1945, as the Soviet army was about 60 kilometres from Berlin, Kubiivych together with Bandera, Mel'nyk and Pavlo Skoropadskyi used the final chance to collaborate with the Nazis in the UNK (Ukrainian National Committee – *Ukraïns'kyi Natsional'nyi Komitet*) which was led by Pavlo Shandruk. The UNK mobilized about 75,000 Ukrainians for the last crusade with the remaining fanatical Nazis against the Soviet Union.⁵⁸

After elaborating on some of the correlations between Ukrainian nationalism and Canadian multiculturalism with the help of the image on the cover of Lupul's *The Politics of Multiculturalism: A Ukrainian-Canadian Memoir*, we will now approach the Bandera cult in the western Canadian city of Edmonton.

The Ritualistic Celebration of Stepan Bandera in Edmonton

Performing rituals is crucial for the formation of a collective identity; participants in the performance become a collective. Rituals also influence the morality and values of the individuals practicing them and thereby transform the cultural, political and social state of the practicing group.⁵⁹ The emotions that are invoked during the enactment of rituals can either strongly influence the cognitive functions of the individual, or replace them.⁶⁰ Because of the role that emotions play in influencing the morality and values of individuals, rituals are used to form collective identities.⁶¹ Rituals can also be used to provide a sense of orientation and to assure members of a collective group about the validity of their political, cultural and social orientation. Finally, rituals are also used for the symbolic recreation of communities.⁶² Therefore, the study of rituals involved in the creation of the Bandera myth provides us with an insightful look at not only the processes surrounding the creation of the political myth, but also the processes of establishing communities as parts of the Ukrainian diaspora who ›loved‹ Stepan Bandera, or the community in the Soviet Union who ›hated‹ him.

51 Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies. A Brief History from 1976 to 1996. In: <http://www.ualberta.ca/CIUS/about/about-history.htm> (accessed: 29.07.2010).

52 Luckyj, George S. N.: Memoirs. In: Isajiw, Wsevolod/ Boshyk, Yuruy/ Senkus, Roman (Eds.): The Refugee Experience: Ukrainian Displaced Persons after World War II. Edmonton: Canadian Inst. of Ukrainian Studies Pr. 1992, pp. 508-512, here p. 508.

53 Luckyj 1992, p. 508f.

54 On Petro Savaryn memoirs, in which he discusses and expresses pride in his SS past, cf. Savaryn, Petro: Z soboiu vzialy Ukrainu. Vid Ternopilia do Al'berty [We took Ukraine with Us. From Ternopil to Alberta]. Kyiv: KVITs 2007, p. 275; Bairak, Mykhailo: Ukrain'ska Strilets'ka Hromada v Edmontoni [Ukrainian War Veterans Association in Edmonton]. Edmonton: Ukrain'ska Strilets'ka Hromada – Vid dilu v Edmontoni 1978, p. 185. On the 14th Grenadier Division of the Waffen SS, cf. Golczewski, Frank: Shades of Grey: Reflections on Jewish-Ukrainian and German-Ukrainian Relations in Galicia. In: Brandon, Ray/Lower, Wendy (Eds.): The Shoah in Ukraine. History, Testimony, Memorialization. Bloomington: Indiana UP 2008, pp. 114-155, here p. 136.

55 For Kubiiovych and *Krakivs'ki visti*, see Himka: Ethnicity and the Reporting of Mass Murder (forthcoming).

56 Kubiiovych to Frank, 29 August 1941, NAC, MG 31, D203, vol. 23, file 31. Cf. Golczewski 2008, p. 133f. In his seminar *History at the Movies: The Holocaust in Cinema* at the University of Alberta in the winter semester of 2010, John-Paul Himka mentioned that during the War his father-in-law Mykhailo Chomiak, the chief editor of *Krakivs'ki visti* moved into an Aryanised Jewish apartment in Kraków. However, Himka did not reveal any specific information about this incident. After the war Chomiak worked for the Edmonton based *Ukrains'ki visti* (Ukrainian News), and between 1981–1982 he was the chief editor of this newspaper. On Chomiak as the editor of *Krakivs'ki visti*, cf. Himka, John-Paul: *Krakivs'ki visti*: An Overview. In: Gitelman, Zvi/Hajda, Lubomyr/Himka, John-Paul/Solchanyk, Roman (Eds.): *Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe. Essays in Honour of Roman Szporluk*. Cambridge: Harvard Ukrainian Pr. 1998, pp. 251-261, here p. 254.

From the beginning, elements of the Ukrainian diaspora used the death of Bandera for such purposes as spreading hatred towards the Soviet Union, or uniting the community through ostentatious and collective mourning. The *Ukrainian News* informed its readers in Edmonton of the death of Stepan Bandera on October 19, 1959; Bandera's death was announced on the front page and readers were informed that Bandera perished at the hands of an unknown murderer. Furthermore, the article familiarized readers with the details of Bandera's life, which was reduced to his »national-revolutionary« activities. No information about the atrocities that banderites committed against Jews, Poles and unsympathetic Ukrainians, either during or after the war, appeared in this article. The penultimate sentence of the article informed readers that both of Bandera's brothers, Oleksandyr and Vasyly, perished in the »German camp of Auschwitz«. This information implied that not only Stepan Bandera but also his two brothers fell in their struggle for Ukraine. The last sentence of the article announced that the funeral of Stepan Bandera would take place on October 20, 1959 in Munich, encouraging the Ukrainian community of Edmonton to mark this event.⁶³

The readers of *Ukrainian Echo*, a newspaper edited by the LVU, were likewise bombarded with material regarding Bandera's death. The editors of *Homin Ukraïny* turned it into one of the greatest catastrophes of the Ukrainian nation. On October 24, 1959, the front page turned into a huge obituary (fig. 2), with Bandera's photograph featured in the middle.



Fig. 2: The front page of Ukrainian Echo 24.10.1959.

The headline and deck consisted of a striking inscription: »In Loving Memory STEPAN BANDERA«. Between the photograph and inscriptions, the editors informed readers that

57 Motyka 2006, p. 181, p. 383, p. 386; Golczewski 2008, p. 136; Himka 2006, p. 165f.

58 Golczewski, Frank: Geschichte der Ukraine. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1993, pp. 259-260.

59 Bergesen, Albert: Die rituelle Ordnung. In: Belliger, Andréa/Krieger, David J. (Eds.): Ritualtheorien. Ein einführendes Handbuch. Opladen, Wiesbaden: Westdt. Vlg. 1998, pp. 49-76, here p. 50f.

60 Kertzer, David J.: Ritual, Politik und Macht. In: Belliger/Krieger 1998, pp. 365-379, here p. 387.

61 Bergesen 1998, p. 53.

62 Ibid., p. 50f.

63 Stepan Bandera ne zhyve [Stepan Bandera is dead]. In: Ukrainian News 42/XXXII (19.10.1959), p. 1.

64 Ukrainian Echo 44/XI (24.10.1959), p. 1, p. 6.

65 Jak zhyнув Stepan Bandera [How Bandera died]. In: Ukrainian News 43/XXXII (26.10.1959), p. 1f.

66 Ostannia doroha providnyka Bandery [The Final Journey of the »Providnyk« Bandera]. In: Ukrainian Echo 45/XI (31.10.1959), p. 1.

67 Cf. the picture in: Ukrainian Echo 45/XI (31.10.1959), p. 1.

68 1500 People at Bandera's Funeral. In: Ukrainian News 44/XXXII (02.11.1959), p. 1.

69 Zvernennia Provodu ZCH OUN [Appeal of the ZCH OUN Leadership]. In: Ukrainian Echo 46/XI (07.11.1959), p. 1.

the period of mourning would last for two months, from October 15 to December 15. Introductions to two articles were printed on either side of the photograph, which the articles prolonged on page six. One article was entitled *Fighter, Leader and Symbol (Borets', Providnyk i Symvol)*, while the second was called *In Deep Sadness... (U hlybokomu smutku...)*. These articles told readers that the death of Stepan Bandera »shocked the entire Ukrainian diaspora on this side of the ocean«, and that Bandera was killed by an enemy. Furthermore, readers were advised that, in the person of Stepan Bandera, a symbol of both the general Ukrainian struggle and an entire epoch of the struggle for independence in particular, had passed away.⁶⁴

On October 26, the front page of the newest issue of *Ukrainian News* informed readers of the sad news of Bandera's death, providing details about how Bandera had been found suffocated in his stairwell. Readers found out that Bandera died in the ambulance on the way to the hospital and that the proclamation of the police in Munich stated that Bandera had died because of potassium cyanide that was found in his body during the post-mortem examination. Additionally, the newspaper wrote about the proceedings of the funeral in Munich on October 20 and the church services that had been held in many Canadian towns and cities on the October 18 and 20.⁶⁵

On October 31, 1959, the front page of *Ukrainian Echo* featured an article entitled *The Final Journey of the »Providnyk« Bandera*. The authors glorified »the final 500 meter journey of Bandera«, during which he was accompanied by about 1,500 admirers and 10 priests who came to the funeral from all around the world to say farewell to their *providnyk*, who had »perished on the forefront of a bloody, lingering war against the cruel, deceitful, villainous enemy«. ⁶⁶ To persuade the readership about the seriousness of the tragedy that had struck the Ukrainian nation, together with the apologetic article the publisher printed a photograph showing Bandera's coffin being carried by four men and the funeral procession behind it. In the centre of the photograph, marching alongside the coffin, are four uniformed young women, most likely members of the SUM, and a man in a suit. The faces of all four uniformed teenage women and the well-dressed man appear to be filled with sadness, sorrow and concern. One of the women, mourning the loss of her *providnyk*, is seen weeping and looking down at the ground. The eyes of the man in the suit are focused on the final 500 meters of his *providnyk's* journey. His face is not only sad, but also appears pensive and seemingly outraged. The facial expressions of all people seen in the picture communicate the same message – that of the loss of a very important and irreplaceable personality.⁶⁷

On November 2, on the front page, *Ukrainian News* published an article with the headline »1500 People at Bandera's Funeral« that reminded the Ukrainian community of Edmonton of the importance of the loss. Fifteen hundred people had attended the funeral, they emphasised, despite it being held on a working day. The article also mentioned that representatives of other liberation movements attended the funeral, including the Hungarian, Bulgarian, Slovakian, Romanian, Croatian and Turkmen movements, thus stressing the wider significance of the loss.⁶⁸

On November 7, the front page of *Ukrainian Echo* informed its readers that the »Ukrainian nation« had suffered a blow from the »villainous« and »savage« Moscow that had killed, in the most cunning and perfidious manner, the greatest leader of the Ukrainian freedom movement. According to the authors of this article, the loss of Bandera for the Ukrainian people was akin to the loss of a great son of the nation, who for his entire life had struggled for the freedom of Ukraine. Furthermore, the authors characterized Bandera as being »a great example of an unswerving fighter – revolutionary, ideologist and strategist, theoretician and practician of the Ukrainian liberation revolution.«⁶⁹ This kind of characterization of Bandera recurred in many other articles printed in the Ukrainian Canadian diaspora press. Generally, the authors of these articles were keen to glorify their *providnyk* and never mentioned any atrocities that the banderites or the »Ukrainian liberation movement« had committed. They also avoided referencing the negative portrayals of Bandera that emerged after World War II. This allowed Bandera to appear as a saint, or a demigod figure, comparable to Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini and Iosif Stalin at the height of their power and popularity.

The diaspora Ukrainians who could not attend the funeral of Bandera in Munich mourned him in their places of residence. In Edmonton the Organisations of the Freedom Movement (*Orhanizatsii Vyzvol'noho Frontu*) started to prepare for lavish celebrations

70 U pokloni Providnykovi [Deference to the Providnyk]. In: Ukrainian Echo 46/XI (07.11.1959), p. 3.

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid.

73 Na Fond vyvol'noi borot'by im. Stepana Bandery [For Stepan Bandera's Liberation Struggle Fund]. In: Ukrainian Echo 46/XI (07.11.1959), p. 5.

74 U pershu richnyciu smerty sl. p. Providnyka S. Bandery [The First Anniversary of Stepan Bandera's Death]. In: Ukrainian Echo 44/XII (29.10.1960), p. 2; U richnytsiu smerty sl. p. S. Bandery [On the Anniversary of Bandera's Death]. In: Ukrainian Echo 45/XII (05.11.1960), p. 7.

75 U pershu richnytsiu smerty S. Bandery [On the First Anniversary of Bandera's Death]. In: Ukrainian News 43/XXXIII (28.10.1960), p. 7.

76 Vidnachyly rokovyny smerty S. Bandery [We Celebrated the First Anniversary of Bandera's Death]. In: Ukrainian News 43/XXXIV (23.10.1961), p. 3.

on the day of Bandera's death, October 15. On October 20, the day of Bandera's funeral in Munich, memorial services were organized in almost all Ukrainian churches in Edmonton. On October 25, a requiem mass (*panakhida*) was organized at the St. Iosaphat Ukrainian Catholic Cathedral at 7 p.m., with six priests presiding. Members of the SUM and the Plast Scout Organisation presented their banners as scout uniforms hung behind the altar, while members of the LVU were also in attendance. The cathedral was full of people, both uniformed and in plain clothes. After the male choir of the Ukrainian National Home of Edmonton (*Ukrainskyi Narodnyi Dim*) enriched the national and holy atmosphere in the church with their vocal performances, the pastor (*parokh*) of the church delivered a speech in which he praised Bandera's love, commitment and labour for Ukraine. The blue-yellow flag of Ukraine and the red-black flag of the OUN were flown at the entrance to the church, where young girls distributed black ribbons.⁷⁰

After the church service, the celebration continued at the Ukrainian National Home that had also been decorated with flags. It was there that the ›mourning assembly‹ (*zhalibna akademiia*) took place. The hall could not accommodate the crowd that had gathered to mourn Bandera's death and some were turned away. The memorial service opened with Chopin's *Funeral March*, after which Dr. V. Hyrak opened the academy and D. M. read a poem entitled *Immortal Son (Bezsmertnyi syn)*, which he wrote for Stepan Bandera. Subsequently, the male choir of the Ukrainian National Home of Edmonton sang several religious and nationalist songs. Bandera's portrait composed the stage decoration. It had been prepared especially for the occasion by ›professor‹ Iu. Butsmaniuk. The portrait hung on a black wall in the background with Bandera's dates of birth and death on either side with a huge wreath and a trident, the symbol of Ukraine, as well as two baskets with red roses placed underneath.⁷¹

Similar religious-ideological celebrations of Stepan Bandera occurred in many other places around the world as the Ukrainian diaspora said goodbye to their *providnyk*.⁷² The OUN-ZCh (Foreign Section – *Zakordonna Chastyni*) used Bandera's death to start a fund called Stepan Bandera's Liberation Struggle Fund (*Fond vyvol'noi borot'by im. Stepana Bandery*); they collected money for a possible war against the Soviet Union and the liberation of Ukraine.⁷³

The first anniversary of Bandera's death was celebrated around the world: in Munich, Philadelphia, Ottawa, Cleveland, London, New York, Chicago, Toronto, Edmonton and many other cities with a sizeable Ukrainian diaspora.⁷⁴ In Edmonton, the celebrations began with a *panakhida* held at St. Iosaphat Ukrainian Catholic Cathedral. After the *panakhida*, the celebration moved into the Ukrainian National Home, where Petro Bashuk from Winnipeg delivered a speech. Bashuk claimed that Stepan Bandera was a fighter for ›the rights of God and people in Ukraine‹ and that the Ukrainian nation was in a permanent state of struggle. He stressed that the Ukrainian people were imbued with the spirit of Christian idealism, adding that the West should accept the same ideals as the Ukrainian nationalists if they were to win their struggle against ›Moscow Bolsheviks‹. A female choir added a cheery note to the celebration with some nationalist and religious songs.⁷⁵

The second anniversary of Bandera's death in Edmonton proceeded in a similar manner. The celebrants first met at St. Iosaphat Cathedral where the *parokh*, Iurii Koval's'kyi, conducted a *panakhida*. Koval's'kyi reminded the gathering that, since Ukrainians had lost so much with the death of Bandera, it remained important to preserve a religious and national spirit. After the *panakhida*, the crowd moved to the Ukrainian National Home, where a meeting of the male and female sections of the League for the Liberation of Ukraine took place. The gathering opened with a speech by M. Kohut, who spoke about *Stepan Bandera – the Symbol of the Liberation Struggle*. Additionally, Mrs. Aponiuk read the poem *October 15, 1959*, followed by a reading of Morozenko's memoirs about Bandera. The stage was decorated in a similar fashion to the year before: a portrait of Bandera painted by Iu. Butsmaniuk was surrounded on either side by the dates 1959 and 1961, with a wreath, flowers, the date ›October 15‹, and the Ukrainian and OUN flags underneath. This imagery indicated that the Ukrainian community of Edmonton had had to overcome all the difficulties of daily life and to continue their struggle for liberation without their *providnyk* for two years. The mood amongst the 170-strong crowd that gathered for the proceedings was very ceremonious.⁷⁶

To some extent, the third anniversary of Bandera's death was overshadowed by the trial of Bandera's murderer, Bohdan Stashyn's'kyi, which took place between October 8

77 U tretiu richnytsiu smerty S. Bandery [On the Third Anniversary of S. Bandera's Death]. In: Ukrainian News 42/XXXV (18.10.1962), p. 3.

78 For the demonstration in New York on 15 October 1959 and 17 October 1959 in Washington and Ottawa, cf. Protymoskovs'ki demonstartsii [Anti-Muscovite Demonstrations]. In: Ukrainian Echo 45/XVI (31.10.1964), p. 2.

79 U 5-tu richchia smerti Stepana Bandery [On the Fifth Anniversary of Stepan Bandera's Death]. In: Ukrainian Echo 45/XVI (31.10.1964), p. 5.

80 U 5-tu richchia smerti Stepana Bandery [On the Fifth Anniversary of Stepan Bandera's Death]. In: Ukrainian Echo 46/XVI (07.11.1964), p. 7.

81 U 5-tu richchia smerti Stepana Bandery [On the Fifth Anniversary of Stepan Bandera's Death]. In: Ukrainian Echo 46/XVI (07.11.1964), p. 3.

82 Provincial Archives of Alberta, accession number 97732/161 (Orhanizatsii Ukrain's'koho Vyzvol'noho Frontu. Obizhnyi Lyst – Zakyk), without a number of leaf.

83 Desiaty rokovyny smerty Bandery [The 10th Anniversary of Stepan Bandera's Death]. In: Ukrainian News 43/XLII (23.10.1969), p. 5.

84 U 10-tu richchia smerti Stepana Bandery [On the 10th Anniversary of Stepan Bandera's Death]. In: Ukrainian Echo 46/XXI (29.11.1969), p. 3.

85 Na poshanu sl. P. Stepana Bandery [Paying Homage to Stepan Bandera]. In: Ukrainian Echo 39/XXXI (19.09.1979), p. 1.

86 Na poshanu Stepana Bandery [Paying Homage to Stepan Bandera]. In: Ukrainian Echo 46/XXXI (07.11.1979), p. 1f.

87 U 50-richchia OUN [On the 50th Anniversary of the OUN]. In: Ukrainian Echo 7/XXXII (06.02.1980), p. 3.

and 19, 1962 in Karlsruhe, West Germany. This trial was a media sensation for Ukrainian communities around the world. During this time period, the same people who had called for a trial in the immediate aftermath of Bandera's death now announced that his murderer was a Soviet agent. The fact that Stashyns'kyi came from Western Ukraine was a disturbing fact for the nationalists. Even so, this gave a new legitimacy to those Ukrainian nationalists who had proclaimed a ›crusade‹ against Moscow, giving a new impetus to their political activities. Just as in the two preceding years, the celebrations began with a panakhida at St. Iosaphat Cathedral in Edmonton, moving then to the Ukrainian National Home where, underneath Butsmaniuk's portrait of Bandera, the participants could see a golden trident and a barbwire trident surrounded by a crown of thorns (symbols of Auschwitz and the Passion of Christ). Halyna Shevchuk, a female member of the Ukrainian Youth Association, opened the rituals by reading Ie. Ren's memoirs concerning Bandera, which was then followed by Oleh Hnatiuk's recitation of the poem *We Will Not Stop Fighting* (*Ne kynemo zbroï*). Ivan Shevchuk spoke about Bandera as a human and as a *providnyk*, as additionally giving information about the trial against his murderer – the Soviet agent – that had begun the previous week.⁷⁷

In the following years, Bandera's adherents celebrated the anniversary of his death on a regular basis; usually this was not done every year, as it had been during the first three years, but eventually it was held every five and ten years. As the 1964 celebrations in Edmonton and Winnipeg took place on October 18, the ideological factions of the Ukrainian diaspora could render homage to their *providnyk* first by attending a large anti-Soviet demonstration in front of Soviet diplomatic missions on October 15 in New York and on October 17 in Washington D.C. and Ottawa.⁷⁸ On October 18, the Ukrainian community in Winnipeg celebrated the death of Bandera by singing nationalistic songs such as *March of Nationalists* (*Marsh Natsionalistiv*) or *Ukraine Will Arise* (*Vstane Ukraïna*).⁷⁹ The Ukrainian community of Saskatoon did not have the opportunity to attend the protests in front of the Soviet embassy in New York because they decided to celebrate on the exact anniversary of Bandera's death.⁸⁰ In Edmonton, the Ukrainian community chose to combine the celebration of their *providnyk*'s death with two other national or religious celebrations: the first was *Sviato Pokrovy* (Protection of the Mother of God) and the second was *Sviato Zbroï* (Weapon Celebration). As in previous years, the day of festivities started at St. Iosaphat Cathedral. Afterwards, the celebratory crowd of 200 people listened to a speech about their *providnyk* at the Ukrainian National Home, which had been recorded five years before and which gave them a chance to admire the ›farsightedness and the political reason‹ of their *providnyk*.⁸¹

On Saturday, October 18, 1969, Bandera's adherents used the 10th anniversary of his death to demonstrate in Ottawa. The most important points of their demonstrative and commemorative march in Ottawa were at the parliament and the Soviet embassy.⁸² In Winnipeg, 10th anniversary celebrations of Bandera's death were enriched by a relic: soil from Bandera's grave in Munich that had been brought to Winnipeg by Semen ĭzhnyk, radiating an aura of ›nationalist holiness‹ for the 500 celebrants.⁸³ In Edmonton, between October 11 and 13, the Organisations of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement combined the 40th anniversary of the OUN with the 10th anniversary of Bandera's death, adopting the atavistic and heroic motto ›Either you achieve the Ukrainian state or you die in the struggle for it‹.⁸⁴

In 1979, the International Celebration Committee (*Mizhkraiovyi Sviatkovyi Komitet*) invited believers in the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism from around the world to come to Munich to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the death of the *providnyk* on the site of his grave on Saturday, October 13.⁸⁵ Prominent figures of Ukrainian nationalism, such as Mykola Klymyshyn, an old friend and prison companion of Bandera, and Bandera's son, Andrii Bandera, travelled from Canada to Munich. Klymyshyn delivered a speech on the grave of his *providnyk* on October 13, and marched with other adherents of Bandera through the streets of Munich, protesting against the Soviet Union and carrying banners with Bandera's image on it. For his part, Andrii Bandera joined Iaroslav Stets'ko, a good friend of Bandera, and another important Ukrainian nationalist and leader of the OUN-ZCh and the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, at a conference that took place on October 12 in the Plazi Hotel in Munich.⁸⁶ Canadian Ukrainians who were unable to travel to Bandera's graveside in Munich for the celebration of the 20th anniversary of his death commemorated the anniversary at home, as witnessed in Saskatoon.⁸⁷

88 For encouragement for celebration, cf. Zvernennia KUK [Appeal of the KUK]. In: *Ukrainian Echo* 43/XXXVI (24.10.1984), p. 2. For celebrations in Munich in 1984, cf. U pokloni Stepanovi Banderi [Obeisance to the Providnyk]. In: *Ukrainian Echo* 44/XXXVI (31.10.1984), p. 1f., 4. For celebrations in Munich in 1989, cf. Zhalobni vidzachennia v Miunkheni [Mourning Ceremony in Munich]. In: *Ukrainian Echo* 45/XLVI (08.11.1984), p. 1f. For celebrations in Munich in 1999, cf. Povidomlennia [Announcement]. In: *Ukrainian Echo* 37/LI (04.10.1999), p. 1.

89 On Roman Shukhevych and the ethnic cleansing against Poles in Volhynia and Galicia, cf. Motyka 2006, p. 367. For Shukhevych's atrocities against the Jews see Bruder 2007, p. 150. For Shukhevych's atrocities in 1942 in Belarus, cf. Rudling, Per Anders: Schooling in Murder: Schutzmannschaft Battalion and Hauptsturmführer Roman Shukhevych in Belarus 1942. In: *Prawda historyczna na prawda polityczna* (volume in progress after a conference in Wrocław with the same title).

90 *Ukrainian News* 20/LXXXII (15-28.10.2009), p. 8.

While searching through the newspapers *Ukrainian News*, published in Edmonton, and *Ukrainian Echo*, published in Toronto, I did not find any articles or reports discussing celebrations of the anniversary of Bandera's death in the years 1984, 1989 and 1999 in Edmonton. The *Ukrainian Echo*, however, featured articles that encouraged its readers to commemorate the anniversary of Bandera's death, and I have found reports from celebrations that took place in other North American cities and in Europe. The most elaborate of these celebrations took place in Munich, where the celebrants gathered at Bandera's gravesite.⁸⁸

Since 1989, and particularly after the establishment of the independent Ukrainian state in 1991, the political myth of Stepan Bandera and the political cult surrounding his image have also flourished in Ukraine. Still, the Ukrainian diaspora continues to organise its own celebrations of Bandera. In 2009, I witnessed how the Ukrainian community in Edmonton celebrated the anniversary of Bandera's death.

This was a combined celebration, commemorating 100 years since Bandera's birth and 50 years since his death. It took place in the building of the Ukrainian Youth Association at 9615-153 Avenue in Edmonton on Sunday, October 25, 2009, between approximately 2:30 and 5:30 p.m. The complex is named in honour of Roman Shukhevych, a leading banderite and leader of the UPA in the years 1943–1950. Shukhevych was more directly responsible for OUN-UPA's crimes against humanity such as the ethnic cleansing of Poles in Volhynia and Galicia and massacres of Jews.⁸⁹ In 1972, a bust of Roman Shukhevych was placed in front of the entrance to the building, resulting in all celebrants passing by it on their way to the place of celebration.

The Bandera celebration was combined with the religious holiday *Sviato Pokrovy* (Protection of the Mother of God). The hall was decorated with a huge painting of the Virgin Mary. The painting was fixed upon a cross made from blue and yellow cloth, the colours of the Ukrainian flag. The background was red and black, symbols of the OUN standing for blood and earth. This religious, nationalistic, and fascist collage was the main decoration on the stage. The Ukrainian and Canadian flags were fixed on both sides of this decoration. On the right side of the stage the audience could see a huge portrait of Bandera with the dates 1909–1959. A golden trident was hung from above the stage, above the Mother of God. The podium was covered in red and black cloth, with a trident fixed on top.

About 400 people attended the celebration. It began with a *panakhida*, during which the participants sang dirges for Stepan Bandera and performed a wide range of religious rituals under the leadership of three or four priests. Nationalist rituals began after this religious component. A very mysterious, nationalistic, and ›martyrdom-tinged‹ narrative of the history of Ukraine was presented in several short, two to three minute segments by the speaker Roman Brytan who also coordinated the entire event. Between the speeches, many different individual artists and musical groups sang pop, folkloristic or classical songs to glorify Stepan Bandera. Some of them were based on the lyrics of OUN and UPA songs. Altogether some 15 performances took place. Performers wore peasant blouses and Cossack costumes. Also children of the SUM, wearing light brown uniforms and ties that resembled the colour and design of the uniforms of the Hitler Youth, sang different pop songs about the OUN, UPA and the Orange Revolution.

In addition to musical performances, Bohdan Tarasenko recited Bandera's 1936 speech before the Polish court in L'viv, in which Bandera explained why he had given permission for the liquidation of a number of Poles and Russians, as well as some Ukrainians who in his understanding betrayed the Ukrainian nation. The organisers also played back a recorded interview Bandera had given Western journalists in the 1950s, explaining the necessity of a war against the Soviet Union. The event ended with a speech by Ihor Broda, the leader of the League of Ukrainian Canadians in Edmonton, during which he gave thanks to the celebrants and artists for being such a ›spiritual nation‹, also underlining that the participants had helped keep Bandera alive by coming to the celebration. The speech also asserted that modern-day Ukraine is threatened by ›Moscow‹, because Russia is planning to conquer Ukraine as it had done in the past. My impression was that, for Broda, Bandera is the embodiment of the person who can help Ukrainians to defend itself against ›Moscow‹.

The celebration was advertised on posters and in the newspaper *Ukrainian News*.⁹⁰ The CIUS was also involved in the promotion of this event, displaying a poster on its premises (fig. 3), as well as sending one employee, Dr. Andriy Hornjatkevyc, to enhance the artistic program of the celebration by playing folkloristic music on bandura and singing folkloristic

91 Broda, Ihor: Stepan Bandera – po-
klin bezsmertnomu [Stepan Bandera
– Deference to the Immortal]. In:
Ukrainian News 20/LXXXII (15-
28.10.2009), p. 1, 8.

92 Ibid., p. 1.

93 Ibid., p. 2.

94 Ibid.

95 Cf. Ukrainian Echo 35/LXI (2009)
(Special Section without a specific day
of publication).

songs in honour of Stepan Bandera. Moreover, a week before the celebration, Ukrainian News published Ihor Broda's article about Stepan Bandera on the front page.⁹¹ Broda characterized Bandera as the symbol of an epoch in which the OUN and UPA had struggled for an independent Ukrainian state. In this article, Broda never mentioned the atrocities against humanity that the OUN and UPA had committed likely because he believes that the OUN and the UPA consisted only of heroes. For Broda, Bandera as a symbol of the OUN and UPA can only be characterized in this holistic, heroic, pathetic and apologetic way. Broda delivered proof for this self-evident nature of Bandera in two sentences: »Highly civilized nations and honest people can respect even foreign heroes. Primitives can only be hostile [to the heroes], they can only dishonour, defame, curse them, and declare false propaganda«. Broda did not consider whether the »heroes« were radical nationalists, fascists, anti-Semites or war criminals; from his perspective this is not a relevant issue, because he celebrates Bandera as a hero and a civic saint.⁹² Furthermore, like Bandera, Broda cannot be wrong because of the »awareness that God is with us [him, Bandera and the Ukrainian nationalists].«⁹³ This logic might be surprising, but it is the fundamental logic of the believers of the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism.

It is interesting to note that Broda applies the political myth of Stepan Bandera to a period in which a Ukrainian state exists, thus there is no longer anything left to fight and struggle for. Broda claims that Ukraine remains threatened by »Moscow«, with the threat of war looming above both »enemies«. The first enemy is the »contemporary Ukrainian nation [sic]« which should be »educated, inspired and provided with national consciousness so that it can understand that it is the descendant of Cossacks...«. The second enemy is the »Russian nation in Russia and Ukraine«.⁹⁴

Ukrainian Echo devoted the entirety of issue 35, a full 32 pages, to the propagation of the political myth and cult of Stepan Bandera.



Fig. 3: Poster promoting Sviato Pokrovy combined with the 100th anniversary of Bandera's birth and the 50th anniversary of his death.

All propagandistic measures and methods that this newspaper employed over five decades were mobilised again in this issue. The entire front page consisted of a portrait of Bandera. Articles and pictures served two main goals. Firstly, they were to convince readers of Bandera's greatness, heroism and willingness to make sacrifices. Secondly, they aimed to demonstrate that Bandera was not only a hero amongst the Ukrainian diaspora but also in Ukraine. In this vein, the newspaper featured articles discussing demonstrations and celebrations in Ukraine, as well as photographs of monuments and museums glorifying Bandera in Kyiv and west Ukrainian cities, towns and villages.⁹⁵

Conclusions

96 Golczewski 2010, p. 450. At the time of writing of this article the dean of the Philosophy Department at the UFU is the director of the Toronto office of the CIUS, Prof. Dr. Frank Sysyn. The dean of the Department for State and Economics Studies is Prof. Iaroslav Hrytsak, the director of the Institute for Historical Research at the L'viv University and visiting professor at the Historical Department of the Central European University in Budapest. Cf. Ukrainische Freie Universität/Ukrains'kyi Vil'nyi Universytet/Ukrainian Free University Flyer. Munich: Ukrainische Freie Univ. 2010, p. 2. In an interview in 2009 Iaroslav Hrytsak wondered as to whether documents existed that would confirm that Roman Shukhevych contributed to the destruction of Jews in Ukraine. Since Franziska Bruder's 2007 monograph proved this in the case of at least two villages, Hrytsak's wondering seems remarkable. For the interview with Iaroslav Hrytsak, cf. Istoryk Ia. Hrytsak: Avtor kontseptsii henotsydu spryavsia na pryklad holodomoru [The Author of the Concept of Genocide Argued about the Famine]. In: Unian (15.09.2009) <http://www.unian.net/ukr/news/news-336228.html> (accessed: 30.09.2010). For Bruder's monograph and the Nachtigall battalion under the command of Roman Shukhevych, which slaughtered the entire Jewish population of two villages, see Bruder 2007, p. 150. Also see the original document in TsDAVOV f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 57, l. 17 (Autobiographies of well-known OUN members).

97 TsDIA (Tsentralnyi Derzhavnyi Istorychnyi Arkhiv), f. 371, op. 1, spr. 8, ed. 77, l. 69.

98 Very interesting in this regard is the UCC Task Force for »Developing Community Strategies regarding Recent Attacks on Ukraine's Liberation Movement« which was established in March 2009 by the UCC. This Task Force was also made up of such CIUS employees as Jars Balan and other believers in the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism, living mainly in Canada and Ukraine, including Steven Bandera, the grandson of Stepan Bandera. During a teleconference on March 8, 2009, the UCC Task Force discussed both this paper and another article by the author that were to be presented at the *Holocaust and Memory Politics Workshop* at the University of Alberta on March 11. At another conference, the UCC Task Force discussed the

This article has analysed several aspects of the political myth of Stepan Bandera in Canada, concentrating on Edmonton. The Bandera myth forms a Ukrainian contribution to Canadian multiculturalism. At the same time it provides a mechanism through which Canadian Ukrainians cope with Ukrainian and European history. It propagates frames of thinking which are incompatible with democratic values, as well as attitudes to war, violence, fascism, nationalism and anti-Semitism that developed in Europe after World War II. It appears that Ukrainian communities in Canada provide ›their‹ or Ukrainian history with meaning in churches and at political meetings, refusing to study ›their‹ history on the basis of publications written by professional scholars.

The Ukrainians of Edmonton have been able to celebrate Bandera in Ottawa, Washington D.C. and at Bandera's gravesite in Munich. The Toronto-based *Ukrainian Echo* and, to a lesser extent, *Ukrainian News* from Edmonton, have been the main sources of inspiration and orientation in the development of Bandera's cult. It is difficult to establish the ›uniqueness‹ of the cult of Bandera in Edmonton, for this would require a more detailed study of other nationalist Ukrainian communities, but two observations about the uniqueness of Edmonton and Alberta can be made here.

Firstly, Edmonton is home to the CIUS, funded by the Alberta government, which the University of Alberta has provided with an academic aura. This aura seems to have been abused by the institute. From the very beginning, the CIUS refused to cope in a critical and professional manner with contemporary Ukrainian history. At the time of writing of this article, CIUS has not initiated any program to investigate Ukrainian history during World War II, examine questions surrounding the collaboration of the OUN and UPA with the Nazis, Ukrainian fascism, the role played by Ukrainians in the Holocaust or any other related subject matter. In this sense, the CIUS has followed in the footsteps of the Ukrainian Free University in Munich where Volodymyr Ianiv worked as rector between 1968 and 1986.⁹⁶ Ianiv was active in the OUN in the first half of the 1930s and was a member of the national executive alongside Stepan Bandera, Iaroslav Stets'ko, and Roman Shukhevych while the executive was conducting a range of assassinations against the »enemies of the Ukrainian nation«. ⁹⁷ CIUS has also echoed the views of such nationalist ›whitewashers‹ of Ukrainian history as Roman Il'nyts'kyi, Petro Mirchuk, Mykola Klymyshyn and Volodymyr Kosyk who have either sympathised with the OUN or have been members of the movement, while later writing a range of apologetic historical studies about Ukrainian nationalism. In 2009, the academic aura of the CIUS was further compromised with the institute's involvement in the Bandera celebrations at the Shukhevych complex, as one of its scholars not only promoted the event but also took an active part in artistic performances.⁹⁸ One year later, on November 8, 2010, the CIUS even invited Volodymyr Viatrovych, known for his anti-Semitic writings on Jews and the OUN, to give a lecture.⁹⁹

However, it would be wrong to claim that all employees of the CIUS are under the influence of the Bandera myth and do not try to separate activism from scholarship. At least two historians employed at the CIUS, David Marples and John-Paul Himka, both former students¹⁰⁰ or colleagues¹⁰¹ of Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky, have tried to separate activism from scholarship. In the last two decades, Marples and Himka have published several critical articles and one monograph about recent Ukrainian history.¹⁰² Moreover, they did not participate in the celebrations of Stepan Bandera on October 25, 2009 at the Roman Shukhevych complex in Edmonton. It is interesting to note that both Marples and Himka were not interested in a critical study of Ukrainian nationalism in the 1980s, and even developed affirmative attitudes towards the UPA, which begs the question of what encouraged them to revise their previous attitudes towards the OUN and UPA and to begin to cope critically with the question of Ukrainian nationalism in the 1990s and 2000s.¹⁰³

Secondly, in considering the uniqueness of Edmonton and Alberta, it should be noted that certain local Ukrainians developed a strategy to channel government funds into their nationalistic projects by depicting them as a Ukrainian contribution to Canadian multiculturalism. A good example of this is the massive complex of the SUM, where the Bandera celebration took place in 2009, which is named in honour of a Nazi collaborator and war criminal, Roman Shukhevych. This complex was erected between 1972 and 1974, as the policy

question of how to prevent research on issues surrounding the Holocaust and War Criminality in Ukraine. As the director of the UCC Paul Grod mentioned, the UCC Task Force considered how to »put pressure on North American academic institutions which are funded by community money (Harvard [Ukrainian Research Institute], the CIUS, and the Chair of Ukr[ainian] Studies [at the University of Ottawa], etc.)«. Shortly prior to my presentation of this article at the Holocaust Workshop, Bohdan Klid, the assistant director of the CIUS and a well-known activist of Ukrainian nationalism, came up to me and demanded to speak to me about my article. I declined and invited him to the workshop to express his concerns. Klid did not appear at the workshop. Information about the UCC Task Force and the content of the teleconferences come from e-mails by Lesia Demkowicz to [name withheld], March 2, and of Jars Balan to Lesia Demkowicz et al., March 14, 2010, in addition to an e-mail from Paul Grod to community leaders sent out on March 14, 2010. I am grateful to John-Paul Himka for providing me with the e-mails concerning the UCC Task Force for »Developing Community Strategy regarding Recent Attacks on Ukraine's Liberation Movement«.

99 The Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute invited Viatrovych a month later, on December 8, 2010, to give a lecture, as well. On Viatrovych's anti-Semitic writing about Jews and the OUN-UPA, cf. Kurylo, Taras/Himka, John-Paul: Іак ОУН ставляся до ієвреїв: формулювання позиції на тлі катастрофи [What was the Attitude of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists toward the Jews? Reflections on Volodymyr Viatrovych's Book]. In: *Ukraina Moderna* 2/13 (2008), pp. 252-265. On anti-Semitism in contemporary Ukraine in general, cf. Per Anders Ruling: Organized Anti-Semitism in Contemporary Ukraine: Structure, Influence and Ideology. In: *Canadian Slavonic Papers/Revue canadienne des slavistes* XLVIII/ 1-2 (2006), pp. 81-119. On Viatrovych's lecture at the CIUS, cf. http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/EVENTS/details.cfm?ID_event=25450 (accessed: 15.12.2010). On Viatrovych's lecture at the HURI, cf. <http://www.huri.harvard.edu/calendar.html> (accessed: 15.12.2010).

100 For David Marples and Ivan Lysyak-Rudnytsky, see Marples, David R.: *Studying Ukraine*. In: http://www.hist.cam.ac.uk/seminars_events/seminars/modern-european/marples-wri

of multiculturalism was officially applied from 1971. Construction work consumed \$750,000 Canadian, which was partially provided by the Alberta and Canadian governments.¹⁰⁴

The investigation of rituals surrounding the political myth and cult of Stepan Bandera also proves that parts of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada have used the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism as a point of orientation in their cultural and political activities. Some of these activities, primarily the new ones illustrated by the example of Ihor Broda's article, are so misanthropic as to be seen as incitement to hatred. In fact, if Broda had not defined war in his article as »propaganda war« but as a »violent conflict« he could have been prosecuted for his article *Stepan Bandera – Deference to the Immortal* that appeared shortly before the Bandera celebration in 2009.¹⁰⁵ Yet Broda's article did not evoke any concern from its readers. In view of the fact that Broda can present his activities as part of Canadian-Ukrainian culture and politics, he can claim a contribution to Canadian multiculturalism.

This leads one to question why Canadians can tolerate, ignore or approve of the glorification of Ukrainian radical nationalism in Canada. Conceivably, before 1990, it was the Cold War that encouraged support for any anti-Soviet action or opinion. Indeed, positive attitudes towards the cult of Bandera can be seen as reactions to Soviet propaganda, which demonized Ukrainian nationalists. One can also explain the rise of ambiguous attitudes towards Bandera by difficulties involved in accessing Soviet archives, both before 1991 and, to a lesser extent, beyond. However, despite these considerations, there still seems to be something wrong with both the intellectual shape of Ukrainian communities in Canada and with historians and other scholars in Canada who have failed to understand Ukrainians in Canada for a long period of time. Until recently, only a handful of individuals were interested in conducting a critical investigation of these factions of the Ukrainian diaspora who are besotted with the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism and thus celebrate fascists, radical nationalists, war criminals and anti-Semites as martyrs and heroes.

ting-history-of-ukraine.pdf (accessed: 31.07.2010).

101 For John-Paul Himka and Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky, cf. Himka, John-Paul: *My Past and Identities*. In: Suny, Ronald Grigor/Kennedy, Michael D. (Eds.): *Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation*. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Pr. 1999, pp. 165-169, here p. 168.

102 The monograph is an introduction into historical discourses on the famine of 1932–1933 in Soviet Ukraine and the Ukrainian nationalism, cf. Marples, David. R: *Heroes and Villains. Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine*. Budapest: Central European UP 2007.

103 For John-Paul Himka admiring the UPA in the 1980s, advising historians to follow the rules of the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism and being angry with historians who do not follow them, cf. the correspondence between John-Paul Himka and Janusz Radziejowski in: Interview with John-Paul Himka (a manuscript forthcoming in *Krytyka*). For David Marples uncritically following a Cold War narrative that whitewashed the OUN and UPA of crimes against Jews, Poles, non-nationalistic Ukrainians, Russians etc., cf. Marples, David: *Ukraine During World War II: Resistance Movements and Reannexation*. In: *The Ukrainian Weekly* 41/LIII (13.10.1985), p. 7, p. 13. In this article, Marples euphemizes UPA's crimes with the statement that »some undisciplined actions on the part of an armed group were almost inevitable« (ibid.) and claims that the UPA was a multicultural force as he writes that »according to a Western source, the nationality groups within the [UPA's] ranks included Azerbaijanis, Uzbeks, Tatars, and Jews« (ibid.).

104 *Buduemo dim ukrains'koi molodi [We are Building a Home for Ukrainian Youth]*. In: *Ukrainian News* 8 (22.02.1973), p. 4; Rudling, Per: *Multiculturalism, Memory and Ritualization. Ukrainian public memorials in Edmonton, Alberta* (article in progress which will explore in more depth the financial background of multiculturalism and Ukrainian nationalism in Edmonton).

105 Broda 2009, p. 1.

Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, PhD student at the University of Hamburg, dissertation on *Stepan Bandera: Deconstructing the Myth of a Ukrainian Fascist*. Recent publications: The »Ukrainian National Revolution« in the Summer of 1941. Discourse and Practice of a Fascist Movement. In: *Kritika: Explorations of Russian and Eurasian History* 12/1 (2011), pp. 83-114; *Der polnisch-ukrainische Historikerdiskurs über den polnisch-ukrainischen Konflikt 1943–1947*. In: *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 57 (2009), pp. 54-85; in co-operation with Henke, Lutz/Ther, Philipp (Eds.): *Eine neue Gesellschaft in einer alten Stadt. Erinnerung und Geschichtspolitik in Lemberg anhand der Oral History/Нове суспільство в давиньому місті. Память та історична політнка засобами oral history*. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Atut 2007; *Der Raum der Stadt Lemberg in den Schichten ihrer politischen Denkmäler*. In: *Kakanien Revisited*, <http://www.kakanien.ac.at/beitr/fallstudie/GRossolinski-Liebe1.pdf>; *Umbenennungen in der Ziemia Lubuska nach 1945*. In: Vogenbeck, Bernd (Ed.): *Terra Transoderana: zwischen Neumark und Ziemia Lubuska*. Berlin: Be.bra 2008, pp. 59-68; reviews in *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, *Osteuropa* and *H-Soz-U-Kult*.