Chapter II:
Japanese Policy and Strategy,
1931-July 1941

It may even reasonably be said that the intensely sharp competitive preparation for war by the nation is the real war, permanent, increasing; and that battles are only a sort of public verification of mastery gained during the "peace" intervals.

WILLIAM JAMES

In the period between the two world wars, Japan sought to establish control first of east Asia and then of the southwest Pacific. After a decade of liberal ascendancy and acquiescence in the post-World War I agreements, the extremists in Japan gained power and embarked on a program of military preparation and territorial aggrandizement. First the Japanese moved into Manchuria and then into China, where they soon became involved in a war that dragged on interminably and from which they could extract neither victory nor honor. Having scrapped the Washington Treaty system, they withdrew from the League of Nations and from the naval disarmament system established in 1922 and 1930. Gradually they moved toward a closer understanding with Germany and Italy, and, in 1940, turned south to the rich British, French, and Dutch colonies of southeast Asia in search of raw materials they needed to carry on the war in China.

The United States opposed all these moves as vigorously as circumstances permitted. Since the turn of the century, when it had annexed the Philippines, the United States had been inextricably drawn into the confused politics and imperialist rivalries of the Far East. Despite the nation's traditional preference for remaining aloof from world affairs, it was abundantly clear that America could not remain indifferent to any change in the status quo in the Pacific or in Asia. John Hay had defined America's position in China in 1899, and his statement -- that there must be equal opportunity for trade, or an open door, in China -- remained the keystone of American policy in the years that followed. It was inevitable, therefore, that the United States would challenge the efforts of any power to gain a dominant position on the mainland of Asia.

America's opposition to Japanese expansion in Asia, its insistence on the open-door policy and the integrity of China, led to mutual distrust and suspicion. No Japanese government could accept America's solution for the deepening crisis and remain in power; nor

would the United States accede under any conditions to the dismemberment of China. There was no escape from this dilemma and by mid-1941, despite the utmost efforts of men of good will on both sides of the Pacific, Japan was moving rapidly down the road that led to Pearl Harbor.

Japanese Expansion

The impulse to expansion and domination of East Asia had its roots deep in Japanese tradition, patriotism, and economic necessity; its strongest support came from the militarists and extreme nationalists. In marked contrast to the position of the armed forces in democratic countries, the Army in Japan had a tradition of political leadership and enjoyed a position high in the esteem of the people. It was not, as in the United States and Great Britain, the servant of the government, controlled through responsible civil officials and by the power of appropriation. Under the Japanese Constitution the Emperor commanded the Army and Navy, and the Diet had little control over the organization of the military forces.¹

Military control in prewar Japan was exercised by the War and Navy Ministers and the General Staffs of the Army and Navy, not by the civil government. The services were in a peculiarly independent position. The War and Navy Ministers, though members of the Cabinet, could go over the head of the Premier and appeal directly to the throne in military or naval matters of great importance. Moreover, they could, by resigning from the Cabinet, force the resignation of the Premier and the formation of a new government, for under the Constitution, no Cabinet could exist without the War and Navy Ministers.

An even more significant aspect of the relationship of the services to the government of prewar Japan was the control of the Army and Navy over their respective Ministers. By custom, and after 1936 by law, the War and Navy Ministers were chosen from among the senior officers (3-star officers or higher) on the active list. Thus, the Army selected the Minister, who, if not himself a member of the General Staff, was almost certain to reflect its views. Opposition of the civil authorities could be quickly overcome by the threat of withdrawing the service Ministers from the Cabinet. The Chiefs of the General Staffs had the right also to report directly to the Emperor and had considerable freedom of action. So great was their prestige and influence in political matters and so unlimited their ability for independent action, that they could virtually commit the government to a course of action, and the nation to war.²

Despite the enormous power and prestige of the Army, the liberal and moderate elements in Japan were not without influence. The decade of the 1920's was theirs and during these years Japan followed a moderate course. This

course was based on the belief that the limits of profitable armed expansion had been reached and that the future of the nation lay in peaceful economic expansion and co-operation with the United States and Great Britain. It was this view that made possible the signing of the Washington Treaties 1921-22, which established the status quo in the Pacific, recognized the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China, forbade additional fortification of certain islands in the Pacific, and limited capital ship construction.

As the decade of the 1920's came to an end, the popular discontent arising from the poverty and despair of worldwide depression was channeled into national and fascist movements. American exclusion of Japanese immigrants in 1924, although balanced by generous and ready sympathy during the Tokyo earthquake, had strengthened the hand of the discontented. Further, the acceptance by the liberal government in 1930 of the extension of naval limitation to cruisers, destroyers, and submarines provided the advocates of expansion with strong arguments for scrapping the entire Washington Treaty system, as well as the pretext for the assassination of the Premier. Nationalist groups readily joined forces with the supporters of the Army and the extreme right to demand a reversal of the liberal program and a return to the policy of expansion.

Events in China gave strong support for the aggressive policy urged by the expansionists. Under Chiang Kai-shek the Chinese were displaying symptoms of a nationalism and unity which boded ill for Japanese interests in Manchuria and dreams of expansion in Asia. By 1931 the Chinese had already regained partial economic control of Manchuria and were seeking to remove foreign influence from China. The liberal government of Japan had made clear its intention of maintaining Japanese rights in Manchuria, but by peaceful means. The Army, doubtful of the efficacy of such means and acutely aware of the strategic importance of Manchuria, decided on bolder measures and in September 1931 seized control of key cities in Manchuria by force.

The seizure of Manchuria was the work of the Army extremists acting on their own authority and in defiance of government policy. Presented with a fait accompli and fearing open revolt, the government gave its reluctant consent to the Army's action and the Foreign Office did its best to justify to the rest of the world this violation of the Washington Treaties, the Kellogg Peace Pact, and the Covenant of the League of Nations. But the Japanese troops in Manchuria, the Kwantung Army, did not stop there. Despite opposition in the Cabinet and even from the throne, the Kwantung Army extended its control over the rest of Manchuria, established a puppet regime there, and began to move into the northern provinces of China. Nor did opposition from the United States, whose Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, informed Japan that his country could not recognize as legal this infringement on existing treaties or the violation of the open door policy in China, halt the Japanese Army. In 1933, after the League of Nations adopted the strongly critical report of the Lytton

Commission, Japan withdrew from the League.³

The Manchurian incident was but the first step in the Army's rise to power. Having defied the government and set the nation on a course opposed by the Cabinet, the Army gained virtual control the following year, 1932, as a result of the celebrated incident of 15 May when a group of young Army and Navy officers terrorized Tokyo for several hours and assassinated Premier Inukai.

With the death of the Premier, party rule in Japan virtually ceased. The Emperor's advisers, recognizing that either outright opposition to or complete acceptance of the Army's program would be equally disastrous, urged a middle course. The result was a series of compromise Cabinets in which the moderate and liberal elements opposed the dangerous policies of the militarists as far as prudence would allow and yielded to them when necessary.⁴

The balance thus achieved lasted only five years, years in which Japan renounced its adherence to the naval disarmament agreements of 1922 and 1930 and made abundantly clear its opposition to the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922 guaranteeing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China. In 1935 a liberal movement opposed to fascism and militarism and calling for a return to full parliamentary government began to take form. Liberals in the Diet attacked sharply the government's policy and criticized the War Ministry so strongly that it felt constrained to discipline some of the extremists in the Army. The extremists retaliated in February 1936, after the victory of the liberals in the elections of that month, with a full-scale armed revolt against the government. The mutineers, numbering 1,500 soldiers led by twenty-two junior officers of the 1st and Guard Divisions (supported, there is reason to believe, by other highranking officers), attacked members of the Cabinet, high court officials, and even senior Army officers thought to be lukewarm to the cause. The Finance Minister and one of the most important members of the high command were killed, while the Premier himself narrowly escaped assassination.

The government and the high command reacted with vigor. Army leaders, fearing that the forces they had raised might destroy them as well as their enemies, made serious efforts to restore discipline. The revolt was soon suppressed and the leading offenders court-martialed and punished, though lightly. Then followed an effective purge of the

NEW ARMY-CONTROLLED JAPANESE CABINET, MARCH 1936. At left, War Minister Terauchi in uniform, with Navy Minister Nagano at his left.

Army, directed by the War Minister and the' General Staff and designed to prevent unauthorized or untimely revolts which the high command itself did not favor.⁵

The 26 February incident marked one more step in the Army's rise to power. Ten days after the mutiny, the Premier resigned and a new government more favorably disposed to the Army's program took office. From this time on, Japanese policy must be read in terms of military strategy.

To determine just who made Army policy is extremely difficult. Not even the leading civilian statesmen of Japan seem to have known, and Prince Ayamaro Konoye, thrice Premier and a politician who made co-operation with the Army the keystone of his career, complained that he never knew where Army opinion originated.⁶ But there was no doubt about the essentials of this program. Its basic objective was to make Japan strong enough to become the unchallenged

leader of Asia. This could be accomplished, the Japanese military leaders believed, only by the expansion of the heavy industries necessary to support a modern war machine, the integration of the economic resources of Manchuria into the Japanese economy, the establishment of a firm position on the Asiatic continent, and the acquisition of the strategic raw materials needed to make the nation self-sufficient. Without these materials, most of which could be found in the East Indies and Malaya, Japan's pretensions to leadership in Asia were empty shadows.

The Army's program became the official policy of the Japanese Government in August 1936. At that time the most important members of the Cabinet, including the Premier and the War, Navy, Foreign, and Finance Ministers, met to fix the program of the new administration. The agreement reached at that meeting gave the Army and the nationalists all they wanted. Japan, the five Ministers agreed, must acquire a "firm position" on the Asiatic continent -- a euphemistic way of saying that China must be conquered; expand into southeast Asia to secure the bases and raw materials needed to make the nation strong; and take steps to counter the Russian menace to the north. The Ministers had no difficulty in agreeing on the measures required to achieve these objectives: the Army (including its air arm) and the Navy would have to be strengthened, trade and industry expanded, and air and sea transportation improved. Finally, the Ministers agreed that to steel the national will and unify public opinion for the coming emergency, it would be necessary "to establish good living conditions for the people, increase their bodily strength and foster sound thinking."⁷

The five Ministers carefully avoided any reference to military action. Rather, they stated explicitly that the expansion southward was to be gradual and peaceful, that every care would be exercised "to avoid aggravating friendly relations with other nations" and "to allay the Great Powers' suspicion and apprehension toward the Empire."⁸ But the goals these Ministers set for Japan clearly implied military action. The Soviet Union would certainly oppose expansion in the north, and Great Britain and the United States could be expected to dispute any violation of the territorial integrity of China. To these opponents could be added the French and the Dutch, who would challenge Japan's expansion southward. Basic, therefore, to the new administration's program was the success of the effort to increase the nation's military and naval might and its capacity to wage war.

With agreement on the aims and methods of national policy, the Armydominated Japanese Government moved closer to its natural allies, Germany and Italy, and on 25 November 1936 signed the Anti-Comintern Pact directed principally against Soviet Russia. The next move came in July 1937 when Japanese military forces, after a trumped-up incident near Peiping, marched into northern China. This action, like the Manchurian incident, was taken by the Army alone, without the knowledge or approval of the Cabinet, but no difficulties

developed on that account in the first phase. The government readily supported the Army, on condition that it exert every effort to prevent the spread of the incident.⁹

The vigor of the Chinese reaction soon led to full-scale war, an eventuality the Japanese military leaders neither expected nor desired.¹⁰ With command of the sea and air and with overwhelming superiority in men and equipment, the Japanese were able to occupy quickly the capital and the large coastal cities of China. But they were never able to extend their control much beyond the navigable rivers and the railroads or to bring the China incident to a successful close. It became an increasingly heavy drain on the nation's resources and a constant source of embarrassment to the Army.

The United States, like the other powers with interests in China, could hardly be expected to acquiesce in this new venture and in the destruction of the NinePower Treaty. In unmistakable terms it made clear to Japan that it still stood by the open-door policy and the territorial integrity of China, and that it considered Japan's action in China a violation of existing treaties. At the same time the United States Government acted with extreme caution and restraint, resisting public pressure to boycott the shipment of oil and scrap iron to Japan and declining all offers to mediate in the dispute.

Japan was just as anxious to avoid an open break and when the Panay was sunk in December 1937, quickly apologized and made indemnity. But so long as Japan persisted in its efforts to conquer China and the United States continued to insist on the territorial integrity of China and to aid that nation, no real solution of the China incident or restoration of good relations between the two countries was passible.

As the area of disagreement with the United States and Great Britain grew larger, Japan moved closer to the Axis. To the military, the future of Japan was closely tied to the destiny of Nazi Germany. The Anti-Comintern Pact had already paid dividends. Hitler had refused to participate in the Brussels Conference of November 1937, called to seek a settlement of the conflict in China, and had kept the Western Powers so preoccupied with European problems that they were unwilling to take any coordinated action in the Far East. But when the Japanese sought a full political and military alliance which would free them from the danger of Russian interference and recognize their special position in China, Hitler countered with a demand for military aid against Britain and France. This the Japanese were not prepared to promise and for two years the negotiations hung fire.

Meanwhile the relations between Japan and the United States steadily worsened. Six months after the sinking of the Panay, the United States placed a "moral embargo" on the export of aircraft and aircraft equipment to Japan, the first in a series of economic measures designed to deter Japanese aggression. Japan responded in November by announcing its intention of establishing

JAPANESE TROOPS MARCHING THROUGH THE PEIPING GATE, September 1937.

a "Co-Prosperity Sphere" in east Asia and expressing a pious hope that other nations would "understand the true intentions of Japan and adopt policies suitable for the new conditions."¹¹ Both the United States and Great Britain recognized this policy for what it was and countered with loans to the Chungking government.

By the spring of 1939 the Army was ready to commit Japan fully to the Axis. But there was sharp disagreement in the Cabinet. The Navy and Foreign Ministers insisted on an agreement directed primarily against the Soviet Union and refused to accept any commitment which might involve Japan in a war against the Western Powers. They were willing, however, to agree to lesser commitments in the hope that the United States and Great Britain might thus be forced to accept the situation in China. But the Army pressed for the full military agreement demanded by Germany, and even planned to negotiate separately to secure such an alliance. Neither side would give way.

On 23 August 1939 Germany, without Japan's knowledge, concluded a neutrality pact with Russia. A week later Germany invaded Poland and the war in Europe began. The German-Soviet Pact was a stunning blow to Japan's program for expansion and to the Army's prestige. The Japanese felt betrayed and bewildered and the Premier promptly offered his resignation to the Emperor, asserting bitterly that the failure of Japan's foreign policy had resulted from

KONOYE CABINET OF JUNE 1937. Circled faces are, from left, Admirqal Yonai, Premier Konoye, and General Sugiyama.

"the unreasonableness of the Army."¹² A combination of civilian statesmen and Navy leaders, taking advantage of the Army's political eclipse, then attempted to reorient national policy toward better relations with Great Britain and the United States. The Cabinet formed for this purpose lasted only four months and was succeeded by a compromise Cabinet headed by Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, the former Navy Minister.

All efforts to win over America and Britain foundered on the issue of China. On 26 July the United States had served notice on Japan of its intention to abrogate the commercial treaty which had governed the trade relations between the two countries since 1911, and in December of 1939 prohibited Americans from furnishing Japan with technical information and manufacturing rights for the production of high-grade aviation gasoline. After January 1940, when the commercial treaty lapsed, the United States was free to employ economic sanctions against Japan. Congress, in June of that year, passed the National Defense Act which made it possible for the President to prohibit exports to Japan and on 2 July President Franklin D. Roosevelt put the export license system into effect by restricting the shipment of arms and ammunition, certain strategic materials such as aluminum, and airplane parts.

Japanese sentiment, which had veered toward the Western Powers after the German-Soviet Pact, shifted back toward

Germany in the spring of 1940 as the Axis gained one victory after another in quick succession. Once more the Army point of view found favor and support. The German-Soviet Pact had ruled out, at least temporarily, expansion northward, but the opportunities for easy conquest in the south were better than ever once Holland and France had fallen. The forces behind a full military and political alliance with Germany could now argue that such an alliance would secure Japan on the north, discourage American interference in China, and smooth the paths of empire to the south.

Once more overtures were made to the Germans. This time Hitler asked as payment for supporting Japan's ambitions in southeast Asia a Japanese commitment to hold the United States at bay by threatening Hawaii and the Philippines if America entered the war in Europe. The Premier thought the price too high, and the Army, now fully restored to its former prestige and political influence, brought about the fall of the Cabinet on 16 July 1940. Prince Konoye, who had been Premier in 1938 and was favorable to the Army's program, took over the reigns of government next.

In July 1940 Japan stood ready to embark on a course of unreserved expansion to establish the new order in Greater East Asia on the ruins of the crumbling British, Dutch, and French Empires. Only the United States was in a position to check Japan's ambitions, but such opposition, the Japanese believed, could be overcome with the assistance of Germany and Italy. Once a military pact with the Axis Powers had been signed and the war in China ended, then Japan would be free to establish the new order in Asia. All this, the Japanese leaders hoped, could be accomplished peacefully, but if not, the Japanese intended to be ready, for since 1931 they had been preparing the nation for war.

Economic and Military Preparations

In the decade 1930-40, industrial production in Japan increased at a phenomenal rate. In the opening year of the decade, Japanese industrial output was valued at six billion yen and the emphasis was on the light industries; by 1941 production had increased fivefold and heavy industry constituted 72.7 percent of the total.¹³

The military significance of this sensational rise in industrial production can be found in the emphasis on heavy industries, the basis of any modern military machine, and a measure of its importance lies in the increase in annual steel production from 1.8 to 6.8 million tons. In 1930 Japan had produced only 500 vehicles and 400 aircraft. Ten years later the annual production of vehicles was 48,000 units, and the Japanese aircraft industry was manufacturing over 5,000 planes annually. Shipbuilding in Japan showed a similar increase during these years. Deliveries under the naval construction program in this period totaled 476,000 tons, and construction of merchant ships rose from 92,093 tons in 1931 to 405,195 tons in 1937.¹⁴

TABLE I -- JAPANESE MILITARY BUDGET, 1931-1940 (in millions of yen)
Year	Military Budget			Military Budget as Percent of Total Expenditures
1931		434			29.4
1932		733			37.6
1933		873			39.2
1934		955			44.2
1935		1,032			46.8
1936		1,105			48.4
1937		3.953			71.6
1938		6,097			75.4
1939		6,417			71.7
1940		7,266			65.9
Source: Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction, p. 5.

Much of this increase in industrial production, especially in the heavy industries, was due to government expenditures for military purposes which rose sharply after 1936 as a result of the February 1936 incident and the Army's ascendancy. Military expenditures after 1936 reflected military domination of political life. The entire economy of the nation was rigidly controlled and oriented toward war; the armament industries were expanded, and every effort was made to stockpile strategic raw materials.¹⁵

The production of armaments after 1936 increased rapidly to meet the demands of the China war. This increase was accomplished under a 5-year plan developed by the Army in 1937 and officially adopted by the Cabinet two years later. Separate programs were established for Japan, Manchuria, and northern China, and certain industries considered essential for war were selected for rapid expansion.¹⁶ Some success was achieved in Manchuria under the 5-year plan but the program for Japan had to be modified several times. The aviation and munitions industries made rapid progress, the steel industry achieved a remarkable success, and the production of machine tools surpassed the goals established. But other basic industries, such as the production of synthetic oil and hydroelectric power, were limited by the shortage of raw materials, and, despite the most strenuous efforts, failed to reach the goals set by the Army.¹⁷

During these years the Japanese armed forces also began building up stockpiles of essential supplies. Reserves of weapons, ammunition, and other important military equipment were adequate, but those of certain strategic materials were

not. The quantity of bauxite on hand in 1941 totaled 254,740 tons, which represented a 9-month supply. Also, since 1938, Japan had been forced to draw upon its stockpile of iron ore for the war in China, and at the end of 1941 had only a few months' reserve.¹⁸

The shortage of petroleum production was the key to Japan's military situation. It was the main problem for those preparing for war and, at the same time, the reason that the nation was moving toward war. For the Navy, the shortage of oil was critical; for the Army it was always a limitation. To secure reserves of this precious commodity, Japan imported heavily during the decade of the 1930's, the amount reaching 37,160,000 barrels in 1940. During that year Japan produced only 3,163,000 barrels, less than 12 percent of the nation's peacetime requirements. To increase the amount available for military use, civilian consumption of oil was curtailed sharply after 1937, and practically all civilian motor traffic was abolished or required to use wood and charcoal burners. Despite these measures, Japan had only 43,000,000 barrels of oil reserves in 1941, an amount sufficient at most for two years of war under the most favorable conditions, if supplemented by resources within the empire.¹⁹

The growth of Japan's military forces matched its industrial growth during these critical years. Between 1936 and 1941, the number of men conscripted for the Army doubled. At the end of 1937 Japan had 24 divisions, 16 of which were stationed in China; three years later the total had risen to 50: 27 in China, 12 in Manchuria, and the remainder in Korea and the home islands. The Army Air Forces showed the greatest proportionate growth, increasing from 54 squadrons in 1937 to 150 in 1941. Pilots were well trained and about half of them had actual combat experience in China or in border fighting with Soviet Russia.²⁰ (Table 2)

Japan's naval forces, which had been limited first by the Washington Naval Conference (1921) and then by the London Naval Conference (1930), grew rapidly after 1936 when Japan withdrew from the naval conference of that year. In 1937, twenty new vessels with a tonnage of 55,360 tons were completed; the next year this amount increased to 63,589 tons, and by 1941 had reached the prewar peak of 225,159 tons. This tonnage represented one battleship of the Yamato class, 10 carriers of unspecified tonnages, 7 cruisers, and 37 destroyers.²¹ By 1941, Japanese combat tonnage had risen to 1,059,000 tons, more than twice that of 1922, and Japan's fleet was more powerful than the combined United States -- British fleets in the Pacific.

Despite these preparations for war, the Japanese Army and Navy had no military or naval plans to guide them. There were in the files of the supreme command statements dealing with national defense policy and with the employment of troops, but these dated from 1930 and were expressed in general principles rather than in terms of specific operations. Moreover, they provided only for a defensive war against either

TABLE 2 -- JAPANESE ARMY GROUND AND AIR FORCES AND NAVY AIR FORCES 1937-1941
	Army Ground Forces	Army Air Forces (First-Line Aircraft)			Navy Air Forces
					Carrier- Based	Land-Based
Year	Divisions	Bombers	Fighters	Rcn		Bombers	Fighters	Torpedo	Others
1937	24 (plus 6 Reserve Divisions)	210	210	120	216	204	132	108	178
1938	34	330	240	130	269	228	132	132	200
1939	41	450	280	180	201	288	132	156	228
1940	50	500	360	200	167	264	132	180	306
1941 (8 Dec)	51	660	550	290	684	443	252	92	198
Source: Japanese Opns in SWPA, GHQ Hist Series, II, p. 54.

the United States or the Soviet Union, and emphasized that in no case should Japan fight more than one of these countries at the same time. There was no mention in these statements of a possible war with Great Britain or the Netherlands, or of war against a combination of these powers. They were, in the words of one Japanese officer, "outdated writings" and "utterly nonsensical from the standpoint of authority and contents."²²

The lack of a concrete strategical plan was partially overcome by the Army and Navy's annual operations plans. Each year the two services worked out their own plans for operations against the two named enemies separately and then submitted them for Imperial approval. These plans made no provision for total war, and so long as the government refused to decide which was the most likely enemy or to admit the possibility of war with more than one nation, it was impossible to establish priorities, for a war against Russia would require strengthening the Army and a war against the United States would call for larger naval appropriations. The Navy's 1940 plan for a war with the United States, therefore, simply declared that the Imperial Navy, in co-operation with the Army, would destroy American strength in the Far East and maintain command of Far Eastern waters "by intercepting and crushing American fleets."²³ How America was to be defeated was never even considered.

The Army's annual plan for 1940 emphasized defensive operations against the Soviet Union from Manchuria. Operations to the south were "secondary and supplementary in importance."²⁴ In case of war with the United States, the planners expected that Japanese forces would

take the Philippines and Guam, but made no concrete plans for their seizure or for countering American reaction. The main objective of the Army, they believed, was to prepare against attack, not to fight a war against the United States. The 1940 plan was equally vague about Great Britain and the Netherlands. In case of war the plan provided for the seizure of Hong Kong and Singapore, but not for the Netherlands Indies, Burma, India, or Australia. Japan, said the Army's Chief of Operations, "had no capacity to meet the need of a crisis ... with drastic measures on a grand scale."²⁵

Thus, throughout the decade of the 1930's, the Japanese leaders had no military strategy for a war against a coalition such as they later faced, and their policy was based almost entirely on political considerations and on what one officer called their "exceedingly conceptual and common sense understanding of war strategy." Deliberations of the Cabinet and of the Liaison and Imperial Conferences,²⁶ though attended by Army and Navy officers, were not limited by precise studies and plans outlining the course of military and naval action to be taken in every conceivable situation. They were guided, rather, by political strategy "pushed without any consideration of a definite war strategy plan."²⁷

Japan Moves South

The program of the Konoye Cabinet, which took office on 22 July 1940, set the course of Japanese policy for the next critical year. This program was drawn up on 19 July, even before the Cabinet had been organized, and was accepted by the four principal ministers -- the Premier, Prince Konoye, War Minister Hideki Tojo, Navy Minister Zengo Yoshida, and Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka, whom Cordell Hull called "as crooked as a basket of fishhooks." The new administration, it was agreed, would make its main objective the establishment of a new order in east Asia, known as the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Included in this sphere at first were Hong Kong, Burma, French Indochina, Thailand, Malaya, the Netherlands Indies, the Philippines, and New Guinea; later India, Australia, and New Zealand were added to the list. Specific measures designed to gain this grand objective included a closer alliance with the Axis, a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union, and every effort necessary to bring the China war to an end. While there were some differences among the four ministers over the nature and timing of the actual measures to be taken, there was no question about basic objectives. And all were agreed that any nation that opposed this program was the enemy of Japan.²⁸

The program outlined on the 19th was discussed and approved by the full Cabinet on the 26th and, the following day, by a Liaison Conference. The decisions of this last conference, which became, in effect, the policy of the Japanese Government, differed only slightly from the preliminary program drawn up by the four ministers on the 19th. They were embodied in a document entitled General Principles To Cope With the Changing World Situation, laying down four specific measures designed to end the war in China and to give Japan a dominant position in southeast Asia:

1. The elimination of all aid to the Chungking government by third powers.

2. Adoption of "a firm attitude" toward the United States and, at the same time, the strengthening of political ties with the Axis and a drastic readjustment of relations with Russia.

3. Stronger diplomatic measures against the Netherlands Indies in order to secure vital raw materials.

4. Intensification of political, economic, and military preparations for war.

Japan hoped to gain these objectives by peaceful means but was prepared where necessary to use force. "In employing armed strength," it was agreed at the Liaison Conference, "efforts will be made to limit the war adversary to Great Britain insofar as possible. However, thorough preparations for the commencement of hostilities against the United States will be made as it may prove impossible to avoid war with that country."²⁹

The first and most pressing problem for the new Konoye Cabinet was the conflict in China. Already the United States had indicated that it was in no mood to discontinue its support of Chiang. On 25 July, only three days after Prince Konoye had taken office, President Roosevelt added scrap iron and oil to the list of items whose export was subject to license. But the Japanese, undeterred by this warning and by the prompt rejection of fresh peace overtures to the Chungking Government, sought to take advantage of the weakness of Vichy France by demanding, first, the right to send troops into northern Indochina, adjacent to the China border, to intercept supplies to Chiang Kai-shek; and second, control of the airfields there to provide bases from which to bomb the Burma Road and Chungking. These demands had been specifically outlined in the "General Principles" adopted on 27 July and Japan was ready to resort to force to gain them. But military action proved unnecessary, for on 29 August, after the Germans had brought pressure on Vichy France, the French yielded. A month later Japanese troops entered Indochina.³⁰ Despite the explanation of Foreign Minister Matsuoka that this action was a normal military measure against China, the United States entered a formal protest. This was an empty gesture; more tangible was the loan of another twenty-five million dollars to Chiang Kai-shek and extension of the embargo on scrap iron and steel.

The effort of the Konoye Cabinet to secure strategic raw materials from the Netherlands Indies, an effort which

American economic measures had made more urgent, met with little success. On 16 July the Japanese had notified the Dutch that they wished to send a mission to discuss the relations between the two countries, and, after an exchange of notes limiting the scope of the mission to economic matters, the Minister of Commerce, Ichizo Kobayashi, and a staff of twenty-four experts, left for Batavia. The talks began early in September with the Japanese demanding large oil concessions in the Indies and three million tons of oil annually for five years, an amount that represented about threefifths of Japan's normal requirements. The Dutch companies with whom the Japanese dealt, urged on by the British and the Americans, refused to meet these large demands. They were willing to send only half the amount requested and that on a 6-month contract basis. Kobayashi left Batavia on 22 October, and, though the conversations continued for some months more, the Japanese were never able to get what they wanted. But they took what they could -- a slight increase in the amount of rubber, tin, and bauxite, and an agreement with the oil companies for the quantities offered.

On 27 September, four days after the dispatch of troops into French Indochina, Japan concluded the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, thus achieving one more objective in the program outlined by the Liaison Conference. Under the terms of this agreement, Germany and Italy recognized the leadership of Japan in bringing a new order to Asia, and Japan, on its part, recognized the new order in Europe. More important was the commitment of the signatories to come to each other's aid "with all political, economic, and military means" should any of them be attacked by a power with which it was not then at war. Since Germany and Italy were at war with the western European nations, and since the pact was not to have any effect on the existing relations of the signatories with Soviet Russia, it was evident that the Tripartite Pact was a warning to the United States to remain neutral.

The decision to conclude the Tripartite Pact had been made on 19 September at the Imperial Conference. The agreements reached at this meeting constitute an important guide to what Japan hoped to achieve from the alliance with Germany and Italy and what the policy of the nation would be in the months to come. Clearly, the ministers expected support in their efforts to expand southward and end the war in China. With the co-operation of the Axis they hoped to induce the Russians to advance toward the Persian Gulf, and possibly India, that is, in a direction that would not threaten Japan. They hoped also, with the co-operation of Germany and Italy, to bring pressure on the United States to accept Japan's claims in the south and in China.

But the four ministers did not expect to pay for this support with military action, except where it was necessary to gain their own objectives. They agreed that they would assist the Axis against Great Britain by measures short of war, but reserved the right to make their own decisions on the use of armed force against that nation and the United States. If the war in China were near a conclusion, the four ministers decided, then Japan might resort to force to gain its objectives, waiting only for the right

moment. But until that time, they agreed, Japan would not go to war against Great Britain or the United States unless the situation permitted no delay."³¹

It is clear that Japan did not interpret the Tripartite Pact as a commitment to war, and, as a matter of fact, the Emperor agreed to it with misgivings and only after he had been assured that it would not lead to hostilities.³² The Konoye Cabinet evidently believed that the United States (and the Soviet Union) would not intervene in the Far East if the advance southward was achieved gradually and by diplomatic means. They hoped that the United States would be forced by the Tripartite Pact to remain neutral and that the issue would be between Japan and the British, Dutch, and French who were in no position to dispute Japanese expansion southward. Soviet opposition was to be overcome through the intervention of Germany."³³

These hopes were entirely unrealistic. The United States had never retreated from its position on China and had declined time and again to recognize Japan's interpretation of treaties to which the United States was a party. Instead of showing any timidity or weakness, the United States Government on this occasion adopted a firm but cautious attitude. Cordell Hull announced to newsmen that the pact did not substantially alter the situation, but his statement was belied by the announcement on 8 October 1940 that consuls in the Far East had been instructed to advise American citizens to return home, and that three liners had been sent to the Orient to hasten their evacuation.³⁴ Already the Pacific Fleet, which was normally based on the west coast, had been ordered to remain at Pearl Harbor indefinitely, and preparations were being made to strengthen American garrisons in Alaska, Hawaii, and Panama.³⁵

While maintaining a firm attitude toward Japan, the United States Government adopted a policy designed to "avoid an open struggle in the Pacific" so that American resources would not be diverted from the main tasks -- strengthening the nation's military forces and aiding Britain. Japan, it was agreed, was not to be pushed "to the point where her military elements would demand war."³⁶ The door was to be left open for discussion and agreement, but the United States was to maintain its treaty rights in the Far East, continue to exert economic pressure against Japan, and provide aid to China. The Tripartite Pact, in the view of the United States, had placed Japan in the Axis camp and Japan was to be treated as one of the

Axis Powers. The last chance of settling Japanese-American conflicts as a separate problem, divorced from European affairs, was gone. In his Fireside Chat of 29 December 1940, President Roosevelt emphasized that the Tripartite Pact represented a threat to the United States and that the nation for its own defense must increase its aid to the free nations and make greater efforts to rearm."³⁷

In spite of the fact that the Tripartite Pact had failed to convince the United States that acceptance of Japan's program for expansion was desirable, the Konoye Cabinet continued along the path laid out by the Liaison Conference of 27 July. Every effort was made to bring the war in China to an end; when air bombardment failed, the Japanese solicited the support of German diplomacy. The only result of these measures was another American loan to Chiang Kai-shek, this time for a hundred million dollars. Japanese policy was no more successful in the Indies. The conversations begun in September dragged on, with a new special envoy taking Kobayashi's place in January 1941. The Dutch so stoutly resisted Japanese pressure for economic co-operation that the new envoy reported that force alone would produce the desired results. "How can we compromise," complained one of the Japanese delegates, "when you refuse to accept our views."³⁸ But Japan was not yet ready for war and rather than lose prestige by breaking off the negotiations Konoye instructed the delegates to remain in Batavia.

In Indochina and Thailand the Japanese made important gains. Seizing the pretext of a border dispute between the two countries, Japan offered its services as mediator, after prior arrangement with Thailand, "on the ground of maintaining stability in Greater East Asia."³⁹ Britain was particularly concerned over Japan's entry into the dispute and the possibility of Japanese military intervention in an area so close to Burma, Malaya, and Singapore, and urged the French to negotiate. Neither British nor American efforts to end the dispute proved successful, and on 20 January 1941 Japan made a formal offer of mediation. It was accepted by both parties, the Vichy Government acceding only after German persuasion, and on the last day of the month a truce was signed. But a final settlement was still to be reached.

Japan's aims in the border dispute between Thailand and French Indochina were defined at the Liaison Conference of 30 January, when it was decided that Japan would use its position as mediator to obtain from the French naval bases in Camranh Bay and air bases near Saigon for a possible attack later against Singapore, an attack which the Germans were urging with vigor. Both countries would be required to sign agreements with Japan and promise not to conclude with any third power pacts affecting that nation. If either proved intractable it was agreed that force would be used, and for this purpose a large naval force was ordered to take up positions along the coasts of Indochina and Thailand. To the rest of the world, which noted these naval movements with considerable concern,

Japan protested that its only interest in the affair was to bring about peace in east Asia.

Conversations for the settlement of the boundary dispute were to open in Tokyo at the beginning of February, but the Vichy Government, though it had agreed to the armistice, would not agree so readily to Japanese mediation. Unfortunately, neither the United States nor Great Britain was in a position to affect the outcome, and the French finally agreed on 11 March, under the combined pressure of Germany and Japan, to accept mediation of the dispute and not to enter into any agreement inimical to Japan. The boundary controversy was settled on 9 May when the French ceded to Thailand most of the land in dispute, but Japan did not receive its wages until the end of July.

The date on which Vichy France acceded to the Japanese mediation plan, 11 March, was by coincidence the day on which the American Congress approved and the President signed the Lend-Lease Act. The stated purpose of this law was to promote the defense of the United States, but its real meaning lay in the aid it offered to the nations fighting the Axis. It was clearly a declaration of cold war against the Axis Powers, and was taken by them as such. There was no longer any doubt for those who could read American opinion rightly that the United States had taken its stand with Britain and China and would push all measures short of war to prevent their defeat.

The Konoye Cabinet, indifferent to or unable to comprehend the extent of American opposition, persisted in its efforts to push through the program laid down on 27 July 1940 in the General Principles To Cope With the Changing World Situation. One of the objectives of this program, it will be recalled, was "the readjustment of diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia."⁴⁰ Until the beginning of 1941 the Konoye Cabinet had been too involved in other matters to act on this front, but at that time, as Mr. Matsuoka, the Foreign Minister, was preparing to visit Europe, the question of an agreement with the Soviet Union came up again. The trip to Europe was approved and Matsuoka was instructed to seek Soviet recognition of Japanese supremacy in east Asia but to avoid military commitments. Matsuoka left Tokyo on 4 March. His first stop was Moscow where he talked with Molotov about the possibility of a nonaggression pact. Nothing tangible resulted from these conversations and Matsuoka went on to Berlin. Hitler had already decided to attack Russia, and urged that Japan take aggressive action in the Far East, specifically against Singapore, to bring about the final collapse of England. Not a word was said about the forthcoming attack on Russia, although Matsuoka may have surmised it; instead, the Germans hinted darkly about worsening relations with the Soviet Union when the Japanese Foreign Minister explained the nature of his talks with Molotov.

On his return trip Matsuoka stopped again in Moscow. The Russians had had a month to consider his proposals. Persuaded perhaps by foreknowledge of the impending German attack, as well as a willingness to encourage Japan's drive southward, Molotov and Stalin proved remarkably amenable to Matsuoka's proposals. On 13 April, after only a week

of deliberation, an agreement that pledged Japan and the Soviet Union to respect each other's territorial integrity and to remain neutral in case of attack by a third power was signed.

The Japanese were jubilant over the pact with Russia and immediately made plans to push the program for expansion to the south, a program to which the Army and Navy were already heavily committed. It had been decided earlier that this expansion was to be achieved by diplomatic means, but that preparations for military action must be rushed if peaceful methods failed. On 6 December 1940 the Army had designated three divisions, then in south China, to be trained for operations in tropical areas, and ten days later had directed commanders in China and Formosa to study the problems involved in such operations and to prepare area studies of the Indies, Malaya, Indochina, Thailand, Burma, the Philippines, and Guam.⁴¹ Next month the Japanese had begun aerial reconnaissance of the Malayan coast and the War Ministry and Foreign Office began to print military currency for use in the southern area.

Among the military preparations the Japanese undertook in the early spring of 1941 was a plan to take Singapore, a step the Germans favored highly for their own purposes. The Japanese were not averse to German support and were using this support to wrest from the Vichy Government advance bases in Indochina from which, presumably, they would attack the British Far Eastern bastion. Repeatedly the Japanese assured the Germans that they hoped to take Singapore, probably in May, but refused to commit themselves beyond the occupation of Saigon. They also assured the Germans that they were making preparations for a possible war against the United States, but had actually developed no plans for such a war other than a personal study initiated in January by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander of the Combined Fleet and an ardent advocate of carrier-based operations, for an attack against Pearl Harbor.⁴²

Japan's position in Indochina had been greatly strengthened in May when an economic and political agreement with the Vichy Government was concluded. But in southern Indochina, where there were no Japanese troops, there was strong antiJapanese sentiment supported by the de Gaullists, the Chinese, the British, and the Americans. The economic results of this sentiment were most disadvantageous to the Japanese and were reflected in the decreased quantity of rice exported from Indochina to Japan and the threat that other vital Indochinese resources such as rubber, tin, coal, and manganese would find their way into other markets. The occupation of southern Indochina, therefore, became an urgent matter for the Japanese and one which was to have an important effect on their relations with other nations.

Nor were Japanese efforts to wrest concessions from the Dutch meeting with success. The conversations had been going from bad to worse, although the Dutch had increased slightly the

amounts of rubber, tin, bauxite, and nickel promised the Japanese earlier. But the requests for more oil and for concessions in the Indies had not yet been granted. Finally, on 17 June, Japan broke off the conversations and ordered its delegates home. Though the Japanese sought to minimize its meaning, this action was clearly an admission of defeat.

By this time Japan was feeling the pinch of shortages created by the controls the United States had instituted over shipments to Japan, and the relations between the two countries had improved not at all. Efforts to settle the outstanding disagreements between them had begun in February, when Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura arrived in the United States.⁴³ After a series of preliminary talks with President Roosevelt and Mr. Hull, Nomura, on 18 April, handed the Americans a 7-point proposal as the basis for an agreement. Essentially, this proposal called for the United States to provide, or assist Japan in securing, strategic raw materials, and to persuade Chiang to reach agreement with Japan. In return, Japan would agree not to start war in the southwest Pacific and to interpret the Tripartite Pact as meaning Japan would support Germany only if that nation were the object of aggression. The proposal was not acceptable to the Americans and was made even less so by revisions from Tokyo. On 30 May, Mr. Hull presented an interim American proposal to Nomura and on 21 June a second draft, to which was attached a "verbal memo" containing a delicate reference to the lack of confidence the Americans had in the pro-Axis Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Matsuoka. The negotiations had reached a deadlock and the only hopeful sign was the trouble brewing within the Japanese Cabinet where a change might produce a shift in the direction of Japanese policy.

The impending crisis in the Japanese Government was rapidly accelerated by the German invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June, the day after Hull handed his note to Nomura. Though the Japanese had expected the attack, they were greatly upset when it came for it changed the entire complexion of world events and strengthened America's hand in the Pacific. The Japanese were oriented toward the south and seeking to obtain from Vichy France, with Germany's help, control over southern Indochina. This new development opened up the possibility of an advance northward, and thus required a thorough review of Japan's position and a reconsideration of the program established a year before.

The course charted by the Liaison Conference in July 1940 had by the middle of June 1941 brought Japan few of the advantages so optimistically expected. More by military pressure than diplomacy Japan had obtained from a defeated and subjugated France the right to occupy Tonkin Province in Indochina and the use of French air bases and military facilities there. Hopes for a base in southern Indochina had not yet been realized; the results of the economic agreement were proving disappointing, and important opposition to the new order in Asia was developing in Indochina. Efforts to secure from the

Dutch the oil and other resources needed so desperately to support operations in China and to prepare for war had yielded meager results and ended in a serious diplomatic defeat. Negotiations with the United States had produced as yet no easy formula for peace and there was no sign that America would yield to the minimum Japanese demands. The Tripartite Pact had paid dividends, but, as events turned out, had proved unnecessary and had created a formidable obstacle to an agreement with the United States. But the Japanese were never able to resolve the deadlock in China, and it was this failure that forced them to adopt in desperation a course that led almost irresistibly to war.

Footnotes

1. Under Articles 11, 12, and 62 of the Japanese Constitution, the Diet had partial control of the budget and this gave it some leverage over the military.

2. E.E.N. Causton, Militarism and Foreign Policy in japan (London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1936), pp. 75-82; R.K. Reischauer, Japan, Government and Politics (New York: Ronald Press Company, 1939), pp. 90-93. For a general description of the Japanese high command, see Yale Candee Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy: A Study of Civil-Military Rivalry, 1930-1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957).

3. The Japan Year Book, 1934 (Tokyo: Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, 1934); Henry L. Stimson, The Far Eastern Crisis (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1936); International military tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), Defense and Prosecution Cases of Japanese Aggression in Manchuria, Japanese War Crimes Files, National Archives; Political Strategy Prior to Outbreak of War (in 5 parts), pt. I, Japanese Studies in World War II, 144, pp. 1-9, Hist Sec, Far East Command (FEC). This series was prepared by former Japanese Army and Navy Officers under the supervision of G-2, FEC. Both the original Japanese version and translations are on file in OCMH.

4. Reischauer, Japan, Government and Politics, pp. 154-57; Clyde, The Far East, pp. 600-604, 664; Judgment, International Military Tribunal for the Far East, November 1948 (hereafter cited as IMTFE, Judgment), pt. , pp. 98-103, copy in OCMH. Unless otherwise noted, the account which follows is based on these sources, passim, and on Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor, The Coming of the War Between the United States and Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950); Joseph W. Ballantine, "Mukden to Pearl Harbor: The Foreign Policies of Japan," Foreign Affairs, XXVII, No. 4 (July, ), 651-64; and Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy, passim.

5. IMTFE, Judgment, pt. B, pp. 113-19; Hugh Byas, Government by Assassination (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1942); Latourette, The History of Japan, p. 219; The Japan Year Book, 1939, pp. 13r-36.

6. Memoirs of Prince Konoye, in Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings Before the joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack (Washington, 1946), 39 Parts, (hereafter cited as Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings), pt. 20, exhibit 173, p. 4014.

7. IMTFE, exhibit 216; Political Strategy Prior to Outbreak of War, pt. I, Japanese Studies in World War II, 144, app. 1.

8. Ibid.

9. Political Strategy Prior to the Outbreak of War, pt. I, app. 5, Japanese Studies in World War II, 144.

10. Diary of Marquis Koichi Kido, submitted as an affidavit to IMTFE, p. 34. For a full account of the China incident from the Japanese point of view, see Political Strategy Prior to Outbreak of War, pt. I, Japanese Studies in World War II, 144.

11. United States Relations with China, Dept of State Pub 3573 (Washington, 1949), p. 21.

12. Saionji-Harada Memoirs, 1931-1940 (24 parts with appendixes), Civil Intel Sec, G-2 FEC, copy in OCMH, quoted in F, The Road to Pearl Harbor, p. 34.

13. Jerome B. Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and reconstruction (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1949), p. 1; United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan's War Economy (Washington, 1946), p. 12.

14. Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction, pp. 2-3; USSBS, Japanese Naval Shipbuilding (Washington, 1946), p. 1; USSBS, Japanese Merchant Shipbuilding (Washington, 1947), pp. 4-5.

15. IMTFE, Judgment, pt. B, pp. 114ff.

16. Ibid., p. 353.

17. History of the Army Section, Imperial General Headquarters, 1941-1945, Japanese Studies in World War II, 72, p. 5; Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction, ch. I.

18. Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction, p. 48.

19. USSBS, Oil in Japan's War Washington, 1946), p. 1.

20. Hist of Army Sec, Imperial GHQ, Japanese Studies in World War II, 72, pp. 2-3; USSBS, Japanese Air Power (Washington, 1946), pp. 4-5.

21. USSBS, Japanese Naval Shipbuilding, app. A.

22. Political Strategy Prior to Outbreak of War, pt. IV, Japanese Studies in World War II, 150, pp. 1-2.

23. Ibid., p. 2.

24. Deposition of former Lt. Gen. Shinichi Tanaka, Chief of Operations, Japanese General Staff, IMTFE, exhibit 3027.

25. Ibid.

26. The Liaison Conference was an informal body consisting of the service chiefs, the principle civilian ministers, and other high government officials, and served as a link between Imperial General headquarters and the Cabinet. The same body when it met with the Emperor on more important occasions and under more formal circumstances was known as the Imperial Conference.

27. Political Strategy prior to Outbreak of War, pt. IV, Japanese Studies in World War II, 150, p. 3.

28. Political Strategy prior to Outbreak of War, pt. II, Japanese Studies in World War II, 146, pp. 10-16. Unless otherwise indicated, this section is based upon Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor, passim; Ballantine, "Mukden to Pearl Harbor," Foreign Affairs (July, 1949), pp. 658-61; IMTFE, Judgment, pt. B, pp. 487-520, pp. 864-903, and the Japanese sources cited above.

29. IMTFE, exhibit 1310; Political Strategy prior to Outbreak of War, pt. II, Japanese Studies in World War II, 146, app. 2.

30. Political Strategy prior to Outbreak of War, pt. II, Japanese Studies in World War II, 146, pp. 7-9, app. 2.

31. IMTFE, exhibit 541; IMTFE, Judgment, pp. 504-508. Takushiro Hattori, The Complete History of the Greater East Asia War, translated from Japanese by FEC, Doc. 78002, I, 42-45, OCMH.

32. Political Strategy Prior to the Outbreak of War,, pt. II, 146, http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/monos/146/146app04.htmlapp. 4 and pp. 20-25. The latter reference contains an account of the 26 September conference with the Emperor to discuss the treaty.

33. German-Japanese Relations From 1936 to 1943, MIS237954, Mil Intel Div Library; IMTFE, exhibits 551, 552.

34. Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 2 vols. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), I, 914-15; Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), p. 271. See also Ltr. Joseph C Grew, formerly U.S. Ambassador to Japan, to auth, 19 Jun 49, copy in OCMH.

35. Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, pt. I, exhibit 9, p. 943. Mark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1950), ch. XIV.

36. Hull, Memoirs, I, 911.

37. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan: 1931-1941, 2 vols. (Washington, 1943), II, 173-81.

38. Joseph C. Grew, Ten Years in Japan (New York: Simon and Schuster, 194, p. 213.

39. Political Strategy Prior to Outbreak of War, pt. III, Japanese Studies in World War II, 147,, p. 12.

40. Political Strategy Prior to Outbreak of War, pt. II, Japanese Studies in World War II, 146, app. 2.

41. Imperial GHQ Army Dept Directives, 791, 6 Dec 40; 810, 16 Jan 41; and 812, 18 Jan 41, copies in OCMH.

42.Apparently this study was kept a secret from the authorities, and even Yamamoto's staff, except for Rear Adm. Ohnishi, knew nothing of it. Statement of Rear Adm. Tomioka, then Chief of the Operational Section, Navy General Staff.

43. These conversations were initiated unofficially by two clergymen. IMTFE, exhibit 3441, Ltr. Joseph C. Grew to author, 19 Jun 49, OCMH. A full account from the American side can be found in Hull, Memoirs.