

O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov

**Soviet-Chinese Relations,
1945–1970**

EDITED WITH AN INTRODUCTORY ESSAY BY
VLADIMIR PETROV

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stration in the station, and insulted Soviet authorities. As a result the train departed quite late. On December 17, in Novosibirsk, a Chinese train crew forcefully dragged a Soviet passenger into a compartment, accused him "of insulting a portrait of Mao Tse-tung," and demanded written apologies. This escapade also resulted in upsetting train schedules.

Chinese authorities organized a total of 40 anti-Soviet provocations in transportation in 1967, 17 on the railroads, 15 on the airlines, and 3 in river and maritime transportation. The result was 18 protests by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other Soviet agencies.

The January 1967 provocation in Moscow's Red Square signaled new outrages at the Soviet Embassy in Peking. They were prepared in advance, and began promptly the following day.

This time anti-Soviet demonstrations around the Embassy assumed a particularly widespread and malicious aspect. They lasted over two weeks, continuously, day and night. The Soviet citizens within Embassy grounds literally were subjected to assault by noise. Loudspeakers set up around the Embassy blasted away, twenty-four hours a day. No Soviet newspapers or journals were delivered to the Embassy between January 26 and February 13. Chinese workers left the Embassy, saying they were going on "strike." When the Chinese were advised that the Embassy no longer had need of their services they tried to return by force. On February 3 those Chinese citizens who had been fired burst into the Embassy's consular section and issued an ultimatum that they be reinstated. They detained the chief of the consular section in his office for almost a day and threatened him with physical violence.

On January 29, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodged a strong protest against these anti-Soviet outrages and demanded, on behalf of the government of the USSR, that the Embassy be protected against hostile demonstrations interfering with its normal activities and threatening the personal safety of its personnel.

The outrages persisted. This led the USSR to evacuate families of Soviet representatives, Embassy personnel, trade delegation personnel, economic advisors, and TASS correspondents from Peking.

On February 2, A. N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministry of the USSR, sent the Premier of the State Council, Chou En-lai, a letter requesting a guarantee of safety for families of staff members of Soviet institutions during their return.

But PRC leaders failed to provide a normal departure for the Soviet citizens. Quite the contrary, Soviet women and children leaving Peking confronted an atmosphere of humiliation, flagrant violence, and the

flouting of the most elementary norms of international law and morals. All this was coordinated and encouraged by Chinese authorities. Representatives of Soviet Aeroflot were advised that the safety of the special aircraft being flown to Peking, with official permission of the Chinese authorities, to evacuate the families of USSR delegations in the PRC could not be guaranteed. Our Embassy in Peking appealed three times to the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs for assistance in getting the women and children out of the country, but each time the stereotyped answer came back, "the safety of Soviet people cannot be guaranteed."

On February 5, when returning Soviet citizens and accompanying personnel from the Soviet and other socialist embassies arrived in Peking airport, they were surrounded by a crowd of Red Guards and agitators. Alternating malicious anti-Soviet taunts and curses with readings from the works of Mao, unrestrained provocateurs terrorized the defenseless people for eight hours. The jeering continued even during boarding. The Red Guards made the people run the gauntlet; they shook their fists at women and children, struck their feet and pulled their hair. The same thing happened upon departure of succeeding groups of Soviet citizens.

La Stampa, the Italian newspaper, in describing these events wrote:

... the disgusting, unprecedented hooliganistic actions of the "Red Guards" with respect to the Soviet Union definitely surpassed all bounds. They are absolutely intolerable to all foreigners living in Peking. One gets the distinct impression that the government of Mao Tse-tung also wants to force the USSR to break its official relations with China, and at the same time wants to arouse in its country fanatical hatred for the Soviet Union. The Soviet citizens behaved splendidly, demonstrating firmness and retaining their dignity in this disorderly and howling crowd, ready for any baseness. Women and men, pressing the smallest of the children to their breasts, stood with their heads held high among the howling crowd.¹¹

On February 4, 1967 the Soviet government issued a statement elucidating the crude anti-Soviet actions by Chinese authorities and lodging a stern protest with the PRC government. The statement noted that provocations directed against Soviet institutions in Peking indicated intentions of the Chinese leadership to further exacerbate relations with the Soviet Union. It stressed that outrages around the Soviet Embassy in Peking, arbitrary humiliation of staff members of Soviet institutions, appeals "to overthrow" the Soviet government, and "to take care of" state and political leaders in the USSR, all were just causes of indignation to the Soviet people, whose self-restraint and patience were not inex-

haustible. The Soviet government demanded that the Chinese authorities take most urgent measures to ensure the safety of workers and their families assigned to Peking, and to punish severely organizers of provocations. The statement emphasized that the Soviet Union reserved the right to take whatever measures were dictated by the situation to protect the safety of its citizens and of its lawful interests.¹²

Chinese leaders continued to inflame the situation around the Soviet Embassy in Peking. On February 6 the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially advised the Embassy of the USSR that the safety of Soviet personnel leaving the Embassy grounds "could not be guaranteed."

The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on February 9 dispatched a note to the PRC government demanding that the safety and mobility of the staff members of the Soviet Embassy be guaranteed. The note stated:

... the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, upon the request of the Soviet government, declares that the steps taken by the Chinese authorities can mean either a deliberate attempt to undermine relations between the People's Republic of China and the USSR, or the inability of these authorities to provide in the country elementary conditions for the life and activities of representatives of a state maintaining normal diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. The Soviet government demands the immediate cessation of the arbitrary measures taken by the Chinese authorities directed against the Soviet Embassy in Peking and the freedom of its staff members to move about. If this is not done in the shortest time possible, the Soviet side reserves to itself the right to take the necessary retaliatory measures."¹³

Two days later the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs advised the Embassy of the USSR that the February 6 notification was retracted.

The chaotic events at the Embassy of the USSR would remain forever a disgrace to their instigators and organizers; even so they could not help the Maoists reach their objectives. *Pravda*, in an editorial published on February 16, 1967, wrote:

The anti-Soviet campaign by the Chinese leaders is being carried out in the most provocative, truly hooliganistic forms. But this outward aggressiveness should not delude anyone. In fact, the actions of the Mao Tse-tung faction are based not on its strength but on its weakness, by fear of its own party, its own people.

The fraternal parties were unanimous in observing that anti-Soviet actions by CCP leaders played into the hands of imperialism. As one

example, *Nuestra Palabra*, the newspaper of the Argentine Communists, on February 27, 1967 wrote:

... Mao intends to show the world that no one is more anti-Soviet, more anti-Leninist, more anti-Marxist, than he, and in this he has been successful. Yankee imperialism should be deeply indebted to him for this. Needless to say, it is no accident that the Yankees began their bombing of Vietnam at precisely the moment the unlimited anti-Soviet campaign on the part of the Chinese leaders was unleashed. The aggressive anti-Sovietism of the clique we are talking about is a tremendous gift to the imperialist aggressors.¹⁴

A leader of the CP USA, James Jackson, expressed the same thought in the newspaper *The Worker*:

... This spectacle of how far behind the leaders of China have left even the sworn enemies of Communism in their slander of and attacks against the fraternal party cannot help but attract the attention of the strategists of imperialism. Anti-Sovietism is what currently unites the adherents of Mao Tse-tung and the imperialists.¹⁵

The imperialist camp expressed unabashed satisfaction over the anti-Sovietism of the Maoists. A columnist for *The Washington Post*, Joseph Kraft, commented:

Officials in Washington think that Mao is serving American interests because his efforts to galvanize the Chinese masses are drawing China into conflict with Russia to a greater degree than with the United States.

American officials, in the words of the columnist, "even are thinking of cultivating Maoism as a means of putting pressure on Moscow."

It was openly said in Washington that US ruling circles were interested in keeping Mao Tse-tung in power. In February 1967 a directive sent to all centers by the Director of the United States Information Service (USIS), pointed out that members of the service should "take every opportunity to strengthen the positions of Mao's adherents," because the United States wanted "Mao and his faction to remain in power" since their activities were directed against the CPSU and other Communist parties. "The United States is betting on Mao," wrote the journal *U.S. News and World Report*, continuing:

American officials are inclined to prefer a Mao Tse-tung victory in his struggle to eliminate the more moderate elements, because this would mean a continuation of the unpleasantness for Soviet Russia.

The journal noted with satisfaction that the anti-Soviet campaign in China exceeded all Peking's anti-American campaigns in its "maliciousness."¹⁶

Instigators of the "cultural revolution" continued efforts to incite anti-Soviet provocations in other countries. They staged a meeting of Chinese citizens in the Ulan Bator railroad station under the pretext of greeting those Chinese students responsible for the Red Square demonstrations. This led to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Mongolian People's Republic lodging a strong protest with the acting chargé d'affaires for China. The Chinese Embassy was given a stern warning that any further "rallies" or any other provocative acts directed against a sister nation, and occurring on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic, would be suppressed as an illegal act. Two weeks later the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Mongolian People's Republic also lodged a stern protest with the PRC Embassy in Ulan Bator in condemning propaganda efforts of the Chinese Embassy on Mongolian territory directed against the USSR and other socialist countries.

This was also the period when Chinese citizens living in Algiers, acting upon instructions from Peking, engaged in hooliganistic acts with respect to diplomatic personnel attached to the Embassy of the USSR and Soviet citizens in the Algerian People's Democratic Republic. On February 2, 60 Chinese grossly violated the generally accepted norms of international law and diplomatic immunity by stopping a Soviet Embassy car containing the First Secretary and his daughter. Hooligans surrounded the car, hammered on windows, roof, and doors, then tried to open the doors and get into the car. All the while they screamed threats against the Soviet Union and insulted the Soviet people, their party and government.

It should be noted that Chinese authorities organized numerous hostile acts against representatives of other socialist countries in the PRC during the "cultural revolution." The wife of the First Secretary of the German Democratic Republic Embassy, for instance, was attacked and seriously injured in Peking on April 29, 1966. Military attachés of the GDR, their wives and children, were beaten on August 28, 1966. Red Guards, the same day, attacked the correspondent of the Polish news agency. Hooliganistic demonstrations were held near the Embassies of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Hungarian People's Republic.

While the outrages near the Embassy of the USSR in Peking in January and February 1967 continued, and Soviet evacuations were in progress, Chinese authorities also permitted hostile actions against per-

sonnel attached to the Embassies of Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, the Mongolian People's Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Korean People's Democratic Republic. On January 26, 1967 Red Guards in Peking attacked two Czech diplomats and damaged an official car belonging to the Embassy of Czechoslovakia. On February 5, fanatical groups of youths, in the presence of police, abused the Ambassador of the Polish People's Republic, Rodzinski. The crowd detained the Polish diplomats for several hours, cursed them, threw paint, and pasted placards with hooliganistic inscriptions on the Ambassador's car, which flew the Polish national ensign. The Ambassadors of the Mongolian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia were grossly insulted on that same day. The car carrying the deputy trade counselor from Bulgaria and his family was almost overturned by Red Guards, who threatened to "execute" the passengers.

On August 9, 1967 there occurred an infamous provocation in Peking involving Mongolian representatives. A group of Red Guards attacked the car belonging to the Ambassador of the Mongolian People's Republic in China, turned it over, and set it on fire. The driver, a Mongolian citizen, was rudely jeered at and then arrested. On that same day a crowd of hooligans broke into the official premises of the Mongolian People's Republic Embassy, committing outrages which continued for several hours.

The line aimed at maximum exacerbation of Sino-Soviet relations was not limited to staging outrages before the Embassy of the USSR in Peking. The whole of 1967 literally was full of provocations directed against Soviet representatives in the PRC. For purposes of illustration, we have compiled a short incomplete chronology of these disgraceful actions.

On January 28, Red Guards engaged in a hooliganistic attack on a bus en route to the USSR Embassy carrying a group of Soviet railroad men working on the Moscow-Peking train.

The following day Red Guards spewed their venom at our diplomats arriving at a hotel for a meeting with the Soviet train brigade. They were surrounded by an unruly crowd for four hours. Police witnesses said they "were not responsible for the actions of the revolutionary masses."

Another provocation occurred at the Peking airport on January 31, when aircraft carrying our specialists en route to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to help the Vietnamese people landed. Soviet personnel were not permitted to disembark and, in violation of safety regulations,

the aircraft was required to refuel with passengers on board. After take-off, representatives of Soviet Aeroflot in Peking were detained and suffered vulgar insults.

A group of Soviet diplomats and personnel assigned to other Soviet institutions in Peking was detained in the vicinity of the Chinese Civil Aviation Administration building on February 2. They were held until about 3 A.M. on the 3rd of February, when energetic protests on the part of the Soviet Union resulted in their release. The Soviet people had been subjected to insults, blackmail, and threats for 16 hours. Physical force had been used on some. Soviet Embassy cars were defaced with vandalist graffiti. The chief of the Embassy's consular section and several other Soviet diplomats proceeding to the scene were also detained on a city street. On that same day, there was an attack on a group of Embassy personnel and on the trade representative of the USSR near the Embassy. Hooligans surrounding them chanted anti-Soviet slogans under the very eyes of the police.

A crowd of Red Guards detained a group of Soviet specialists and diplomats just returned from Hanoi for six hours on February 3. Rocks, clumps of dirt, and the like were thrown at their bus.

Two Soviet passenger trains, arriving in Zabaykal'sk Station from Peking on January 30 and February 6, were plastered with anti-Soviet posters, covered with provocative slogans, and daubed with paint.

On February 21 the Soviet Embassy in Peking was forced to protest the gross discrimination of Embassy personnel to the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Normal functions of the Embassy staff were constantly disrupted. They were forbidden to eat in public places, their hotel was saturated with anti-Soviet graffiti, and stores refused to take their orders. But provocations against Soviet representatives in China continued. On March 11, the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared two second secretaries of the Embassy *persona non grata* on the trumped-up charge that they interfered in PRC internal affairs. On May 6, the press section of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, without reason, declared the *Pravda* correspondent in Peking undesirable and demanded his immediate departure. There were incidents in April and May when Soviet diplomats going about the city on official business were detained by hordes of Red Guards for several hours. Their cars were plastered with anti-Soviet slogans, daubed with paint, and efforts made to thrust anti-Soviet materials upon them.

PRC officials refused permission for USSR Embassy personnel to travel in Yunnan, Harbin, Mukden, Dal'ny, and Port Arthur; they were also forbidden to place wreaths in honor of the 49th anniversary of the