

# Late Ottoman Society

The Intellectual Legacy

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ  
لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ مُحَمَّدٌ عَبْدُهُ وَرَسُولُهُ  
عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ وَآلِهِ وَسَلَّمَ  
مِنْ مَشَارِقِ الْبُرُوقِ عَالَمِك

Edited by

Elisabeth Özdalga



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## Late Ottoman Society

This volume brings together a fascinating set of essays dealing with intellectual developments in late Ottoman society. Under the impact of European expansionism and modernization the Ottoman Empire underwent profound transformations. Important features were the development of a market economy and modern political and administrative structures; the splitting up of the empire into separate nation-states; and the coming into being of a professional middle class and various groups of modern intellectuals.

Addressing a rapidly modernizing period in late Ottoman history, which so far has been under-explored, this book considers the relative diversity of intellectual streams of thought of the decades preceding the 1908 Young Turk revolution. Through the chapters the reader will make the acquaintance of the following:

- outstanding personalities such as the Ottoman historian, Ahmed Cevdet, the radical atheist, Abdullah Cevdet, and the nationalist/ socialist, Ziya Gökalp;
- intellectual movements like the Westerners (*Garpçılar*) part of the larger Young Turk opposition;
- ideologies like pan-Islamism, constitutionalism and liberalism;
- religious institutions like the state mufti;
- educational institutions like the *Mülkiye* (School of Public Administration) and the Christian community schools;
- printing and publishing activities, including the women's magazine *Hanımlara mahsûs gazete* (the Ladies' Own Gazette).

The discussion of the cultural and intellectual legacy of late Ottoman society is not limited to modern Turkey but includes former Ottoman provinces such as Albania and Syria.

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The Intellectual Legacy

*Edited by Elisabeth Özdalga*

# **Late Ottoman Society**

The Intellectual Legacy

**Edited by Elisabeth Özdalga**

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# Preface

This book is the fruit of a conference entitled ‘The Ottoman Intellectual Heritage’ that was held at the Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul (SRI) on 15–17 March 2001. This event was preceded by a larger SRI-sponsored venture between 1996 and 1999 that encompassed four conferences with ‘Islamic culture’ as their overarching theme. Within this thematic framework, the question of Islam and democracy and the situation of different Islamic communities (the Alevi, Naqshbandi, and Mevlevi) were addressed. These communities are active in Turkey, and also, in varying degree, in the Middle East and Central Asia. All these conferences brought to the fore the situations and predicaments faced by different groups of intellectuals in Ottoman and republican Turkey. In this volume, the intellectual heritage has been treated as a topic in its own right. As such, this book should be read as the epitome of the larger SRI project on ‘Islamic culture’.

Turkey is a country undergoing rapid transformation, where intellectuals continually face a large number of difficult and controversial social, political and moral issues. As an outsider, partly rooted in Turkish academia, I have long had it in my mind to come to grips with the hesitancy of Turkish intellectuals in their social and political criticisms. In terms of sheer numbers, intellectuals—present throughout society, but especially concentrated in institutions and organizational networks such as universities and other educational establishments, the editorial offices of newspapers, magazines and publishing houses, civil society organizations (NGOs), public offices, and political parties—form quite an impressive social body. However, when the question of the function of the learned elite is broached, i.e., when the focus is on the social, political and moral responsibility associated with men and women of letters, the picture is more discouraging. Looking back over the past decades, one searches in vain for a viable community of intellectuals who critically approached such burning questions as the Kurdish problem, the persecution of different Islamic groups and communities, the unjust treatment of different state officials and university staff, and the widespread abuse of power and neglect of governmental duties. There is also a lack of active participation in debates related to family relationships, educational problems and reforms, and other issues of social concern. Intellectuals have been, if not directly loyal to the echelons of power, then certainly all too willing to avoid adopting a critical standpoint. Ambivalence evidently rules over

strong-mindedness. This problem provides the rationale behind the Istanbul conference.

Intellectuals are bearers of different kinds of ideologies. It is by no means valid that, by definition, an intellectual has to be an Enlightenment person in any narrow leftist or secularist sense of the word. On the contrary, an intellectual may be a representative of very different ideological positions, such as Islamism, conservatism, and traditionalism. But intellectuals, in Karl Mannheim's sense of being free-floating, should, in spite of their different ideological preferences, have a common interest in promoting the values of law, justice, and a democratic society. Standing up for these values is undoubtedly a difficult task. Even so, one cannot help returning to the question: why has the voice of the Turkish intellectuals been so relatively weak? And the questions to be added are: Has it always been like this? What are the explanations for this state of affairs? These questions can only be addressed in a historical perspective.

The idea underlying the conference was, therefore, that in order to better understand intellectuals of recent times as well as their ambivalences and predicaments, we need to know about the intellectuals of yesterday. So the intellectuals of the late Ottoman period were examined in relation to institutions and the social networks (especially educational institutions, state offices, and newspapers, magazines, publishers); in relation to ideas, ideologies, and new audiences; and also in relation to the way in which they opposed or mingled with representatives of the political power, and how they understood their role or identity as intellectuals.

The intellectuals of the late Ottoman period were opposed to the dictatorship of Abdülhamid II. The opposition, gathered in the amorphous Young Turk movement, sought liberal constitutional reforms that would bring the power of the sultan under popular (middle-class) control. The Young Turks saw themselves as the true disciples of the great French Revolution of 1789, but a more realistic assessment points to the year 1848—the 'springtime of the peoples'. Indeed, the 1908 Young Turk Revolution may in many respects be looked upon as a belated expression of 1848.

Karl Marx's famous *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* was an analysis of the 1848 Revolution as it evolved in France. This classic historical materialist study was focused on the relationships between social classes in a society in which capitalism had already made some impact. The term, '1848', however, also encompasses revolutions in other parts of Europe where other social forces were at work, and where Marx's analysis certainly would not have been valid. One example of a study that focuses on 1848 not from the perspective of Paris and 'class struggles in France', but on feudal and semi-feudal areas around such cities as Prague, Budapest, Frankfurt, and Vienna is Sir Lewis Namier's *1848—The Revolution of the Intellectuals* (London: Oxford University Press, 1946, based on a Raleigh lecture of history, British Academy, 1944), in which he argued that the main outcome of 1848 was not liberalism, but nationalism. 'The result was that 1848 inaugurated a new age, not of liberalism as many of the revolutionaries

hoped, but of a nationalism that was to destroy liberal constitutionalism' (from the Introduction by James Joll). In Sir Lewis's own words: 'Acid nationalisms based on language...originate mainly with urban middle-class intellectuals: and this is why 1848 is of such supreme importance in the growth of European nationalisms' (ibid., p. 101). Writing in 1944, Namier contended he could trace the authoritarian tendencies of nationalism and its totalitarian forms back to 1848.

The sketchy analysis provided here outlines the background to the current work, a background, however, woven in mixed and even clashing colours. Turkey's Westernizers have emphasized a nationalism based on ethnic and linguistic identity, while the popular masses, as they increasingly occupied the political stage, have added Islamic colours to their national identity. Both emphases have militated against the coming of age of more liberal trends, to the detriment of a more tolerant intellectual climate. It is with this very general analytical focus in mind that the intellectual legacy of Ottoman society, especially in the later period of its history, has been approached in this study.

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Professor Ismail Kara of the Faculty of Theology, Marmara University in Istanbul, must also be acknowledged for his valuable help in preparing the first outlines of the conference.

Adnan Tonguç at the Çitlembik translation bureau in Istanbul undertook the initial translation from Turkish into English of Professor Ismail Kara’s chapter, ‘Turban and Fez’. Later, during some of the more intricate phases of the editing process, it was my privilege to consult Professor Şükrü Hanioglu at Princeton University. I also owe many thanks to Professor Suraiya Faroqhi at the Ludwig Maximilians University in Munich for her kindness in commenting on the Introduction. In addition to his linguistic sensitivity, language editor Peter Colenbrander has contributed to this project with his prompt and cooperative work. In spite of the fact that we live in opposite parts of the world—Peter Colenbrander is in Canada—this aspect of the editing process has always been smooth and rewarding.

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# Abbreviations

AAst	<i>Asian and African Studies</i>
AHR	<i>American Historical Review</i>
BBA	Başbakanlık Arşivi—İstanbul
BEO	Bâb-ı Âli Evrak Odası
CUP	Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress
EI	<i>Encyclopaedia of Islam</i>
HHStA	Haus-, Hof—und Staatsarchiv-Vienna
IJMES	<i>International Journal of Middle East Studies</i>
İÜEF	İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi
İÜİFD	<i>İstanbul Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi</i>
SBF	Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi-Ankara
TDVIA	<i>Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi</i>
TSAB	<i>Turkish Studies Association Bulletin</i>
TTK	Türkiye Tarih Kurumu—Ankara

# Introduction

*Elisabeth Özdalga*

When the Ottomans began their modernizing *Tanzimat* reforms in 1839, they still ruled over a vast empire. In addition to today's Turkey, including Anatolia and Thrace, their power extended over Mesopotamia, North Africa, the Levant, the Balkans, and parts of the Caucasus. In its whole extent the Sultanate represented a truly multi-ethnic society.

Modernization not only brought market principles to the economy, and more complex administrative controls as part of state power, but also new educational institutions as well as new ideologies. A professional middle class grew up that paved the way for the development of modern intellectuals, independent of state, tribal relationships, and institutionalized religion. Many intellectuals became the bearers of nationalist ideologies, thereby constituting a threat to the unity of the empire. However, nationalism also had its opponents and a large range of different ideologies, including Islamism and Ottomanism, found fierce champions during the last century of the empire's life.

As the empire reached its end, Turkish nationalism became a political reality. For Turkish people the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire not only meant that their territory shrank, but also that the range of ideologies narrowed. It would not be an exaggeration to say that much of the ideological colour of the last Ottoman decades gave way to a more streamlined intellectual climate during the early republican period.

For a long time Turkish historians have under-estimated, even ignored, the importance of the Ottoman intellectual heritage. The kind of Kemalist historiography, which depicts the Ottoman Empire as a dark *ancien régime* and the modern republic as the epitome of progress and enlightenment (especially common in intermediary school textbooks), has had a significant impact on the general image of Ottoman society and is still firmly rooted in the minds of the ordinary people. Instead of recognizing the multifaceted and vibrant atmosphere of late Ottoman society, its authoritarian and despotic character is noted, an image which well serves the purpose of forming a dark backdrop to the alleged 'enlightened' mentality of the republican era.<sup>1</sup> What is suppressed by this image, however, is that the authoritarianism of the earlier epoch has lagged behind and continues—to this very day—to hamper intellectual developments.

Contrary to this pessimistic description of the Ottoman era is the form of nationalist historiography, which pays tribute to the exclusivity of the Ottoman state and society, especially as it took form during the ‘classical age’ (1300–1600), with due emphasis given to military champions and empire-builders like Mehmet the Conqueror (r. 1451–81) and Süleyman the Magnificent (r. 1520–66). In its exaggerated form, such glorification of the Ottoman past is most often combined with theories contending that the subsequent decline must be blamed on external, rather than internal forces, such as the influence from Iran, Russia or the European powers.

However, Turkish historiography of the past two or three decades has gone a long way in critically distancing itself from the kind of biases mentioned here.<sup>2</sup> As will be seen from the chapters in this book, fundamentally more realistic and deep-going scholarship on intellectual and political movements is now available, which distinguishes the complexities and contradictions of its subject matter. Late Ottoman society was a social order where a wide variety of ideas and streams of thought competed, where a great diversity of publications flourished, and where educational institutions of good standing developed fairly rapidly, but it was also a society generating and reproducing authoritarian structures.

The aim of this book is to illuminate along what trajectories Turkish intellectuals have followed the path to modern society. In doing so, the emphasis is on the Ottoman intellectual heritage understood as containing both emancipatory and restraining tendencies. In parallel with the dynamic and liberalizing processes during the last decades of the Ottoman Empire there were countervailing forces at work that resulted in contraction of the public space. At the risk of over-generalization, this introductory chapter will be used to venture three contentions on this last issue. The first relates to the overall inclination towards authoritarianism in the Turkish nation-building process. The second refers to the development of the burgeoning middle classes during the nineteenth century and the loss of the more liberal-minded parts of the middle classes through the separation or liberation of non-Muslim communities. The third concerns the *ulema*, the religious learned establishment, that was banned from public life after the secularizing reforms of the 1920s.

### **Authoritarianism and Westernization**

Since the early nineteenth century and the first modernizing reforms, Turkey has been transformed from an agrarian empire into a nation-state. This has not been an easy process, and compared with most other countries in Europe today, Turkey is a relatively less well-integrated society. True, modern Turkey has developed vigorous military and police organizations; good transportation networks; dams and energy power plants; educational institutions at all levels; health- and social-care services; and, since 1950, a multi-party parliamentary democracy. However, the accomplishments of the public institutions lag behind the demands of the mobile and rapidly urbanizing population, and the relationship between the

individual citizen and the state is often marked by lack of confidence. The fact that civil initiatives are most often looked upon with suspicion, and that the state has more often than not responded with repression in the name of order than with tolerance and encouragement, have perpetuated the distance between the individual citizen and the state, so that individuals continue to feel unprotected, insecure, and even oppressed.

Modernizing reforms were always implemented under the influence of values and patterns developed in Europe. Turkey has at every stage in its more than 150-year encounter with modernity, perceived itself as lagging behind acknowledged Western standards. This sense of deficiency never caused the official elite to question its ambition to make the country into a true Western power. On the contrary, this perception seems rather to have spurred the establishment to achieve its Western ideals with even greater resolution.

The effect of this reverence for Western ideals has been that, in the nation-building process, intellectuals have not only come under pressure from authoritarian power structures, but they have also been confronted with a pro-Westernization official ideology. Certainly, authoritarianism and Westernization represent contradictory principles. For example, to the extent that Westernization stands for liberal values—representing constitutionalism as opposed to the prevailing despotism of the Ottoman sultanate—it has clearly been in opposition to authoritarianism. In Turkish political praxis, however, authoritarianism and Westernization have gone largely hand in hand. This paradox, which consists of mixing authoritarianism (or despotism) and enlightenment at the official level—or, to use the catchwords of Positivism, ‘Order and Progress’—still constitutes the confusing and ambiguous backdrop against which Turkish intellectuals have to define their aims and negotiate the scope of their influence and responsibility

### **A divided middle class**

Almost without exception, intellectuals of the first reform period (1839–76) had their roots in one of three main official institutions: (1) the military; (2) the *ulema* (religious doctors); and (3) the bureaucracy. As a result of the *Tanzimat* reforms, new educational opportunities opened up at home and abroad for the elite. The generations that were thus able to get a mostly secular education eventually formed a class of modern professionals. Many early Ottoman intellectuals were recruited from this class of ‘new professionals’. Ziya Pasha (1825–80), for example, one of the leading figures of the Young Ottoman Society (founded in 1865), the son of a customs official, was educated in one of Mahmut II’s new *Rüşdiyye* (secondary) schools. Later, he advanced within the translation office of the Sublime Porte. Because of his activism, he had to flee to France in 1867, where he continued his opposition through the press. Upon his return to Turkey in 1872, he served as a member of the state council.

Namık Kemal (1840–88), son of a court astrologist and grandson of an army general (pasha) and educated by private tutors, is another example. After joining

the Young Ottomans, he had to flee to France in 1867, where, besides completing his education, he published opposition newspapers along with Ziya Pasha. Upon his return to Istanbul in 1870, he worked for a while in the translation office of the Sublime Porte, but was exiled again in 1873, to Cyprus. He was one of the leading figures behind the constitution of 1876.

Another prominent figure (and also a leading personality in the Young Ottoman Society, and, indeed, Namik Kemal's mentor), was Ibrahim Şinasi (1824–71), son of an artillery sergeant, who died when Şinasi was only a child. Şinasi received his education in one of the traditional state departments, the army arsenal (*Tophane*), but soon turned his interests to European languages and literature. At the age of 25 he was sent to France, where he met leading French Orientalists such as Lamartine and Ernest Renan. Back in Istanbul, he made his living as an author, translator, and publisher.

The Ottoman Empire was based on military expansion and had been a multicultural society since its early days in the fourteenth century. The empire reached its territorial zenith during the seventeenth century. The first loss of culturally assimilated territories under direct Ottoman rule was to Russia in 1768–74,<sup>3</sup> in terms of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca. This loss signalled dangerous tendencies of weakness and decline. Nonetheless, and in spite of several further territorial losses, the Ottomans still ruled vast areas at the time of the *Tanzimat* reforms, including the Balkans, North Africa and the Arab Middle East.

It goes without saying that the population of this vast empire was extremely heterogeneous. The relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims (Christians and Jews) had by tradition been regulated according to the *millet* system. This arrangement guaranteed non-Muslims certain autonomous legal rights within the framework of their own religious communities, but also excluded them from state office, including military service. An important change in these regulations occurred with a new reform charter (*Hatt-i Humayun*) in 1856, which built on the principle of equality, irrespective of religion. A large number of legal reforms followed, with liberalizing effects on the economy. Real estate, which had been under strict state control, was opened to private ownership through a law enacted in 1857.

Modernizing reforms gave rise to a new middle class. Because of the traditional division in Ottoman society between Muslim and non-Muslim populations, the middle class was from the very beginning divided into two parts: that part which grew out of industry and commerce, and the 'new professionals', most often recruited from different sections of the state bureaucracy, including the military and the *ulema*. The first part was dominated by non-Muslims, the latter by Muslims. The business-oriented non-Muslim middle class was also more liberal-minded than the Muslim 'professionals', who were dependent on the state for income as well as social status.

This division between a more liberal-minded and non-Muslim middle class and a more state-oriented and Muslim middle class would prove fatal in future

intellectual developments. As the empire lost more and more of its territory to the newly independent Balkan nations—Greece, Serbia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania (Bosnia and Herzegovina were occupied by the Habsburg Empire)—it also lost vital sections of the liberal-minded and business-oriented middle class. What remained was the Muslim-dominated professional middle class, dependent on the state for its social status, material existence, and moral strength.

### **The banned *ulema***

Contrary to the assessment found in official Turkish historiography, the *ulema* did play an important role in the intellectual life of Ottoman society. Under the absolutist regime of Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909), which followed a short period of constitutional rule (*Meşrutiyet*)(1876–78), many *ulema* joined the Young Turk opposition and became renowned activists in its most radical faction—the Committee of Union and Progress. In his chapter, *Turban and Fez*’, Ismail Kara provides a description of the *ulema* that stands in contrast to the commonly accepted notion of this class as hopelessly superstitious and reactionary and as nothing more than the obedient tools of a decadent regime.

Abdülhamid II’s accession to the throne in September 1876 occurred during a period of deep social, economic and political crises. He assumed power after his uncle Sultan Abdülaziz (r. 1861–76) had been deposed in a *coup d’état* (the toppled sultan committed suicide a week later). Abdülaziz was first replaced by his nephew Murat—Sultan Murat V—who, however, suffered a nervous breakdown shortly after his accession and was declared incompetent to rule. Abdülhamid II, who came to power during these dramatic events, was Murat’s younger brother.

Sultan Murat V was known to be close to the Young Ottomans (formed in 1865), who were advocates of a constitution and a parliament. The attempt to bring Murat to the throne was part of the efforts to institute a constitution. It fell to Abdülhamid to implement these reforms. However, a few months before his accession, Serbia had declared war on the empire (30 June 1876). The ensuing wars for control of the Balkans and the Caucasus (1876–78) had disastrous consequences for the empire, which lost about a third of its territory (including Cyprus) and over 20 per cent of its population in terms of the Berlin Conference at the end of the war in 1878.

It proved almost impossible to manage a parliamentary assembly that, given the traumatic circumstances, was bursting with criticism and complaint. In February 1878, when the Russians were approaching Istanbul (they were not stopped until they stood at San Stefano or Yeşilköy, only 12 kilometres outside Istanbul in March 1878) Sultan Abdülhamid II annulled the parliament indefinitely. After that he ruled with an iron fist.

Constitutional government was not revived until thirty years later (*İkinci Meşrutiyet*), a development that also led to the deposition of Abdülhamid II. The organization behind this upheaval was the Committee of Union and Progress, also called the Young Turks.

Abdülhamid II developed a special relationship with Islam. After the humiliating defeats in the Balkans and the Caucasus at the beginning of his reign, a large part of the former non-Muslim population was no longer part of the empire. At the same time, large numbers of Turkish people from the forfeited lands fled to Istanbul and other places in Anatolia. For a ruler with ambitions to strengthen his hold over the remaining parts of the empire, the question of a unifying ideology became urgent. Nationalism had flourished in Europe and in all those provinces that had struggled for independence from the Ottomans. What kind of 'nationhood' could the Ottomans claim? Turkish identity was no answer while a large part of the Ottoman population was still Arabic. Ottomanism was an ideology inherited from the early *Tanzimat* reformers, but it did not have the same appeal for people living in peripheral areas as it had for the elite living in or close to Istanbul. For those diverse populations drawn towards the centre through the ongoing process of centralization and infrastructural integration, Ottomanism was an ideology loaded with elite connotations, connotations that alienated rather than attracted the growing lower and middle classes. Islam, however, had much more appeal for common people and became a convenient tool in the hands of Abdülhamid II to rally support for his extensive reform programmes, and to demand loyalty to the state.

Under Abdülhamid II, Islam, in the guise of pan-Islamism (see Adeeb Khalid's chapter), gradually assumed the role of a common national ideology. This was one important reason that the sultan paid so much attention to the institution of the caliphate, which was revitalized during his reign. Using Islam as a kind of proto-national ideology led inevitably to what Kemal Karpat has epitomized as 'The Politicization of Islam' in the title of his recent book.<sup>4</sup>

This process could not leave the *ulema* untouched. Some sided with the sultan. Others turned against him to defend a purer form of Islam, unsullied by political or ideological concerns. Yet others turned against him because of his absolutism, which, according to their conception of Islamic jurisprudence, was unconstitutional.

The *ulema* were divided. As they were drawn into the whirl of political controversy, their traditional identity also changed. Activism went together with a process of 'intellectualization' (see Ismail Kara's chapter). They began to distance themselves from their own faith and traditions, thereby illustrating how they had gradually become more entrenched in modernity than either they themselves or their more secular-minded adversaries had ever realized.

During more than a decade of continuous warfare, starting with the Balkan Wars (1912–13), continuing with the First World War, followed immediately by the War of Independence (1919–22), power relationships changed dramatically. Mustafa Kemal and the group around him who managed to lead the Ottoman military forces to victory were also the carriers of a radical secularist ideology, inclined towards Westernization. In their zeal to build a new nation based on a Turkish national identity, they either suppressed or ignored those groups whose loyalty to the new regime they doubted. The *ulema* more or less disappeared as a result of the educational reforms in 1924, which entailed the closure of the

*mekteps* and *medreses* and the prohibition in 1925 of all *tarikats* (Sufi orders) and *tekkes* (lodges). Thus, groups supposedly subversive of the new regime were neutralized, but so too were many potential intellectuals and bearers of Islamic traditions and genuine domestic wisdom. In the new republic, the public space became a carefully guarded space for several decades to come. The comparative diversity of the Ottoman intellectual heritage was pushed into the background or relegated into oblivion for several generations. What remained was the dull spirit of authoritarian self-sufficiency.

### Overview of the book

In [Chapter 1](#), Erik-Jan Zürcher traces the Ottoman roots of the official nationalist ideology of the young Turkish republic. Kemalist ideology was summarized in the ‘Six Arrows’, adopted by the governing Republican People’s Party in 1931. Four of these, forming the essence of Kemalist ideology, namely secularism, nationalism, reformism, and populism, are analyzed in the light of their Ottoman origins, above all the ideology of the Young Turk movement. This analysis emphasizes the republican, secularist and anti-clericalist ideology in particular, and the significance of the Kemalist revolution in terms of its new radicalism.

Zürcher argues that Kemalism and Young Turk ideology were strongly influenced by French Positivism. The examples of Ahmet Rıza (who regarded himself as a disciple of Auguste Comte), Ziya Gökalp (who was a great admirer of Emile Durkheim), and Abdullah Cevdet (who translated quite a few works by the widely read and admired Gustave LeBon), are among the best-known cases discussed in this chapter. While the author acknowledges the diverse meanings of ‘Positivism’, this tradition, with its elitism and its belief in secularism and in the value of science and education, is held to have had an enduring impact on Turkish political thinking.

The Young Turk Movement obviously had a strong influence on the later Kemalist ideology. Şükrü Hanioglu’s recent works on the Committee of Union and Progress<sup>5</sup> are invaluable contributions to our knowledge and understanding of this period of late-Ottoman political and intellectual history. In [Chapter 2](#), Hanioglu offers a discussion of the influences of French and German materialism on late Ottoman intellectuals. The author’s emphasis is on the largely neglected German influence, which consisted of a special form of *Vulgärmaterialismus*, an interpretation of materialism that never took root among German thinkers but became especially influential among intellectuals of the late Ottoman era. Hanioglu’s chapter consists of an extensive survey and analysis of three radical materialists, namely Beşir Fu’ad (1852–87), Abdullah Cevdet (1869–1932), and Baha Tevfik (1884–1914), with respect to three major aspects of their scientific visions of a new Ottoman society: religion, philosophy and art, especially literature.

Late Ottoman materialism, with its vision of a rational civilization based on science, was deeply at odds with religion. For some thinkers, this antagonism was



understood as an invitation to condemn religion as the greatest obstacle to progress. Others interpreted this opposition as a challenge to bridge the gap between Islam and materialist philosophy. Hanioglu covers a wide spectrum of opinions on these intricate issues and undertakes a detailed discussion of how these views have worked their way into the official ideology of the Turkish republic right up to our own day

The depth of the changes taking place in the Ottoman Empire from the early nineteenth century should not be under-estimated. The relationship between the ruler, the power elite, and the subjects changed fundamentally. The state, both as configuration and ideology, underwent a fundamental transition. The German-born sociologist Norbert Elias (1897–1990), best known for *The Civilizing Process* (1939)<sup>6</sup> has discussed the altering forms of social integration during the European civilizing process in terms of changes in the ‘we-I balance’. In feudal times, when society was based on less complicated divisions of labour, the family and the local community constituted the most significant ‘we’-relationship for the individual. As development continued and gave rise to more complex relationships, the state (the nation-state) became an increasingly important framework for the integration of individual citizens. Looked at from this perspective, Christoph Neumann’s [Chapter 3](#) on Ahmed Cevdet Pasha (1823–95), prominent Ottoman statesman, grand vizier, and one of the greatest historians of the *Tanzimat* period, is especially interesting. *Tarih-i Cevdet*, for example, is an impressive historical work in twelve volumes, dealing with Ottoman history for the period between 1774 and 1826 and draws on the diverse legacy of Islamic scholars such as Ibn-Khaldun and Enlightenment *philosophes* such as Montesquieu. However, the focus of Neumann’s chapter is not on any particular work by Cevdet Pasha—a very prolific writer—but on the question of how his ‘we’-conception changed both in relation to earlier (pre-*Tanzimat*) Ottoman statesmen and historians and in the context of his own long career as statesman and intellectual. The ‘Ottoman governing elite’ and the ‘Ottoman Muslims’ increasingly give way to ‘we’ understood as ‘the state’—a concept, however, that for Cevdet Pasha remains abstract and imaginary, lacking any link to the idea of a social contract. Neumann’s conclusion is that Cevdet Pasha’s veneration of a somewhat drained concept of the state—patterned on the old sultanate—has had a strong bearing on the political culture of modern Turkey, even into the present period.

*Hanımlara mahsûs gazete* (‘The Ladies’ Own Gazette’) was a magazine that appeared for a period of fourteen years, between 1895 and 1909. This coincides almost exactly with the period of active Young Turk opposition. Notwithstanding this chronological overlap, there are greater differences than similarities between the character of the oppositional Young Turks and the spirit permeating this magazine, which not only survived much longer than similar magazines (which usually lasted for a year or less), but which found its own press and published its own supplement for girls and a separate magazine for children. It goes without saying that in order to keep on good terms with the government, the magazine supported the Hamidian reforms and kept a low profile on politically sensitive

issues. However, since it was an important forum for ideas on women's emancipation, the fact that it escaped Abdülhamid II's censorship is a sign as good as any of the sultan's reformist leanings on issues of education, including instruction for girls and the professionalization of women. This reformism may sound contradictory, keeping in mind the authoritarianism of the Hamidian regime, but shows, as a matter of fact the actual relatedness and continuity between the Hamidian and the ensuing early republican era.

In [Chapter 4](#), Elizabeth Frierson analyzes the *Hanımlara mahsûs gazete* by placing it into a wider historical context, emphasizing especially the conditions prevailing for the serial press and women's status in late Ottoman society. It is true that feminism, for several decades has come to permeate historiographic discourse. Still, it is not until the last decade, or so, that there has been a breakthrough in the study of women's intellectual history. This concern has also brought a recognition that women's emancipation not only has involved upper-class women, but also women of ordinary social status. The road is thereby opened to a re-evaluation of what was achieved in the Hamidian era concerning progress on women's issues. Frierson's contention is that even if the main emphasis in the serial press was on the motherly, wifely and religious virtues of women, there were also openings for deeper redefinitions of Ottoman womanhood within a modernizing society.

[Chapter 5](#), 'Turban and Fez' concerns the role of the *ulema* (learned establishment). Ismail Kara spotlights the *ulema* at the point in time when they joined forces with the Young Turk opposition (1896). By presenting a selection of oppositional pamphlets and other publications from this period written by members of the *ulema*, the author analyzes through numerous illustrative examples the transformations taking place in their general worldview. Kara argues that under the spell of activism, an 'intellectualization', in the modern sense of the word, took place, which meant that many *ulema* fundamentally changed their evaluations of history as well as of basic political conceptions (including the caliphate). True, many *ulema* remained under the influence of *medreses* (Islamic educational institutions), which were untouched by modern influences, but many *ulema* played a central role in the unfolding ideological and political strife.

The *ulema* are also analyzed in Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen's [Chapter 9](#), which deals with local muftis in the Levantine capitals of Damascus and Beirut. By definition, the main duty of a mufti was to deliver *fatwas* (legal opinions), but in the Ottoman Empire muftis had also acquired the role of local religious leaders in a wider sense. Accordingly, their duties included formal control over *waqfs* (pious foundations) and supervision of schools and mosques. Adopting an historical perspective stretching back to the classical Ottoman period, Skovgaard-Petersen analyzes how the local Ottoman *ulema* came closer to being modern (i.e., critical) intellectuals through the influence of modernization. The issuing of *fatwas* for specific persons or public authorities was exchanged for involvement in general public debate. Kara's and Skovgaard-Petersen's analyses of the 'intellectualization' of the *ulema* during the reform period support each other. Whereas the *ulema* were

banned in republican Turkey in the name of secularism, they carried on as a part of the administrative and intellectual elite in post-war Levantine society. Skovgaard-Petersen's chapter can also be read with that comparative perspective in mind.

Pan-Islamism, the topic of [Chapter 6](#) by Adeeb Khalid, was an issue of special concern to the *ulema*. But, as Khalid points out, pan-Islamism was at least as much related to politics as to religion. Its significance lay in the fact that it served as a kind of proto-nationalism during a specific historical epoch, namely the 'age of empire' (Eric Hobsbawm), a period that more or less coincided with Abdülhamid II's reign.

Khalid distinguishes between three different forms of pan-Islamism: (1) pan-Islamism as a form of religious fanaticism, as it was generally understood by contemporary Europeans; (2) pan-Islamism as Ottoman state policy; and (3) pan-Islamism as a new form of solidarity that knitted Muslim elites together. The author pays particular attention to the last variant, 'public pan-Islamism'. Compared with the two first mentioned variants of pan-Islamism, the third implies a broader, more complex, even contradictory conceptualization built on the contributions of 'foreign' (non-Ottoman) Muslims from Russia, Central Asia, and India.

In a society that still lacked universities, academies and public libraries, the press, including books as well as periodicals, played an important role as a medium for the exchange of ideas and the formation of intellectual networks. Based on the Ottoman statistical yearbooks (*salname*), Johann Strauss in [Chapter 7](#) presents an extensive survey of publications authorized by the Ministry of Public Education, starting from 1880. Included in the official registers were not only publications in Turkish, Arabic and Persian, but also in the languages of the non-Muslim minorities (Greek, Armenian, Bulgarian), or in European languages (French, Italian, English, German).

Strauss' analysis highlights several issues of general significance for the understanding of the character of cultural life in late Ottoman society. The first relates to the great multitude of communities involved in the process of publication. As an example, the author mentions that as late as 1914 the majority of printing presses in Istanbul were still run by non-Muslims. The second issue concerns the mutual influence between the different communities. Ottoman society was truly multicultural, a characteristic that was accentuated by the increase in publications and the development of more complex social and political networks. This diversity (especially in Istanbul) constituted one of the most important characteristics of the Ottoman intellectual heritage, a legacy, which, according to the author, was dramatically lost with the demise of the empire.

Education as an institution in Ottoman society grew in importance during the nineteenth century. In [Chapter 8](#) on Christian community schools during the Ottoman reform period, Akşin Somel deals with changes taking place in the Christian educational institutions—Greek, Arab, Bulgarian, Albanian, and Armenian—during the Ottoman reform period. The political importance of non-Muslim community schools began to emerge when the values of the European

Enlightenment became more widespread among some of the non-Muslim literati and a current of nationalist thought began to penetrate the non-Muslim communities. Secular notions of progress and individualism were also acquired through the missionary schools, which became increasingly influential in the Balkans, Anatolia and the Arab-speaking provinces. Missionary schools offered instruction in the local vernacular and provided the opportunity for pupils to learn a modern Western language such as English, French or German.

Ottomanism was a response elaborated by the Ottoman elite to the challenges of the various nationalist movements that threatened the unity of the empire. In Somel's analysis, emphasis is placed on the role of the Christian community schools in weakening the multiethnic social fabric of the Ottoman Empire, as modernization shook the traditional integral structure of religious communities, thus politicizing them and opening the way for the spread of nationalism and other modern ideologies.

The last chapter, by Nathalie Clayer, is a study of Ottoman civil servants of Albanian origin who were educated in the *Mektebi-i Mülkiye*, established in 1869. Clayer analyzes what happened to these elite groups during and after the Hamidian regime, especially in relation to Albanian national independence, first in 1913 and again after the First World War, following the Austrian occupation in 1915. The archives show that the return of Ottoman civil servants of Albanian origin to post-independence Albania was by no means inevitable. Members of this Muslim minority were torn between Albanianism and Ottomanism, that is between loyalties to their native region and loyalties to the Ottoman state and its capital Istanbul.

The data do not indicate any major motive separating those who remained in Ottoman service from those who went to Albania. The only discernible trend is one of age, in that there were more young *mülkiye* graduates among those joining the new Albanian state than among those who did not. The overall effect of Balkan independence, however, was that an important share of Ottoman intellectual 'capital' was transferred to the new Balkan states. Thus, an elite with roots in the Ottoman educational and administrative system continued to shape political and intellectual life in the Balkan areas, while, on the other hand, what remained of it in Turkey was screened out by the new regime there and lost some of its power and energy.

To illustrate her analysis, Clayer has added an extensive appendix containing short biographical notes of the surveyed Albanian *mülkiyelis*.

### Conclusion

The chapters presented in this volume are as good a sign as any of a rising interest in the roots of Turkish intellectual life. As a matter of fact, Turkish historiography has come a long way during the past couple of decades towards breaking the earlier silence about and indifference towards the Ottoman heritage. It is true that since the establishment of the republic, nationalism combined with authoritarianism has weighed heavily on Turkish intellectual life, and continues to do so, but one should

not ignore the tribute demanded by the nation-building process, especially in a heterogeneous and poorly integrated society.

Without denying the pull of nationalism, the aim of the present volume is to draw attention to the ongoing development of alternative, original perspectives on Turkish and Ottoman intellectual history. It is a pleasure to present this book as part of a larger scholarly endeavour towards that end, an endeavour possibly powerful enough to carry along with it the larger community of intellectuals.

### Notes

- 1 For an all but vulgar version of this interpretation, see Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963, reprinted 1998. In this widely read work the author distinguished the reign of Abdulhamid II (1876–1909), which he designated as the period of ‘reaction’, from, in his opinion, the more promising *Tanzimat* reform period. Still, it is against Berkes’s critical description of the Hamidian dark regime that the secular Republic stands out in new and bright colours.
- 2 Leading names (and works)—just to mention a few—in this tradition are: Kemal Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001; Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961; İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyih*, Istanbul: Hil Yaymlan, 1983; Şükrü Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995; and by the same author, *Preparation for a Revolution, 1902–1908*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001; and Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire*, London: I.B.Tauris, 1999.
- 3 Certainly, Küçük Kaynarca was not the first major Ottoman defeat. Hungary and Transylvania had been lost in 1699. The difference, however, was that with the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca the Ottomans lost closely incorporated areas, while Hungary and Transylvania had only been partially assimilated at the cultural level.
- 4 Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity*.
- 5 Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, and Hanioglu, *Preparation for a Revolution*.
- 6 See Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2000. By the same author, see also *The Society of Individuals*, London: Continuum, 2001.

# 1

## Ottoman sources of Kemalist thought

*Erik-Jan Zürcher*

The radicalism of the ideological stance of the Kemalist republican regime after 1923 never ceased to amaze its contemporaries. To those who observed Turkey from afar or who visited its towns (but not its villages) in the 1920s and 1930s, a spectacular transformation seemed to be taking place that affected not only Turkey's institutions and its legal system, but also the very way of life of the Turks. As most observers were not intimately familiar with Turkey's recent history and the achievements of the late Ottoman Empire in the field of modernization, developments in the Kemalist republic were all seen as part of a brave and entirely new experiment. In popular writing on Turkey this image persists, but in academic writing it has long been superseded by analyses that see the Kemalist policies as the last phase of reform policies initiated by the Ottoman Empire. For those who try to gauge on a scholarly level the origins of the Kemalist 'revolution' and the way it was influenced by the Ottoman intellectual heritage, it is important first of all to establish precisely where the Kemalists were radical innovators and where they were not. In doing so, we can do no better than take as our point of departure the definition of the essential elements in its ideology given by the Kemalist party itself: the 'Six Arrows' (*Altı Ok*), adopted at the Party Congress of 1931 and inserted into the Turkish Constitution in 1937. These were republicanism, secularism, nationalism, reformism, populism and etatism.<sup>1</sup> Of these, two may be described as dealing with instruments rather than objects of policy, republicanism and etatism. The other four together therefore form the quintessence of Kemalist ideology. To what extent were these new and radical? Let us look briefly at the four elements in turn and compare Kemalist policies with those of the preceding era and with the ideas formulated by a number of leading thinkers and writers of the Second Constitutional Period.

Fortunately, we are now in a position to make use of excellent scholarly analyses of the work of each of the leading Young Turk thinkers. Ziya Gökalp was the first to receive attention in Uriel Heyd's *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism*, which appeared as far back as 1950. Şerif Mardin's 1964 study, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri* ('The Political Ideas of the Young Turks') is an analysis of the ideas expressed in the leading Young Turk *émigré* journals by writers such as Ahmet Rıza, Abdullah Cevdet and Samipaşazade Sezai, as well as those of 'liberals' such as Prens Sabahattin, who are less relevant to our discussion here,



Figure 1.1 Yusuf Akçura (1876–1935; second from left) during the War of Independence.

having been rejected by the dominant Unionist faction of the Young Turks even before 1912. Mardin's subject was taken up from the 1970s onwards in Şükrü Hanioglu's works, first in his *Bir siyasal düşünür olarak doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve dönemi* ('Doctor Abdullah Cevdet as a Political Thinker and his Times', 1981) and later in his two-volume history of the Young Turk movement between 1889 and 1908, *The Young Turks in Opposition* (1995) and *Preparation for a Revolution, 1902–1908* (2001). The two leading intellectual figures among the Russian *émigrés* in the Ottoman Empire, Yusuf Akçura and Ahmet Ağaoğlu, have been respectively treated in François Georgeon's 1979 PhD thesis, published in Turkish in 1986 as *Türk milliyetçiliğinin kökenleri: Yusuf Akçura (1876–1935)* ('The Roots of Turkish Nationalism') and Holly Shissler's PhD thesis, 'Turkish Identity between Two Empires: Ahmet Ağaoğlu (1869–1919)'.<sup>2</sup>

In addition, we have the studies not of individual thinkers, but of currents: Füsün Üstel's study of the Turkish Hearth movement and Masami Arai's contents analysis of its journal, *Türk Yurdu*; Esther Debus's study of the Islamist-modernist journal *Sebilürreşad*; and Jacob Landau's work on pan-Turkism and on pan-Islamism. Of particular relevance to any discussion of the sources of Kemalism is Şükrü Hanioglu's article on the *Garbcılar* ('Westernists') movement.<sup>3</sup>

When we compare Kemalist ideology to the ideas of these influential Young Turk writers (Ahmet Rıza, Abdullah Cevdet, Ziya Gökalp, Ahmet Ağaoğlu and

Yusuf Akçura), we must of course be aware that their ideas on the vital issues that concerned them evolved over time. They lived in times of enormous upheaval (the Constitutional Revolution, the Balkan War, the First World War, the Russian Revolution, the Independence War, and the end of the empire), and their thinking reflected the fast-changing circumstances surrounding them. It is not difficult to find contradictions in the writings of each and every one of them, but we can try to discern the essential characteristics of their thinking on the four principles of secularism, nationalism, populism and reformism.

### Secularism

There can be no doubt that secularizing trends had been present in the Ottoman Empire for at least a century. Even the early modern empire, basing itself on classical theories going back to the Seljuks, had recognized state and religion (*din ü devlet*) as distinct spheres, but saw them as mutually dependent. The *Tanzimat* period and the Hamidian era had witnessed the transformation of administrative and educational institutions along European, particularly French, lines—in other words, the modernization of the *devlet*. Those who had an exclusively traditional *ulema* education had to make way for professional bureaucrats trained in institutions modelled on the French *grandes écoles* and were less and less able to attain high office. Eventually, *din* was also affected. The introduction of state-run educational establishments and of legislation derived from European examples meant encroachments upon the role of the *ulema* in their primary spheres of influence, education and law. The Young Turk reforms, particularly those of 1916–17, in which the *Şeyhülislam*, the highest religious authority in the land, was excluded from the cabinet, and jurisdiction over the religious colleges and charitable foundations was transferred to secular ministries, were final stages in the Ottoman secularization process. The changes introduced in 1917 into the family law, the only legislation still based on Islamic canon law (*şeriat*), brought it more into line with European practice.

The post-war regime in Istanbul tried to reverse some of these changes, but the Kemalists continued where the Unionists had left off. As soon as the War of Independence had been won, but even before peace had been concluded, Mustafa Kemal began to make public his ideas on the role of religion, and he did so in a very consistent manner. He emphasized that he was not against Islam, on the contrary, defending it as ‘the most rational and natural of religions’.<sup>4</sup> At the same time, he fiercely attacked the role of the clergy, saying that true Islam did not recognize priesthood or any kind of intermediary between man and God.<sup>5</sup> He was particularly critical of those men of religion whose position was not recognized by the state. The anticlerical rhetoric of his speeches was very often combined with warnings about the danger posed by reactionaries, who would use religion for political ends. *İrtica*, religious reaction, a term that had gained currency among the Young Turks at the time of the counter-revolution of April 1909, was frequently referred to in his speeches.<sup>6</sup>



This anti-clericalism, which at the same time defended a 'pure' Islam as rational and progressive, clearly owed a lot to Young Turk predecessors of the Kemalists. In his many articles in *Mechveret* and other journals published during his long stay in Paris, Ahmet Rıza had shown himself a convinced supporter of a *laïque* order in which religion relinquished its hold over education, administration and politics. Clearly, Islam held little attraction for him as a revealed faith, but it was important to him as a form of social cement and, as such, more conducive to progress than other faiths.<sup>7</sup> Apologetic arguments defending the essential rationality and openness to science of Islam make up a large part of his writing. In Rıza's view, the transition from Islam to materialism and even positivism was much easier than that from Christianity to science. Even his private correspondence seems to show that Ahmet Rıza was fiercely anti-clerical (accusing the 'ignorant imams and softas' of fostering obscurantism), but that he does seem to have believed that there is a 'real' Islam that is entirely compatible with science and materialism.<sup>8</sup>

Of all the Young Turk publicists, Abdullah Cevdet was the most radical secularist. He not only advocated a complete separation of religion and state, but, as a convinced materialist, he sought ways of gradually weaning Muslims away from their religious world-view and guiding them to a worldview based only on science. Cevdet's public attacks on the clergy and the sheikhs were more outspoken than Ahmet Rıza's. There can be little doubt that he eventually considered himself an atheist (although Mardin points out a mystical element in his thinking),<sup>9</sup> but like Ahmet Rıza he saw in a purified Islam a valuable instrument for social cohesion and progress. Over time, Abdullah Cevdet seems to have become more pessimistic about the possibilities of Islam as a vehicle of progress.

Ziya Gökalp was a convinced secularist in the sense that he favoured a strict separation of state and religion. His 1917 memorandum on the issue to the Committee of Union and Progress paved the way for the abolition of the Sheykhulislamate and of the *medreses* by the Kemalists in 1924. Although he was certainly influenced by Islamic mysticism in his youth, Gökalp despised the religious orders for the fatalist mentality they instilled in their followers. He did not favour the abolition of the caliphate, seeing in a purely religious caliphate an instrument for renovation in the Islamic world. But in some areas he went further than the Kemalists, notably in demanding the transfer of the Islamic charitable foundations (*evkaf*) to local authorities controlled by the public.<sup>10</sup>

Ahmet Ağaoğlu agreed with Gökalp that an obscurantist clergy should not be allowed to interfere in government affairs or with freedom of thought. In that sense, he was a secularist and an anti-clericalist. Along with most other Young Turk thinkers, Ağaoğlu held that Islam was not hostile to science, quite the reverse, and that Islamic society could be revitalized through the adoption of European technology and science. Like Gökalp and most Islamic modernists, Ağaoğlu made a distinction between the eternal truth of Islam and its application in specific times and specific societies, but he did not go so far as to see in God a projection of the moral values of the community or the nation (as Gökalp seemed to do at times).<sup>11</sup>

He was strongly influenced (like Akçura) by the *Usul-u cedit* movement of Ismail Gasprinskij, which combined pan-Turkist sentiments with Islamic revivalism, and both elements remained very important in his thinking until the end of the Young Turk period at least.

Yusuf Akçura seems to have been the least interested in religious matters of the Young Turk thinkers under consideration here, but his ideas on Islam, like those of Ağaoğlu, seem to have been taken from the *Usul-u cedit* movement in the Russian Empire. Like Gökalp, he criticized the European-Islamic dichotomy created by the *Tanzimat* reforms and the fact that the *Tanzimat* politicians had left Islam to the 'obscurantist' clerics and sheikhs. Also like Gökalp, Akçura was in favour of a Turkified Islam, which in his case seems to have meant that Turkish should replace Arabic as the language of religion. Akçura advocated a thorough reform of Islamic education in the *medreses*, but not their abolition.<sup>12</sup>

Clearly, Kemalist secularism was anchored in the mainstream of Young Turk ideas on the subject. The Kemalist reforms of 1924 (abolition of the Caliphate and Sheykhulislamate, the unification of education under a secular ministry and the institution of directorates for religious affairs and for charitable foundations) can all be seen as logical conclusions of the Ottoman secularization process. Where the Kemalists really did go a lot further than their predecessors was in banning the religious orders (*tarikats*) and closing down shrines in 1925, and in the wholesale introduction of European family law in 1926. These measures were radically new because they meant that the state now interfered to an unprecedented degree in Islamic institutions unconnected to the state and in personal relationships between citizens. These measures not only concerned institutions and legislation, but the 'way of life' of the ordinary citizen. Even in measures which had no immediately religious aspect and seemed to be aimed at Europeanization of the Turkish lifestyle, secularism and anticlericalism played a role: in his 1925 speech in Kastamonu in which he launched the campaign for dress reform, Mustafa Kemal explicitly pointed to the fact that by wearing ceremonial dress in public, sheikhs and clerics usurped the authority that belonged to state-appointed officials, and that this use of robes should be banned.<sup>13</sup> The Kemalist decision to close down the *medreses* (and later the schools for prayer leaders and the faculty of theology in Istanbul) also constituted a clean break with the ideas of the Young Turks, most of whom had set great store by a modernization of Islamic education.

### Nationalism

Under the influence of European academic orientalism and of Turkish intellectuals from the Russian Empire influenced by Ismail Gasprinskij's *Usul-u cedit*, awareness of, and pride in, Turkishness as a distinct identity had been growing among the Ottoman ruling elite around the turn of the century, but for Ottoman Turkish intellectuals it was just one element in a complex identity in which being an Ottoman subject (and often a servant of the Ottoman state) and a Muslim were at least equally important. Pan-Turkist sentiments, like pan-Islamist ones, were

exploited politically by the Unionist government, but the circle of convinced pan-Turkists remained very small and was dominated by immigrants from Russia. The Committee of Union and Progress never opted for a Turkish, rather than an Ottoman state and, as Hasan Kayalı has shown, the charges of Turkification levelled against them by Arabs and Albanians were largely unjustified.<sup>14</sup>

Ahmet Rıza never wrote much about the issues of nation and nationalism, but, like those of so many of his contemporaries, his ideas evolved over time. In the 1890s he was still clearly an Ottomanist and nationality to him was a voluntarist and legalist concept in the tradition of the French Revolution. After 1902 there was a gradual change in which not only the defence of the Ottoman Empire, but also the defence of the position of the Ottoman-Muslim elite within it became more and more important to the young Turk leaders. By 1906 this change was complete.<sup>15</sup> It is hard at this time to distinguish between Ottoman-Muslim proto-nationalism and Turkish nationalism, but as the dominant element in the Muslim elite was Turkish, Turkishness also received more emphasis. Ahmet Rıza never became an outspoken Turkish nationalist, however.

Although he used the term 'Türkiye' to describe the Ottoman Empire earlier than other Ottoman intellectuals, Abdullah Cevdet consistently defended the idea of the 'unity of the elements' (*İttihadi anasir*), that is, Ottomanism. That he disliked the term 'Ottomanism' was due to the fact that he saw Ottoman patriotism as based on shared interests of the different communities and not on adherence to the monarchy.<sup>16</sup> Of all Young Turks, Abdullah Cevdet probably came closest to being a republican, but when, after the First World War, he had to admit the failure of Ottomanism, he turned not to Turkish nationalism but to his Kurdish roots, involving himself in the embryonic Kurdish national movement. This meant that, paradoxically, the very thinker who was closest to the Kemalist programme in many ways was ostracized by the republican regime for his politics during the years of the armistice.

Gökalp has often been described as the father of Turkish nationalism, but this is only partly true. Although a strict secularist in the French sense of being *laïque*, Gökalp did accord an important place to Islam as a constituent element of the Turkish national identity. Indeed, in some of his writings he seems to equate the nation with God as the highest moral authority.<sup>17</sup> He opposed the traditional Islamic position that Islam and nationalism were incompatible and saw a revived Turkish national state as a bulwark both of the Islamic and of the Turkic world. Gökalp argued for a Turkification of Islam (though his ideas on this remained rather vague) and he saw a genuine popular religion as a source of strength for nation-building.

Ağaoğlu in his younger years identified himself politically as a Muslim of the Russian Empire and culturally as a Persian or Shi'ite Muslim.<sup>18</sup> Gradually, pan-Turkist nationalism became more important to him, but—at least until the establishment of the republic—he rejected a complete separation of state and religion, as he held that religion was indispensable as a unifying part of the national identity and was needed to underpin a viable nation-state.<sup>19</sup>

From the publication of his famous series of articles called *Üç Tarzı Siyaset* ('Three Types of Policy') in 1904 onwards, Yusuf Akçura was the recognized leader of the Turkish nationalist current that grew up around the *Türk Ocakları* clubs and the journal *Türk Yurdu*. His main thesis was that the Ottoman Empire should identify itself with Turkish nationalism and put itself at the head of the Turkic world. His pan-Turkist nationalism was based on the concept of *ırk* (race), which, however, did not yet carry racist connotations and can be more properly translated as 'ethnicity'.<sup>20</sup> After the First World War (and the Russian Revolution) he largely abandoned political pan-Turkist ambitions and instead supported the Kemalist nation-building effort, both politically and academically.<sup>21</sup>

### *How does Kemalist nationalism fit into this picture?*

As early as the spring of 1923, when negotiations in Lausanne were still stalled and peace seemed a long way off, Mustafa Kemal talked about having established a new and *Turkish* state, different from the Ottoman state it succeeded (although at this time he still maintained that it was one of a kind and quite different from a republican regime).<sup>22</sup> Turkey' (*Türkiye*), the loan-word which had been used off and on as an equivalent of the Ottoman Empire by Mustafa Kemal at least as far back as 1919, now became the sole descriptive term for the country. The dominant discourse of the national struggle period, with its talk of 'Turkish-Muslim' and 'Ottoman-Muslim' rights and 'Turkish-Kurdish solidarity' was abandoned overnight. The new national state was Turkish, and Turkish identity was based on 'language, culture and ideal' (*dil, hars, mefkure*), as programmes of the People's Party in 1927 and 1931 would make clear. It is striking that, unlike the secularist discourse discussed earlier, the Turkish nationalist discourse was introduced in 1923 without any argument or discussion of its content, as something that was entirely self-evident. In fact, not until fifteen years later, in Tekin Alp's *Le Kémalisme* of 1937, do we see an attempt to discuss the nature of Turkish nationalism in detail.<sup>23</sup>

When compared to the ideas of the Young Turks, we see that Kemalist nationalism was much closer to the culturally defined nationalism of Gökâlþ than to the ethnic nationalism of Akçura (although of course no nationalism is ever either the one or the other). The fundamental distinction that Gökâlþ borrowed from Tönnies,<sup>24</sup> that between 'culture' (*hars*) and 'civilization' (*medeniyet*), is kept by the Kemalists and, as in the case of Gökâlþ, allows them to argue for a revival of Turkish culture while at the same time advocating a transition to European civilization. What is completely lacking in Kemalist nationalism, however, is the idea, shared by Gökâlþ, Ađaođlu, Akçura and even to a certain extent by Rıza and Cevdet, that Islam should play an important role as a constituent of national identity and as social cement.

That the Kemalists should opt for a radically secularist and Turkish nationalist stance from 1923 onwards is remarkable, because this decision, or series of decisions, followed hard on the heels of the very period that had witnessed the

strongest religious colouring of political discourse in late Ottoman history. From the outbreak of the Balkan War in 1912 onwards, and certainly after the *Babı Ali Vakıası* (the *coup d'état* of January 1913), the Unionists had tried to mobilize the population by appealing to sentiments of Muslim solidarity. The many clubs, committees and societies founded from 1912 onwards, which carried the epithet *millî* (national) in their name, were without exception organizations with an Ottoman-Muslim membership. When the National Economy Programme was launched, the consumer cooperatives, production cooperatives, firms and banks that were started, generally had *millî* in their name as well and they were founded by and for Ottoman Muslims, in open competition with the Christian minorities who, in cooperation with European interests, dominated the modern sectors of the Ottoman economy.

The years 1914–18 saw an intensification of ethnic/religious tensions and, correspondingly, of the religious colouring of Ottoman politics. This resulted directly in the expulsion of a large section of the Greek community on the Aegean coast and, of course, in the deportations and massacres of the Armenians in 1915. The national resistance movement in Anatolia after the First World War, the *millî mücadele*, constitutes the high water mark of religiously flavoured politics. The proclamations of the movement, starting with those of the Congress of Erzurum in July 1919 and continuing with those of the Congress of Sivas, of the last Ottoman parliament and of the first National Assembly (1910–23), as well as the speeches of its leaders, such as Mustafa Kemal Pasha, make clear the extent to which the population of Anatolia was mobilized on the basis of Muslim solidarity. Islamic symbolism and religious ceremonies were so much in evidence that even a fairly conservative man like the commander of the Eastern Front, Kâzım Karabekir, remarked on it. Finally, the population exchange agreed to at Lausanne in 1923, defined the groups that were to be exchanged in religious terms, Greek Orthodox from Turkey, Muslims from Greece.<sup>25</sup>

Seen in this context it is all the more surprising that the political leadership of the new republic opted for a policy of radical secularism and Turkish (instead of Ottoman-Muslim) nationalism. The reasons for this change have yet to be explained satisfactorily, but the most logical explanation seems to be that with the threat to the survival of the country gone, the need for large-scale mobilization had also disappeared. The question that Ottoman reformers had been asking themselves for two generations, 'How can the state be saved?', took on another meaning. Militarily and politically it *had* been saved. Now the number one priority of the Kemalists was the rejuvenation and modernization of society in order to catch up with Europe in terms of wealth and power. In the eyes of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his circle, this could only be achieved in the context of a secular nation-state. Was it not true, after all, that the outcome of the First World War had shown that the days of empire had passed?

Secularism and nationalism undoubtedly make up the core of Kemalist ideology. Let us now briefly touch on the two other principles we selected from the *Altı Ok*, reformism and populism.

### Reformism

The correct interpretation of the term *inkılapçılık* has been a matter of both academic and political debate in Turkey for a long time, but to my mind there can be no doubt that what Mustafa Kemal and his followers meant when they used it was reformism rather than revolution, even though the term *inkılap* originally referred to revolution (of the spheres). When referring to the changes they brought about in Turkey, they carefully avoided using the term *ihtilâl*, which they did use in their many references to the French Revolution. Although to Young Turks and Kemalists alike, the French Revolution was an inspiring example, they were not revolutionaries. Indeed, as Hanioglu has pointed out,<sup>26</sup> ‘the problem of how to change the regime without a revolution was deemed paramount’ among the Young Turks. The whole generation of Young Turk thinkers and politicians was deeply influenced by Gustave Le Bon’s ideas on the psychology of the masses, and the fear of the irrational behaviour of a people who were not led firmly by an intellectual elite, was deep-rooted among them. For the Kemalists, orderly transformation from above was the ideal, not upheaval from below, and in this they were at one with the late Ottoman reformers. The monarchy was abolished, but the right of the ruling elite to govern, and that of the landowners to own the land, was never questioned.

### Populism and etatism

The concept of populism, as used by the Kemalists, always was a vague one. On the one hand, there was a certain element of romantic idealization of ‘the people’, in particular, the Anatolian peasantry, which owed something to the *Halka doğru* (‘Towards the People’) movement of the First World War and, indirectly, to the *Narodniki* in Russia. Populism’s more important, and concrete, connotation was that of the denial of the existence of classes in Turkey and the advocacy of absolute national solidarity in which each section of society had a specific role to play. When Mustafa Kemal founded his party in 1922, he went out of his way to explain that this was what the ‘Halk’ (People) of *Halk Fırkası* meant, in order to dispel any fears that this was a leftist or even socialist party. The term *halkçılık* had already been a favourite of Ziya Gökalp, who used it interchangeably with *tenasütçülük* (solidarism). In their denial of class struggle, their calling for national solidarity and their ruthless suppression of class-based organizations, there is a direct continuity between the Unionists and the Kemalists, but the latter even rejected corporatism (which had gained a certain popularity among the Unionists during the First World War and in the first National Assembly in Ankara) as being too divisive.<sup>27</sup> Under the cloak of solidarism, the socioeconomic policies of the republic were a continuation of the national economy programme that the Unionists had put in place after 1913. Echoing ideas advocated by Yusuf Akçura and the German socialist arms dealer and publicist Alexander Helphand (‘Parvus’), Kemalism aimed at the creation of a strong ‘national’ bourgeoisie

under the protection of the state. As Zafer Toprak has shown, there is a strong strand of continuity between the ‘National Economy’ programme of the First World War and the etatist politics of the Kemalists in the 1930s.<sup>28</sup>

The conclusion that there is a great deal of common ground between the Kemalist policies and the ideas of the leading thinkers of the Young Turk period, and between the ideas of these Young Turks themselves leads logically to the question whether there are common sources. These are not hard to find. We have already pointed out the importance of the *Usul-u cedid* movement in Czarist Russia to the thinking of the Muslim immigrants from the Russian Empire, such as Aġaoġlu and Akçura (or, for that matter, Hüseyinzade Ali). But the emphasis on secularism (in the sense of *laïcité*) and anti-clericalism, and also the belief in science and education and the role of an intellectual elite in transforming society, the predilection for orderly reform and progress and for a society based on solidarity, all lead us almost automatically in the direction of French positivism. And, indeed, the studies of the Young Turk ideologues make it clear that many of the names associated with French positivism figure among those who influenced them most deeply. But can the Young Turks themselves or even those French intellectuals who influenced them most deeply, be considered full-blown positivists?

Ahmet Rıza was, of course, a self-confessed positivist. Uniquely among the leading Young Turks, he actually became a member of the Positivist church and was deeply influenced by Pierre Laffitte, who, after Comte’s death in 1857, had succeeded him as head of the majority wing of the movement and President of the Religious, later Positivist, Committee. There can be no doubt that Ahmet Rıza’s picture of an ideal society, based on orderly progress through a division of labour under the enlightened guidance of a ‘scientific’ elite, was derived from Laffitte. That Laffitte represented a fairly broad-minded version of positivism and ‘was inclined to dilute the positivist gospel with generous doses of common sense’<sup>29</sup> must have helped. But as Haniöġlu has pointed out, the ideas of an orderly, harmonious society built on a division of labour were also easily reconciled with older Ottoman ideas on social order.<sup>30</sup>

None of the other Young Turk writers was as closely associated with those who held positions in organized positivism as was Ahmet Rıza, but a number of people who were in contact with the positivists and are often labelled positivists themselves were very influential among the Young Turks. One such central figure is the philosopher and historian Ernest Renan. Aġaoġlu was in direct contact with Renan and was certainly influenced by him in his ideas on history and religion. Renan was a secularist and anticlerical, but he nevertheless saw religion as a fundamental human need and a social bond.<sup>31</sup> Abdullah Cevdet does not seem to have been in touch with Renan, but he became a *cause célèbre* through his Turkish translation of Dozy’s *Essay sur l’Histoire de l’Islamisme*, which could be said to be an attempt to treat Islam and the prophet Muhammad as Christianity and Jesus had been treated by Renan in his *Vie de Jésus*. Renan’s conception of nationalism, which famously defined the nation as ‘a daily plebiscite’ but also idealized a



historically grown French ‘national character’, can also be said to have influenced the Young Turks. Certainly Kemalist nationalism displays the same characteristic of being voluntarist/legalist and romantic at the same time. But was Renan really a positivist? He did reject theology and metaphysics, but in his early *L’Avenir de la science*, written in 1848 but published only in 1890, which is the book in which he comes closest to positivism, he explicitly disavows Comte. He was a close friend of Littré (the leader of the minority faction within positivism) and helped to get Laffitte appointed to the College de France, but he wrote that he regarded positivism as an intellectual straitjacket.<sup>32</sup>

Ahmet Ağaoğlu and Yusuf Akçura both attended classes at the famous *École Libre des Sciences Politiques* in Paris, which had been founded in 1874 and went on to produce generations of top-level French administrators. Here the intellectual climate was dominated, if not by positivism, then certainly by ideas and people related to it. Chief among these was Emile Boutmy, the founder and director of the school. Ağaoğlu and Akçura were taught by him (among others) and Abdullah Cevdet was also deeply impressed by the ideas of Boutmy and translated one of his works (on the ‘Political Psychology of the English People’) into Turkish.<sup>33</sup>

Perhaps no European thinker had greater influence on the Young Turks than Gustave Le Bon, quite a few of whose works were translated by Abdullah Cevdet. Le Bon’s contribution was twofold. On the one hand, he conceived a theory of the development of races, and on the other, he laid the basis for crowd psychology. His ideas about the role of the masses, and mass psychology in an industrialized society were rooted in the fear brought about in the liberal bourgeoisie by the spectacle of the Paris Commune. These ideas would later be taken up by people like Mussolini (who was a self-confessed admirer of Le Bon), but to the Young Turks they also appeared very convincing. This may have been partly due to the number of military men (or at least militarily educated men) among them. Le Bon’s strong emphasis on the need for law and order to contain ‘the rabble’ had made him very popular among French officers as well. Can we call Le Bon a positivist? Undoubtedly, Le Bon was inspired by positivism. His work on mass psychology can be seen as an effort to show the inapplicability of democracy to an industrial society based on science, and in this sense it is in line with Comte’s authoritarianism. But Comte was only one of his sources of inspiration.<sup>34</sup> Darwinism and the ideas of Herbert Spencer were at least as important to his thinking.

Finally, we should of course mention Emile Durkheim, whose overwhelming influence on Ziya Gökalp is well known. Durkheim started out as a positivist, and it was to the influence of positivism and Comte’s advocacy of sociology as a branch of science that he owed his appointment to the first chair in that field at the age of 29. He accepted basic Comtean dogma on the subject matter and methodology of sociology, and the theory of the three stages. By the time he published his seminal *Rules of Sociological Method* in 1895, however, he had become ‘consistently critical of Comte’ and no longer called himself a positivist but a rationalist.<sup>35</sup>



Of course, these figures represent only a handful of the most important influences on Young Turk thinking, but the preliminary conclusion would seem to be that influences of ‘positivist’ writers can be seen in the ideas of all major Young Turk thinkers, but that these writers belonged to such different currents within positivism that one can hardly describe them as belonging to one and the same movement. In fact, it is probably better to describe Renan, Durkheim, Le Bon and Boutmy as belonging to the broad European current that is more properly called ‘scientism’.<sup>36</sup> With the exception of Laffitte, none of these actually belonged to Positivism in the narrowly defined sense—the Church of Humanity in its different guises. The same is true of the Young Turks themselves. Only Ahmet Rıza was an active member of the Positivist movement. At the same time, all of them belonged to positivism in the broad definition—the intellectual current that sought to explain not only nature, but also history and society by the application of scientific models, aiming to discover the laws determining their development. They shared with this broad church of positivism some basic attitudes: anti-clericalism, scientism, biological materialism, authoritarianism, intellectual elitism, a deep distrust of the masses and a belief in a peculiar kind of social Darwinism projected on nations and societies as a whole. Nationalism did not originate with the positivists, of course, but one should not forget that the France in which the Young Turks studied, worked and plotted, was a society scarred by the defeat of 1878, and that in the conservative liberal circles in which the Young Turks moved, a militant and revanchist nationalism was rife.

This whole bundle of attitudes and ideas: anti-clericalism, scientism, biological materialism, authoritarianism, intellectual elitism, distrust of the masses, social Darwinism and nationalism, which they soaked up in the France of the *fin de siècle* was then transmitted by Young Turk thinkers and publicists to the Kemalist activists, who—far more than the Young Turks before them—were in a position to fashion their state and society after their ideas.

### Notes

- 1 For an analysis of the contents and origins of the “Six Arrows” see: Paul Dumont, ‘The origins of Kemalist ideology’ in Jacob M.Landau, *Atatürk and the modernization of Turkey*, Boulder: Westview, 1984, pp. 25–44.
- 2 Now published as A.Holly Shissler, *Between Two Empires: Ahmet Ağaoğlu and the New Turkey*, London: I.B.Tauris, 2003.
- 3 Şükrü Hanioğlu, ‘Garbçılar: Their Attitudes towards Religion and their Impact on the Official Ideology of the Turkish Republic’, *Studia Islamica*, vol. 86, Paris: G.-P.Maisonneuve-Larose, 1997, p. 133.
- 4 Nimet Ünan (ed.), *Atatürk’ün söylev ve demeçleri II (19–6–1938)*, Ankara: TTK, 1959, p. 90.
- 5 *Ibid.*, pp. 144–6.

- 6 Erik-Jan Zürcher, “‘Fundamentalism’ as an Exclusionary Device in Kemalist Turkish Nationalism”, in Willem van Schendel and Erik-Jan Zürcher (eds), *Identity Politics in Central Asia and the Muslim World*, London: Tauris, 2001, pp. 207–20.
- 7 Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin siyasi fikirleri 1898–1908*, Ankara: İş Bankası, 1964, p. 131.
- 8 Şükrü Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 200.
- 9 Mardin, *Jön Türklerin siyasi fikirleri*, p. 179.
- 10 Uriel Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gökalp*, London: Luzac, 1950, p. 91.
- 11 A.Holly Shissler, ‘Turkish Identity between Two Empires. Ahmet Ağaoğlu 1869–1919’, unpublished PhD thesis, Chicago, 2000, pp. 132, 276–81.
- 12 François Georgeon, *Türk milliyetçiliğinin kökenleri: Yusuf Akçura (1876–1935)*, Ankara: 1986, p. 89.
- 13 Ünan, *Atatürk’ün söylev ve demeçleri*, pp. 215–16.
- 14 Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–18*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997, p. 113.
- 15 Şükrü Hanioglu, *Preparing for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 300.
- 16 Şükrü Hanioglu, *Bir siyasal düşünür olarak doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve dönemi*, Ankara: Ugdal, 1981, pp. 216–19.
- 17 One could argue that in this he follows Durkheim, but as Heyd has pointed out, Gökalp replaced Durkheim’s concept of ‘society’ with ‘nation’ (Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism*, p. 57).
- 18 Shissler, ‘Turkish Identity between Two Empires’, p. 110 ff.
- 19 Ibid., p. 132.
- 20 Erik-Jan Zürcher, ‘The Vocabulary of Muslim Nationalism’, *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, 137 (1999), 90, referring to the Redhouse Dictionary of 1921.
- 21 Georgeon, *Türk milliyetçiliğinin kökenleri*, pp. 106.
- 22 Ünan, *Atatürk’ün söylev ve demeçleri II*, pp. 70 and 92.
- 23 Erik-Jan Zürcher, ‘Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists: Identity Politics 1908–38’, in Kemal H.Karpat (ed.), *Ottoman Past and Today’s Turkey*, Leiden: Brill, 2000, p. 176.
- 24 See: Heyd, *Foundations*, p. 67 and Taha Parla, *The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp 1876–1924*, Leiden: Brill, 1985, p. 28.
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- 26 Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, p. 207.
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- 31 Shissler, ‘Turkish Identity between Two Empires’, p. 132.
- 32 Simon, *European Positivism in the Nineteenth Century*, p. 95.
- 33 Mardin, *Jön Türklerin*, p. 131; Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, p. 233.

- 34 Robert A.Nye, *The Origins of Crowd Psychology: Gustave LeBon and the Crisis of Mass Democracy in the Third Republic*, London: Sage, 1975, p. 39.
- 35 Simon, *European Positivism in the Nineteenth Century*, p. 146.
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## 2

### Blueprints for a future society

Late Ottoman materialists on science, religion, and art

*M.Şükri Hanioglu*

The salient characteristic of late Ottoman materialism is the belief in science as the exclusive foundation of a new Ottoman society. Mid-nineteenth-century materialism, a *Weltanschauung* placing science at the core of a new and rational civilization, usually entailed rejection of all competing truths, both philosophical and religious. In the Ottoman context, the conception of a new society strictly regulated by scientific truth logically led to the rejection of the old basis of society—the revealed truth of Islam. To the many Ottoman intellectuals who passionately shared this world-view, religion was the most dangerous type of philosophy, and a major obstacle to social progress. So powerful was the attraction of the doctrine of materialism to Ottoman thinkers that it became the mainstream approach to philosophy in the late Ottoman Empire.

One of the most important and hitherto neglected aspects of late Ottoman materialism is its heavy debt to the German popular materialism of the mid-nineteenth century. This unsophisticated offshoot of the original doctrine of materialism based itself rather vaguely upon the superiority of scientific truth and the empirical method of investigation. Its devotees replaced the entire *Naturphilosophie* with ‘natural sciences and medical experiments’ founded upon a non-philosophical ‘scientific truth’. The transposition of German popular materialism into the Ottoman context sparked a number of conflicts. The most violent encounter was, of course, with Islam.

Despite the innate antagonism of materialism toward religion, a number of Ottoman intellectuals sought to bridge the gap between Islam and the materialist philosophy. They attempted to forge an Islamicized version of the materialist doctrine. In part, such efforts were motivated by the realization that without an Islamic guise, scientism would never take root among the masses. In addition, they were designed to preempt the anticipated charge of atheism emanating from the *ulema*. Finally, some attempts to Islamicize materialism derived from a sincere conviction that Muslim civilization was not exempt from the eternal need of all civilizations for a religious belief system, and that it was vitally important to incorporate liberal Islamic principles into a blueprint for a future society. These thinkers imagined a future society founded upon a modern and scientific religion independent of divinely imposed obligation or sanction. Their various attempts to unite science with Islam could easily be mistaken at first glance for Islamist

arguments in favor of the reconcilability of Islam and modern science.<sup>1</sup> Thus it is by no means a coincidence that many reviewers of Ottoman materialist journals erroneously took them to be Islamist organs ‘merely defending the interests of Islam’.<sup>2</sup> But in fact, Ottoman materialists and Ottoman Islamists were approaching the problem from opposite orientations, and their prescriptions bear little resemblance to each other.

Late Ottoman materialism was a bifurcated movement. On the one hand, stood those who, like many of their European materialist counterparts, regarded religion and science as utterly incompatible. On the other, those who strove to reconcile materialism with Islam. This bifurcation itself conceals a considerable range of opinion within late Ottoman materialism concerning the vision of a future society. It is this spectrum of opinion that forms the subject of the present chapter.

I focus on the three major aspects of the imagined society as envisioned by the leading figures of the Ottoman materialist movement: religion, philosophy, and art—especially literature. In addition, I briefly assess the role of these ideas in molding the official ideology of the modern Turkish Republic. For the purpose of examining these issues, I draw heavily upon the works of three leading figures of late Ottoman materialism: Beşir Fu’ad (1852–87), the first Ottoman positivist and naturalist, Dr Abdullah Cevdet (1869–1932), the leading ideologue of the late Ottoman materialist ideology and the most prominent proponent of the fusion of materialism with Islam, and Baha Tevfik (1884–1914), who reintroduced post-Feuerbach German popular materialism to Ottoman intellectual circles as the philosophy of the future.

It is important to bear in mind that Ottoman writers of the time employed no rigorous methodology of citation; in fact, they often practiced what in our time would be considered blatant plagiarism. This makes the identification of sources and influences in works such as these exceedingly difficult. At times, therefore, my analysis is necessarily conjectural, but more often it is based on a careful comparison of a variety of European source texts with the Ottoman works under consideration. In any case, sources will be made apparent in the notes throughout.

### **The impact of German popular materialism after Feuerbach on late Ottoman materialism <sup>3</sup>**

An unexpected result of the Ottoman encounter with Western modernity was the adoption of a vulgar materialist ideology in Ottoman intellectual circles in the mid-nineteenth century. Around this time, almost any idea critical of religion, from ancient Greek materialism to contemporary Darwinism, was hastily and uncritically assimilated into an unsophisticated materialist philosophy that persisted in those circles until the collapse of the empire. This popular materialism was, in fact, similar to various forms of folk Islam then in existence throughout the Muslim world. But there was a crucial difference; whereas the sheikhs of folk Islam were vulgarizing orthodoxy, the proponents of Ottoman materialism were popularizing an already vulgarized version of the original belief system, which

they borrowed from the West. It is a curious fact that this popular materialism, which saw in religion an obstacle to human progress, and which elevated science to a position of supreme authority over every aspect of life, dominated successive generations of westernized Ottoman intellectuals up until the end of the empire, despite frequent changes of political regime and intellectual climate. It is still more curious that a belief in the absolute supremacy of science should gain so much ground under the regime of Abdülhamid II. Indeed, the official ideology of the modern Turkish state owes much to the preparatory work conducted by Ottoman intellectuals during the reign of this pious sultan.

Before analyzing the impact of European materialism on late Ottoman thought, it may be useful to review the basic streams of thought underlying this movement. Comtian positivism, which also attracted many leading Ottoman intellectuals, was a philosophical system that sought to explain nature by means of science. Comte believed that the six 'pure' sciences in his hierarchy would enable man to examine all natural phenomena and discover the laws that regulated them. He regarded scientific truth not as a goal in and of itself, but as an instrument towards the formulation of a grand philosophy superior to but based upon the 'positive sciences'. Scientists, according to Comte, could not see the wood for the trees.<sup>4</sup>

Post-F Feuerbach German popular materialism promoted a slavish exaltation of 'scientific truth' and the natural and medical sciences. Materialists of this school studied the relationship of the human to the animal world to prove that human 'consciousness' was merely a function of neural matter. This constituted an important contribution to the biological materialism that became fashionable following the publication of La Mettrie's *L'homme machine*. The major conclusion of the leading figures of this movement was that their discoveries rendered all existing belief systems and philosophies obsolete. In the future, they believed, human beings would live in a scientific society based upon scientific truth. Accordingly, they preached the immediate expunging of all delusive imaginations, philosophies, and religions from society. In their stead, they offered the simple truths of materialism.

Popular experimental science, which maintained that advances in natural and medical sciences made possible a re-evaluation of humanity's relationship to nature, received a boost after the publication of Alexander von Humboldt's *Kosmos* and Justus von Liebig's<sup>5</sup> *Chemische Briefe*. The pioneering work of von Humboldt and von Liebig had initially been used by the opponents of materialism to uphold Christian dogma, but scientists in mid-nineteenth-century Europe also cited it to underscore the importance of science.<sup>6</sup> By then the Schellingian *Naturphilosophie* had already been refuted as 'metaphysical' by leading scientists such as Emil Heinrich DuBois-Reymond and Hermann von Helmholtz. Popular German materialism flourished in Europe at mid-century in such journals as *Die Gegenwart*, *Das Jahrhundert*, and *Nord und Süd*. It did not merely underscore the superiority of 'science' while reducing religious belief systems of any kind to the metaphysical trash of the pre-scientific era; it also inadvertently produced a pure scientism free of philosophy. Important popularizers of this idea, such as Ludwig

Büchner, Jacob Moleschott, and Karl Vogt, went as far as to equate scientific research with philosophy. It was because of this exclusive emphasis on empiricism that Karl Marx and his disciples labeled this brand of materialism *Vulgärmaterialismus*.<sup>7</sup>

While Vogt harbored a visceral hatred toward all philosophical systems (including *Naturphilosophie*), Büchner grappled with the problem of reconciling scientific materialism with traditional philosophy. Although he shared Vogt's views on *Naturphilosophie*,<sup>8</sup> he suggested the obvious solution that simple scientific truth would become the new philosophy of the future. Although he never clearly defined 'philosophy' while criticizing all philosophical schools, Büchner considered himself a 'philosopher' destined to make science the 'philosophy' of the new age.<sup>9</sup> As he put it:

Just as the religions of the past have become out of date in our time, so also in no less degree has the true or speculative philosophy, which...has...so long exerted an injurious influence upon the minds of men.<sup>10</sup>

Büchner maintained furthermore that it is 'only in scientific observation and in facts that we can seek and find a firm footing for philosophical theories'.<sup>11</sup> In order to avoid the charge of crass empiricism, Büchner claimed that there was a difference between *Wissenschaft* and *das blosse Wissen*, but did not elaborate.<sup>12</sup> In his best seller *Kraft und Stoff* he stated that the sole object of the scientist is to reach *Wahrheit*.<sup>13</sup> To those who feared that their philosophical convictions might be undermined by scientific research,<sup>14</sup> he offered Bernard Cotta's words: 'Die empirische Naturforschung...hat keinen andern Zweck, als die Wahrheit zu finden, ob dieselbe nach menschlichen Begriffen beruhigend oder trostlos, schön oder unästhetisch, logisch oder inconsequent, vernünftig oder albern, nothwendig oder wunderbar ist.'<sup>15</sup> The times 'des gelehrten Maulheldenthums' and 'philosophischen Charlatanismus' were passing away.<sup>16</sup>

Like David Friedrich Strauss, Büchner spoke of a 'new religion' to replace all the outdated existing belief systems, albeit in a private correspondence (later published in a compilation):

Verbesserung des Einzelnen wie der Gesellschaft in materieller, geistiger und moralischer Beziehung heißt das große Ziel, welchem die zum Ersatz der alten bestimmte neue Religion oder die Religion der Zukunft, die Religion der Menschenliebe zuzustreben hat...Die moderne Welt ist es müde, ewig vom Himmel und von jenseitiger Gerechtigkeit unterhalten zu werden; sie will Gerechtigkeit, Glück und Liebe nicht im Himmel, sondern schon hier auf der Erde. In diesem Sinne sind wir alle Bürger eines idealen Reiches, dessen Verwirklichung wir schon hier anzustreben haben, und in welchem eine neue Religion, d.h. eine Religion der Liebe und Gerechtigkeit ohne Priester, ohne Gebete, ohne heilige Bücher, ohne Autoritäten an die Stelle der alten verlassenen treten wird.<sup>17</sup>

It should be emphasized that Büchner is referring here to a new moral order that will appear only after the final triumph of ‘science’ and the destruction of all existing religious systems. From the ashes of the old would emerge a new society, founded upon a new belief system (if it may be called such) based on *Wahrheit*. For Büchner, even the best of existing religions, such as Buddhism, ‘which recognizes neither the idea of a personal God nor that of a personal duration, and nevertheless teaches an extremely pure, amiable even ascetic morality’, or the humanistic Zoroastrian religion,<sup>18</sup> could not provide a remedy to mankind. He concluded: ‘for our present age and for the future a foundation must be sought and found for culture and morality, different from that which can be furnished to us by religion’.<sup>19</sup>

The impact of this simple doctrine on many late Ottoman intellectuals—especially those who received a Western-style education—was enormous. The first reference to Büchner and his ideas in Ottoman circles was strongly critical. A leading Young Ottoman, Ali Suavî, described the German materialist as the ‘prophet’ of the modern *dahrîyyîn*. Curiously choosing to base his criticism upon the work of Claude Bernard,<sup>20</sup> he pronounced that a thousand Büchners could not challenge Islam.<sup>21</sup> But as Ali Suavî was compelled to confess, many ‘ignorant’ intellectuals, taken in by Büchner’s ingenuity, had converted to ‘infidelity’.<sup>22</sup>

In fact, within a short time the German materialist thinker had become the idol of a generation in the Ottoman Empire, as indeed was the case in many other countries.<sup>23</sup> Büchner’s *Sechs Vorlesungen über die Darwin’sche Theorie von der Verwandlung der Arten und die erste Entstehung der Organismenwelt*<sup>24</sup> was translated into Arabic in 1884. It added oil to the fire of an already heated debate on Darwinism and evolution then raging in the intellectual circles of Alexandria, Cairo, and Beirut. This debate had begun in 1876 and was conducted mainly through the medium of the journal *Muqtataf*.<sup>25</sup> The works of Büchner’s Arab translator, Dr Shibli Shumayyil,<sup>26</sup> focused mainly on Darwinism and on Büchner’s vulgarization of this theory.<sup>27</sup> As a consequence, exchanges between ‘pro-scientists’, such as Shumayyil himself, and their opponents, such as Sheikh Ibrāhīm Ḥawrānī and Jirjis Faraj Şufayr,<sup>28</sup> were limited to evolutionary theory. Shumayyil’s work thus provoked little debate in Egypt on the wider issues raised by popular materialism.<sup>29</sup> It was left to his disciples, Salāmah Mūsā and Ismā‘īl Maẓhar to continue his work with more success. An overwhelming number of the initial supporters of Darwinism were Christians, while their opponents were by and large Muslims.<sup>30</sup> As a result, the literate public in the Arabic-speaking parts of the empire tended to view the debate as one between Europeanized Christian intellectuals and Muslim *ulema*.<sup>31</sup> Therefore, although hiding between the lines were momentous issues ranging from creation to the reconcilability of Islam and science, the debate did not seem particularly threatening at first. This illusion was strengthened by the fact that so-called Muslim secularists, such as Qāsim Amīn, treated religion ‘with seemingly genuine respect’ in the Arab lands. Unlike some of their more provocative allies in the Ottoman capital, they did not contest the



primacy of the religious sciences, and thus succeeded in avoiding a head-on confrontation with the *ulema*.<sup>32</sup>

In the central parts of the Ottoman Empire, however, including the imperial capital itself, the conflict between religion and science was much more direct. Here, the debate fostered by the promotion of Büchner's theses by Muslim intellectuals began in the late 1880s (it became particularly fierce after 1908) and centered on Büchner's main challenge: a blunt attack on religion and all existing philosophies. The reaction was forceful. One Ottoman intellectual, who was to play a significant role in Ottoman and then Turkish cultural life, and who produced an important historical essay on the conflict between religion and science, described his days reading Büchner's '*Force et matière...* as the time when [his] mind knew its deepest peace'.<sup>33</sup> Büchner's popularity compelled some conservative Ottoman figures to write essays to refute his hypotheses, most often in the form of pious criticisms.<sup>34</sup> One of these, İsmail Ferid, was ignorant of Western languages, but deeply saddened by the evident popularity of *Kraft und Stoff*. He asked a friend, who had filled his library with Western books on 'nature', to summarize Büchner's magnum opus for him.<sup>35</sup> He then proceeded to pen a 200-page essay to counter *Kraft und Stoff's* main arguments by means of a reading of several Islamic texts informed by a somewhat outdated understanding of physics. The Ottoman materialists, however, took little notice of such criticisms.<sup>36</sup> For the most part, they judged them unworthy of refutation.

### Science reigns supreme: Beşir Fu'ad Bey

For many Ottoman intellectuals, science began to approach the status of religion from the middle of the nineteenth century. Not surprisingly, faith in science usurped the position of religion. Yet this was not so obvious at first. Since 'religious learning' and 'science' had been synonymous in Ottoman parlance for centuries—the term '*ilm*' denoted both—the initial penetration of materialist thought was unobstructive, and the Ottoman Empire was flooded with a plethora of popular materialist literature. But the contradiction could not be concealed for long. Shortly after the emergence of the Ottoman press, the conflict between religion and science became one of the most frequently discussed subjects in print. In these discussions, although it was never stated explicitly, 'science' appeared as the new 'truth' destined to replace the outmoded, obsolete truth of religion in the new era. Usually, criticism was leveled against 'superstitions', which served as a code word for religion in general and Islam in particular.<sup>37</sup>

As conveyed in a poem by Sâdullah Pasha entitled 'The Nineteenth Century', many Ottoman intellectuals believed that the future was to be based upon science and positivistic progress:

The light of comprehension has attained the summit of perfection  
Many impossibilities have become possibilities.

Elementary substances have become complex, complexity has become elementary;  
 Many unknowns have become well known through experience.

The truth has become figurative, that which was once figurative has become true;  
 The foundations of old knowledge have collapsed.

...

Neither the belief in metamorphosis nor the fire of the Magians has survived  
 The Holy trinity is not the *kible* of fulfillment for the intelligent.

...

The time is a time for progress; the world is a world of sciences;  
 Is it possible to uphold society with ignorance?<sup>38</sup>

The Scotsman, Charles MacFarlane, who visited the empire in the middle of this century of 'science and progress', was stunned to see 'a collection of downright materialism' in the library of the Royal Medical Academy.<sup>39</sup> He was even more astonished at the response of one of the medical students to his question whether the performance of an autopsy was 'not somewhat contrary to his religion'. 'Eh! Monsieur', exclaimed the student, 'ce n'est pas au Galata Serai qu'il faut venir chercher la religion'. Another student commented that they had all become 'philosophes a la Voltaire', and a professor stated that through scientific experiments they were attempting to 'extirpate prejudices.'<sup>40</sup> To this observer, it seemed that 'every student who came out of Galata Serai, after keeping the full term, came out always a materialist, and generally a libertine and rogue.'<sup>41</sup> He noted also that he had found a heavily worn copy of Baron d'Holbach's *Système de la nature* in a salon set apart for the use of medical personnel at the Ottoman military hospital in the capital. In that book, many striking passages were marked, and especially those mathematically demonstrating the absurdity of believing in the existence of God and the immortality of the soul.<sup>42</sup>

Three decades after MacFarlane's encounter with the Ottoman 'philosophes à la Voltaire', a pioneer of Ottoman materialism authored an essay eulogizing the French philosopher.<sup>43</sup> For Beşir Fu'ad, the eighteenth century should be called the 'century of Voltaire',<sup>44</sup> and there was no better proof of the 'genius' of the French philosopher than his words:

Nos prêtres ne sont pas ce qu'un vain peuple pense;  
 Notre crédulité fait toute leur science.<sup>45</sup>

Beşir Fu'ad, who became the most prolific materialist author of his generation, was born in Istanbul in 1852 and educated at the Ottoman Military Academy. As an officer, he served voluntarily in various military campaigns. In 1884, at the age of 32, he resigned from military service to invest all his energies in the study of

science and linguistics. His most important books were devoted to the introduction of materialist ideas into Ottoman society. Even his biography of Voltaire was a platform for furthering the same project.

In keeping up with the prevailing fashion in Ottoman intellectual circles, Beşir Fu'ad leveled harsh criticisms against religion. But he artfully camouflaged them as attacks directed against Christianity in particular. Moreover, he employed Voltaire's favorable comments on the Qur'an to persuade his readers that the French philosopher had indeed been so fond of Islam as to be considered a veritable 'defender' of the faith.<sup>46</sup> Likewise, Beşir Fu'ad compared Voltaire's critique of the 'immortality of soul' to that of Ibn 'Abbās, thereby making the materialism inherent in that critique more palatable to his Muslim readership.<sup>47</sup>

Yet despite his praise of Voltaire, and unlike the Ottoman materialists of the preceding decades, whose materialism was based largely upon the works of Voltaire, d'Holbach, and Spinoza, Beşir Fu'ad's true materialist idol was Ludwig Büchner. For him, *Kraft und Stoff* was the starting point for 'reforming philosophy'.<sup>48</sup> The new philosophy emerging from this reform process, according to Beşir Fu'ad, should exclude any kind of 'poetic' assumptions that were then in fashion and base itself solely upon science.<sup>49</sup> One enthusiastic devotee later commented that by introducing Büchner's work to the Ottoman intelligentsia, Beşir Fu'ad 'freed our youngsters from the shackles of theology and opened new horizons for them'.<sup>50</sup>

Beşir Fu'ad also admired the work of Claude Bernard.<sup>51</sup> He considered Bernard's 'méthode scientifique', free from the 'joug philosophique et théologique',<sup>52</sup> to be an effective guide to the attainment of his new philosophy. He did so despite the fact that Bernard had explicitly rejected all philosophical systems, including positivism, which had greatly influenced him. Beşir Fu'ad might easily have selected the following words of Claude Bernard as his motto: 'en effet, ce serait une illusion que de prétendre absorber les découvertes particulières d'une science au profit d'un système philosophique quelconque.'<sup>53</sup> Hence, although he was correctly considered the first Turkish positivist,<sup>54</sup> he approached Comte's 'philosophy' with suspicion aroused by Bernard's critique.<sup>55</sup>

In fact, a leading Ottoman publicist who wrote a book on Beşir Fu'ad described him as a 'pure materialist'.<sup>56</sup> But from Beşir Fu'ad's writings it becomes clear that he did not at all consider 'materialism' an immutable 'metaphysical dogma', as did Comte. Beşir Fu'ad's praise of George Henry Lewes and his adoption of Lewes's ideas on philosophy<sup>57</sup> make it more difficult to understand his positivist leanings. Lewes, after all, was 'not in opposition to metaphysical speculation *per se*, and... urged that a resuscitated and modernized Aristotelianism might provide a remedy to the bifurcation in philosophy'.<sup>58</sup> It seems that Lewes's emphasis on 'verification' as a means of distinguishing 'science' from 'philosophy'<sup>59</sup> (in his *Aristotle and Biographical History of Philosophy*) led Beşir Fu'ad to equate Bernard's position with that of Lewes. Yet it is difficult to believe that Beşir Fu'ad really supported Lewes's idea of creating an empirical, thus scientific metaphysics. Beşir Fu'ad was interested only in those aspects of the work of

Lewes and Bernard that appeared to conform to scientism. He thought that the new philosophy should consist of nothing other than an interpretation of experimental science as proposed by Büchner. In this respect, it is particularly telling that Beşir Fu'ad chose to adopt one of Büchner's witticisms on *Wahrheit* as a guiding principle for scientific research.<sup>60</sup> It reveals that Beşir Fu'ad identified with the post-Feuerbach German *Vulgärmaterialismus*, according to which positivism was no more than *eine neue Religion*.<sup>61</sup>

It is in light of this crucial fact that Beşir Fu'ad's references to Comte and Lewes must be regarded. Furthermore, one may also accept Beşir Fu'ad's fulsome praise of Paul-Émile Littré<sup>62</sup> as evidence that he considered positivism only as a philosophy. As one influential contemporary put it,

positivism has had the merit of being for many years the only philosophy we had which was founded on science, the only doctrine that addressed itself to men of science desirous of obtaining broad views and general ideas. Unhappily, it has remained closely confined within its own dogma, persuaded that nothing ought to be added to or subtracted from it.<sup>63</sup>

While dedicated to the preservation of the sacred Comtian cult, Littré and *La Philosophie positive* objected to the direct application of new advances in the natural sciences to social life. Society, they thought, could only be perfected through the intelligent application of the interpretive philosophical lens of Positivism. Like his prophet Comte, who sharply criticized Lamarckian theories of evolution, Littré too voiced strong opposition to Darwinism and to the application of the theories of natural science to social phenomena.<sup>64</sup> For Littré, theories of this nature were purely speculative. As for Beşir Fu'ad, he clearly regarded Positivism as a religion of humanity, which was open to the application of new scientific advances.<sup>65</sup> He must have turned a deaf ear on this note to his mentor Büchner, who acerbically denounced Positivism as a new religion. But of course his aim was considerably wider than Büchner's; Beşir Fu'ad hoped to reconcile Positivism with Darwinism and *Vulgärmaterialismus*, an ambition to which both Littréian Positivists and mid-century scientific materialists would have objected.

### **Beşir Fu'ad and the implications of *Vulgärmaterialismus* for literature**

Taking his cue from Büchner, Beşir Fu'ad also initiated a new approach to literature. Although his general approach to literature had provoked long-lasting debates in Ottoman intellectual circles, his criticism of poetry stands out.<sup>66</sup> A scientific approach to the subject had been talked about since Renan suggested that the production of such art 'presupposes a faith and a simplicity we have no longer'.<sup>67</sup> Darwin's professed loss of taste for poetry was also much discussed in scientific circles.<sup>68</sup> Yet Beşir Fu'ad regarded the scientist critique of poetry as the brainchild of Büchner.<sup>69</sup> One of the cardinal points of Beşir Fu'ad's critique was

that poetry must be grounded in reality. He insisted that poetry should reflect actuality and should not stem from unrealistic conceits and similes.<sup>70</sup> Poets could correct their errors with the help of science. Scientists, on the other hand, had little to learn from poetry. Hugo, for example, could have learned much of value from Littré and Bernard, but not the other way around.<sup>71</sup> Beşir Fu'ad laid the groundwork for a comprehensive presentation of this view by translating a scientific essay entitled 'Heart'. The essay strongly criticized poets for attributing various unscientific functions to the human heart, which was merely a 'muscle'.<sup>72</sup>

Beşir Fu'ad's ideas on literature and poetry met a considerable degree of opposition from many leading Ottoman intellectuals. Namık Kemal, the foremost Ottoman poet of the time, maintained that scientism as promoted by Beşir Fu'ad would render literature flavorless.<sup>73</sup> Beşir Fu'ad responded with a vigorous defense of scientism and launched a new debate on 'love', insisting that it must be considered an illness, as discussed by Letourneau and other physiological psychology experts.<sup>74</sup> Significantly, in an attempt to gain the upper hand in the debate, Beşir Fu'ad based his criticism of those who mistakenly attributed cerebral functions to the heart upon the works of the 'great German philosopher' Büchner.<sup>75</sup> Numerous other literary figures wrote poems to censure Beşir Fu'ad. Some went so far as to call him a 'charlatan'.<sup>76</sup> In response to these critics, Beşir Fu'ad wrote his first and last poem:

Those who appreciate Voltaire are all people of culture;  
Those who diffuse enlightenment are all deserving of praise.

O, Lover of Science and Wisdom, follow the footsteps of geniuses;  
Those who criticize and censure them are all ignorant.  
Be on the alert for robbery, O Enlightenment and Progress!  
The highway robber is doomed to frustration.

Those who are wise should demand science and truth;  
Those who incline toward the barren soil of ignorance lack intelligence.

A human being must be aware of world affairs;  
In my opinion those who advocate the opposite are all animals.

O, Fu'ad, mortal foe of poets, you too should pronounce a lyric poem;  
Such things are considered difficult, but indeed they are easy.<sup>77</sup>

To this poem Beşir Fu'ad added a short note in which he stated that anyone could compose a poem; writing a scientific essay, on the other hand, required numerous skills and much knowledge. Indeed, he challenged, 'if our poets would write a scientific article on eternity, and the scientific errors in the article would not outnumber the shortcomings of my lyric poem, I promise to write poems in the classical and modern styles'.<sup>78</sup> The obvious implication was that in a society in

which science reigns supreme there is no place for certain approaches to literature. Those authors who would reconcile their work with science, as Zola had done, might be taken seriously as individuals rendering a service to society. But poets who could go as far as to attribute the functions of the brain to the heart would have no place in a modern society founded upon science.

### **Beşir Fu'ad and the popularization of science in the Ottoman Empire**

An important dimension of Beşir Fu'ad's life work was the dissemination of popular science. Many of his numerous articles and pamphlets, on topics ranging from human anatomy to the solar system, were translations from journals such as *Science pour tous* and *Die Natur*.<sup>79</sup> Like many of his contemporaries who published works of vulgar science translated into Turkish, Beşir Fu'ad wanted to strengthen the belief in the supremacy of science among literate people. Yet his work in this respect differed from that of leading French popular scientists such as Louis Figuer, Arthur Mangin, and Jules Rengrade. For Beşir Fu'ad, the propagation of popular science was decidedly secondary to his major aim; namely, persuading members of the Ottoman elite to embrace scientism and *naturwissenschaftlich orientierten Materialismus*. To him, 'an idea that considered it a mistake to go against the will of masses would prevent progress'.<sup>80</sup>

Beşir Fu'ad committed suicide on February 5, 1887. As he put it, he wished to make his death 'a scientific experiment'.<sup>81</sup> Accordingly, he cut his veins and took notes describing his deteriorating condition until he lost consciousness in order to prove that life was no more than a scientific phenomenon. He bequeathed his body to the Royal Medical Academy for use in scientific research. His heirs, however, refused to meet this demand and gave him a proper funeral.

### **A materialist *mujtahid*: Doctor Abdullah Cevdet**

Beşir Fu'ad's colorful life and work reflect the radical strain of scientism that prevailed in certain Ottoman intellectual circles in the last third of the nineteenth century. This stream of thought believed in a scientific society free of religious dogma. It relied on a host of materialist ideas that were not always in perfect harmony with each other, but which generally praised 'science' and criticized the 'obsolete pre-scientific past'. Ideas of Comte, Bernard, Büchner, Letourneau, Lewes, Littré, Spencer, and Voltaire were all thrown together in order to fashion a blueprint for a society in which science reigned supreme. It is no coincidence that the most radical and least sophisticated German materialist of the post-Feuerbach era, Ludwig Büchner, became the idol of those Ottoman proponents of scientism who needed nothing but 'scientific truth' to create their new society.

The work of Beşir Fu'ad and his comrades was by no means in vain. Letters sent to popular journals by enthusiastic materialists reveal that probably a significant segment of the educated class adhered to a vulgar scientist

*Weltanschauung* that regarded science as a transcendent value. One clerk in Bursa, for instance, felt impelled to write a letter to a popular journal to discuss the importance of ‘science’. He wrote, ‘I give a short answer to the question “what are the sciences good for?” It is: “What is there in the world besides sciences?”’<sup>82</sup> Even in works presented to the sultan, strong criticism was directed against ‘philosophy’ and in defense of ‘science’. In one such work it was maintained that ‘the philosophies of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, all emanating from empty imaginings, never promoted scientific progress and hence the progress of civilization’.<sup>83</sup> In another, Şemseddin Sami Frashëri, celebrated author of several Ottoman lexicons, claimed that ‘the universe is composed of two things: matter and force.’<sup>84</sup> He discredited those ‘ancient philosophies based upon empty imaginings and illusions’ and lavished praise on a new philosophy that, despite a specific reference to Comte, bears the unmistakable mark of Büchner. He wrote, ‘A new philosophy that makes the theses advanced by all the past philosophies obsolete has emerged.’ This *philosophie positive*, based upon science, ‘will be the sole philosophy of future times’.<sup>85</sup>

While Beşir Fu’ad was working hard to promote the ‘supremacy of science’, the Royal Medical Academy—whose students, it will be recalled, had so shocked Charles MacFarlane in 1848 with their outspoken advocacy of materialism—was busy producing new ‘philosophes à la Voltaire’. The memoirs of one medical student reveal that an overwhelming majority of the students thought that believing in the existence of God was nothing but an absurdity. Indeed, one of the frequently discussed subjects at secret meetings held in the dormitories of the Academy was the role of religion in society in general and in Muslim society in particular. In the course of these discussions, some students made derogatory remarks about religion. Others, however, avoided the use of strong language against religion, although they shared the extreme materialist tendencies of their peers.<sup>86</sup> Often they underscored the need of society for a religion, its unscientific nature notwithstanding. One such student, Rıf’at Osman, espoused ideas reminiscent of Bruno Bauer’s controversial theses on the Christian gospels. For instance, he avowed:

Human beings must have lived without a religion for many centuries. Who knows for how long this situation lasted? Again who knows what sort of reasons compelled them to establish and build temples and worship various religious [idols]? In fact, history narrates to us many unclear things. It tells that the sacred books were sent down by God, and describes Moses, Jesus, and their books. All of these are results of a need. Neither in a recent nor in a remote century has mankind ever involved itself in matters that it did not need. Hence the current religions, too, are results of such a need. Finally Islam, likewise, is a product of a need.<sup>87</sup>

Another of these students was Abdullah Cevdet, a future leader of the Ottoman materialist movement. His case provides a fascinating illustration of the role that

the Royal Medical Academy played in breeding radical materialism among its students—who would proudly hold aloft placards reading ‘le salut de la nation c’est la science’ at political demonstrations.<sup>88</sup> This pioneer of Ottoman materialism was born in Ma‘muret’ül-Azîz in 1869. He grew up in an observant household and received a religious education from family members whom he later described as ‘*imams, hodjas*, and extremely pious and very conformist’ individuals.<sup>89</sup> Abdullah Cevdet was still a very pious person when he entered the Royal Medical Academy. One of his early poetry books includes a glowing ‘Na’t-i Şerif, a eulogy, for the Prophet Muhammad, of whom he wrote:

You are the bright star that radiates in the ninth heaven of Islam,

...

You are the ultimate cause of creation.<sup>90</sup>

Yet under the impact of his experience at the Academy, Abdullah Cevdet’s views underwent a drastic transformation. Like many other devout students who emerged from this spawning ground of materialist and anti-religious ideas, it did not take Abdullah Cevdet long to complete this ‘innocent phase’ of his life and ‘perceive the difference between nature and religion’.<sup>91</sup> Reflecting later on this early period, he confessed that his ‘innocent past’,<sup>92</sup> in which he used to frequent the mosques of Istanbul with a Qur’ân in hand and ardent piety in his heart, ‘would make him sad forever’.<sup>93</sup> He became painfully aware of the fact that some of his early ideas and writings stood very much in contradiction to the ‘scientific truth’ that he subsequently acquired at the Royal Medical Academy.<sup>94</sup> As he saw it, it was his conversion to scientism that made it impossible for him to experience again the emotions of his early days.<sup>95</sup>

We may speculate that Abdullah Cevdet’s conversion came about through the intervention of senior students at the Academy, who compelled him to read Darwin, as they usually did for the purpose of ‘unseating the convictions’ of such stubbornly devout recruits.<sup>96</sup> Regardless of the manner of Abdullah Cevdet’s conversion, it caused an abrupt and total transformation of his world-view. Before long, he too was writing disparagingly of religion:

Religion, ce faux et ravissant rayon  
Emané de cerveaux ivres d’illusion,  
Nous a longtemps bercé de vaine rêverie,  
L’infirme humanité n’en pas plus guérie.<sup>97</sup>

A mere six months after the publication of his eulogy of the Prophet Muḥammad, Abdullah Cevdet completed a translation of a chapter from Büchner’s *Kraft und Stoff*. This chapter, entitled ‘Der Gedanke’, starts with Moleschott’s famous aphorism ‘Der Gedanke ist eine Bewegung des Stoffs’.<sup>98</sup> Abdullah Cevdet’s aim in undertaking this translation was to underscore one of Büchner’s major bio-materialist theses: consciousness is a function of neural matter. A few months later



he published another essay on the ‘scientific relationship between brain and soul’.<sup>99</sup> In this short essay, consisting mainly of arguments advanced by Büchner in the chapters entitled ‘Der Mensch’ and ‘Sitz der Seele’ of *Kraft und Stoff*, Abdullah Cevdet maintained that as *l’homme machine*, man, like other animal types, had a ‘soul’ created by ‘matter’.<sup>100</sup> In a detailed study based upon Guyot-Daubès’s *Physiologie et hygiène du cerveau et des fonctions intellectuelles*<sup>101</sup> and *Kraft und Stoff* in 1894, he undertook to further demonstrate the connection between consciousness and matter.<sup>102</sup> He was later to publish the most detailed study in Turkish on this subject.<sup>103</sup>

Like his predecessor Beşir Fu’ad, Abdullah Cevdet also endeavored to popularize his materialist thinking through the publication of accessible essays and articles. One such piece was entitled ‘Chemistry for Everybody’,<sup>104</sup> while many of his short articles claimed to provide scientific explanations for natural phenomena wrongly attributed to supernatural powers. He too hoped by means of such works to reach out to the average literate man, and persuade him, like his more educated contemporaries, to accept the notion of the supremacy of science.<sup>105</sup> Yet ultimately, Abdullah Cevdet, like Beşir Fu’ad, placed more faith in the leadership of an ‘intellectual aristocracy’—an idea he took from John Stuart Mill<sup>106</sup>—and considered these popularizing efforts a sideshow to his major effort of converting the intelligentsia.

In the Preface to his translation of ‘Der Gedanke’, aimed at proving the material basis of consciousness, Abdullah Cevdet explained that the act of ‘submitting the treasure of scientific truth’ to his fellow compatriots was an ‘extremely exalted and sacred duty for him’.<sup>107</sup> In a translation of another piece from Büchner’s *Aus Natur und Wissenschaft* under the rubric of *Goril (Gorilla)*,<sup>108</sup> he further elucidated what he had meant by the term ‘sacred’. He explained that the motivation for this translation was his desire to follow the Prophetic *ḥadīth* requiring all Muslims to attain ‘wisdom and truth’.<sup>109</sup> Stitching materialist ideas into an Islamic jacket was, to be sure, not a technique invented by Abdullah Cevdet. Even one of the most radical materialists, Beşir Fu’ad, had attempted to Islamicize Voltaire’s views—albeit without direct quotations from the Qur’ān or the *ḥadīth* literature. But Abdullah Cevdet was to take this method farther than any of his predecessors had done. One of his professors, Mehmed Şakir, had been educated in France by Claude Bernard.<sup>110</sup> Mehmed Şakir wrote a book entitled *Dürûs-i Hayat-ı Beşeriye*, in which he drew liberally on Bernard’s *Introduction à l’étude de la médecine expérimentale*, while maintaining that the performance of autopsies accords with Islam, in light of the *ḥadīth* stating *al-‘ilm ‘ilmān ‘ilm al-abdān thumma ‘ilm al-adyān* (science is of two kinds: ‘the science of bodies and the science of religions’).<sup>111</sup> Abdullah Cevdet must have found this technique of Islamicization, employed by a positivist mentor to whom he had dedicated one of his early pamphlets,<sup>112</sup> most suitable for his purposes. He subsequently became its greatest master and champion.<sup>113</sup> Thus, despite his utter disregard for Islam as a religion, Abdullah Cevdet maintained that it should be used both as a tool to modernize Islamic society and as a springboard to create a new materialistic ethic.

There is no doubt that Abdullah Cevdet agreed with Büchner on the need for a new materialistic morals. Furthermore, he found the notion of creating a new ethic free of religious dogma appealing. But this was an idea taken not from Büchner, but from an obscure French materialist and doctor,<sup>114</sup> whose popular essay on materialism played a significant role in Abdullah Cevdet's transformation from Islamic piety to secular materialism.<sup>115</sup> Dr Félix Isnard, who dreamed of a 'morale matérialiste', had maintained that the popular motto *il faut de la religion* must be replaced with *il faut de la morale*. He predicted that 'le matérialisme scientifique', would supplant all doctrines not based on 'science expérimentale' and 'raison' and become the philosophy of the future.<sup>116</sup> To Dr Isnard, such a philosophy was indispensable to the future society:

[L]a philosophie est aussi nécessaire à l'existence des sociétés que la nourriture l'est à la vie de l'individu. Elle est la boussole indispensable dans l'évolution progressive de l'humanité. Sans elle, il n'y aurait ni stabilité politique, ni état social possibles.<sup>117</sup>

Significantly, in an essay attempting to reconcile philosophy and scientism, Abdullah Cevdet translated this passage verbatim.<sup>118</sup> However, ultimately he found this philosophy insufficient to solve the problems of Ottoman society.

Abdullah Cevdet found these views compelling, but he questioned their applicability to the Ottoman case. Indeed, for many Ottoman materialists, the fundamental role played by Islam in the organization and preservation of Muslim societies was too important to be totally ignored. While the simple scientism of a Büchner or an Isnard supplied the foundation 'truth' for the future society, it did not provide the necessary toolset with which to direct a decadent religious society toward a scientific future. Moreover, according to many Ottoman materialists, a society totally devoid of any belief system was likely to suffer major tribulations. In this, they resembled several German ethical materialists, such as Überweg and Strauss. Just as Strauss had asked, 'Sind wir noch Christen?' and 'Haben wir noch Religion?', replying with a categorical 'No' to the first but with a conditional 'Yes' to the second,<sup>119</sup> Abdullah Cevdet concluded that Islam as religion must go, but Islam as philosophy must remain; although the Muslim God was of no use in the modern era, Islamic society must preserve Islamic principles.<sup>120</sup> He believed that the new philosophy could be strengthened by liberal Islamic principles, as long as they made people religious only in the philosophical sense. Furthermore, he believed that it was possible to reconcile Büchner's ideas with Islam, at least on paper: 'Now without pronouncing Büchner mistaken, I...praise Islam while I do not subscribe to it blindly but respect its wise and liberal judgments.'<sup>121</sup>

In order to construct this 'scientific Islam' and create a materialistic belief system upheld by Islamic principles, Abdullah Cevdet adopted two courses of actions, which to him seemed inseparable. On the one hand, he strove to prove the superiority of the 'natural sciences' over all alternative truths. On the other, he waged a resolute war against Islam as religion. He assumed that once people

comprehended the superior truth of science and the ‘nonsensical’ nature of the assertions of religious philosophers,<sup>122</sup> a new, scientific religion would rise spontaneously from the ashes of Islam. At the same time, once Islam had been discarded as a religion, liberal reinterpretation of the Islamic sources (relying on the work of medieval Muslim free-thinkers) would enable the vanguard of scientism to present this new belief system to the Muslim masses as the new Islamic religion. This point cannot be overstressed; despite his strong materialist convictions, Abdullah Cevdet firmly and consistently believed that ‘human society cannot live without religion.’<sup>123</sup> For many, he wrote, the ‘these libre pensée comprend d’autres complications’.<sup>124</sup> Indeed, ‘religion was the science of the masses whereas science is the religion of the elite’, and the problems of the Muslim world in general, and of Ottoman society in particular, stemmed from the fact that ‘religion, which is the science of the masses, has not progressed and risen to a level similar to that of science.’ The cure for this ‘illness’, he wrote, was ‘to obtain scientific value for religion, and religious power for science’.<sup>125</sup> It was incumbent upon Muslim intellectuals to transfuse ‘un sang nouveau dans les veines musulmans’.<sup>126</sup>

As part of his efforts at promoting the new materialist creed, Abdullah Cevdet established the ‘Muslim world’s first publishing house in Europe’ to publish a journal significantly named *İctihad (Ijtihād)*.<sup>127</sup> He carried out an *enquête* that posed the following two questions to a group of intellectuals: ‘Quelles sont, d’après votre opinion, les principales circonstances auxquelles tient la décadence du monde musulman?’ and ‘Quels sont les moyens que vous croyez efficaces pour remédier à ce mal?’<sup>128</sup> In his view, the problems of Ottoman society could only be resolved by curing the illnesses of the larger Muslim world. This goal, in turn, could only be accomplished by means of a marriage between Islam on the one hand and modern science and the materialist doctrine on the other. In order to facilitate this merger and forge a new creed for the Ottoman future, Abdullah Cevdet boldly assumed the role of *mujtahid*. But effecting the reconciliation of such disparate systems of thought would require the gates of *ijtihād* to be thrown wide open. Clearly, only a radical and highly original reinterpretation of the Islamic tradition would enable Abdullah Cevdet to incorporate materialism into Islam. Before examining this complex lifelong endeavor, however, we turn to an aspect of Abdullah Cevdet’s views on the place of literature in a scientific society.

### **Abdullah Cevdet on literature, poetry, and science**

Like his effort to forge a new philosophical system, Abdullah Cevdet’s attitude toward literature was marked by conciliation and originality. During his early years at the Royal Medical Academy, the discussion of the relationship between literature and science originally initiated by Beşir Fu’ad gained new momentum. One of Abdullah Cevdet’s close friends launched a new campaign against ‘unscientific’ literature in general and poetry in particular. Şerafeddin Mağmumî, whose views on the subject were deeply influenced by those of Beşir Fu’ad,<sup>129</sup>

declared that the memorization of such trivia as the birth date of Alexander the Great or the population of China at the expense of the study of human anatomy or the atmosphere was absurd. Similarly, clogging the brain with 'poetic misapprehensions' concerning 'the influence of the heart' without knowing the true functions of either organ was unpardonable.<sup>130</sup> Praising Abdullah Cevdet's work on the brain, Şerafeddin Mağmumî denounced poets for their crime against science in attributing the functions of brain to heart.<sup>131</sup> Literature, concluded Mağmumî, had but one alternative: to turn itself into a useful scientific activity:<sup>132</sup>

What about chemistry! What about chemistry! Is there anything similar that can occasion so deep a feeling as that caused by the formation of various materials having many characteristics, by the mixing of two uncolored liquids, or by the appearance of a stronger poison from the combination of two other poisons, or by observing water becoming frozen and the appearance of flames in it? Can a more exquisite poetic panorama be imagined than these scientific wonders and chemical transactions?...It is impossible to examine meticulously the poetry left by ancient poets and reach a clear conception...If we wish to say something about ancient and modern poetry, from a conceptual point of view, besides their stylistic flavor, we can say nothing beyond calling them amateurish...Which aspect of it accords with reason and science? The only path for becoming a poet relies upon writing in rhymes and meters and lies. What an absurd idea'... Ancient and modern poetry, i.e., average poetry can make neither bread nor clothing for man...The true poets, i.e., scientists, invented ships and the telegram.<sup>133</sup>

Many leading scientists and intellectuals voiced their support for Mağmumî.<sup>134</sup> Indeed, during this second phase of the debate on poetry and science throughout the last decade of the nineteenth century, the anti-poetry front had the upper hand.

Abdullah Cevdet, however, attempted to find a better solution to the problem posed by the persistence of poetry in a scientific society. He seems to have been reluctant to reject classical poetry entirely. A simple indication of this ambivalence was his reluctant use of the term 'heart (the metaphorical seat of reason in classical Islamic and Ottoman poetry)' interchangeably with the term 'mind'.<sup>135</sup> But more generally, Abdullah Cevdet's work betrays the strong influence of the Parnassians. It is plausible that Abdullah Cevdet found in their reaction to the emotionalism and verbal imprecision of the Romantics a form suitable for both scientific and literary purposes. It was his familiar propensity to reconcile rather than reject that led him to propose a fusion of scientism and poetry. He himself refused to abandon his poetic pursuits for 'science'.<sup>136</sup> A striking example from the early period is the following poem entitled 'A Long Long Meditation':

While I was observing the sky one night

I thought about creation from beginning to end.  
 The sublime calmness of the night  
 Called various matters to my mind.  
 I laughed in delight at infinity,  
 But the thought of non-existence distressed me.  
 The cells of my brain trembled with joy;  
 I said the following without burning and melting:  
 It is true that the word 'past eternity' is obscure;  
 Still it is the only one deserving respect.  
 Matter existed, exists, and will exist forever;  
 It will give life to billions of realms.  
 The universe seems changing but it doesn't change;  
 Nothing perishes but it becomes concealed.  
 The essence of all creation is motion.  
 Chemistry proves this claim,  
 Since nothing can ever be non-existent.  
 How could anything have existed before matter?  
 In reality what does it mean to say 'today, tomorrow'?  
 Each motion creates an idea.  
 O earth, you are our mother,  
 O earth you are our grave.  
 I cannot say but other worlds  
 Nourish our likes on them.  
 O gentle breeze that envelops our globe!  
 O cheerful light coming from the sun!  
 Microbes of every type  
 Turn each living thing into barren soil.  
 You are the origin of our life,  
 You summon up our death.<sup>137</sup>

Such reflections on matter, chemistry, microbes, and the like, presented in a poetic mode of expression, suggested a novel solution to the problem of poetry in a scientific age. Unlike Beşir Fu'ad and Şerafeddin Mağmumî, who proposed that literature adopt scientific approaches such as realism, Abdullah Cevdet suggested that poets could employ traditional literary forms without necessarily contradicting science. Accordingly, such poetic notions as 'delight', 'gentle breeze', and 'cheerful light' could still be used, but always in a scientific context. In fact, some experiences, such as Abdullah Cevdet's own conversion from religiosity to materialism, could best be explained by using poetic metaphors to represent natural phenomena guiding the individual toward truth:

Once I was surrounded by darkness;

I did not know what the earth was, what the sky;  
 All pains, griefs, and exhilarations  
 Were things coming down from the sky for me.

...

What was the figure that manifested itself to me?  
 It was a plaything of nature, humanity.<sup>138</sup>

Similarly, the role of the Royal Medical Academy in his conversion might best be conveyed in verse:

Science and reason are my torches on the road to understanding the  
 secret side of things.

...

The secrets of the universe have been solved thanks to science,  
 The secrets of genesis and life have become clear to me.  
 My Medical Academy is a school of enlightenment;  
 In my eyes all supernatural phenomena have become illusions.<sup>139</sup>

Again, it was the content of poetry, not its form, which, according to Abdullah Cevdet, must change to conform to the demands of science. He saw no reason why new ideas might not be expressed through ancient verses, as André Chénier had done,<sup>140</sup> and it was precisely such a reconciliation of romantic poetry with science that would resolve the problem raised by Büchner and his Ottoman disciples. He revealed that Arthur Schopenhauer's *Pensées et fragments: Les douleurs du monde, l'amour, la mort, l'art et la morale* provided him with the inspiration to express his grief in a poem.<sup>141</sup> In the words of one prominent Symbolist, 'L'oriental qu'est Abdullah Djevdet Bey a bien raison de rester plus préoccupé de l'Amour que du Progrès.'<sup>142</sup> Literature (and poetry in particular), regardless of its form, would prove an asset for anyone who aims at reshaping the world. This belief inspired Abdullah Cevdet to write poetry in imitation of poets ranging from Pushkin to Dumas.<sup>143</sup>

Translation of French literary works into Ottoman Turkish was yet another expression of Abdullah Cevdet's accommodating approach to literature. His many translations from Chénier,<sup>144</sup> Alfred de Musset,<sup>145</sup> and Hugo<sup>146</sup>—all authors whose literary output had been strongly criticized by Beşir Fu'ad—clearly reveal that Abdullah Cevdet did not wish literature to become a mere 'branch of science'. Unlike other followers of Büchner in the Ottoman intelligentsia, Abdullah Cevdet felt free to praise a figure like Chénier, long considered a champion of *l'art pour l'art*, and described as the 'last expression of an expiring art' by Anatole France.<sup>147</sup> Nor did he refrain from translating the explicit romanticism of Alphonse de Lamartine.<sup>148</sup> Indeed, Lamartine's evolution from early piety, represented in such poems as *L'hymne au Christ*, to a resolute anti-Catholic stance in his later years greatly resembles Abdullah Cevdet's own transformation from Islamic piety

to materialism. Going against the strong current of antagonism to Romanticism running through Ottoman materialist circles, Abdullah Cevdet remained a passionate admirer of Romanticism.

His admiration was not unreciprocated. No less a figure than Gustave Kahn, considered the greatest of the Symbolists along with Jean Moréas (Yannis Papadiamantopoulos), wrote a glowing preface to one of Abdullah Cevdet poetic works.<sup>149</sup> One can only be amazed at such praise from a man who had summed up the Symbolist doctrine as ‘antinaturalism, antiprosaism in poetry, a search for freedom in the efforts in art, in reaction against the regimentation of the *Parnasse* and the naturalists’.<sup>150</sup> Ernest Raynaud, another leading Symbolist, penned a fulsome preface to another book by Abdullah Cevdet.<sup>151</sup> Raynaud’s admiration is no less astounding than Kahn’s, given his interpretation of the ultimate goal of the poet as ‘pure beauty—an exceedingly elusive and vague thinking, and meaningful, perhaps, only to metaphysicians, musicians, or poets of his own stamp’.<sup>152</sup>

Like many Parnassians such as Stéphane Mallarmé and Paul Verlaine, who later became Symbolists, Abdullah Cevdet produced Symbolist poetry much appreciated in European literary circles;<sup>153</sup> some of his Symbolist sonnets feature in the prestigious *La Plume*,<sup>154</sup> and by 1902 his status as a poet was such that his passage though Paris occasioned a Symbolist fête.<sup>155</sup> Both the evident influence of the Parnassians on Abdullah Cevdet and his initiation into Symbolist circles reveal how different was his attitude toward literature and art from that of his fellow Ottoman materialists. Unlike many of them, he also praised the work of the leading figures of Divan poetry, whom he described as Symbolists.<sup>156</sup> As he later wrote:

poetry does not have a purpose, just as spring water, or the sun that rises on the horizon every morning and warms and illuminates us, does not have a purpose. However, like the sun that could not be so called if it became a cold globe, poetry could not be so called if it did not instill tenderness, strength, and spaciousness into souls and develop an ardent desire in minds for the beautiful and good.<sup>157</sup>

We may recognize the first part of this statement as a reformulation of Cotta’s famous saying ‘Die empirische Naturforschung...hat keinen andern Zweck’ so extolled by Büchner.<sup>158</sup> However, unlike his materialist idols, Abdullah Cevdet thought that humanity should not restrict itself to ‘scientific’ art forms whether they were ‘schön oder unästhetisch’. Poetry and art should move minds towards the ‘beautiful and good’. Symbolist verse could be a powerful tool in the hands of the materialist. Indeed, through poetry, one might summarize Letourneau’s or Büchner’s works in a more æsthetic and powerful way:

Irradiant de nos cerveaux,  
Fait surgir des rêves nouveaux,

Cette vibrance impressentie.<sup>159</sup>

Abdullah Cevdet's attitude toward literature was exceptional among Ottoman materialists. On one occasion, a writer launched an attack on literature from within the pages of Abdullah Cevdet's very own *İctihad*. The writer criticized the role played by literature in contemporary society, 'envenoming youngsters with the poison of illusion'. He described 'philosophy' as a 'science of empty imaginings' and advocated the termination of literary studies at schools.<sup>160</sup> To this Abdullah Cevdet responded straightforwardly: 'philosophy is the brain of humanity; literature is the heart of humanity. A heart in a brainless body or a brain in a heartless body may only be found at the stage of death.'<sup>161</sup>

### **Abdullah Cevdet's attempt to fuse materialism with Islam**

Of all the works of Victor Hugo, Abdullah Cevdet chose to translate and publish one poem in particular. His choice is significant. The poem he chose was '*Le pont*'.<sup>162</sup> An individual cries out:

Je m'écriai:—Mon âme, ô mon âme! il faudrait,  
Pour traverser ce gouffre où nul bord n'apparaît,  
Et pour qu'en cette nuit jusqu'à ton Dieu tu marches,  
Bâtir un pont géant sur des millions d'arches.  
Qui le pourra jamais? Personne! ô deuil! effroi!  
Pleure!

To this, a specter responds that the only bridge to pass over these abysses is '*La prière*'.<sup>163</sup> Like Hugo, and despite strong materialist convictions, Abdullah Cevdet considered faith necessary for the individual. Hugo had abandoned his theistic views of the divinity in old age. His God ceased 'to be circumscribed and personal, and does expand into the Infinite'.<sup>164</sup> Like Hugo, Abdullah Cevdet in his old age, and under the influence of Jean-Marie Guyau, reached similar conclusions:

We are pious infidels; our faith is that  
Being a disciple of God is tantamount to love.  
What we drink at our drinking party is  
The thirst for the infinite.<sup>165</sup>

These thoughts read like Charles Sectéran's ideas on reconciling Christianity with reason to create a 'religion of love'.<sup>166</sup> Yet Abdullah Cevdet had no intention of using his new faith to refute positivism and materialism, as Sectéran had done. He sought reconciliation.



His attempt to construct a ‘religion of love’ constituted a powerful challenge to accepted views of Ottoman scientism. As early as 1873, Ottoman intellectuals had grappled with the problem of supplying a scientific description of ‘love’. One popular journal informed its readers that ‘some experts consider love as a kind of illness influencing the nervous system.’<sup>167</sup> Furthermore, the writer opined, ‘love is not unique to humans but common among animals.’<sup>168</sup> Beşir Fu’ad, as I have noted,<sup>169</sup> was later to elaborate on this topic. One of Abdullah Cevdet’s closest associates, Şerafeddin Mağmumî, provided the following explanation:

Like the soul, love too is an important issue...In my opinion, love is semi-madness. It is the emergence of a thin liquid layer and its coverage of the brain, the center of wisdom and intelligence, because of constant contemplation...In any case, what is madness? It is nothing but the attack of blood on the head, which is the center of wisdom and understanding, because of constant thinking about the same issue.<sup>170</sup>

In order to merge this faith in love with ‘science’, Abdullah Cevdet declared the prophet of his faith to be *le bon sens*.<sup>171</sup> He thus expressed his desire for a ‘scientific faith’ different from all known religions. At the same time, he believed that once existing religions were stripped of their sacredness and unscientific assertions, they would be of much help in the process of creating this new ‘faith’. But only a faith based upon ‘science’ could keep up with the necessities of modern times. In this sense, therefore, it is perhaps possible to speak of Abdullah Cevdet as a Büchner and a Strauss rolled into one.

Without understanding this crucial point, it would be difficult to comprehend Abdullah Cevdet’s motivations for translating Reinhart Dozy’s controversial essay *Het Islamisme: De Voornaamste Godsdiensten*. This was a fervent attack on Islam and on its prophet based on one carefully selected prophetic *ḥadīth*—*al-ḥikma al-mu’min wajadahā iltaqatahā* (wisdom is the believer’s stray camel; wherever he finds it, he appropriates it).<sup>172</sup> According to Abdullah Cevdet, the book was ‘a product of an absolutely impartial *bon sens*’. He agreed with Dozy’s claim that the emergence of Islam resulted from the Prophet’s alleged muscular hysteria, a claim substantiated in Aloys Sprenger’s thesis.<sup>173</sup> More surprisingly, Abdullah Cevdet maintained that Dozy, a Dutchman of French Huguenot ancestry, was ‘a thousand times more Muslim’ than many Muslims.<sup>174</sup> He cited various *ḥadīths* of the Prophet in support of this claim, including *al-muslim man salima al-nās min yadihi wa-lisānih* (the Muslim is one from whose hand and tongue people are safe), *khayr al-nās anfa ‘uhum li’l-nās* (the best of men is he who is the most useful to people), and *ṭalab al-‘ilm sā ‘atan khayr min ‘ibādat alf sana* (one hour’s search for knowledge is better than a thousand years of worship).<sup>175</sup> As Abdullah Cevdet saw it, such statements were meaningful and beneficial, regardless of the unscientific basis of Islam. Here, as not in his half-hearted defense of Islam against the critique of Vittorio Alfieri, his aim was sincere. He was convinced that the new philosophy must be adorned with the beneficial

principles of Islam in order to invest it with the power of faith. In later years, he went as far as to call for the prominent display of such beneficial *hadīths* and Qur'ānic verses in public places.<sup>176</sup>

Yet despite his zealous promotion of the Islamic tradition, Abdullah Cevdet was, in fact, reducing Islam and all other religions to the status of tools, to be wielded by materialist apostles in their efforts to promote the progressive elevation of humanity towards a scientific society. Indeed, he was not averse to borrowing from the liberal principles of other religions, such as Buddhism, in the process of forging the new faith.<sup>177</sup> As he wrote, reformulating a famous saying of Émile Boutmy, 'science is a halo without fervor, whereas religion is fervor without a halo.'<sup>178</sup> Since 'human society could not live without religion', a religion promoting 'love, harmony, concord, and *bon sens*' had to be created.<sup>179</sup> Clearly, in the eyes of Abdullah Cevdet, Islam as it stood was insufficient. He emphasized that he did not aim at 'an idle and passive religion strongly attaching the human to an idol', but rather at 'a torch of idealism, which would elevate the human'.<sup>180</sup> Ultimately, as he had prophesied previously, 'culture and virtue will reduce all religions to one religion, that of justice and truth'.<sup>181</sup> This would be a 'religio' for this world, not for the next:

I have tried to enlighten you day and night,  
I traveled from moon to sun, from sun to moon.  
Prophets promise paradise in the next world;  
I am here to make this world paradise for you.<sup>182</sup>

In order to create a philosophy that would serve as a basis for a new and scientific faith, Abdullah Cevdet attempted to reconcile 'the liberal principles of Islam', with modern science, thought, and philosophy by means of free interpretation. His first initiative was to edit and translate a chapter from Büchner's *Aus Natur und Wissenschaft*. In this chapter, the German materialist denied a need for philosophy in the traditional sense of the word. Büchner wrote that philosophical speculations were nothing but dogmatism, and were therefore thoroughly unscientific.<sup>183</sup> The system he promoted as a new philosophy was really just a notion of 'science' derived from the experimental sciences. Abdullah Cevdet made something more of it. By adding to the translated text a host of quotations from sources ranging from the New Testament to the Qur'ān, from Plato to Abū al-'Alā' al-Ma'arrī, he created an eclectic philosophy, reconciling science, religion, and philosophy with one another. As one reviewer observed correctly, his method was highly scholastic; he aimed to create a new dogma by carefully assembling and liberally interpreting select quotations from traditional sources.<sup>184</sup> In order to do this, however, Abdullah Cevdet ended up subverting many ideas of Büchner, who despised any form of philosophy, from ancient doctrines to *Naturphilosophie*, and produced a study that would have undoubtedly been shunned by Büchner. He called this essay *Fünûn ve Felsefe* (Sciences and Philosophy), and added to it extensively over time. The first edition was a 35-page lithograph pamphlet that appeared in Geneva

in 1897.<sup>185</sup> This was essentially a translation of Büchner's ideas on philosophy. A second and slightly larger 49-page edition was published in Cairo in 1906.<sup>186</sup> This was followed by a 159-page book published in Istanbul in 1912. This final edition bore the new title *Fünûn ve Felsefe ve Felsefe Sânihaları* (Sciences and Philosophy and Philosophical Inspirations).<sup>187</sup> It was here that Abdullah Cevdet at last achieved his ultimate goal of reconciliation between religion, philosophy, and science. As he stated in the introduction to the first edition, written in the form of a letter to one of his classmates, Dr İbrahim Temo, he aimed not merely to transmit scientific information from Büchner and other materialist thinkers, but to find a remedy for a 'moral need' desperately felt in the Ottoman society.<sup>188</sup> The problem was not that the advances of science were insufficiently appreciated in the Ottoman Empire—it was quite the opposite as far as the Ottoman elite was concerned—but that Ottoman society lacked a philosophy to reconcile these advances with moral values, and make them accessible to the masses. As Abdullah Cevdet put it, his purpose was 'becoming enlightened and enlightening' others at the same time.<sup>189</sup>

Like many of his contemporaries, Abdullah Cevdet was deeply influenced by the French sociologist Gustave Le Bon's theory of *psychologie des foules*. He translated many of his essays into Turkish.<sup>190</sup> Under the influence of Le Bon, Abdullah Cevdet declared that the responsibility for teaching the 'foules' fell on the elite.<sup>191</sup> This was because 'the soul of the masses has an important virtue: they accept the ideas and sentiments constantly repeated to them without any judgment or analysis.'<sup>192</sup> Accordingly, Abdullah Cevdet expected that the vanguard of his new philosophy could, by constantly indoctrinating the masses with the tenets of the new belief system, make them accept it over time. Thus his ambitious program (unlike his efforts to disseminate materialism) was not limited to influencing the elite—an aim that he accomplished quite successfully—but extended to altering the *Weltanschauung* of the Muslim masses by propagating a new philosophy he deemed Islamic. It is in this context that we may understand some of his more extreme actions: the hiring of agents to supply copies of *İctihad* to Muslim pilgrims in the Suez Canal area;<sup>193</sup> ensuring the cheap availability of Dozy's controversial book in reading rooms for Ottoman youth;<sup>194</sup> or its dissemination among Muslims in Azerbaijan and Central Asia.<sup>195</sup>

In his essay *Fünûn ve Felsefe ve Felsefe Sânihaları*, Abdullah Cevdet first discussed the various types of philosophy by making verbatim translations from Büchner (who found all existing forms out of date and insufficient). He then elaborated on a discussion between Georg Stiebeling and Büchner,<sup>196</sup> which appeared in a book by Stiebeling and was written as a refutation of Eduard von Hartmann's *Philosophie des Unbewussten*. In this book, Stiebeling had also launched a strong attack on all existing philosophies, claiming that advances in the medical and other sciences had rendered them utterly obsolete.<sup>197</sup> This opinion was naturally much appreciated by Büchner. Yet Stiebeling had also taken issue with Büchner's claim that a new realistic philosophy compiled from the modern experimental sciences might appear in the future. Abdullah Cevdet seemed to

disagree with Stiebeling's criticism of Büchner. However, he took it one step further—a step which would have shocked Büchner, had he lived long enough (and learned enough Turkish) to read through Abdullah Cevdet's liberal extrapolations from *Aus Natur und Wissenschaft*. Abdullah Cevdet's aspiration to reconcile such a realistic philosophy with religion, and with philosophies from Heraclitus to Muḥyī al-Dīn al-'Arabī, highlights not only his ingenuity but also the naïveté and scope of his ambition. To him, even the lofty goal of attaining *Wahrheit*, in the sense Büchner understood it, was insufficient unless it could provide the same services that religion offered. It was not that *Wahrheit* must become a religion itself, but that it must be infused with the qualities of religion. *Wahrheit*, in short, had to be 'religionized'.

In his efforts to imbue *Wahrheit* with religious content, Abdullah Cevdet relied on three major sources. The first consisted of the two foundations of the Islamic tradition, the Qur'an and *ḥadīth* literature.<sup>198</sup> He presumed he could bridge the enormous gulf separating the atheist doctrine of materialism from the traditional religion of Islam by means of a free reinterpretation of Islamic sources. By doing so, he sought to reconstruct the golden age of Islam as an enlightened era of liberalism and democracy, in which Muslims had been guided by an Islamic form of materialism.<sup>199</sup> Central to his project was a belief in the capacity of religion for progressive evolution. He assumed that religions, much like the species described by Darwin, could evolve into better belief systems.<sup>200</sup> Yet the faith inherited by the modern Islamic world was 'degenerate or, to be more precise, fake Islam'.<sup>201</sup> Islam, according to Abdullah Cevdet, had not evolved favorably because of the political oppression exercised by the Muslim rulers who followed the orthodox caliphs of the golden age.<sup>202</sup> Therefore, the best way to reform Islam in the modern age was to return to its original sources and reinterpret them in accordance with the needs of contemporary society.

The inspiration for this project came from one of the greatest Muslim reformers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Muḥammad 'Abduh. Abdullah Cevdet met 'Abduh shortly before the latter's death in 1905 and was deeply impressed by his vision and methodology.<sup>203</sup> He dreamed of becoming a new 'Abduh, who would reinterpret the Islamic tradition in harmony with modern science and materialism. He found 'Abduh's greatest advantage to be his thorough knowledge of the West.<sup>204</sup> As for his biggest shortcoming, it was his 'outdated method manifested in the old-fashioned ideas' that he had selected to present in spite of his clear inclination towards modern ideas.<sup>205</sup> In other words, 'Abduh had somehow inexplicably neglected materialism. It was this failure that Abdullah Cevdet set out to correct. Once he had reconciled Islam with those modern Western ideas that 'Abduh had ignored, he would launch a Muslim renaissance. Undoubtedly, Abdullah Cevdet greatly underestimated 'Abduh's authority in the Muslim world. More significantly, he failed to grasp the reason for 'Abduh's influence and the fundamental difference between his own project and 'Abduh's. 'Abduh approached the problem of Islamic modernization from a point of origin firmly rooted in Islamic orthodoxy. Abdullah Cevdet approached the same problem

from the opposite vantage point, that of the modern sciences and atheist materialism. Whereas ‘Abduh was a respected ‘*‘alim* with well-established Islamic credentials, Abdullah Cevdet was a medical doctor, a self-declared *muftahid* with little recognition in the society he aimed to transform. He seemed fundamentally unaware of the relative weakness of his position. Rousseau too, he wrote, had been a ‘religious *muftahid* and innovator like Luther’.<sup>206</sup>

The second group of sources upon which Abdullah Cevdet drew in his attempt to Islamicize *Wahrheit* comprised works of Muslim mysticism, poetry, and philosophy. Whereas the orthodox Muslim establishment frowned upon much of this literature, Abdullah Cevdet regarded it as a treasure trove of ideas, and did not hesitate to exploit it accordingly. His selective gaze rested on such thinkers as al-Ma’arrī, ‘Umar-i Khayyām, and Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī, all of whom could prove extremely useful to a reformer intent on dressing modern materialism in Islamic garb. Several examples will serve to illuminate his use of these sources. At one point in his career, for example, when he was particularly interested in anarchism, Abdullah Cevdet declared al-Ma’arrī to be an ‘anarchist precursor’.<sup>207</sup> He made repeated references to al-Ma’arrī’s *Luzūm mā lam yalzam*, holding it up as an important interpretation of the Qur’an by a *libre-penseur*.<sup>208</sup> He also made frequent use of a couplet he ascribes to Rūmī<sup>209</sup> to attack the ‘ignorant pietists’ who were ‘unaware of the maxim *al-Dīn al-mu’āmala*’ (religion resides in the interaction between humans).<sup>210</sup>

With head on the ground and backside in the air  
He considers God to be the place of his prayer.

Abdullah Cevdet used the ideas of both al-Ma’arrī and Rūmī to Islamicize specific modern theories such as those of Cesare Lombroso.<sup>211</sup> He relied heavily on Khayyām, a ‘naturalist’,<sup>212</sup> an ‘oriental Voltaire’,<sup>213</sup> and a genius whose struggle against ‘dogmatisme musulman’ had won high praise from Renan.<sup>214</sup> More importantly to Abdullah Cevdet, ‘Omar Khayyām et J.M.Guyau ne semblent ils pas fraterniser dans cette profonde et même pensée.’<sup>215</sup> Khayyām had also defended the major thesis of Guyau’s *Esquisse d’une morale sans obligation, ni sanction*.<sup>216</sup> As for ‘Urfī-yī Shīrāzī, who might be considered an Oriental ‘Symbolist’,<sup>217</sup> he had summarized the major themes of Conte Vittorio Alfieri’s *Del principe e delle lettere* <sup>218</sup> centuries ago.<sup>219</sup> More importantly, he had put forward ideas very similar to those advanced by Baron d’Holbach in *Le bon sens*, a major atheist text.<sup>220</sup>

Abdullah Cevdet’s third source was a collection of statements on science attributed to Muslim leaders and intellectuals. By reinterpreting these quotations and inflating their importance, he was able to claim proof that Islam was in full accord with modern science. *Inter alia*, this technique also enabled him to present scientific facts as Islamic ones. For instance, a statement made by the fourth Caliph, ‘Alī ibn Abī Tālib, *man mā akala al-laḥm arba ‘īn yawman fa-dhahaba ‘aqluh* (he who eats no meat for forty days loses his mind) should be understood as

a sound scientific observation on the relationship between brain activity and protein consumption.<sup>221</sup> Similarly, the Prophetic *ḥadīth*, *tadāwaw yā 'ibād allāh lam yunzal dā' mā unzila dawā'uh* (cure yourselves, O servants of God; no disease has been created without a cure for it), according to Abdullah Cevdet, was a deft summary of the philosophy of the modern medical sciences.<sup>222</sup>

The attempt to reconcile materialism and Islam based on such diverse sources yielded striking, often confusing conclusions. In *Fünûn ve Felsefe ve Felsefe Sânihalari*, Abdullah Cevdet aimed to reconcile modern materialism with Islam so as to produce a blended philosophy. He first attempted to introduce his philosophy by means of a discussion of the various descriptions of philosophy present in Islamic jurisprudence. He accepted what he took to be the orthodox consensus on philosophy, namely that *hiya ma'rifat al-ḥaqā'iq al-mawjūdāt 'alā mā hiya 'alayhi bi-ḥasab al-qudra al-basharīya* (philosophy is the knowledge of facts as they are in reality, insofar as they are ascertainable by human capacity).<sup>223</sup> In order to underscore the importance of science in classical Islam, he cited the saying *al-'ilm yarfa' bayt lā 'imād lahu wa'l-jahl yukhaffid bayt al-majd wa'l-sharaf* (science will raise high a lowly house and ignorance brings down a house of glory and honor).<sup>224</sup> He established the relationship between science and philosophy based on the *ḥadīth*: *al-ḥikma qā'id, al-'ilm junūduhu wa-lā fawz lil-junūd bi-lā qā'id. Fa-yā ḍay'at umma aḍā'a shabābuhā* [text. *shabābuhu*] *al-ḥikma* (wisdom [philosophy] is a general and the sciences [lit. knowledge] are his troops. The troops cannot be victorious without a general. How great is the loss of a community whose youth has neglected wisdom).<sup>225</sup>

Having secured religious sanction for the importance of science and philosophy, Abdullah Cevdet took the second step of bestowing religious titles upon the practitioners of scientism. Ernst Haeckel, thought Abdullah Cevdet, had been correct when he said 'Là où commence la foi la science finit' Yet this dictum applied only to those who blindly followed dogmas and imitated old practices. Relying on the Qur'ānic verse *wa-lā taqfu mā laysa laka bihi 'ilm* (Do not go after things of which you have no knowledge),<sup>226</sup> Abdullah Cevdet maintained that 'the scientists are the real believers and the believers are the real scientists.'<sup>227</sup> Since this fact was also supported by various *ḥadīths* —including *al-nazar fī wujūh al-'ulamā' 'ibāda* (looking upon faces of the *ulema* is a form of worship)<sup>228</sup> and *faḍl al-'ālim 'alā ābid ka faḍl al-qamar laylat al-badr 'alā sār al-kawākib* (the superiority of the scholar to the simple worshipper is like the superiority of the full moon to the other stars)<sup>229</sup>—the works of a Haeckel or a Büchner should be read as religious studies. In order to present these materialist writings as works of piety, Abdullah Cevdet also attempted to redefine 'belief'. Since the Prophet himself had decreed that *al-dīn huwa al—'aql wa-lā dīn li-man lā 'aql lahu* (religion is reason itself; he who has no reason has no religion), those believers who merely went through the motions of performing their religious duties without having any reason for doing so could not be considered truly pious.<sup>230</sup> Additionally, Abdullah Cevdet pointed to the high priority accorded to reason in Islam by advancing two principles of *fiqh*: *idhā ta'arada al—'aql wa'l-naql uwwila al-naql bi'l—'aql* (If

reason and received opinion are in conflict, then the received wisdom must be weighed in the scales of reason), and *al—‘aql mīzān al-naql* (Received wisdom must be weighed in the scales of reason).<sup>231</sup> In order to make his case stronger, he also quoted al-Ma’arrī:

Tāha al-naşārā wa’l-ḥanīfatu mā ihtadat  
wa-yahūdu haṭrā wa’l-majūsu muḍallalah  
qusima al-warā qismayni hādḥā ‘āqilun  
lā dīna fīhi wa-dayyinun lā ‘aqla lah.<sup>232</sup>

Thus, according to Abdullah Cevdet, blind belief in any religion—whether Christianity, Islam, Judaism or Zoroastrianism—entailed lack of reason.<sup>233</sup> Therefore, those individuals who merely followed the religious commandments without exercising reason were not religious in the philosophical sense of the word.<sup>234</sup> It was thus natural for ignorant but pious people to attribute unbelief to the scientists, whose theories they did not understand.<sup>235</sup> But their ignorance must be rectified. The masses must be told that God possesses various qualities and that one could seek His help in different ways. After all, as the Qur’ān decrees, God will answer any prayer: *inna allāha lā yukhlifu al-mī’ād* (God does not break His promise)<sup>236</sup> and *ud’ūnī astajīb lakum* (Pray unto me; I will answer your prayer).<sup>237</sup> For instance, as the *ma’būd* (the object of worship), He must be worshipped through performing religious duties, such as *namāz* (ritual worship), the reward for which was in the next world. At the same time, however, as *ghālib* (Victorious One), God should be worshipped through the production of dreadnoughts, machine guns, and torpedoes, the reward for which was victory in this world. By this logic, therefore, the manufacture of a man-of-war was essentially a religious rite. By contrast, the cause of victory would not be served by prayer.<sup>238</sup> In order to triumph on the field of battle, individuals and nations must achieve progress in specific sciences. In other words, for any mundane object, for any purpose lying outside the purely spiritual realm, man must depend upon a different mode of worship determined by science.<sup>239</sup>

By implication, the scientific project of transforming the world order must itself be considered a religious activity in perfect harmony with Islam. Its clerics were scientists; their ritual was scientific research. Accordingly, Büchner, Haeckel, and Vogt were performing religious rites. And although some pious individuals, who could comprehend neither their work nor its religious significance, might consider them anti-religious, the materialists were, in fact, the true believers. Such a line of thought could lead to rather strange conclusions. Thus, for example, the British must be considered better Muslims than their actual Muslim counterparts because of their interest in travel and exploration (this was somewhat curiously justified by the *ḥadīth*, *siyāḥat ummatī al-jihād fī sabīl allāh*—In my community *jihād* for the sake of God takes the place of wandering monks).<sup>240</sup> Similarly, the Muslim caliphate should be offered to one who had proven himself more worthy of it than Sultan Abdülhamid II—the victorious Emperor of Japan.<sup>241</sup> In his Preface to the



translation of Reinhart Dozy's book, Abdullah Cevdet wrote that Dozy, who had launched a serious attack on Islam and its prophet, was 'more Muslim' than Caliph Abdülhamid II.<sup>242</sup> At the same time, he ironically ended this Preface with the saying *wa'l-salāmu 'alā man ittaba'a al-hudā!* (Peace be upon those who follow right guidance!).<sup>243</sup> For those who knew these words to be the Qur'anic version of the greeting pronounced by Moses and Aaron to the Egyptian pharaoh, and who knew that they represented the conventional 'non-greeting' to unbelievers at the end of a letter, the message was quite clear. Abdullah Cevdet's intention was to exclude Muslim fanatics but include Dozy, for he was more Muslim than they were.<sup>244</sup> This was a crucial point for the success of his entire enterprise. For in the final analysis, there was little chance of merging Büchner's theses into Islam unless Büchner could be presented as a 'Muslim' thinker. Of course, one could argue, the chances of success in such an endeavor were low in any case.

Abdullah Cevdet's final step was to present modern scientific theories ranging from Darwinism to genetics as repetitions of Islamic holy texts or derivations from the writings of Muslim thinkers. He demonstrated how the *ḥadīth*, *ana al-malik al-ma'būd u 'āmil al-dhurriyya bi-mā taṣna 'al-judūd* (I am the king, the one worthy of worship. I deal with the forthcoming generations according to the deeds of their ancestors), pointed to the recently discovered laws of biological inheritance, and summarized the work of Théodule Armand Ribot on heredity.<sup>245</sup> Similarly, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi's saying 'les hommes descendent des animaux et sont destinés à devenir des dieux' was a repetition of a statement made by 'Alī ibn Muḥammad al-Jurjānī in his essay *Kitāb al-ta'rīfāt*.<sup>246</sup> Al-Ma'arrī, too, according to Abdullah Cevdet, had made significant pronouncements on evolution. Indeed, his dictum *wa'l-ladhī ḥārat al-barīya fīhi ḥayawān mustaḥdath min jamād* (what perplexes all creation is an animate being brought forth from [lifeless] matter) pointed to 'self-generation', the very basic principle of Darwinism.<sup>247</sup> Likewise, Ibn al-'Arabī's ideas regarding the philosopher's duty resembled those of Francis Bacon;<sup>248</sup> Letourneau's focus on the importance of philosophers in his *Science et matérialisme* was a repetition of the *ḥadīth*, *faḍl al-'ālim 'alā 'ābid ka-faḍl al-qamar laylat al-badr 'alā sā'ir al-kawākib* (the superiority of the scholar to the simple worshipper is like the superiority of the full moon to the other stars);<sup>249</sup> and finally, a subtle point made by Jean-Baptiste Massillon seemed to have been 'quoted' directly from the Qur'ān.<sup>250</sup>

While imbuing Western philosophy with Islamic content, Abdullah Cevdet was simultaneously trying to broaden Islam to encompass all existing knowledge and science. This was a bi-directional process that transformed Islam into a materialistic philosophy, and at the same time made materialist philosophy Islamic. Perhaps the most significant aspect of this fascinating effort was the stress on the need for a new philosophy forged out of materialism and religion. Abdullah Cevdet's view stood in stark contrast to the materialist claim for science as the lone creed of a future society, in which religious beliefs would no longer be necessary.



In this sense, Abdullah Cevdet's great undertaking carried an implicit criticism of scientism: namely, that it failed to take into consideration the moral needs of human society. Yet at the same time he did not doubt that scientism was providing mankind with the elusive *Wahrheit*. This ambivalence was clarified in a new book, composed of three significant chapters of *Kraft und Stoff*—'Gehirn und Seele (*Dimağ ve Ruh*)', 'Der Gedanke (*Tefekkür*)',<sup>251</sup> 'Das Bewußtsein (*Vicdan*)'—and a discussion on 'Thought and Soul' translated from Letourneau's *Science et matérialisme*.<sup>252</sup> In his Preface, Abdullah Cevdet made it clear that the theses of scientism represented the *Wahrheit* attained through experience, and that this truth should be repeated as many times as necessary.<sup>253</sup> To believe in the immortality of the soul, for example, was absurd, in the face of the cumulative evidence provided by Büchner's meticulous scientific research and in the light of the prophetic tradition *arwāḥukum ashbāḥukum*, which he translated into Turkish as 'your souls are your bodies.'<sup>254</sup> In fact, there was no support for the doctrine of immortality in Islam. This could readily be seen from 'Ubayda bin al-Jarrāh's response to the question: 'Where does the soul of man go when he dies?' Posing a counter-question in reply, al-Jarrāh asked: 'Where does the light of the candle go when its oil is used up?'<sup>255</sup> The import of such examples was to portray Islam as an ancient form of materialism. Only if Islam were shown to be an ancestor of modern materialism could it serve as a versatile tool for fixing the problems of modern society.

Between 1911 and 1912, in addition to his ambitious work on philosophy and several translations of Büchner, Abdullah Cevdet produced yet another essay later named 'A Historical and Philosophical Opinion on the Muslim World'.<sup>256</sup> Most of the ideas in this essay were taken from an obscure Indian 'ālim, Muhammad Ghūrī, who had died in Berlin not long before.<sup>257</sup> Here, in addition to analyzing the reasons behind Muslim decline, Abdullah Cevdet presented the case for pulling the Muslim world out of its decadence with the help of a desperately needed new philosophy. One of his key objectives was to demonstrate the harmony of Islam with natural law. He cited the Qur'anic verse *idhā jā'a ajaluhum [fa-lā yasta'khīrūna sā'atan wa-] lā yastaqdimūna* (when their term comes they shall not put it back by a single hour nor put forward)<sup>258</sup> not as evidence of the divine appointment of events, but as a vindication of the laws of nature. Providence did not predestine each individual act or event, but rather the rules regulating their occurrence. Thus *sunnat allāh* or 'ādat allāh were, in fact, nothing but the immutable commandments of nature. The verse *wa-lan tajida li-sunnati allāhi tabdīlan* (You will never find a change in the way of God) summarized not only the law of conservation of mass but the entire *Naturphilosophie*.<sup>259</sup> Islam in general, therefore, included all unalterable laws of nature. It was incumbent upon Muslims to understand this and realize the full potential of Islam, instead of reducing it to mere rites and rituals.<sup>260</sup> For instance, those *ulema* who criticized Darwinism should understand that 'the Qur'ān both alluded to and summarized the theory of evolution.'<sup>261</sup> Interpreted 'correctly', Abdullah Cevdet argued, Islam would prove infinitely useful to society. Otherwise, he warned, if Muslims did not

mend their ways, they would soon become servants to other *'ibād allāh* who did possess 'knowledge'.<sup>262</sup>

Abdullah Cevdet was greatly disappointed that his attempt to create a new philosophy acceptable to Muslims was not endorsed by the religious establishment. Professions of admiration for a respected reformist *'ālim* like 'Abduh and reports of a cordial meeting with him were not enough to render Abdullah Cevdet's radical revisionism appealing to members of the *ulema*, however reformist they might happen to be. Even those who praised him for 'filling science with religious power' were critical overall. They recognized Abdullah Cevdet's project for what it was: an extremely unorthodox doctrine supported at best by highly unconventional interpretation, and at worst by downright misinterpretation of the traditional Islamic sources.<sup>263</sup> His efforts to garner support for his project from members of the *ulema* were unsuccessful.

One way in which Abdullah Cevdet sought to push his work into the mainstream of contemporary Islamic thought was by drawing parallels between his own work and that of unorthodox members of the *ulema*. This approach backfired in a spectacular manner, provoking an outcry in orthodox Islamic circles. The most notorious instance of this involved the non-conformist *'ālim* and Afghan *émigré*, 'Ubayd Allāh ibn 'Abd al-Ḥamīd more familiar as 'Ubayd Allāh al-Afghānī. He came forward with an interesting interpretation of the fifth *sūra* of the Qur'ān, a key passage of which reads: 'Should any of you turn back from his religion, then God will bring a people, whom He loves and who love Him, [and who will be] humble toward believers, mighty against the disbelievers.'<sup>264</sup> 'Ubayd Allāh al-Afghānī interpreted this to mean that a new Muslim community (*kavm-i cedīd*) would emerge to replace those Muslims who, for some time now, had been neglecting their major duty, *jihād*.<sup>265</sup> Significantly, this new Muslim community would be a reformed one, not unlike the Protestant community of England. In a controversial essay, *Kavm-i Cedīd*, 'Ubayd Allāh al-Afghānī asked 'whether progress or Protestantism occurred first in England?' His answer was bold: 'If Protestantism had not occurred and old-fashioned Christianity had been maintained, there would have been no trace of contemporary civilization.'<sup>266</sup> Muslims too, he suggested, should find the 'truth' in Islam in order to embark on a similar journey of progress. Members of the doomed existing community had adopted a foolishly antagonistic approach toward the European advances in science, and had focused on absurd subjects instead.<sup>267</sup> They had done so despite the inherently scientific nature of Islam.<sup>268</sup> As for the new Muslim community, while it was not destined to ignore the five pillars of Islam, it would no longer consider them central.<sup>269</sup> The new tenets of Islam, to be derived from the Qur'ān and *ḥadīth* literature, would be: reason, confession of faith, good morals, *jihād*, and preparation for war under the banner of the Ottoman caliphate.<sup>270</sup> 'Ubayd Allāh al-Afghānī had faith that with the Qur'ān and the *ḥadīths* on their side, the leaders of the new Muslim community could successfully 'challenge the *ulema* of the old Muslim community of the entire world',<sup>271</sup> who were to blame for the backwardness of Muslims in so many fields.<sup>272</sup>

To Abdullah Cevdet, these ideas sounded surprisingly like his own. But more importantly, they were issued by a figure with religious authority. Recognizing an opportunity, he immediately announced his intent to publish the controversial sermons of ‘Ubayd Allāh al-Afghānī. When they appeared in installments in *İctihad*,<sup>273</sup> he presented them as produced exclusively for that journal,<sup>274</sup> not as chapters from *Kavm-i Cedîd*, which in another context he praised as ‘a perfect religious essay’.<sup>275</sup>

This episode sparked a serious controversy, which taught Abdullah Cevdet that befriending the nonconformist fringes of the *ulema* was not without its perils. When ‘Ubayd Allāh al-Afghānī visited the offices of the widely-read Islamist journal *Sebil’ür-Reşad*, what was intended as a friendly conversation with the editors turned into an interrogation. Leading Islamist intellectuals, İsmail Hakkı, Eşref Edib, and Mehmed Âkif attacked their visitor, accusing him of producing nonsense that had had nothing to do with Islam. They exposed him as an author who did not understand even the most basic Islamic sources. According to the record of the conversation subsequently published in *Sebil’ür-Reşad*, ‘Ubayd Allāh al-Afghānī proved unable to answer technical questions about Qur’ānic interpretation and the *hadīth* literature.<sup>276</sup> He was denounced as a dilettante individual pretending to be an ‘*âlim*’.<sup>277</sup> One reader of *İctihad* did try to defend the embattled cleric and his liberal Islamic outlook,<sup>278</sup> but this defense only served to trigger a fresh attack by some *ulema*.<sup>279</sup>

This controversy embarrassed Abdullah Cevdet, forcing him break his word and halt the publication of ‘Ubayd Allāh al-Afghānī’s sermons. He thus came to realize that association with controversial religious figures would only further damage his already poor image in the eyes of the faithful.

The guardians of Muslim orthodoxy were harshly critical of Abdullah Cevdet’s initiatives. Far from subscribing to his controversial ideas, his orthodox Muslim critics shunned him as ‘a vile individual’ attempting to ‘establish a religion’.<sup>280</sup> In the words of one prominent Islamist, Abdullah Cevdet and his companions wanted ‘to obtain the approval of the people for the new religion [that they had] instituted’, and which they dared to call Islam.<sup>281</sup> According to Şeyhülislām Mehmed Es’ad Efendi, Abdullah Cevdet and those who contributed to his journal were attempting to ‘spread disarray throughout the *sharī’a* and vitiate its judgments, which are based upon absolute dogmas’.<sup>282</sup> One Islamist journal editorialized that their actions were those of ‘fake Muslims’.<sup>283</sup> Another accused *İctihad*’s major contributors of ‘reformism’ and of ‘imitating Luther’, both of which were derogatory charges in the Islamist jargon of the time.<sup>284</sup> They were charged with ignorance of Islam, with reliance on books in Western languages, and with deliberate misuse of Islamic sources in order to render their ideas more appealing.<sup>285</sup> In fact, since ‘religious reform’ was a ‘ridiculous utopia’ in the first place, an individual like Abdullah Cevdet had no right to serve as a *mujtahid*.<sup>286</sup> The *Dâr’ül-Hikmet’il-İslâmiye* (Academy of Islam) *officially* appealed to the *Meşihat*, requesting that the necessary changes be made to the birth certificates of the accused to indicate their true religious affiliation, atheism.<sup>287</sup> Finally, in an

attempt to frustrate the entire materialist enterprise, all versions of materialism were equated with atheism and presented as the antithesis of religion.<sup>288</sup>

Criticism was also leveled against Abdullah Cevdet's choice of sources. Al-Ma'arrī, for example, was singled out by the most prominent Islamist journal as a dubious source on Islamic practice. In a translation from Arabic of a work on al-Ma'arrī, it was admitted that certain of his writings did qualify him as a good Muslim.<sup>289</sup> Yet at the same time, the journal warned, 'al-Ma'arrī of the Arabs very much resembles Khayyām of the Persians in his lack of principles'. They were both 'mediocre' poets, who did not possess 'sufficient skills to become important literary figures' and whose desire for originality led them to discuss ideas that may have been thought but never uttered by the great Islamic thinkers. Therefore, the editors suggested, it would be better to ignore those works used by various enemies of Islam.<sup>290</sup>

### **Alternatives to orthodox Islam in fusing religion and materialism**

The strong reaction from representatives of orthodox Islam put pressure on Abdullah Cevdet to abdicate his position as prominent materialist *mujtahid*. However, resilient and indefatigable as ever, he refused to surrender and instead resorted to heterodoxy. One might have expected, based on the large number of Bektashi hymns published in the pages of *İctihad*,<sup>291</sup> that Abdullah Cevdet would turn to popular Bektashi Sufism—or Turkish Stoicism,<sup>292</sup> as he considered it—to further his goals. However, he came up with a more original idea, Bahatism. Having prepared the ground with a series of articles describing Bahatism in his journal,<sup>293</sup> Abdullah Cevdet penned an article proposing the Bahai faith as a universal religion. Still hanging on to shreds of Islamic legitimacy, and basing his claim upon Abū al-Fidā's *Kitāb al-mukhtaṣar fī akhbār al-baṣhar* and 'Abd al-Bahā's *Lawḥ-i-ḥikmat* he pronounced Bahatism to be the only faith lacking a single judgment against reason,<sup>294</sup> and found it to be in perfect accord with the *ḥadīth*, *al-dīn huwa al—'aql wa-lā dīn li-man lā 'aql lahu* (religion is reason itself; he who has no reason has no religion).<sup>295</sup> Furthermore, Bahatism alone among existing universal religions promoted 'love'; thus it was 'fervor with a halo'. He confessed that the religion for which he had been yearning for many long years, and the one to which he had referred in the poem 'The Religion of the Poet',<sup>296</sup> was none other than Bahatism:

Life and universe are at rest in the midst of your saintly light.  
Our religion is not a religion of hatred but a religion of love.  
Our poetry is the ecstatic language of the consciousness of divine unity.  
What shivers in the soul of our lute is the heart of nature.<sup>297</sup>

While his flirtation with Bahatism did not provide Abdullah Cevdet with the long-sought-after vehicle for reconciling materialism with religion, it did land him in

one of the longest trials of late Ottoman and early republican Turkish history. He was charged with blasphemy<sup>298</sup> and sentenced to two years in prison in April 1922. Luckily for him, his appeal to a higher court coincided with the change of regime and with the omission of the crime of blasphemy from the new Turkish penal code. He was acquitted in December 1926 after a four-and-a-half-year trial.<sup>299</sup> In addition to his legal problems, criticism from the *ulema* continued unabated. A former Şehyüslâm attacked Abdullah Cevdet for introducing a heresy that offered no substitute for the best of all religions, Islam.<sup>300</sup> To no avail, Abdullah Cevdet replied that he would try to reconcile the beneficial principles of Bahaism with Islam in imitation of Muḥammad ‘Abduh.<sup>301</sup> In yet another bold display of resourcefulness, he opened the pages of *İctihad* to an eccentric *dersiâm* whose ambition was ‘to meet the demands of Qur’an and *ḥadīth* with a new system of belief and ideals’.<sup>302</sup> He was much praised by Abdullah Cevdet as the first ‘*imam* addressing God in Turkish’,<sup>303</sup> but his low credibility among the learned classes made it impossible for him to succeed where Abdullah Cevdet had failed. Moreover, although this ‘*âlim* adopted the materialist rhetoric on science and religion,<sup>304</sup> his knowledge of modern philosophy and sciences was too limited for the scope of Abdullah Cevdet’s plan.

Having utterly failed as a materialist *mujtahid* and as a proselytizer for Bahaism, yet determined as ever not to give up, Abdullah Cevdet resolved to pursue other means to accomplish the goal of his life. He found the answer in the work of the ‘immoralist’ French philosopher, Jean-Marie Guyau. As early as 1906, he was well aware of Guyau’s *Esquisse d’une morale sans obligation, ni sanction*,<sup>305</sup> and of his magnum opus *L’Irréligion de l’avenir: Étude sociologique*.<sup>306</sup> Yet at the time, these significant works do not seem to have made a significant impact on him, caught up as he was in his ambitious project to fuse materialism with Islam. In the last decade of his life, however, Abdullah Cevdet reconsidered Guyau’s theses on religion and found in them the object of his quest. As one of his closest friends later reminisced, ‘Abdullah Cevdet’s brain had become prisoner in a triangle, the corners of which were Büchner, Le Bon, and Guyau.’<sup>307</sup> Of these, Guyau made the strongest impact on him.<sup>308</sup> Abdullah Cevdet went so far as to describe Guyau as ‘the greatest Frenchman of the nineteenth century’,<sup>309</sup> and ‘a musician who enchanted his life with his work’.<sup>310</sup> Readers of *İctihad* in the 1920s could easily have mistaken the French philosopher (who died in 1888), for a major active contributor to the journal—so many of his poems and essays appeared in every issue. When Abdullah Cevdet translated Guyau’s *Vers d’un philosophe* into Turkish in 1930, he could not but point out the similarities between the themes of his earlier poems and those of Guyau’s.<sup>311</sup> This was particularly remarkable given that Abdullah Cevdet had composed these early works long before he encountered the French philosopher’s work.<sup>312</sup> The similarities are indeed striking and they become increasingly so in the later poetry of Abdullah Cevdet.<sup>313</sup> Undoubtedly, Guyau’s presentation of *Wahrheit* in an æsthetic form<sup>314</sup> was the primary reason for Abdullah Cevdet’s admiration. He also translated Guyau’s work *É ducation et hérédité: Étude sociologique* into

Turkish,<sup>315</sup> and published various parts of his *Esquisse d'une morale sans obligation, ni sanction* and *L'Irréligion de l'avenir* in his journal.<sup>316</sup> He prepared a translation of the first essay for publication by the Turkish Ministry of Education. Despite Abdullah Cevdet's wishes, neither this essay nor Guyau's magnum opus appeared in Turkish in book form.<sup>317</sup>

Guyau's works, especially *L'Irréligion de l'avenir*, proposed solutions to many of Abdullah Cevdet's problems. On the one hand, Guyau's provocative titles portrayed him as the quintessential positivist and the bearer of a morality divorced from religion. And yet, as Fidler noted, in *Esquisse d'une morale sans obligation, ni sanction*,<sup>318</sup> and *L'Irréligion de l'avenir*—both of which were translated by Abdullah Cevdet—Guyau in fact made significant contributions to the French spiritualist or intuitionist school (from Maine de Biran to Bergson), and more importantly, showed himself to be a 'moralist'.<sup>319</sup> Guyau started out by asserting that 'des plus graves problèmes' were a result of 'l'affaiblissement du christianisme'. He then proposed that in order to remedy this situation, 'Il faut que la science fasse désormais ce que la religion fit jadis: il faut qu'elle assure, avec la fécondité de la race, sa bonne éducation physique, morale et économique.'<sup>320</sup> According to Guyau, who allotted science an important but secondary role in society, 'Nous ne voyons donc pas comment des "couches profondes" de l'humanité pourrait germer et sortir encore une grande religion.'<sup>321</sup> Any attempt to solve this problem by means of a 'fétichisme' like Comte's philosophy was useless, since such systems, unlike modern religions, had not gradually evolved from a primitive system of physics into metaphysics. '[L]e Positivisme ne peut nous offrir aucun symbole de ce genre: son "Grande Fétiche" est un pur fétiche, bon pour les peuples primitifs.'<sup>322</sup> In the future, he prophesied:

Nous nous sentirions entrer et monter dès cette vie dans l'immortalité de l'affection. Ce serait une sorte de création nouvelle. La moralité, la religion même n'est, selon nous, qu'un phénomène de fécondité morale; l'immortalité serait la manifestation ultime de cette fécondité. Alors on verrait disparaître, dans une synthèse final, cette opposition que le savant croit apercevoir aujourd'hui entre la génération de l'espèce et l'immortalité de l'individu. Si on ferme les yeux dans la mort, on les ferme aussi dans l'amour; qui sait si l'amour ne pourra pas devenir fécond jusque par delà la mort?<sup>323</sup>

In other words, Guyau dreamed that the individual would attain a higher conception of 'religion' and 'morality' by freeing himself from the yoke of obligations and sanctions imposed upon him by the existing versions of these concepts. 'C'est une force qui ne nous est pas supérieure, mais intérieure: c'est nous qu'elle porte en avant.'<sup>324</sup> This force, impelling the individual to promote the good for the sake of 'love' without expectation of reward or fear of punishment, would elevate him to a higher ethic. In the final analysis, 'love' was destined to become the basis for a new natural ethic, rendering the individual 'immortal' not

in the religious sense, but in the philosophical sense of the word.<sup>325</sup> 'Irreligion' was not something desirable; its domination 'de nos jours est donc, à beaucoup d'égards, le triomphe au moins provisoire d'une religion plus digne de ce nom, d'une foi plus pure'.<sup>326</sup> Abdullah Cevdet agreed with Guyau that 'belief in a Supreme Being who rules the universe according to his own caprice indicates not only enormous credulity but also gives rise to a sad weakness of the human soul, leading it to a helpless inconsistency.'<sup>327</sup> Still, he saw the need for religion guided by a 'reasonable purpose'. This purpose '[was] to develop among men the spirit of concord, of love and mercy'. Religions lacking this characteristic could be dangerous: 'It is better to cease using the remedy when, in place of healing or alleviating, it aggravates the trouble.'<sup>328</sup>

Guyau, the philosopher-poet, held unique views on art in general and poetry in particular. Like Abdullah Cevdet, he took issue with the contemporary tendency to treat art as obsolete in an age of scientific supremacy.<sup>329</sup> Poetry, eloquence, and music were arts 'plus religieux'. In the future, the traditional 'prophètes religieux' would be replaced by 'grandes individualités...de la pensée humaine, de la poésie, de la méta-physique et de la science'.<sup>330</sup> According to Guyau, 'les grands poètes, les grands artistes redeviendront un jour les grands initiateurs des masses, les prêtres d'une religion sans dogme'.<sup>331</sup> Taking his cue from Guyau, Abdullah Cevdet formulated it as one of *İctihad's* guiding principles: 'Art, poetry, music refine the soul and give it a divine range.'<sup>332</sup> Guyau's main thesis regarding art and poetry is that science itself 'only brings man to the thresh-old of the divine which is infinity...From this point a new kind of imaginative poetry, the poetry of immensity, of metaphysical mystery', exemplified in various poems of Hugo, could emerge.<sup>333</sup> According to Guyau, poetry was one of the most important media for the expression of philosophical and social ideas.<sup>334</sup> The poet and the artist needed both a scientific and a philosophical spirit to understand reality and transcend it,<sup>335</sup> but 'the modern poet should attempt to communicate the conclusions, not the methods of science.'<sup>336</sup>

Abdullah Cevdet considered himself to be a poet-philosopher redefining Guyau's ideas for a Muslim society. He devoted the last years of his life to reconciling his early materialist convictions with the work of Guyau, despite the obvious contradictions between the two systems. Indeed, only by the exercise of sheer willpower could one possibly hope to reconcile Büchner's 'Religion der Liebe' with the thought of Guyau. Clearly, Guyau's 'love', 'religion', and 'mystery' meant something altogether different in a materialist context. Yet such problems presented little difficulty to a former *mujtahid* who claimed to have succeeded in bridging the enormous chasm separating Islamic orthodoxy from Büchner's materialism. Thus, for example, Abdullah Cevdet could easily smooth over Guyau's strong criticism of Ribot<sup>337</sup> and reconcile their contradictory positions on heredity to achieve a single 'truth'.<sup>338</sup> Still, he encountered difficulties making scientism conform to some of Guyau's major theses.

Like Guyau, Abdullah Cevdet acknowledged the 'impossibility and undesirability of converting a whole nation to atheism'.<sup>339</sup> As a devotee of Le



Bon, he thought that the 'foule' must be spoon-fed with basic mottos and principles, but one should not serve it sophisticated theories and systems of thought. It is in this light that we must understand Abdullah Cevdet's translation and publication of classical materialist works such as d'Holbach's *Le bon sens*<sup>340</sup> and Voltaire's *Testament de Jean Meslier*,<sup>341</sup> which surely must have seemed cryptic to the average reader. As he admitted, these were works for the elite, not for the masses.<sup>342</sup> Ultimately, he depended on members of the elite to eliminate superstitions, accept Guyau's philosophy, and transmit its vulgarized adaptation to the ignorant masses who yearned for simplified clichés.

Although 'atheist ideas' could be used to purge 'hazardous' ideas from the elite, 'atheism' was not a goal in and of itself. As he stated in his Preface to *Le bon sens*, Abdullah Cevdet categorically rejected the allegations of 'atheism' leveled against him. He was in fact a 'real believer', but his religion did not contain hatred, enmity, and vengeance, nor did his god possess such qualities.<sup>343</sup> He declared that 'the real religion is to simply not be a member of a narrow religion with superstitions.'<sup>344</sup> According to Abdullah Cevdet, this religion would be 'a religion of love' akin to Guyau's faith of the future. With no false modesty, he took upon himself the role of its prophet.<sup>345</sup> Adoption of Guyau's philosophy would eliminate all existing moral obligations in society. Because of this, humanity required neither Comte nor Bergson nor Kant. The philosophy of Guyau would suffice.<sup>346</sup> An ethic free of religion, dogma, myth, supernatural commands, rites, and rituals, would constitute the final solution for modern society.

Long before his obsession with Guyau, Abdullah Cevdet had published a short novel attributed to a certain Sanfani entitled *Tıbbiyeli ve Nişanlısı yahud Mekârim-i Ahlâkiyesiz Din, Dinsiz Mekârim-i Ahlâkiye* (The Medical Student and His Fiancée: Religion without Morals, Morals without Religion) to promote such ideas.<sup>347</sup> Unlike Guyau's works, this popular novel attempted to prove the superiority of the materialistic ethic to religious ones. Such an ethic, strenuously defended by one of Abdullah Cevdet's old materialist icons, Félix Isnard, seemed tremendously beneficial. It would not, however, yield the benefits of the sophisticated philosophy promoted by Guyau. For Abdullah Cevdet, who sought to 'put hell and heaven in the conscience of the individual',<sup>348</sup> and who had asked his comrades to propose 'a moral education independent of religion',<sup>349</sup> Guyau's philosophy was a solution to a lifelong problem. This problem received only partial answers from scienticism and the materialist ethic. This is why Abdullah Cevdet commented that 'Guyau...was not only a great brain but at the same time a great heart.'<sup>350</sup>

For Abdullah Cevdet, who was striving to promote the maxim *al-Dîn al-Mu'âmalâ*,<sup>351</sup> Guyau's focus on 'work' as a mode of worship was highly relevant. Guyau had written that 'le travail, comme on l'a dit, vaut la prière; il vaut mieux que la prière, ou plutôt il est la vraie prière, la vraie providence humaine: agissons au lieu de prier',<sup>352</sup> and that 'la croyance au divin ne sera plus une adoration passive, mais une action.'<sup>353</sup> For Abdullah Cevdet, a staunch supporter of private initiative and individualism, work was to be an extremely important part of the



new ethic. In *Fünûn ve Felsefe ve Felsefe Sânihaları*<sup>354</sup> and in many other writings he had claimed that such an ethic followed logically from the Qur'anic verse *laysa li'l-insāni illā mā sa'ā* (man will have nothing but what he strives for).<sup>355</sup> Strangely enough, in his later years Abdullah Cevdet related this idea to Edouard Herriot's theses supporting the use of personal energies to secure social progress.<sup>356</sup> The unsophisticated ideas of this radical French politician, as expressed in his book *Créer*, seem to have had a strong impact on Abdullah Cevdet.<sup>357</sup> Herriot was at the same time a believer in progress in a Condorcetian sense, an ideological disciple of Léon Bourgeois's biological *Solidarisme*, a humanist following in the footsteps of the *Encyclopédistes*, and a stalwart advocate of *laïcité*.<sup>358</sup> He could never have imagined that his ideas would be used to promote a new ethic favoring individualism, and by a disciple of Le Bon, no less.

Abdullah Cevdet died on November 29, 1932. Unlike his predecessor Beşir Fu'ad or his comrade Şerafeddin Mağmumî, he did not will his body to the Medical School for use in scientific research. Instead, he asked to be cremated.<sup>359</sup> An explanation may be found in the following poem from 1901:

Amis! venez brûler mon corps;  
 La tombe au Poète ne doit  
 Etre que de feu; le linceul  
 Digne de lui, n'est que la flamme;  
 La flamme est la sœur de son âme;  
 Et sur cet abattoir immonde,  
 Nature, Poète est le [?] seul.<sup>360</sup>

But Abdullah Cevdet's family, like that of Beşir Fu'ad, did not honor the 'dernière volonté' of the 'Poète', and gave him a proper Muslim funeral. The event, not unexpectedly, triggered yet another debate between Turkish materialists and conservatives.<sup>361</sup> One of his Royal Medical Academy friends delivered a eulogy, in which he described the deceased materialist poet as either 'a pious atheist or an atheistic pietist' (*dindar bir dinsiz veya dinsiz bir dindar*).<sup>362</sup> This was an apt description of a peculiar individual, at once Symbolist and Materialist, who aspired to become a Büchner, a Strauss, a Guyau, a Haeckel, and an 'Abduh-style *mujtahid* all in one. As he saw himself, he was above all a secular prophet of the modern, scientific era with the self-imposed duty of reforming the Muslim world and integrating it into the world of science. Throughout his life he believed fervently in the attainability of this goal. The complex, eclectic, and often confused character of his program made him one of the least understood intellectuals in late Ottoman history. Although shrugged off by many contemporaries as a simple atheist, the underlying import of Abdullah Cevdet's mission for the future of Turkey was enormous.

### ***Vulgärmaterialismus* as the philosophy of the future: Baha Tevfik Bey**

Abdullah Cevdet's relentless efforts to promote materialism made him an icon of the next generation of materialists.<sup>363</sup> Many Ottoman intellectuals came to see Abdullah Cevdet as an Oriental Büchner leading the charge against religious dogma. Admiration for the man and his work was more open and widespread following the Young Turk Revolution of 1908.<sup>364</sup> One of Abdullah Cevdet's many admirers in the Ottoman elite was the writer and publisher Baha Tevfik. Born in İzmir in 1884, he was educated at the Royal School for Administration between 1904 and 1907.<sup>365</sup> During these years, he began to publish literary pieces for various dailies and journals. He also developed a keen interest in philosophy. In 1909 Baha Tevfik moved to Istanbul, where he rapidly became one of the most prolific authors of late Ottoman times. He produced a host of books and articles, translated major European works into Turkish, and published several journals specializing in topics ranging from philosophy to satire. In 1910 Baha Tevfik and a close friend, Ahmed Nebil, established a publishing house named *Teceddüd-i İlmî ve Felsefî* (Scientific and Philosophical Renovation) dedicated to the publication of essays on scientific materialism. In 1913 Baha Tevfik launched the best known Turkish philosophical journal in the late Ottoman Empire.

In a note published in this journal, Baha Tevfik praised Abdullah Cevdet for seeking 'the naked truth in science and in religion'.<sup>366</sup> Although Baha Tevfik shared Abdullah Cevdet's materialist convictions, he saw a certain division of labor between them. Abdullah Cevdet, he believed, was primarily a practitioner of Ottoman materialism, whereas he himself was its primary theoretician. Indeed, wrote Baha Tevfik, Abdullah Cevdet's *İctihad* translated into a program of action the theory set forth in his own journal, *Felsefe Mecmuası*. *İctihad*, he wrote, was a 'call to prayer for civilization (*bir ezan-ı medenî*)'.<sup>367</sup> This compliment also revealed a general drift away from the mainstream approach of the Ottoman materialists, who attempted to force *Vulgärmaterialismus* into an Islamic framework. Baha Tevfik's work represents the emergence of a more straightforward materialist doctrine in the Ottoman Empire after 1908. Thinkers of this persuasion abandoned the quest for reconciliation with Islam, and fell back upon a thoroughly secular and more purely German notion of scientific materialism. Whereas Abdullah Cevdet had been driven by the conviction that religion was somehow inescapably necessary even for a society founded upon scientific truth, the new wave of Ottoman materialists held no such belief. They did not see the need for religion in modern society, nor could they understand its attractiveness for the intelligent man. Most, like Baha Tevfik, were simply dismissive of the religious impulse in all its manifestations. Thus, in 1912 for example, Baha Tevfik wrote an article ridiculing the visit of the Hindu teacher Jiddu Krishnamurti to Paris. He found it difficult to comprehend that in Paris, a center of civilization in which priests are pelted with rotten lemons, this 'most

peculiar social event' had occurred, and a Hindu 'charlatan' and his New Age movement could attract so many people.<sup>368</sup>

Baha Tevfik thought that

philosophy is the science of the future. In every century in every place, science could reach a certain point, but it manifested a desire and a capability to go beyond it. The area beyond which science could not go is an area of hypotheses and theories, and it is called philosophy. Thus always the philosophy of yesterday is the science of today, the science of tomorrow is the philosophy of today.<sup>369</sup>

He intended to draw upon the results of scientific research to produce a philosophy with which to enlighten his fellow citizens.<sup>370</sup> This philosophy would rely on scientific, materialist, empirical methods. An admirer of Büchner, Baha Tevfik believed that 'non-scientists' could no longer produce 'philosophy'. The times of a 'philosophy of empty words' what Büchner had called 'des gelehrten Maulheldenthums' and 'philosophischen Charlatanismus'—were no more.<sup>371</sup> Indeed, the designation 'philosopher' itself had become derogatory, at least for those following the path of the Büchner critic Paul Janet;<sup>372</sup> the true philosophers were those who had never sought the title, men such as Darwin or Haeckel, who were producing the science of the future.

Baha Tevfik's reference to the philosophy generated by scientists was clearly an allusion to Büchner's opinions. He considered Büchner and Moleschott to be the foremost revitalizers of materialism in the modern era.<sup>373</sup> Following in the footsteps of his Ottoman predecessors, Baha Tevfik determined that if he were to successfully promote scientifically-based *Vulgärmaterialismus* as the philosophy of the future, a necessary step was to translate the major works of the movement—and most especially its bible, *Kraft und Stoff*—into Turkish. Baha Tevfik and his friend Ahmed Nebil achieved this important goal in 1911, publishing a complete translation of Büchner's magnum opus.<sup>374</sup> Abdullah Cevdet, of course, had translated various chapters of *Kraft und Stoff*—into Turkish and made liberal use of the work in his scientific essays. Yet he had refrained from producing a full translation. This seems surprising, given his admiration for Büchner, his reputation as a prolific commissioner and author of translations,<sup>375</sup> and his well-documented complaints that *Kraft und Stoff* had been translated into 'all civilized and semi-civilized languages but Turkish'.<sup>376</sup> But when we consider that a full translation would have compelled Abdullah Cevdet, then at the height of his career as a *mujtahid*, to confront a chapter like 'Die Gottes Idee', the mystery vanishes. Significantly, he steered clear of many similar works of Büchner,<sup>377</sup> and limited himself to works more conducive to his grand project, such as *Der Mensch und seine Stellung in Natur und Gesellschaft in Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft*, *Natur und Geist*, and *Aus Natur und Wissenschaft*. By the time Abdullah Cevdet's career as a *mujtahid* had ended, Baha Tevfik had already beaten him to the task.

For Baha Tevfik, *Kraft und Stoff* was a study that made Büchner 'dominate the entire civilized world's brain'.<sup>378</sup> Its attacks on religion only made it more valuable. Baha Tevfik did not cite the Qur'an or refer to *hadiths* in an attempt to make the work attractive or acceptable to Muslims. He simply invited the *ulema*, if they disagreed with Büchner, to try and refute him.<sup>379</sup> In a Preface to another major work of *Vulgärmaterialismus*, Baha Tevfik discussed the similarities between Haeckel's Monism and the Bektashi philosophy. He made the claim that both 'Bektashis' and 'atheists' subscribed to Monism. He wrote that the religious thinkers who identified themselves with Monism could not comprehend its 'essence' or its 'scientific bases', nor could they reach a 'scientific idea' about Monism.<sup>380</sup> While Baha Tevfik conceded that there might be certain similarities between the old philosophies and modern materialism, it was only the latter, he asserted, that could prove useful in 'the search for and attainment of truth'.<sup>381</sup>

Baha Tevfik's attitude toward Islam in this context was markedly different from that of Abdullah Cevdet. Instead of launching into a comprehensive comparison between Monist and Islamic sources, he limited his Islamic references to a single Qur'anic quotation, two sayings of Ibn al-'Arabī (whom he considered a transmitter of Greek philosophy to the Arab world),<sup>382</sup> and poems of Rumi and his son Sultan Veled.<sup>383</sup> Not only did Baha Tevfik make few references to the Islamic tradition, he admitted that he was no expert on Islam. For example, he supposed that there was no foundation for the concept of the immortality of the soul in the principles of Islam, but, as he was no expert, he referred the matter to the *ulema*, in whose area of expertise such matters rightfully belonged.<sup>384</sup>

As these examples illustrate, Baha Tevfik's approach was very different from that of Abdullah Cevdet. He made no attempt to reconcile Islam with materialism, nor did he assume the role of *mujtahid* in order to interpret Islam in light of materialism. Men of science and men of religion had different *Weltanschauungen*; therefore, their agendas should not be mixed, nor could they be reconciled.<sup>385</sup> Only on one occasion did he adopt an Islamic discourse: in a piece on feminism he attempted to prove that 'original Islam' was 'feminist', employing Qur'an and *hadith* literature in order to blunt attacks from the *ulema*.<sup>386</sup> When dealing strictly with materialist philosophy, however, he shunned such tactics. Moreover, he avoided the debates with the clerics so common in Abdullah Cevdet's career. For instance, his translation of Haeckel's ideas on Islam, in which he portrayed Islam as a new phase in the evolution of religion,<sup>387</sup> met with a formidable outcry in Islamist circles. Many Islamists published refutations to the ideas expressed in the book,<sup>388</sup> but Baha Tevfik opted not to engage the critics in debate. Similarly, his comments on the poverty of Muslim and Ottoman philosophers<sup>389</sup> met with harsh scholarly criticism,<sup>390</sup> but again Baha Tevfik could not be goaded into a public debate.<sup>391</sup> He and his associates simply did not find Islamist criticism worthy of response.<sup>392</sup> Other, more sophisticated Islamist critiques of scientific materialism<sup>393</sup> made use of spiritualist and idealist European works. As these too went unanswered by Ottoman or European materialists of Baha Tevfik's generation,<sup>394</sup> the debate tended to become somewhat one-sided.

There is no question that among the late Ottoman materialists, Baha Tevfik paid the closest attention to philosophy and to its role in shaping human society. He authored and translated many books on philosophy and the history of philosophy,<sup>395</sup> as well as numerous essays on major philosophers and their thought. His most important essays deal with Kant and Nietzsche. Baha Tevfik's work on Nietzsche, written in collaboration with his close associates Ahmed Nebil and Memduh Süleyman, was an informative essay that intentionally refrained from evaluating Nietzsche's thought, leaving it to the reader to decide.<sup>396</sup> In another piece, however, Baha Tevfik betrayed his admiration for Nietzsche by explaining that the translators had intended to package Nietzsche's ethics with materialism.<sup>397</sup> In this, Baha Tevfik was not unlike John Davidson, who following Haeckel's suggestion, attempted to do the same in his later work.<sup>398</sup> Still, the choice is surprising, given Büchner's strong criticism of Nietzsche.<sup>399</sup> It is likely that Baha Tevfik found irresistible Nietzsche's sophisticated theory of atheism as expressed in *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*, his immoralism and individualism, and his tribute to Schopenhauer, who was highly regarded by the late Ottoman materialists.

Baha Tevfik's work on Kant may be seen as an attempt to reinterpret the German philosopher's major theses in light of the progress of the natural sciences. Baha Tevfik viewed Kant's work as iconoclastic, since it had destroyed the old ideas, and likened it to the work of Copernicus in cosmography.<sup>400</sup> But at the same time, he thought, Kant's theses were 'far from being scientific',<sup>401</sup> and were not in line with the progress of philosophy.<sup>402</sup> Baha Tevfik's opinions were, to a certain extent, repetitions of Haeckel's ideas on Kant's philosophy. Haeckel praised Kant, but observed that Kant's superb analysis of the profound difference between *Werkursachen* and *Endursachen* was inaccurate. In his early work *Allgemeinen Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels*, Kant attempted to examine the formation and the mechanical origin of the entire universe in light of the new Newtonian physics. Kant's *kosmologische Gastheorie* was based solely upon the mechanical phenomena of gravitation as described by Newton. According to Haeckel, Kant's mechanism could supply a true explanation of natural phenomena; however, it suffered from a central flaw, namely, that Kant had not understood the laws regulating biological processes, and had thus been forced to resort to supernatural final causes. This flaw could be rectified, thought Haeckel, if Kant's theory were reinterpreted in light of Darwin's explication of these processes, and in light of modern physiology.<sup>403</sup> Furthermore, according to Haeckel, the natural bridge between Kant's theory of the mechanical origin of the universe and Darwin's theory of the mechanical origin of life forms on earth is a bio-genesis, or spontaneous generation.<sup>404</sup> Unlike neo-Kantians, Haeckel thought that there was no reason to accept the slogan 'Zurück nach Kant!' and retreat to dualism; still, as Fritz Schultze demonstrated in his *Kant und Darwin*, some of Kant's ideas could be reinterpreted in a Darwinist context.<sup>405</sup> Like Haeckel, Baha Tevfik argued that Kant had been compelled to regard processes of organic adaptation as evidence of intentional creation due to the limitations of science in

his day. Kant's followers, he thought, had done much to cleanse Kant's critique from its illusions and to transform it into an organic philosophy.<sup>406</sup>

Baha Tevfik saw in the popular materialism of the mid-nineteenth century the *Wahrheit* and philosophy of the future. His faith in the natural transformation of today's philosophy into the science of tomorrow made his enterprise calmer and more future-oriented than Abdullah Cevdet's desperate campaign to capture hearts and minds in the present. In Baha Tevfik's vision of a future society, there would be no religion or philosophy based upon 'empty words', but rather 'real philosophy' based upon science, research, and experience. Yet even in the present, he thought, there existed prominent 'scholars of natural sciences and mathematics in Europe'.<sup>407</sup> Indeed, prominent men such as 'Feuerbach, Büchner, and Haeckel had created a materialistic philosophy.'<sup>408</sup> The modern science replacing obsolete philosophies stood on three pillars: 'the law of evolution; the infinity of matter, its immortality, and the impossibility of its creation or annihilation; and the theory of the cell'.<sup>409</sup> Since these three principles constituted 'immutable universal laws', there was little point in expending effort to reconcile them with Islam. Accordingly, Baha Tevfik focused on promoting the three pillars of the 'philosophy of the future'. Significantly, the second pillar derived from a maxim of Büchner (in the chapter 'Unsterblichkeit des Stoffs' of *Kraft und Stoff*) and, like many contemporary popular materialists, Baha Tevfik accorded it a certain primacy among the other pillars. Since the science of today was destined to become the philosophy of tomorrow, Baha Tevfik and his associates set about exploring the contemporary frontiers of science in these key areas. Beyond these frontiers, however, a philosophical explanation would be required.

### **Baha Tevfik and the limits of science**

Deeply influenced by Haeckel's thought, which highlighted the direct impact of the environment on organisms, Baha Tevfik raised evolution, not natural selection, to the status of a universal law. His own interest in evolution reflected a much wider fascination with Darwinism in Ottoman materialist circles. Several interesting works emerged placing evolutionary theory within the context of materialism. One such book relied mainly on Büchner's *Kraft und Stoff*, *Licht und Leben*, and *Sechs Vorlesungen über die Darwin'sche Theorie*, and on Haeckel's *Die Welträthsel*, *Über unsere gegen wärtige Kenntnis vom Ursprung des Menschen*, and *Die Lebenswunder*.<sup>410</sup> The author, Subhi Edhem, reinterpreted the ideas of these major popular materialist figures as presenting the theory of evolution. More specifically, he associated evolutionary theory with Büchner's ideas on 'Force' and the immortal, infinite nature of 'Matter'.<sup>411</sup> He suggested that one of the major successes of Darwinism was to prepare a base for Monism.<sup>412</sup> Later, at Baha Tevfik's behest, Subhi Edhem wrote a series of articles on 'Lamarck and Lamarckism',<sup>413</sup> which aimed to underscore the Haeckelian reinterpretation of evolution based upon Lamarck's theory that species acquire characteristics from their environment. As these efforts demonstrate, the new

materialist school led by Baha Tevfik after 1908 regarded Haeckel's Monism and his Lamarckist reinterpretation of Darwinism as the truth about evolution.

Conspicuously, the other major work on Darwinism produced by an associate of Baha Tevfik was an abridged translation of Eduard von Hartmann's *Wahrheit und Irrthum im Darwinismus*,<sup>414</sup> which pointed to the major shortcomings of Darwin's theory and of evolutionism. Along with Johannes Volkelt and Wilhelm Wundt, von Hartmann was one of the leading figures in the neo-Kantian school who adopted a critical stance toward evolutionism. The choice of von Hartmann's critical work in the context of an effort to promote Darwinism and evolutionism was hardly ideal.<sup>415</sup> Hartmann spoke out against the adherents of 'Darwinismus in seiner crass mechanistischen und antiteleologischen Gestalt',<sup>416</sup> but maintained that

die exclusiv mechanistische Weltansicht des Darwinismus nur eine geschichtliche Durchgangsstufe von dem früheren seichten Materialismus zu einem vollen und ganzen Idealrealismus ist, und nur dazu dienen soll, der lebenden und heranwachsenden Naturforscher-generation den Übergang von einem Pol zum andern zu vermitteln und zu erleichtern.<sup>417</sup>

Although it is hard to understand why Baha Tevfik chose this particular study to promote 'evolution',<sup>418</sup> it is likely that his positive view of aspects of Kant's philosophy, and especially his tribute to Schopenhauer,<sup>419</sup> played a role in this decision. Like Baha Tevfik, von Hartmann, a neo-Kantian, had 'certainly had his aim at starting to reconcile Schopenhauer's metaphysic with the results of natural science'.<sup>420</sup> In retrospect, one could also draw parallels with Baha Tevfik and Friedrich Zöllner, who attempted to fuse Monism with Schopenhauer's philosophy to create a materialism with idealistic undertones.<sup>421</sup> But how could Baha Tevfik consider von Hartmann a materialist? One clue is that he also considered Friedrich Albert Lange, a still more improbable figure, to be a leading materialist who had 'made the materialism revitalized by Büchner more scientific'.<sup>422</sup> Lange had written one of the most elegant refutations of materialism as reducing science to the phenomenal level and repudiating the thing-in-itself, and had established the long-lasting neo-Kantian tradition at the University of Marburg. If someone like Lange could be considered a materialist, so too could von Hartmann. After all, he had written about religion that 'das Christenthum kein lebendiger Factor unserer Culturentwicklung mehr ist, und alle seine Phasen bereits durchlaufen hat'.<sup>423</sup> Once again, this example illustrates the frequent reduction of materialism to antagonism toward religion by many Ottoman materialists of the time. In such an environment, any comment hostile to religion was sufficient to earn the title of 'materialist'. Another appealing fact about von Hartmann's work from the perspective of Baha Tevfik and his colleagues was that early Monist theory initially based itself upon the major works of midnineteenth-century materialism—especially Büchner's *Kraft und Stoff* and Vogt's *Köhlerglaube und Wissenschaft*; but Haeckel later attempted to shift his Monism in the direction of idealism,<sup>424</sup> and



like von Hartmann, suggested that ‘there is an inner side of inorganic substance, an “unconscious”’.<sup>425</sup>

Monism’s major thesis is the fusion of consciousness with the One. As Loewenberg stated, such fusion may be accomplished in a variety of ways:

It may, in materialism, take the form of extending the meaning of consciousness, as in Haeckel’s panpsychism, so as to include all so-called ‘unconscious’ manifestations; or it may take the form of denying to consciousness any attributes not possessed by physical energy... Consciousness must be robbed of its power to disturb the permanent stillness and the harmony of the One... Thus the method of the mystic is like the method of the materialist.<sup>426</sup>

Seen in this light, the focus of Baha Tevfik and his circle of associates on von Hartmann’s skeptical treatment of evolution and on Monism and its distinct interpretation of evolution was no coincidence. It highlights an emerging tendency to present mid-nineteenth-century scientific materialism in a more idealistic fashion. Without fully understanding the major theses of the neo-Kantian school, they regarded its major figures as materialist philosophers. Moreover, like their idol Haeckel, Baha Tevfik and his associates believed that Monism could help establish that the soul of man engaged in ‘purely mechanical activity’. Yet through philosophical physics, pantheism, and hylozoism, ‘a depressing materialism which reduced the universe to dead matter’ could be avoided.<sup>427</sup>

Thus, on the one hand, Baha Tevfik continued to rebuff those who criticized *Kraft und Stoff* for not being in line with ‘recent scientific progress’,<sup>428</sup> declaring it to contain nothing in conflict with ‘present science’.<sup>429</sup> But at the same time, he was promoting a Monism that bordered on idealism. His dilemma was obviously of a lesser order than that of Abdullah Cevdet; reconciling Monism with the major theses of Vogt and Büchner is significantly easier than turning Guyau into a popular materialist.<sup>430</sup>

In order to present Monism to the Ottoman elite as the scientific truth of the century, Baha Tevfik and Ahmed Nebil first translated Haeckel’s *Monismus als band zwischen Religion und Wissenschaft*. They sought to advance Monism as the last word of popular materialism on science, philosophy, and religion.<sup>431</sup> As Baha Tevfik and his associates saw it—and they were no different from many of Haeckel’s contemporaries and followers in this respect<sup>432</sup>—Monism, as an extension of Büchner’s ideas, was the highest achievement and dramatic final stage in the evolution of German popular materialism. Following this work of translation, Baha Tevfik collaborated with Subhi Edhem to produce translations from sections of *Die Welträthsel*,<sup>433</sup> perhaps the masterpiece of pyknotic Monism, and a somewhat less idealistic work than its successor, *Die Lebenswunder*. Finally, he prevailed upon his comrade Ahmed Nebil to translate Haeckel’s *Anthropogenie, oder, Entwicklungsgeschichte des Menschen* so as to highlight Haeckel’s ‘perfect interpretation of Darwinism’ and the harmony between this



work and *Kraft und Stoff*.<sup>434</sup> In support of these ideas, Baha Tevfik and Ahmed Nebil inserted portraits and short biographies of Haeckel, Darwin, and Büchner before the text. Although Büchner was dead, they stressed, ‘his works are still alive and will live on in the future.’<sup>435</sup> By the publication of this work in translation, Haeckel had already distanced himself considerably from Büchner, Vogt, and their extreme mechanism. This, however, was something the translators had no desire to admit in public. Accordingly, they remained silent about it, despite the attractive idealism inherent in Haeckel’s new positions, which might have been useful towards extracting a more ‘philosophical’ message from *Vulgärmaterialismus*.

Once the first two pillars, the theory of evolution and the infinity of matter, were established, it was time to explore the third and final foundation of the future science, the cell. One of Haeckel’s major conclusions had been that all living cells, without exception, possessed psychic properties, and that the psychic life of multi-cellular organisms was the aggregate of the psychic functions of the cells composing them. Consequently, Haeckel’s Ottoman disciples attributed great importance to understanding the creation and evolution of the cell, which, in their eyes, would lead to insights concerning spontaneous generation, a favorite subject of Büchner. Furthermore, the reduction of all cell processes to the regular, mechanical action of immutable laws on matter would bolster the materialist argument against the existence of an immaterial soul and a personal god. Such considerations led Baha Tevfik to publish a compilation of materialist scholarship on biology and botany. Fikri Tevfik, the Ottoman biologist who assembled the book, based his conclusions mainly upon the research of Gaston Bonnier.<sup>436</sup> A neo-Lamarckian, Bonnier had conducted experiments in the French Alps to prove that by transplanting a new species into a new environment one could transform it into a closely related but different species.<sup>437</sup> Bonnier’s work was clearly valuable to the Ottoman materialist project, because it supported the Haeckelian thesis of evolution. But in fact, the compilation touched upon evolutionary theory only lightly, and focused heavily on cell generation, chemistry, and nutrition. The major objective of the book was to prove that life phenomena in the cell are entirely functions of the protoplasm, and more generally that all life processes in nature are completely determined by the chemical and morphological properties of organic matter. The movement of organisms was no different from the movement of inorganic dynamos, as Haeckel had suggested.<sup>438</sup> And life itself could only be understood by means of Büchner’s explanation of the relationship between force and matter.<sup>439</sup>

Such were the limits of science as explored by Baha Tevfik and his associates. Beyond these frontiers, they believed, a philosophical explanation was necessary. The philosophical explanation they hit upon was Haeckel’s Monistic doctrine of the unknown reality. Future science, they contended, would prove these theses to be true. Until then, a philosophy claiming to provide answers to the riddles of the universe would grant them peace of mind. Such a philosophy could, of course, provide a *Gott-Natur* as well, if they so desired. But as loyal disciples of Büchner,

these intellectuals exhibited minimal interest in deities of any sort. In their jargon, *Gott-Natur* referred to an atheistic understanding of the universe that depended solely on the infinity of matter.<sup>440</sup> Whereas James Martin Gillis described Haeckel as one of the ‘false prophets’ of the late nineteenth century,<sup>441</sup> Haeckel’s Ottoman disciples had no desire whatsoever to make him a ‘prophet’, as members of the *Monistenbund* had done. To their way of thinking, such a religious title would only have diminished the importance of ‘a genius like Haeckel’.<sup>442</sup>

### Baha Tevfik on literature

In addition to his work to promote *Vulädrmaterialismus* as the philosophy of the future, Baha Tevfik produced many literary works, including children’s tales, philosophical and immoralist fiction, poetry, and translations of major European books.<sup>443</sup> Yet at the same time, he stood behind the most radical critique of literature in late Ottoman society. His final judgment on literature became a maxim of late Ottoman scientists: ‘Edebiyat kat’iyen muzırdır! (Literature is absolutely harmful!).’<sup>444</sup>

Baha Tevfik’s translation and publication preferences reveal a keen interest in realism, naturalism, and immoralism.<sup>445</sup> Undoubtedly, he wished to advance the cause of scientism through dissemination of the works of Flaubert, de Maupassant, Tolstoy, and Zola. Baha Tevfik also pioneered the immoralist mode of thought in two short stories, in which homosexual men figured prominently as the major protagonists.<sup>446</sup> He co-authored another immoralist story designed to promote Nietzsche’s philosophy through literature.<sup>447</sup> Although these and other publications are evidence of a clear intent to benefit from literature as a powerful vehicle for the promotion of philosophical ideas, Baha Tevfik ultimately considered literary activity to be ‘a contagious mental illness’.<sup>448</sup> The results of such activity, and especially poetry, were ‘pathological productions’.<sup>449</sup> Indeed, poetry could only be produced in a pathological state. Those who maintained otherwise knew nothing of psychology.<sup>450</sup> He wrote that ‘the mad acts of Fuzûlî, the unreasonable aggressiveness of Nef’î, the way in which Flaubert died, the insanity of de Maupassant, the tragic ends of the leading literary men and poets’ proved categorically that literature is an ‘illness’.<sup>451</sup> Similarly, he believed that poets spent their time dealing with ‘illusions and superstitions’ similar to ‘the ravings of insane individuals’, and that not one of them could ever become ‘a scientist and chemist’. Furthermore, ‘the illness of poetry’ was a hereditary disease transmitted from father to son, as were syphilis and tuberculosis.<sup>452</sup> Thus, although he shared a strong dislike for literature and poetry with his predecessors Beşir Fu’ad and Şerafeddin Mağmumî, he did not take his cue from Büchner. In his opinion, the production of literature was mainly a ‘psychological’ problem, and thus could only be understood through this science.

Baha Tevfik’s attraction to a psychological explanation of the ‘problem of literature’ was not coincidental. In fact, one of his major contributions to Ottoman intellectual life was to introduce the modern science of psychology.<sup>453</sup> Although

his volume on modern psychology was hastily compiled and somewhat disorganized,<sup>454</sup> it introduced the reader to the major ideas of Émile Boirac, Alfred Fouillée,<sup>455</sup> Élie Rabier, Theodule Armand Ribot, and René Worms.<sup>456</sup> Despite several references to physiological psychology,<sup>457</sup> the book is fundamentally an endorsement of the experimental method, which it regards as the best means of conducting psychology.<sup>458</sup> This endorsement of experimental psychology is somewhat strange, as one would have expected Baha Tevfik to prefer the physiological psychology advanced by Helmholtz, Donders, and Fechner, or the evolutionary psychology developed by Romanes and Morgan. To a certain extent, Baha Tevfik's choice may have resulted from a misunderstanding of Haeckel, who in fact classified psychology as a natural science and a branch of physiology in order to facilitate the examination of mental life from a monistic point of view.<sup>459</sup> Like his simplistic classification of neo-Kantians as 'materialists', Baha Tevfik regarded the experimental psychology founded by Wundt as the most 'scientific' one, in contrast to the outdated introspective approach to psychology. He stated that 'some philosophers desired to transform psychology into physiology to benefit from it more, but they could not reach satisfactory results. Although psychology needs assistance from physiology, it is a fully independent major science.'<sup>460</sup> Following in the footsteps of Büchner and Vogt, Baha Tevfik's article praised experimental psychology specializing in animals.<sup>461</sup>

As mentioned above, Baha Tevfik made liberal use of Ribot's works in the preparation of his psychology textbook. Ribot was the leading experimental psychiatrist in France between the 1870s and 1910, and was something of a sensationalist.<sup>462</sup> Ribot's work and his style attracted the attention of many Ottoman intellectuals, who chose to further their political ideas based on his pronouncements on psychopathology, brain disease, and heredity. Abdullah Cevdet, for example, proposed in 1906 to depose the Ottoman royal house, a family of 'degenerate and ill-bred individuals', on the grounds that (as Ribot had shown) 'experiments on animals had proven that offspring born in captivity cannot inherit the racial characteristics of their fathers.'<sup>463</sup> Baha Tevfik drew mainly on Ribot's theory of the passions, which dealt with the processes through which emotions were transformed into passions and then intellectualized.<sup>464</sup> Baha Tevfik embraced Ribot's hypothesis that aesthetic passion is the opposite of the scientific passion for discovery. Like its political and religious counterparts, aesthetic passion derives from frivolous activities.<sup>465</sup> But he went one step further than Ribot, inferring that literary activity was actually harmful. His concentration on emotions and their psychological importance was in line with the new approach in psychiatry led by Jean-Martin Charcot, which focused on emotions instead of on the mind. Yet in Baha Tevfik's mind, such an approach could somehow cohabit with a view holding Büchner's 'Bewußtsein' to be the basis for psychological research.<sup>466</sup>

Baha Tevfik also wrote a book on the subject of sensations and their relationship to the acquisition of an individual ethic. Upon inspection, this book also turns out to be a compilation of several French sources, although there are no references or citations. Besides a significant debt to Ribot, the influence of Gustave Le Bon, Paul

Dubois, Léon Dumont, and Frédéric Paulhan is apparent. From Paul Dubois, Baha Tevfik and his associate Ahmed Nebil took the fundamental idea that ‘La cellule n’agit pas, elle réagit. La sensibilité, dans son sens le plus général, est donc la première condition de toute activité physiologique.’<sup>467</sup> From Dubois they also borrowed notions concerning the impact of ideas, mental representations, and sentiments on the body.<sup>468</sup> From Ribot, they took (with some reservations) the idea that passions and inclinations were fixed, prolonged, and intellectualized emotions.<sup>469</sup> They also borrowed the emphasis on the role of heredity in the formation of passions. Léon Dumont supplied a theory of sensibility, upon which Baha Tevfik and Ahmed Nebil built a classification of inclinations and emotions. Baha Tevfik was naturally drawn to Dumont’s explanations of the ‘caractère essentiel de la peine et du plaisir’, based as they were on an attempt to tackle metaphysical problems using medical science, other natural sciences, and Darwinian evolution.<sup>470</sup> Baha Tevfik was also impressed by the role that Dumont attributed to ‘habit’ in producing intelligent ideas.<sup>471</sup> Finally, Paulhan contributed the idea that the basic form of sentiment is tendency, and that tendencies could evolve into more sophisticated emotions such as ‘love for the fatherland’.<sup>472</sup>

One of Baha Tevfik’s major conclusions was that such sophisticated emotions were at base expressions of ‘egoism’, as François La Rochefoucauld elegantly put it.<sup>473</sup> Such a psychological explanation of human attitudes could obviously elucidate the production of art in general and literature in particular.<sup>474</sup> In this regard, Baha Tevfik accepted Dumont’s verdict that *Tart est le contraire de la nature. C’est la production volontaire par opposition a la production instinctive ou naturelle.*<sup>475</sup> In his own words, the production of poetry betrayed the ‘egoistic need’ of a poet to demonstrate to others that he could create what others could not.<sup>476</sup> He inferred from this that there would be no art in a society where individuals lived in isolation.<sup>477</sup> Baha Tevfik’s references to Max Nordau<sup>478</sup> make clear his indebtedness to that thinker. He drew upon Nordau not only in the formulation of his psychological theses. He also relied heavily on Nordau’s theory of degeneration (presented in his renowned *Entartung*) to create the moral and scientific argument against literary activity. Unlike Nordau, Baha Tevfik considered degeneration a fact that did not necessarily stem from the circumstances and mood of the *fin de siècle*. Nonetheless, he accepted the major thesis of Nordau’s magnum opus on the psychology of egomania,<sup>479</sup> and viewed literary production as its result. Like Nordau, who attacked the Parnassians and realism at the same time, Baha Tevfik regarded all genres of literature as ‘harmful’.<sup>480</sup> At the same time, however, he admired Ibsen, Tolstoy, and Zola, who had been viciously attacked by Nordau.<sup>481</sup> Baha Tevfik found Nordau’s work attractive for a number of reasons because it was grounded in contemporary psychology and Ribot’s thought,<sup>482</sup> because of Nordau’s claim that the *fin-de-siècle* mentality was an artificial ‘fashion’ and not a consequence of ‘organisch entstanden’,<sup>483</sup> and finally because of his treatment of degeneracy as a scientific topic.<sup>484</sup> Baha Tevfik believed that literary activity had been a major factor in the degeneration of human society throughout history. Ottoman moral decadence

could, in this regard, be traced back to the sixteenth century, and might be explained as a consequence of the popularization of literary activity. Similarly, the major share of responsibility for the collapse of morality during the reign of Abdülhamid II fell on the poets of the empire; and the French defeat in 1871 could be traced to the dominance of Romanticism in literary circles.<sup>485</sup> Baha Tevfik, therefore, proposed the omission of all literature courses from the school curriculum, and the delegitimization of poets, who ‘cause the degeneration of morals in every society’, as sick and disabled individuals.<sup>486</sup> Although his attack focused on literature, and especially on poetry, Baha Tevfik found other forms of art, such as theater, equally ‘harmful’.<sup>487</sup> In the final analysis, all forms of art were ‘entertainments’ distracting mankind from the pursuit of science, which alone enabled man to ‘dominate nature’.<sup>488</sup>

### **Baha Tevfik and the ethical foundations of the future society**

Baha Tevfik imagined a future society purged of the ‘harmful’ effects of pathologies like literature and art. He also proposed a new ethical foundation for this future society. In his opinion, the Kantian system of ethics, based on ‘duty’ and on the notion of a common moral consciousness judging the morality of human motives, had been totally undermined by Darwinism and the advances in psychology. In the modern world, such a common moral consciousness did not exist, and ‘an individual’s behavior can only be judged by psychology.’ Utilitarian approaches also fell short of providing an adequate basis for ethics. In Baha Tevfik’s opinion, the study of ethics was inappropriate for discrimination between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’; this was the duty of science. Ethics was appropriate for the establishment of individual self-control, which could be achieved only through the application of the principles of psychology.<sup>489</sup> The new ethics could prevail in a society in which individuals had established self-control, preventing their sensations from turning into passions like gambling or nationalism. In order to achieve this ambitious goal, education would be an indispensable tool, for sensations had three roots: ignorance, habits, and instincts. In a future society devoid of ignorance, a new psychology-based ethics could provide happiness to all of humanity.<sup>490</sup>

Many Ottoman intellectuals did not realize that Baha Tevfik took all these ideas from Dubois’s book on the influence of the mind on the body.<sup>491</sup> This lack of awareness is not surprising, for Baha Tevfik employed many of Dubois’s ideas out of context, and used them in a most peculiar way in a discussion of the characteristics of his proposed ethics. Dubois had maintained that it was useless to return to the ‘conceptions anciennes du dualisme’;<sup>492</sup> he further urged that ‘non contents de négliger nos malaises physiques, nous devons diminuer aussi notre impressionnabilité *vis-à-vis* des émotions morales.’ He explained that he did not mean that individuals should create a protective mechanism that would enable them not to be moved by anything. ‘Ce serait de l’égoïsme et c’est là un des côtés répugnants d’un stoïcisme poussé à l’excès.’ Self-education would provide

a 'préservatif' against nervous diseases and the major preoccupation of life should be 'le perfectionnement constant du moi moral'.<sup>493</sup>

Dubois was a leading psychiatrist who sought to establish a philosophical basis for psychotherapy, the object of which was to give to the patient, as he put it, 'maîtrise de lui-même'. The best method for achieving this aim was 'l'éducation de la volonté' or, more precisely, 'de la raison'.<sup>494</sup> Although there is a spiritualistic tendency implied in such a view, Dubois did not wish to return to the Kantian concept of dualism. Rather, he attempted to realize this ambitious goal by means of an exclusive emphasis on the medical and natural sciences. The serious problem with the attempt to turn Dubois's theses into an ethics of the future is that he was desperately seeking to find the 'cause of ethics in a so-called moral sense', but not 'moral values' in themselves, or 'an *Umwertung der Werte*'.<sup>495</sup> Baha Tevfik's attempt to forge a new ethical foundation for society by extending Dubois's proposed philosophical basis for psychotherapy to society as a whole reveals an imagination without limits. It also betrays a confused mind. Baha Tevfik considered psychology to be a pure science<sup>496</sup> like the natural sciences. Thus, since he held every individual to be abnormal, Baha Tevfik could imagine a scientific process similar to the curing of a disease by which new ethics could be used to create healthy people. At the same time, he relied on theories of psychology devoid of philosophical content in order to reach conclusions about the nature of ethics.<sup>497</sup> Neither approach made much sense.

Although he served as editor of a host of popular journals, including satirical ones, Baha Tevfik refrained from producing popular essays. In retrospect, his works seem popular in nature, but he thought that he was introducing sophisticated and 'serious' scientific works to Ottoman intellectual circles.<sup>498</sup> Cover pages of his works often display statements to the effect that the work is intended only those people 'who can think'.<sup>499</sup> Moreover, the very names of his journals underscore this attitude: *Düşünüyorum* (I am Thinking),<sup>500</sup> *Yirminci Asırda Zekâ* (Intelligence in the Twentieth Century), *Zekâ* (Intelligence). Certainly, by Ottoman intellectual standards, his work was of major significance. Baha Tevfik's objection to the popularization of *Vulgärmaterialismus* should be viewed in light of Le Bon's theory of the *psychologie des foules*, introduced into Ottoman intellectual circles by Abdullah Cevdet.<sup>501</sup> Like Le Bon and his contemporaries from the Italian school of criminal law, Baha Tevfik viewed the masses as subhuman, and crowd psychology as abnormal. He agreed with Le Bon that the collective intellectual capacity of a crowd was much less than the sum of the capacities of the individuals composing it. Therefore, 'the majority's opinion was always wrong!'<sup>502</sup> As a consequence, his teachings of *Vulgärmaterialismus* were strictly for intellectuals.

Baha Tevfik died, or in the words of a close friend, 'turned into nature',<sup>503</sup> on May 19, 1914. His premature death was a heavy blow to the late Ottoman materialist movement, which was to remain the obscure preserve of a tiny group of intellectuals throughout the Great War. In a life span of thirty years, he managed to produce a substantial body of influential literature in the context of a unique effort to promote *Vulgärmaterialismus*, and especially Haeckel's Monism, as the

philosophy of the future. He envisioned a society dominated by science, and devoid of superstition or religion. He proposed a new ethic for its healthy members who, having developed a sense of self-control over their emotions, would live in the utmost happiness.<sup>504</sup> Although these were mostly dreams of the future, Baha Tevfik tried to jump-start the transformation of society in his own time through the propagation of the popular German materialism admired by so many of his Ottoman contemporaries.

### **Conclusion: the legacy of late Ottoman materialism**

The leading figures of German popular materialism betrayed an ambivalent attitude to politics. Their grandiose theories aimed to revolutionize society by placing it on a base of pure science. While it may seem obvious that only a political program could provide the means for the realization of such a goal,<sup>505</sup> these thinkers looked down on incremental, man-made reform. Instead, they expected that the impersonal forces of nature would bring about the desired revolution in human affairs. Thus Vogt, on the basis of observations of social relations in animal societies, developed an interest in anarchism. Human freedom, he believed, could best be achieved in an anarchic society. Much to the dismay of Marx, however, Vogt defended capitalism, which he found to be the most natural of economic systems. Moleschott, on the other hand, relying on a theory of the relationship between force and matter, suggested that socialism (but not communism) would prevail in the future society. As for Büchner, he flirted for a while with Ferdinand Lassalle's socialist ideas, although ultimately the intellectual dialog between them ended in mutual recrimination.<sup>506</sup> Like Vogt, Büchner finally concluded that capitalism, as a reflection of the Darwinian struggle for survival, was the most natural economic system.

The major fault shared by all these materialists as political visionaries was their single-minded insistence on the strict application of 'empirical scientific truth' to human society. In their view, 'scientific truth'—a concept rarely if ever defined—stood above all man-made rules. They never adapted their inflexible, simplistic creed to the complex and changing needs of human society. Accordingly, their brief careers as political thinkers ended in miserable failure. Although there was much that was appealing in the ideas of Büchner or Vogt on science and society, their programs for social transformation never attained the level of popularity and influence achieved by that other renowned school of 'scientific materialists'—the one led by Marx and Engels.

Ostensibly, the political careers of the leading Ottoman materialists were similarly unsuccessful. Beşir Fu'ad, who operated under the strict censorship of the regime of Abdülhamid II, could not publish anything political. As his private papers are not available for inspection, it is difficult to tell whether he developed any interest in politics. Abdullah Cevdet, on the other hand, was far more politically active. In fact, he was one of the original founders of the nucleus of the Committee of Union and Progress at the Royal Medical Academy in 1889.<sup>507</sup> As a



close friend and comrade of Abdullah Cevdet in the Young Turk movement later related to Edouard Herriot, the simple goal of the founders had been ‘to replace religion with science, in the way [François-Vincent] Raspail had prophesied decades before’.<sup>508</sup> Despite his early importance in the Young Turk movement, Abdullah Cevdet lost interest in politics over time, as he became increasingly preoccupied with the formulation of grand unified theories designed to transform human society. Toward the turn of the century, he developed an interest in anarchism and socialism, regarding the works of Bakunin, Kropotkin, and Reclus as his bibles. Like Vogt, he looked forward to the collapse of the state.<sup>509</sup> He later established contacts with Russian Nihilists,<sup>510</sup> but subsequently came to the realization that subscribing to their ideas was like ‘wishing for a river without banks’.<sup>511</sup> Following the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, he supported the short-lived Ottoman Democratic Party and its defense of social democracy, but later on became disillusioned with these ideas as well.<sup>512</sup> Abdullah Cevdet was known for his strong individualism, which he explained as the natural consequence of the organic principles of life. This belief in the individual went hand-in-hand with support for *laissez-faire* capitalism, which he found to be in perfect accordance with Darwin’s theory of the struggle for survival. As noted above, Abdullah Cevdet was also harshly opposed to the Ottoman royal house, not from a republican standpoint, but as a disciple of Ribot and his theories on heredity. He was also a major opponent of Turkish nationalism. But as his active participation in the nascent Kurdish nationalist movement attests, he was not against nationalism in and of itself.

Until recently, Turkish historiography has portrayed Baha Tevfik as an intellectual father of the Ottoman socialist movement and an anarchist sympathizer. But as his latest biography reveals, Baha Tevfik was never a believer in socialism, and his discussions of anarchism reflect intellectual curiosity, not sympathy.<sup>513</sup> He, too, opposed the Committee of Union and Progress and supported the liberal individualist movement that promoted private initiative and *laissez-faire* economics for the Ottoman Empire. Like Abdullah Cevdet, Baha Tevfik tired of politics and turned to an attempt to alter the foundations of society through ‘science’ and not through ‘political reform’.<sup>514</sup> In addition, he adopted a very strong position against nationalism in general and Turkish nationalism in particular. For him, nationalism was a ‘destructive’ ideology based upon harmful emotions and an idea ‘with no social application’.<sup>515</sup>

Although these Ottoman materialists, like their German role models, failed to achieve the sort of societal transformation they promoted in their work, their effect on the late Ottoman and modern Turkish societies was nevertheless enormous. To be sure, modern Turkey is nationalist, solidarist, and corporatist in nature. There is no trace of late Ottoman materialism in these features. But if we turn to ideology, we discover a profound and lasting imprint left by late Ottoman materialists upon the modern Turkish state.

We can begin to understand the impact of Ottoman materialism on early republican ideology by contrasting the success of *Vulgärmaterialismus* in Turkey



with its utter failure in Germany. The leaders of German popular materialism were ridiculed as ‘dilettantes’ by leading scientists, denounced as polemical writers with ‘pretensions to philosophy’ by philosophers,<sup>516</sup> and caricatured as ‘vulgar materialists’ by the Marxists, who claimed that they alone were the ‘real scientific materialists’.<sup>517</sup> Although an overwhelming majority of their critics agreed with the basic arguments of Büchner, Molsechott, and Vogt, they nevertheless thought that those ideas could get them no further than undermining religion. Karl Marx, amazed at a favorable French review of Büchner, noted that in Germany he was ‘viewed quite rightly only as a *vulgarisateur*’.<sup>518</sup> This is a crucial insight. In Germany, the land of philosophical giants, thinkers like Büchner, Molsechott, and Vogt quite simply could not compete. But across the border in France, popular materialism had an immediate impact. France, of course, boasted a high philosophical tradition of its own. In addition, it had a vigorous left-wing political movement promoting Marxist ideas. But the crucial aspect present in France and absent in Germany was the bitter struggle raging between the Church and the *laïque* State over the future of French society. In such an environment, an extreme, polemical anti-religious approach grounded in reason was bound to prove immensely appealing to the upholders of anticlericalism.

Transplanted into the vastly different Ottoman context, *Vulgärmaterialismus* acquired yet another meaning. In the central parts of the Ottoman Empire (where the philosophical tradition had been dominated by the *ulema* for centuries, where no foundation of ethical materialism existed, and where the first short-lived socialist party was founded in 1910), German popular materialism, borrowed via French translations and commentary, instantly lost its vulgarity and became the ‘high philosophy’ and *Weltanschauung* of an entire educated class. In stark contrast to Germany or France, an overwhelming majority of Ottoman men of science affiliated themselves with this movement, which they regarded as the idealization of their everyday labour. Above all, in the Ottoman Empire the materialist maxims of ‘scientific truth’ possessed the magic of European civilization. They were perceived to be the ideological underpinnings of the evident material progress of the West. Many Ottoman intellectuals found an exhaustive explanation for the embarrassing superiority of Europe in the methods of empirical science. For them, the tangible benefits of science and a philosophical approach underscoring its superiority were inseparable. They came to regard materialism and scientism in their crudest form as the philosophical engines of progress, producing new wonders every day.

In short, the attraction of Ottoman intellectuals to materialism was inseparable from their fascination with the West. It is, therefore, by no means a coincidence that two of the leading Ottoman materialists were also the foremost ideologues of the Ottoman Westernization movement. Abdullah Cevdet advocated the adoption of ‘Western civilization...with its roses and thorns’, and wrote that the relationship of Europe to the Ottoman Empire was that of ‘the learned and the ignorant’.<sup>519</sup> For him, materialism was the philosophy of the ‘learned’. Likewise, Baha Tevfik closely identified with the notion of Westernization as the culminating ideal for Ottoman

society.<sup>520</sup> Abdullah Cevdet denounced Ottoman and Islamic customs like ‘hospitality’,<sup>521</sup> Baha Tevfik proposed that they be thrown onto the trash heap of history.<sup>522</sup> Both published pictures promoting Western good manners supplied by Abdullah Cevdet.<sup>523</sup>

These thinkers regarded materialism not only as *Wahrheit* but as a civilizing process. For that reason, they felt free to reconcile and promote disparate theses by Littré and Büchner, Vogt and Guyau, von Hartmann and Haeckel, and Herriot and Le Bon. Studied in the abstract, their ideas were often contradictory. But in the Ottoman context, they shared one basic feature: they were popular ideas emanating from the civilization of material progress, the West. In the Ottoman Empire, unlike Germany, to become a disciple of materialism also meant to become modern, civilized, and progressive. As one prominent contributor to Abdullah Cevdet’s journal pointed out, ‘rules and regulations made in the desert 1,300 years ago’ offered little of value to a society confronting the challenges of modern life.<sup>524</sup> At the same time, anti-materialism was a distinctly religious stance. Except for scattered remarks by Ali Suavî in a journal published abroad, until the second decade of the twentieth century<sup>525</sup> criticism of materialist theories invariably took the form of classical Islamic refutations based entirely upon the Islamic tradition. Thus, the debate between materialists and their opponents in the Ottoman context turned into a straightforward confrontation between science and religion, between reason and revelation, within the overarching framework of ‘the advanced West versus the backward East’.

Büchner eschewed the use of labyrinthine philosophical language to communicate his message. Philosophical theses that could not be comprehended by an educated adult, he believed, were worthless. Scientific results were unambiguous and those who could comprehend them could also relate them to educated individuals.<sup>526</sup> In his own words, he did not write for the ‘Gelehrte’ but for the ‘ganze gebildete Publikum’.<sup>527</sup> Ironically, it was in the central lands of the Ottoman Empire that his wish for popularity came true. Ottoman intellectuals such as Beşir Fu’ad, Abdullah Cevdet, and Baha Tevfik, who could not be considered ‘Gelehrte’ by German standards, introduced Büchner’s work to an educated class that was hungry for his ideas. Many members of this class read his books and essays voraciously. They then freely appropriated parts of his work. It is difficult to provide accurate estimates of circulation levels for the earlier journals in which Büchner’s theses were promoted, or sales figures of Abdullah Cevdet’s earlier essays, in which he liberally quoted Büchner’s works. Baha Tevfik once stated that he sold approximately 2,250 copies of the Turkish translation of *Kraft und Stoff* in less than two years.<sup>528</sup> Abdullah Cevdet’s journal *İctihad*, which published essays of Büchner and chapters from his magnum opus, enjoyed a circulation of 3,000–4,000 during that period.<sup>529</sup> By contemporary standards, these numbers certainly indicate a high level of interest in this crude, mechanistic brand of mid-nineteenth-century German materialism among an educated class of civil officials, teachers, and army officers. This was a class that avidly read a variety of materialistic publications critical of religion.<sup>530</sup> Many readers had difficulty

digesting even this popular version of materialist doctrine. They found Büchner's *Kraft und Stoff* recondite, despite its uncomplicated language and straightforward messages. They subscribed to maxims such as 'Matter is immortal'; 'Faith must be placed in science'; 'The brain produces thought as the liver produces bile';<sup>531</sup> 'Science has solved the mystery of human existence'; 'The more religious a man is, the less he feels in himself the necessity for culture and knowledge.' In short, they subscribed to an unsophisticated point of view that promoted omnipotent science at the expense of obsolete religion. The popular Ottoman publications, in which the further vulgarization of *Vulgärmaterialismus* was carried out, popularized scientific advances alongside the doctrine of materialism. These journals packaged Edison's inventions, Zeppelin flights, and geographical explorations together with presentations of the basic tenets of popular materialism. Presented thus, *Vulgärmaterialismus* became the highest ideal of cultural life and the prerequisite for modernity.

Among these educated adherents of late Ottoman materialism, no less a figure than Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) stands out. He, like many others in this class, read parts of Büchner's magnum opus, and exhibited special interest in the idea of phosphorus as the main chemical substance underlying the process of thought production—an idea championed by Moleschott and popularized by Büchner.<sup>532</sup> Like many of his contemporaries, Mustafa Kemal combined *Vulgärmaterialismus* with the earlier anti-religious stands of Europeans like d'Holbach, whose work was also introduced to the Ottoman elites by Abdullah Cevdet.<sup>533</sup> But in the hands of Mustafa Kemal and his fellow state-builders, this admixture of mid-nineteenth-century German and eighteenth-century French materialism became the powerful instrument of Abdullah Cevdet's dreams. The pragmatists of early Republican Turkey found in *Vulgärmaterialismus* a versatile tool for building a modern state dedicated to scientific progress. This ideal is evoked in Mustafa Kemal's famous aphorism 'Hayatda en hakiki mürşid ilimdir (the most truthful guide in life is science)', which may still be found on many public buildings in Turkey today. It placed faith in a perpetually progressive science that would propel human society to ever more elevated stages of development. Here was the fulfilment of Büchner's prophecy:

Just as its [scientific materialism's] theory is simple...so also is its practical tendency; and its whole programme with regard to the future of man and of the human race may be expressed in six words, which contain all that can be theoretically or practically required for this future, namely: Freedom, culture and prosperity for all.<sup>534</sup>

As pragmatists, many educated Turks who took part in the process of statebuilding that followed the Great War much preferred such a flexible and vaguely defined ideological framework to the rigid, clearly delimited ideology of a specific interpretation of science like Marxism. It was not inevitable that they should hold such an attitude. Indeed, in contrast to this pragmatic stance, another group of

contemporary state-builders adopted a very different position *vis-à-vis* German popular materialism. Following in the footsteps of Engels, Lenin launched a vicious attack on Büchner, Moleschott, and Vogt, as well as on the eighteenth-century French materialists. They were, according to Lenin, too mechanistic, anti-dialectical, and idealistic for the philosophical needs of the socialist society.<sup>535</sup> Similarly, the new regime in Turkey did not adopt a strictly scientist policy towards art. The importance accorded to science made everything else seem secondary in the new Turkish society, yet no official campaigns against particular forms of art took place. Nothing comparable to Soviet initiatives to create 'socialist art' occurred in modern Turkey. The critiques of art formulated by Beşir Fu'ad and Baha Tevfik were too complicated and impractical for a generation of pragmatic nation-builders.

Beşir Fu'ad and Baha Tevfik died before the Ottoman collapse and the establishment of the modern Turkish republic. Abdullah Cevdet, however, lived long enough to see the impact of his movement on the new Turkish state. He relates that when he met Mustafa Kemal, the founder of the republic said to him, 'Doctor, up to now you have written about many things. Now we may bring them to realization.'<sup>536</sup> A number of Abdullah Cevdet's fellow materialists and associates at *İctihad*, such as Celâl Nuri (İleri) and Kılıçzâde (Kılıçoğlu) Hakkı, were made deputies. Abdullah Cevdet himself was briefly considered for such a post by Mustafa Kemal in 1925. This sparked a hostile campaign in the conservative press, which focused on Abdullah Cevdet's activities during the Allied occupation of the Ottoman capital and portrayed him as a collaborationist and a Kurdish nationalist.<sup>537</sup> Ultimately, however, it was the vilification of Abdullah Cevdet's proposal to bring immigrants from Germany and Hungary in order 'to infuse new blood into the veins of the Turkish race'<sup>538</sup> as part of a request for the import of 'European men for breeding'<sup>539</sup> that made the founder of the republic change his mind. The subsequent naming of a major street in Ankara after Abdullah Cevdet may be considered a belated tribute by the Republic to a man whose thought informed so much of ideology of the modern Turkish state. By popularizing *Vulgärmaterialismus* and presenting it as the philosophy behind European progress, Abdullah Cevdet and his fellow materialist friends had a very strong impact on that unsophisticated world-view. The final product, however, was quite different from their visions for the future.

Despite their devoted adherence to nineteenth-century German materialism and to the way in which Büchner popularized it, all the leading figures of late Ottoman materialism intuitively recognized that something was missing. If society were to be transformed, Büchner's crass mechanism simply would not do. In other words, the Ottoman materialists, when faced with the real problem of propagating their creed in Ottoman society, sensed the inadequacy of *Vulgärmaterialismus* and the need for a more rigorous 'philosophy' (albeit not in Büchner's interpretation of the word). Beşir Fu'ad sought a remedy in Positivism. Abdullah Cevdet looked first to Islam, then to Guyau's moralism for an answer. Baha Tevfik found a solution in Haeckel's Monism. For the leaders of the new Turkish republic, however, nothing

seemed lacking. ‘Science’ was sufficient, as Büchner had predicted. Thus in the ideology of the modern Turkish republic we observe the final stage of vulgarization of *Vulgärmaterialismus*. The further debasement of late Ottoman popular materialism at the hands of the founders of modern Turkey produced one of the most unsophisticated but pragmatic ideologies of modern times.

Late Ottoman materialism had another, more subtle impact on modern Turkey: it shaped the state’s understanding of its relationship with society. The proponents of materialism in the Ottoman Empire exclusively addressed the intellectuals, whom they sought to convert to their world-view. They assumed that this class would then serve as the vanguard of secular modernity. It was imperative, as they saw it, to transform society from above—if necessary, against the will of the great unwashed. The late Ottoman materialists absorbed this elitism from Gustave Le Bon, whom they considered to be the greatest living sociologist, and a man who applied the new advances in science to social life. In Abdullah Cevdet’s words, ‘Le Bon’s theories regarding social life [were] of the same significance as the use of antiseptics in surgical medicine.’<sup>540</sup> Le Bon’s ideas gave a peculiar shape to the populism of the early Republic, whose motto might be characterized as ‘for the people, but never by the people’. After Abdullah Cevdet published a translation of Le Bon’s *Les incertitudes de l’heure présente*, Cemal Bey, a governor, described the work as a brilliant guide for all Turkish administrators. In fact, Le Bon’s influence clearly extended to the top reaches of the state. Mustafa Kemal himself read *Les incertitudes de l’heure présente* with interest. In the margins, next to a sentence explaining how to transform the mentality of a nation, he jotted down the suggestive phrase: ‘to dominate it’.<sup>541</sup>

In transforming their nation, the fathers of the modern Turkish republic displayed hostile ambivalence toward Islam. On the one hand, many of them perceived religion as the main obstacle to human progress. On the other, they were not in a position to imitate their neighbors to the north and wholly reject religion as ‘the opiate of the masses’. True to their pragmatic natures, they attempted to turn religion into a vehicle of social transformation, much as Abdullah Cevdet had proposed. In keeping with his conception, they imagined a reformed Islam reconciled to a modern society powered by science. Thus Mustafa Kemal declared, in 1923, that a new library of books drawn from three continents would become a source for ‘contemporary *mujtahids*’—free thinkers who would blend Islam and modern science.<sup>542</sup> In contrast to Abdullah Cevdet, who pursued the same agenda seemingly in vain, the leaders of the new republic had power on their side. In their efforts to reform Islam, they had much more substantial agents than figures such as Muḥammad Ghūrī or ‘Ubayd Allāh al-Afghānī.<sup>543</sup> Whereas Abdullah Cevdet became a lightning rod for hostile *ulema*, the leaders of the republic enjoyed the ability to shape the religious establishment in their own image.

Nevertheless, the Turkish republic has, in its own fashion, come smack up against the same problem that doomed Abdullah Cevdet’s program: the innate power of religion. The average Muslim has proven far more resistant to the dull mantras of ‘science’ and ‘progress’ than the believers in an elitist transformation

could ever have imagined. As the current clash between religion and state ideology demonstrates, the mosque has clearly shown a stubborn unwillingness to transform itself into a temple of science.

On the contrary, religion has not only survived but periodically rebelled. The Islamist rejection of elitist social engineering resulted in serious clashes between the secular state and religious society during the early years of the republican regime. In later periods, especially following the shift to the multi-party system in 1946, violent confrontation was avoided. However, a number of popular religious movements did challenge the state's 'Islam' indirectly—by developing a radically different approach to modernity. This grassroots Islamic modernism occupies one side in a tense standoff with an official ideology whose features clearly betray its late nineteenth-century parentage.

This is not to argue that in the religious sphere the Republican project has been a complete failure. Four generations of Turks have grown up under a state that aggressively promoted secularism. This experience has deeply influenced all realms of Turkish society, including its religious culture. Thanks to the state's adherence to secularism, we today are witnessing the emergence of conciliatory approaches to modernity among some—though certainly not all—Islamic groups. To be sure, no Turkish believer accepts *Vulgärmaterialismus*. But under its impact, some Islamist groups are now promoting alternatives that embrace fundamental components of Western modernity—ideas such as science, secular education, and democratic government. This development has opened up the possibility of a shared vision of society founded upon compromise. The idea of secular and religious elements standing on common political ground would have been unimaginable to the elitist followers of Le Bon and Büchner. For the late Ottoman materialists and the founders of the Turkish republic, modernity entailed the birth of a society devoid of all unscientific characteristics. The religious masses, being inherently irrational, had no place in such a society.

While *Vulgärmaterialismus* played a vital role in the foundation of the Republic, it has outlived its usefulness. By preventing the secular elite from recognizing and exploiting the new potential for compromise, *Vulgärmaterialismus* is today widening the gap between official and folk Islam, undermining the very bridge that Abdullah Cevdet had tried to build.

For many years, it was on a street in Ankara bearing the name of Abdullah Cevdet that Turkish pilgrims formed long lines to obtain visas from the Saudi Embassy. Nothing symbolizes better the limitations inherent in the ambitious secularist project of the founders of modern Turkey.

### Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Micheal A.Cook, Michael S.Doran, Jesse Ferris, Andrés P.Hámori, and Arsev Bektaş, who read and commented on drafts of this chapter.

## Notes

- 1 See, for an example of the latter, Musa Kâzım, 'İ'câz-ı Kur'an', *Sırat-ı Mustakim*, no. 9 (October 22, 1908), pp. 135–7.
- 2 See the criticism made by an Armenian reader of *İctihad*, the most important journal of Ottoman popular materialism, in Yekvücüd Vatanımızın Selâmetine Arzukeş Bir Ermeni, 'Mektub-i Mahsus: *İctihad* Mecmua-yı Osmaniyesi İdare-i Aliyyesine Ma'rûz-i Âcizânemdir', *İctihad*, no. 2 (January 1905), pp. 14–15.
- 3 By 'German' I am not referring to the ethnic origins of the leading figures associated with this intellectual movement. For instance, Jacob Moleschott a leading figure in German popular materialism was born a Dutch citizen, but died an Italian. He was educated at Heidelberg University.
- 4 Of course, scientists, for their part, thought that Comte imagined a world without a scientific understanding of the nature of trees.
- 5 It should be noted that von Liebig himself tried to reconcile science and religion; however, the general impact of his work contributed to the formation of the belief that 'science reigns supreme.' For a detailed analysis of this point, see Otto Sonntag, 'Religion and Science in the Thought of Liebig', *Ambix*, vol. 24, no. 3 (1977), pp. 159–69.
- 6 Büchner relied on von Liebig's work on chemistry in order to underscore the superiority of science. But at the same time, he (like Moleschott) was very critical of von Liebig, to whom he referred as 'an amateur in physiology'. On this point, see Frederic Gregory, *Scientific Materialism in Nineteenth Century Germany* (Dordrecht: D.Reidel, 1977), pp. 118, 240. Von Liebig had also described the leaders of *Vulgärmaterialismus* as 'dilletanten' in his *Chemische Briefe*. See Friedrich Albert Lange, *Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik Seiner Bedeutung in der Gegenwart 2* (Leipzig: Verlag von J.Baedeker, 1898), p. 139. For Büchner's use of von Liebig's and von Humboldt's work in his magnum opus, see Ludwig Büchner, *Kraft und Stoffoder Grundzüge der natürlichen Weltordnung*, 16th edition (Leipzig: Verlag von Theodor Thomas, 1888), pp. 27, 35, 99 (for use of von Liebig's work and theses), pp. 355, 377 (for criticism of von Liebig), and pp. 102, 156 (for praise of von Humboldt's work).
- 7 See Dieter Wittich, *Vogt, Moleschott, Büchner; Schriften zum kleinbürgerlichen Materialismus in Deutschland 1* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1971), pp. lxii ff. See also Frederick Gregory, 'Scientific versus Dialectical Materialism: A Clash of Ideologies in Nineteenth-Century German Radicalism', *Isis*, vol. 68, no. 2 (June 1977), pp. 216 ff.
- 8 Büchner, *Kraft und Stoff*, pp. xxi-xxii.
- 9 See Lange, *Geschichte des Materialismus 2*, p. 89.
- 10 L[u]dwig Büchner, *Man in the Past, Present and Future: A Popular Account of the Results of Recent Scientific Research as Regards the Origin, Position and Prospects of the Human Race*, tr. W.S.Dallas (London: Asher & Co. [1872]), pp. 222–3.
- 11 *Ibid.*, p. 223.
- 12 Gregory, *Scientific Materialism*, pp. 155–6.
- 13 Büchner, *Kraft und Stoff*, p. 503.
- 14 *Ibid.*

- 15 Ibid.
- 16 Ibid., p. xxii.
- 17 Ludwig Büchner, *Das künftige Leben und die moderne Wissenschaft: Zehn Briefe an eine Freundin* (Leipzig: Max Spohr, 1889), pp. 140–1.
- 18 Büchner, *Man in the Past, Present and Future*, pp. 220–1.
- 19 Ibid., p. 219. It is significant that when Büchner spoke of *Religion der Liebe*, ‘Liebe’ referred to nothing more than ‘neural activity’.
- 20 [Ali Suavî], ‘Materyalist: Ehl-i Madde, Ehl-i Hiss ve Şübhe’, *Ulûm Gazetesi*, no. 17 [April 17, 1870], pp. 1009, 1019. Ali Suavî underscored the difference between Büchner’s materialism and Bernard’s ‘experimental positive science’, praising the latter.
- 21 [Ali Suavî], ‘Hülâsat’ül-Muhakeme beyn’el-Gazzali ve’l-Felâsife’, *Ulûm Gazetesi*, no. 7 [October 11, 1869], p. 353.
- 22 Ibid.
- 23 Within seventeen years of its first edition Büchner’s magnum opus had been translated into seventeen languages, including Armenian, Bulgarian, and Greek. See Gregory, *Scientific Materialism*, pp. 105, 238, fn. 25. For the popularity of Büchner among early Russian revolutionaries, see Franco Venturi, *The Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia*, trans. Francis Haskell (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), pp. 288–9. Dostoyevsky’s novel *Besy* depicts a second lieutenant (*pod-poruchik*) who one day goes crazy and attacks his commanding officer, biting him on the shoulder. The investigators discover strange facts about the lieutenant:

He threw out of his apartment, for example, two icons of the owner and split one of them with an ax; in his own room he laid out on stands in the form of three lecterns [*v vide trekh naloev*] the works of Vogt, Moleschott, and Büchner, and before each lectern [*naloi*] lit waxen church candles.

See F.M.Dostoevskii, *Besy: Roman v trekh chastiakh* (Leningrad: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, Leningradskoeotdelenie, 1989), pp. 327–8. An Ottoman writer likewise has the protagonist of one of his short stories presenting Büchner and Ernst Haeckel as ‘thinkers who have granted most of the existing truth to humanity’. See Ömer Seyfeddin, ‘Beşeriyet ve Köpek’, *Piyano*, no. 7 [October 3, 1910], p. 78.

- 24 Leipzig: Th.Thomas, 1868.
- 25 Ludwig Büchner, *Ta’rīb li-sharḥ Büchner ‘alā madhhab Darwin fī intiqāl al-anwā’ wa-zuhūr al—‘ālam al-‘udwī wa-ītlāq dhalika ‘alā al-insān ma’a ba’d taşarruf fih*, tr. Shiblī Shumayyil (Alexandria: Maṭba’at Jarīdat al-Maḥrūsah 1884).
- 26 Other important essays of Shumayyil include *Al-ḥaqīqa wa-ḥiya risāla tataḍamman rudūdan lī-ithbāt madhhab Darwin fī al-nushū’ wa’l-irtiqā’* (Cairo: al-Muqtataf, 1885), and the pamphlet ‘*Ārā’ al-Duktūr Shiblī Shumayyil* (Cairo: Maṭba’at Ma’ārif, 1912).



- 27 Büchner's magnum opus appeared in 1855, four years prior to the publication of Darwin's *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection* in 1859. Büchner considered Darwin's work a vindication of his 'grand theory'. See also his *Sechs Vorlesungen über die Darwin'sche Theorie von der Verwandlung der Arten und die erste Entstehung der Organismenwelt: sowie über die Anwendung der Umwandlungstheorie auf den Menschen, das Verhältniss dieser Theorie zur Lehre vom Fortschritt und den Zusammenhang derselben mit der materialistischen Philosophie der Vergangenheit und Gegenwart* (Leipzig: Th.Thomas, 1868); and his *Die Darwin'sche Theorie von der Entstehung und Umwandlung der Lebe-welt: ihre Anwendung auf den Menschen, ihr Verhältnis zur Lehre vom Fortschritt und ihr Zusammenhang mit der Erfahrungs oder Wirklichkeits- Philosophie der Vergangenheit und Gegenwart* (Leipzig: Th.Thomas, 1876). In several of his other works, Şumayyil provided a critical discussion of the major ideas of Büchner. See, for example, Şiblî Şumayyil, *Kitāb falsafat al-nushū' wa'l-irtiqā'* 1 (Cairo: Maṭba'at al-Muqtataf, 1910), p. 167, fn: 'Büchner here abandons his sharp analysis, disassociating himself from his firmly grounded materialism, he returns to his imaginative poetic melodies.' The first edition of this study appeared in 1884.
- 28 The following refutations of Darwin and evolutionism give a good sense of the debate: İbrāhīm Ḥawrānī, *Al-ḥaqq al-yaqīn fī al-radd 'alā buḥl Darwin* (Beirut: [s.n.], 1886); Jirjis Faraj Şufayr, *Kitāb fī aṣl al-insān wa'l-kā'ināt: daḥḍan li-madh hab al-taḥawwul wa-raddan 'alā al-Duktūr Şiblî Şumayyil alladhī 'arraba sharḥ Büchner 'alā madhhab Darwin* (Beirut: Maṭba'at al-Abā' al-Yasu'iyīn, 1890); and Muḥammad Riḍā al-Iṣfāhānī, *Naqd falsafat Darwin* in 2 volumes ([Baghdad?]: Maṭba'at al-Wilāya al-'Āmira, 1331 [1912]), especially. 1, pp. 179 ff.
- 29 H.A.R.Gibb, 'Studies in Contemporary Arabic Literature', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies* vol. 5, no. 3 (1929), p. 464, fn. 4.
- 30 There were, of course, exceptions on both sides. Şiblî Şumayyil, for instance, was a Greek Catholic. His most prominent disciple, Salāmah Mūsā, was a Copt. Jirjis Faraj Şufayr (whose work against Şiblî Şumayyil was mentioned in note 28) was a Maronite. See also his *Kashf al-sitār 'an ḥurriyat al-ikhtiyār; muḥāwara bayna Ayyūb wal-faylasūf mawḍū'uhā aṣl al-sharr: bayān radā'at al-fi'l: şudūr al-sharr 'an al-irāda* (Alexandria: J.F.Şufayr, 1890). This is a book on philosophy in which Şufayr promoted similar ideas from a strictly religious viewpoint.
- 31 This became more evident in a refutation authored by the *ulema*. See *Rudūd al-'ulamā' 'alā madhhab Darwin fī'l-irtiqā'* (Beirut: Maṭba'at al-Mursalin al-Yasu'iyīn, 1886), originally published in the journal *al-Bashīr*.
- 32 See Hisham Sharabi, *Arab Intellectuals and the West: The Formative Years, 1875–1914* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 93.
- 33 Abdülhak Adnan Adıvar, *Tarih Boyunca İlim ve Din 1* (Istanbul: Remzi Yayımevi, 1944), p. iv.
- 34 In addition to the early refutation of Büchner mentioned below (see note 35), two major refutations appeared following the publication of the full translation of *Kraft und Stoff* into Turkish in 1911. See Şehbenderzāde Ahmed Hilmi, *Allah'ı İnkâr Mümkün Müdür? Yahud Huzur-i Fende Mesâlik-i Küfr* 1–4 (Istanbul: 1327–31 [1911–15]) and Harputizāde Hacı Mustafa, *Redd ü İsbat* (Istanbul: Hikmet Matbaası İslâmiyesi, 1330 [1912]). Two other important refutations were published in the early years of the republican regime. See Emin Feyzi, *İlm ü İrade* (Istanbul:

- Necm-i İstikbâl Matbaası, 1343 [1925]) and İsmail Fennî Ertuğrul, *Maddiyûn Mezhebinin İzmihlâli: Maddiyûn Mezhebiyle (Monizm) ve Felsefe-i Müsbete Mezheblerinin Keşfiyât-ı Fenniye ve Muhakemât-ı Akliyye ile Redd ü İbtâlî* ([İstanbul]: Orhaniye Matbaası, 1928).
- 35 İsmail Ferid, *İbtâl-i Mezheb-i Maddiyûn* (Izmir: Ahmed Celâdet ve Şürekâsi Matbaası, 1312 [1894]), p. 6. According to the author, his friend declared to him that he would never keep a Qur'ân or even an *İlmihâl* (catechism) in his library. Ibid.
- 36 For another example, see 'Tercih-i Bend', *Mırsad*, no. 6 [April 30, 1891], p. 43, fn.
- 37 See, for instance, M.Nadir, 'İtikâdât-ı Bâtladan', *Mir'at-ı Âlem* vol. 1, no. 15 (1882), pp. 236 ff; and Münif, 'Mukayese-i İlm ve Cehl', *Mecmua-i Fünûn* vol. 1, no. 1 (June 1862), p. 23. İsmail Kara provides a list of negative terms that were frequently used to refer to the religious sphere. They were *itikadât-ı kadîme* (ancient beliefs), *menkıbe* (legend), *itikadât-ı bâtila* (superstitions), *hurafe* (silly tale), *bâtil inanç* (false belief), *esâtir-i evvelîn* (tales of the men of old), and *israiliyât* (superstitions). See İsmail Kara, 'Modernleşme Dönemi Türkiye'si'nde Ulûm, Fünûn ve Sanat Kavramlarının Algılanışı Üzerine Birkaç Not', *Kutadgubilig* 2 (October 2002), p. 252.
- 38 Sâdullah Paşa, 'Ondokuzuncu Asır', in Mehmed Kaplan, *Şiir Tahlilleri: Âkif Paşadan Yahya Kemal'e Kadar* (Istanbul: Anıl Yayınevi, 1958), pp. 59–60.
- 39 Charles MacFarlane, *Turkey and Its Destiny: The Result of Journeys Made in 1847 and 1848 to Examine into the State of That Country* (London: John Murray, 1850), pp. 270–1.
- 40 Ibid., pp. 268–9.
- 41 Ibid., p. 271.
- 42 Ibid., p. 301.
- 43 Beşir Fu'ad, *Voltaire* (Istanbul: Osmanlı Kütübhanesi, 1304 [1886]). For an excellent biography of Beşir Fu'ad with sound analysis of his ideas, see M.Orhan Okay, *Beşir Fuad: İlk Türk Pozitivist ve Natüralisti* (Istanbul: Hareket Yaymlan, 1969).
- 44 Beşir Fu'ad, *Voltaire*, p. 115.
- 45 Ibid., p. 18.
- 46 Ibid., pp. 125 ff. See also Beşir Fu'ad, 'Aynen Varaka', *Tercüman-i Hakikat* [February 4, 1887].
- 47 Beşir Fu'ad, *Voltaire*, pp. 124–5.
- 48 Mu'allim Naci and Beşir Fu'ad, *İntikad: Mu'allim Naci Efendi ile Beşir Fu'ad Bey Arasında 'Victor Hugo' Hakkında Cereyan Eden Mükâtebedir* (Istanbul: Kitabcı Arakel, 1304 [1886]), p. 70.
- 49 See Beşir Fu'ad's letter to Fazlı Necib, dated Istanbul [December 27, 1885], in Beşir Fu'ad and Fazlı Necib, *Mektubât* (Istanbul: Mihran Matbaası, 1305 [1887]), p. 20.
- 50 Hüseyin [sic] Cahit Yalçın, *Edebî Hatıralar* (Istanbul: Akşam Kitaphanesi, 1935), p. 36. Berkes, in my opinion, misinterprets this remark. He writes that Beşir Fu'ad had translated Büchner's 'Matter and Energy [sic]', but that he was unable to find the translation (see Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* [Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964], p. 293, fn). Clearly, there was no such translation to be found. The phrase 'the work translated from Büchner' should be

understood to refer to Beşir Fu'ad's own use of various works by Büchner in his essays.

- 51 See Beşir Fu'ad's letter to Fazlı Necib in *Tercüman-ı Hakikat* [December 9, 1885]. Beşir Fu'ad considered Claude Bernard a 'genius'. See Beşir Fu'ad, *Beşir* (Istanbul: Ceb Kütüphanesi, 1303 [1885]), p. 8.
- 52 See Claude Bernard, *Introduction à l'étude de la médecine expérimentale* (Paris: J.B.Baillière et fils, 1865), p. 75.
- 53 *Ibid.*, p. 392. A good analysis of Bernard's ideas on the relationship between 'science and philosophy' may be found in Annie Petit, 'Claude Bernard and the History of Science', *Isis*, vol. 78, no. 2 (June 1987), pp. 206–8.
- 54 Okay, *Beşir Fuad*, p. 217.
- 55 According to Claude Bernard:

Je considère qu'Auguste Comte a raison quand il s'agit de science pure. Mais la grande objection que je lui fais, c'est qu'il s' imagine qu'il va supprimer le côté moral et [religieux] sentimental de l'homme...L'idée de Comte de considérer la philosophie positive comme les généralités scientifiques est mauvaise.

(*Philosophie: manuscrit inédit*, Paris: Boivin, 1937, pp. 29, 31).

Bernard further maintained: 'Quant à l'influence que Comte attribue à la philosophie sur l'éducation et sur le développement des sciences, elle est ridicule' (*ibid.*, p. 38).

- 56 Ahmed Midhat, *Beşir Fu'ad* (Istanbul: Tercüman-ı Hakikat Matbaası, 1304 [1887]), pp. 15, 28.
- 57 Beşir Fu'ad refers to Lewes as his major source on philosophy. See Okay, *Beşir Fuad*, p. 188. Furthermore, Beşir Fu'ad strongly recommended Lewes's *Biographical History of Philosophy* to his fellow Fazlı Necib. See Beşir Fu'ad's letter in *Tercüman-ı Hakikat* [December 30, 1885].
- 58 See Jack Kaminsky, 'The Empirical Metaphysics of George Henry Lewes', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 13, no. 3 (June 1952), p. 317.
- 59 *Ibid.*
- 60 Beşir Fu'ad, 'Mebhas-ı Kıhıf ve Netayici', *Saadet* (October 9, 1886).
- 61 Louis Büchner, *Aus Natur und Wissenschaft: Studien, Kritiken und Abhandlungen 1* (Leipzig: Th.Thomas, 1862), pp. 14 ff.
- 62 'France produced two philosophers of genius in this current century: One of them is Comte and the other is Littré.' See Beşir Fu'ad's letter to Fazlı Necib, published in *Tercüman-ı Hakikat* [December 30, 1885].
- 63 See Th[éodule] [Armand] Ribot, 'Philosophy in France', *Mind*, vol. 2, no. 7 (July 1877), p. 374.
- 64 See É[mile] Littré, 'De la condition essentielle qui sépare la sociologie de la biologie', *La Philosophie positive*, no. 2 (1868), pp. 186–207. See also E.J., 'La transformisme devant le Positivism', *La Philosophie positive*, no. 14 (1875), pp. 25–41.
- 65 There were English positivists who claimed that Comte's endorsement of Lamarck (for insisting on the connection between organism and environment) outweighed

- his criticism of Lamarck's evolutionary ideas. Accordingly, they proposed a reconciliation. See W.M.Simon, *European Positivism in the Nineteenth Century: An Essay in Intellectual History* (Port Washington: Kennikat Press, 1972), pp. 26–7. One may infer from Beşir Fu'ad's praise for Littré, however, that he did not share this viewpoint.
- 66 As for other literary genres, Beşir Fu'ad lauded naturalism and realism as scientific genres according with Bernard's experimentalism. His defense of Émile Zola's *Roman expérimental* as an excellent example of 'scientific literature', and his denunciation of other literary genres, provoked a long-lasting debate in Ottoman literary circles. See Beşir Fu'ad, *Victor Hugo* (Istanbul: Ceb Kütüphanesi, 1302 [1885]), pp. 181 ff and Okay, *Beşir Fuad*, pp. 158 ff.
- 67 As quoted in Richard M.Chadbourne, 'Renan, or the Contemptuous Approach to Literature', *Yale French Studies*, no. 3 (1949), p. 97.
- 68 See Edward L.Rice, 'Darwin and Bryan: A Study in Method', *Science*, vol. 61, no. 1575 (March 6, 1925), p. 250.
- 69 Beşir Fu'ad, 'Yine Şiir ve Hakikat Mes'elesi', *Tercüman-ı Hakikat* [February 1, 1887].
- 70 Beşir Fu'ad, 'Gayret' in 3, 4, 5, 6 Numerolu Nüshalarında Münderic "Victor Hugo" Ünvanlı Makale-i İntikadiyeye Mukabele', *Saadet* (July 26, 1886).
- 71 Beşir Fu'ad, 'Victor Hugo Ünvanlı Makale-i İntikadiyeye Mukabele', *Saadet* (August 4, 1886). For a more detailed discussion of this debate, see Okay, *Beşir Fuad*, pp. 148 ff.
- 72 'Kalb', *Envâr-ı Zekâ*, no. 15 [December 1883], p. 401.
- 73 [Namık] Kemal, 'Mektub: Ebüzziya Tevfik Bey Biraderim'e', *Mecmua-i Ebüzziya*, no. 52 [October 14, 1886], pp. 1633–6.
- 74 Beşir Fu'ad, 'Menemenlizâde Tahir Beyefendi'nin *Gayret*' in 29, 30, 31, 33 Numerolu Nüshalarındaki Makale-i Cevabiyeye [Cevabiyelerine] Cevab!' *Saadet* (November 3, 1886).
- 75 Beşir Fu'ad, 'Yine Şiir ve Hakikat Mes'elesi', *Tercüman-ı Hakikat* [February 1, 1887].
- 76 See, for instance, Salahî, 'Nazîre', *Saadet* (January 18, 1887).
- 77 'Gazel', *Tercüman-ı Hakikat* [January 29, 1887].
- 78 Ibid.
- 79 For further discussion of these articles, see Okay, *Beşir Fuad*, p. 117 and pp. 224 ff.
- 80 See Beşir Fu'ad, *Victor Hugo*, p. 6.
- 81 See Okay, *Beşir Fuad*, p. 93.
- 82 Bursa Reji Nezareti Muhafaza Serkâtibi Ahmed Hakkı, 'Ulûm ve Fünûn Neye Yarar [?]', *Ma'lûmat*, no. 82 [May 20, 1897], p. 696.
- 83 Ömer Subhi bin Edhem, *Yunanistan-ı Kadîm Mader-i Medeniyet Midir [?]*, Istanbul University Library, Turkish Manuscripts, no. 3225, f. 12. For a similar criticism of sociology and other social sciences, see Rıza Tefvik, 'İbn Haldun'dan', *Maarif*, no. 188 [July 4, 1895], p. 275.
- 84 [Şemseddin Sami Frashëri], 'Kuvvet', *Hafta*, no. 16 [November 30, 1881], p. 241.
- 85 [Şemseddin Sami Frashëri], 'Felsefe', *Hafta*, no. 9 [October 3, 1881], p. 142. The leading Ottoman materialist of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries praised Şemseddin Sami Frashëri's work and the journal *Hafta*, which was a major

- platform for the promotion of his ideas. See A[bdullah] D[jevdet], 'Ch[emseddin] Samy Bey', *İdjtihad*, no. 2, pp. 10–12.
- 86 Rıf'at Osman, *Hayatım ve Hâüratım* 1, Istanbul University, Cerrahpaşa Tıp Fakültesi Manuscripts, no. 213/69 (1921), f. 49.
- 87 *Ibid.*, f. 50.
- 88 'Les manifestations', *Le Moniteur Oriental*, July 27, 1908.
- 89 İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal İnal, *Son Asır Türk Şairleri* 1 (Istanbul: M.E.B. Devlet Kitapları, 1969), p. 244. For additional biographical information about Abdullah Cevdet, see my *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi* (Istanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1981), pp. 5 ff.
- 90 İbn Ömer [Abdullah] Cevdet, *Ramazan Bağçesi* (Istanbul: Vatan Kütübhanesi, 1307 [1890–1]), p. [3]. This eulogy was republished in İbn Ömer [Abdullah] Cevdet, *Tulu'at* (Istanbul: Âlem Matbaası, 1308 [1891–2]), pp. 9–12.
- 91 See 'Dr Ibrahim Themo Bey'in Mektubu', *Yolların Sesi*, no. 6 (February 28, 1933), p. 131.
- 92 İbn Ömer [Abdullah] Cevdet, *Türbe-i Ma'sumiyet* (Istanbul: Vatan Kütübhanesi, 1308 [1891]), p. 3.
- 93 *Ibid.*, p. 14.
- 94 *Ibid.*, p. 3.
- 95 See Abdullah Cevdet, *Ma'sumiyet* (Istanbul: İstapan Matbaası, 1311 [1895]), p. 4.
- 96 İbrahim Temo, 'Darwin'in Ellinci Ölüm Yıldönümü', *İçtihat*, no. 347 (June 15, 1932), p. 573.
- 97 Abdullah Djevdet, *Fièvre d'âme: pour elle—à elles—pensées inquiètes* (Vienna: Guillaume Frick, 1901), p. 90.
- 98 Abdullah Cevdet, *Fizyolocıya-i Tefekkür: La pensée—Mehazımın Esası C[K]raft und Stoff Ünvanlı Kitab-ı Eşherin Tefekkür Bahsidir* (Istanbul: İstapan Matbaası, 1307 [1892]). A close friend and a schoolmate of Abdullah Cevdet later testified that he was deeply influenced by the theses of Ludwig Büchner, Ernst Haeckel, and Karl Vogt (See Rıza Tevfik, 'Abdullah Cevdet Bey', *Nevsâl-i Millî* 1330 [Istanbul: Artin Asadoryan ve Mahdumları Matbaası, 1914], pp. 99–100). Nonetheless, Abdullah Cevdet's early work depended almost entirely upon Büchner's studies.
- 99 İbn Ömer [Abdullah] Cevdet, *Dimağ ve Dimağ ve Ruh İle Arasındaki Münasebet-i Fenniyyeyi Tedkik* (Istanbul: Vatan Kütübhanesi, 1308 [1893]).
- 100 *Ibid.*, p. 46. The study of neural matter became popular during this period. For a more basic study, see Mehmed Fahri, *Hıfz-ı Sıhhat ve İstigâlât-ı Zihniyye* (Istanbul: Artin Asadoryan, 1309 [1894]).
- 101 Paris: Bibliothèque d'Éducation Attrayante, 1890.
- 102 Abdullah Cevdet, *Fizyolocıya ve Hıfz-ı Sıhhat-i Dimağ ve Melekât-ı Akliyye* (Istanbul: Mahmud Bey Matbaası, 1312 [1894]).
- 103 See Abdullah Cevdet, *Dimağ ve Melekât-ı Akliyyenin Fizyolocıya ve Hıfz-ı Sıhhası* (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Âmire, 1333–1335 [1918–19]).
- 104 He published this essay in installments in a popular journal. A[bdullah] Cevdet, 'Herkes İçün Kimya', *Musavver Cihan*, no. 4 [September 23, 1891] pp. 30–1, no. 34 [April 27, 1892], pp. 266–8.
- 105 See, for example, Abdullah Cevdet, 'Harput'da Buzluk yahud Bir Tabîi Buz Fabrikası', *Resimli Gazete*, no. 30 [October 15, 1891], pp. 370–1.
- 106 Abdullah Cevdet, *Fizyolocıya-i Tefekkür*, p. 19.
- 107 *Ibid.*, pp. 7–8.

- 108 See Abdullah Cevdet, *Goril* (Ma'muret'ül-Azîz: Vilâyet Matbaası, 1311 [1894]); and Büchner, *Aus Natur und Wissenschaft*, 1, pp. 279–88. Abdullah Cevdet translated this chapter from a French version that appeared in 1866. See Louis Büchner, *Science et nature: Essais de philosophie et de science naturelle* 1 (Paris: Germer Baillière, 1866), pp. 127–42. For a study of Abdullah Cevdet's preparation of his translations and the shortcomings of these works, see O[tt]o Hachtmann, 'Abdullah Dschevdet als Übersetzer', *Die islamische Welt*, no. 9 (August 1917), p. 527.
- 109 Abdullah Cevdet, *Goril*, p. 52.
- 110 For his education and his transmission of Claude Bernard's ideas to Ottoman intellectual circles, see Z.Fahri Findikoğlu, *Claude Bernard ve Şakir Paşa* (Istanbul: Türkiye Harsî ve İctimaî Araştırmalar Derneği Neşriyatı, 1963), pp. 36–51.
- 111 Mehmed Şakir, *Dürûs-i Hayat-ı Beşeriye*, 2nd edition (Istanbul: Mekteb-i Tıbbiye-i Şâhâne Matbaası, 1317–1319 [1901]), p. 25.
- 112 See İbn Ömer [Abdullah] Cevdet, *Dimağ*, p. 2.
- 113 It should be noted that on many occasions Abdullah Cevdet employed this technique without enthusiasm. Certainly, a special case was his footnoted translation of Vittorio Alfieri's *Della Tirannide*, in which Abdullah Cevdet denied any Islamic basis for absolutism (V[it]torio) Alfieri, *İstibdad*, tr. Abdullah Cevdet (Geneva: Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti Matbaası, 1317 [1899]), pp. 115–8, fn). His strident defense of Islam has made many later scholars assume that these were his sincere views (see, for instance, Ettore Rossi, 'Una traduzione turca dell'opera "Della Tirannide" di V.Alfieri probabilmente conosciuta da al-Kawākibī', *Oriente Moderno*, vol. 34, no. 7 (July 1954), pp. 336–7). In fact, he had found Alfieri's criticisms of Islam entirely justified (Abdullah Cevdet to İshak Sükûti, December 21, 1897, Arkivi Qendror Shtetëror [Tirana], Fondi Dr I.Temo, 19/106//186/1).
- 114 Büchner was aware of Isnard's work, however. See Büchner, *Kraft und Stoff*, p. 146.
- 115 See İbrahim Temo's letter to Karl Süsseim, Medgidia, August 9, 1933, Nachlaß Süsseim, Staatsbibliothek Preußischer Kulturbesitz: Orientabteilung.
- 116 Félix Isnard, *Spiritualisme et matérialisme* (Paris: C.Reinwald, 1879), pp. 154–5.
- 117 *Ibid.*, pp. v–vi.
- 118 Abdullah Cevdet, *Fünûn ve Felsefe ve Felsefe Sânihaları* (Istanbul: Kütübhaneci İctihad, 1912), pp. 31–2.
- 119 Lange, *Geschichte des Materialismus* 2, p. 535.
- 120 A[bdullah] C[evdet], '(Tevhid-i Efkâr) ve (Sebil'ür-Reşad)'dan Sual', *İctihad*, no. 173 (January 1, 1925), p. 3488.
- 121 Abdullah Cevdet, *Hadd-ı Te'dib: Ahmed Rıza Bey'e Açık Mektub*, 2nd edition (Istanbul: Kütübhaneci İctihad, 1912), pp. 65–6, fn.
- 122 İbn Ömer [Abdullah] Cevdet, *Dimağ*, pp. 36–7.
- 123 Abdullah Cevdet, 'Tarihden Bir Sahife-i Hünûn: Saint-Barthélemy', *İctihad*, no. 147 (April 15, 1922), p. 3072.
- 124 Abdullah Djevdet, *La vengeance dorée: nouvelle turque* (Geneva: Imprimerie Internationale, 1904), p. 9.
- 125 Abdullah Cevdet, 'Şehzâde Mecid Efendi Hazretleri'yle Mülâkat', *İctihad*, no. 57 [March 20, 1913], p. 1257.

- 126 A[bdullah] Djevdet, 'Une profession de foi', *İdjtihad*, no. 6 (May 1905), p. 89.
- 127 Abdullah Cevdet, 'İctihad', *İctihad*, no. 1 (September 1, 1904), p. 1.
- 128 'Notre enquête', *İdjtihad*, no. 1 (September 1, 1904), p. 16.
- 129 Like Beşir Fu'ad, Şerafeddin Mağmumî willed his corpse to the dissecting room of the Royal Medical Academy, to be used in anatomical research. See Abdullah Cevdet, 'Büyük Ölümler: Doktor Şerafeddin Mağmumî Bey', *İctihad*, no. 237 (August 15, 1927), p. 4458. His heirs, too, overrode his will and gave him a Muslim funeral after his death in Egypt.
- 130 See Şerafeddin Mağmumî, *Vücut-i Beşer* (Istanbul: Kitabçı Arakel, 1310 [1894]), pp. 8–9. The book had been published previously in installments in the daily *Tercüman-i Hakikat*.
- 131 Şerafeddin Mağmumî, 'Kalb ve Dimağ', *Maarif*, no. 32 [March 25, 1891], p. 83. For his praise of Abdullah Cevdet's work on the brain, see Şerafeddin Mağmumî, *Vücut-i Beşer*, p. 259, fn.
- 132 See Şerafeddin Mağmumî, *Başlangıç* (Istanbul: İstefan Matbaası, 1307 [1888–90]), p. 76.
- 133 *Ibid.*, pp. 22–3. The passage quoted is reminiscent of Herbert Spencer's view that 'science is itself poetic.' See Herbert Spencer, *Education: Intellectual, Moral, and Physical* (London: G.Manwaring, 1861), pp. 44–5. Abdullah Cevdet must have been aware of this study, as he uses it in *Fünûn ve Felsefe ve Felsefe Sânihaları*, pp. 24 ff. His vantage point, however, was different than Spencer's. Instead of finding poetic expressions in science itself, he thought that poetry might be used to promote science. Büchner's Arab translator Şiblî Şumayyil had adopted a very similar stance. See As'ad Razzûq (ed.), *Hawâdith wa khawâtir: Mudhakkirât al Duktûr Şiblî Şumayyil* (Beirut: Dâr al-Ĥamrâ ', 1991), p. 158: 'If the sprit of poetry does not depart from the spirit of science, the heart of humanity remains vibrant, and the sparkle of hope shines in an atmosphere of sadness. What is life without hope? What are sciences without literature and art?' He further maintained that 'there is magic in science.' See *ibid.*, p. 159.
- 134 See, for example, İ[brahim] Edhem [Temo], 'Tagaddi ve Devam-ı Hayat', *Musavver Cihan*, no. 31 [April 6, 1892], p. 242, fn. See also Şükrü Kâmil, 'Musahabe-i Sihhiye ve Tibbiye: Kalb mi, Dimağ mı [?]' *Maarif*, no. 116 [October 12, 1893], pp. 180–2.
- 135 İbn Ömer [Abdullah] Cevdet, *Tulu'at*, p. 70, fn: 'I am hesitant to use "heart" instead of "mind" anywhere and at anytime.'
- 136 He wrote the following in 1891: 'Un coup puissant de la "science" m'inspire aujourd'hui des sentiments d'adieu.' See Abdullah Djevdet, *La lyre turque: feux de paradis et roses d'enfer* (Vienna: Guillaume Frick, 1902), p. 160. This poem was first published in Turkish. See Abdullah Cevdet, *Ma'sumiyet*, p. 44.
- 137 *Ibid.*, pp. 18–19.
- 138 Abdullah Cevdet, *Kahriyat* (Cairo: Küttübhan-e İctihad, 1908), pp. 52–4.
- 139 *Ibid.*, pp. 32–3.
- 140 For a good analysis of Chénier from this point of view, see Donald R.Kelley, 'Ancient Verses on New Ideas: Legal Tradition and the French Historical School', *History and Theory*, vol. 26, no. 3 (October 1987), pp. 319–38. Some of Abdullah Cevdet's poems took their inspiration from the works of Chénier. See, for example, 'Kitâbe-i Gam', *İctihad*, no. 9 (October 1905), p. 144.
- 141 Abdullah Cevdet, *Ma'sumiyet*, pp. 5–12.

- 142 Ernest Raynaud, 'Préface', in Abdullah Djevdet, *Fièvre d'âme*, p. x.
- 143 See Abdullah Cevdet, 'Puşkin'den Muktebesdir', *Mekteb*, no. 15 [August 9, 1894], p. 51, and 'Dumas'dan Tercüme', *Mekteb*, no. 17 [October 11, 1894], p. 151.
- 144 See, for example, İbn Ömer [Abdullah] Cevdet, *Tulu'at*, pp. 70–1, 72–3.
- 145 Ibid., pp. 74–5; and [Abdullah] Cevdet, *Hiç* (Istanbul: Mahmud Bey Matbaası, 1307 [1889]), p. 18.
- 146 See, for example, İbn Ömer [Abdullah] Cevdet, *Ramazan Bağçesi*, pp. 6–7; İbn Ömer [Abdullah] Cevdet, *Tulu'at*, pp. 68–9, 76–7; and Abdullah Cevdet, *Ma'sumiyet*, pp. 31–2.
- 147 See John Wilcox, 'The Beginnings of l' Art pour l' Art', *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, vol. 11, no. 4 (June 1953), p. 374.
- 148 See [Abdullah] Cevdet, *Hiç*, pp. 13–17.
- 149 Gustave Kahn, 'Préface', in Abdullah Djevdet, *La lyre turque*, pp. v–xi. Many important intellectual and literary figures praised this work of poetry. See, for example, Stefan Zweig, 'Abdullah Djevdet Bey: La lyre turque', *Beilage zur Allgemeinen Zeitung*, no. 43 (February 23, 1903), p. 343; 'Abdullah Djevdet Bey: La lyre turque', *La Semaine Littéraire*, November 22, 1903; and Pierre Quillard, 'La lyre turque', *Mercure de France* 47, no 158 (February 1903), p. 466, in which the reviewer made the following comment: 'la pensée d'un poète de langue française qui a beaucoup lu Heine et Schopenhauer'.
- 150 Quoted in *La société nouvelle* (April 1894) by René Wellek in his 'The Term and Concept of Symbolism in Literary History', *New Literary History*, vol. 1, no. 2 (Winter 1970), p. 264.
- 151 See Ernest Raynaud, 'Préface', in Abdullah Djevdet, *Fièvre d'âme*, pp. vii–xi.
- 152 Quoted in Raynaud's *La mêlée symboliste* (Paris, 1918) by J. Warshaw in 'Góngora as a Precursor of the Symbolists', *Hispania*, vol. 15, no. 1 (February 1932), p. 10.
- 153 Besides Abdullah Cevdet's aforementioned Symbolist works, he penned three important works of poetry: *Les quatrains maudits et les rêves orphelins* (Paris: La Plume, 1903); *Rafale de parfums: sonnets* (Geneva: Imprimerie Internationale, 1904); and *Viola semper florens—Cendres et feux: sonnets* (Cairo: Édition de la Revue 'Idjtihad', 1908).
- 154 See, for example, Djevdet Bey, 'Sonnet', *La Plume*, no. 15 (1903), p. 100.
- 155 See 'Le "Jardin des Ronces"', *Le Mentor: guide rose de la Plume*, vol. 14, no. 328 (December 15, 1902), p. [1].
- 156 See Abdullah Cevdet, *Hadd-i Te'dib*, pp. 31–2.
- 157 Abdullah Djevdet, *Düşünen Musiki* (Istanbul: İctihad Kitapları, 1932), pp. 3–4.
- 158 Seep. 31.
- 159 Abdullah Djevdet, *Viola semper florens*, p. 20.
- 160 Artuhi, 'Haftanâme', *İctihad*, no. 70 [July 17, 1913], p. 1532.
- 161 Abdullah Cevdet, 'Felsefe-Edebiyat', *İctihad*, no. 72 [July 31, 1913], p. 1579.
- 162 He did not cite the title of the poem but referred to it by the name of the book in which it was published, *Au bord de l'infini*.
- 163 See Victor Hugo, *Œuvres complètes 5: Poésie 2* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1985), p. 467; and İbn Ömer [Abdullah] Cevdet, *Ramazan Bağçesi*, pp. 6–7, for its translation into Turkish.
- 164 H.C.O.Huss, 'Victor Hugo's Religion Drawn from His Writings', *Transactions and Proceedings of the Modern Language Association of America* 2 (1886), p. xi.



- 165 Abdullah Djevdet, *Düşünen Musiki*, p. 14. He further vowed: 'I cannot be a devotee of a God also capable of evil/I will go to a God only capable of good' (ibid., p. 89). He used similar themes in his poem 'Eglogue de l'infini', written in 1902 in Abdullah Djevdet, *La lyre turque*, pp. 156–7, and in his poem 'À l'infini', in Abdullah Djevdet, *Rafale de parfums*, pp. 117–8.
- 166 For more information, see Émile Boutroux, 'La Philosophie de Charles Sectéran', *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, no. 3 (May 1895), pp. 253–68. Abdullah Cevdet quoted Sectéran's work in his *Fünûn ve Felsefe ve Felsefe Sânihaları*, p. 154.
- 167 'Aşk', *Kırk Anbar* 1 (1290 [1873]), pp. 3–4.
- 168 'Aşkın Hayvanâtda dahi Zuhuru', ibid., pp. 13–15.
- 169 Seep. 37.
- 170 Şerafeddin Mağmumî, *Başlangıç*, pp. 22–3.
- 171 'Sebil'ür-Reşad'a Cevab', *İctihad*, no. 171 (November 1, 1924), p. 3446.
- 172 Abdullah Cevdet, 'İfade-i Mütercim', in Reinhart Dozy, *Tarih-i İslâmiyet* 1 (Cairo: Kütübhaneye-i İctihad, 1908), p. 4.
- 173 See Aloys Sprenger, *Das Leben und die Lehre des Mohammad, nach bisher grösstentheils unbenutzten Quellen* (Berlin: Nicolaische Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1861–5), in three volumes.
- 174 Abdullah Cevdet, 'İfade-i Mütercim', in Dozy, *Tarih-i İslâmiyet* 1, p. 5.
- 175 Ibid.
- 176 See Abdullah Cevdet, 'Din ve Terbiye-i Vicdaniye', *İctihad*, no. 197 (February 1, 1926), p. 3862. The fact that Abdullah Cevdet called for this policy during the republican era reveals his sincerity.
- 177 Abdullah Cevdet, 'Sebil'ür-Reşad'a Cevab', *İctihad*, no. 171, p. 3445.
- 178 Abdullah Cevdet, 'Mezheb-i Bahauallah: Din-i Ümem', *İctihad*, no. 144 (March 1, 1922), p. 3015. Abdullah Cevdet had quoted Boutmy's original saying before coining this phrase. See Ab[dullah] Djevdet, 'Des morts qui ne meurent pas: E.Boutmy', *İdjihad*, no. 10 (January 1906), p. 158: 'La philosophie est de la lumière sans chaleur; la religion est de la chaleur obscure, ou avec une lumière brisée, réverbérée, réfractée. Mais la chaleur est essentiellement un mouvement et un principe de mouvement.'
- 179 Abdullah Cevdet, 'Tarihden Bir Sahife-i Hûnîn: Saint-Barthélemy', *İctihad*, no. 147, p. 3072.
- 180 Abdullah Cevdet, 'İman, İman!', *Hak*, April 30, 1912.
- 181 Abdullah Cevdet, 'İfade-i Mütercim', in Dozy, *Tarih-i İslâmiyet* 1, p. 5. This is reminiscent of Büchner's notion of *Ersatzreligion*.
- 182 Abdullah Djevdet, *Düşünen Musiki*, p. 38. See also Abdullah Djevdet, *Karlı Dağdan Ses* (Istanbul: İctihad Kitapları, 1931), p. [13]: 'I have carried suns from West to East/I have carried things similar to the paradise and prophecy of Islam (*kevser*)'
- 183 Büchner, *Aus Natur und Wissenschaft* 1, pp. 312 ff.
- 184 A[kçuraoğlu] Y[usuf], 'İntikad ve Takriz: Fünûn ve Felsefe ve Felsefe Sânihaları', *Türk Yurdu*, vol. 2, no. 23 (April 20, 1912), p. 728.
- 185 Abdullah Cevdet, *Fünûn ve Felsefe* (Drafted in 1307 [1891], Lithograph edition [Geneva, 1897]).
- 186 Abdullah Cevdet, *Fünûn ve Felsefe* (Cairo: Kütübhaneye-i İctihad, 1906).
- 187 Abdullah Cevdet, *Fünûn ve Felsefe ve Felsefe Sânihaları*.

- 188 Ibid., p. 6 (all the references given here are to this third and final edition of the study).
- 189 Ibid., p. 5.
- 190 Abdullah Cevdet translated the following works of Le Bon into Turkish: *Ruh'ül-akvâm* (Cairo: Kütübhan-e İctihad, 1907)/ *Les lois psychologiques de l'évolution des peuples; Asrımızın Nüsûs-i Felsefîyesi* (Istanbul: Kütübhan-e İctihad, 1914)/ *Les aphorismes du temps présent; Avrupa Harbinden Alınan Psikolociyâ Dersler* (Istanbul: Kütübhan-e İctihad, 1918)/ *Enseignements psy chologiques de la guerre européenne; İlm-i Ruh-i İctima'î* (Istanbul: Kütübhan-e İctihad, 1924)/ *Psychologie des foules; Dün ve Yarın* (Istanbul: Kütübhan-e İctihad, 1924)/ *Hier et demain, pensées brèves; and Amelî Ruhiyyat* (Istanbul: Kütübhan-e İctihad, 1931)/ *Les incertitudes de l'heure présente; réflexions sur la politique, les guerres, les alliances, le droit, la morale, les religions, les philosophies, etc.*
- 191 See Abdullah Cevdet, 'Doktor Gustave Le Bon', *İctihad*, no. 8 (July 1905), pp. 118–20.
- 192 [Abdullah Cevdet], 'Abdülhamid ve İlm-i Ruh', *Osmanlı*, no. 24 (April 15, 1899), p. 5.
- 193 See Assistant Governor Refik Bey to Âsım Bey at the Chamberlain's office, Izmir [November 15, 1905], no. 2334, *Umum Kayda Mahsus Defter*, Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (hereafter BBA)-Yıldız Esas Evrakı, 36/139–74–4/139/XIX.
- 194 See İsmail Fahreddin Efendi's petition to the *Meşihat*, dated [January 30, 1909], and his petition to the Grand Vizier's Office, dated [July 6, 1909], BBA-Bab-ı Âlî Evrak Odası (hereafter BEO)/Dahiliye Giden, 108–3/57, files 264617 and 278257, respectively.
- 195 See the petition by Ahmed Ramiz on behalf of the İctihad Publishing Company in BBA-Meclis-i Vükelâ Mazbataları, vol. 146, folio 609 [November 25, 1910]; and BBA-BEO/Maliye Giden, 506, file 287206.
- 196 Abdullah Cevdet, *Fünûn ve Felsefe ve Felsefe Sânihaları*, pp. 9 ff.
- 197 See Geo[rg] C.Stiebeling, *Naturwissenschaft gegen Philosophie: Eine Widerlegung der Hartmann'schen Lehre vom Unbewußten in der Leiblichkeit, nebst einer kurzen Beleuchtung der Darwin'schen Ansicht über den Instinkt* (New York: L.W.Schmidt, 1871).
- 198 It should be stated that most of the *hadîths* quoted by Abdullah Cevdet do not have clear parallels in the classical collections.
- 199 See his extensive footnote in V[ittorio] Alfieri, *İstibdad*, tr. Abdullah Cevdet (Geneva: Osmanlı İctihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti Matbaası, 1317 [1899]), pp. 115–18.
- 200 Abdullah Cevdet, 'İslâmın Tekâmül-i Dinîsi', *İctihad*, no. 76 [August 28, 1913], p. 1675.
- 201 Abdullah Cevdet, *Fünûn ve Felsefe ve Felsefe Sânihaları*, p. 82.
- 202 See Abdullah Cevdet, 'Cihan-ı İslâma Dair', *İctihad*, no. 26 [July 14, 1911], p. 763; and his footnote in V[ittorio] Alfieri, *İstibdad*, pp. 115–16.
- 203 Abdullah Cevdet, 'Şahzâde Şeyh'ül-Re'is Hazretleri'yle Mülâkat', *İctihad*, no. 126 [January 28, 1915], p. 447.
- 204 See Abdullah Cevdet, 'Emvât-ı Lâyemût: Şeyh Muḥammad 'Abduh', *İcti had*, no. 11 (April 1906), pp. 164–5, and [Abdullah Cevdet], 'Des morts qui ne meurent pas: Cheikh Mohamed Abdou', *Idjihad*, no. 9 (October 1905), p. 135.

- 205 This was stated in an epilogue allegedly written by an obscure French orientalist at Abdullah Cevdet's behest, and appended to the Turkish translation of Dozy's *Het Islamisme*. See 'Tekmile', in Reinhart Dozy, *Tarih-i İslâmiyet 2* (Cairo: Kütübhaneci İctihad, 1908 [1909]), pp. 717–8.
- 206 Abdullah Cevdet, 'Ruhî ve Felsefî Tettebbü': Din Dersleri', *İctihad*, no. 224 (March 15, 1927), p. 4288.
- 207 See Abdullah Cevdet, 'Un précurseur anarchiste: Ebou-Ala-el-Muarri', *Les Temps Nouveaux, Supplément Littéraire 2*, no. 5 (1898), p. 557. (This article was originally published in *L'Estafette* on May 16, 1898 under the rubric 'Grands esprits de l'Orient'.) Abdullah Cevdet also considered the pessimist poet a 'librepenseur', see Abdullah Djevdet, *De la nécessité d'une école pour les éducateurs sociaux: mémoire présenté au Congrès international de l'éducation sociale, tenu à l'exposition universelle de Paris, du 26 au 30 Septembre 1900* (Paris: Librairie Vve Thomas & Ch. Thomas, 1900), p. 39.
- 208 A[bdullah] D[jevdet], 'Les grands esprits de l'Orient', *Idjihad*, no. 2 (January 1905), pp. 15–16.
- 209 Abdullah Cevdet used this couplet frequently and maintained that 'it was one of the famous couplets of Rûmî.' I could not trace it to Rûmî.
- 210 Abdullah Cevdet, 'İfade-i Mütercim', in Dozy, *Tarih-i İslâmiyet 1*, p. 7, and Abdullah Cevdet, *Dilmestî-i Mevlânâ ve Gazalî'de Ma'rifetullah: Ruba'iyât-i Gazalî, Urfî'de Şiir ve İrfan* (Istanbul: Kütübhaneci İctihad, 1921), p. 21.
- 211 Abdullah Cevdet, 'Dil Mestî-i Mevlâna', *İctihad*, no. 84 [December 25, 1913], p. 1858.
- 212 See Abdullah Cevdet, *Ruba'iyât-i Hayyam ve Türkceye Tercümeleri*, 2nd edition (Istanbul: Kütübhaneci İctihad, 1926), p. 56. Abdullah Cevdet introduced Khayyâm and his quatrains long before this. See Abdullah Cevdet, 'Hayat ve Âsâr-ı Ömer Hayyâm', *İştihad*, no. 91 (February 12, 1914), pp. 2031 ff.
- 213 This had originally been stated by Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall. It was mentioned in an essay translated by Hüseyinzâde Ali and published in İbn Ömer [Abdullah] Cevdet, *Ramazân Bağçesi*, p. 17.
- 214 Abdullah Cevdet, *Ruba'iyât-ı Hayyam*, pp. 15–16. Interestingly, Abdullah Cevdet quoted only Renan's praise for Khayyâm and his work. For Renan's complete commentary, see Ernest Renan, 'Rapport sur les travaux du conseil de la Société Asiatique pendant l'année 1867–1868, fait à la séance annuelle de la Société, le 9 Juillet 1868', *Journal Asiatique* 6 (12) (1868), p. 56:

Mathématicien, poëte, mystique en apparence, débauché en réalité, hypocrite consommé, mêlant le blasphème à l'hymne mystique, le rire à l'incrédulité, *Khayyâm est peut-être l'homme le plus curieux à étudier pour comprendre ce qu'a pu devenir le libre génie de la Perse sous l'étreinte du dogmatisme musulman.*

Abdullah Cevdet selected for quotation only the section here italicized.

- 215 See Abdullah Cevdet's essay 'Omar Khayyam et J.M.Guyau', in Abdullah Cevdet, *Ruba'iyât-ı Hayyam*, p. 76. Here Abdullah Cevdet also maintained that Khayyâm's

- work had proposed basic principles of evolutionary theory centuries before Darwin. See *ibid.*, p. 74.
- 216 *Ibid.*, p. 76. Abdullah Cevdet further claimed that there were pages reflecting Khayyām's ideas in the chapter on 'Les idées philosophiques et sociales dans la poésie', in Guyau's *L'art au point de vue sociologique*. See Abdullah Cevdet, *Ruba'iyât-ı Hayyam*, p. 88.
- 217 See Abdullah Cevdet, *Hadd-ı Te'dib*, p. 31, and Abdullah Djevdet, *Les quatre ans maudits*, pp. 164–5, fn.
- 218 Alfieri's work was translated into Turkish by Abdullah Cevdet under the title *Hükümdar ve Edebiyât* (Geneva: Kütübhane-i İctihad, 1905).
- 219 Abdullah Cevdet, *Dilmesfî-i Mevlânâ ve Gazalî'de Ma'rifetullah: Ruba'iyât-ı Gazalî, Urfî'de Şiir ve İrfan*, p. 99.
- 220 *Ibid.*, p. 111.
- 221 Abdullah Cevdet, *Fizyolojiya ve Hıfz-ı Sıhhat-i Dimağ*, pp. 209–10.
- 222 Abdullah Cevdet, *Fünûn ve Felsefe ve Felsefe Sânihaları*, p. 64.
- 223 *Ibid.*, p. 19.
- 224 *Ibid.*, p. 47.
- 225 *Ibid.*
- 226 *The Qur'ân*, 17. 36.
- 227 Abdullah Cevdet, *Fünûn ve Felsefe ve Felsefe Sânihaları*, p. 61.
- 228 *Ibid.*, p. 63.
- 229 *Ibid.*, p. 29.
- 230 *Ibid.*, pp. 62 and 156.
- 231 *Ibid.*, p. 54.
- 232 *Ibid.*, pp. 155 and 63. The translation of the piece quoted by Abdullah Cevdet is as follows:

The Christians are in error, the Muslims have not found the true path;  
the Jews are humbled, the Zoroastrians have been led astray; Mankind  
has been divided into two parts: some are rational without religion,  
some are pious but lack reason.

- 233 Abdullah Cevdet also provided quotations from the New Testament, something very rarely done by Muslim Ottoman intellectuals. See *ibid.*, p. 30.
- 234 *Ibid.*, pp. 155–6.
- 235 Here, too, Abdullah Cevdet quotes al-Ma'arrî: 'wa-lammâ ra'aytu al-jahla ft'l-nâsi fâshiyân/tajâhultu hattâ zunnâ anniya jāhîlu! (when I saw that ignorance was common among people I acted the part until at length I was thought to be ignorant).' See *ibid.*, p. 41.
- 236 *The Qur'ân*, 3. 9; and Abdullah Cevdet, *Fünûn ve Felsefe ve Felsefe Sânihaları*, p. 22.
- 237 *The Qur'ân*, 40. 60; and Abdullah Cevdet, *Fünûn ve Felsefe ve Felsefe Sânihaları*, p. 21.
- 238 *Ibid.*, pp. 22–3.
- 239 *Ibid.*, pp. 21–2.
- 240 *Ibid.*, pp. 63–4.
- 241 See Ab[dullah] Djevdet, 'Rêve réalisable', *İdjtihad*, no. 12 (June 1906), pp. 181–2.

- 242 Abdullah Cevdet, 'İfade-i Mütercim', in Dozy, *Tarih-i İslâmiyet* 1, p. 5.
- 243 *The Qur'ân*, 20. 47.
- 244 Abdullah Cevdet, 'İfade-i Mütercim', in Dozy, *Tarih-i İslâmiyet* 1, p. 8.
- 245 Abdullah Cevdet, *Fünûn ve Felsefe ve Felsefe Sânihaları*, p. 67.
- 246 *Ibid.*, pp. 23–4.
- 247 *Ibid.*, p. 24.
- 248 *Ibid.*, p. 30.
- 249 *Ibid.*, pp. 28–9.
- 250 *Ibid.*, pp. 24–5.
- 251 Abdullah Cevdet had used this chapter in preparing his pamphlet *Fizyolociya-i Tefekkür: La pensée—Mehazımın Esası C[K]raft und Stoff Ünvanlı Kitab-ı Eşherin Tefekkür Bahsidir* in 1892. This was not a verbatim translation of the chapter in question, however.
- 252 Abdullah Cevdet, *Fenn-i Ruh: Dimağ ve Ruh-Tefekkür-Vicdan-Dimağ ve Tefekkür* (Istanbul: Kütübhaneye-i İctihad, 1911). (Büchner, *Kraft und Stoff*, pp. 258 ff, 299 ff, and 307 ff; and Ch[arles] Letourneau, *Science et matérialisme* [Paris: C.Reinwald, 1891], pp. 70 ff).
- 253 Abdullah Cevdet, 'Dibâce', *Fenn-i Ruh*, pp. 6–8.
- 254 *Ibid.*, p. 14.
- 255 Abdullah Cevdet, 'Dibâce', *ibid.*, p. 7. It is interesting that both Abdullah Cevdet and Beşir Fu'ad chose the same anecdote to support their case, although the latter mistakenly attributed it to Ibn 'Abbâs.
- 256 Abdullah Cevdet originally published the essay in his journal. See Abdullah Cevdet, 'Cihan-ı İslâma Dair', *İctihad*, no. 26, pp. 761–7. He republished it with minor additions and alterations, as well as a new title, twelve years later. See Abdullah Cevdet, *Cihan-ı İslâma Dair Bir Nazar-ı Tarihî ve Felsefî* (Istanbul: Necm-i İstikbâl Matbaası, 1922).
- 257 Karl Süsseim, 'Abd Allâh Djevdet', *Encyclopaedia of Islam (Supplement, 1938)*, p. 57; and [Muḥammad Ghūrî], *Müslümanlar Uyanın: İkaz-ı Müslim*, tr. Abdullah Cevdet (Cairo: Kütübhaneye-i İctihad, 1907), pp. 12–14.
- 258 *The Qur'ân*, 10. 49 and 7. 34; Abdullah Cevdet, 'Cihan-ı İslâma Dair', *İctihad*, no. 26, p. 765. Abdullah Cevdet selectively quoted from the verse in question, skipping the phrase given in square brackets. The reference is to the members of an *umma* as a whole, not to individual lifespan.
- 259 See *The Qur'ân*, 33. 62, and Abdullah Cevdet, 'Cihan-ı İslâma Dair', *İctihad*, no. 26, p. 765. He had provided a similar interpretation in Abdullah Cevdet, 'Fırak'a Dair', in Giridli Bir Türk [Mehmed Macid], *Fırak* (Cairo: Matbaa-i İctihad, 1906), pp. 12–14.
- 260 Abdullah Cevdet, 'Cihan-ı İslâma Dair', *İctihad*, no. 26, pp. 766.
- 261 Abdullah Cevdet, 'Kastamoni'de Kurun-i Vusta', *İctihad*, no. 58 [March 27, 1913], p. 1273.
- 262 Abdullah Cevdet 'Cihan-ı İslâma Dair', *İctihad*, no. 26, p. 767. As he did in his controversial preface to the translation of Dozy's work, Abdullah Cevdet ended his essay with the ironic statement: 'wa'l-salâmu 'alâ man ittaba'a al-hudâ!' See *ibid.*
- 263 See, for example, Eşref Efendizâde Şevketî, 'Varaka: Din Felsefesinden: Doktor Abdullah Cevdet Bey'e', *İctihad*, no. 62 [May 1, 1913], pp. 1356–8.
- 264 *The Qur'ân*, 5. 54.

- 265 Şeyh ‘Ubayd Allāh [al]-Afgḥānī, *Kavm-i Cedīd: Kitab’ül-Mevâiz* (Istanbul: Şems Matbaası, 1331 [1913]), pp. 5–6.
- 266 See *ibid.*, p. 19.
- 267 *Ibid.*, pp. 40–1.
- 268 *Ibid.*, p. 49.
- 269 *Ibid.*, pp. 21, 30, and especially, 51–2.
- 270 *Ibid.*, p. 52.
- 271 *Ibid.*, p. 90.
- 272 ‘Ubayd Allāh [al]-Afgḥānī, *Mu‘cize-i Peygamberî* (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Hayriyye ve Sürekası, 1332 [1914]), pp. 39–41.
- 273 ‘Ubayd Allāh, ‘Kavm-i Cedīd’, *İctihad*, no. 81 [December 4, 1913], p. 1796.
- 274 *Ibid.*
- 275 ‘Kavm-i Cedīd’, *İctihad*, no. 81, back cover.
- 276 ‘Kavm-i Cedīdci ‘Ubayd Allāh [al]-Afgḥānī ile *Sebil’ür-Reşad* İdarehânesinde Bir Muhavere’, *Sebil’ür-Reşad*, no. 277 [January 1, 1914], pp. 257–8.
- 277 For the most important response, see ‘Ubayd Allāh [al]-Afgḥānī, *Kavm-i Cedīd’de Salâvat Bahsine Mu‘teriz Olanlara Kur’an-ı Azîm’üs-Şânın İnzâr ü İhtar* (Istanbul: Şems Matbaası, 1332 [1914]).
- 278 See the letter by M.C. published in Server Bediî [İsmail Safa], ‘Haftanâme’, *İctihad*, no. 87 [January 15, 1914], pp. 1938–9.
- 279 İzmirli İsmail Hakkı, ‘Müdafa‘at-ı Diniyye: ‘Ubayd Allāh [al]-Afgḥānī’ nin Müdafî ‘i M.C.Efendi’ye!’ *Sebil’ür-Reşad*, no. 280 [January 22, 1914], pp. 306–8.
- 280 See Abdullah Cevdet’s preface to [d’Holbach], *Akl-ı Selim*, tr. Abdullah Cevdet (Istanbul: Kütübhanesi-i İctihad, 1928), p. 7.
- 281 Ferid, ‘Tarih-i İstikbâl: Celâl Nuri Bey’e’, *Sebil’ür-Reşad*, no. 283 [February 12, 1914], p. 358. Ferid Bey made these remarks in the context of a criticism of a close friend of Abdullah Cevdet. The friend had proposed that the Prophet be viewed as one of Thomas Carlyle’s heroes, and had voiced support for the utilization of the progressive elements in Islam. See Celâl Nuri, ‘Zât-ı Hazret-i Muhammed: Hazret-i Peygamberin Dehâsi’, *İctihad*, no. 82 [December 11, 1913], p. 1803.
- 282 Şeyhülislâm Es‘ad Efendi’s memorandum to the Grand Vizier, dated [September 14, 1913], BBA-BEO/Meşihat Gelen, 531, file 316347.
- 283 ‘Sahte Müslümanlar Ayrılmalı, Aramızdan Çıkmalıdır!’ *Sebil’ür-Reşad*, no. 390 [February 5, 1919], pp. 454–5.
- 284 See Mustafa Sıdkı, ‘İctihad Gazetesi’ nin “Reform”culuğu’, *Medrese İtikadları*, no. 7 [June 30, 1913], pp. 51–3, and Mustafa Na‘im, ‘Lutherlik Yapmak İsti-yorlar’, *Medrese İtikadları*, no. 13 [August 15, 1913], pp. 103–4.
- 285 *Idem*, ‘İctihad fi’l-tefsîr’ *Medrese İtikadları*, no. 15 [August 29, 1913], pp. 117–8.
- 286 Y[esârî] S[ami], ‘İnkılâb-ı Dinî: Hayâl-ender-Hayâl: *İctihad*’ın Sukûtu’, *el-Medâris*, no. 5 [June 5, 1913], pp. 65–7.
- 287 For the appeal dated December 9, 1918, see Sadık Albayrak, *Son Devrin İslâm Akademisi: Dâr-ül Hikmet-il İslâmiye* (Istanbul: Yeni Asya Yayınları, 1973), p. 123.
- 288 See, for example, Aksekili Ahmed Hamdi, ‘Felsefe: Maddiyûn ve Meslekleri’, *Sebil’ür-Reşad*, no. 19 [July 11, 1912], pp. 357–8; no. 20, pp. 376–9; and no. 21 [July 25, 1912], pp. 396–7.
- 289 ‘Abd al-‘Azîz Châwîsh, ‘Arab Tarih-i Edebiyatından: Abû al-‘Alâ’ al-Ma‘arrî’, tr. A[bdüllâtîf] N[evzad], *Sebil’ür-Reşad*, no. 3 [March 21, 1912], pp. 37–9; no. 6 [April

- 11, 1912], pp. 99–100; no. 9 [May 2, 1912], pp. 157–8; no. 10 [May 9, 1912], pp. 178–9; no. 12 [May 23, 1912], pp. 221–2; no. 13 [May 30, 1912], pp. 237–8; no. 14 [June 6, 1912], pp. 263–4; and no. 16 [June 20, 1912], p. 301. The original essay was published in the journal *al-Hidāya*.
- 290 See ‘Edebiyat: Abū al-‘Alā’ al-Ma‘arrī’, *Sebil’ür-Reşad*, no. 20 [July 18, 1912], pp. 380–1.
- 291 See, for example, Sun‘ullah Gaybî Baba, ‘Enfâs-ı Bektaşîye’, *İctihad*, no. 143 (February 15, 1922), p. 3013; and Rıza Tevfik, ‘Enfâs-ı Bektaşîye’, *İctihad*, no. 144, p. 3024.
- 292 See Abdullah Cevdet’s footnote in J.M.Guyau, *Terbiye ve Veraset: Sosyolociyâî Tettebbu’* (Istanbul: Maarif Vekâleti, 1927), p. 544.
- 293 E[min] Âlî, ‘Bahaî Hareketi Hakkında İlmî Bir Tettebbu’’, *İctihad*, no. 140 (December 31, 1921), pp. 2952–5; no. 142 (January 31, 1922), pp. 2983–5; and no. 143, pp. 2999–3003.
- 294 ‘Abd al-Bahâ’, on the other hand, was very critical of Büchner and Haeckel, and attempted to reconcile Darwinian evolution with creation. See Keven Brown and Eberhard von Kitzing, *Evolution and Bahá’í Belief: ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s Response to Nineteenth-Century Darwinism* (Los Angeles: Kalimat Press, 2001), pp. 140 ff, 143–4, 205.
- 295 Abdullah Cevdet, ‘Mezheb-i Bahauallah—Din-i Ümem’, *İctihad*, no. 144, p. 3016.
- 296 See Abdullah Djevdet, *Karlı Dağdan Ses*, p. [31]. The two versions of this poem vary slightly.
- 297 Abdullah Cevdet, ‘Mezheb-i Bahauallah—Din-i Ümem’, *İctihad*, no. 144, p. 3016.
- 298 See the prosecutor’s indictment in *Peyâm-ı Sabah*, April 21, 1922.
- 299 For more information see Abdullah Cevdet, ‘Da‘vamız’, *İctihad*, no. 148 (July 25, 1922), pp. 2080–2, and ‘Fazahât-ı Lisaniye’, *İkdam*, December 31, 1926.
- 300 See, for example, Mustafa Sabri, ‘Abdullah Cevdet Bey Efendi’ye’, *Peyam-ı Sabah*, March 7, 1922 and March 18, 1922; and Ahmed Şirânî, ‘Mebâhis-i Diniye’, *Tevhid-i Efkâr*, June 19, 1922.
- 301 See Abdullah Cevdet, ‘Fâzıl-ı Muhterem Mustafa Sabri Efendi’ye’, *Peyam-ı Sabah*, March 13, 1922; see also his defense in court as published in *İctihad*, no. 149 (September 11, 1922), pp. 3097–8.
- 302 Elhac Mehmed Cemaleddin, ‘İnkılâb-ı Hakikat—Bir Mektub’, *İctihad*, no. 171, p. 3447.
- 303 See Abdullah Cevdet, ‘Tanrıya İlk Def‘a Türkce Söyleyen İmam’, *İctihad*, no. 202 (April 15, 1926), p. 3942.
- 304 See Elhac Mehmed Cemaleddin, ‘Halkın Fitrat-ı Dinine Doğru’, *İctihad*, no. 177 (April 1, 1925), pp. 3542–3.
- 305 This book was first published in 1885. There are several quotations from Guyau in Abdullah Cevdet’s essay on the ‘religionization’ of philosophy. See Abdullah Cevdet, *Fünûn ve Felsefe ve Felsefe Sânihaları*, pp. 42, 85–6.
- 306 He made earlier references to Guyau’s *Éducation et hérédité: Étude soci ologique*. See Abdullah Djevdet, *De la nécessité d’une école pour les éducateurs sociaux*, pp. 17–18, 35.
- 307 Celâl Nuri, ‘Abdullah Cevdet’e Dair’, *İctihad*, no. 358 (December 1932), p. 5892.
- 308 See İsmail Hakkı, ‘Abdullah Cevdet Şahsiyeti’, *ibid.*, p. 5869.
- 309 See Abdullah Cevdet’s short introduction to J.M.Guyau, ‘Din Noktasından A’ilede Terbiye’, *İctihad*, no. 308 (November 1, 1930), p. 5495.

- 310 Abdullah Djevdet, *Karlı Dağdan Ses*, p. 148.
- 311 See J.-M. Guyau, *Bir Filozofun (sic!) Şiirleri*, tr. Abdullah Cevdet (Istanbul: Maarif Vekâleti, 1930), pp. 20–1, 34, 57, 123–4, 147, 160, 175, 233, 239, and 247–8, and Abdullah Cevdet's footnote in *Terbiye ve Veraset*, p. 285.
- 312 See Guyau, *Bir Filozofun (sic!) Şiirleri*, p. 123, fn.
- 313 See, especially, his two final works of poetry, *Düşünen Musiki* (1932) and *Karlı Dağdan Ses* (1931).
- 314 See Julius Kiesow, *Die philosophische Lyrik von Guyau und Lahor* (Greifswald: Verlag von Bruncken, 1916), p. 57.
- 315 The translation appeared under the title *Terbiye ve Veraset: SosyolociyaiZ Tetebbu'*.
- 316 Parts of *L'Irréligion de l'avenir* were published in *İctihat* between no. 308 (November 1, 1930), pp. 5495 ff and no. 325 (July 15, 1931), p. 5506. Subsequently, two further installments appeared in no. 339 (February 15, 1932), pp. 5559–61, and no. 340 (March 1, 1932), p. 5672. Parts of *Esquisse d'une morale sans obligation, ni sanction* appeared in this journal in installments. See 'J.M. Guyau'nun En Mühim Eseri', *İctihad*, no. 268 (March 1, 1929), pp. 5127 ff. Abdullah Cevdet made the following comment on this study: 'Sa "Morale sans obligation ni sanction" ne nous dénote-[t-]elle pas une âme divinement grande, un esprit superbement dégagé, pénétrant et modeste?' Ab[dullah] Djevdet, 'Une lettre analytique', *İctihad*, no. 155 (July 1, 1923), p. 3205.
- 317 In the 325th issue of *İctihat*, Abdullah Cevdet wrote that he had completed the translation of *Esquisse d'une morale sans obligation, ni sanction*, and that completing a full translation of *L'Irréligion de l'avenir* was his strongest desire. However, the size of the work made the translation financially impossible (see p. 5506). Abdullah Cevdet also intended to translate and publish Alfred Fouillée's *La morale, l'art et la religion d'après Guyau*, in which Guyau's impact on leading intellectuals is discussed. See Guyau, *Terbiye ve Veraset*, p. [iv]. This project, too, could not be brought to fruition. Despite fulsome praise for Guyau's *La morale d'Épicure et ses rapports avec les doctrines contemporaines* (Abdullah Cevdet, 'Âyine-i Matbuat', *İşhad*, no. 80 [September 25, 1913], p. 1771), Abdullah Cevdet did not profess an interest in translating this important work—one that could have been of much benefit to the Ottoman materialist project.
- 318 First published in 1885.
- 319 See Geoffrey C. Fidler, 'On Jean-Marie Guyau, Immoraliste', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 55, no. 1 (January 1994), p. 75.
- 320 J.-M. Guyau, *L'Irréligion de l'avenir: Étude sociologique*, 22nd edition (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1925), pp. 297–8.
- 321 *Ibid.*, p. 309.
- 322 *Ibid.*, p. 314.
- 323 *Ibid.*, p. 472.
- 324 M. Guyau, *Esquisse d'une morale sans obligation, ni sanction*, 4th edition (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1896), p. 252.
- 325 *Ibid.*, pp. 231 ff.
- 326 *Ibid.*, p. 63.
- 327 Abdullah Djevdet, 'The Guiding Principles of the Review "İdjihad"', *İctihad*, no. 172 (December 1, 1924), p. 3468.
- 328 *Ibid.*



- 329 See, especially, Guyau's 'Préface' to *Les problèmes de l'esthétique contemporaine*, 6th edition (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1904), pp. v-viii.
- 330 Guyau, *L'Irréligion de l'avenir*, pp. 364–5.
- 331 M.Guyau, *L'art au point de vue sociologique*, 4th edition (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1897), p. 163.
- 332 See Abdullah Djevdet, 'The Guiding Principles of the Review 'İdjtihad'', *İcti had*, no. 172, p. 3468.
- 333 See F.J.W.Harding, *Jean-Marie Guyau (1854–1888): Aesthetician and Sociologist; A Study of His Aesthetic Theory and Critical Practice* (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1973), p. 36.
- 334 Guyau, *L'art au point de vue sociologique*, pp. 161 ff.
- 335 Harding, *Jean-Marie Guyau*, p. 38.
- 336 *Ibid.*, p. 90.
- 337 See J.M.Guyau, *Éducation et hérédité: étude sociologique* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1889), pp. 72 ff.
- 338 See Abdullah Cevdet's footnote in [Muḥammad Ghūr], *Müslümanlar Uyanın*, p. 131.
- 339 İctihad, 'Din Du'a Halk', *İctihat*, no. 338 (February 1, 1932), p. 5651.
- 340 See [d'Holbach], *Akl-ı Selim* (1928). A second edition of this translation in the new modified Latin script appeared in 1929. Baron d'Holbach originally published *Le bon sens* anonymously in 1772. Until the mid-nineteenth century the book was mistakenly ascribed to Jean Meslier (d.1729). Though working in the early twentieth century, Abdullah Cevdet himself misattributed the book to Meslier.
- 341 [Voltaire], *Rahip Meslier'nin Vasiyyetnâmesi Hakkında*, tr. Abdullah Cevdet (Istanbul: Kütübhaneye-i İctihad, 1924).
- 342 See, Abdullah Cevdet's preface to *ibid.*, pp. 5–7.
- 343 Abdullah Cevdet's preface to [d'Holbach], *Akl-ı Selim* (1928), pp. 7–8.
- 344 See Guyau, 'İstikbalin Din Yokluğu', *İctihat*, no. 318 (April 1, 1931), p. 5618.
- 345 Ab[dullah] Dj[evdet], 'Muhabbet Peygamberine', *İctihat*, no. 300 (July 1, 1930), p. 5415: 'To the prophet of love: In this cold land of hatred/Our act of worship is love.'
- 346 Ab[dullah] Dj[evdet], 'Bize Lâzım Olan Felsefe', *İctihat*, no. 327 (August 15, 1931), p. 5524.
- 347 The first edition made in 1329 [1913] appeared under the title *Tibbiyeli ve Nişanlısı: Fennî ve Felsefî Hikâye*, tr. A.Vefa (Matbaa-i İctihad). A second edition was published in 1928 with the new and more provocative title *Tibbiyeli ve Nişanlısı yahud Mekârim-i Ahlâkiyesiz Din, Dinsiz Mekârim-i Ahlâkiye: Felsefî, Ahlâkî Hikâye* (Istanbul: Kütübhaneye-i İctihad, 1928). The idea of non-religious ethics is much praised by Abdullah Cevdet. See 'Feylosofun Köşesi: Fi'l-i Livata', *İctihad*, no. 150 (November 23, 1922), p. 3117.
- 348 See Abdullah Cevdet, 'Rubâ'iyât-ı Hayyam', *İctihad*, no. 109 [June 18, 1914], p. 176, fn.1.
- 349 See İsmail Hakkı, 'Lâdinî yâni Sadece Ahlâkî, Bedi'î ve İnsanî Bir Terbiye', *İctihad*, no. 202, pp. 3943–4.
- 350 Abdullah Cevdet, 'Mütercimden Bir İki Kelime', in Guyau, *Terbiye ve Veraset*, p. [vi].

- 351 See, for example, Abdullah Cevdet, *Uyanunuz! Uyanunuz!* 2nd edition (Cairo: Kütübhaneye-i İctihad, 1908), p. 25, and Abdullah Cevdet, 'İfade-i Mütercim', in *Dozy, Tarih-i İslâmiyet* 1, pp. 5 and 7.
- 352 Guyau, *Esquisse d'une morale sans obligation, ni sanction*, p. 251.
- 353 Guyau, *L'Irréligion de l'avenir*, p. 394.
- 354 Abdullah Cevdet, *Fünûn ve Felsefe ve Felsefe Sânihaları*, p. 21.
- 355 *The Qur'ân*, 53. 39. Those Ottoman intellectuals who promoted private initiative (often relying on the theories of Edmond Demolins) also frequently cited this Qur'anic verse. See, for example, [Mehmed] Sabahaddin, *Teşebbüs-i Şahsî ve Tevsi'-i Me'zuniyet Hakkında Bir İzzah* (Istanbul: Kütübhaneye-i Cihan [1908]), p. 15.
- 356 See, for example, Ab[dullah] D[jevdet], 'Ölü Hakikatler ve Diri Hakikatler', *İctihat*, no. 289 (January 15, 1930), p. 5319; and idem, 'Fikir Hareketi', *İctihat*, no. 298 (June 1, 1930), pp. 5391-3.
- 357 See, for example, Edouard Herriot, 'Yaratmalı-Créer', *İctihat*, no. 288 (January 1, 1930), pp. 5315 ff; and Abdullah Cevdet, 'Edouard Herriot: Mütefekkir ve Türkiye Dostu', *İctihat*, no. 348 (July 1, 1932), pp. 5743-5. Abdullah Cevdet must have been deeply impressed by Herriot's idea that 'la science est elle-même une poésie.' See Edouard Herriot, *Créer* 1 (Paris: Payot, 1919), p. 20.
- 358 For more information see Pierre Olivier Lapie, *Herriot* (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1967), and Sabine Jessner, *Edouard Herriot: Patriarch of the Republic* (New York: Haskell House, 1974).
- 359 See [Abdullah Cevdet], 'Feylesofun Köşesi', *İctihad*, no.150, p. 3118.
- 360 Abdullah Djevdet, *La lyre turque*, p. 110.
- 361 For the acrimonious exchanges between materialists and conservatives at the funeral, see *Cumhuriyet*, December 1, 1932, and *İctihat*, no. 358, pp. 5875 ff.
- 362 Hüseyin Zade Ali, 'Aptullah Cevdet', *ibid.*, p. 5896. This calls to mind Lucien Arréat's depiction of Julius Duboc as 'un athée idéaliste' (See L[ucien] Arréat, 'Un athée idéaliste', *Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger* 18 [1884], p. 511).
- 363 Their names can be found in a list entitled 'Authors Dealing with Issues of Science and Philosophy'. Baha Tevfik placed Abdullah Cevdet in this category. See *Karagöz Salnâmesi* 3 (1912), p. 22.
- 364 See Cenâb Şehabeddin, 'Muhterem Simâlar: Doktor Abdullah Cevdet Bey', *Piyano*, no. 7, p. 77.
- 365 All biographical information given here is taken from a recent authoritative biography of Baha Tevfik, which includes a thorough analysis of his literary works. See Rıza Bağcı, *Baha Tevfik'in Hayatı, Edebî ve Felsefî Eserleri Üzerinde Bir Araştırma* (Izmir: Kaynak Yayınları, 1996), pp. 13 ff.
- 366 [Baha Tevfik], 'Âsâr-ı Cedîde: *İctihad*', *Felsefe Mecmuası* 1 (1329 [1913]), p. 109.
- 367 *Ibid.*
- 368 [Baha Tevfik], 'Yeni Bir Din!' in *Yirminci Asırda Zekâ*, no. 3 [April 15, 1912], p. 40, and in *Karagöz Salnâmesi* 4 (1913), pp. 21-2.
- 369 [Baha Tevfik], 'Maksad ve Meslek', *Felsefe Mecmuası*, no. 1, p. 1. As Baha Tevfik noted, these ideas had originally been proposed in 'Bizde Felsefe', *Yirminci Asırda Zekâ*, no. 2 [March 31, 1912], p. 19. See also Baha Tevfik, *Muhtasar Felsefe: Ruhîyat, Mantık, Mafevk'ul-Tabî'iyat, Ahlâk, Tarih-i Felsefe* (Istanbul: Artin Asadoryan ve Mahdumları Matbaası, 1331 [1913]), p. 13.
- 370 [Baha Tevfik], 'Maksad ve Meslek', *Felsefe Mecmuası*, no. 1, p. 2.

- 371 Ibid.
- 372 This is undoubtedly a reference to Janet's criticism of Büchner and of contemporary German popular materialism in general. See Paul Janet, *Le matérialisme contemporain en Allemagne: Examen du système du docteur Büchner* (Paris: G.Baillière, 1864). Ottoman *ulema* held Janet in very high regard. An eminent Ottoman *‘ālim*, Elmalılı Hamdi (Yazır), translated *Histoire de la philosophie: les problèmes et les écoles*, a work co-authored by Janet and Gabriel Séailles. See *Tahlilî Tarih-i Felsefe: Matâlib ve Mezâhib: Maba'd'ut-tabî'a ve Felsefe-i İllâhiye* (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Âmire, 1925).
- 373 Baha Tevfik, *Muhtasar Felsefe*, p. 131.
- 374 Louis Büchner, *Madde ve Kuvvet*, in 3 volumes, tr. Baha Tevfik and Ahmed Nebil (Istanbul: Teceddüd-i İlmî ve Felsefî Kütübhanesi [1911]). The translation was made from a French version entitled *Force et matière: ou, Principes de l'or dre naturel mis à la portée de tous*, tr. Victor Dave (Paris: S.Frères, 1906). The translators maintained that while making the translation from this French version they also examined the 18th edition of the German original. See [Baha Tevfik], 'Tenkid-i Felsefî: Ali Kemal Bey'in 8 Haziran Tarihli *İkdam* Gazetesi'ndeki Makalesine Cevabdır', *Felsefe Mecmuası*, no. 5 [1913], p. 68.
- 375 See Abdullah Cevdet, *İki Emel* (Geneva: Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti Matbaası, 1316 [1898]), pp. 9–10.
- 376 *Matbaa-i İctihad'in Fihrist-i Neşriyâtı*, 2nd edition (Cairo: Matbaa-i İctihad, 1908), p. 13. Following Baha Tevfik's unexpected death in 1914, Abdullah Cevdet wrote an obituary. He noted that Baha Tevfik's translation of *Kraft und Stoff*—which had caused a 'formidable revolution in the mind of the entire world'—was reason enough for future generations to remember his name. See [Abdullah Cevdet], 'Baha Tevfik Bey', *İctihad*, no. 109, p. 168.
- 377 See, especially, his 50-page pamphlet *Der Gottes Begriff und dessen Bedeutung in der Gegenwart: ein allgemein-verständlicher Vortrag* (Leipzig: Th.Thomas, 1874); and his 81-page essay, *Gott und die Wissenschaft* (Leipzig: Th.Thomas, 1897).
- 378 See the note 'Louis Büchner Kimdir?' by B[aha Tevfik] and A[hmed Nebil], in Louis Büchner, *Madde ve Kuvvet 1*, p. 10.
- 379 See the preface 'Bizim Sözcümüz' by Baha Tevfik and Ahmed Nebil, *ibid.*, p. 6. Baha Tevfik further noted that the book was directed against the corrupted version of Christianity, not against of Islam. But he and Ahmed Nebil invited the *ulema* to respond to Haeckel's comment about the 'sacred legends' of Islam. See Ernest Haeckel, *Vahdet-i Mevcud: Bir Tabiat Âliminin Dini*, tr. Baha Tevfik and Ahmed Nebil (Istanbul: Teceddüd-i İlmî ve Felsefî Kütübhanesi [1911]), p. 64, fn.
- 380 See the preface 'Bizim Sözcümüz' by Baha Tevfik and Ahmed Nebil, *ibid.*, pp. 4–5.
- 381 *ibid.*, p. 5. See also Baha Tevfik, 'Hafta Musahabesi', *Zekâ*, no. 29 [April 30, 1914], p. 74.
- 382 Baha Tevfik, 'Platon ve Muhyî al-Dîn', *Yirminci Asırda Zekâ*, no. 12 [August 19, 1912], pp. 210–1. It should be remembered that there was marked hostility toward Ibn al-'Arabî among the Ottoman *ulema*, and the most detailed book on him and his philosophy of *vahdet-i vücûd* was written to overcome this 'hatred'. See İsmail Fennî [Ertuğrul], *Vahdet-i Vücûd ve Muhyî al-Dîn 'Arabî* (Istanbul: Orhaniye Matbaası, 1927), p. 3.

- 383 Baha Tevfik and Ahmed Nebil, 'Bizim Sözcümüz', in Haeckel, *Vahdet-i Mevcud*, pp. 2, 55, fn. 77, fn. In order to draw parallels between Haeckel's ideas and Islam, the authors quote the Qur'anic verse 'innahu bi-kulli shay' in muḥīṭ (He certainly encompasses all things) [*The Qur'an*, 41. 54]' and Ibn al-'Arabī's statements 'mā ra'aytu shay'an illā wa-ra' aytu allāh fihi (I have never seen anything but that I saw God in it)' and subḥān alladhī khalāqa al-ashyā' wa-huwa 'aynuhā (Glory be to the one who created all things and He [Himself] is those things)'. Although he quoted Rūmī, Baha Tevfik had a very low opinion of Rūmī's philosophy. See Baha Tevfik, 'Bizde Felsefe', *Yirminci Asırda Zekâ*, no. 1 [March 18, 1912], pp. 4–5. The quotations from Ibn al-'Arabī and Sultan Veled provoked harsh criticism from the ulema. See 'Vahdet-i Mevcud', *Hikmet*, no. 53 [April 20, 1911], p. 6.
- 384 Haeckel, *Vahdet-i Mevcud*, p. 60, fn.
- 385 See, for instance, his criticism of Şehbenderzâde Ahmed Hilmi, an Islamist, whom he accused of imitating Victor Cousin's eclecticism. In the initial text, published as an article (Baha Tevfik, 'Bizde Felsefe', *Yirminci Asırda Zekâ*, no. 4 [April 29, 1912], p. 54), Baha Tevfik accused the Islamist thinker of imitating the 'eclecticism of Auguste Comte'. In a compilation of Baha Tevfik's many articles on philosophy, this phrase was replaced with the 'eclecticism of Victor Cousin', which makes more sense. See Baha Tevfik, *Felsefe-i Ferd* (Istanbul: İlm ve Felsefe Kütübhanesi, 1332 [1914]), p. 61.
- 386 Baha Tevfik translated Odette Laguerre's *Qu'est-ce que le féminisme?* (Paris: Société d'éducation et d'action féministes, 1905) into Turkish as *Feminizm: Âlem-i İslâm* (Istanbul: Teceddüd-i İlmî ve Felsefî Kütübhanesi [1912]). These statements appear in an addendum to the text discussing Islam and Feminism. See *ibid.*, pp. 61–85. By his own admission, Baha Tevfik completed the translation in 1906, long before it was published.
- 387 'İslâmiyet Hakkında Avrupa Hükemâsının Fikirleri', *Yirminci Asırda Zekâ*, no. 2, pp. 19, 22.
- 388 See, for example, the refutations of H.Mehmed Şevket, 'İslâmiyet Hakkında Ernst Haeckel'in Makalesine Reddiye', *Sebil'ür-Reşad*, no. 9 [May 1, 1912], pp. 161–3 ff., and Balcızâde Seyyid Mehmed ül-Tahir, 'İslâmiyet Hakkında Avrupa Hükemâsının Fikirleri', *Yirminci Asırda Zekâ*, no. 3, p. 38. Both authors accused Haeckel of ignorance of Islamic sources.
- 389 Baha Tevfik, 'Bizde Felsefe', *Yirminci Asırda Zekâ*, no. 2, pp. 19, 22.
- 390 See, for example, A[hmed] Rıfki, 'Şarkda ve Garbda Pantheisme', *Yirminci Asırda Zekâ*, no. 2, pp. 22–3; *idem*, 'Şarkda Felsefe', *Yirminci Asırda Zekâ*, no. 7 [June 10, 1912], pp. 103–6; Rıfki, 'Şarkda Felsefe: İlk Mutasavvıfânın Mesleği', *Yirminci Asırda Zekâ*, no. 8 [June 24, 1912], pp. 119–20; and Rıfki, 'Felsefe-i Tasavvuf: Şeyh-i Ekber Muḥyî al-Dîn 'Arabî', *Yirminci Asırda Zekâ*, no. 9 [July 8, 1912], pp. 134–6 ff. The author was a leading expert on Bektashi philosophy and the author of a major work in four volumes on the subject. See A[hmed] Rıfki, *Bektaşî Sırrı 1–4* (Istanbul, [1909–20]).
- 391 Baha Tevfik's translations from Büchner and Haeckel also provoked works of refutation by *ulema*. See pp. 69–70, 91.
- 392 See, for instance, Ahmed Nebil, 'Bir İzah', *Yirminci Asırda Zekâ*, no. 8, pp. 120–2. Ahmed Nebil maintained that the refutation of *Kraft und Stoff* by Harputzâde Hacı Mustafa had no scientific value. It was an expression of ignorance and thus unworthy of a response.

- 393 The most important among them is Şehbenderzâde Ahmed Hilmi, *Allah'ı İnkâr Mümkün müdür? Yahud Huzur-i Fende Mesâlik-i Küfr*. He made similar criticisms in another essay, *Huzur-i Akl ü Fende Maddiyân Mezhebinin İzmihlâli* 1 (Istanbul: Hikmet Matbaa-i İslâmiyesi, 1332 [1914]), pp. 42 ff.
- 394 To my knowledge, no leading European materialist was in correspondence with the Ottoman materialists in Istanbul during this period. Haeckel did exchange letters with Şiblî Şumayyil, however. See As'ad Razzûq (ed.), *Hawâdith wa khawâtir: Mudhakkirât al-Duktûr Şiblî Şumayyil*, pp. 219–22.
- 395 Baha Tevfik and Ahmed Nebil translated Fouillé's *Histoire de la philosophie*, a major history of philosophy in two volumes. See *Tarih-i Felsefe* 1 (Istanbul: Teceddüd-i İlmî ve Felsefî Kütübhanesi [1911]), and 2 (Istanbul: Teceddüd-i İlmî ve Felsefî Kütübhanesi [1912]).
- 396 See Ahmed Nebil, Baha Tevfik and Memduh Süleyman, *Nietzsche: Hayatı ve Felsefesi* (Istanbul: Teceddüd-i İlmî ve Felsefî Kütübhanesi [1912]), p.128.
- 397 See Baha Tevfik, 'Bizde Felsefe', *Yirminci Asırda Zekâ*, no. 2, p. 19.
- 398 John A.Lester, 'Friedrich Nietzsche and John Davidson: A Study in Influence', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 18, no. 3 (June 1957), p. 427.
- 399 See Gregory, *Scientific Materialism*, p. 260, fn. 110 and fn. 115.
- 400 Baha Tevfik, 'Felsefe-i Hâzıra: Kant', *Felsefe Mecmuası*, no. 1, p. 8. This comment had originally been made by Kant himself in his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Later, Haeckel praised Darwin as the Copernicus of natural sciences, and du Bois Reynold followed suit. See Ernst Haeckel, *Der Monismus als Band zwis chen Religion und Wissenschaft: Glaubensbekenntniss eines Naturforschers, vorgetragen am 9. Oktober 1892 in Altenburg beim 75jährigen Jubiläum der Naturforschungen Gesellschaft des Osterlandes* (Bonn: Verlag von Emil Strauss, 1893), p. 39, n. 6.
- 401 Baha Tevfik, 'Felsefe-i Hâzıra: Kant', *Felsefe Mecmuası*, no. 7 [1913], p. 109.
- 402 Baha Tevfik, 'Felsefe-i Hâzıra: Kant', *Felsefe Mecmuası*, no. 6 [1913], p. 90.
- 403 Ernst Haeckel, *Die Weltrâthsel: gemeinverständliche Studien über monistische Philosophie* (Bonn: Verlag von Emil Strauß, 1899), pp. 299–301.
- 404 Philip F.Rehbock, 'Huxley, Haeckel, and the Oceanographers: The Case of Bathybius Haeckelii', *Isis* 66, no. 4 (December 1975), p. 522, fn. 78.
- 405 Ernst Haeckel, *Die Lebenswunder: gemeinverständliche Studien über biologis che Philosophie* (Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1904), pp. 365–7.
- 406 Baha Tevfik, 'Felsefe-i Hâzıra: Kant', *Felsefe Mecmuası*, no. 9 [1913], p. 150.
- 407 Baha Tevfik, 'Feylesof Ne Demek?', *Yirminci Asırda Zekâ*, no. 5 [May 13, 1912], p. 67.
- 408 Baha Tevfik, 'Bizde Felsefe', *Yirminci Asırda Zekâ*, no. 2, p. 19.
- 409 Baha Tevfik's preface, entitled 'Bir Mukaddime: Bizde Tabi'iyat ve Istilâhlar', to Ernst Haeckel, *İnsann Menşei: Nesl-i Beşer*, tr. Ahmed Nebil (Istanbul: Teceddüd-i İlmî ve Felsefî Kütübhanesi [1911]), pp. 13–15.
- 410 Subhi Edhem, *Darwinizm* (Monastir: Beyn'el-milel Ticaret Matbaası, 1327 [1911]).
- 411 *Ibid.*, pp. 183–4.
- 412 *Ibid.*, p. 182.
- 413 See Subhi Edhem, 'Lamarck ve Lamarckizm', *Felsefe Mecmuası*, no. 6, pp. 81–4 ff. This study liberally used A[lpheus] S[pring] Packard, *Lamarck, the Founder of Evolution: His Life and Work* (New York: Longmans Green, 1901).

- 414 Memduh Süleyman's abridged translation, *Darwinizm: Darwin Mesleğinin İhtiva Ettiği Hakikatler ve Hatalar* (Istanbul: Teceddüd-i İlmî ve Felsefî Kütübhanesi, 1329 [1913]), was made from a French translation. This was *Le Darwinisme: ce qu'il y a de vrai et de faux dans cette théorie*, translated by Georges Guérault in 1878.
- 415 See, for example, Phil. B.Hadley, 'Arguments Alleged against the Doctrine of Organic Evolution', *Science* 22, no. 553 (August 4, 1905), p. 145.
- 416 Edouard von Hartmann, *Philosophie des Unbewussten 1: Phänomenologie des Unbewussten* (Berlin: Carl Duncker's Verlag, 1876), p. xviii.
- 417 *Ibid.*, p. xix.
- 418 In his Preface to a book by Fikri Tevfik, Baha Tevfik maintained that he and his friends had 'explained the theory of evolution' by means of the two aforementioned books. Baha Tevfik, 'Bir Mukaddime', in Fikri Tevfik, *Huceyre: Hayatın Esası* (Istanbul: Teceddüd-i İlmî ve Felsefî Kütübhanesi [1913?]), p. 3.
- 419 Baha Tevfik put Schopenhauer's picture on the cover of *Felsefe Mecmuası* to pay him tribute. See also Ahmed Nebil and Baha Tevfik, *Mebâdi-i Felsefe: Psikoloji: İlm-i Ahvâl-i Ruh* (Istanbul: Teceddüd-i İlmî ve Felsefî Kütübhanesi [1911]), p. 153.
- 420 W.Wundt, 'Philosophy in Germany', *Mind* 2, no. 8 (October 1877), p. 506. See also W.Caldwell, 'Von Hartmann's Moral and Social Philosophy', *The Philosophical Review* 8, no. 5 (September 1899), pp. 465–83, and von Hartmann's foreword to his magnum opus, *Philosophie des Unbewussten 1*, p. xix:

Bis jenes heranwachsende Geschlecht von Naturforschern meine bezüglichen Bestrebungen würdigt, muss ich mich mit der Anerkennung begnügen, die denselben in reichem Maasse schon jetzt von solchen Vertretern unserer idealistischen Kultur gezollt wird, welche, weit entfernt, die Resultate der modernen Naturwissenschaft zu ignorieren oder zu verdammern, die Nothwendigkeit einer organischen Einfügung derselben in den Idealismus einsehen, bisher aber einen geeigneten Führer bei der Lösung dieser von den exclusiven Vertretern der Naturwissenschaft selbst für unmöglich erklärten Aufgabe vermissten.

- 421 See his *Über die Natur der Cometen: Beiträge zur Geschichte und Theorie der Erkenntnis* (Leipzig: L.Staackmann, 1883).
- 422 See Baha Tevfik, 'Bizde Felsefe', *Yirminci Asırda Zekâ*, no. 2, p. 19.
- 423 Von Hartmann, *Philosophie des Unbewussten 1*, p. xix.
- 424 Niles R.Holt, 'Ernst Haeckel's Monistic Religion', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 32, no. 2 (April 1971), pp. 273–6.
- 425 See David DeGroot, *Haeckel's Theory of the Unity of the Nature: A Monograph in the History of Philosophy* (Boston: The Christopher Publishing House, 1965), p. 38. See also the critique of von Hartmann's book in *Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger* 4 (1877), p. 201.
- 426 J.Loewenberg, 'The Apotheosis of Mind in Modern Idealism', *The Philosophical Review* 31, no. 3 (May 1922), p. 231.
- 427 See Holt, 'Ernst Haeckel's Monistic Religion', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, p. 273.
- 428 Ali Kemal, 'İlm-i Ahlâk', *İkdam*, June 21, 1913.

- 429 See [Baha Tevfik], 'Tenkid-i Felsefî: Ali Kemal Bey'in 8 Haziran Tarihli *İkdam* Gazetesi'ndeki Makalesine Cevabdır', *Felsefe Mecmuası*, no. 5, p. 68. Baha Tevfik further maintained that Lange's criticism of *Kraft und Stoff* had been sound, but that Büchner had addressed this criticism in the new editions of his magnum opus.
- 430 As a matter of fact, although Baha Tevfik and his associates agreed with Guyau's general ideas on the evolution of religion, they had quite a low opinion of Guyau's idealism. See, for example, Memduh Süleyman, 'Din Felsefesi', *Yirminci Asırda Zekâ*, no. 4, p. 58.
- 431 Ernest Haeckel, *Vahdet-i Mevcud*, p. 4.
- 432 See Holt, 'Ernst Haeckel's Monistic Religion', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, p. 266.
- 433 See Ernst Haeckel, 'Kâinatın Mu'ammaları', tr. [Baha Tevfik and Subhi Edhem], *Felsefe Mecmuası*, no. 1, pp. 9–13 ff.
- 434 Baha Tevfik's preface, 'Bir Mukaddime: Bizde Tabi'iyat ve Istılahlar', to Ernst Haeckel, *İnsanın Menşei*, pp. 14–15.
- 435 *Ibid.*, p. 7.
- 436 The book *Huceyre: Hayatın Esası* is based itself upon Bonnier's *Recherches sur l'anatomie expérimentale des végétaux* (Corbeil: Crété, 1895); *Cours de botanique* (Paris: Librairie générale de l'enseignement, 1905); and *L'enchaînement des organismes* (Paris: Les fils d'Émile Deyrolle, 1906) as well as upon Georges Colomb's *Cours de botanique* (Paris: Octave Doin, 1897). Fikri Tevfik maintained that he used works of Doctors Es'ad Şerafeddin, Mazhar, and Rıza as well in putting together his compilation.
- 437 See Joel B.Hagen, 'Clementsian Ecologists: The Internal Dynamics of a Research School', *Osiris* 8 (1993), p. 191.
- 438 Ernst Haeckel, *Die Lebenswunder*, p. 62.
- 439 Fikri Tevfik, *Huceyre*, p. 153.
- 440 Haeckel's Islamist critics, too, viewed Monism in these terms, and not as a religion. See, for example, 'Vahdet-i Mevcud', *Hikmet*, no. 53, p. 5. Quoting Félix Le Dantec, M.Mahir Bey, author of a refutation of Haeckel's Monism, maintained that 'Monism, materialism, and atheism are interchangeable phrases.' See *ibid.*, p. 6.
- 441 James M.Gillis, *False Prophets* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1927), pp. 102 ff.
- 442 Baha Tevfik, 'Bizde Felsefe', *Yirminci Asırda Zekâ*, no. 4, p. 54.
- 443 A detailed and skillful analysis of Baha Tevfik's literary works can be found in Bağcı, *Baha Tevfik'in Hayatı*, pp. 41 ff.
- 444 Baha Tevfik, 'Edebiyat Kat'iyen Muzırdır!', *Piyano*, no. 8 [October 17, 1910], pp. 81–3.
- 445 Bağcı, *Baha Tevfik'in Hayatı*, p. 70.
- 446 See Baha Tevfik, 'Küçük Hikâye: Ah Bu Sevda!', *Piyano*, no. 4 [September 12, 1910], pp. 41–4, and Baha Tevfik, 'Küçük Hikâye: Aşk, Hodbîni', *Piyano*, no. 8, pp. 89–92.
- 447 See Ahmed Nebil and Baha Tevfik, 'Küçük Hikâye: Ulüv-i Cenâb', *Piyano*, no. 2 [August 29, 1910], pp. 16–17.
- 448 Baha Tevfik, 'Edebiyat Kat'iyen Muzırdır!', *Piyano*, no. 9 [October 24, 1910], p. 94.

- 449 Baha Tevfik, 'Edebiyat Kat'iyen Muzırdır!', *Piyano*, no. 8, pp. 82–3. See also Baha Tevfik, *Felsefe-i Edebiyat ve Şair Celîs* (Istanbul: Teceddüd-i İlmî ve Felsefî Kütübhanesi, 1330 [1914]), p. 5.
- 450 Baha Tevfik, 'Edebiyat Kat'iyen Muzırdır!', *Piyano*, no. 8, p. 82.
- 451 Baha Tevfik, 'Edebiyat Kat'iyen Muzırdır!', *Piyano*, no. 9, p. 94.
- 452 Baha Tevfik, 'Edebiyat Kat'iyen Muzırdır!', *Piyano*, no. 10 [October 31, 1910], pp. 105–6.
- 453 Hilmi Ziya Ülken considers Baha Tevfik's work on psychology a serious and fresh reintroduction of psychology to Ottoman intellectual life. See his *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi* (Istanbul: Ülken Yayınları, 1979), pp. 238–9.
- 454 Ahmed Nebil and Baha Tevfik, *Mebâdî-i Felsefe: Psikoloji: İlm-i Ahvâl-i Ruh*.
- 455 Interestingly, Baha Tevfik considered Fouillée's concept of *idéés-forces*, a motor theory of consciousness making ideas the principal agent of progress, to be the heart of a 'natural and scientific' philosophy. See Baha Tevfik, 'Bizde Felsefe', *Yirminci Asırda Zekâ*, no. 2, p. 19.
- 456 The book is a compilation of sections, pages or paragraphs taken from Boirac's *Cours élémentaire de philosophie* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1898); his *La psychologie inconnue: introduction et contribution à l'étude expérimentale des sciences psychiques* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1908); his *Leçons de morale* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1910); Alfred Fouillée's *La psychologie des idéés-forces* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1893); his *Tempérament et caractère selon les individus, les sexes et les races* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1895); Théodule Ribot's *Essai sur les passions* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1907); his *La psychologie des sentiments* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1896); Élie Rabier's *Leçons de philosophie 1, Psychologie* (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1896); and René Worms's *Éléments de philosophie scientifique et de philosophie morale* (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1891); and his *Organisme et société* (Paris: V.Giard & E.Brière, 1895).
- 457 See, for example, Ahmed Nebil and Baha Tevfik, *Mebâdî-i Felsefe: Psikoloji*, pp. 200 ff.
- 458 *Ibid.*, pp. 27 ff.
- 459 Haeckel, *Die Welträthsel*, p. 104; and Haeckel, *Die Lebenswunder*, pp. 20–1.
- 460 Ahmed Nebil and Baha Tevfik, *Mebâdî-i Felsefe: Psikoloji*, p. 27.
- 461 Baha Tevfik, 'Mukayese-i Ervâh', *Düşünüyorum*, no. 21 [January 23, 1911], pp. 266–8.
- 462 This is particularly evident in his commentary on English psychology. See Th [éodule] Ribot, *La psychologie anglaise contemporaine: école expérimentale* (Paris: Ladrance, 1870).
- 463 See Abdullah Cevdet, 'Teselsül-i Saltanat Mes'alesi', *İctihad*, no. 6, pp. 86–90, and *idem*, 'Hanedan-ı Osmanî', *İctihad* 2, no. 2 (October 1906), p. 218.
- 464 See Ribot, *Essai sur les passions*, pp. 137 ff.
- 465 *Ibid.*, pp. 96 ff and Ribot, *La psychologie des sentiments*, pp. 320 ff.
- 466 Baha Tevfik, *Muhtasar Felsefe*, p. 22. See also Baha Tevfik, 'Mutantan Ta'birler', *Yirminci Asırda Zekâ*, no. 2, p. 18.
- 467 [Paul] Dubois, *Les psychonévroses et leur traitement moral: leçons faites à l'Université de Berne* (Paris: Masson, 1904), p. 152; Ahmed Nebil and Baha Tevfik, *Hassasiyet Bahsi ve Yeni Ahlâk* (Istanbul: Hürriyet Matbaası, [1910]), pp. 4 and 13; and Baha Tevfik, *Teceddüd-i İlmî ve Edebî* (Istanbul: Teceddüd-i İlmî ve Felsefî Kütübhanesi [1911]), pp. 24–36. Baha Tevfik and Ahmed Nebil dedicated their work to Dubois, whom they described as a 'genius' and a 'grand rénovateur'.



- See Ahmed Nebil and Baha Tevfik, *Hassasiyet Bahsi ve Yeni Ahlâk*, pp. [2] and 12. Baha Tevfik also translated from Dubois's work. See Baha Tevfik, *Teceddüd-i İlmî ve Edebî*, pp. 7–16.
- 468 [Paul] Dubois, *De l'influence de l'esprit sur le corps* (Bern: A.Francke, 1910), pp. 3–4.
- 469 Ribot, *Essai sur les passions*, pp. 7 and 27; Ahmed Nebil, and Baha Tevfik, *Hassasiyet Bahsi ve Yeni Ahlâk*, p. 18.
- 470 See Léon Dumont, *Théorie scientifique de la sensibilité: la plaisir et la peine* (Paris: Librairie Germer Ballière, 1875), pp. 64 ff and 241 ff.
- 471 See Léon Dumont, 'De l'habitude', *Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger* 1 (1876), pp. 323–66; and Ahmed Nebil and Baha Tevfik, *Hassasiyet Bahsi ve Yeni Ahlâk*, pp. 16 ff.
- 472 Frédéric Paulhan, *Les caractères* (Paris: F.Alcan, 1902), pp. 115 ff. Ahmed Nebil and Baha Tevfik, *Hassasiyet Bahsi ve Yeni Ahlâk*, pp. 13–14 ff. Like Guyau, Paulhan did emphasize that touch was an aesthetic sense in his *Le mensonge de l'art* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1907). Obviously, Baha Tevfik had no interest in such ideas.
- 473 Ahmed Nebil and Baha Tevfik, *Hassasiyet Bahsi ve Yeni Ahlâk*, p. 18.
- 474 Obviously, Baha Tevfik accepted the thesis of Ribot and Paulhan that specific emotions result in aesthetic productions. See note 463 and Fr[édéric] Paulhan, 'Sur l'émotion esthétique', *Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger* 19 (1885), pp. 652 ff.
- 475 Dumont, *Théorie scientifique de la sensibilité*, p. 258.
- 476 Ahmed Nebil and Baha Tevfik, 'Osmanlı Edebiyatı', *Tenkid*, no. 5 [June 30, 1910], p. 71.
- 477 Baha Tevfik, *Felsefe-i Edebiyat ve Şair Celîs*, p. 5.
- 478 See, for example, Baha Tevfik, *Felsefe-i Ferd*, pp. 10 and 108 ff. He also made translations from Nordau. See Baha Tevfik, *Teceddüd-i İlmî ve Edebî*, pp. 93–111.
- 479 Max Nordau, *Entartung* 2 (Berlin: Verlag von Carl Duncker, 1893), pp. 3 ff.
- 480 Baha Tevfik, *Felsefe-i Edebiyat ve Şair Celîs*, p. 8. Despite his dislike of Symbolism (because of its 'unscientific' nature), Baha Tevfik regarded it as the most natural form of literature on account of its synthetic quality. See *ibid.*, p. 7.
- 481 Nietzsche, whom Baha Tevfik held in high esteem, was one of Nordau's principal *bêtes noires*.
- 482 See Nordau, *Entartung* 2, pp. 19 ff. Ribot, too, stated that Nordau's *Entartung* was the only serious study on the pathology of the aesthetic sentiment and, moreover, 'treats other questions as well'. See Ribot, *La psychologie des sentiments*, p. 348, fn.
- 483 Max Nordau, *Entartung* 1 (Berlin: Verlag von Carl Duncker, 1893), p. 3. The last point was quite important for Baha Tevfik, whose critics attacked him, claiming that Nordau's work was not in line with the progress of civilization (See Baha Tevfik, 'Edebiyat Kat'iyen Muzırdır!', *Piyano*, no. 8, p. 81). This claim calls to mind Moebius's idea (in 'Ueber das pathologische bei Goethe') that 'the man of genius is a production of evolution, not of degeneration.' See I. Woodbridge Riley, 'Recent Theories of Genius', *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods* 2, no. 13 (June 1905), p. 347.
- 484 See Nordau's letter to Cesare Lombroso, in Nordau, *Entartung* 1, pp. vii–viii. Although the work was dedicated to Lombroso, he strongly criticized Nordau's

- thesis on degeneration, and accused him of totally ignoring the role of 'genius' in artistic production. See Linda L.Maik, 'Nordau's Degeneration: The American Controversy', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 50, no. 4 (October-December 1989), pp. 614-5.
- 485 Baha Tevfik, 'Edebiyat Kat'iyen Muzırdır!', *Piyano*, no. 10, p. 106.
- 486 Ibid., pp. 106-7. Baha Tevfik must have taken these ideas from Nordau. See Nordau, *Entartung* 2, p. 505: 'Das ist die Behandlung der Zeitkrankheit, die ich für wirksam halte: Kennzeichnung der führenden Entarteten und Hysteriker als Kranke, Entlarvung und Brandmarkung der Nachaffer als Gesellschaftsfeinde, Warnung des Publikums vor den Lügen dieser Schmarotzer.'
- 487 [Baha Tevfik], 'Sene-i Temaşa: Tiyatro ve Vazifesi', *Karagöz Salnâmesi* 4 (1913), pp. 93-6.
- 488 See [Baha Tevfik], *Mekteb Dersleri* (provided as a supplement to *Felsefe Mecmuası* [1913]), p. 10.
- 489 Ahmed Nebil and Baha Tevfik, *Hassasiyet Bahsi ve Yeni Ahlâk*, pp. 5-6.
- 490 Ibid., pp. 6-10, 19-20.
- 491 Baha Tevfik made verbatim translations of certain sentences from Dubois's short book, including the following one: 'Un philosophe français, Guyau, a dit très bien: "Celui qui n'agit pas d'après ce qu'il pense, pense incomplètement."' (See Dubois, *De l'influence de l'esprit sur le corps*, p. 84). He commented that Guyau was mistaken (see Ahmed Nebil and Baha Tevfik, *Hassasiyet Bahsi ve Yeni Ahlâk*, p. 17, fn). This is perhaps evidence of Baha Tevfik's dislike of Guyau's moralism, an aversion shared by his associates.
- 492 Dubois, *De l'influence de l'esprit sur le corps*, p. 89.
- 493 Ibid., pp. 80-6.
- 494 Dubois, *Les psychonévroses et leur traitement moral*, p. 29.
- 495 Karl Schmidt, 'Concerning a Philosophical Platform', *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods* 6, no. 25 (December 1909), p. 676.
- 496 See [Baha Tevfik], 'Psikoloji', *Piyano*, no. 17 [December 19, 1910], p. 200.
- 497 It should be remembered that there were two major schools, the scientific and philosophical, competing within psychology at the time. (For an illuminating article on the subject, see J.Chazottes, 'Le conflit actuel de la science et de la philosophie dans la psychologie', *Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger* 54 [1902], pp. 249-59).
- 498 Baha Tevfik, 'Bir Mukaddime', in Fikri Tevfik, *Huceyre*, p. [3].
- 499 Ahmed Nebil and Baha Tevfik, *Hassasiyet Bahsi ve Yeni Ahlâk*, cover page: 'Düşünebilenlere mahsusdur'.
- 500 This may be an allusion to Descartes's famous aphorism *cogito ergo sum*, which would be translated into Turkish as 'Düşünüyorum öyleyse varım.'
- 501 Many materialist associates of Baha Tevfik were influenced by Le Bon's ideas. See, for example, Subhi Edhem, *Darwinizm*, p. 56.
- 502 Ahmed Nebil and Baha Tevfik, *Hassasiyet Bahsi ve Yeni Ahlâk*, p. 18.
- 503 Memduh Süleyman, 'Zekâ'ya', *Zekâ*, no. 32 [June 4, 1914], p. 118.
- 504 Ahmed Nebil and Baha Tevfik, *Hassasiyet Bahsi ve Yeni Ahlâk*, p. 20.
- 505 A good analysis of the views of leading mid-nineteenth-century materialists on society may be found in Gregory, *Scientific Materialism*, pp. 189 ff.
- 506 See Ludwig Büchner, *Meine Begegnung mit Ferdinand Lassalle: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Sozialdemokratischen Bewegung in Deutschland* (Berlin: Hertz

u.Süssenguth, 1894). Büchner accused Lassalle of misusing the results of scientific research for the furtherance of his political aims. In a similar manner, Büchner defended the political concept of federalism, or of autonomous regions within a 'political organism', as he called it, simply because such would be the natural result of the application of the principle of the division of labor to the organization of societies composed of higher organisms. See Büchner, *Man in the Past, Present and Future*, pp. 165–6.

- 507 For more information, see my *The Young Turks in Opposition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 71 ff. The original founders called their organization the 'Ottoman Union Society'.
- 508 See the letter sent by Dr Mekkeli Sabri to Edouard Herriot on November 18, 1912. It was published in [Feridun] Kan Demir, *Jön Türklerin Zindan Hatıraları, 1848–1903: Bir Devrin Siyasî ve Fikrî Tarihi* (Istanbul: Sinan Matbaası ve Neşriyat Evi, 1932), p. 106.
- 509 Abdullah Cevdet, 'Gençlerde Ruh İstikameti', *İçtihat*, no. 349 (July 15, 1932), p. 5755.
- 510 For more information, see my *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi*, p. 255.
- 511 See Abdullah Cevdet, 'Gençlerde Ruh İstikameti', *İçtihatı*, no. 349, p. 5755.
- 512 See my *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi*, pp. 315 ff.
- 513 See Bağcı, *Baha Tevfik'in Hayatı*, pp. 174 ff.
- 514 See Baha Tevfik's introduction, 'Bizde Tabi'iyat ve Istilâhlar', in Haeckel, *İnsanın Menşei*, p. 13.
- 515 Baha Tevfik, 'Hâl-i Hâzırın Mes'elesi: Millîleşmek Emeli', *Felsefe Mecmuası*, no. 1, pp. 3–5.
- 516 Lange used the phrase 'seine Anforderungen an die Philosophie' to describe Büchner's pretensions. See Lange, *Geschichte des Materialismus 2*, p. 89.
- 517 Upon reading Büchner's *Sechs Vorlesungen über die Darwin'sche Theorie von der Verwandlung der Arten und die erste Entstehung der Organismenwelt*, Marx made the following comment to Dr Kugelmann:

Ich habe Büchners Vorlesungen über Darwinismus erhalten. Er ist offenbar ein 'Buchmacher' und heißt deshalb wahrscheinlich 'Büchner'. Das oberflächliche Geschwatz über die Geschichte des Materialismus ist offenbar aus Lange abgeschrieben...Sehr naiv ist auch, wenn er von Cabanis sagt 'man glaube beinah Karl Vogt zu hören.' Wahrscheinlich hat Cabanis den Vogt abgeschrieben!

See Marx's letter to Dr Kugelmann, dated London, December 5, 1868 in Karl Marx, *Briefe an Kugelmann: Aus den Jahren von 1862 bis 1874* (Berlin: Vereinigung internationaler Verlags-anstalten, 1927), p. 58.

- 518 As translated from Marx and Engels, *Werke 32*, p. 671 in Gregory, *Scientific Materialism*, p. 240.
- 519 See Abdullah Cevdet, 'Şime-i Muhabbet', *İctihad*, no. 89 [January 29, 1914], pp. 1979–84. For more information, see my 'Garbçılar: Their Attitudes toward

- Religion and Their Impact on the Official Ideology of the Turkish Republic', *Studia Islamica*, no. 86 (August 1997), pp. 133–58.
- 520 See Baha Tevfik, *Felsefe-i Ferd*, pp. 88–94. See also his 'Hâl-i Hâzırın Mes'elesi: Millîleşmek Emelî', *Felsefe Mecmuası*, no. 1, p. 5: 'Europeanization is the ideal of becoming civilized and progressive.'
- 521 Abdullah Cevdet, 'Dilimle İkrar, Kalbimle Tasdik Ederim', *İctihad*, no. 82 [December 11, 1913], pp. 1809–10.
- 522 Baha Tevfik, *Felsefe-i Ferd*, p. 84.
- 523 For Baha Tevfik, see, for example, *Yirminci Asırda Zekâ*, no. 1, p. 13. See Abdullah Cevdet, *Mükemmel ve Resimli Adâb-ı Mu'aşeret Rehberi* (Istanbul: Yeni Matbaa, 1927). This was a liberal translation of Gaston Jollivet and MarieAnne L'Heureux, *Pour bien connaître les usages mondains* (Paris: P.Lafitte, 1911). Two decades before, the most popular Ottoman author of the late nineteenth century, Ahmed Midhat Efendi, published a best-selling Turkish translation of J. William Draper's *Conflict between Religion and Science*, and a book entitled *Alla franca*. See J.W. Draper, *Niza'-i İlm ü Din* 1–4, trans. Ahmed Midhat (Istanbul: Tercüman-ı Hakikat Matbaası, 1313–18 [1895–1900]). Ahmed Midhat added an essay entitled 'İslâm ve Ulûm (Islam and Sciences)' to the translation and provided notes to criticize Draper's theses as well as an additional explanation from an Ottoman 'âlim, Hoca Musa Efendi. Obviously, without these refutations the translation would not have obtained permission for publication from the Ministry of Education. For Ahmed Midhat's essay on European good manners, see *Avrupa Adâb-ı Mu'aşereti yahud Alafranga* (Istanbul: İkdâm Matbaası, 1312 [1894–5]).
- 524 Keçecizâde İzzet Fu'ad, 'Meclis-i Meb'usan Re'isi Ahmed Rıza Beyefendi'ye', *İştihad*, no. 132 (November 28, 1918), p. 2827.
- 525 I refer here to Şehbenderzâde Ahmed Hilmi's essays in the 1910s and İsmail Fennî (Ertuğrul)'s later studies, both of which used European philosophical works along with classical sources.
- 526 Lange, *Geschichte des Materialismus* 2, p. 89.
- 527 See Anton Büchner, *Die Familie Büchner: Georg Büchners Vorfahren, Eltern und Geschwister* (Darmstadt: Eduard Roether Verlag, 1963), p. 78.
- 528 [Baha Tevfik], 'Tenkid-i Felsefi: Ali Kemal Bey'in 8 Haziran Tarihli *İkdâm Gazetesi*'ndeki Makalesine Cevabdır', *Felsefe Mecmuası*, no. 5, p. 68. Baha Tevfik also stated that the strong demand for the translation of Haeckel's *Monismus* made a translation of *Kraft und Stoff* possible. See Baha Tevfik and Ahmed Nebil, 'Bizim Sözlerimiz', in Büchner, *Madde ve Kuvvet* 1, p. 5.
- 529 Abdullah Cevdet provided the circulation figure '4,000 or more' [see Abdüllah *[sic]* Cevdet, 'İctihad'ın Kari'lerine', *İctihad*, no. 279 (August 15, 1929), p. 5231]. His meticulous biographer Karl Süsseim, who obtained information from Abdullah Cevdet and his widow, cited the figure 3,000. See Süsseim, 'Abd Allâh Djvedet', *Encyclopaedia of Islam (Supplement)*, p. 58. Some out-of-print issues were sold for exorbitant prices on the black market, while some controversial issues saw two or three editions, a rare phenomenon in the world of Ottoman publishing.
- 530 Abdullah Cevdet remarked that he had received letters from many educated individuals living in remote corners of the country. One of them, a superintendent of education in the town of Ödemiş, promised to buy one hundred copies of the Turkish translation of *Le bon sens* to encourage Abdullah Cevdet to complete the

- work. See Abdullah Cevdet's introduction to [d'Holbach], *Akl-ı Selim* (1928), pp. 8–9.
- 531 This was a notion championed by Vogt, especially in his *Physiologische Briefe für gebildete aller Stände*, but strongly criticized by Büchner. See Büchner, *Kraft und Stoff*, pp. 299–306.
- 532 Mustafa Kemal marked the relevant passages in Abdullah Cevdet, *Fenn-i Ruh*, pp. 29 and 31 (*Kraft und Stoff*, pp. 267–9). See Atatürk'ün Okuduğu Kitaplar: Özel İşaretleri ve Düşüştüğü Notlar İle, ed. Gürbüz D.Tüfekçi (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1983), pp. 200–1.
- 533 This was another book that Mustafa Kemal read carefully. He marked phrases such as 'Dans le fait, ôter la religion au peuple, c'est ne lui rien ôter.' See [d'Holbach], *Akl-ı Selim* (1928), pp. 295 ff. (For the original text, see [d'Holbach], *Le bon sens du curé J.Meslier, suivi de son testament* [Paris: Au Palais des Thermes de Julien, 1802], p. 279).
- 534 Büchner, *Man in the Past, Present and Future*, pp. 229–30.
- 535 V.I.Lenin, *Materializm i empiriokrititsizm: kriticheskie zametki ob odnoi reaktionnoi filosofii* ([Moscow]: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1952), pp. 222–6. Despite his strong criticism of the leading figures of *Vulgärmaterialismus*, Lenin had a high opinion of Haeckel and especially of his *Welträtshel*. See *ibid.*, pp. 329 ff.
- 536 Abdullah Cevdet's undated letter [1925] to his wife Fatma Hanım, Private Papers of Abdullah Cevdet. He provides further information about his meeting with Mustafa Kemal in Abdullah Cevdet, 'Gazi Paşa'nın Köşkünde', *İctihad*, no. 194 (December 15, 1925), pp. 3813–6.
- 537 See my *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi*, pp. 386–7.
- 538 Abdullah Cevdet advanced this idea long before 1925. See 'Une question vitale pour Turquie: la repopulation', *Presse du Soir*, June 3, 1920.
- 539 'Avrupa'dan Damızlık Adam Celbini İsteyen de Var', *Tevhid-i Efkâr* [January 25, 1925].
- 540 See Abdullah Cevdet's preface to Gustave Le Bon, *Amelî Ruhîyyat*, p. 5. Those who wished to be 'social doctors' of a nation, he claimed, must acquaint themselves with the ideas of Le Bon. See his preface to Gustave Le Bon, *Ruh'ül-akvâm*, p. 7, and 'Ruh'ül-akvâm', *İctihad*, no. 26, p. 776.
- 541 Tüfekçi (ed.), *Atatürk'ün Okuduğu Kitaplar*, p. 173.
- 542 *Atatürk'ün Kültür ve Medeniyet Konusundaki Sözleri* (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Dil ve Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1990), p. 49.
- 543 Some obscure religious figures associated with the new regime had supported Abdullah Cevdet, however. See Abdullah Cevdet, 'Tanrıya İlk Def'a Türkce Söyleyen İmam', *İctihad*, no. 202, pp. 3942 ff.

### 3

## Whom did Ahmed Cevdet represent?

*Christoph K. Neumann*

One of the most significant changes the post-1839 state reorganisation of the *Tanzimat-ı hayriye* brought about was the transformation of the Ottoman *askeri* class of tax exempted state servants and military persons into a corps of civil servants and a modern military. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the theory of the clear dichotomy between *askeri* and *reaya* (tax-paying subjects) had for quite some time been largely a fiction. There was nothing like one Ottoman elite, there were a number of them, and some of the elite groups would have had no place in the sixteenth-century concept of *askeri*: it is sufficient to mention as examples the tax-farming provincial notable, the non-Muslim *kocabaşı* (local or regional community leader), the Phanariot *hospodar* or the Armenian money-lender of substance who belonged to the group of people called *amira*. Those who had the status of *kul* were only very rarely still of slave origin.

Nevertheless, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Ottoman state administration, the regular Ottoman military system and Ottoman education were largely in the hands of people who regarded themselves either as *kul* (privileged sultanic slave) or as *âlim* (scholar of Islamic theology and law). In both cases, the status involved privileged servanthip. The *kul* was the slave of the sultan, the *âlim*, as a member of the corps of the *ilmiye*, the servant of the *sharia* (*hademe üş-şer*). The main difference between the two was that in theory as well as in partial praxis,<sup>1</sup> those belonging to the class of *kul* had no rights before the sultan, whereas the *ilmiye* enjoyed a great degree of immunity.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, the status of *kul* conferred on its bearer privilege and an identity with high self-esteem.<sup>3</sup>

It is significant that the rhetoric of the *Tanzimat* changed less than the status of state servants. As late as 1900/1, Ahmed Rasim's *Îlâveli Hazine-i Mekâtib Yahud Mükemmel Münşeât*<sup>4</sup> preserved a rather complete set of submissive formulae for use in official letters. The purification of language already under way since the mid-nineteenth century had only abridged these expressions, but had not abolished the subservient tone associated with them.

Still, with the *Tanzimat-ı hayriye*, the *kul* ideology that had been so central to Ottoman statecraft no longer reflected the underlying social reality. Since the first half of the nineteenth century, state servants had acquired the rights of life and property. Accordingly, the treatment of Midhat Pasha later in the century caused considerable scandal (though it is noteworthy that even in his case at least the show

of a trial was considered necessary).<sup>5</sup> Moreover, the development of a bureaucracy, prompted by the Ottoman's perceived need to match their European counterparts, brought with it the development of a new type of professional.<sup>6</sup> Similar developments applied to the military, at least to the officer corps.

At the same time, Ottoman politics took a turn towards an ideologically more controversial mode. Conflicts among Ottoman politicians could now lead to relatively open debate based on arguments connected to a particular world-view. In fact, only in the nineteenth century does the term 'politician' become appropriate. Until then, members of the state elite had been firmly integrated into a system of patronage that was backed up by religious networking. Prior to the nineteenth century, considerations of loyalty, fidelity and devotion had tended to eclipse the expression and programmatic pursuit of political aims that were systematically related to a specific worldview. In the Ottoman Empire, the advent of ideology and the emergence of the politician were interconnected.<sup>7</sup>

Simultaneously, Ottoman politicians, especially Ottoman politicians with a Turkish and Muslim background, were more often than not also state officials of some kind.<sup>8</sup> This makes the question of representation an awkward one for these people. On the one hand, they discharged a newly delineated, bureaucratic function, while still belonging to networks of loyalty inherited from earlier times. On the other, they pursued political aims that were not necessarily formulated within the framework of established state policy. In whose name did these Muslim Ottoman politicians act, speak or vie with each other?

It is obvious that there may be more than one answer to this question—after all, these were times of conflict and struggle. Still, this conflict was viable and meaningful because it took place in a shared framework of reference. An acceptable start to answering this question may be to study just one person. Needless to say, the relevance of these findings will have to be tested in the future.

In my opinion, Ahmed Cevdet presents himself as an especially interesting case. In the first place, he was one of the figureheads of the later *Tanzimat* era and was involved in several of the more important attempts at transforming the state.<sup>9</sup> Second, he was a prolific author and respected intellectual, and one could expect him to be an articulate commentator on such an important question. Indeed, the issue of the official's position in the Ottoman state is one of the most frequently reiterated topics in his historical work, the *Ta'rih-i Cevdet*. Third, Ahmed Cevdet began his career as a highly successful *âlim* and later became a vizier (a change he commented on in both historical and political perspective).<sup>10</sup> Accordingly, he had to adjust his professional identity in a rather thorough-going manner. It is for all these reasons that I regard the examination of his writings as worthwhile in order to establish how he envisaged the question of representation.

In his *Ta'rih*, Cevdet adopted a double argumentative register: in his view, on the one hand history is contingent. This is also a precondition for his claim that one can draw lessons from it.<sup>11</sup> On the other hand, Cevdet often puts some distance between his own times and the events he describes and evaluates. He sometimes indicates this by talking about '*olvakt*' ('at that time'), and what

happened ‘at that time’ is in marked contrast to what would happen today.<sup>12</sup> Unfortunately, it is not always easy to discern which of the two registers Cevdet uses in any given passage.

On another level there is another double register in Cevdet’s historiographical writing. While he describes events, he often incorporates longish passages from his sources into his narrative, often stylistically adjusting them to his own writings and without giving any citation. These passages may contain the evaluations of the original authors that are not necessarily shared by Cevdet. Consequently, it is difficult to be sure whether one is confronted with Cevdet’s own opinion or something he is just reproducing.<sup>13</sup> Often, only intertextual comparison and contextualisation within Cevdet’s text can lead the reader to a clearer understanding.

### Cevdet on himself

Under these circumstances, it is quite difficult to find out whom (or what) Cevdet wanted to represent. A handy solution is to scrutinise those instances where Cevdet talks about himself. And indeed, in the *Tezakir* and *Ma’ruzat*, he frequently and rather freely does so.

However, both the *Tezakir* and the *Ma’ruzat* were never intended for publication. The *Tezakir* are notes Cevdet put together in his capacity as official chronicler of the empire (*vak’anüvis*). He wrote them as background information for his successor, Ahmed Lütfi, who had to compile the chronicle for the years Cevdet had actually served as *vak’anüvis*. With regard to this period, he collected notes and materials but never wrote anything resembling a narrative. Only the autobiographical *Tezkere* No. 40 is an exception. This text, or at least its last part, was apparently never passed to Ahmed Lütfi but stayed in the family. In the years after the Young Turk revolution, his daughter Fatma Aliye (see Elizabeth Frierson’s chapter) used it for her biography of Cevdet.<sup>14</sup>

By their very character, the *Tezakir* are a form of text that discuss the question of representation only rarely, and never with direct applicability to Cevdet. His worldview overlapped too much with that of his readers to make such a discussion necessary, and conventions of modesty, though not very strictly observed by Cevdet, prevented outright personal discussion of his case.

Even more restricted was his discussion of this matter in the *Ma’ruzat*. The texts resorting under this title are basically longish memoranda submitted to Abdülhamid II.<sup>15</sup> Consequently, Cevdet had to refrain from discussing what would show him as anything but a rule-abiding servant of his sultan, even though the rhetoric is remarkably free of submissive phrases.

His *Ta’rih*, on the other hand, was intended for publication. Notwithstanding the issues mentioned above, it can be read as a public discussion of historical and political issues. Nonetheless, its contents had to be compatible with the author’s standing in the administration. That such a man would discuss matters of this kind in front of anonymous readers would not have been very likely before the *Tanzimat*



period. It was in full agreement, however, with the ‘authoritarian enlightened despotism’<sup>16</sup> of the *Tanzimat* cadres.

However, Cevdet mentions himself only rarely. Only at the very end of his work does he note that he has been writing on the orders of the *encümen-i danış*, the Ottoman equivalent of an academy of science, which was, however, mainly charged with the more modest task of publishing text-books.<sup>17</sup> This situation is the more curious as the official sultanic order of 1270 (1853) to write such a chronicle was issued in response to a request from the Commission for General Education (*meclis-i maarif-i umumiye*).<sup>18</sup> The *encümen-i danış* was obviously no longer active.<sup>19</sup> Where an author uses his sources in so singular a way and refers to an institution whose activities had come to an end decades ago, he certainly conceals more than he explains.<sup>20</sup> But it is characteristic of him that he does not refer to Abdülmecid’s order, but to a more institutionalised setting.

As already mentioned, this reference to the *encümen-i danış* is an isolated one. But the same is true of most of the instances where Cevdet talks about himself. This can also be seen with regard to his treatment of the *ilmiye*.<sup>21</sup> Until 1866, Cevdet was an *alim*, and, as such, one would expect him to be an advocate of *ilmiye* interests. Indeed, in the first three volumes, his criticism of *ulema* (Islamic scholars) is relatively mild. In one instance, he confesses that as an *alim* he would never accept the insinuation that *ulema* would act in a way damaging to the best interests of the exalted Holy Law.<sup>22</sup>

But long before he switched careers he grew much more outspoken about the shortcomings of the *ulema*. In his *Ta’rih*, he is critical of the lack of knowledge throughout the *ulema* rank and file, and of the political role assumed by the *ilmiye* elite, whom he called *ulema-yı resmiye* in a term that suggests both the purely official quality of their being scholars and that such an *âlim* is one just in form. This criticism is already very pronounced in the fourth and fifth volumes, published in 1275 (1858) and 1278 (1860) respectively. At the same time, Cevdet discussed measures with Âli Pasha that would have resulted in a certain assimilation of the *ulema*’s status to that of the other state servants.<sup>23</sup> Later on, his political actions contributed to the marginalisation of *ulema* jurisdiction and education: Cevdet was active in creating the *nizamiye* courts responsible for the administration of the codified law and the *Hukuk Mektebi* (Law School), which was no longer part of the *medrese* system, responsible for the education of *kadıs* and *muftıs*.

If Cevdet presented himself as neither acting on sultanic orders nor as a member of the *ilmiye*, he also cannot be seen as writing from a regional perspective. It is true that he repeatedly praises the inhabitants of his hometown, Lofça (Lovec), for repelling bandits<sup>24</sup> or depicts in surprising detail the town’s role in the Russo-Ottoman war of 1806–12.<sup>25</sup> In these passages, Cevdet recounts the reports he had heard in his youth,<sup>26</sup> but in no instance was he writing with a Rumelian agenda.

### The 'we' of the *Ta'rih-i Cevdet*

Cevdet may write only rarely about himself or directly relate historical phenomena to his own person. But does he write about a group of people as 'us' ('biz'), thus identifying with the group and inviting his reader to do so as well? Indeed, there are such instances. But again, these passages are often expressed as a matter-of-course contrasting of Ottoman groups with their adversaries. Cevdet talks about the victory 'on our side' ('*bizim tarafımızda*') after the battle at the Pruth,<sup>27</sup> about 'our side' in a confrontation with the Iranians,<sup>28</sup> or about 'our canons' in the context of the Ottoman-French confrontation in Egypt in 1800.<sup>29</sup> Similarly, he writes about 'our soldiers'.<sup>30</sup> In the same vein, Cevdet contrasts 'our chronicles' with European sources.<sup>31</sup>

These incidents are relatively isolated. Their infrequency together with their lack of emphasis diminish their importance. Only a careful reader would spot them in the vast body of text constituting the *Ta'rih-i Cevdet*. There are, however, two more significant (though not necessarily more frequent) expressions of a 'we' in his work. One relates to the Ottoman governing elite, the other to the Ottoman Muslims.<sup>32</sup>

The perspective of Cevdet's chronicle is mostly that of the government. To a large extent, it can be read as an historical guide for active politicians.<sup>33</sup> He expresses this perspective when he writes about 'our unmindfulness', 'our lack of perseverance' and 'our thoughtlessness',<sup>34</sup> or about 'the neglect and mistakes of our predecessors that are apparent in this matter'.<sup>35</sup> Similarly, Cevdet writes about 'our' soldiers, governors, and officials,<sup>36</sup> or about the rule of feudal lords ('*derebeğilik usuli*') that once had existed 'among us'.<sup>37</sup>

Remarkably, this use of 'we' from a government perspective is more often than not rather critical. The same applies to the *Tezakir*. In a number of instances, Cevdet writes about past opportunities to salvage the empire that were missed because 'we' were more concerned with personal intrigues or all kinds of dissipation.<sup>38</sup> This mode of writing addresses not only a long perceived continuity within the ruling elite but provides an opportunity to be critical without being disloyal.

The opposite is true for the 'we' constituted by the Muslims of the Ottoman Empire. Wherever Cevdet talks about 'our *millet*' (I deliberately refrain from translating the term), he is very positive.<sup>39</sup> At the same time, he is rather unspecific about what constitutes 'our' *millet*. Only in one instance does he use the term '*unsur-u aslıye*' (original, 'essential component') that was so popular with the nineteenth-century administration, and he waters it down by putting it in the plural form.<sup>40</sup>

Still, in the course of time, Cevdet's concept of *millet* becomes clearer. In the first volume of the first edition he includes a very interesting, albeit slightly self-contradictory sentence:

As the Ottoman *millet* is also a new and illustrious society that uses language consisting of diverse languages and that has chosen its habits from the best mores and manners of different *millets*, the Islamic *millet* has renewed itself with the emergence of this state.<sup>41</sup>

This sentence was written during the Crimean War. Thirty lunar years later some of the keywords had changed:

Ottoman society, which [the Ottoman state] has constituted, is a new and illustrious formation that uses language consisting of diverse languages and that has chosen its habits from the best mores and manners of different *millets*. Well, with the emergence of this Exalted [Ottoman] State the power and might of the Islamic *millet* were renewed.<sup>42</sup>

The relationship between Ottoman and Muslim *millet* is still not quite clear, but the author is no longer using a concept of Ottoman *millet* that would include non-Muslims as well.

What is even more important about this passage is the stress put on the role of the state. Within a few words Cevdet twice asserts that the state creates and inspires society in a unidirectional way. It is in this framework that he reserves his sympathies for the Muslims, talks about their historical freedoms<sup>43</sup> or their 'prudent and patriotic inclination, affection, obedience and submission'.<sup>44</sup> Throughout his description of the Greek War of Independence he refers to a dichotomy between Muslims ('*ehl-i İslâm*') on the one hand, and Greek Orthodox ('*Rum*') or Christians ('*Hristiyan*') on the other.<sup>45</sup>

But he never recognises agency in the Muslim community or Ottoman society. Whenever Cevdet writes about social activities not controlled or inspired by the state, he describes them as not legitimate. In the Ottoman context, public opinion is eminently important and dangerous, but not acceptable.<sup>46</sup> For this very reason, Cevdet cannot be regarded as representing the Ottoman Muslim community, even if they are closer to his heart than other sectors of the population.

### Cevdet's state

So, what in his view is the Ottoman state? It was noted above that the answer could no longer centre on the sultan alone. Cevdet agrees with Fuad Pasha's pun that the Ottoman state was built on four basic principles: (1) Muslim *millet*; (2) the Turkish state; (3) the Ottoman sultanate; and (4) the capital of Istanbul.<sup>47</sup> But these are elements that guaranteed, in Fuad's and Cevdet's eyes, the existence and progress of the state. They are not its exhaustive characteristics.

Cevdet's writes in one place that the 'Ottoman Empire was essentially a military grouping and the Islamic *millet* in general warriors'<sup>48</sup> and that, therefore, in olden times the Muslims living within its borders readily engaged in *gaza* ('fight for the Islam') and *cihad* (here: 'holy war') and the sultan led his army in person. This

statement appears to be as much an historical one as an attempt to harmonise Ottoman statehood with the Islamic concept of the community fulfilling its collective responsibility (*fard kifaya*) for *cihad* under the leadership of the imam.<sup>49</sup>

This image, which arose from the treasury of early modern Ottoman political thought, is connected to another image that defines the state not in an institutional but in a functional way. Drawing on the writings of Calâl od-Din Davvani both in his *Ta'rih* and the *Tezakir*, Cevdet asserts repeatedly that states have two main 'duties' (*vazife*): (1) to implement the rights of God's servants (*ihkak-ı hukuk-u ibad*);<sup>50</sup> and (2) to be militarily active. Cevdet's term for this last function varies. He does use the words *cihad* and *gaza*,<sup>51</sup> but in other contexts he speaks only of military defence, and here he explicitly writes that these two aspects apply to states everywhere.<sup>52</sup> Seen in synopsis, in Cevdet's work the idea of the state as a primarily military institution must be considered as recurrent.

This has consequences. If the state is a military body, it is essential that the 'grandeess of the *millet*' (*kibar-ı millet*) cared for the military.<sup>53</sup> For its part, the military (*askerlik*) consists essentially of giving and obeying orders.<sup>54</sup> Order and discipline, however, cannot be confined to the army itself, even if military reform is one of the most important topics of the *Ta'rih-i Cevdet*.<sup>55</sup> The state administration as a whole must be well ordered because no 'corrupt body can manage an ordered one'.<sup>56</sup> Thus, law and order become the 'soul of the body of the state'.<sup>57</sup>

It needs to be stressed that all this has little to do with the concept of state (*mulk*) developed by Ibn Khaldun, who has often been regarded as the theoretician upon whose views Ahmed Cevdet supposedly based his political thought.<sup>58</sup> The interpretations of Ibn Khaldun's *Mukaddima* differ greatly from one another but they agree in their assessment of Ibn Khaldun's definition of state. In Franz Rosenthal's words:

A state exists only in so far as it is held together and ruled by individuals and the group which they constitute, that is, the dynasty. When the dynasty disappears, the state, being identical with it, also comes to an end.<sup>59</sup>

The difference from normal personal rule (*riyasa*) lies in the dynasty's (*dawla*) ability to enforce obedience and thus to perform state functions, such as the collection of taxes, defence and the sending of envoys. In short, the state is defined by a dynasty powerful enough to forcibly secure its rule.<sup>60</sup> It should be equally clear that this view has little in common with the concept put forward by Cevdet.

### Unity and order

In keeping with Cevdet's view that states are essentially military organizations is his insistence on their administrative compactness and the consistent application of one political will. Diversity and polyphony amount to decline and chaos:

In sum, if the order of the biggest community that is called 'state' by the philosophers is in decline, the assumptions of its diverse parts yield influence, and the general good that emerges from the bonds of the community dissolves and comes to an end. Thus groups whose power and influence cannot exceed the limits set by the state dominate some parts of the great community of which they are scattered parts. In other words, with the separation of the whole into its parts the influence of this whole diminishes, and because the assumption 'authority goes with power' finds reception between these parts, each group begins to act at will and the strong develops egoistic aspirations against the weak.<sup>61</sup>

As an upshot of this, uniformity in state administration<sup>62</sup> and unanimity among decision-makers<sup>63</sup> are essentials for sound statehood. Conversely, irregular participation of the populace in the political process or in the military functioning of the state are discarded as being 'in a republican style'<sup>64</sup> and contravening the necessary order. This applies not only to Ottoman cases, but also to European ones.<sup>65</sup> A modern military would, by contrast, act like 'a single body'.<sup>66</sup> Applying this concept to the state as a whole blocked the development of a concept of state with checks and balances.

In this context, Cevdet's treatment of the question of local power-holders is illuminating. Cevdet himself came from a family with such an *a'yan* background. This might have given rise to a relatively understanding approach to this stratum of Ottoman society that was so important in the period described by him. Cevdet, however, is unyielding. The moment the viziers directly representing the central government are no longer able to enforce their will on local notables, these latter begin to act obstinately and repressively. Cevdet uses strong wording, generally dubbing local power-holders *mütegallibe* ('oppressors') and *derebeği* ('local despot'), and dismissing their deeds as 'revolution' or 'sedition and rebellion' (*ihtilâl* and *fitne u fesad*, respectively). On the other hand, he clearly argues for a uniform and consistently ordered policy against them, a policy that allows neither for arbitrary execution<sup>67</sup> nor for an agreement such as the *sened-i ittifak* that had been concluded, in 1808, between leading notables and the sultanic administration and guaranteed both sides its existence.<sup>68</sup> Indeed, the policy toward the *a'yan* is one of the few areas where the jurist Cevdet explicitly calls for an ordered process in accordance with the law.

### State servants

Some important and longstanding elements of Ottoman political doctrine fit seamlessly into this call for unity and order. One of the most pertinent of these demands is the insistence on the independence and power of the grand vizier. This demand can be found as early as the mid-sixteenth-century *Asafname*, written by the ex-grand vizier Lutfi Pasha,<sup>69</sup> and is even more prominent in Koçi Beğ's famous treatise of 1631.<sup>70</sup>

On first view, Cevdet's assessment of the grand vizier's office seems to bear entirely conventional features: freedom from interference (*istklâl*),<sup>71</sup> and faithfulness towards the sultan.<sup>72</sup> A second look, however, reveals that Cevdet is making some modifications that adjust the meaning of these two features to his framework of thought. The notion of *istklâl* is explained in a passage referring to the Turkish translation of Raimondo di Montecuccoli's *Della Guerra col Turco in Ungheria* of 1670.<sup>73</sup> The passage explains the commander's full power of decision as a necessity of warfare but insists that the same also applies to the other aspects of state administration.<sup>74</sup> With regard to the relationship between sultan and grand vizier, Cevdet uses the term *sadakat* ('faithfulness') but makes exceedingly clear that this has to be understood in contradistinction to *intisab* ('patron-client relationship'). In Cevdet's eyes, the crucial difference lies in the absence of personal self-interest in the grand vizier.<sup>75</sup>

It is significant that throughout his text, but with increasing vigour, he is scathing about patron-client relationships (*intisab*) and favouritism (*iltizam*). He writes on this topic: 'There are two main matters that are destroying the order of the country, namely corruption and favouritism, which latter amounts to moral corruption.'<sup>76</sup>

Elsewhere, I have called the *Ta'rih-i Cevdet* 'a document of the search for a modern bureaucratic system in Max Weber's sense'.<sup>77</sup> This search was doomed to remain incomplete for two reasons: Cevdet did not develop a concept of simultaneous impersonal and sultanic rule, and he refrained from replacing the notion of a servant's duty with that of an office on a contractual basis.<sup>78</sup> In this last respect, he did not transgress the limits set by the political rhetoric of the *Tanzimat* era as outlined above. His disapproval of the *sened-i ittîfak* was likewise rooted not only in his aversion to local power-holders but also in his repugnance for a contractual basis of the state.<sup>79</sup>

It is for this reason that at times the translation of Cevdet's wording into modern political terminology produces incoherent, contradictory texts. A translation of his writing about a conflict between the governors of Van and Muş reads as: These were supposed to be state officials, protectors of the country and patrons of the populace, but they dared to ruin the countries of the sultan for the sake of vengeance and complained about each other.<sup>80</sup> A passage such as this makes sense only if one replaces 'official' with 'servant' and adopts the notion of a patrimonial state.

Given these assumptions, the fault lies in each political or historical case with the state servant. His failure is a moral one. Being a good servant of the empire amounts to not succumbing to limitlessly ambitious human nature<sup>81</sup> but to act as 'a man of pure duty', to adopt the phrase used by Cevdet near the end of his work.<sup>82</sup> Child of his time, Cevdet trusts in the 'scientific' solution of political and administrative problems,<sup>83</sup> so that a 'man of duty' will do more good than bad for his country.<sup>84</sup>

### Representing the state

It should be clear that a man of duty has no ideology, no personal ambition, no greed, no lust for power. Any of these would drive him into discord and enmity (*nifak*) at best, into rebellion (*fitne u fesad*) in other cases. The servant of the state thus becomes a depersonalised man. In times of individualism and ideology, he becomes a fiction. On the other hand, sultanic rule is presumed to be personal. But the person of the sultan is remote, his relationship to state servants no longer that of master and *kul*, so that the presumption of personal rule becomes a fiction as well.

For that reason, Cevdet supplements (rather than replaces) personal sultanic rule with a functional notion of the state that necessitates the same kind of subordination once required of the *kul*—the state as a uniform, military body, an overwhelming, abstract and imaginary entity that rests on no particular institution, group or person. Conversely, it may rest at times on the sultan, the army, the Muslims, the administration.

The fictional man of duty operates within the framework of this imaginary entity. He serves because the state possesses sanctity, authority and superiority. It has taken them over from the sultan at the moment his rule ceased to be personal. The man of duty serves because by serving he represents this superior and holy authority that has evolved from sultanic rule and is now called state. By representing it, the man of duty becomes a part of the state. The others, the people, are imagined as isolated persons that are devoid of any legitimacy outside or in opposition to the state. Therefore, they cannot form any constituency that could hold the man of duty responsible.

Cevdet's reconstruction of the Ottoman state as a framework of postsultanic rule that was not founded on any social contract received parts of its credibility from its cultural background. Cevdet rooted his view in countless references to the Ottoman past, to Islamic values and to the living experience of social convention. This convention also included—among many other elements—a submissive rhetoric towards the sultan. All this helped to conceal the fact that this concept of state was as hollow as it was exalted.

It is exactly this aspect of Cevdet's argument that has a bearing on the political culture of Turkey even today. Cevdet was no nationalist, in marked contrast to the vast majority of today's Turkish polity. But François Georgeon has described how Turkish nationalism evolved as 'un patriotisme d'État qui est le fait de la bureaucratie civile et militaire, et dont le ressort est territorial et politique'.<sup>85</sup>

Georgeon then demonstrates that this nationalism, unlike all the other nationalisms originating in the Ottoman Empire, was never to evolve into a nationalism opposing the state.<sup>86</sup> Cevdet's work is positioned exactly at the point where the state began to be conceptualised without reference to direct and personal subordination to the sultan. He confers the same attributes on the state that had been associated with the sultan—superiority, sanctity and authority—but does not define the state in any other than a functional way. It is this feature that continues to this day: the state, holy and hollow.

## Notes

- 1 In this respect, mention must be made of the widespread practice of executing state servants or confiscating their belongings without formal trial. With regard to the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, it is, however, impossible to explain the last feature, the so-called *müsadere*, only in terms of a patron-slave relationship between the sultan and the person subjected to it. The institution deserves in-depth treatment. For the time being, see *İslâm Ansiklopedisi* 8:669–73 (sq. Art. ‘müsadere’; Cavid Baysun), *EI*<sup>2</sup> 7:652–3 (sq. art. ‘musadara’, Fatma Müge Göçek), Fatma M.Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of the Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change*, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 56–7; Ahmet Mumcu, *Osmanlı Devletinde Siyaseten Katl*, 2nd ed, Ankara: Birey ve Toplum Yayınları, 1985 [first published 1963], pp. 154–61; Yavuz Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi: XVIII. yy’dan Tanzimat’a Mali Tarih*, İstanbul: Alan, 1986, p. 135; Yavuz Cezar, ‘Bir Âyanın Muhallefatı: Havza ve Köprü Kazaları Âyanı Kır İsmail-oğlu Hüseyin’, *Bellekten* XLI, 61 (1977), 41–78, especially 43–56; Fikret Yılmaz, ‘Kara Osman-Oğlu Ataullah Ağa’ya Ait Malların Müsaderesi ve bir Kira Defteri’, *Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi* 5 (1990), 239–52; Feridun M.Emecen, ‘Başbakikulu Defterlerine Dâir’, *Osmanlı-Türk Diplomatîği Semineri: 30–1 Mayıs 1994; Bildiriler*, İstanbul: İÜEF Tarih Araştırma Merkezi, 1995, pp. 165–82.
- 2 The most important one being the indemnity against executions. In the very few cases of *ulema* executions, the death was either widely regarded as a kind of state murder (Murad’s IV orders to hang the *kadı* of İznik and to execute the *şeyh ül-islâm* Ahi-zade) or, prior to the execution, a change in status was effected by striking the perpetrating *âlim*’s name from the records and taking off his turban. İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin İlmiye Teşkilâtı*, 2nd edn, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1984 [first publ. 1965], pp. 223–7; Mumcu, *Siyaseten Katl*, pp. 125–30; Hans Georg Majer, ‘Der Tod im Mörser: eine Strafe für osmanische Scheichülislame?’, in Gerhard Grimm (ed.), *Von der Pruth-Ebene bis zum Gipfel des Ida: Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Emanuel Turczynski*, München: Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, 1989, pp. 141–52.  
The immunity of the *ulema* was so deeply rooted that the status could be regarded as a life saver. During the Kabakçı rebellion that led to Selim’s III dethronement, his private secretary ( *sırr kâtibi* ) Ahmed asked for and received an appointment as a *müderris* in order to be spared by the janissary crowd. Cf. ‘Tüfengçi-başı Ârif Efendi Tarihçesi’, ed. Fahri Ç.Derin, *Bellekten* 38, 151 (1974), 379–443, especially 399. In this context it is only of secondary importance that Ahmed Efendi died after he fell from a roof while escaping. For an overview of the chroniclers’ testimony, see *III. Selim’in Sırkâtibi Ahmed Efendi Tarafından Tutulan Rûznâme*, ed. V.Sema Arkan, Ankara: TTK, 1993, pp. XII–XIII.
- 3 On the situation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see Cornell H. Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Âli; 1541–1600*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 255–7; Metin Kunt, ‘Osmanlı Dirlük-Kapı Düzeni ve Kul Kimliği’, *Tarih Eğitimi ve Tarihte ‘Öteki’ Sorunu: 2. Uluslararası Tarih Kongresi; 8–10 Haziran 1995, İstanbul*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yay, 1998, pp. 162–71.



- 4 5th edn (Istanbul: Şems Kütüphanesi, Artin Asaduryan Matbaası, 1318 [1900–1]). Examples are the chapters on ‘elkab-ı resmiye’ (‘official forms of addressing’, pp. 333–6) and concluding formulae (pp. 365–9). To portray the praxis of this late period I quote an example *in extenso* (pp. 338–9):

*Tamm Maaşla Tekaiid Olunmak İçün Rikâb-ı Hümayuna: Cenab-ı Yezdan; padişah-ı kadir-dan şehinşah-ı muallâ-unvan efendimiz hazretlerini ilâ âhır üd-devran kemal-i şevket u şan ile taht-ı âlî-baht-ı osmanide nur-eşşan buyursun. Kulları...alayın...taburının...bölüğünün yüz-başlılarından olub 70 ta’rihinde sülk-ü askeriye duhul etmiş ve pek çok muharebelerde ifayı hüsn-ü hizmet ederek yüz-başılık rütbesine nail ve müddet-i hizmet-i bendegânem otuz-beş seneye vasil olmuş kudema-yı bendegân-ı saltanat-ı seniyyeden bulunmuş ve vücud-u kemteranem alîl ve bi-derman olarak artık ıfa-yı vazıfeye gayr-ı muktedir bulunmuş olduğından hidemat-ı mesbuke-i çakeraneme mükâfaten tamm maaşım ile icra-yı tekaüdüm hususuna müsaade-i inayet-âde-i şehriyarlarının bi-diriğ buyurulmaması babında ve her halde emr u ferman.*

One has to admit, however, that Reşad’s roughly contemporary *Ameli ve Nazari Ta’lim-i Kitabet Yahud Mükemmel İnşa*, 2nd edn, Der-Seadet: Asr Kütüphanesi, Kasbar Matbaası, 1308 [1890–1], while not radically different in its examples, takes pains to explain away the self-denigrating aspect of Ottoman letter-writing (see his chapter on ‘ubudiyet’, pp. 203–5).

- 5 The standard narrative is still the one of İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı’s three monographs on the subject, namely, *Midhat ve Rüştü Paşaların Tevkiflerine Dâir Vesikalar*, Ankara: TTK, 1946, reprinted 1984; *Midhat Paşa ve Yıldız Mahkemesi*, Ankara: TTK, 1967; and *Midhat Paşa ve Tâif Mahkûmları*, Ankara: TTK, 1950, reprinted 1985. Uzunçarşılı based his account mainly on archival sources, thereby missing some of the stirring effect the process had on the Ottoman mind and European public opinion. Midhat Pasha’s ‘martyrdom’ was to continue as a point of reference in Turkish political discourse. Even today, he is the only Ottoman vizier whose image is regularly displayed by a Turkish state agency: his portrait is hung in every branch office of the agricultural bank (*Ziraat Bankası*).
- 6 On nineteenth-century Ottoman bureaucratic transformation, Carter V. Findley has authored the two most influential volumes: *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789–1922*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980, and *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989. His Weberian approach and indebtedness to a modernisation paradigm that seems to identify with a European model of rational statecraft have prompted a lively debate. Reviews on *Bureaucratic Reform* reflecting the lines of argument include, among others, Kemal Karpat’s in *AHR* 86, 2 (1981), 433–5 (Findley answered in *Civil Officialdom*, p. 7, n. 12); Ehud R. Toledano’s in *AASt* 20, 3 (1986), 357–73; on *Civil Officialdom* see again Karpat in *IJMES* 26, 2 (1994), 301–3, Selim Deringil in *TSAB* 14:2 (1990), 238–42 and mine in *Periplus* 2 (1992), 200–5. His approach has, however, enabled Findley to develop a picture of three fictitious ideal-typical bureaucrats: a Muslim traditional,

- a Muslim modernist and a transient Armenian. See his *Civil Officialdom*, pp. 334–42. None of them was any longer a *kul* in any conventional sense.
- 7 The Young Ottomans were the first ideologues of the Ottoman Empire.’ Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962, p. 397. A similar assessment is by İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, İstanbul: Hil, 1983, pp. 66–7.
- 8 This was first noted by Şerif Mardin, *Young Ottoman Thought*, p. 398; and by Dankwart A. Rustow, ‘The Modernization of Turkey in Historical and Comparative Perspective’, in Kemal Karpat (ed.), *Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis*, Leiden: Brill, 1973, pp. 93–120, especially pp. 101–2.
- 9 On Ahmed Cevdet, see the bibliography in Neumann, *Das indirekte Argument: Ein Plädoyer für die Tanzimat vermittelt der Historie; Die geschichtliche Bedeutung von Ahmed Cevdet Paşa’s Ta’rih*, Hamburg: Lit, 1994, also available in Turkish as *Araç Tarih, Amaç Tanzimat: Tarih-i Cevdet’in Siyasi Anlamı*, transl. Meltem Arun, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yay., 1999. To this bibliography needs to be added: TDVİA 7 (1993), 443–50 (s.v. ‘Cevdet Paşa’—Yusuf Halaçoğlu, M. Âkif Aydın); *Ahmet Cevdet Paşa (1823–1895): Sempozyum 9–11 Haziran 1995*, Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1997; Ahmet Zeki İzgöer, *Ahmet Cevdet Paşa*, İstanbul: Şûle, 1999; Beşir Atalay, ‘Ahmet Cevdet Paşa Tarihinde Osmanlı Devleti’, *Osmanlı*, vol. 8; Güler Eren et al. (eds), *Bilim*, Ankara: Yeni Türkiye yay., 1999, pp. 271–85; Kemal Sözen, *Ahmet Cevdet Paşa’nın Felsefi Düşüncesi*, İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Vakfı Yayınları, 1998; Kemal Sözen, ‘Ahmed Cevdet Paşa’ya Göre Devlet’, *Yeni Türkiye* VI, vol. 33 (2000), 211–16, and more recent contributions by Neumann, namely ‘Ahmed Cevdet Paşa’nın Tarihiçiliğine Yansıyan Zihniyet Dünyası’, in *Osmanlı’dan Cumhuriyet’e: Problemler, Araştırmalar, Tartışmalar; 1. Uluslararası Tarih Kongresi, 24–26 Mayıs 1993*, Ankara, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yay., 1997, pp. 64–71; ‘Paradigmalar Arasında: Ahmed Cevdet ve Aidiyet’, *Düşünen Siyaset*, vols 7–8 (1999), 219–36; and ‘Tanzimat Bağlamında Ahmet Cevdet Paşa’nın Siyasî Düşünceleri’, in Mehmet Ö. Alkan (ed.), *Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet’in Birikimi: Cumhuriyet’e Devreden Düşünce Mirası*, İstanbul: İletişim, 2001, pp. 83–8.
- 10 Ahmed Cevdet, *Ma’rûzât* (ed. Yusuf Halaçoğlu), İstanbul: Çağrı, 1980, pp. 176–7; *Tezâkir* (ed. Cavid Baysun), 2nd edn, Ankara: TTK, 1986 [1st edn, 1953–67], 3: 198–9. Cevdet’s comment in his *Ta’rih-i Cevdet: Tertib-i Cedid*, 2nd edn, Der Seadet: Matbaa-ı Osmaniye, 1309, 3:271, is another instance when the change of the *tarik* was not a very well-received step. Cevdet thinks that the ex-*kadı* Abd el-Gaffar Ağa is not faultless if he has been executed after changing career in order to attain high office. He might have lived without any worries (‘müsterih ül-bal’) instead. In another, interestingly twisted instance he comments upon the case of Müderris Osman Pasha. This man, a scion of a leading Morean family, had entered first the *ilmiye* career but was then made a vizier after entering the Russo-Ottoman war with his clients and some volunteers. A few years later, however, he was executed because of recurrent complaints from the population about his administration. Cevdet argues that this case not only proves that servants of the state have different abilities but also that a good soldier is not necessarily a good administrator. Therefore, ‘it spoils the affair of both sides if one mingles civil

service and the military' ('mülk me'muriyetiyle askerini birbirini karışdırmak iki tarafının işini dahi bozar', Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedit*, 2:14–17, quotation p. 17). Cevdet supports this argument, as he repeatedly does, with the quotation of *Kur'an* IV, 58, which stipulates that any trust should be given to those qualified (on the importance of this verse in Cevdet's thought, see Neumann, *Das indirekte Argument*, 249–50, with references). It is interesting that in this instance, Cevdet does not comment upon Osman Pasha's departure from the *ilmiye* but on the use of military men in bureaucratic contexts—thereby suggesting a curtailment of the role of the military in the Ottoman state.

- 11 Neumann, *Das indirekte Argument*, pp. 196–7, 210–12.
- 12 On Cevdet's attempt to reconcile these two different approaches, see *ibid.*, pp. 263–4.
- 13 *Ibid.*, pp. 207–12.
- 14 Fatma Aliye, *Ahmed Cevdet Paşa ve Zamanı*, Der Seadet: Kanaat Kütübhanesi, 1332. Fatma Aliye's account ends in 1271 (1855) with the description of a political problem not taken from *Tezkere* No. 40, but from No. 7: *Tezâkir* 1:35–7. A second volume was never published, allegedly because readers were no longer interested in Cevdet's personality. See Mübcecel Kızıltan, *Fatma Aliye Hanım: Yaşamı, Sanatı, Yapıtları ve Nisvan-ı İslam*, İstanbul: Mutlu Yayıncılık, 1983, p. 28. Perhaps one should not forget that these were the years of the First World War. After Fatma Aliye, Richard L. Chambers used the *Tezakir* for his account of Cevdet's life: *Ahmed Cevdet Paşa: The Formative Years of an Ottoman Transitional* (unpublished PhD thesis, Princeton University, 1968), and 'The Education of a Nineteenth-Century Ottoman *âlim*: Ahmed Cevdet Paşa', *IJMES* IV, 4 (1973), 440–64.
- 15 In some passages it is difficult to decide whether these texts were an historical account or rather the report of an informer. See especially his writings about the politicians of his time, e.g. Cevdet, *Ma'rûzât*, 214–18 on Şirvani-zade Rüşdi Pasha.
- 16 Aydın Mutlakıyet', Ortaylı, *En Uzun Yüzyıl*, 88, compare also pp. 64–7, 79–81, 188–9.
- 17 Cahit Bilim, 'İlk Türk Bilim Akademisi Encümen-i Daniş', *Hacettepe Üniver sitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 3, 2 (1985), 891–904. On Cevdet's role, see Neumann *Das indirekte Argument*, pp. 17–21, and 66–7, and 'Primärquelle und Sekundärliteratur im Dialog: Zu den Beziehungen zwischen Ahmed Cevdet Paşa und Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall', in Nurettin Demir and Erika Taube (eds), *Turkologie heute: Tradition und Perspektive; Materialien der dritten Deutschen Turkologen-Konferenz, Leipzig, 4.-7. Oktober 1994*, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1998, pp. 211–24.
- 18 BBA-OA, İradeler, Dahiliye 17685, cf. also *Das indirekte Argument*, 27; *İslâm Ansiklopedisi* 13:284 (s.v. 'vekayinüvis', Bekir Kütükoğlu).
- 19 In the *hatime* (epilogue) of the first volume (first edition) Cevdet refers to the assistance offered to him by a number of their members while he was writing the first two volumes, but the wording does not convey a more directly institutionalised intervention. Ahmed Cevdet, *Vekayi'-i Devlet-i aliyeye-i Osmaniye=Ta'rih-i Cevdet*, vol. 1 (İstanbul: Dar ü-tıbaat il-Amire, 1270), p. 337.
- 20 For the background of the argument that Cevdet also used in letters to Namık Kemal and Sa'dullah Pasha, see Neumann, *Das indirekte Argument*, pp. 66–8 (with sources).

- 21 On this topic, see Neumann, *Das indirekte Argument*, pp. 108–29.
- 22 Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedit*, 3:13. The sentence in question is part of Cevdet's very critical exposition of an argument found in Vasıf's chronicle. See Ahmed Vâsif, *Mehâsinül-Âsâr ve Hakâikü'l-Ahbâr*, (ed. Mücteba İlgürel), İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1978, p. 60.
- 23 *Ma'rûzât*, pp. 35–6.
- 24 Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedit*, 6:213, 244, 297, 303–5, 309–10, 313; 7:94.
- 25 Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedit*, 9:142, 136–7, 194–6.
- 26 Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedit*, 9:189–90.
- 27 Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedit*, 3:91. In this context Cevdet also speaks of 'our enemies' ('a'damız') and 'our military order' ('bizim zâbıtâ-ı askeriyemiz').
- 28 'bizim taraflarda', Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedit*, 3:210.
- 29 Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedit*, 7:76.
- 30 Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedit*, 11:190 ('bizim tersanelükler'), 11:95 ('beş-bin yeniçeri askerimiz').
- 31 'bizim ta'rihlerimiz' and 'bizim ta'rihlerimizden', respectively: Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedit*, 3:238, and 4:70.
- 32 There is an isolated incident where the turkophone community does constitute the 'we' of his text: 'Frenklerin Girek ve bizim Yunan dediğimiz Elinoz kavminin': Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedit*, 11:61.
- 33 *Das indirekte Argument*, pp. 234–6, 275–83; 'Zihniyet Dünyası', pp. 67–70.
- 34 Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedit*, 2:229 ('bizim...gafletimiz...adem-i gayretimizden', 'bizim bu tedabirsizlik').
- 35 Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedit*, 11:65 ('eslâfımızın bu babda ru-nüma olan hatâ ve müsamahaları kabil-i inkâr değildir')—in this passage he argues that all of the Ottoman subjects should be instructed in the language of the government ('hukûmet lisanını'), Ottoman literature and praiseworthy Islamic manners ('âdât-ı hasene-i islâmiye[ye]').
- 36 Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedit*, 3:95.
- 37 Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedit*, 3:89 ('bizde bir vakt mevcut olduğu misillü').
- 38 Cevdet, *Tezâkir*, 1:45, 60–6, 87; 2:8, 23–4.
- 39 An example: 'bais-i necat-ı devlet u millet olan nizamât-ı askeriye ve mülkiyeye milletimizin meşhud olan meyl ve muhabbet ve inkiyad ve mutavaat-ı akılâne ve vatanperveranesi': Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedit*, 3:96.
- 40 'anasır-ı aslıye(nin)': Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedit*, 1:41. This passage criticises Süleyman the Magnificent for expanding the empire too far to the north and west, where the lack of loyal population was to make its defence impossible. The sentence had first been included in the third volume that had been authored in 1856. Neumann, *Das indirekte Argument*, pp. 30, 102–6. In other contexts, Cevdet used the terms 'unsur-ı aslıye' and, interchangeably, 'anasır-i aslıye' for the Turks, e.g. *Ma'rûzât*, 115. The same discussion is set out in a much more restricted way and without mentioning any 'essential component' in *Tezâkir*, 3: 107 (dated 22 September, 1881).
- 41 'Osmanlı milleti dahi lisanları elsine-i adideden mürekkebe ve tavr ve şiarları milel-i mütenevviânın ehasin-i adab ve etvarından müntehib bir cem'iyet-i cedide-i celîle olmuş olduğundan bu devletin zuhurıyla millet-i İslâmiye tecdid ederek' (Cevdet, *Vekayi'-i Devlet-i aliyeye-i Osmaniye*, 1:15).

- 42 Terkîb ve teşkîl etdiği Osmanlu cem'iyeti dahi lisanları elsine-i adideden mürekkeb ve tavr ve şiarları milel-i mütenevvianın ehasin-i adab ve etvarından müntehibb bir hey'et-i cedide-i celiledir işte bu Devlet-i Alîye'nin zuhurıyla millet-i İslâmiyenin kuvvet ve satveti tazelenerek' (Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedid*, 1:29–30).
- 43 'millet-i İslâmiyedeki hürriyet ve serbestiyet[i]' in the times of the Crusades (Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedid*, 6:159). Compare also 7:288.
- 44 'milletimizin meşhud olan meyl ve muhabbet ve inkıyad ve mutavaat-ı akılâne ve vatan-perverane' (Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedid*, 3:96).
- 45 Beginning with the passages at Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedid*, 11:51.
- 46 *Das indirekte Argument*, pp. 256–63, 276–7; 'Zihniyet Dünyası', pp. 66–9.
- 47 *Tezâkir*, 1:85—Fuad Pasha made this statement to the British ambassador Stratford Canning in 1856.
- 48 'Devlet-i Aliye fi'l-asl bir hey'et-i askeriye olub millet-i İslâmiye dahi ale'l-umum asker olduğundan her nereye ferman gönderilse eli silâh tutan ehl-i İslâm din uğruna cihad ve gaza niyetiyle seğirdüb mevki'-i harbe giderlerdi ve eslâf-ı selâtin-i Osmanîye dahi bi'l-zat ordu-yı hümayun ile sefer ederlerdi' (Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedid*, 8:271).
- 49 *TDVİA* 7 (1993): 527–34, NB 527–8 (s.q. 'cihad'—Ahmet Özel); EI<sup>2</sup> 2:538–40 (s.q. 'd̡jihād'—E.Tyan). Western scholars belonging to the Orientalist tradition have continuously tended to highlight what they perceived as the vigour of the concept of *cihad* had throughout Islamic history. As an example, see Bernard Lewis, 'Politik und Kriege', in Joseph Schacht and C.E.Bosworth (eds), *Das Vermächtnis des Islams*, München: dtv, 1983, 1:193–254, especially 215–18 [= *The Legacy of Islam* (1974), transl. D.v.Denffer]. I do not argue here that Cevdet was advocating a politics of Holy War. Rather, he uses a positive connotation that serves a two-fold purpose: enhancing Ottoman legitimation by modelling its more remote past on early Islamic history, and offering an explanation for decline. This does not entail, however, any practical suggestion with regard to politics.
- 50 On this concept, cf. Neumann, *Das indirekte Argument*, pp. 237–8, 245–50, 256–7.
- 51 'Devlet-i İslâmiyenin en büyük vazifesi ifa-yı farize-i cihad ve gaza olub' (The greatest duty of the Islamic state is to perform the obligation of Holy War and fight for the Islam) (Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedid*, 12:138).
- 52 'hıfz-ı bilâd': Cevdet, *Tezâkir*, 4:97–8; *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedid*, 1:88.
- 53 Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedid*, 3:49.
- 54 Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedid*, 9:96. Cevdet also calls obedience the very basis (*üss-i esas*) of the state's military function. See his *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedid*, 12:138.
- 55 Neumann, *Das indirekte Argument*, cf. index, 'Militärreform'.
- 56 'bir bozuk hey'et ise bir hey'et-i muntazameyi idare edemeyeceğinden' (Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedid*, 6:5).
- 57 'ruh-u cism-i devlet olan nizam ve kanun' (Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedid*, 4:80). The very same metaphor is also used for trade: *ibid.*, 2:195–6.
- 58 For a detailed discussion of this thesis, see Neumann, *Das indirekte Argument*, pp. 213–33, and 'Paradigmalar Arasında', 228–30.
- 59 From the introduction to Ibn Khaldun, *The Mukaddimah* (ed. and trans. Franz Rosenthal), London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958, p. LXXX.
- 60 See, among others, Muhammad Mahmoud Rabi', *The Political Theory of Ibn Khaldun*, Leiden: Brill, 1967, pp. 141–8; Heinrich Simon, *İbn Khalduns Wissenschaft von der menschlichen Kultur*, Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1959,

pp. 100–2; Ümit Hassan, *İbn Haldun'un Metodu ve Siyaset Teorisi*, 2nd edn, İstanbul: Toplumsal Dönüşüm Yay, 1998 [1st edn, 1977], pp. 298–309; Ahmet Arslan, *İbni Haldun'un İlim ve Fikir Dünyası*, Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 1987, pp. 129–33.

61 According to Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedit*, 9:191–2:

El-hasıl felâsefe kavlıyla devlet ta'bir olunan nizam-ı cemaat-ı kübra inhitat buldukca hükm-ü ecza-yı müteferrika isti'dad bulub rabıtâ-ı cemaatdan ammeye aid olur menafî' dahi muhtall ve munkat' oldukda kuvvet ve kudreti devletin hududundan öteye tecavüz ve sebkat edemeyen fırkalar müteferrik olduğu cemaat-ı kübranın ba'z-ı aksamına tagallub ederek ya'ni küll kendi eczasına taksim olunmağla külliyet-i mezkûrenin hükmi zail ve eczası beyninde ( *al-hukm li-min ghalab*) şaibesi hasıl olarak her fırka keyf ma yeşa harekete ve kavi zaife icra-yı garaz-ı nefsaniyete başlar.

- 62 'devletin hey'et-i icrâiyye ve adliyye ve askeriyyesi bir tarz-ı muttarid ve hep siyâk-ı vâhid üzere muntazam olmak lâzımdır' (Cevdet, *Tezâkir*, 4:99).
- 63 On Cevdet's stance concerning the 'ittifak-ı ârâ', see Neumann, *Das indirekte Argument*, pp. 253–6.
- 64 'cumhuriyet tarzında' (Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedit*, 11:201).
- 65 Cevdet thinks, though, that in Europe public opinion plays a constructive role. See Neumann, 'Zihniyet Dünyası', pp. 67–9. In military matters, he has no appreciation for diverging opinions, not even in Europe: Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedit*, 4:148 (a Swedish case called a 'strange situation').
- 66 'cism-i vahid' (Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedit*, 6:12).
- 67 Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedit*, 7:146–9, 9:190, 10:16, 10:181–2.
- 68 Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedit*, 8:183.
- 69 For a recent edition of this important text, see Mübahat S.Kütükoğlu, 'Lütfi Paşa Âsafnâmesi; Yeni bir Metin Tesisi Denemesi', in *Prof Dr. Bekir Kütükoğlu'na Armağan*, İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Araştırma Merkezi, 1991, pp. 49–100, especially pp. 62–5.
- 70 Görüceli Koçi Bey, *Koçi Bey Risalesi: Eski ve Yeni Harflerle* (ed. Yılmaz Kurt), Ankara: Ecdâd, 1994, pp. 16–18 and 34–6.
- 71 Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedit*, 2:155.
- 72 Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedit*, 8:103, 9:199 (this last a quotation from a *ferman* issued by Mahmud II).
- 73 Cevdet used a Turkish translation of Montecuccoli's 'Hungarian War' extensively throughout his history (see also his—partly misleading—note *ibid.*, 1:5). This work had been translated from the Latin version printed in 1718 into Turkish by a Hungarian renegade. In addition to the account of the Habsburg-Ottoman war, the text included some other parts by and on Montecuccoli alongside parts of Gaspar Schott's *Cursus mathematicus* of 1674. The Turkish translation was never printed but was used as a textbook in the Ottoman engineering school: Kemal Beydilli, *Türk Bilim ve Matbaacılık Tarihinde Mühendishâne, Mühendishâne Matbaası ve Kütüphânesi: 1776–1826*, İstanbul: Eren, 1995, pp. 277, 299, 373, 390, 402, 413, and 416. Fuller information will be given in the relevant passage of Neumann's

- catalogue of the Turkish manuscripts in the Czech National Library, Prague (in preparation).
- 74 Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedid*, 6:19.
- 75 Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedid*, 5:22.
- 76 '(Zira) nizam-ı memleketi ihlâl eden başluca iki madde olub biri rüşvet ve diğeri hatıra riayet ki bu dahi ma'nevi rüşvet demekdir': Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedid*, 4: 292. Compare the continuation of the passage to p. 294 and *ibid.*, 5:273, 10: 88, 11: 40, as well as Neumann, *Das indirekte Argument*, p. 249, n. 63, with additional material.
- 77 Neumann, *Das indirekte Argument*, p. 251.
- 78 The model is outlined in Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriß der verstehenden Soziologie*, 5th edn (ed. Johannes Winkelmann), Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, Paul Siebeck, 1972, repr. 1990, pp. 124–30.
- 79 There are instances where Cevdet comes relatively close to such a notion but he uses it only in order to highlight the sultan's prerogative. In Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedid*, 10:18–19, as part his rendition of a meeting of deliberation ( *meşveret meclisi* ) he approvingly quotes the idea that even if the state is in a weak condition, the collective force of all Muslims is still materially and bodily strong and the imam has the right to dispose of this force in times of need. The social contract is well hidden behind religious doctrine.
- 80 'Bunlar sanki devlet me'murı ve memleketin muhafızı ve sekinenin hamisi olacaklar iken birbirinden ahz-ı sar için memalik-i padişahiye tahribe cür'et ve yekdiğerinden şikâyet ediyorlardı' (Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedid*, 11:20).
- 81 Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedid*, 11:65.
- 82 'sırf iş eri' (Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedid*, 12:112). Cevdet's term is rather less unambiguous than any of the possible translations.
- 83 Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedid*, 2:229–30, 6:19–20.
- 84 The 'balance of benefit and damage' ( *müvazene-i nef ve zarar* ) is of importance in Cevdet's thinking. For his argument, see Cevdet, *Ta'rih: Tertib-i Cedid*, 12: 115.
- 85 François Georgeon, 'A la recherche d'une identité: Le nationalisme turc', in *Des Ottomans aux Turcs: Naissance d'une nation*, Istanbul: Isis, 1995, pp. 1–22, especially p. 17 (the article was first published in 1986).
- 86 *Ibid.*, p. 18.

## Women in Late Ottoman intellectual history

*Elizabeth B. Frierson*

Heroines of the revolution, seductive concubines, power-hungry mothers of sultans, victims of centuries of oppression, revolutionary heroines—women in Ottoman and modern Turkish historiography have been restricted to a few, limited and stereotypical roles by most historians until recently. The entertainment value of these images has proven hard to resist for scholars and laypeople alike, even with the shaming adjective of (Said's definition of) 'Orientalist' to condemn them, and even after efforts in the last few decades to displace these images with more balanced reckonings of women's roles in societies of South-west Asia and North Africa. As Bernard Lewis pointed out in the 1960s, women had far more varied roles in Middle Eastern society than most scholars have commonly allowed. Early on in his writings, Lewis included images of women and words of women in his highly textured accounts of the early modern Ottoman Empire and of modern Turkey.<sup>1</sup> There were only a few other scholars writing in European languages from the 1960s through the 1970s who included women's experiences in their reckonings of the Ottoman past, or who focused on women as a legitimate topic of study.<sup>2</sup> Most feminist historians in the 1960s and 1970s who wrote about the pre-1908 Ottoman past also largely dismissed it as an era of obscurantist Islam and oppressive *sharia* traditions. They argued that by comparison with the Kemalist, secularist vision of women's potential, early modern and modern Ottoman women were silenced, segregated and that even elite and royal women were capable of attaining only a sycophantic and manipulative sort of power, devoid of authority recognized as legitimate by their contemporaries.<sup>3</sup>

By the early 1980s, feminist scholars were writing incisive accounts, critical of the limitations of Kemalist top-down reforms, but still saw 1908 and 1914–23 as the pivotal years when women began to be notably more active in public life and politics. Nermin Abadan-Unat pointed out in 1981 and again in 1986 the heroic roles played by women during the First World War and the War of Independence, not only as speechmakers before thousands, but also as casualties of warfare and resistance. She attributed women's sudden appearance as public actors to the war itself, arguing that the war years and early Kemalist reforms 'illustrate how a national crisis may induce deep changes in social values without explicitly redefining sex roles and individual goals and aims'.<sup>4</sup> While I agree with her analytical point, I will argue here that the national crisis that changed women's



social status markedly began not in 1914 but in the 1890s, in the middle of decades of wars and refugee flows into the empire. For example, she argues that '[o]nly girls of wealthy families, educated either by European governesses or attending foreign schools, were exposed to "Western" ideas and consequently began to exercise some kind of social criticism'<sup>5</sup> while more recent research suggests that the effects of 'Western' ideas were long felt among ordinary people, who also responded with social criticism in print and in protest—less easily captured in the historical record.

This scholarly inattention and, in popular presentations of pre-Kemalist history, deliberate erasure of women's roles in making history before 1908 or 1923, were possible only by dint of an inability or refusal to check the accuracy of these accounts against the vast archival, manuscript and print records of the Ottoman past.<sup>6</sup> This was a bizarre occurrence in the post-Annalistes era for, as Madeline Zilfi stated in her seminal conference volume on women in the Ottoman Empire, 'the Ottoman period offers documentary texture and ample ground for comparative evaluations and insights' in millions of records of tax registers and court cases of all sorts.<sup>7</sup> Her fourteen contributors brought women into historiographical play not only in tax registers and court records, but also in literature, art and architecture. Zilfi's conference in 1994 captured a paradigm shift in Ottoman studies, as many more scholars started going to the Ottoman past and bringing back stories and statistics of women's multiple roles in the Ottoman Empire, with the results apparent in journal articles and edited volumes throughout the 1990s.<sup>8</sup> In addition, Zilfi anticipated the welcome shift in increasing numbers of Arabists who work in Ottoman Turkish as well, and this has resulted in Ottoman and Turkish women's studies appearing more frequently in edited volumes about the Middle East as a whole.<sup>9</sup>

Şirin Tekeli (1990) and Zehra Arat (1998) both included articles in their edited volumes about women before the Young Turk era as well, including Aynur Demirdirek's important 'In Pursuit of the Ottoman Women's Movement'.<sup>10</sup> Scholars have been somewhat hobbled, however, by the search for an Ottoman 'women's movement', as this calls for scouring the historical record for liberal or radical women with, first, the means (elite status, education, money, personal liberty) to read, write, and publish their words for anyone to read; and second, a propensity to gather in clubs or meetings that proved memorable enough to make it into someone's memoir, or to be covered in the press. This leaves the vast majority of ordinary women out of the picture, including those who posted flyers or spread the word orally or in print to boycott European goods and buy local products, as an act of patriotism.<sup>11</sup> Ordinary schoolgirls and their teachers, as well, are nearly invisible in studies of the Hamidian and Young Turk eras, but they had gained one of the characteristics of the avant-garde feminists, the ability to read and write. Perhaps what changed in the 1890s was that reading and writing were suddenly enough, that money and power were not base requirements for a woman to participate in public debates (see [Figure 4.1](#))



*Figure 4.1* Schoolgirl prizewinners

Even as one must credit the elite *avant-garde* for creating a new openness to women's words, it is clear that focusing on wealthy women leaves aside several basic questions, such as what the average public schoolgirl studied in her classes, how ordinary women entrepreneurs persuaded customers to visit their shops, and what women expected to see and buy and hear in those shops. In other words, women's activity that did not result in self-conscious, articulated, and public political action is not given credit for having political effect. In this chapter, I will first synthesize some of the results of early and recent studies to give a sense of what we can see now of women's intellectual history in the late Ottoman era, and then present some findings from my research in late Ottoman print production, and conclude with what we might be able to discern of ordinary women's agency in what was once the Ottoman heart of the Western civilized world.

From a multilingual perspective, the Ottoman era was one in a continuum of vast complexities in the mix of local and imperial cultures that changed from village to village and, in the great cities of empire, from one quarter to the next. As such, the Ottomans inherited and in turn compounded the complexity of Mediterranean, Mesopotamian, northern European and Asian histories which interwove peoples, languages and cultures from the earliest days of empires, through the rise of Islam, and into the very recent past. Faced with such a dizzyingly complicated history, one can sympathize with the impulse to simplify and categorize ordinary people such as non-elite minorities, women, and children who slip in and out of the sources with distressing elusiveness compared to the *janissaries* and other state actors solidly outlined in the archival record, or the famous men and women captured concisely in biographical collections. One of the

greatest boons of the vast Ottoman historical record is that it liberates scholars to focus where they will, knowing that someone among their many colleagues present or future will read and reckon with the hundreds or thousands of documents which one is forced to pass by on the way to the objects of any given research programme. As empirical work and analytical sophistication have come to characterize work on women in the 1990s and 2000s, it is becoming easier for scholars and popular writers to incorporate women's experiences, along with that of other excluded groups, into the meta-narratives of the Ottoman past on the basis of secondary sources. At the same time, our expanding knowledge base continues to have major lacunae.

### Recent findings

As Deniz Kandiyoti and Leila Ahmed pointed out in the early 1990s, early women's studies on the Middle East orbited around two rather large suns. The first involved rewriting the Muslim past to include the voices of women in an effort to show that 'true Islam', as interpreted with linguistic skill and pure logic, actually demanded of human society an absolute protection of women's legal rights, notably in family law, and also encouraged women to attain education, economic success and honour beyond that permitted by the fragilities of sexual purity. That these demands had not been met in the past was not the fault of 'true Islam', but of local cultures, replete with patriarchy and other superstitions that corrupted the more radical demands for social justice in Muhammad's prophecies and deeds. The second revealed the oppression of women in modern colonial or quasi-colonial territories through the First and Second World Wars and in new Muslim nation-states, and often canonized female elite innovators from the late 1800s through the middle of the twentieth century as forerunners of women's liberation on secular and Western models.<sup>12</sup> With the exception of Kandiyoti, most scholars writing for a Western audience also assumed that Arab women were the default or the norm for Muslim modernization and feminist movements, focusing primarily on women of modernizing Egypt, and second on women of Syria.<sup>13</sup> They often ignored the frankly Ottoman context of many of these women's lives, and the socio-political developments in Ottoman cities occurring earlier than, or simultaneously, in Arab cities. In the 1990s and 2000s, we have seen women's studies break out of these illuminating but ultimately confining orbits to explore other avenues for understanding women's past. For example, Leslie Peirce, through new readings of documents, and Gülrü Necipoğlu, through history of art and architecture, have shown that royal women—consorts, concubines, princesses and the occasional wife—were political actors of influence in the classical era of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>14</sup> Lucienne Thys-Şenocak as well, through close study of prominent women's endowments of rich mosque complexes and humble neighbourhood fountains, has shown elite and middling women achieving public, socio-political legitimacy by literally rebuilding the landscape of the empire and, in many instances, making the great cities of empire safer, cleaner and better

provisioned. Sara Wolper has taken the inquiry even further into the Seljuk predecessors of the Ottomans.<sup>15</sup> Scholars of photography such as Sarah Graham-Brown, and of modern art history such as Nancy Micklewright, show us women's presence in public life in ways not accounted for in pre-existing accounts.<sup>16</sup> Suraiya Faroqhi and Donald Quataert have also traced the actions of non-elite women through the archives.<sup>17</sup>

Moving into the modern era, Serpil Çakır has shown us women training for jobs in the new technologies of telephones and telegraphs, forming their own labour union and publishing their own gazette in the Young Turk era.<sup>18</sup> Nicole van Os in her work on the First World War has put women back into the poorly delineated history we have of that era.<sup>19</sup> In contemporary studies as well, work by such scholars as Yeşim Arat, Elisabeth Özdalga and Nilüfer Göle, and feminist activist-scholars such as Şirin Tekeli, have raised provocative questions that challenge the Kemalist legacy of feminism, such as 'why is it that we are emancipated, but not liberated?' or, 'why is it that women choose *hijab*, and is there actually something liberating in that choice?'<sup>20</sup> In their inquiries, they have pointed to continued inequities in the workplace and in politics, as well as such discontinuities in Turkish women's contemporary lives as continuing to be primarily responsible for the household while maintaining a full-time job. In all these studies, we see sound empirical work that shows women's agency and thereby challenges many assumptions that have excluded women from Ottoman and modern Turkish historiography. Most promisingly, we have begun to move beyond the need to be overly sober and canonizing in our renditions of women's lives, capturing in court records and satirical cartoons their bawdiness, transgressive behaviour and aggressive pursuit of self-interest, as well as their dignity and power as exemplars of early modern and modern female proprieties.<sup>21</sup>

### **Elite women in the classical Ottoman and Early Modern eras**

What do these new studies tell us, then, of Ottoman women's intellectual history? First, we have further proof that the most segregated and secluded of women were able to achieve great public prominence through their political roles and in their benefactions to the poor and sick of the empire. For an explanation of this, we can salvage some Kemalist historiography in its depiction of female pre-Islamic goddesses and female Mongol co-rulers as significant elements in the central Asian heritage claimed by the Ottomans as their own, by testing it against archaeological and textual evidence. As co-rulers and occasionally as warriors, Turco-Mongol women brought a new trope of womanhood into the Muslim world after the 1250s.<sup>22</sup> The legends of ferocious Mongol warrior women had their parallel in the stories told by Turco-Circassian slave consorts to their children and grandchildren in elite Egyptian households, up through the late nineteenth century.<sup>23</sup> In looking at how Greco-Iranian heritages of seclusion and contempt for women were able to restrain the more radical and reformist tenets of Islam that protected

the rights of women, Muslim and non-Muslim historians long dismissed the possibility that women could be legitimate actors. In this, they were following the evidence they found, including official histories and private chronicles of the events of the day, and there is no doubt that women are poorly represented in these texts.

From studies of elite Ottoman women, we can construct the following brief narrative of women's roles in palace and high-ranking families. Coming into the Ottoman state via royal marriage, slavery or conquest, women of the royal household in the early Ottoman state were an integral part of international politics and diplomacy. Peirce has argued that the classical Ottoman model of an imperial household developed because princesses of conquered or allied regimes brought a trail of their own connections into the house of Osman, entangling the sultans in domestic politics of little interest or use to the state, and opening the possibilities of actions which were treasonous within the Ottoman context, but entirely loyal to the princesses' natal households.<sup>24</sup> Women of intellect and political savvy occasionally made it into the records of political history and the public eye, not simply as scandalous sources of *fitna* (discord), but also as exemplars of Muslim womanhood. They did so primarily through the public display of two qualities: one being erudition, and the other a mastery of what a well-designed *waqflvakıf* (pious endowment) could accomplish both for one's public and for one's heirs. In addition, individual women of piety such as Rabi'a al-Adawiyya have long played important literary roles as exemplars of faith and as teachers and as mystics within the Sufi tradition.<sup>25</sup> In addition, if we follow the money, we find that when classical Islamic law prevailed over local custom, Muslim women were granted the right to inalienable property won by inheritance or marriage (*mehr*, the form of dowry paid to the bride directly), but this tradition, in the Mediterranean basin, Mesopotamia and Indian subcontinent, was almost always in conflict with other pre-Islamic and concurrent minority forms of dowry which amounted to brideprices, reducing daughters and widows to costly commodities devoid of their own property rights.<sup>26</sup>

In women's status as in so many things, the Ottoman state developed a uniquely flexible and pragmatic compound of Islamic law and practice, Turco-Mongol law and mores and, at the local level, from the Balkans to Iraq to North Africa, the addition of pre-existing and co-existing religious and legal practices. In its extreme meritocracy of slaves in the early *devşirme* and janissary institutions; in replacing feudal landlords in the Balkans and warlord kings in southwest Asia and North Africa with an institution of local rule nearly devoid of individual property rights; in the parallel reduction of royal women to consorts, not wives; in instituting the one-mother/one-son rule delineated by Leslie Peirce, the Ottoman Empire crafted an empire in which the ruling elite were profoundly dependent on the favour and fortunes of the ruling household. Agricultural production units and urban properties alike were subject to confiscation by the state, a situation which revived the concept of *waqf/vakıf* not only of providing charity, but also as a means of alienating wealth from the state, of building monuments to one's piety and

accomplishments and, not coincidentally, of providing sinecures for one's descendants. Even as the state declined, adapted, or sedentarized in the early modern era, the institutions of *mehr* and *vakıf* endured in Ottoman *sharia* courts.<sup>27</sup> In building and endowing soup kitchens, mosque complexes, hospitals, clean water sources and religious retreats, elite Ottoman women built their legacies into the infrastructure and social fabric of Ottoman cities and countryside. They provided employment at all levels, from elite military architects idled in the off seasons of warfare through conceptual artists of *muqarnas* (ornamental carving), ceramics and calligraphy, to stone masons and mosque cleaners and cooks exercising a fairly basic culinary repertoire in soup kitchens large and small. As in the Mamluk era in Egypt, a few elite women and daughters of Ottoman scholarly families also left records of themselves in manuscripts, primarily of poetry and musical composition, or even as instructors in the sciences of the Koran.<sup>28</sup> As well, we know that women held performative roles in celebrations of *mawlid an-nabih* (the birthday of the Prophet) and as storytellers of secular tales within the household.<sup>29</sup> We have much yet to learn about religious minority women's history in the Ottoman era; ironically, we are finding much of our evidence of minority women in *sharia* court records.<sup>30</sup> Early modern Ottoman women seem to have contributed primarily in three ways, then, to intellectual history: first as patrons building mosque complexes and neighbourhood schools, second as patrons of male and female producers of knowledge, and third and more rarely as writers themselves, primarily as poets. Beginning in the 1870s, Ottoman society would see a revival of this pattern as a few elite women became prominent in the new newspaper debates and pamphleteering of the Hamidian era. Rapidly, however, these women were joined and eventually outnumbered by far humbler folk.

### *Elite and non-elite women in the modern era*

Scholars of the Ottoman Empire's longest century<sup>31</sup> have, oddly, lagged behind scholars of the early modern era in searching for traces of women in historical records. This is due in large part to the force of Kemalism's portrayal of the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century empire as an obsolete regime compounded of superstition, religion and Oriental despotism. Moreover, the Hamidian and Young Turk eras produced thousands upon thousands of bureaucratic records as well as serials, books, and pamphlets, as both the bureaucracy and the publishing sphere expanded at the end of the nineteenth century.<sup>32</sup> Put bluntly, it simply takes time and many scholars to work through the record, and there are key topics that have yet to see full monograph treatment—cholera and quarantine, for example, or conscription and other military aspects of the continuous wars from the 1870s through the 1920s. Recently, two books on late Ottoman educational reforms respectively written by Selçuk Akşin Somel (in both German and English) and Benjamin Fortna have given brilliant proof of what the Ottoman archives can tell us not only about the ruling elites, but also about ordinary subjects of the empire.<sup>33</sup> In Turkish, Serpil Çakır's book on women's organizations in the Young Turk era

detailed the scope of political, professional and economic activity possible for female workers in the new technological workplaces of telegraph and telephone offices, and the Istanbul Library of Women's Works has collected in one place photocopies of late Ottoman print materials and has published detailed indices of some.<sup>34</sup> Nonetheless, when I arrived in Istanbul in 1990 to start reading Ottoman women's and family magazines in earnest, I was told in all seriousness by a number of Turkish friends and colleagues outside of women's studies, and echoing what I'd been taught in the US, that women in the era of Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909) really couldn't read or write in significant numbers. I was further informed that the print production for and by women could have left only a very limited record of the writings of only elite women, analogous to Mamluk or Ottoman women in the early modern era, such as Fatma Âliye from a scholarly family, or Leyla Sâz as a musician and intimate of the royal family. Nora Şeni's article on satire and fashion in the late nineteenth century focuses on such women to great effect, beginning with Fatma Âliye's arguments about modernity and dress, and then presenting several images from the early satirical press of the 1870s and afterwards. Her approach gives us a window onto ordinary people's perceptions, as cartoons are easily grasped by non-literate or marginal literates happening upon these images in coffeehouses, schools, private homes. Still, for words of women, we were forced to rely on the self-invention of Halide Edip and other elite memoirists who constructed their pre-revolutionary memories, of the Hamidian era in particular, as a grim, oppressive backdrop to the heroics of liberation and independence (national and female) suggested in the Young Turk era, and clearly articulated in the Kemalist era.<sup>35</sup> The notion that ordinary women could read, write, and publish arguments about women's status seemed risible.

What I found in the print record, however, turned this particular cliché upside down, and led me to conclude that an innovation of the Hamidian print record was the increasing activity of non-elite authors, including hundreds of contributors who were known only by first names and sometimes educational accomplishments, such as Tatime, a graduate of the Üsküdar middle school', or subjects of articles like Tatime Hanım, a graduate of the imperial midwives' school'. It also mattered that these gazettes were cheap and widely available in the cities of the empire, that they were illustrated to aid the marginally literate, and that their publishers saw themselves as leaders in a civic embrace of state-sponsored reforms. In essence, Hamidian writers for and about women presented themselves as running an extracurricular school to produce patriotic Ottomans through light, entertaining fiction, gossip and anecdotes, as well as earnest, well-wrought arguments primarily about the most effective forms of education, how to be a patriotic consumer, and the role of members of conjugal households in building the Ottoman nation. From this perspective, the record of an ephemeral medium, most often ending up as scratch paper or to wrap garbage rather than being carefully bound and displayed on the shelves of private libraries, can give us clues to how reforms promulgated by state actors were accepted, debated, altered by non-governmental actors, ordinary Ottoman men, women and children.

### The Ottomans' 'Age of Empire'<sup>36</sup>

The identities of modern Ottoman subjects—children, women and men—were highly contested throughout the nineteenth century, the age of the overtly modern and Western overseas empire, when Istanbul was the seat of one of the last great land-based empires. In addition to being left out of the colonial race, indeed fending off colonization itself, the state was further weakened by landward conquests of the Austrian Habsburgs to the west and the Russian Empire to the north and east. The state became more interventionist as it attempted to compete for the ever-rising stakes of modernity. Or by another reading, the state became interventionist in ways more recognizable as such within Western notions of state-society relations. Censuses, for example, were not new to the Ottomans, but they were put to new purposes in the nineteenth century. The concept of universal, co-educational primary education was also not new to the Middle East, and in fact has strong roots in Islam as a self-described religion of the book, but in the course of the century the Ottomans took the bulk of education out of the religious branch of government and put it under a new Ministry of Education, and its mission was broadened and redefined along explicitly Western models.<sup>37</sup> While this was ostensibly a movement from one branch of government to another, or a superseding of a traditional branch by a modern one, it was also a transition from *laissez-faire* administration to more directive formation of the polity in the bodies and minds of the empire's children.

Faced with the task of governing an empire and with appealing as caliph to a non-Ottoman Muslim constituency of increasingly inflected diversity, Abdülhamid II attempted to centralize the power of the state in his hands, but he pursued centralization less in the name of keeping up with the European Joneses and more in the name of Islam and the prerogatives of Ottoman monarchy. Like his contemporaries in Japan, he pursued a vigorous policy of defensive Westernization aimed at shoring up his own state on as many of its own terms as could be preserved in the modern era.<sup>38</sup> He looked to traditions for authority and endurance and to the West for techniques of administration, industry and finance. The result was a state with all the traditional authoritarian superstructure of the Ottoman Empire overlaid on a rapidly modernizing and shifting infrastructure of bureaucracies for education, policing and justice among others. This infrastructure in turn flexed uneasily around a splintering social order. Compounding the stresses on state and society were the tens of thousands of refugees flowing into the Empire from the Balkans and elsewhere from the late 1870s after the establishment of the Turkish Republic.

The Hamidian state was a highly original creation, a conscious and intricate merger of recreated Islamic traditions with Western statecraft and technology. Hamidian ministers of state, provincial governors and state and municipal bureaucrats effected dramatic changes in education, commerce and manufactures, and the expansion of each of these spheres reshaped Ottoman society at all levels. The desperate struggle for economic and political survival, pursued through



adaptation, resistance and subversion of Western agendas, was in part facilitated by the forbidding figure of the Sultan. His public stance of Islamic modernism, with its emphasis on Islam and resistance to the West, legitimated many of the Westernizing innovations that bureaucrats and governors brought into the empire during his reign. This dynamic of transcendental appeal and particular adaptation created a matrix which increasing numbers of Ottoman subjects, both male and female, were able to manipulate to become not passive victims of Islamic despotism and Western capital, but makers of their own modernity.

For example, while much of the empire's economy was under the direction of the European Ottoman Public Debt Administration, the PDA was formed as a preventive against default and it worked to guarantee greater access by Ottomans to foreign loans and to make the empire more attractive for direct investment, ultimately becoming an integral part of the Ottoman economy, and one which bureaucrats and entrepreneurs cannily exploited as a resource.<sup>39</sup> Officials of the state used patronage and policy to create openings for Ottoman subjects to take on aggressively protectionist and entrepreneurial roles in the struggle to regain Ottoman autonomy, dominion and self-respect, and they were increasingly met halfway or more and were forced to respond to innovative demands for action by elements of non-official society. As a result, new actors on the scene, such as Muslim capitalist entrepreneurs, newly skilled workers, professional men and women and ethnic nationalists, did not spring full-blown from the mind of the Young Turks or Kemalists as was later claimed. Rather, they created themselves initially in the new and highly complex avenues to profit and persuasion constructed by Hamidian state-society interactions between 1876 and 1908.

### **The Hamidian press**

The serial press of Istanbul and other major port cities was a site of this new Muslim entrepreneurship operating within what was perhaps the densest and most manipulable matrix of Hamidian society-state interactions, censorship carried on by three branches of government: Education, Interior and Police. Journalists and publishers in particular produced local manufactures from foreign and local raw and finished materials when they collected, translated, argued about and disseminated ideas and information from the empire and around the world. The business of publishing was extremely active throughout the empire, as evidenced in Istanbul alone in Babı Ali Caddesi's printing houses, and in news kiosks and vendors throughout the city. In the provinces as well, calendars, yearbooks, industrial manuals, cheap fiction and non-fiction paperbacks were available, and new school-books and other instructional materials were distributed at all levels from primary and secondary schools up through the new professional schools. A distinct and highly active category within this growing sphere of readership and published materials was made up of inexpensive serials and books in the popular press.<sup>40</sup>

Archival records of conflicts over enforcement of rules and regulations make it clear that censorship procedures, carried out under three different press laws and dozens of minor regulations promulgated by competing ministries, could be quite flexible, up to the extreme resort of exile and forcing publications abroad.<sup>41</sup> This could lead to at least two interpretations. One would be that censorship was ineffective, weakened by patronage, corruption and conflicts among ministries. A second interpretation would be that the overlapping and contradictory press regulations allowed for selective punishment on the one hand and selective promotion on the other of journalists and publications, so that several responses were possible to any perceived offence. From this perspective, the ability of individual bureaucrats and high officials, including the Sultan himself, to enforce separate and indeed conflicting regulations at will, allowed government personnel to exercise more nuanced control over the press than is implied in current historiography. It is clear that a savvy negotiator of patronage and the law could manipulate the system and its enforcers to the benefit of his or her press or publications.<sup>42</sup> The resulting picture is not one of closed loopholes and closed doors, but something much more fluid. Censors and publishers were not only struggling in conflicts of repression and expression; they were also, more subtly, manipulating each other's interests and allegiances, with the result that late Ottoman publishing was, like other late Ottoman sectors, 'vital, creative, evolving and diverse'.<sup>43</sup>

This was perhaps nowhere more evident than in the segment of the press aimed at households. In contrast to the journals of the new professional schools, or the publications aimed at an intellectual elite, family magazines such as *Çocuklara Mahsûs Gazete* and *Resimli Gazete* were inexpensive, literally and figuratively lightweight, and illustrated both for entertainment and to facilitate comprehension for newly or marginally literate readers. These magazines pursued explicitly didactic missions, describing themselves as either supplementing the curricula of the schools for young readers, or picking up where schooling left off for adult readers. Unlike later Young Turk magazines which carried singles advertisements and discussed male-female socializing, those late Ottoman magazines in Turkish that were aimed at a particular audience tended to break down along lines of professional, official, or household audiences, rather than by single or married status. Women's magazines, produced by both men and women for a female readership, actually were meant to be consumed by families, as they were written for wives and mothers, and often carried puzzles and riddles for young readers to solve as did the other general-audience or family magazines of the time (see [Figure 4.2](#)). The ones that succeeded did so through attracting advertising, subscribers and sales at news kiosks and bookstores; and also by negotiating the legal terrain created by press laws and regulations and, more importantly, patterns of enforcement. They have therefore left scholars a rich record of discussions and negotiations of public and private identities at the meeting point of state and society.



Figure 4.2 Advertisement in Greek and faux Japanese styles.

Namık Kemal began publishing a women’s supplement to his scientific and literary gazette in the 1860s, and this practice was revived in the Hamidian era. By the 1880s, however, magazines entirely for women were founded with some frequency, many folding after a short run, others lasting anywhere from a year to fourteen years. *Aile* (Family), for example, was founded in 1880 and published only three issues. *İnsaniyet* (Humanity) published two issues in 1882 and 1883. *Mürüvvet* (Munificence) published nine issues in 1887. *Parça bohçası* (Rag Bag) published one issue in 1889. *Hanımlara mahsûs malûmat* (a women’s supplement to *Malûmat*, a scientific and illustrated gazette) lasted for several issues in 1895. *Kadın* (Woman), one of several publications after the 1908 revolution bearing this title (as opposed to *Hanım* or ‘Lady’), began publication in 1911 and issued twenty-six biweekly magazines before closing in 1912. The hardy survivor among these magazines was *Hanımlara mahsûs gazete* (Ladies’ Own Gazette), which not only thrived for fourteen years (1895–1909), but also published its own auxiliary for girls and a separate gazette for children, and was financially successful enough

to found its own press. It circulated throughout the empire and into Europe and Russia, and in its pages we can trace the results of Hamidian reforms in education as well as changes in the economic and social environment. While *Hanımlara mahsûs gazete* has been mentioned occasionally in studies of Turkish women, it has generally been variously dismissed as an upper-class phenomenon, a publication severely restricted by stiff Hamidian censorship, and in any case not readable, since the vast proportion of women were presumed to be illiterate—in short, a pre-Kemalist failure, a fiction of literacy.<sup>44</sup>

In fact, the first writers for the magazine were indeed daughters of high civic officials and the occasional princess, contributing poetry, fiction, original musical compositions, and high-minded essays on women's place in society. Makbûle Leman, the first managing editor, was the daughter of Murad V's *kahvecibaşı* and later the wife of Mehmed Fuad Bey, one of the members of the Council of State; she began publishing her poetry and topical essays in serials in 1882. After attending a girls' primary school, she continued her studies privately, and argued vigorously for women to dedicate themselves to education.<sup>45</sup> As editor of *Hanımlara mahsûs gazete*, she shepherded to publication dozens of articles besides her own about education as a patriotic pursuit, and discussing the various ways other nations educated their children, both boys and girls. Her death in 1898 after a long illness, possibly tuberculosis, occasioned several columns' worth of eulogies in prose, poetry, and epistolary form, and her poetry and essays were still being published in magazines ten years after her death.<sup>46</sup> Other society luminaries rushed to grace this new publishing endeavour with their accomplishments. Leyla Sâz, daughter of an elite family and intimate of the palace, submitted original songs, with full musical notation produced on the page; the famous poet Nigâr bint Osman produced lyrical odes. In their courtly, Persianate flights of song and word we can see the late fruits of the long history of *harem* education for elite women. Under the editorial guidance of a series of female editors, we can see over the next several years the formation of new genres of literary craft emerging not only as Middle Eastern female praxis but also as harbingers, both in the authors and in their texts, of the many forms that modern womanhood would take in the Ottoman Empire and its successor states throughout the Middle East. Here I will discuss trends in Hamidian women's magazines in general, but focus primarily on *Hanımlara mahsûs gazete*, since it had the longest run and allows us to track these pivotal changes in a coherent manner as fits a short article.

From the statement of purpose on the first page of the first issue of *Hanımlara mahsûs gazete*, which was typical of editorial statements in women's magazines of the era, it is clear that education was central to the editors' vision of a reformist and progressive Ottoman state: 'thoughtful and capable persons measure the degree of women's attainments and knowledge in order to plan carefully a nation's progress.'<sup>47</sup> The editors and publisher personalized their obligatory encomia to the Sultan by situating his 'bounty' and his 'care' within the attention shown to educational reforms. They specifically named his support of the Women's Teachers Training College (founded 1870) and the Girls' Crafts Schools, as well



Figure 4.3 Woman at writing desk.

as his expansion of primary and middle schools for girls. The first indication they gave of their own publishing goals was that the magazine was intended to be a means for a woman to continue her education after leaving school, once she was in the midst of raising children. The ultimate benefit of education was then stated: without educated women, the entire structure of society was at risk of crumbling at its foundation, the family.<sup>48</sup>

Some daughters of educated and progressive elite families were sent to the new public schools, mixing there with orphans and other girls of lower classes, as was the case in Japan at roughly the same time (a similarity that was not lost on Ottoman readers, who were bombarded with comparisons of Meiji and Hamidian modernization programmes).<sup>49</sup> Fanny Davis described two such, one who attended an arts and crafts school, and another who attended one of the new public upper schools for girls. The first, Hamiyet Hanım, was born to Minister of Education Suphi Pasha in 1876, and studied at the Leylî girls' arts and crafts school founded by her father. 'During the First Balkan War of 1912, she founded the Esirgeme, a society for the protection of refugees...[and she was] active in the...Red Crescent Society.'<sup>50</sup> Nimet Hanım was the daughter of another educator and palace official who attended the International Congress of Orientalists in 1894 and 1897. At the age of 10, after several years of study at the Emirgân girls' secondary school, she travelled with her father to the International Congress of Geography in 1895. She worked in a gender-segregated section of the Ministry of Finance during the First World War, and published a travellers' account of Lebanon in 1906.<sup>51</sup>

Fatma Âliye, the first contributor to *Hanımlara mahsûs gazete* to write a feature article on women and education, was in many ways typical of the first cadre of contributors to early magazines in the 1880s. The daughter of a prominent reformer, Cevdet Pasha (see Christoph Neumann's chapter), she pursued a literary career as a translator, novelist, and essayist after an education at home.<sup>52</sup> According to Carter Findley's interpretation, she pursued her education in a highly fluid family environment determined by extended household relations among the elite, and in her case in particular also by a mix of paternal indulgence, oversight, and eventually active support and promotion by both her blood father and her literary father and biographer, Ahmed Midhat. In Ahmed Midhat's biography of Fatma Âliye, her brother seemed to be her only consistent ally; she shared his lessons.<sup>53</sup> She obtained her first French lessons in secret, until her father discovered her with a French alphabet book and responded by hiring a French tutor for her. Her husband, Faik Pasha, stood in ever-shifting positions; at one moment he was burning her French novels because he disapproved of novel-reading, and the next he was supporting her efforts to translate a novel they read together, George Ohnet's *Volonté*.<sup>54</sup> Indeed one of her pioneering efforts was in writing novels, first of all, an untraditional literary production for women, and in writing novels that portrayed the hypocrisies of traditional marriages and households and, at the same time, the hazards of romantic love and of carelessly borne wealth and privilege. By the 1890s, Fatma Âliye had broken through as a public intellectual, writing not only in the scandalous medium of the novel, but also instructing her many readers on the differences between women's status in the Muslim and Christian worlds, on the merits of education for women, and a wide variety of other topics.<sup>55</sup>

In 1895, Fatma Âliye published an article entitled, 'Let us take warning from the bluestockings!' (she used the French term, *bas-bleus*, transliterated into Ottoman Turkish).<sup>56</sup> Here she showed one of the qualities which made her a successful writer within the state reformist constraints of the Hamidian era: couching her appeals for Ottoman progress within calls to support the Muslim community and defend the reputation of Islam. In 1891, she had published an influential text, *Nisvân-i İslam* (The Women of Islam), which was to be translated eventually into French and Arabic, through the latter entering a larger sphere of contestation over Islam and modernity. Written in the form of three debates with European women in Istanbul, the book discussed slavery, polygyny, natural science, and theological points of difference between Islam and Christianity, and made comparisons between European and Ottoman dress, and between marriage and divorce in Europe and in Islam.<sup>57</sup> She presented biographies of the wives of the prophet and other prominent Muslim women, which were often serialized during Ramadan in various family magazines, in keeping with the recasting of Muslim historical figures as precursors to an essentially Muslim modernity that figured in the *salafiyya* movement. In her article on blue-stockings, she portrayed these independent European women of letters as models of wit and erudition, even as she scolded them for their scandalous behaviour and bad reputations. The lesson was that Ottoman women should pursue literacy and wide knowledge, but still

behave like proper ladies who know their places—at home primarily, but with some severely circumscribed public roles as exemplars of progress and civilization:

Men, when they start to enter that treasure house [of knowledge], are envious of the women following them and want to keep from them the jewels of the treasury. It is as if they obstinately wish to see their right of precedence as a right of property. This is one of those things that has been and always will be. Knowledge is one of the benefits which the very munificent God, the possessor of knowledge and superiority, granted to his slaves all together both men and women.<sup>58</sup>

These arguments were familiar to Ottoman readers by the 1890s, as they had been forwarded already by Namık Kemal in the 1860s in his pioneering supplement for women to his newspaper, and by Şemseddin Sâmî in the 1880s, but were couched more cautiously and placatingly by this female author. As Nermin Abadan-Unat wrote of these early women's productions, there was a 'certain ambiguity' to their arguments, forwarding claims of women's abilities, but restricting their deployment of skills.<sup>59</sup> In fact, it would turn out that these arguments had begun to seem a bit tired to their readers by the late 1890s, as the style of arguing for expansion of education became more direct, analytical of current trends, and confrontational. As the century turned, the ambiguities would increasingly lean in a new direction, towards more public roles for women, and for women not only as mothers of the nation, but also as teachers and healers of the nation, and fighters for its liberation from foreign economic domination.

Ayşe Sıdıka was, like Fatma Âliye, a transitional figure but more modern in her training and in her professional practice, moving directly from graduation to employment. Daughter of a Topkapı Palace teacher (*enderun hoca*), she attended a Greek school, the Zaption, before enrolling in the Women's Teacher Training College. On graduation in 1891, she became an instructor in pedagogy, though she was also noted for her traditional skills such as embroidery and music, and a fairly modern skill for women, painting.<sup>60</sup> By 1899, eight years after her graduation, she was head of the upper school of the Women's Teacher Training College, and a published author both in serials and in at least one bound monograph. Her book, *The Principles of Education and Training*, was reviewed by one A.Rasime (surely a pseudonym for the prolific journalist Ahmet Rasim, himself a transitional figure, from child schooled in a state orphanage and public schools, to famous author) shortly after its publication. His review of her book was a jumping-off point for his own ideas about pedagogy. He began with a protracted discussion of the word '*terbiye*' one of the Ottoman words available in Ottoman for 'education' with an implication of 'upbringing' as well as schooling, defining it for his audience, who are scolded in this way: There can be no doubt that *terbiye* is one of the words not at all understood among us, or utterly mistakenly understood.<sup>61</sup> Rasim(e) applauded Ayşe Sıdıka's arguments against rote learning (an encryption for education in traditional Qur'an schools), and detailed her discussion of 'such



sciences as physiology, protection of the health, the science of morals, and psychology' in describing the ideal curriculum for children. Rasim(e) inveighed against the notion that an educated child is a quiet and submissive child without any sign of individuality, and wrote that those who preferred old-fashioned teaching, consisting of word-by-word transcription, to modern methods which developed both body and mind, were profoundly misguided. That sort of training produced monkeys instead of children, while proper *terbiye* could develop not only the child's body and mind, but also his or her morals. Ayşe Sıdıka further argued that moral character was critical in a teacher, and that it was preferable for Muslim students to be taught by Muslim teachers. In the meeting of two like minds apparent in Rasim(e)'s review, we can glimpse the sort of education offered to children in the thousands of new state schools founded during the Hamidian era, by two graduates of state schools. The puzzle and riddle contest sections of family magazines also encouraged active engagement with a wide variety of knowledge and critical thinking styles, with children who succeeded in having their photographs published in some of the leading general-interest magazines of the day (see [Figure 4.1](#)).

### **Non-elite women in modern Ottoman intellectual history**

Within a year of its founding, *Hanımlara mahsûs gazete* had been taken over almost entirely by professional journalists and schoolteachers, and this was the trend for most women's magazines intended for a general audience. The wife of the publisher was herself an entrepreneur, running an *atelier* producing European fashions interpreted for the Ottoman market. Through her involvement as well as entrepreneurs like the publisher himself and a wide variety of advertisers, the magazine opens a window on changing patterns of consumption. The journalists, schoolteachers and entrepreneurs of *Hanımlara mahsûs gazete* and its less successful competitors, along with the writers of hundreds of letters to the editors and authors in these publications, have left us a record of their attitudes and activities, one that conveys conflict rather than consensus over the results of Hamidian reforms. Key to most of these magazines' success was their promotion of Hamidian reforms, such as the new girls' elementary, secondary and industrial arts schools, coverage of fashion not only as style and *şık* (chic), but also promoting the purchase of goods which were made and sold locally rather than imported from abroad. This magazine went beyond advertising to set up its own mail-order business (*sipariş odası*), which subscribers outside the city could use to order Istanbul goods.<sup>62</sup> Moreover, the publisher's wife offered discounts on her goods and tailoring services to the magazine's subscribers.<sup>63</sup>

I have argued elsewhere that the magazine's success can be attributed to a number of factors: the commercial and political savvy of its publisher and editors, combined with Sultanic and/or high bureaucratic patronage, or at the very least a savvy negotiation of censorship and self-censorship. In addition, it may well have survived in large measure because of its trivial appearance amid dozens of other



publications undergoing censorship over military and political affairs in the Ottoman Turkish, Arabic, Greek, Armenian and European languages. Silliness, though, has long been used as a disguise for serious intent, and most cheap, illustrated magazines, including the satirical magazines of the briefly vibrant satirical press of the first two years of the Young Turk era, leavened their serious texts with entertainment and trivia.<sup>64</sup> The serious goals of most scientific and artistic gazettes were articulated in their mastheads and elaborated in feature articles, and women's magazines followed this model, claiming that their intent was to enable women to continue their education after leaving school and, more fundamentally, to train women to be good Muslims, good wives and able mothers of loyal Ottoman subjects. To this end, feature articles focused on theories of education and childrearing, the roles of family members (including guidelines on how to get along with one's stepchildren), nutrition, disease prevention and treatment, public appearance and activities of Ottoman Muslim women, and lessons in the geography, ethnography and civilizational status of the world beyond the Ottoman Empire. It is also worth considering, however, whether the magazine survived not just because it entertained and informed, but also because its staff wrote in ways that appealed to its readers, more direct than the poetry of Nigâr Hanım, more useful than sheet music from Leyla Sâz, less conciliatory to one's opponents than Fatma Âliye. Also, the magazine attracted advertisers marketing practical household goods and services, even as its feature articles articulated moralistic and patriotic responses to those goods and services.

Gülistan İsmet, the first Muslim Ottoman graduate of the Constantinople Women's College, became a professional journalist, contributing weekly to different magazines for women and for general audiences. One of her interests was in teaching Ottoman women to be critical in their reception of European fashions, and also to teach them to be self-sufficient; in 1902, she translated an entire sewing manual from English into Ottoman Turkish for a series in *Hanımlara mahsûs gazete*, a series that was interrupted by a perennial feature, an article arguing against wearing the corsets necessary to fit into the wasp-waisted European fashions of westernized Istanbul, barely disguised by the close-fitting overcoats of the new veiling. The article does not convey the ambiguity suggested by Abadan-Unat, as its title was in the imperative: 'Do not wear the corset!' Abandoning the circuitous, indirect style of the 1880s and early 1890s, Gülistan İsmet detailed for her readers the broken ribs, constricted lungs, and depressed circulation of a woman wearing the corset, and argued vigorously that it should be abandoned altogether. In the same issue, however, we see remnants of early ambiguity, with a fashion illustration of an outfit so disproportionately small-waisted that it could only have been worn by a woman wearing a corset underneath (see [Figure 4.4](#)).

The main themes of Ottoman women's and family magazines from the mid-1890s onwards were these: education, modern culture, modernity itself, the adoption of social Darwinism as a measure of progress and civilization, work inside and outside the home, the foreign within and without the empire, economic and other kinds of patriotism, and the slow whittling down of multiethnic,



Figure 4.4 Effects of corsetry.

multi-confessional variants of Ottoman patriotism to the narrower scope of Ottoman Muslim patriotism. *Hanımlara mahsûs gazete* presented, in nearly every issue, short items about foreign women entering professional life, qualifying as doctors, forming unions, being invited to join professional honorary associations. The editors frequently included statistics on the numbers of Western women in various professions, such as secretarial, accounting, architecture, publishing and advertising. At the same time, these exemplars of Western progress were set against frequent discussions of Ottoman and Muslim women's productive and reproductive capabilities as framed in an anti-colonial rhetoric, presenting an Islamic critique of capitalism and Western mores, which were identified increasingly with minority communities within the empire. In addition, the greatly expanded public education system under Abdülhamid II was both a conduit towards and site for women's employment as schoolteachers, as skilled workers and as foot soldiers in the frontlines of the economic warfare over markets and manufacture.

### The Young Turk era

1908 ushered in marked changes throughout the serial press, with invocations to progress and modernity uttered in a new highly charged rhetoric of constitutional monarchy, one that had formerly only been seen in banned and foreign publications of the Young Turks in exile.<sup>65</sup> This rhetoric, as well as opposition to it for two brief years before the establishment of a central censor's office, rippled throughout the press, in family magazines, in satirical magazines, and in women's magazines as well. A striking change for women's magazines is that they were almost all renamed to include not the old Ottoman term for lady, *hanım*, but a more ordinary and by that time scientized term, woman or *kadın*: *Kadın* (published in Salonica from 1908 to 1909), *Kadınlar Âlemi/The World of Women* (1914), and *Kadınlar dünyası/Women's World* (1913–21), whose editors from the Organization for the Defence of Women's Rights made this statement of purpose: This is an illustrated gazette for the defence of the rights and benefits of womanhood. Our pages are open to works of Ottoman ladies [*hanımlar*] without distinction by sex or religion.<sup>66</sup> At the other end of the spectrum were relatively expensive fashion magazines, with full-colour covers showing off the latest print technology available in Istanbul, such as *Mehâsin* (Personal Charms or Beautiful Features) [1908], and the lush *Resimli Ay* (Illustrated Monthly) with its Orientalist depictions of modern women. Their pages were filled with courtship advice, pictures of the latest flapper fashions and of women and men dancing together, as well as photos and explanations of gymnastic exercises, and in general were another level up in frankness and directness, including using photos instead of line drawings, from the magazines of the late Hamidian era. As well, Ottoman Muslim women were featured in the illustrations, whereas before 1908 a fashion illustration or advertisement for the latest veiling fad would be depicted on a European woman (fashion) or as a disembodied garment (over-garments and veils). These serials also carried forward earlier trends in discussion: education as the key to a modern life and a modern, progressive society, scientific housewifery and the raising of healthy children, selective consumption of Western fashions and mores, boycotting foreign products in favour of local goods, and even their frankly feminist arguments had their predecessors in the writings of Hamidian journalists and readers who styled themselves anonymously 'bir feminist' or just Tatime from the Üsküdar secondary school' (see [Figure 4.5](#)).

By 1915, at least one member of the old Ottoman elite had come to refuse the European fashions in which she was photographed earlier in her life entirely in favour of local manufactures:

Fatma Alié is a feminist. She is strongly in favour of women leading an active, useful life, and working at a profession if necessary, but she is decidedly opposed to the adoption of European fashions in literary style, as well as in clothing and furniture. To her the picturesque stuffs of Broussa are worth more than all the wares in the shops of Paris put together, and to her



*Figure 4.5* Women boating.

neat compromise between a dressing gown and a dress which covers her uncorseted form and to her easy, if not elegant, slippers, she will remain faithful to the end of her days.<sup>67</sup>

What is startling about this sudden change is not that it happened, but that it is described as sudden at all. From the era of Abdülhamid II and his reformers, and their Tanzimat predecessors, through to the Kemalist era, we can trace a clear series of continuities, as has long been argued for the rest of Ottoman-to-Turkish politics and society, in the ways women were taken as objects of reform, inhabited their newly allowed identities, and then struggled to take those identities in new directions and into new arenas of public life.

### **Conclusion**

Here I have constructed a survey narrative of women's intellectual history as understood at the moment—with the pleasant caveat that more research is being carried out and published in Turkey and abroad. The progress of the last decade has been remarkable. At the same time, I have argued that a preoccupation of many

scholars—the search for an ‘Ottoman women’s movement’—has obscured the history of ordinary people, but that with the tools of intellectual history and social history (such as archival research and cross-reading of other sources) combined, scholars can capture the activities of women that were not overtly political or carried out in groups led by alpha females, but that nonetheless had a political effect. Ottoman women of the late Hamidian era, like their sisters elsewhere in the world at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, both acted for themselves and were used as objects of reform in this era. What I would highlight for the time being is the creativity, endurance and commitment with which late Ottoman journalists and publishers—female and male—carried out their mission to aid the Sultan in ensuring ‘civilization and progress’ of the empire in matters large and small. They marked out a path followed through revolution, war, and revolution again, as women struggled to define themselves in a rapidly changing environment of patriarchal reforms. As such, from the 1890s onward, women came to assume a wider variety of places in Ottoman intellectual life. The elite avant-garde of the 1870s and 1880s was joined in the 1890s by a broader cohort of ordinary, educated women who expanded women’s spheres of action through the classroom and other workplace settings. Their scope of action was still constrained by top-down reforms and social attitudes, but was nonetheless critically important for understanding the late Ottoman era, not simply as a failed predecessor for another era, but in and of itself. The Young Turk and Kemalists eras each brought stronger state support for Ottoman and then Turkish women to take leading roles in public life, to work outside the home while producing healthy children for the nation in a ‘proper’ Ottoman or Turkish home—an 8-arm juggling act which women in Turkey and elsewhere continue to improvise. The revolutions of the Young Turks and the Kemalists did not, however, mark an end to top-down reform in the name of progress for the nation; it was simply renamed (top-down) ‘liberation’ in the name of progress for the nation. Examining how elite and ordinary women have been instrumentalized by the state in all of Turkey’s modern history allows us to turn a critical eye on the question of how elite and ordinary men, women, and children have been instrumentalized by the current state, and what they have done or do now in response.

### Notes

- 1 See, for example, Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961.
- 2 Fanny Davis anticipated much current research in her *The Ottoman Lady: A Social History from 1718–1918*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986.
- 3 See, for example, A.Afetinan, *The Emancipation of the Turkish Woman*, Paris: UNESCO, 1962.
- 4 Nermin Abadan-Unat, *Women in the Developing World: Evidence from Turkey*, Denver: University of Denver, 1986, p. 12. See also Emel Dođramacı, *Türkiye’de kadının dünü ve bugünü*, Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1989.

- 5 Ibid., p. 13.
- 6 For non-specialist readers, it should be noted that the cataloguing of several classes of archival documents is still ongoing, so that the holdings available to researchers change rapidly from year to year.
- 7 Madeline Zilfi, *Women in the Ottoman Empire: Middle Eastern Women in the Early Modern Era*, Leiden: Brill, 1997, p. 4. By 'post-Annalistes' era I refer to work done after French historians such as Lucien Febvre, Fernand Braudel, and Marc Bloch, who began to work intensively in local and national archives to recover the histories of ordinary, non-literate people left out of earlier Great Man (and the occasional Great Woman) History.
- 8 Some examples include Şirin Tekeli (ed.), *Women in Modern Turkish Society*, London: Zed Books Ltd., 1995, an English translation and update of *Kadın Bakış Açısından: 1980'ler Türkiyesinde Kadınlar*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1990. Also published in German in 1991; Deniz Kandiyoti (ed.), *Women, Islam, and the State*, Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1991; Zehra Arat (ed.), *Deconstructing Images of 'The Turkish Woman'*, New York: St.Martin's Press, 1998.
- 9 Lila Abu-Lughod, *Remaking Women: Feminism and Modernity in the Middle East*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998 is one such volume.
- 10 In Arat, op. cit. Demirdirek has published a number of articles and books in Turkish on women's magazines in the Hamidian and Young Turk eras. See, for example, her *Osmanlı Kadınlarının Hayat Hakkı Arayışının Bir Hikayesi* (A Story of the Ottoman Women's Demand for the Right to Life), Ankara: Imge Kitabevi, 1993.
- 11 Elizabeth B.Frierson, "'Cheap and Easy': Patriotic consumer culture in the late-Ottoman era', in Donald Quataert (ed.), *Consumption in the Ottoman Empire*, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1999.
- 12 Deniz Kandiyoti (ed.), *Women, Islam and the State*, London: Macmillan, 1991, Introduction; and Leila Ahmed, *Women and Gender in Islam*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992, Introduction and [Chapter 1](#).
- 13 Leila Ahmed, op. cit., Beth Baron, *The Women's Awakening in Egypt: Culture, Society, and the Press*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994.
- 14 Leslie Penn Peirce, *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire*, NY: Oxford University Press, 1993; Gülrü Necipoğlu, *Architecture, Ceremonial, and Power: The Topkapı Palace in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991.
- 15 Both of these authors can be found in D.Fairchild Ruggles's edited volume, *Women, Patronage, and Self-Representation in Islamic Societies*, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2000. See also Fanny Davis, op. cit. pp. 217–43.
- 16 See Micklewright's article in Ruggles, op. cit. and Sarah Graham-Brown, *Images of Women: The Portrayal of Women in Photography in the Middle East 1860–1950*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.
- 17 See Faroqi's article in Zilfi, op. cit. and Donald Quataert, 'Ottoman Women, Households, and Textile Manufacturing, 1800–1914', in one of the foundational works in the studies of Middle Eastern and North African women, Nikki Keddie and Beth Baron (eds), *Women in Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries in Sex and Gender*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991.
- 18 Serpil Çakır, *Osmanlı Kadın Hareketi*, İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1993.

- 19 Nicole van Os, 'Taking Care of Soldiers' Families: The Ottoman State and the Muinsiz Aile Maaşı', in Erik Jan Zürcher (ed.), *Arming the State: Military Conscription in the Middle East and Central Asia, 1775–1925*, London: Tauris, 1999.
- 20 Several excellent articles can be found in Şirin Tekeli, *Women in Modern Turkish Society: A Reader*, London: Zed, 1995, (originally published in Turkish in 1990). See also Yeşim Arat, *The Patriarchal Paradox: Women Politicians in Turkey*, Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1989; Elisabeth Özdalga, *The Veiling Issue: Official Secularism and Popular Islam in Modern Turkey*, Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1998; Nilüfer Göle, *The Forbidden Modern: Civilization and Veiling*, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1996.
- 21 See Zilfi's article, "'We Don't Get Along": Women and Hul Divorce in the Eighteenth Century', and Fatma Müge Göçek and Marc David Baer, 'Social Boundaries of Ottoman Women's Experience in Eighteenth-Century Galata Court Records', in Zilfi, op. cit.; and Leslie Peirce, "'She is trouble...and I will divorce her": Orality, Honor and Representation in the Ottoman Court of Aintab', in G.Hambly (ed.), *Women in the Medieval Islamic World: Power, Patronage, Piety*, New York: St.Martin's Press, 1998, pp. 267–300; Nora Şeni, 'Fashion and Women's Satirical Clothing in the Satirical Press of Istanbul at the End of the 19th Century', in Tekeli, op. cit., pp. 24–5; Palmira Brummett, 'Dressing for Revolution: Mother, Nation, Citizen, and Subversive in the Ottoman Satirical Press', in Zehra Arat, op. cit., pp. 37–63.
- 22 Bernard Lewis, editor and translator, *Islam: From the Prophet Muhammad to the Capture of Constantinople*, Volume 2, NY: Oxford University Press, 1974 (and subsequent editions), pp. 89–96.
- 23 Melek Hanım, *Thirty Years in the Harem*, New York, 1872.
- 24 Peirce, op. cit., Introduction and [Chapter 1](#).
- 25 On Rabi'a al-Adawiyya and others like her, see Margaret Smith's classic study, *Rabi'a the Mystic, A.D. 717–801, and her Fellow Saints in Islam: Being the Life and Teachings of Rabi'a al-'Adawiyya al-Qaysiyya, of Basra, Sufi Saint, ca. A.H. 99–185, A.D. 717–801, Together with Some Account of the Place of Women in Islam*, San Francisco: Rainbow Bridge Press, 1977, and Wiebke Walther, *Women in Islam: From Medieval to Modern Times*, Princeton, NJ: Marcus Weiner, 1993 (copyright for English translation, 1981). For a modern Sufi activist, see Julia Clancy-Smith, 'The Shaykh and his Daughter: Coping in Colonial Algeria', in Edmund Burke III (ed.), *Struggle and Survival in the Modern Middle East*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993, and for a more analytical treatment of the same material, her 'The House of Zainab: Female Authority and Sainly Succession in Colonial Algeria', in Keddie and Baron, op. cit.
- 26 Leila Ahmed, op. cit.; see also Elizabeth B.Frierson, 'Mirrors Out, Mirrors In: Domestication and Rejection of the Foreign in Late-Ottoman Women's Magazines (1875–1908)', in Ruggles, op. cit.
- 27 See Dina Khoury, 'Slippers at the Entrance or Behind Closed Doors: Domestic and Public Spaces for Mosul Women', in Zilfi, op. cit.
- 28 See works cited above by Necipoğlu and Thys-Şenocak; on poetry, see Walter Andrews, *Poetry's Voice, Society's Song: Ottoman Lyric Poetry*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1985; on the Mamluks and traditions of learning, see Jonathan Berkey, *The Transmission of Knowledge in Medieval Cairo: A Social*

- History of Islamic Education*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992, esp. his Chapters 6 and 7.
- 29 Halide Edip, *The Clown and His Daughter*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1935, describes a *mawlid* party and other festival occasions where women performed for *harem* audiences.
- 30 Göçek and Baer, op. cit.
- 31 İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun en Uzun Yüzyılı*, İstanbul: Hil Yayınları, 1983.
- 32 See scholars listed in earlier notes, and also for the late Ottoman period see both the content and the bibliographies of Şükrü Hanioglu's comprehensive works in English, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, and also his *Preparation for a Revolution, 1902–08*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Carter V. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Port, 1789–1922*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980, and Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909*, London: Tauris, 1998 are two other scholars who have written archivally rich political histories of the Ottoman elite and state structures.
- 33 Benjamin Carr Fortna, *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, and Selçuk Akşin Somel, *The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839–1908: Islamization, Autocracy, and Discipline*, Leiden: Brill, 2001.
- 34 Toska et al., *Kütüphanelerindeki eski harflı Türkçe kadın dergileri bibliyografyası: (1869–1927)*, İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1993.
- 35 See Elizabeth B. Frierson, *Patriarchal Feminism: Gender and the Public Sphere in the Ottoman Empire*, op. cit. for a discussion of the prima donna-style of memoir-writing and the construction of solo heroines as a model for Turkish women's liberation.
- 36 Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire: 1876–1914*, New York: Vintage Books, 1989.
- 37 Fortna, op. cit. and Somel, op. cit.
- 38 Carol Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985, discussed in Elizabeth B. Frierson 'Unimagined Communities: Press, State, and Gender in the Hamidian Era', PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 1996. Selim Deringil also makes some use of Gluck's paradigm in his *Well-Protected Domains*, op. cit.
- 39 Halil Inalcık and Donald Quataert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1914*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p.774; Zafer Toprak, *Millî İktisat, Millî Burjuvazi*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1995.
- 40 Atilla Çetin, 'El-Cevaib gazetesi ve yayımı', *Tarih Dergisi* vol. 34 (1984), 475; Azmi Özcan, 'The Press and Anglo-Ottoman Relations', *Middle Eastern Studies* vol. 29:1 (January 1993), 111–17; Ziyad Ebuzeziya, 'Abdülhamid Döneminde Basın ve Basın Hareketlerine Bakış', II. *Abdülhamid ve Dönemi: Sempozyum Bildirileri*, 2 Mayıs 1992, İstanbul: İlim kültür ve sanat vakfı Tarih Enstitüsü, 1992, pp. 111–30; Cevdet Kudret, *Abdülhamit devrinde sansür*, İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1977, [Chapter 1](#).
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- Mart 1325/15 March 1909); BEO Maarif Giden 396/9–7 (15 Cemaziyelevvel 1300/12 Mart 1299/23 March 1883), 397/9–8 (25 Zilkade 1318/3 Mart 1317/15 March 1901); BEO Zaptiye Gelen 657/21–8 (20 Rebiyülevvel 1314/18 Ağustos 1312/28 August 1896); BEO Zaptiye Giden 663/21–14 (28 Rebiyülevvel 1314/26 Ağustos 1312/6 September 1896).
- 42 For more detailed analysis of Hamidian censorship, see Elizabeth B.Frierson, *Patriarchal Feminism: Gender and the Public Sphere in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909*, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, forthcoming.
- 43 Donald Quataert, *Technology Transfer and Manufacturing in the Ottoman Empire*, Istanbul: Isis Press, 1992.
- 44 Demirdirek in Zehra Arat, op. cit., p. 66, and others dismiss the Hamidian press in this manner.
- 45 Fanny Davis, op. cit., p. 232.
- 46 Makbule Leman, ‘Ah Sihat’ (O Health), *Kadın*, vol. 14 (Kânun-i Sani 1327/20 January 1901), 23.
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- 48 Ibid.
- 49 Frierson, *Unimagined Communities* (1996), pp. 171–217.
- 50 Fanny Davis, op. cit., pp. 52–3.
- 51 Fanny Davis, op. cit., p. 53. There are other profiles of transitional women in Davis’s book in her chapter on education, pp. 45–60. Many of these profiles are based on a compilation of interviews and published works.
- 52 Fanny Davis, op. cit., pp. 233 ff.
- 53 Similar sister-brother alliances in negotiating gender barriers to education can be found in other memoirs and biographies of early female writers. See for example, Huda Sha’arawi, *Harem Years: Memoirs of an Egyptian Feminist*, trans. Margot Badran, London: Virago Press, 1986.
- 54 Carter V.Findley, ‘Fatma Âliye: First Ottoman Woman Novelist, Pioneer Feminist’, unpublished paper, 18 March 1993.
- 55 Her younger sister, Emine Semiye, followed a less traditional route, attaining a PhD in psychology in Europe and becoming a professional journalist and educator. (Fanny Davis, op. cit.). She wrote serialized didactic novels and essays for a variety of magazines for women and for general audiences, and her style was more direct than her elder sister’s.
- 56 Fatma Âliye, ‘Bablölerden ibret alalım!’, *Hanımlara mahsûs gazete* 2 (5 September 1895), pp. 2–3.
- 57 Carter V.Findley, ‘Lady Mary Wortley Montagu and Fatma Âliye Hanım’, a paper presented to the Türk Tarihi Kongresi, Ankara, Turkey, December 1990.
- 58 Fatma Âliye, op. cit.
- 59 Abadan-Unat, op. cit., p. 13.
- 60 Fanny Davis, op. cit., p. 51.
- 61 A.Rasime, A few words about “The Principles of Education and Training”, the exalted work of the head teacher of the Dârülmü’allimât’s upper classes, Ayşe Sıdıka Hanımefendi’, *Hanımlara mahsûs gazete* 336/34 (9 November 1899).
- 62 ‘Maatbaamızda sıparîş odası’, *Hanımlara mahsûs gazete* 260/58 (12 May 1900), p.4.
- 63 ‘Hanımlara mahsûs gazete aboneleri için ücretsiz terzi’, *Hanımlara mahsûs gazete*, 552 (22 March 1906), p.1.

- 64 Palmira Brummett: *Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908–1911*, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2000.
- 65 See Şükrü Haniöglu, *op. cit.*
- 66 Toska, Çakır, Gençtürk, Yılmaz, Kurç, Art, Demirdirek (eds), *op. cit.*, p. 250.
- 67 Grace Ellison, *An Englishwoman in a Turkish Harem*, London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1915, pp. 109–10.



## 5

# Turban and fez Ulema as opposition

*İsmail Kara*

The Ottoman *ulema*—the learned establishment—were the upholders of a complex network of institutions. The administrative system was one part of the tripartite governing structure of the Ottoman state, the others being the palace and the Janissary corps. This system encompassed a vast field of functions, such as the *Şeyhülislam* (chief authority in religious affairs), the *kazasker* (military legal authority), the *kadı* (judge), the *medrese* (theological school), the *nakibü'l-eşraf* (representative of the descendants of the Prophet), the *müneccimbaşı* (chief seer), the *hâce-i sultani* (religious authority in the palace) and the *müftü* (official expounder of the Islamic law). In addition, there were other local authorities such as the mosque employees, the mystic brotherhoods with their sheikhs, the *vakıfs* (pious foundations) and other urban service institutions (precursors of today's urban administrations). In great part it was the religious authorities who shaped judicial philosophy, interpreted canonical jurisprudence and regulations and directed the judicial system. They also defined, obtained, safeguarded and transferred knowledge (and eventually culture) via the *medreses*, the mosques and their guidance services, and thus influenced the mentality, conscience and values of society as a whole.

With the advent of the *Tanzimat* reform programme (1839), new secular schools and courts came onto the scene, creating a duality in the spheres of knowledge and education as well as jurisprudence and justice. State departments, like the ministries of education and justice, and religious foundations were created, which gave rise to friction with traditional institutions such as the *Şeyhülislam*. The *Dariülfünun* (university) and the *medreses* were reformed, but suffered a loss of status and reputation in the process. Indeed, the whole effect of the *Tanzimat* on the multifaceted composition of the religious classes was immense.<sup>1</sup>

The intricate relationships between the reforms and the *ulema* may be divided into three consecutive phases. In the first phase, which lasted until the abolition of the Janissary Corps in 1826, the palace preferred to create alliances with the *ulema*. This was an attempt by the palace to divide and rule by setting the two largest centres of potential oppositional power, the Janissaries and the *ulema*, against one another. However, support for the palace against the Janissaries did not strengthen the power of the *ulema* but, on the contrary, weakened it.





Figure 5.1 Photographs of four ulema members of the 1908 Parliament.

In the second phase the *ulema*—by then the only force capable of counterbalancing the palace—was pushed further into the background. It was as if the Ottoman leadership had reached the conclusion that military modernization could not be materialized in conjunction with the Janissary Corps and that scientific and cultural modernization could not be realized in conjunction with the *medreses*.

A different and more difficult situation arose in the third phase. By this time the *ulema* had drawn closer to the political opposition against the sultan/caliph (increasingly also against the regime). The fact that the *ulema* sided with the opposition was in itself not unexpected. After all, given the history of Islam, the role that the *ulema* had traditionally played in the Ottoman administration, and the class's privileges and duties, it was natural that this class should lead any opposition. The problem lay in the fact that participation in the opposition meant that the *ulema* had become immersed in day-to-day politics, which led to a politicization of Islam, which in a longer perspective undermined the very existence of the *ulema*. A member of this class, Mustafa Sabri Efendi, deputy of Tokat and later *Şeyhülislam*, who was closely involved in politics, gave the following description of this phase:

Another important and profound reason for the misfortune of the *ulema* is its involvement in politics...For the last 30–40 years the government has considered the turbaned classes as followers of Midhat Paşa [1822–84, grand vizier 1876–77, and a leading reforming statesman] and all experts know that Midhat Paşa totally supported these religious classes during his time in office. It is since then that the government has been their secret enemy. A noteworthy problem is the fact that the *ancien régime* [the absolutist part of Abdülhamid II's reign between the dismissal of the Ottoman Parliament on February 14, 1878 and the reinstatement of the constitutional regime on July 24, 1908] adopted a policy of caution towards the *ulema*. It seemed to hope that the problem would just disappear by itself. Even when it granted them freedom of action, its real aim was their final destruction.<sup>2</sup>

This chapter concentrates on the increasing support of the *ulema* for the opposition and their participation in the *İttihad ve Terakki* (Committee of Union and Progress, hereafter CUP) movement. Adopting the metaphor of the title, this process can be seen as a substitution by the *ulema* of the turban for the fez, their increasing use of an 'intellectual' language, their critical attitude towards classical institutions like the caliphate and their increased acceptance of the teaching-thinking-perception clichés of the time. In short, this change meant an 'intellectualization', in the modern sense of the word, of the *ulema*.

### **Rapprochement between the *ulema* and the Committee of Union and Progress**

Hijrî 1314 (1896–97) seems to have been a turning point in the relationship of the *ulema* to politics, specifically their rapprochement with the CUP. This important event, which took place mainly in Egypt, had several effects: it worsened the *ulema*'s relations with Abdülhamid II and the palace circles; it led to a search for foreign alliances by the opposition with negative effects for the foreign relations of the Ottoman state; it increased demands for the reinstatement of the Ottoman constitution of 1876; and it opened the way for the caliphate itself to become the subject of debate.

The date of this rapprochement may have been related to the celebrations surrounding the twentieth anniversary of Abdülhamid II's accession to the throne, or to a stillborn coup in 1896,<sup>3</sup> or to general social unrest. These are questions that require further research. However, based on available information the following points may be addressed.

In retrospect, it may seem surprising that the predominantly positivist cadres within the CUP cooperated with the *ulema*. Taking the political realities of the day into consideration, however, what was more natural for an association hostile to the regime than to come into close contact with and try to gain political advantage from the social reputation, religious status and political strength of the *ulema*? For their part, the *ulema* were critical of the sultan, who wished to benefit from their power solely for legitimation, and dissatisfied at their abandonment and decreased status.

It should be remembered that the *ulema*, as a class, did not form a homogeneous but a fragmented body, members of which defending somewhat contradictory theses. Many high-ranking members of the *ulema* strongly supported the Hamidian regime and policies implemented by the sultan for different reasons. In retrospect, however, it would not be inaccurate to comment that those who wholeheartedly supported the aforementioned regime were of a negligible quantity. This comment might seem contradictory, given the policies implemented by the sultan. The examination of a host of memoirs, pamphlets, and newspaper and journal articles published by members of *ulema* in exile and after the reinstatement of the constitutional regime unequivocally reveals this significant fact, however.

The idea of creating a political opposition movement was born in 1889 among military medical school students, but similar or identical ideas had entered the minds of a greater mass of people. Since there was no other influential authority apart from religion that could legitimize the opposition, the sympathizers of CUP discovered that clamorous opposition, shrouded in religious motifs, was the best way of guaranteeing the future of their movement, of legitimizing it and of delegitimizing the regime of Abdülhamid II. This became more urgent as Abdülhamid II and the palace increasingly labelled members of the opposition as 'irreligious', 'traitors', 'intriguers', 'immoral', 'lacking in patriotism' and 'bandits', thus increasing tension by appealing to religious sentiments. So the *ulema*,

who had not yet gone into action,<sup>4</sup> were urged to do so through celebrations, persuasion, threats, satire and contempt. The following statements from a pamphlet entitled *Ulema-yı Din-i İslama Davet-i Şer'îye* (A Religious Appeal to the *Ulema*) expressed this feeling: 'Silence and calm have become the professional characteristics of the *ulema* of Islam', or 'O, *ulema* of Islam! The Muslim *ummah* invites you to take action to reform the religion. It is wailing and imploring. It wants to see your devout patriotism.'<sup>5</sup>

According to Hanioglu,<sup>6</sup> one factor contributing to this close relationship was the fact that the headquarters of the CUP were controlled at the time by traditional-minded people who disagreed with positivists like Ahmed Rıza Bey.<sup>7</sup> We also know that this traditionalist group, which would be purged and would disappear in later years, insisted at the time of the foundation of CUP that the association instead be called *İttihad-ı İslâm Cemiyeti* (Society of Islamic Union).<sup>8</sup>

As to the reasons for this movement's main activities being in Egypt, it is clear why many religious figures would prefer Cairo to Paris or Geneva. The fact that Egypt was a Muslim land, that Cairo was a centre of religious learning symbolized by the presence of al-Azhar (a renown institution for Islamic learning), that Arabic was spoken, and that both Great Britain and the Khedivial family provided support to the 'Young Turks' (the wider movement of which CUP was the leading association), made the choice of Egypt inevitable. To be sure, in the competition for political influence between supporters of CUP, on the one hand, and supporters of Abdülhamid II and the Ottoman caliphate/sultanate, on the other, Istanbul certainly was the main arena. However, conflicts between government and opposition reverberated throughout the Islamic world, particularly in Egypt. It was to continue like this, without interruption, until the abolition of the caliphate in 1924.<sup>9</sup>

The scope of common action between CUP and the *ulema* in 1896 is illustrated by the volume of pamphlets published that year on subjects like the caliphate, the constitution, obedience vs. opposition and the status of the sultan.<sup>10</sup> One should not forget that these publications were not left unanswered, as the palace was eager to produce its own pamphlets to counter these arguments.

### Three *ulema* pamphlets against the regime

In order to illustrate the character of the publications issued by the opposition, three different texts will be presented here. These texts refer to the very first period of CUP/*ulema* rapprochement. Thus, the first one was written as a last warning before members of the *ulema* took the crucial step into the CUP-dominated opposition, while the second and third ones document an accomplished common cause against the sultan.

The first text, a 12-page petition dated 27 Cemeziyelahir 1314/3 December 1896, published by a group of *ulema* writing for the Cairo-based opposition journal *Kanun-ı Esasî* ('Constitution'), demanded the reinstatement of the constitutional regime. Its author was Köprülülü Şeyh Aliefendizâde Hoca Muhyiddin,<sup>11</sup> a



graduate of the Fatih Medrese in Istanbul and representative of the *Cemiyet-i İlmîye-i İslâmiye* (Islamic Society). The booklet was submitted to Sultan Abdülhamid II.<sup>12</sup>

Some important characteristics of this petition should be highlighted. First, following a trend originally initiated by the Young Ottomans, the author, before expressing anything hostile to the regime, prefers to offer the sultan a last chance to agree to the suggested reforms. Only after that is he prepared to go underground, i.e., start opposition from countries abroad. The underlying nature of the demand for reforms at this stage is, therefore, a search for compromise, not confrontation. So, notwithstanding the strong critique, the petition is at times imploring and many paragraphs start with the invocation 'O my Sultan'. This double-sided attitude and policy is clear from the following examples:

If, also in this instance, your exalted person will deign to reject the desire for the opening of a parliament, the ruin of the government of Islam by the evil hand of the regime seems certain, that is why all efforts to prevent this outcome are legal...

(*Kanun-ı Esasî*, number 2, p. 3)

Deign to consign this petition to a judicial system guaranteed by a constitution and we shall all be once more your subjects! We shall once more consider you as the life giver to religion and nation.

(*ibid.*)

It has been promised that this religion would be improved by a reformer every hundred years. Hasten to acquire this title of reformer! The reformer of this century will be he who inaugurates a parliament and who gives freedom to the Islamic community.

(*ibid.*, p. 4)

Not to divulge this matter to friend and foe, we send this petition first of all to your exalted office.<sup>13</sup> We pray as a favour from God that you will, before 15 days have passed, realize an auspicious and noble act in proportion to the moral and worldly nobility of your office. If not, until our last breath, we shall make all efforts necessary for the glorification of religion and the liberation of nation, O our Sultan.

(last paragraph, p. 6)

The second feature of the petition is that it contains expressions and elements that serve to clarify the newly intensifying relations between the *ulema* and CUP:

At the same time that the ulema were thinking of founding an association [*Cemiyet-i İlmîye-i İslâmiye*<sup>14</sup>] for the purpose of publishing secretly or overtly to request the government to comply with religious rules and

principles, last year the Ottoman CUP society was founded and started to publish pamphlets and newspapers.

(*Kanun-ı Esasî*, number 2, p. 2)

From this sentence it can be deduced that at the time it was written there were sympathetic connections between the *ulema* and members of CUP, because of their common purpose regarding constitutional government, but no common action had yet been initiated.<sup>15</sup> This observation is consistent with our stress on the year 1896 as a turning point. Hoca Muhyiddin Efendi starts his narration by saying that he was not a member of the Ottoman '*İttihad*' society (p. 2),<sup>16</sup> but that with the approval of his friends in *Cemiyet-i İlmîye-i İslâmiye* he went to Paris to discern whether the two movements had anything in common, despite that they were organizationally unconnected. For 25 days, he stayed in Paris,<sup>17</sup> where he met with CUP members,<sup>18</sup> who were publishing journals and newspapers to discuss organizational matters. After these discussions the two societies drew closer politically. The way in which Hoca Muhyiddin informs the sultan of these meetings is also telling:

I talked to them separately, at great length, secretly and openly, and in great detail. I understood their programme. They said that they would make every effort to reach their aim of having a parliament inaugurated and that if your exalted person continued to oppose this request they would initiate a revolution. They added that if, on the other hand, your exalted person would deign to inaugurate a parliament of your own will, they would become your well-wishers and grateful servants...

...I cannot claim that all of them are experts in Islamic law, but their aims are based on a council of consensus and on liberty and are in conformity with the canonical laws of the religion of Islam. Even if it were not so, an order for a return to religious legality would be acceptable.

(pp. 2–3)

The third point of interest in this petition is the attempt to offer a canonical justification for the fact that the *ulema* had become a part (rather, felt themselves obliged to become a part) of the political opposition to the sultan-caliph. This process of legitimization had two important aspects. On the one hand, it was stressed that the *ulema* had long acted as a centre of authority and possessed the privilege and competence to supervise and guide the political powers; on the other hand it was stressed that the *ulema* had a religious duty to oppose the actions of a cruel or dictatorial government. Some issues, mentioned with regret in this pamphlet, such as the lack of care shown by Abdülhamid II for the *medreses* and their abandonment to a natural death; the pressures brought to bear on the *ulema*; the increase in banishment and surveillance; the intensified censorship on religious publications; and the increased distortions in government publications were all cited as legitimizing the *ulema's* opposition.<sup>19</sup> Whatever the instruments and

causes of this legitimization, the inclusion of the *ulema* as part of the political opposition was a new and problematic development, and examples of this became more frequently apparent.

The second text, published by a contributor to the *Kanun-ı Esasî* newspaper, is *İmamet ve Hilafet Risalesi* (Treatise on the Imamate and Caliphate). The most important difference in the above-mentioned petition is the fact that it went beyond the demand for a constitution and began to discuss the caliphate itself. This treatise was first serialized in the *Kanun-ı Esasî*<sup>20</sup> and later published as a pamphlet. The author remained anonymous<sup>21</sup> in order to avoid legal difficulties, but is described as ‘(a) person competent in the *zahir* and *batın* sciences (referring to outer appearance and inward qualities), known as a religious expert, a high orator, and a praiseworthy character’. This description underlines the fact that he is a distinguished member of the *ulema* and, consequently, that he could be a menace to the sultan; that he is legitimate in the eyes of the people; and that he is influential. When the pamphlet was published separately, the cover and frontispiece displayed the names of two different printing houses and had two different dates. This is an indication of the differences between the newspaper *Kanun-ı Esasî*, supported by the *ulema*, on the one hand, and CUP, defined by the *ulema* as ‘reformist’, on the other (p. 4). The frontispiece appears to have been printed in the Egyptian typography of *Kanun-ı Esasî* in 1897, while the cover looks as if it was printed in the Cairene typography of the CUP in 1898.<sup>22</sup>

The pamphlet consists of an introduction (pp. 2–5), two chapters ([Chapter 1](#): Imamate and Caliphate; [Chapter 2](#): Obedience to Authority and Consultation Procedures, pp. 7–35); a conclusion (pp. 45–6), and a personal commentary (pp. 46–8). Though the first impression is that the subjects of the two chapters are taken from classic texts such as *Şerh-i Mevâkıf*, *Tarih-i Hulefa* and *Fahr-i Razi Tefsiri*, the way they are treated, interpreted, and presented fully reflects the sentiments and tendencies of the time. For example, the appropriation of the title of caliph into the name of the Ottoman dynasty by Sultan Selim I (r. 1512–20) is described in the following manner:

After the golden ages some usurpers appeared. The laws of the Imamate were not being followed...The authority of the Caliphate has been transformed into the Sultanate...The only law of the Imamate being followed was the requirement of being a member of the tribe of Quraysh [the tribe of the Prophet], and even this was lost in the era of Sultan Selim I. Since then, God help us, mankind has been in a state of corruption.

Everybody knows that both the Seljuk and Egyptian Sultans, though they governed for hundreds of years, never thought of declaring themselves Caliphs. Every sovereign submitted to the authority of Abbasid Caliphs and considered respect and obedience towards the Caliph as a religious duty. Alas! Sultan Selim was not content with his title and thought that if he usurped the title of Caliph he would conquer the world. That is why he fought the sovereign of Egypt, massacring hundreds of thousands of Muslims,

with the result that he conquered Egypt, seized the relics and usurped the title of Caliph.

(pp. 23–4)

It is strange that a member of the Ottoman *ulema* should question the legitimacy of the title of caliph of Sultan Selim I, but the real aim of this discussion is to establish an historical framework that would delegitimize the titles of caliph and sultan held by Abdülhamid II and diminish his reputation. If the author could establish that the title of caliph held by the Ottoman dynasty was an usurpation obtained by massacring thousands of Muslims, then the caliphate and sultanate of Abdülhamid II would be null *a priori*. Similar ideas, and the notion of the caliph as a member of the Quraysh tribe<sup>23</sup> were first created as a political manoeuvre by English functionaries in India and developed by London newspapers in order to weaken the power and influence of the Ottoman state over the Islamic world. That such ideas questioning the legitimacy of the Ottoman caliphate were adopted after a decade by the *ulema* and presented as if they constituted a local and religious question illustrates the *ulema*'s political situation and the loss of their ability to use their own judgement to follow and interpret political developments.<sup>24</sup>

The conclusion expounds on the subjects touched on in the introduction of the pamphlet. It reiterates the need to weaken absolute obedience to the caliph and, consequently, to Abdülhamid II, and the need for outright disobedience;<sup>25</sup> it reinterprets the verse of the Koran ordering obedience to established authorities in a way that excludes sultans and emirs and includes 'learned mystics with the capacity of governing people'; and it includes a defence of a constitutional, even republican, regime in place of the caliphate-sultanate. It also stresses the need for consultation and to found a parliament, which is considered as a synonym for 'a council of the Muslim community and a national council, both of which are a religious necessity', etc. The final 'personal comment' frequently points to the affinity between the *ulema* and the CUP opposition.

And so we come to the third illustrative example, the *Ulema-yı Din-i İslâma Davet-i Şer'îye* (see note 10). This text is, as far as its content and its initiators are concerned,<sup>26</sup> very similar to those already mentioned.<sup>27</sup> It was first published under the title *Ulema-yı Din-i İslâm Hazarâtının Gayret-i Diniyelerine Karşı Bir Feryâd-ı Hamîyyet* (A Patriotic Cry in Response to the Religious Efforts of their Excellencies, the Ulema)<sup>28</sup> in the Cairo newspaper *Mizan* without any indication of its authorship. A month later it was published as a pamphlet.<sup>29</sup>

As in the case of *İmamet ve Hilafet Risalesi*, the author remains anonymous, but to increase his legitimacy, credibility, influence and also his potential threat, he is described as 'the most virtuous scholar'. The Egyptian branch of CUP published this pamphlet twice in 1896.<sup>30</sup> It must have been one of the first joint acts (or the first) by the recently formed alliance between the CUP, the opposition and the *ulema*. The fact that—to our knowledge—it is the first pamphlet in which the CUP is mentioned by name increases its importance. The cover states that the publication was made in conformity with the CUP regulations (Article 21).<sup>31</sup>

The aim of this publication was to incite the *ulema* to revolt against the authorities, while at the same time asking the authorities to grant a constitution, and attempting to politicize the Muslim community. Its political aims were important and clear. It was successful in using cherished symbols and in playing on common sentiments in a provocative language. Its main themes may be summarized as follows:

Not only were the actions of Sultan Abdülhamid II and of his tyrannical regime becoming unbearable for the Muslim population, but they were also, and in greater measure, causing the decline and ruin of Islam and the Islamic world. The *ulema* constituted the first and most important power centre to oppose this development and to mobilize the Muslim population. Their power was legitimized by verses from the Koran and by the sayings of the Prophet and also by historical precedent, because the *ulema* had always had a supervising and guiding function. By not doing their duty, the *ulema* were becoming responsible for the damage and were causing their own reputation and status to decline.

...The greater part of the responsibility for the evil and monstrous calamity that has befallen the Islamic community in our day will be undertaken by the *ulema*, who are neglecting their duties. O *ulema* of the Islamic religion! Do your faith and conscience permit you to be crushed by the heavy load of this great responsibility toward God and community? Will you be able to stand the punishment and the reproach of the 'Firmest of Judges' of the 'Chief of All Prophets'? We are not so ignorant as to believe that you are unaware and ignorant of the bad faith and illegitimate atrocities of the governing authorities.

(p. 4)

The criminal attempts of cruel people, beginning with our Sultan himself, are ruining and damaging the strong edifice of the distinguished religion of Muhammad; they are trampling upon religious laws; and the Islamic community is oppressed and sighing and groaning. Even so the *ulema* are incapable of uttering even a couple of words! O *ulema* of the Islamic religion, where are you? Even though 'Our absolutely equitable Master' has been admonishing and warning the *ulema* against the actions of the tyrants, you are silent. Won't this be interpreted as your (God forbid!) giving precedence to the cruelty of a tyrant over the fear of God?

(pp. 6-7)

The only intention of the governing authorities is to diminish the reputation of the *ulema* of Islam among the people. In this they have reached their aim. There is nothing that the tyrants have to be afraid of or to guard against...

With your calmness and silence toward this criminal calamity, you are ruining yourselves and the community.

(p. 10).

The author of the pamphlet, like many contemporaries, analysed the real and profound causes of the negative and passive attitude of the *ulema* in the context of their tradition of following established authority. That is why he tries to weaken this universal context by weakening the absolute value of the concept of 'obedience toward established authority'. He does this on the basis of the prophetic saying: 'Obedience is due only to the person who respects the (holy) law.' After this he asks: 'How can one defy divine commandments for the sake of obeying the Sultan?' (p. 11).

Toward the end of the pamphlet the author puts forward a request for a constitution, which he legitimizes and identifies through the concept of 'Consultation and Council'. According to him, the restoration of constitutional government was the only way to eliminate innumerable evils and to guarantee the salvation and happiness of the populace. The greatest responsibility for this lay with the *ulema*. 'Without them, no salvation.'

### ***İkinci Hutbe* (Second Sermon)**

So far attention has been paid to the initial writings of the *ulema* in opposition. Now the pamphlet, *İkinci Hutbe* (Second Sermon),<sup>32</sup> will be analysed. It was printed in Geneva—another centre of CUP activity—by a lay member of this organization. In this pamphlet, the author insistently invites (or rather orders) the *ulema* to join the opposition.

*İkinci Hutbe*, with the Prophet's saying '*el-Ulema Verasetü'l-Enbiya*' (Ulema are the Heirs of the Prophets) as its subtitle, was written by Tunalı Hilmi Bey (b. Eskicuma/Bulgaria 1871, d. Istanbul 1928),<sup>33</sup> who was an influential member of the CUP. As is clear from its title, this is the second in a series of eleven sermons published as pamphlets between the years 1314 and 1318 (1896–1902) and written in a forceful propagandistic style. Their aim was to incite various influential strata of Ottoman society, especially the *ulema* and the military, to revolt against the Hamidian regime, to further their demand for a constitution and to give society dynamism with a religious base.<sup>34</sup>

It is significant that these pamphlets were called sermons,<sup>35</sup> in that it shows how and at what level both opposition and government used religious dogma and symbols in their efforts to gain legitimacy and to mobilize society. It is well known that political matters had long been discussed in sermons during Friday prayers and other significant holy days as a way of shaping public opinion and of spreading and strengthening political movements. By this time, the framework, content and means of propaganda had greatly expanded and become more influential, thanks to the introduction of printing presses and resultant ease of duplicating written documents. This shows how modernization had also revitalized




Figure 5.2 The cover page of the pamphlet *İkinci Hutbe*, written by Tunalı Hilmi.

religious activities and other traditional institutions: many political tracts, books, pamphlets, and even one-page declarations were printed with titles like *hutbe*, *vaaz*, *mevize*, *mevaiz*, *davet* and *irşad*, all words connoting a sermon or religious exhortation. These leaflets were distributed everywhere, including mosques and *tekkes* (Sufi lodges).<sup>36</sup>

This was not a matter of just choosing a title because of its favourable religious and social connotations, but the content itself was also peppered with *ayets* (verses of the Koran) and *hadiths* (sayings of the Prophet) and was reminiscent of sermons in language and style. To understand with what care this was done, it is enough to count the number of *ayets* and *hadiths*. *İkinci Hutbe*, for example, contained on average three *ayets* and two *hadiths* per page. Other pamphlets aimed at turning publication activity into preaching.

The content of *İkinci Hutbe* was multi-faceted and highly authoritative. The main aim of the pamphlet was to depose Abdülhamid II and to overturn his regime, 'to eliminate, in cooperation, the catastrophe of tyranny which had descended upon the public' (p. 2) and to re-inaugurate the *Meclis-i Şura*.<sup>37</sup> To achieve these aims, Sultan Abdülhamid II is harshly criticized and slandered. At the same time the *ulema*, whose support is regarded as crucial to the realization of this aim, are criticized and provoked, as well as courted and encouraged. Support is directed at

the 'real' *ulema* (as they traditionally used to be and now ought to be), while criticism is directed at the falseness of their current situation.

Using open expressions, or relating messages between the lines, Tunalı Hilmi pictures two opposing drawings: On the one side is Abdülhamid II, the symbol of evil, darkness, calamity, and the decadence of the state. On the other side are 'the free people, the warriors of Islam', namely the CUP members themselves, representing goodness, the emancipation of the nation, and self-sacrifice for the common good. The *ulema*, who are complimented as 'executors of the religion', are situated somewhere between the government and the governed in conformity with their historical role. Basically, the author approves of this state of affairs. What he does not condone, however, is the fact that the *ulema* do not support the lovers of liberty and often remain silent, thus implicitly supporting the 'evil and cruel' regime.

As long as the *ulema* maintained neutrality, the opposition would, according to the author, suffer from problems of legitimacy and would fail to win the necessary mass support. The new venture consisted of obtaining the active support of the *ulema*. If this proved unattainable, however, it would be necessary to turn against the *ulema*, thereby losing a potential ally. Throughout the text there are plenty of expressions of this quandary:

The people are hopeful for the future and do not support the opposition, because they trust the *ulema*.

(p. 22)

It is always impotent and always spiritless, because we lack means of defence, because the hands and movers of a nation that is its means of preservation, are the *ulema*.

(p. 26)

Once all hope that a tyrant will reform himself is lost, the only way remaining is to use the oppressed nation itself, in which case success is inevitable, because the *ulema* are an organized society. Once they start to talk among themselves and subsequently with the nation about how to apply this or that religious law, the conclusion of this evil becomes inevitable...In the case of the common citizen, even if he makes the greatest effort, the people will listen up to a point, but if a *hodja* shouts, his voice will be considered a voice from heaven and thousands will listen, with the consequence that the elimination of tyranny will become much easier and there will be fewer victims sacrificed.

(p. 29)

[The *ulema* represent a] great opportunity considering their influence and reputation among the population.

(p. 29)



Only you [the *ulema*] have the power to shake people's patience and make them revolt.

(p. 32)

No matter what happens you are among those who can convince the people, consequently both the honours due for success and the responsibility will be, first of all, yours.

(pp. 42–3)

According to this pamphlet, the *ulema* have become part of a society where: (a) instead of cooperating in overthrowing tyranny, individuals oppress one another evilly and cruelly; (b) people think that the condition of individual members of this society can be good, notwithstanding the deterioration of the general condition and of Ottomanism; (c) people believe that though conditions on earth are bad, the afterlife will be better; and (d) people are 'split into millions of particles' (pp. 3–5). The *ulema*, being part of this society, are responsible for these conditions and are obliged to actively try to change this negative situation in various ways. The *ulema* themselves should be aware, like everybody else, that if this world is not good, the afterlife will also be bad, and, in the same way, that the bad condition of the community will inevitably reflect upon the condition of the individual.

Second, the concept of '*ulema*' in the mind of the writer is wider than usual since it also, in addition to the *medrese* staff, teachers and judges,<sup>38</sup> includes *medrese* students, the *meşayih-i takva-perestan* (pious sheikhs) and the *kuşedaran-ı tasavvuf* (members of the Sufi brotherhoods) (p. 8). The classes educated in secular schools (*mektebliler*), of which the author himself is a member and which fall outside the ranks of the *ulema* proper, are like the representatives of the active sphere, the sphere by which the *ulema* will be attracted. According to *İkinci Hutbe*, the *ulema* consist of four groups, all marked by neglect and indifference: (1) 'Those that are trying to accommodate the needs of the Islamic nation and of the members of other religions in ways suitable to the times'. These are the *ulema* not as they were in reality, but as they should have been, meaning that if they had been like this, the writer would not have felt the need to write this pamphlet to remind them of their duty and the problems needing resolution; (2) 'Those that have good ideas, but richly deserve to be criticized because of their lack of deeds'; (3) 'Those that deserve to be criticized both because of their lack of ideas and deeds'; and (4) 'Those who deserve warnings in more than words, unlike the previous categories' (p. 11).

It is noticeable that the author does not refer to the scientific or intellectual deficiencies of the *ulema*.<sup>39</sup> The underlining of such defects is left, for tactical reasons, to a later time. At this stage, all the author does is to point out, through the mention of various *ayets* and *hadiths*, the passivity of the *ulema* (concepts like inertia, dissipation, and thoughtlessness frequently crop up); their demonstrated indifference rather than a willingness to take on active social leadership; their insistence on patience and forbearance, which actually implies endurance of the

cruelty and injustices of the tyrannical regime; their lack of sense of duty or responsibility and, consequently, the description of them as being 'sick'. All this criticism is expressed loudly and provocatively.

Third, to understand that the intention of the opposition movement was to convince the *ulema* to join them in the short term, while having a long-term goal of transforming them and reducing their power, it is enough to look at the condescending and insulting terms used to describe the *ulema*. The author of *İkinci Hutbe* all too easily forgets his previous recognition of the intermediary position of the *ulema* (between authorities and people) and scorns them in derogatory terms for not supporting the opposition more directly; in fact, for being part and parcel of Abdülhamid II's corrupt regime.<sup>40</sup>

Fourth, according to Tunalı Hilmi, demands for the dethronement of Abdülhamid II and to restore the constitutional monarchy ought to have been presented to the people by the *ulema*. The fact that the 'great people' (*ulema*) were not doing their duty, meant that 'lesser people' (allegedly themselves, see below) had to assume this duty. This request to the *ulema* is formulated as an invitation, a summons, even as a compulsion, for the want of alternatives (pp. 8–9, 12).

The only chance for liberty lies in exerting strong pressure on the *ulema*, even before turning on the government itself, because those classes have remained indifferent, even though frightful sights have been presented to their eyes, which they were trying to shut, and soul-rending laments have reached their closed ears.(p. 8)

If the *ulema* do not listen to this voice, do not execute 'real deeds' (p. 8), and do not give 'actual answers' (p. 21), the only way left will be to step over them. The writer escalates his threats by saying that the populace will treat the *ulema* in the same way as it will treat the tyrannical sultan (pp. 14–15, 32).

Fifth, in *İkinci Hutbe*, almost all elements of Young Turk propaganda aimed at depicting Sultan Abdülhamid II as illegitimate, unfit for office, devoid of religion and morality, lacking capacity and merit, and possessing a commonplace but dangerous personality, in spite of his title of caliph, are cleverly expressed and propagandized. He is described as cruel, the 'perpetrator of a massacre of more than hundred thousand people' (p. 43), murderer, despot, 'having declared war on God' (p. 33), infidel, religious hypocrite, immoral, treacherous, oppressor, 'ignorant of religion or faith' (p. 16), crude, cowardly timid, as stubborn as the devil, 'inaugurator of the profession of spying' (p. 17), etc.<sup>41</sup> To describe the unfavourable conditions of the Ottoman Empire at the time of Abdülhamid II, Tunalı Hilmi uses *ayets* evoking hell and metaphorically compares society to hell. In hell, the one wailing loudest is Abdülhamid II himself, 'that bloodthirsty creature who once was worshipped' and is now 'grovelling in pain on the ground like a snake'. The 'apathetic people' and the 'ringleaders of the band', among them the *ulema*, are also in hell, since they deserve the same punishment (pp. 4–5).

The conclusion is that Sultan Abdülhamid II does not deserve obedience. ‘According to public opinion and to the general opinion of the jurists (*icma-i ümmet*), the sultan is not legitimate’ (p. 14). He lacked all the religious, political and moral requisites that should be present in a sultan and caliph. As the *hadith* states, obedience is due only to those who deserve it, and where God’s will is not followed, no obedience is due to a mortal. It is clear that these expressions are a serious attempt to weaken and transform the ancient sense of authority among the subjects of the Ottoman Empire, using Abdülhamid II’s tyranny as an excuse (p. 35).

Sixth, in the pamphlet a framework is set for a request for a constitution, but this request is not expressed clearly or forcefully and remains in the shadows of the opposition to Abdülhamid II’s person. This indistinctness concerning the constitution in the end weakens the criticism of the caliphate-sultanate. One may say that *İkinci Hutbe* lacks any explicit and serious critique of the contemporary political system. Put differently, the criticism of Abdülhamid II, his despotic regime and his deeds, is not focused enough to be interpreted as a direct demand for change in the caliphate-sultanate system.

This stands out in contrast to the message contained in pamphlets and articles published by the CUP-friendly Ottoman *ulema* in Egypt, whose demands for a constitution and criticism of the caliphate-sultanate system were inseparable and were developed parallel to or in conjunction with one another. In spite of the fact that Tunalı Hilmi and his friends were aware of these publications and that members of the CUP and the *ulema* acted jointly (Tunalı Hilmi’s pamphlet was, as a matter of fact, a product of such coordinated acts) in opposition to Abdülhamid II, it is also obvious that some differences existed between them.

Seventh, another characteristic of this pamphlet is the way in which this approximately 25-year-old author describes himself and his friends’ role in the CUP. The description is double-edged. On the one hand he characterizes his group of young people by emphasizing their morality, sense of self-sacrifice and heroism: ‘holy warriors, men of God, lovers of truth’ (p. 9), ‘experts in patriotism’, ‘community of patriots’, ‘active patriots’ (pp. 17, 28, 30), ‘loyal persons on the road of God’, ‘martyrs without a tomb’ (p. 21), ‘people that proceed regardless of consequences’ (p. 27), ‘the darling children of the community’ (p. 29), and ‘sons of the nation who have renounced the pleasures of the flesh and their private futures’ (p. 33). On the other hand, however, he characterizes himself and his group as being modest and ‘minor’ people (see above) in comparison with the *ulema*: ‘juniors’ (pp. 8, 9),<sup>42</sup> ‘carefree’ (p. 9), ‘children’ (p. 27). Consequently, he requests in the most humble way that the *ulema* ‘deign to listen to their arguments’.

The heroic description of his own group can easily be interpreted as a search for reputation and legitimacy. The humble description, contrarily, may be interpreted as an attempt at gaining favour with the *ulema* and appearing modest. An additional point to be considered is the Ottoman belief—derived from the Ottoman religious, political and social hierarchy—that giving advice and governing are attained with age and experience. We know that even after the restoration of the

constitution in 1908, the victorious '*İttihadçı*' (CUP) cadres were reluctant, for a relatively long time, to acquire cabinet-level positions because they considered themselves unworthy of such positions.<sup>43</sup>

Eighth, considering that the *ulema* were the audience that this propaganda pamphlet was trying both to prod into action and to attract into the opposition, we must now ask if this aim was attained, if this pamphlet was indeed able to influence the scholars. Unfortunately, we do not have the data necessary to answer this question; we do not know how many pamphlets were printed, who its recipients were, and what the reactions of the general public or the scholars in particular were. However, considering that the logic, style and arguments evident in this pamphlet were repeated in the following years, particularly after the reinstatement of the constitution in 1908, in various publications and especially in those written by *ulema*, we can conclude that it must have been influential. Actually, the *ulema* had seen a decline in their reputation and were increasingly unhappy with this situation in Abdülhamid II's time. As Şerif Mardin aptly puts it, The *ulema* had been left to boil in their own stew; no precaution had been taken to prevent the gradual collapse of the scholars as a class.<sup>44</sup>

Ninth, in the period immediately following the founding of the CUP society and the subsequent publication of this and similar pamphlets aimed at the *ulema* and Sufi sheikhs, we can see a change in Abdülhamid II's attitude toward these groups, in particular toward the leaders of the Sufi brotherhoods. This change led to increased exiles, banishments, and surveillance.<sup>45</sup> The effect of these publications in changing the sultan's attitude still awaits further research.

The *ulema*'s increasing support for the opposition, particularly in the cities, was not just a change in social and political alliances, but also the result of more profound changes in their intellectual formation and mentality. In fact, this was a movement toward modernity and the transformation of the *ulema* into an 'intellectual' class. The rest of this chapter discusses these changes and focuses on a number of the concepts that played a crucial role in transforming their worldview and hierarchy of values, namely the concepts of history, equality, and liberty.

### **New conceptions of history**

For the Islamic world and the Ottoman state, the reflections on history that flourished among intellectuals in the West during the nineteenth century did not become sources of strength, but of weaknesses. The encounter with history meant that the Islamic world began to have doubts about its past. Why, however, should an individual or a community or a political body have such doubts about its history, which, after all, is an essential component of itself? And why should it try to obliterate this history, especially since this history was in no way inferior to that of any other part of the world?

The elimination of history is, without doubt, a fantasy, but it is by no means only an intellectual fabrication. Efforts to wipe out history are anchored in many unfavourable and complex events, including military defeats that the Islamic world

had undergone in preceding centuries. Parallel with these were changes in the conceptions of knowledge and science. The idea of the past as something obscure, ‘full to the brim with superstitions’, and tied to an incomprehensible language was born of this change in mental attitude. An ‘organic conception of history’—where there is a necessary connection between historical persons, where history is a treasury of real experiences and full of strength as well as weakness—was increasingly and speedily substituted by a ‘synthetic conception of history’ wherein present situations and ideologies helped shape a history based on aspirations for the future—the unknown. Put another way, the question ‘what was our history?’ becomes ‘what should be, or should have been, our history?’ The poet Tevfik Fikret’s description of history as an ‘antiquated book’ and his cavalier development of this train of thought by defining it as a ‘cemetery of ideas’ is a highly representative example of the attitudes of the time:

*Yırtılır ey kitab-ı köhne yarın  
Medfen-i fikr olan sahifelerin*

O antiquated book, torn will be tomorrow  
Your pages similar to cemeteries of ideas.

Among the complex factors bringing with them this new conception of history, and of particular import, is the entry into the Islamic world of concepts like ‘progress’ and ‘European civilization’, which resonated positively and exerted an almost enticing influence. These concepts are among the main factors that changed and even revolutionized the meaning of words like ‘past’ and ‘future’.<sup>46</sup> In many traditional cultures, including the Islamic, the positioning of an individual and the building of his culture are anchored in and take inspiration from his past. On the other hand, the concepts of future and tomorrow, especially in sacred texts, remind one of the day of judgment and symbolize a gradual disappearance of what we know. They are, therefore, frightening, dark and insecure concepts. The mental revolution discussed here consists of the transposition of the religious and social meanings of these two time concepts.

Leaving aside the general tendencies and concentrating on the details of the new conception of history as understood by *ulema* and Islamists, the following interrelated observations can be made.

In terms of historical methodology, contemporary Muslim intellectuals were quick to interpret political and military defeats as cultural, social, and institutional defeats for Islam. This hasty conclusion, which they were not able to correct later, was accompanied by a sense of exhaustion, which glorified ‘liberation ideology’. In reality, however, history is full of examples where political defeat does not necessarily mean the exhaustion of a particular culture or its inability to effect positive solutions. This state of utter mental exhaustion, together with the metaphor of a European torrent of civilization carrying everything in its path, drowning individuals and societies alike, has threatening connotations for Islam and the

Ottomans. A good example is a sermon by the poet, and the future author of the Turkish national anthem, Mehmed Âkif:

All of humanity is rushing with all its force to a very distant point and aim. Mankind is like an impetuous torrent rushing toward the sea of progress. This torrent will carry away anything that stands in its way. We will either drown or be carried away by this torrent. O community of Muslims!...The throne of the Sultanate is creaking. If things go on in this way (refuge is in God) it will topple. God forbid, if this happens everything will come to an end!<sup>47</sup>

This train of thought was fuelled by the fact that the Ottoman State seemed destined for ruin and that this decline was connected to foreign occupation of almost all Muslim lands.

Second, the *ulema* came to perceive their own history as a chain broken into pieces, because this view best suited the current interpretation of liberation and progress. This view was an effect of their unquestioning acceptance of the notion of decadence in the Islamic world. A frequently encountered description went as follows:

The Muslim peoples, once the most powerful and most advanced nations of the world, today live in misery. The Islamic lands, once centres of civilization, today are in ruin. The Muslim populations, who once carried out acts of perseverance, courage and heroism of epic proportions, today are prey to a whirlpool of idleness and sluggishness...Muslims in olden days were the adorers of truth, while nowadays they are enslaved to superstitions. In olden days their religion bestowed upon them the light of endeavour and knowledge, while nowadays their beliefs drag them toward the abyss of cruelty and disappointment.<sup>48</sup>

At first sight, these expressions may sound like praise for a certain period of history, but further analysis reveals that these arguments do not praise a longed-for period, but are rather a tool to underscore the misery of the day through comparison. The accent is not on the goodness or superiority of the past, but on the misery and weaknesses of the time.

This break in history led to the emergence of two trends, which drifted apart to the extent that they even lost contact with one another. The first is the idealized golden era, encompassing the time of the Prophet Muhammad —*asr-ı saadet*—and the period of the orthodox caliphs, while the second is the despotic *ancien régime*, starting with the Omayyad dynasty, i.e., the rest of Muslim history. In this perception history is seen not as a given treasury of experiences and lessons of strength and weakness, but rather as a heavy burden. This is because it is considered, as Mehmet Âkif would have expressed it, a negative and tiresome

repetition (*tekerrür*). History is not being explored for what it is but for what it is thought (and desired) to be.

With respect to Turkish history, an important point becomes obvious. Even the Seljuk and Ottoman periods, fundamental components of the historical experience of Islam, are ignored and many other periods that are important from scientific, political and institutional points of view are lost (with very few exceptions) in the all-encompassing description of the past as a period of tyranny (*ancien régime*). Although, some Young Ottomans (especially Ali Suavî and Namık Kemal) did not view certain periods, customs, and institutions (for example the Imperial Council of State or *Divan-i Hümayun* and the Janissary Corps) as part of this unfavourable history, the search for positive aspects of history would later weaken and even these exceptions would be forgotten.

For a clearer and more complete understanding of this discrediting of history, one should note how the golden age of ideal history is separated from its antecedents, i.e., the earlier prophets and the other monotheistic religions. These previous links in the chain of history are seen as a period of superstition and as unconnected to the golden age. Whereas Islamic scholars were used to seeing history as the history of humanity and considering Adam and Eve as its beginning, the development discussed here undermined the completeness of history and narrowed its horizons. The comments on and consequent classification of Islamic history by Şehbenderzâde Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi, aiming to legitimize (by proving its conformity to canonical law) constitutional government (one of the magical elements of the history of modernization and the search for a new regime) and to delegitimize the *ancien régime* by identifying it with tyranny, are representative:

When we mention tyranny we think only of Abdülhamid II's quarter century reign, whereas Muslims have always been governed through tyranny, with only a few short exceptions, since the victory of the Omayyad dynasty, i.e., for a thousand years. Sometimes governmental tyranny, sometimes religious tyranny, and sometimes a combination of both enslaved the people and ruined the Islamic lands. These long periods of tyranny bequeathed a bad predisposition to all Muslims, honouring poverty and idleness, permitting hypocrisy and dissimulation, docile submission and the like.<sup>49</sup>

As a consequence of these arguments, actual history was transformed and reconstructed on the basis of the golden age. To continue the 'broken chain' metaphor, it had become necessary to uncouple the links representing the thousand years of supposedly problematic and rotten history and to attach the new links directly to the first links, the age of supposed strength and virtue. To my knowledge, there are no substantial writings or documents that ever debated the logic or practicality of this project, which may seem enchanting and brilliant at first sight, but which skipped over a whole epoch in history to a very distant past. What exactly in the past was to be discarded and why, and at what probable cost, does not seem to have been considered. The point that was constantly being

underlined was that Islam already included all the virtues (progress, science, civilization) and that Europe had reached the point at which it was able to challenge Islam thanks to its acceptance of Islamic and Koranic values, which the Muslims themselves had abandoned. As it was epigrammatically expressed at the time, 'our religion has become their life, while their life has become our religion.' The fundamental reason underlying these descriptions and hasty judgments was the unfavourable prevailing material and moral circumstances, which called for urgent and appropriate solutions.

Finally, 'a return to origins', which was one of the most fundamental elements in Islamic thought of the day, is an inseparable part of this new historical project. There are at least two points important to understanding this idea. First, the binding sources of information are the Koran and the *sunna*. Second, the binding example is the golden age (the time of the Prophet, *asr-ı saadet*, and the four caliphs). Reading between the lines, one might see that there is an implied critique of Islamic history for having abandoned, or at least neglected, these two areas. The perceptions and practical interpretations of Islam made during the course of history are seriously flawed in their conformity to original Islam. The *ulema* and their hierarchy, which rose and acquired legitimacy through celebrated concepts like *icma* (consensus), *mezhep* (religious school of thought), *müctehid* (expounder of Islamic law) have veiled the sources, thereby enhancing the value of their own words and impeding the birth of new interpretations. As Mehmet Âkif puts it:

*Doğrudan doğruya Kur'an'dan alıp ilhamı  
Asrın idrakine söyletmeliyiz İslamı*

Let us be directly inspired by the Koran  
Let us make the century interpret Islam.

The conception of history as something that should be directly inspired by holy sources, bypassing earlier interpretations and the authority of the *ulema*, finds its highest expression in these few lines.

### **Political conceptions**

The new religious interpretation of the concepts of *égalité* and *fraternité* must be the first steps in the evolution and modernization of Islamic political thought. The acceptance of the concept of equality, tied to the French Revolution and also a freemasonic principle, was a source of political, religious, and social resentment within the Ottoman-Islamic world, something that offended its collective sentiments. The reasons for this were that equality was perceived as granting privileges to non-Muslims and, in the light of the traditional balance of social forces, causing injustice to Muslims.

We know that non-Muslims living in the great countries of the Islamic world, such as the Ottoman lands, Egypt, and India, did not enjoy the same legal, political



and social status as Muslims, even though their rights were protected and they were treated with justice. Canonical law and historical experience did not permit such equality. In addition, in Ottoman experience not all non-Muslim communities enjoyed equal status among themselves. This differentiation was not due to legal matters or differences in size: it derived from political and social custom, from geographical origin, from abilities, temperament and professions in the context of daily life. The Greek Orthodox people formed the uppermost non-Muslim class, while Jews were placed at the bottom of the hierarchy. According to some sources, after the Reform Edict (1856) the Greeks complained that they had become equal to the Jews and indicated they had been content with the previous situation, even if they were subordinate to Muslims.

The acceptance of equality by the Ottoman body politic had three aims: to halt or weaken nationalist and separatist tendencies within the Ottoman Empire, especially in the Balkans, while trying to maintain the system of *millet*s in the form of purely religious communities. The second aim was to weaken or eliminate direct or indirect interventions by Europe in the name of protecting non-Muslim minorities. The third aim was to offset, even if only partly, the increasingly negative European perception of the Ottoman and Muslim lands as lands of inequality. Three kinds of inequality were considered: between freemen and slaves, between men and women, and between Muslims and non-Muslims.<sup>50</sup>

These reforms had important consequences, because neither in terms of canonical law nor in terms of common sense is it possible for a body politic claiming to be based on religion to treat people of different religions (Muslims and non-Muslims) as equals. Thus, the concept of equality meant development toward acceptance of a secular jurisprudence and mentality. In the *Mecelle* (Ottoman Civil Code combining secular and Islamic law codes) of Ahmed Cevdet Paşa it is stated that ‘the points of canonical law will be codified in a way that they will be canonical stipulations for Muslims and laws for the non-Muslim subjects.’ The differentiation between the concepts of ‘canonical stipulations’ and ‘laws’ (secular) indicates that Ottoman dignitaries were aware of what they were doing and also shows the complexity of the exercise, involving secularization and split minds and world-views. In a later phase of this process, the emphasis was on the difference between Muslims and non-Muslims not in the earthly life, but in the afterlife. This logic would eventually lead to greater emphasis on the division between this world and the next and lead to a secularized perception of social and political life.

Equality was followed by another freemasonic concept originating in the French Revolution, namely liberty. One of the two main problems related to liberty was that in canonical law a Muslim could not have the status of a slave, even if actually enslaved. That is why in the Islamic world, including among the Ottomans, the political concept of *liberté* was translated for a long period as *serbestiyet* (freedom, as opposed to slavery), which had a commercial meaning. The second problem was that Islamic and Ottoman political thoughts were structured around the concept of obedience. Obedience to God and obedience to the caliph or other

established authority was expressed in very similar words (*taat* and *itaat*). It is also significant that in a Koranic verse (Nisa 4/59), the need for obedience to God, the Prophet, and established authority are mentioned successively. Consequently, the acceptance and legitimization of political liberties and of opposition were possible only at the expense of narrowing down and transforming the scope of the concept of *itaat*. A new regime that established legal and political equality between Muslims and non-Muslims and permitted political liberties and an opposition could no longer be based on the caliphate-sultanate system, but had to have a constitutional parliamentary regime.

It was only after reinterpretation of Islamic political thought and tradition, canonical law and the history of institutions that an Islamic regime could be coupled with a constitutional system. Even then, however, this whole endeavour was based on many fundamental and unresolved quandaries. Three of them will be touched on here, namely problems related to the caliphate, to governmental legitimacy, and to the relationship between secular and Islamic law.

### *The Caliphate*

One of the main problems related to the nature of the caliphate and the status of the caliph. This institution, begun during the Omayyad dynasty, was taken over by the Ottoman dynasty (during the reign of Sultan Selim I) and then blended with pre-Islamic Turkish political traditions.

In order to justify and legitimize the constitutional system, contemporary Muslim intellectuals analysed the problem of the caliphate in two related streams of thought. One involved the reinterpretation of the caliphate in light of Islamic history and aimed to demonstrate the incongruities among the periods of the Prophet, the four orthodox caliphs, and the Omayyads, eventually continuing up to the Ottoman dynasty.

The outline of this logic was as follows. Although the Prophet possessed divine inspiration, he ruled through consultation and forbade people from obeying 'mortals in cases where the will of God was being revolted against'. Consequently, obedience to an established authority (caliph) is a relative and not an absolute duty. In addition, the Prophet did not nominate a 'crown prince' but provided the Muslims with the freedom to elect their own rulers by agreement. Thus, the orthodox caliphs, notwithstanding their differences in style, were elected by the community, which expressed their allegiance to them. Beginning with the Caliph Ebubekir, all caliphs asked the community to obey them as long as they were in the right and to rebel if they were not. Consequently, the caliph has no automatic right to hold this title, but was elected by the community as its representative, ruled in their name, and was an 'appointee' who could be deposed if the Muslims deemed unfit. The sultanate system, on the other hand, began with the Omayyad's capture of power by subjugation and usurpation, continued through dynastic crown princes and was applied tyrannically. This interpretation of the caliphate accorded with a constitutional system, while the sultanate had to be

rejected as illegitimate and inconsistent with the fundamental principles of Islam as well as those of liberal constitutionalism.

An article about the caliphate by Hamdi Efendi from Elmalı in the first year of the second constitutional period (1908) is highly important and representative of this period, both for what it openly affirmed and for what it implicitly disapproved:

On the one hand, the Caliph holds the title of representative of the community expressing allegiance to him, but on the other hand, he, like his subjects, is charged with and obliged to apply and follow the law, since he acts as regent and executor for the legislators. He never can, by despotic judgment, suspend a law. If he does, he will face deposition based on the will of the people. Therefore, the Islamic Caliphate is nothing more than the executive arm of canonical law; it has no resemblance to spiritual leadership. The Caliph is a leader of Islam who is bound by many conditions. He is not the guardian of Muslims living in foreign lands, but, all the same, these Muslims feel a spiritual bond with him. The concept of Sultanate (on the other hand) implies subjugation and usurpation of power, and builds on the idea of despotism. That is why, in this time of liberties, the concept of Sultanate has to be circumscribed, since some of its meanings are inconsistent with the constitution. In accordance with the principles of justice and equality established and granted by the constitution, the subdivision of subjects into different nationalities and religions is not an obstacle.<sup>51</sup>

This new and somewhat provocative interpretation relates to the caliphate as an institution built on representation. The important points are that the caliph is the representative not of God or of the Prophet but of the people, and that the will of the people is the defining factor. Another interpretation, just as important, openly states that the caliph, as head of state in a constitutional system, does not represent those Muslims residing outside the Ottoman Empire and, consequently, these Muslims owe him no obedience. In this way a new concept, a 'national caliphate', is created.

The second train of thought used to justify the constitutional system in Islamic terms, reinterprets the concepts of consultation and council in the Koran and in the *hadiths* and so legitimizes the idea of parliament, a fundamental institution in a constitutional system. According to this line of thinking, the concepts of consultation and council, a canonically laudable recommendation in the Sunnah and not binding on the ruler, are defined as binding and upgraded to the level of religious imperative. The interpretation of *bey'at* (acknowledgement of allegiance to sovereignty) as elections, of *meşveret* (consultation) as sovereignty of the people and will of the community, of *icma* (consensus) as parliament, of *ehl-i hall ü akd* (people who are authorized to administer) as members of parliament, of *emr-i bi'l-maruf nehy-i ani'l-münker* (commanding right and forbidding wrong) as

control and oversight were, however, weak and forced interpretations readily susceptible to critique, not least by the *ulema*. Particularly notable is the reinterpretation of *ehl-i hall ü akd* as ‘a member of parliament’ rather than as *ulema*, a reinterpretation that implied a relative degradation of their power and status. The inclusion of non-Muslims in the concept of consultation, on the basis of the principle of equality, and their subsequent inclusion in the concept and institution of parliament became possible only through an artificial reinterpretation of canonical law inconsistent with its spirit.

### *Governmental legitimacy*

The second main problem, apart from the question of the status of the caliphate, related to the sources of governmental legitimacy, which in its turn is based on the concept of justice. According to Islamic political thought, the source of governmental legitimacy is in its acts and not its origins. In other words, this concept of justice and legitimacy stresses the discharge of authority and not the bestowal of authority. That is why acquisition and retention of power by subjugation and usurpation are not, in themselves, illegitimate political acts.

Once the Islamic concept of justice is replaced by consultation as the most fundamental principle of legitimate power, precedence is given to the origin of a given government (how power was bestowed), rather than its performance. From the point of view of Islamic canonical law such a position is incorrect, because while the establishment of justice through deeds is a religious imperative (*farz*), consultation is only regarded as a laudable act (*sünnet*). This inversion in the canonical conceptual hierarchy has still not been resolved in the Islamic world and Muslim populations even today interpret the actions of a government as more important than its sources of authority

### *Secular and Islamic law*

At first sight it may appear that the main challenge of the liberal constitutional framework would be the circumscription of the rights and authority of the caliph-sultan, exactly on the same basis as all other citizens. In reality, however, it was a matter of where to locate canonical law (*şeriat*) within the larger hierarchy of judicial principles. Declarations by Muslim intellectuals that *şeriat* is nothing less than ‘the Law’ itself, cannot disguise the fact that the *şeriat* was being circumscribed openly or implicitly by secular law and being subordinated to secular law. This stood in contrast to the precedents set by traditional Ottoman practice, where common law and the jurisprudence of the sultanate, even if wide-ranging and respected, were nevertheless subordinated to *şeriat*, by which they were legitimized and circumscribed. It is not accidental that the Young Ottomans, whose opposition was inspired by *şeriat*, should prefer terms such as *düstur* (code of law) or *nizamât-ı esasiye* (fundamental regulations) to composite terms derived from the word *kanun*, with its secular connotations and connection to concepts like

‘constitution’, ‘loi fondamentale’ or ‘fundamental law’. *Kanun* also reminded them of customary law, to which they were opposed because these laws were imported from Europe. Some Islamists tried to suggest similarities between the constitution and *şeriat* in statements such as: ‘the constitution is a summary of canonical law’, ‘the constitution is synonymous with divine law’ (Manastırlı İsmail Hakkı), ‘the constitution requires the sacred Islamic canonical law’ (*İttihad-ı Muhammedî Cemiyeti*/The Muhammedan Union Society), ‘our constitution is nothing more than the statement of some commands of the Koran’ (Musa Kâzım Efendi), ‘our constitution is a commentary and detailed explanation of the commands of the canonical law’ (Elmalılı Hamdi Efendi), and ‘the constitution is a temporal document supporting canonical law’ (*Cemiyet-i İlmiye-i İslamiye*, The Society of the Ulema).<sup>52</sup> The reason for this emphasis on the similarity between the constitution and *şeriat* was to increase the legitimacy of the constitution; or to make it resemble *şeriat* and, therefore, counter the criticisms of those groups, who, by strictly conforming to Islamic principles, opposed any constitution.

### The quest for activism

The quest in the Islamic world for active individuals and societies was based on the implicit acceptance of the image found in European literature of Orientals and Muslims as passive, lazy, and indifferent people. This observation does not necessarily mean that the image was taken at face value, but rather that—true or not—it was accepted as a cause of decadence. Collective mobilization and socio-cultural transformation, therefore, required a change in social values and lifestyles. In Muslim societies, ethics, logic, lifestyle, and even language, were mostly structured around Sufism and the mystic brotherhoods. Initiatives for change, consequently, took the form of critiques of ethics and mysticism. This process inverted the hierarchy of ethical values, with some values acquiring great importance by compulsion, and others losing meaning and requiring a new description. This criticism was sometimes directed at beliefs, but it was always connected to the search for an ethic that emphasized a more active individual and society.

As for that sphere of beliefs (*itikad*), Sufism, with its wide network of mystic brotherhoods, was criticized for having developed a framework of ideas, including concepts of divinity that undermined the unity of God. Furthermore, monotheism was interpreted as stressing the similarity between God and His creatures, with whom He became identified. The concepts of chance and destiny were interpreted in an absolute way, negating man’s individual will; beliefs in *ricalü’l-gayb* (all-seeing saints), *hatm-ı velâyet* (attaining sainthood) and *insan-ı kâmil* (attaining perfection) damaged the purity of the doctrines of faith. Such thoughts and institutions spread heresies, myths and superstitions, making man and society idle, and corrupting faith and worship. In addition, pre-Islamic customs, typical of other cultures, had seen a rebirth. As a result, people ‘distanced themselves from the fundamentals uniting the Muslim community’; political and religious unity was

lost, and division prevailed. According to the contemporary Islamic thinkers, important concepts relating to mysticism and the dervish lodges, such as imploring help from holy men by praying at their tombs (*türbe*) or using them as intermediaries with God, endangered the concept of divinity as strictly defined by Islam, and even led to polytheism. Examples of such conduct were praying at the tombs of holy men or making votive offerings (*adak*) with the aim of winning a war, succeeding in a mission, overcoming a physical or psychological illness, having children, marrying, ridding the evil eye of its influence, etc. Concepts like being content with what God provides and consent and submission to the will of God were interpreted in a way that made the belief in chance and destiny all encompassing and annulled man's free will.

These beliefs were seen as the greatest obstacle to building a more active individual and society. Passivity was considered to be the result of individual and collective characteristics that made people submit completely and abase themselves before the unabashed cruelty and injustice of the sultan and his representatives. People completely submissive to chance and destiny believe the individual to be totally impotent, without self-esteem, and view the tombs of holy persons as a link between themselves and God. All these interpretations have in common the view that a people resigned to destiny and lacking free will are inevitably indifferent and passive towards the deeds of the state and the sultan and also towards the intellectual and actual attacks of the enemy. This line of thinking parallels the orientalist conception of eastern society as comprising oppressive government and a passive population.

Another school of thought criticizes mysticism and the mystic brotherhoods because they consider mortal life and all exertion and effort toward a better life as useless and because they afford great importance to the afterlife and to the apocalypse, which they see as imminent. We can see from the writings of these intellectuals that they criticize the stress on the afterlife and on doomsday because this stress makes Muslim individuals and society distance themselves from life, from loving it, from concentrating on their jobs and the *jihad*, and it also makes progress difficult and decadence inevitable. During one of his sermons from the pulpit of Hagia Sophia Mosque, İsmail Hakkı Efendi from Manastır, a critic of these trends within Sufism, tried to convince people that the day of judgement was not 'as near as tomorrow, but could be 50–100 thousand years away' and easily dismisses all related *hadiths* as unconvincing.

Without doubt, in terms of density, scope and richness of content and also of the reinterpretation and transformation of religious culture and lifestyle, the widest and profoundest sphere of criticism was in relation to ethics, the social structure and the general mentality. These criticisms can be summarized as follows: the 'active individual' required by Islam has been transformed into a 'passive individual' because of the influence of mysticism, the dervish lodges and a particular interpretation of ethics; being a dervish, with all its implied characteristics of laziness, idleness and poverty became an accepted lifestyle; ethical concepts like resignation, contentment, patience were distorted and transformed into '*bir lokma*

*bir hurka* (a mouthful and a jacket); laziness, degradation, excessive despair, idleness, and poverty were promoted as favourable characteristics, while dignity, selfrespect, determination, exertion and effort lost their value; those who exclaimed things like ‘Don’t bother! There is nothing to be done. Such is our destiny in this mortal life’, became the respected majority. The consequence was that the concentration of capital was prevented and the increased decadence and even ruin of the Islamic world were brought about. The direct connections drawn by İsmail Hakkı Efendi from Manastır between present Sufi ethics and the Muslim lifestyle and life-concept on the one hand and military defeats and foreign penetration into and subsequent enslavement of the Muslim world on the other, are very significant.<sup>53</sup>

A new and active individual and society considers very important the breakdown of the hierarchy of ethical values associated with mysticism, and the need for change in the conception of the world (mortal life) and lifestyle. A few examples of such change could be: the redefinition and devaluation of concepts like resignation, asceticism and contentment, all highly esteemed by Sufism; a promotion of concepts hitherto not considered very important, like exertion and effort; the transformation of the concept of poverty from virtuous dependence on God into a defect; the transformation of the concept of wealth into a virtue; and the stress on concepts such as determination, free will, and responsibility as opposed to resignation and submission. In the writings of Muslim intellectuals of the time one encounters statements likening mystical concepts such as asceticism and piety to religious excess and the abandonment of that which would improve religious life and make it more authentic.<sup>54</sup> In Mehmed Âkif’s words: ‘Going around dressed in old rags in the name of religion and asceticism, is a miserable act that humiliates Muslims and Islam.’<sup>55</sup>

In the midst of all this tumultuous strife between old and new values and concepts a group of modern intellectuals emerged from the rank and file of the *ulema*. It is part of the peculiar characteristics of Turkish nation-building that, after the establishment of the modern republic in 1923, the doors closed on this group of Muslim intellectuals.

### Notes

- 1 The effect of the *Tanzimat* reforms on the *ulema* represents a vast but still largely unexplored field of historical and sociological analysis. Problems yet to be addressed relate to the great diversity of attitudes among this community of religious ‘doctors’, their varied social origins and the complicated relationships they had with society as a whole. Since the term *ulema* refers to such a wide set of concepts, the field is pregnant with inherent difficulty.
- 2 Mustafa Sabri, ‘İlmiye bûdcesi mûnasebetiyle’ (On the Occasion of the Budget Allocated to Religious Affairs), *Beyanü’l-hak*, V/106, p. 1960, 16 Rebiülâhır 1329/ 17 April 1911. In another article in the same magazine there is the following statement: ‘When Midhat Pasa was banished, even the students wrote on the doors

of the Medresses “Our room will be closed until Midhat returns to his beloved country”, I.Ali Tayyar, ‘Heyûla-i İrtica (!)—*Ulema-yı İslâm*’ (The Bogey of Reaction—The Ulema of Islam); *Beyanü'l-hak*, V/120, pp. 2185–6, 27 Receb 1329/ 24 July 1911.

- 3 Şükrü Hanioglu: *Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jöntürklük (1889–1902)* (The Ottoman Union and Progress Committee as a Political Organization and the Young Turks, 1889–1902), İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985, p. 214.
- 4 On this subject, see Hanioglu, *ibid.*, p. 112. By the same author, *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi* (Doctor Abdullah Cevdet as a Political Philosopher and His Times), İstanbul: Üçdal Yayınları, 1981, p. 141.
- 5 *Ibid.*, pp. 13, 14–15. Also in 1314 an *alim* Mehmed Kadri Nasih (1855–1918) tries to incite the members of the *ulema* and the sheikhs by saying:

You can understand at first sight that *ulema* means people acting scientifically...Stopping and eliminating evil...if one does not exert himself and make an effort to generalize and encourage goodness and if one does not, when it is required, sacrifice his own life for this, then all claims of knowing the external and internal sciences, the mysteries of canonical law and of exalting canonical law will be nothing more than theoretical words..., it will remain a useless science without meaning.

(page 3)

O turbaned gentlemen, who help cruel people and speak untruthfully! ...Let us eliminate lies and hypocrisy; let us admit the truth.... If you are incapable of understanding by yourselves the seeds of depravity that the scoundrels, protected and favoured by Abdülhamid with the express purpose of undermining the morals of the population are spreading by word and deed, how can it be possible to explain this to you?

(page 4)

Let us direct a few words [*teveccüh-i kelam etmek*, *teveccüh* means also to turn one’s heart towards God] to the gentlemen sheikhs! Centuries have gone by, and it is by now clear that simple ‘teveccüh’ and simple breathing [*nefes*, which is also the name for *Bektashi* hymns] are not very useful. Our Prophet Mohammad, peace be upon him, and his companions have not just deigned to make a show of worship. The community expects actual services from you, not just meaningless zeal [*himmət*]. You have given much assistance to cruel people

(page 4)



- See his 'el-Ulema veresetü'l-enbiya' (Scholars are the Inheritors of Prophets), *Kanun-ı Esasî*, first year number 17, pp. 3–5, 17 Zilkade 1314/19 April 1897. One must keep in mind that the concepts of *teveccüh*, *nefes etmek* and *himmet*, are important mystic concepts.
- 6 Hanioğlu, *Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak*, p. 117.
- 7 Ahmed Rıza Bey (1859–1930) was one of the prominent leaders of CUP. He established the journal *Meşveret* (Consultation) and was known for his positivist ideas and connections with famous French positivist circles (he was a student of Pierre Laffitte in Paris). He was temporarily expelled from France in 1896, but returned soon after to publish the French supplement of this journal until 1908.
- 8 From Ahmed Rıza's memoirs: 'In Istanbul the preferred name was Union of Islam. I thought that Union and Progress would be in the interests of all Ottomans. My proposal was accepted.' See Hanioğlu: *Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak*, p. 180, footnote 46. In his memoirs, *Mülâhazat* (Observations), Mehmed Reşid, who was one of the founders of the society, mentions the term Association for the Union of Islam. See Necdet Birinci, *Dr. Mehmed Reşid Şahingiray-Hayatı ve Hatıraları* (The Life and Memoirs of Dr Mehmed Reşid Şahingiray), İzmir: Akademi Kitabevi, 1997, p. 79.
- 9 For the Egyptian branch of the CUP Society and its relations with the *ulema*, see Hanioğlu, *Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak*, pp. 242–52. See also Birol Emil, *Mızancı Murad Bey*, İstanbul: Faculty of Letters of the University of İstanbul, 1979, pp. 143–53.
- 10 The titles enumerated below were published in 1896; in 1897 their number doubled.
- i. A virtuous scholar: *Ulema-yı Din-i İslama Davet-i Şer'iye* (A Religious Appeal to the *Ulema*) Egypt, 1314.
  - ii. A person from the distinguished *ulema*: *el-Maksud min Mansibi'l Hilafet*, Egypt, 1314 (in Arabic).
  - iii. El-Osmani Nasıru'l Hak (a person from the Arab *ulema*): *ed-Davetu ile'l-İttihad li Def'i Gavaili'l-İstibdad*, Egypt, 1314 (in Arabic).
  - iv. Tunalı Hilmi: *İkinci Hutbeel-Ulema Veresetü'l-Enbiya* (The Second Sermon: *Ulema* as Inheritors of the Prophet), Geneva, 1314.
  - v. Hoca Şakir: *Ulema-yı İslâm enarellahu berahinehum Tarafından Verilen Feteva-yı Şerife* (Sacred *Fetvas* [religious decrees]. Given by *Ulema* of Islam, May God Enlighten Them), Geneva, 1314.
  - vi. A person capable in the external and internal sciences: *İmamet ve Hilafet Risalesi* (Pamphlet on the Imamate and Caliphate). Published in the newspaper *Kanun-ı Esasî* in installments, 1315.
  - vii. Abdülcemil from Peshavar, a Mevlevi Hafız (one who knows the Koran by heart): *ez-Zaferu'l-Hamidiyye fi İsbati'l-Halife* 1315 (written in Hindi and translated into Arabic, the original manuscript is in the library of the Theological School of the University of Marmara).
  - viii. Nazif Sururi: *Hilafet-i Muazzama-ı İslâmiye* (The Sublime Caliphate of Islam) Constantinople, 1315. Published in the journal *Musavver Malumat* in installments and subsequently as a book.
  - ix. Feyzi-A.Muhtar-Fuad: *Halife-i Nameşru ve Sultan Murad-ı Hamis* (The Illegitimate Caliph and Sultan Murad V) Paris: 1315.
- 11 For a personal interpretation by Hoca Muhyiddin Efendi, who died on 16 April 1930, see 'Hürriyet Mücadeleleri yahut Fırak ve Menfa Hatıraları' (The Fight for

Liberty or Memoirs of Exile and Grief at Separations), Dersaadet 1326, pp. 2–7. When he died, the following obituary was published:

Muhittin Bey, former member of the military appeals council and father-in-law of Major General Cavid Paşa, commander of division, passed away on Wednesday as a result of cerebral haemorrhage. His body has been carried away from his home in Saraghane Başı by his family and many respected personalities and after funeral prayers at the Fatih Mosque he was buried at the Edirnekapı Cemetery During the reign of the late Sultan Hamid, he left his family, country, and career to struggle for freedom in Europe for years. He published the journal *Kanun-ı Esasî* in Egypt. He was then banished to Kastamonu for twelve years until the declaration of liberty. He was an esteemed and virtuous person, may God bless his soul.

(*Cumhuriyet*, Saturday, 19 April 1930, p. 4)

12 BOA, Yıldız Esas Evrakı, 23/71/12/9. This petition is the subject of three publications:

i. Şeyhalizâde Hoca Muhyiddin, one of the graduates of Fatih Medrese, ‘Fi 28 Cemaziyelahir sene 1314 Zat-ı şahaneye takdim kılınan arıza’ (Petition Presented to His Imperial Majesty on 28 Cemaziyelahir 1314), *Kanun-ı Esasî*, number 1, pp. 3–4, 16 Receb 1314/21 December 1896 and ‘Zat-ı şahaneye takdim kılınan arızadan maba’d’ (Sequel to the Petition Presented to His Imperial Majesty), *Kanun-ı Esasî*, number 2, pp. 2–6, 23 Receb 1314/28 December 1896.

ii. Hayri Mutluçağ, ‘Abdülhamit’e unutamıyacağı dersi veren bir yiğit hoca’ (A Brave Hodja who Gave an Unforgettable Lesson to Abdülhamid), *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, number 1, October 1967, pp. 8–19. After an introduction of three paragraphs, a modernized version is given together with a complete facsimile reprint. The writer says ‘that at the moment nothing is known’ about Hoca Muhyiddin and he was not aware that the text in question was published in *Kanun-ı Esasî*. The modernization of the text reflects the general meaning, but cannot be used for academic purposes.

iii. R. Yücel Özkaya, ‘Tanzimat’ın siyasi yönden Meşrutiyet’e etkileri ve Cemiyet-i İslâmiye başkan vekili Muhiddin Efendi’nin meşrutiyet hakkındaki düşünceleri’ (The Political Influence of the Tanzimat on the Constitutional Period and Reflections on the Constitutional Period by Muhiddin Efendi, Deputy Chief of the Cemiyet-i İslamiye), in *Tanzimat’ın 150. Yıldönümü Uluslararası Sempozyumu* (International Symposium held on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of the Tanzimat, Ankara, 31 October–3 November 1989), Ankara: TTK, 1994, pp. 301–21. This publication, which does not give any information about Hoca Muhyiddin, evaluates the original article (pp. 301–10) and then provides a transliteration in Latin characters with many errors. In addition, the author of this publication is not aware that it had been published in *Kanun-ı Esasî*.

13 In another part of the petition, Hoca Muhyiddin states that:

From Paris, where I had gone to talk to the ‘İttihadçılar’, I wrote a letter with my observations to the ‘Cemiyet-i İlmiye’, which had sent me there. From there I came here [from Paris to Egypt], since my conscience would not let

me complain openly to everybody from friend to foe, with the approval of the dignitaries of the *ulema* of Istanbul, I orally presented this petition to Gazi Muhtar Paşa [Ottoman High Commissioner of Egypt] before sending it to your excellency. (*Kanun-ı Esasî*, number 2, p. 3)

This statement points to secret relations between the *Cemiyet-i İlimiye* and the *ulema* of Istanbul. On this subject see *Hürriyet Mücadeleleri* (The Fight for Liberty, or Memoirs of Exile and Grief at Separation), p. 3. On the report of this meeting written to the palace by Muhtar Paşa, see Hanioglu, *Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak*, p. 246, footnote 380.

- 14 In his memoirs, Hoca Muhyiddin Efendi (p. 3) describes the ‘Cemiyet-i İlimiye-i İslâmiye’ as the representatives of the ‘*Ulema-yı İslâm Vekâleti*’.
- 15 The ‘Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti’ is mentioned as being founded. This must refer to its Egyptian and Parisian branches, which we know to have been founded in 1895. This ties in with the expression used by Hoca Muhyiddin ‘for a year’. On the Egyptian and Parisian branches, see Hanioglu, *Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak*, pp. 184, 205.
- 16 Since Hoca Muhyiddin states in his memoirs that his relations with the ‘İttihadçılar’ started at a much earlier date (*Hürriyet Mücadeleleri*, p. 2), this expression must have been an attempt to assume an impartial position and thus increase his influence with the sultan.
- 17 In his memoirs this is stated as 40 days, *ibid.*, p. 3.
- 18 In his memoirs this is stated as Ahmed Rıza Bey and other members of the society, *ibid.*, p. 3.
- 19 Hoca Muhyiddin Efendi goes as far as issuing threats:

The *ulema* have not yet started to publish anything. Once our enchanting oratory starts and once we start to accompany our religious judgments on political matters with the formula bismillahirrahmannirrahim, meaning in the name of God, the most merciful, the most compassionate, the world will be astounded. Since the people respect the *ulema*, our efforts will become much easier. You have erased what you wanted from the religious and canonical books, but you have not been able to erase the sacred *hadis*, ‘the scholars are the inheritors of the prophets’, from the books of the community.

(*Kanun-ı Esasî*, number 2, p. 3)

- 20 Publication began with Number 11 of the second year, 6 Zilkade 1315/16 March 1897 and ended with Number 22, 27 Rebiülevvel 1316/2 August 1898.
- 21 Most probably the writer of this pamphlet and of the other pamphlet entitled *Ulema-yı Din-i İslâma Davet-i Şer’iye* (A Religious Appeal to the *Ulema*) is Hoca Muhyiddin Efendi or a very close colleague. On the other hand the fact that in his memoirs, which he started to write in 1326 when Abdülhamid II and eventual prosecution had ceased to be a danger, he does not mention these two pamphlets and their authors, while mentioning *Kanun-ı Esasî*, makes us think that this may not

be so, at least until we find new evidence. Ali Birinci, mentioning Mehmed Kadri Nasih (*Serayih*, Paris 1911, p. 157), states that the *İmamet ve Hilafet Risâlesi* (Imamate and Caliphate Pamphlet) might have been written by Hoca Hayret Efendi. See 'İttihad ve Terakki'nin ilk Risâlesi: Vatan Tehlikede' (The First Pamphlet of 'İttihad ve Terakki': The Fatherland is in Danger), *Tarih ve Toplum*, Number 54, June 1988, p. 10, footnote 1c.

- 22 Ali Birinci interprets this not as a change in ownership of the typography, but as the use of two different typographies for the book itself and its cover. Hoca Muhyiddin Efendi in his memoirs mentions that a few selfish people, who had managed to infiltrate the Egyptian branch of CUP intervened on the content of *Kanun-ı Esasî*, even adding articles without his knowledge, upon which he decided, unenthusiastically, to transfer the journal to them and to withdraw. See *Hürriyet Mücadeleleri*, p. 3.

In the *Kanun-ı Esasi* these unfavourable comments were not included, having been added later. In the *Kanun-ı Esasî* the situation is described as follows in an article entitled 'İhtar' (Warning):

Up to now the general services related to the journal were being done by your missionary (himself). The expansion of the service assigned to me, and other important matters confirmed by my colleagues, have made it necessary, for lack of time, to transfer the journal to another managing board, beginning with this number. All the same, it is natural that from time to time, as required by duty, I shall not abstain from writing articles.

(*Kanun-ı Esasî*, number 5, p. 4, 15 Şaban 1314/17 January 1897)

Parallel to this we notice that the subtitle used in the first 4 issues: 'Written by: Şeyhalizâde Hoca Muhyiddin' is eliminated, beginning with number 5 (15 Şaban 1314/17 January 1897); in the second year, number 24 (11 Şaban 1315/25 December 1898), the subtitle reads as follows: The Newspaper of the Egyptian Branch of the Ottoman "İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti", and two issues later it changes to The Propagator of the Ideas of the Ottoman "İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti".

The *Kanun-ı Esasî* was a weekly journal, of which 24 numbers were published in the first year and 40 in the second, for a total of 64. The first number was dated 11 Receb 1314/21 December 1896, while the last number was dated 28 Muharrem 1317/7 June 1899. The managing editor with effect from the first number of the second year was S(alih) Cemal. Over the title the 'Ve emruhum şura beynehum' (Koranic verse) was printed. Under it, to its right and left the following expressions were respectively printed: 'Şura-yı ümmet' (Council of the Community), 'İ'lâ-yı din' (Glorification of the religion) or and 'Tahlis-i vatan' (Rescue of the Fatherland). Generally it consisted of eight pages, while a few comprised four pages. The overwhelming majority of the articles were not signed. In 1897, as part of the palace's attempts to reach an agreement with the expatriate Young Turks and stop their publications, the *Kanun-ı Esasî*, which was considered the mouthpiece of the society in Egypt, was closed for a payment of £1,000. The undistributed copies and

other pamphlets were also collected. See Hanioglu, *Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak*, pp. 528–9.

- 23 A pamphlet, written by the renown linguist Redhouse, entitled ‘A Vindication of the Ottoman Sultan’s Title of “Caliph”; Showing its Antiquity, Validity and Universal Acceptance’, was published in 1877 in London. Its aim was to defend the Ottoman caliphate against the British thesis aiming at discrediting this institution. The British thesis underscored the importance of being a member of the Qurays tribe to become a caliph. It is noteworthy that both theses aimed at discrediting the Ottoman caliphate and defending it were formulated by Englishmen.
- 24 On the relationship between the Quraysh tribe and the institution of the caliphate, see *İmamet ve Hilafet Risalesi*, pp. 13, 15, 36, 48.
- 25 ‘Our noble nation has remained in a valley of ignorance, thinking that the Caliphate and the Imamate were an arbitrary rule of cruel sovereigns and that obedience to established authority was blind submission to the above-mentioned sovereigns’ (*İmamet ve Hilafet Risalesi*, p. 3).

O population, in the name of canonical law I repeat...abstain from submitting to and obeying tyrannical sovereigns and crowds of usurpers...The Mohammedan law shows you two ways to reach a state of happiness, both in mortal life and in the afterlife: the first is to be subject to a just Caliph, the other is to establish a republic and thus to perceive important matters.

(*ibid.*, p. 39)

- 26 In the ‘İlân’ (Announcement) section of the first number of *Kanun-ı Esasî* the following announcement was made: ‘Sufficient quantities of the following pamphlets have been donated by the Ottoman “İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti”. They will be sent free of charge to all subscribers who request them.’ The first of these three pamphlets was: *Ulema-yı Din-i İslâma Davet-i Şer’iye* (Appeal to the *Ulema*) presented as being the second edition of a fiery article written in Turkish by someone described as a virtuous religious scholar. The second was: *el-Maksud min Mansibi’l Hilafe ve’l İmame* written in Arabic by a distinguished *alim*. The third: *ed-Davetu ile’l-İttihad li Def’i Gavaili’l-İstibdad* written by a person from the Arab *ulema*. We have not found information about these two pamphlets. Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, in describing the third pamphlet, states that its writer is El-Osmani Nasıru’l Hak (a *nom de plume*). See Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılabı Tarihi 2*, Ankara: TTK, 1983, II/IV, pp. 674–5. By their names we can conclude that the first pamphlet is *İmamet ve Hilafet Risalesi* (Pamphlet on the Imamate and Caliphate) and the second the translation into Arabic of the petition submitted to Abdülhamid II; see *Kanun-ı Esasî*, year 1, number 1, 16 Receb 1314/21 December 1896, p. 8.
- 27 For a detailed summary and quotation, see Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılabı Tarihi* (II/IV, pp. 70–2). References to this source is given with the warning that it contains spelling and translation mistakes. The commentary on these pamphlets by Enver Ziya Karal is based on Bayur’s work; see *Osmanlı Tarihi*, second edition, Ankara: TTK, 1983, VIII, pp. 527–30. In order to make this pamphlet available, a transliteration in Latin script was published. In that edition the sources of the *ayets* and *hadiths* are also added. See İsmail Kara, ‘*Ulema-Siyaset ilişkilerine dair*

- önemli bir metin: Muhalefet yapmak/Muhalefete katılmak' (An Important Text on the Relations between the *Ulema* and Politics: Being the Opposition/Joining the Opposition), *Divan*, number 4, 1998, pp. 17–25.
- 28 *Mizan*, number 174 (9th year), 17 Zilkade 1313/30 April 1896, pp. 2473–6. When this article was published as a pamphlet its title became: 'A Request for the Religious Efforts of their Excellencies the *Ulema* of the Islamic Religion'. Except for one paragraph, implicitly mentioning the movement for an Arab caliphate, which was omitted in the pamphlet, there are no relevant differences between the two editions. The omitted paragraph is as follows:

O *ulema* of the Islamic religion who occupy the status of inheritors of the prophets! The real wisdom of Islamic politics is not to be found among the nonsense pronounced by the intriguers of Yıldız [the palace of Abdülhamid II]. On the basis of the divine commandments and the advice of the Prophet, it is to be found in Mecca, this is the only way of executing the religious duty of respecting God and the memory of dead Muslims.

- 29 Announcement: Our society has finished printing a pamphlet titled *Ulema- yı Din-i İslâma Davet-i Şer'îye* [Appeal to the *Ulema* for a Return to Religious Legality]. It will be sent, free of charge, from our Egypt and Paris branches to whomever requests it.

(*Mizan*, number 178 (9th year), 10 Zilhicce 1313/28 May 1896, p. 2512).

The same announcement was repeated in number 179. The fact that this text had been published in *Mizan* was not mentioned, probably not to diminish its appeal. The change in title may also be related to this consideration.

- 30 *Ulema-yı Din-i İslâma Davet-i Şer'îye* was first printed prior to June 1896, since it is mentioned in a report written by an informer around that time, together with three other pamphlets—*Vatan Tehlikede* (The Fatherland is in Danger), *Hareket* (Action) and *Mahkeme-i Kübra* (Day of Judgment)—and three newspapers—*Mizan*, *Meşveret* and *Hürriyet*—which were distributed secretly and became increasingly influential. See Hanioglu, *Doktor Abdullah Cevdet*, p. 141, footnote 46. In *Meşveret*, dated 22 Cemaziyelevvel 1314 (23 October 1896), number 2, p. 4, a single column article, written by a member of 'the upper ranks of the *ulema*', announced, joyously and enthusiastically, the first publication of this pamphlet. In the penultimate sentence:

People should not withhold their monetary and physical assistance to the Ottoman 'İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti' and should become members of it. This society, which according to canonical principles would be considered a virtuous alliance by the Prophet itself, has been established against cruel people and despots and is now asking the help of all good people.

A second document, dated 18 June, mentions that this pamphlet had reached the Balkans and that it was being read and commented upon in public by a certain

Muameleci (broker or money lender) Emin Agha. See Hanioglu, *Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak*, p. 202, footnote 164.

The first issue of *Kanun-ı Esasî*, published on Kanunievvel (December) 21, 1896, mentions a second edition of this pamphlet, from which we can deduce that it was published a second time at the end of the same year. I have not seen the first edition, but the late Seyfeddin Özege, after a description of the first edition, states that there is an identical second edition (number 21973), from which we can conclude that the editions are identical as far as the number of pages and dimensions are concerned. According to this chronology, *Ulema-yı Din-i İslâma Davet-i Şer'îye* was compiled and printed before the two texts discussed immediately above.

- 31 This Article, number 21, is significant because it shows the political aims of the society:

The Istanbul council of the society will choose a few of the best individuals, as far as their writing ability and level of knowledge is concerned, among those able to write in a way designed to influence strongly public opinion in Europe and among all Ottomans. These people will be sent, individually or collectively, to foreign countries where they will become the spokesmen of the society by publishing newspapers and other documents. An attempt will be made to notify the councils of the various branches and all individuals about these documents, which will be imported into Ottoman lands and distributed to the people. An attempt will also be made to publish such newspapers and other documents secretly on national territory, until the day when freedom of the press is established.

See Ali Birinci, 'The Foundation and First Regulations of the Union and Progress Committee', *Tarih ve Toplum*, number 52, Nisan 1988, p. 19.

- 32 Tunalı Hilmi: *İkinci Hutbe*, [Geneva] 1314, small size, 48 pages lithographically printed. For an edition in Latin characters with the sources of the *ayets* and *hadiths*, see İsmail Kara: '*Ulema-Siyaset* ilişkilerine dair metinler-II: Ey ulema! Bizim gibi konuş!' (Texts Concerning the Relations between the *Ulema* and Politics—II: O *Ulema* Speak Like Us!), *Divan*, number 7, 2000, pp. 91–128.
- 33 As far as I know, no detailed study concerning the life, work and ideas of Tunalı Hilmi has ever appeared. However, the following sources provide summarized information about his life and views: Uğurlu Tunalı, *Tunalı Hilmi*, Ankara, 1973; Fahri Çoker: *Türk Parlamento Tarihi-Milli Mücadele ve TBMM I. Dönem, 1919–23* (A History of Turkish Parliament, the National Liberation and the First Session of the Grand National Assembly, 1919–23), Ankara, 1995, III, 197–9; *Türk Dili ve Edebiyatı Ansiklopedisi* (The Encyclopaedia of Turkish Language and Literature) Istanbul 1998, VIII, 381; *Osmanlılar Ansiklopedisi* (The Encyclopaedia of Ottomans), Istanbul published by Yapı ve Kredi 1999, II, 565–6; M.Şükrü Hanioglu, 'Tunalı Hilmi Bey'in Devlet Modeli' (The Conception of State of Tunalı Hilmi Bey), *İÜİFD* (Tütengil Festschrift), XXXVIII/Istanbul 3–4, 1984, II, pp. 107–44; Selim İlkin, 'Bolu Mebusu Tunalı Hilmi Bey'in TBMM'nin ilk

- yılındaki görüş ve önerileri' (The Ideas and Proposals of Tunah Hilmi, Member of Parliament for Bolu, during the First Year of the TBMM), *Journal of the Faculty of Literature of the University of Hacettepe*, IV/1 Ankara 1986, pp. 210–20 [text of conferences on Turkish Democratic Movements held on 6–8 November 1985]; Sacit Somel, 'Tunalı Hilmi'nin 1902'de Cenevre'de Fransızca olarak yayınladığı Halk Hakimiyeti risâlesi ve anayasa tasarısı' (The Pamphlet Entitled *Halk Hakimiyeti* [Sovereignty of the People], by Tunalı Hilmi, Published in Geneva in French in 1902 and His Proposal for a Constitution), *Tarih ve Toplum*, I/3, March 1984, pp. 24–31; Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Tunalı'nın Anayasa Tasarısı' (Tunalı Hilmi's Proposal for a Constitution), *Tarih ve Toplum* I/5, May 1984, pp. 3–4.
- 34 The Second Sermon is addressed to the *ulema*; number 4 to officers; 5 and 8 to soldiers; while 6, 9 and 10 are addressed to the general public and not to any class in particular. Şerif Mardin and Ahmet Bedevi evaluate this point as follows:

Tunalı Hilmi Bey founded the Revolutionary Party in 1896 in Geneva. Beginning from that date he wrote 11 sermons with two main characteristics. The first is his attempt to address simple people, peasants and army privates. The second is his attempt to incite these groups to revolt. From this point of view Hilmi Bey is one of the few 'revolutionary' 'Young Turks'. The sermons written by Tunalı Hilmi Bey, beginning in the autumn of 1896, were distributed by the society, to be more exact by people like Şerafeddin Mağmumî...The sermons of Tunalı Hilmi Bey were utterly devoid of intellectual value, but their fiery and enthusiastic style explains why Mağmumî published them in the name of the society.

(Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri 1895–1908 (The Political Ideas of the 'Young Turks')*, İstanbul: İletisim, 1983, p. 107)

- Tunalı Hilmi states that some of his sermons were published in other languages of the Ottoman Empire in addition to Turkish. An article by Tunalı Hilmi, dated 29 August 1325, was published in the weekly *İnkılab* and entitled 'İttihad' (Union). See Nejdî Bilgi: 'II. Meşrutiyet döneminde Osmanlıcı bir gazete/dergi' (An Ottomanist Weekly in the Second Constitutional Period), *Türk Yurdu*, XVIII/132, August 1998, p. 75. On the printing, distribution and their reflection on the political centre in İstanbul, see Hanioglu, *Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak*, p. 262, footnote 468.
- 35 Yusuf Hikmet Bayur quotes two paragraphs of the Second Sermon, while describing the attempts by the CUP to make religious propaganda. See Bayur, *ibid.*, II/IV, 78.
- 36 On this subject, see İsmail Kara, *İslâmcıların Siyasi Görüşleri* (Political Views of Islamists), İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2001, pp. 87–93.
- 37 The term '*Meclis-i Şura*' is used for parliament throughout this text, for example pp. 28 and 35.
- 38 The judges are described as corrupt bandits hated by the people (*İkinci Hutbe*, p. 12, 13).
- 39 Two exceptions to this tactic may be observed: (1) When the author writes that the *ulema* do not have the knowledge necessary to act as a check and control upon the



government and the governed; and (2) When he states that the *ulema* are removed from scientific knowledge, i.e., scientific developments and discoveries (*İkinci Hutbe* pp. 24–5, 27).

- 40 Examples of Tunalı Hilmi Bey's contemptuous style (from *İkinci Hutbe*): 'Those dressed up like *ulema*', 'their hands have been soiled by a putrid corpse', 'drunk with the temporary pleasures of mortal life' (p. 11), 'a mine of intrigue worshippers' (p. 13), 'insolents who have condemned the nation to cruelty and slavery by their insensitivity', 'judges making arbitrary decisions' (p. 14), 'defenders of that traitor [Abdülhamid II] who is the standard bearer of villainy and treachery personified' (p. 15), 'some are pretending to be ignorant, some are optimists deceived by their sentiments' (p. 16), 'followers of their moral interests' (p. 18), 'murder accomplices' (p. 20), 'lack of sensitivity, lack of perception, tarnished sentiments hidden among gilded superstitions' (p. 21), 'people who tremble in the presence of cruelty' (p. 22), 'your disappearing generosity and virtue' (p. 23), 'displayers of flattery and false friendship', 'people who watch an immense state and sublime caliphate rolling inexorably towards a miserable annihilation with helplessness and then with lack of interest' (p. 24), 'people who instead of appearing before the nation as standard bearers of right and justice are defeated by indifference' (p. 27), 'praising sacrifices, robes and gold purses', 'a continuous repetition of the Sultan's benediction', 'people who preach according to instructions, who make immense efforts to become narrators of Huzur Dersleri [special sermons given in the presence of the Sultan during the month of Ramadan] and thus become servants of the arbitrariness of a religious criminal' (p. 28), 'abusers of religious inspiration' (p. 30), etc.
- 41 Quotations in this paraphrased paragraph refer to verses from the Koran quoted by the author of the pamphlet.
- 42 'If the great people [*ulema*] do not do their duties, lesser individuals will be charged with these' (p. 8).
- 43 On this subject see, Ali Birinci, *Hürriyet ve İtilâf Fırkası* (The Liberal Entente Party), Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1990, pp. 16, 31–3; Carter V. Findley, *Kalemîyeden Mülkiyeye Osmanlı Memurlarının Toplumsal Tarihi* (A Social History of Ottoman Bureaucracy from the Beginnings to its Institutionalisation), (translated by G.Ç. Güven), Istanbul: Historical Foundation, 1996, pp. 211–12.
- 44 Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, p. 56.
- 45 On the banishments of sheikhs, see. Hanioglu, *Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak*, pp. 118–20; Kara, *İslâmcuların Siyasi Görüşleri*, pp. 75–6.
- 46 Şehbenderzâde Filibeli Ahmet Hilmi, who is one of the names in Ottoman culture not to be forgotten as far as new conceptions of and commentaries on history are concerned, states the following in his Introduction:

The aim of this reasoning is to state that we will not be able to survive if we do not recognize the necessity to progress until we have reached the level which the Europeans have reached as the result of a long

development. This necessity was clear since the first day of contact and social relations with the Europeans.

(Şehbenderzâde Filibeli Ahmet Hilmi, *Tarih-i İslâm* (Islamic History), Istanbul: Hikmet Matbaası, 1326, I, p. 3)

- İsmail Kara, ‘Osmanlı-İslam dünyasında yeni tarih telakkileri-Şehbenderzâde örneği’, *Dergâh*, Number 126, August 2000, 16–20.
- 47 Mehmed Akif, *Mevize* (Exhortations), *Sebilürreşad*, IX/230, p. 375, 29 Safer 1331/ 25 January 1912.
- 48 M.Şemseddin (Günaltay), *Hurafattan Hakikate* (From Superstitions to Truth), Istanbul: Tevsi-i Tıbaat Matbaası, 1332, pp. 3–5.
- 49 Ahmed Hilmi, ‘Fenalık nerede?’ (What is Wrong?), *Hikmet*, number 34, Zilhicce 1328/8 December 1910, pp. 1–2, 5.
- 50 For detailed information, discussions and commentaries, see İsmail Kara, ‘Müsavât yahut müslümanlara eşitsizlik-Bir kavramın siyaseten/dinen inşası ve dönüştürücü gücü’ (Equality, or in Other Words, Injustice to Muslims—The Political and Religious Making of a Concept and its Capacity for Transforming Society) in *Osmanlı Devleti’nde Din ve Vicdan Hürriyeti* (Freedom of Religion and Conscience in the Ottoman State), Istanbul: Ensar Yayınları, 2000, pp. 307–47.
- 51 Küçük Hamdi, ‘İslâmiyet ve Hilafet ve Meşihat-ı İslâmiye’ (Islam and the Caliphate and the Institution of the Şeyhülislam’s office), *Beyanü’l-hak*, I/22, 8 Safer 1327/1 March 1909, p. 523.
- 52 On the interpretations by the *ulema* and Islamists and related discussions concerning the concepts of *meşrutiyet* (constitutional regime), *istibdat* (absolutism), *hilafet* (caliphate), *meşveret-meclis* (consultation-parliament), *kanun-ı esasî* (constitution), *itaat-fırka-muhalefet* (obedience-party-opposition), see Kara, *İslâmcıların Siyasi Görüşleri*.
- 53 If our state of somnolence and indifference continues thus, we shall always be in a state of servitude under foreign influence and domination, like all passive Muslim populations around the world. We shall completely lose control over our natural resources and national interest in favour of our foes...Many of our people, day and night, favour idleness and live very lazily and miserably. Under the influence of vicious advice, these people mistake this misery and abasement for asceticism and contentment. In reality what our Godly and holy light praised as being asceticism and contentment and encouraged our pursuing, cannot be interpreted as lying in idleness and misery.

(Manastırlı Hakkı: ‘Vücut-ı intibah’ (Obligation to be Alert), *Sırat-ı müstakim*, VI/136, Rebiulahir/13 April 1910, pp. 13, 85–6)

In references to mysticism and the mystic brotherhoods, the most criticized concepts are idleness and all the other words derived from it (*miskin*, *miskinlik* and *meskenet*). We have here a slight change or distortion in the meaning of the word *miskin*. In classical Arabic the word means needy, very poor and fallen on hard times. The Koran uses the word in this sense in many *ayets* and disapproves of those who do not help these people, especially when they are hungry or thirsty. In the verse of Tevbe (9/60) it classifies the eight groups of people to whom *zekat* (alms) can be given. The first group are poor people, while the second group are

the *miskin*. In comments in the Koran, poor people are defined as those who do not have enough income or goods with which to satisfy their needs, while the *miskin* are those who cannot even satisfy their short-term needs (today, tomorrow). The second meaning of the word refers to someone who lives in misery. Up to recent times dictionaries (*el-Mu'cemu'l-Vasit* and *Kamus-ı Türkî*) described this word without negative or unfavourable connotations. As far as mystic terminology is concerned, this word has even more divergent connotations since it is used as a synonym for dervish or poor (*fakir*). It can be a nickname, attribute or pseudonym as in 'Miskin Yunus'. The typical Ottoman term *miskinler tekkesi* does not stand for a dark, humid place where unemployed, idle and shabby people come for a hot plate of soup; instead it refers to a leper hospital where the dervishes themselves serve the patients. (This custom may have been imported from Christian mystics.) On the other hand, in dictionaries commonly used nowadays, such as those compiled by Ferit Devellioğlu and Mustafa Nihat Özön, this word means impotent, miserable, clumsy, idle, pitiful, etc. The second meaning is almost completely neglected. The famous novel *Miskinler Tekkesi* even adds professional mendicancy to this word's unfavourable connotations. In this light, the question 'Can people reading the "Yunus Divan" with the aid of contemporary dictionaries understand it?' becomes relevant.

54 For example, in one of his sermons Manastırlı İsmail Hakkı Efendi states:

We have lost a lot of lands...All because of discord, the calamity called custom, excesses or negligence of duty...Some of us think that we need only think about the afterlife and nothing else. Such people follow a life of asceticism and piety. Truly these are mystic bigots. This is not the way things should be done, but they find it convenient. They consider work and gain irrelevant. They are content with what they have. Resignation, contentment...they do not know what these words mean. God forbid, Islam does not condone idleness.

(‘Mevaiz’ (Sermons), *Sırat-ı müstakim*, 1/22, 28 Zilhicce 1326/21  
January 1909, pp. 351–2)

55 ‘Tefsir-i Şerif’ (Koran commentary), *Sebilürreşad*, IX/211, 7 Şevval 1330/19 September 1912, p. 42.

## 6

### **Pan-Islamism in practice**

#### The rhetoric of Muslim unity and its uses

*Adeeb Khalid*

Few terms are more closely associated with the late Ottoman Empire than 'pan-Islamism'. The term was coined in Europe in the 1870s and conventionally carried negative connotations of regressive anti-modernism rooted in the fanaticism of Islam and its followers. The term came into widespread use in the press and among colonial administrators in the British, French and Russian empires and it continues to be used quite indiscriminately in both popular and academic discourse to imply a phenomenon imbued with danger and fanaticism. In an era when religious radicalism is potent in many Muslim countries, the link of pan-Islamism to religion is easily assumed. The most recent academic treatment of the subject, by Jacob Landau, takes for granted that all the basic premises of pan-Islam were

based, first and foremost, on the commonality of religious sentiment which one can take for granted while devoting the attention in this study to politics and economics as perceived and employed by Pan-Islam. After all, for Muslims Islam has been and remains for most, the main social and cultural fact of life. However, Islam defines their politics as well, for Islam is also a means to articulate political and economic attitudes too.<sup>1</sup>

'Islam' as a homogenous entity hovers over Landau's book. Supposing, however, that pan-Islamism is rooted in religion alone, he never explains why it became a political force only in the late nineteenth century.

The contention of this chapter is that pan-Islamism was a specific historical phenomenon related to what Eric Hobsbawm has called the 'age of empire', roughly the half-century before the First World War. Thus, rather than being rooted in some basic tenets of Islam, pan-Islamism was connected to the contemporary concerns of various groups in different Muslim societies. Furthermore, I argue that pan-Islamism was a complex phenomenon whose various dimensions need to be understood separately. Once we do that, we find a variegated phenomenon more akin to nationalism than to religion. I wish to distinguish between three different aspects of the problem: (1) pan-Islamism as it was understood by contemporary Europeans; (2) pan-Islamism as an Ottoman state policy (and which I will call 'state pan-Islam'); and (3) pan-Islamism as a new

form of affective solidarity that knitted Muslim elites together around the Ottoman state (which I will call ‘public pan-Islam’). While my primary interest lies in the last aspect, a brief examination of the other two is nevertheless necessary, since they had important practical consequences for the articulation of public pan-Islam. ‘State’ and ‘public’ pan-Islam were interconnected, to be sure, but they never fused into a monolithic whole. They were rooted in different phenomena—the former in the exigencies of the Ottoman state, the latter in the emergence of new modes of communication and sociability in the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century. It is the heterogeneity of the phenomenon that I want to emphasize in this chapter. Behind a common rhetoric of global Muslim unity lay discordant local interests that invested it with widely divergent meanings. Moreover, the rhetoric of Muslim unity was by no means a purely Islamic discourse: rather, being itself a product of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century realities of colonialism and anti-colonial struggle, it was completely at home with discourses of progress, nation and ethnicity.

This study is relevant for one other reason. Turkish republican nationalism was built on an explicit rejection of pan-Islamism, which was seen as an unacceptable mixing of religion and politics, but also as a form of political adventurism that had only brought harm to the Turks. Yet, taking this rejection at face value hides more than it reveals. The republican position also saw pan-Islamism as rooted in Islam and refused to recognize the contemporary roots of the phenomenon. Yet, as I argue below, the principal legacy of the phenomenon of pan-Islamism was a series of local, territorially defined, Muslim nationalisms with anti-colonial agendas. As such, it was not unrelated to the bonds on which Anatolian resistance was mobilized during the War of Liberation, which cannot be understood without its appeal to the solidarity of the Muslims of Anatolia. The view of pan-Islamism proposed here provides another challenge to the view of a complete rupture with the Ottoman past posited by Turkish republican historiography.

### **The nature of pan-Islamism**

Landau is not unique in locating pan-Islamism squarely in Islam. This was very much the conventional understanding of the phenomenon among contemporary Europeans, who further connected it to the fanaticism that was deemed to inhere in Islam and which supposedly produced among Muslims a certain propensity to be consumed by the fire of war and rebellion if touched by a spark. Colonial administrators and consular officials put together a vast archive on the subject, a collection which is best described as a catalogue of the fears and obsessions of those charged with ruling large numbers of Muslims, rather than as a transparent and reliable source of historical truth. British and French archives have been extensively used without scholars undertaking the necessary criticism of the sources. Similarly, Russian archives too are replete with evidence of official thinking expressing pan-Islamism as a potential threat.

These were more than misconceptions. They defined colonial and diplomatic policies. The Ottomans were, after all, scarcely the only ones to use the pan-Islamic card in the diplomatic struggles of the fifty years preceding the Great War. Faced with the uprising of 1857 in India, the British sought out the help of Abdülmecid, who used his authority as caliph to urge Indian Muslims to support British rule. A quarter of a century later, in a different diplomatic climate, they sought to undermine the sultan by searching for an Arab caliph. Pan-Islam similarly played a crucial part in Germany's strategy in the Great War and, as we shall see, in that war's aftermath the Bolsheviks too found that the idea held a certain attraction. None of these ploys succeeded, for the simple reason that the hopes invested in them were false. It was not a primordial appeal to Islam that drove the activity of Muslims in the world, but self-interest and local social and political struggles.

Ottoman 'state pan-Islamism' was based on different premises. Beginning in the 1870s, but especially during the Hamidian period, the Ottoman state made use of the appeal of Islam for two reasons that were not always complementary: first, to mobilize support among Muslims abroad, especially colonial subjects of European powers, largely as a diplomatic ploy aimed at doing unto Europeans what they were doing to the Ottoman state through their patronage of various non-Muslim *millets* in the Ottoman realm; and second, as an element of the empire's domestic policy, to articulate a new basis of legitimacy for the state as the dynastic one was put under increasing strain.<sup>2</sup> These two elements of 'state pan-Islam' did not always cohere: Selim Deringil has shown, for instance, how the concept of Ottoman citizenship drew boundaries between Ottoman and foreign Muslims at the same time as the state sought to build connections with Muslims abroad.<sup>3</sup> However, they were both driven by the need to ensure the survival of the Ottoman state.

Although many contemporary observers tied all expressions of Muslim solidarity to Ottoman machinations—the intelligence archives are full of reports of Turkish emissaries circulating printed proclamations from the Ottoman sultan, and the European press routinely repeated such claims—Ottoman policies did not determine everything. Rather, the source of much pan-Islamic activity lay elsewhere. I would suggest that 'public pan-Islamism', the third aspect of pan-Islamism under discussion, had its origins in the creation of a trans-national public sphere in which Muslim publications and Muslim elites circulated in greater numbers than ever before. If this activity is ever examined in the existing literature, it is usually made synonymous with the doings of Jamāluddīn Afghānī.<sup>4</sup> Afghani's activity was important, of course, but we come hazardously close to the Muslim hagiography of Afghani in assigning him the role of mastermind for all pan-Islamic activity. Afghani himself was part of this phenomenon, but he hardly encompassed it all.

This public sphere was the product of print, of course, and its most important form was the newspaper. In the last third of the nineteenth century, newspapers became increasingly common in Muslim societies. Newspapers were established

in various places by various people for various reasons, but combined with ever easier transportation (railways and steamships) and the modern postal system, they became the foundation of a trans-national reading public and brought together Muslims from different countries as never before. People in different places could (and did) read the same newspapers. The principal axis in this regard lay between the Ottoman and the Russian empires: Turkic-language newspapers from each empire were widely read in both and beyond. In the Russian Empire, the most successful newspaper was, of course, *Tercüman/Perevodchik*, published almost single-handedly by Ismail Bey Gasprinskii in Bahçesaray from 1883. After 1905, the periodical press blossomed in the Tatar lands as well as in Transcaucasia (Azerbaijan). Muslim newspapers treated each other as ‘our honoured colleague’ (*mu’tabar rafigimiz*) and constantly quoted one another, reprinted articles from one another and advertised subscriptions for one another. But the Turkic-language press had broader influence. Muslim intellectuals in this generation were still polyglot in Muslim languages and Persian- and Arabic-language audiences were also part of this reading public. The newspaper *Akhtar*, published by Iranian *émigrés* in Istanbul, not only *looked* like any other Ottoman newspaper, but it also quoted extensively from Ottoman newspapers, and indeed from *Tercüman*.<sup>5</sup>

In referring to the role of print and of newspapers, I have Benedict Anderson in mind, although I find his dismissal of the religious as a form of community unconvincing and his emphasis on the role of the market (as in ‘print capitalism’) irrelevant here.<sup>6</sup> Few of these newspapers made money, fewer still were published for making money. Rather, the newspaper itself was seen as a sign of modernity whose very presence would ‘civilize’ society. Newspapers also contended with heavy-handed censorship wherever they appeared. Nevertheless, they were instrumental in creating a shared reading experience and a shared concern with the present state of the Muslim world.

Newspapers were accompanied by a related phenomenon—the increased and more rapid circulation of people and the consequent rise of the travelogue as a genre of writing. Travel allowed for shared experience and the communication of ideas across political boundaries. It produced the figure of the itinerant activist, the archetype of which is provided by Jamāluddīn Afghānī, although his fame unjustly overshadows that of many others, including two men from the following generation who are of particular concern in this chapter: the Siberian Tatar Abdürreşid İbrahim and the Indian Maulvī Muhammad Barkatullah. Abdürreşid İbrahim (1857–1943), born in the village of Tara in western Siberia, received an Islamic education locally before setting out for the *hajj*, after which he stayed in Medina for several years, finishing his studies and perfecting his knowledge of Arabic. He returned to Tara in 1885 and became a teacher. Differences with his superiors led him to leave the Russian Empire again in 1892. He spent two years in Istanbul (during which time he wrote several anti-Russian tracts) and travelled extensively in Europe, before returning to Russia. He was active in Tatar modernism, but left again in 1907, travelling east this time to Manchuria, Korea and Japan, where he spent seven months in 1909. Then he set out overland to

Istanbul, visiting China, Indochina and India along the way. The two-volume account of his travels, published in instalments between 1910 and 1913, is a landmark of Ottoman travel literature. His lectures on conditions in the Muslim world drew huge crowds in Istanbul and elsewhere. He was active all through the First World War. The fall of both the Ottoman and Russian regimes between 1917 and 1918 reshaped his life too and he headed back to Russia and worked along anti-colonial lines. Ultimately, his disagreements with the Bolsheviks forced him out and he returned to Japan, where he lived until his death in 1943.<sup>7</sup>

Muhammad Barkatullah (c. 1866–1926) was born in Bhopal and educated in the traditional mould. A change of heart led him to Bombay in 1883, where he taught himself English and went to England four years later. After a decade of seemingly quiet life in England, working for various Muslim organizations, Barkatullah left for the United States. The rest of his life was devoted to securing independence for India, for which he explored all possibilities and all alliances. Muslim solidarity was, of course, crucial in this respect. He passed through Istanbul in 1905, but most of his pan-Islamic activity took place in Tokyo, where he secured the position of professor of Indian languages. He was active in Indian exile politics in California and, upon the outbreak of the First World War, showed up in Berlin. The Germans sent him to Afghanistan (via Istanbul) to convince the amir of Afghanistan to declare war on the British. That mission was unsuccessful, but when an Afghan amir did declare war on the British (in 1919), Barkatullah was at hand to lead a mission on Afghanistan's behalf to Moscow. There, he threw himself into cooperation with the Soviets on anti-colonial grounds. He spent three years in Soviet Russia and remained in contact with the Comintern until his death.<sup>8</sup>

All three travelled extensively, both in Muslim lands and beyond and were equally at home in the worlds of journalism, political agitation and diplomatic intrigue. But these itinerant activists did not encompass the whole. More significant was the emergence of diaspora and exile communities—the case of the Iranians of Istanbul is the best studied,<sup>9</sup> but there were many more. (In passing, we might note that the relationship between Ottoman state pan-Islam and public pan-Islam was always tense, best exemplified perhaps by Afghani's last few years in 'golden confinement' in Istanbul. The Ottoman state was, not surprisingly, wary of initiatives it did not control itself. From the other side the tension was, expressed, for example, in the bitter denunciations of Abdülhamid's record in the pan-Islamist press of the Meşrutiyet-era in Istanbul itself. To be sure, the travails of the Ottoman state from 1911 on provided the focal point of pan-Islamic sympathy and activity, but that is a different thing from the Ottoman state being the sole motivating force for pan-Islamism.)

But much as travel was important, it was the travelogue that was instrumental in making other Muslim countries more real and more relevant to readers at home. Modern travelogues arrived in the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century. Older forms of travel writing in the Muslim world were, with some notable exceptions, primarily accounts of religious journeys, focusing on the virtuous sites encountered in each stage of the journey and concerned with preparing other






Figure 6.1 Title page of *İslam Dünyası*, a journal published in Istanbul by Abdürreşid İbrahim

pilgrims for the same. The new travelogue was self-consciously different. In addition to offering practical advice to would-be travellers, writers in this new genre sought to convey the wonders of the new civilization they encountered and to offer, often quite self-consciously, a critique of their own society. Although this body of writing is only now beginning to be explored, it played a significant role in the re-imagining of the world by educated Muslims in the late nineteenth century.

Indeed, the very concept of 'the Muslim world' (*Âlem-i İslam, İslam dünyası*) came about as a result of these changes, which made it possible for the first time to imagine a community encompassing all the Muslims of the world, or the Muslim world as a geographical and geopolitical entity. The implications of this re-imagining were far-reaching. The Muslims of the world were a single community that coexisted with other communities: they were, therefore, as much—if not more—a political community with rights, privileges, territory, as a religious one. The rhetoric of pan-Islamism placed much greater emphasis on the Muslim community than on Islam as a faith: indeed, the strength and prosperity of the Muslim community were a necessary precondition for the health of the faith. Pan-Islamism is thus better located in the realm of nationalism than of religion. Also, like so many other nationalisms, pan-Islamism was defined by an external threat, the very palpable one here being European colonial encroachment that had, by the

turn of the century, left only a few Muslim states independent, and had deeply compromised even their sovereignty.

Pan-Islamism, then, came about at the conjuncture of certain concrete historical phenomena and was made possible by nineteenth-century developments in communications and transport. At one level, the notion of a 'Muslim world' became part of the common sense knowledge of the world of Muslim intellectuals who shared a common public space. The Ottoman Empire, as by far the most powerful Muslim state of the era and a bridge-head of Islam into Europe, exercised a deep fascination for all educated Muslims in the world. But different groups of intellectuals related to the Ottoman Empire in different ways, depending on more immediate political concerns rooted in their own struggles at home.

Not surprisingly, this public pan-Islam was extremely diverse, very far from the monolithic Islamic solidarity that contemporary observers feared. First, different groups from different countries invested it with different hopes, depending on the social and political struggles that they were engaged in. For Muslims of India, pan-Islamism meant solidarity with the Ottoman Empire as the home of the Caliphate. Pan-Islamism had, for Indian Muslims, a much greater religious significance than it did for Muslims of the Russian Empire, for whom the Ottoman Empire signified a Muslim modernity. Second, most of those who participated in the rhetoric of pan-Islamism were modernists, highly critical of the status quo in their societies and enthralled with notions of 'civilization', 'progress', and 'awakening'. Nor were they strangers to contemporary discourses on race and ethnicity. Thus, we find the rhetoric of Islamic unity emerging from public pan-Islam to be neither universally Islamic (i.e., pertaining to or claiming to speak on behalf of the entire Muslim world), nor devoid of all regional or ethnic particularities. Pan-Islam as it was articulated in the public sphere took for granted differences within the Muslim world. Ottoman subjects travelling in the Muslim world routinely criticized other Muslims for being less 'civilized'—what has recently been called 'Orientalism *alla turca*'.<sup>10</sup> Foreign Muslims travelling to the Ottoman Empire, as we shall see, also had specific agendas shaped by their own experiences. Travellers drew boundaries even as they discovered commonalities with fellow Muslims.

### **The Ottomans viewed by other Muslims**

The common rhetoric of Muslim unity was underpinned by vastly different political stakes. In the Ottoman Empire itself, 'public pan-Islam' predated the state version. As Karpat has recently argued, Islamism started as a radical populist movement in the Ottoman Empire in the 1870s, before it was tamed by the state. Its radicalism was directed against the status quo in the empire, culminating in the attempted putsch against Abdülhamid II in May 1878, even as it argued for the strengthening of the state.<sup>11</sup> Non-state expressions of pan-Islam re-emerged in the Ottoman Empire after the Constitutional Revolution. For all Ottoman writers, the central purpose of Muslim unity was to ensure the survival and security of the Ottoman Empire itself. This could, at times, bring them into conflict with their

counterparts elsewhere in the Muslim world, who had different stakes in the Ottoman Empire. In this section, I focus on three different non-Ottoman Muslim milieux of the early twentieth century to show how the Ottoman Empire was seen through different prisms and consequently came to be invested with different hopes by Muslims from different countries. The choice of the three groups of Muslims to discuss is admittedly random, based as it is on my own interests and capabilities, but the point here is to suggest the diversity of pan-Islamism rather than to document its every variation. I am interested as much in ‘common sense’ understandings of Muslim unity as in the doings of intrepid activists, for the latter could function only when their doings made common sense to their audiences. By viewing the Ottoman Empire from abroad, I hope to show how, for all its centrality to pan-Islamism, its meanings remained multi-vocal.

### *The Muslims of India*

Pan-Islamic sympathies were nowhere stronger than among the Muslims of India. Liberal donations for the Hijaz railway, a medical mission during the First Balkan War and the Khilafat movement seeking to pressure the British to impose sympathetic terms on the Ottomans after the First World War, all point to a high degree of emotional attachment to the Ottomans. Although those who ruled India often saw an Ottoman hand behind such sentiment, the roots of this pro-Ottoman feeling lay in India itself.

As Azmi Özcan has shown, Indian interest in the Ottoman Empire arose in the last third of the nineteenth century in the aftermath of the final defeat of Muslim political power in India.<sup>12</sup> It was connected to the loss of status by Indian Muslim elites (the *ashrāf*). The Ottomans, for all their current weakness, were a Muslim power and a Muslim power in Europe at that. Having been defeated by European imperial might, Indian Muslims could identify with the one Muslim power that still had a presence in the world. They also found the continued existence of an independent Muslim power reassuring in the context of rivalry with Hindu elites and, indeed, at times tied their own future to the Ottoman Empire, as when a newspaper editor wrote in 1876, just before the outbreak of the Russo-Ottoman War: ‘If that Empire ceased to exist, the [Muslims] will at once fall into insignificance.’<sup>13</sup> There was also a very significant religious dimension to this interest, as the sultan’s status as caliph came to be generally recognized in India. (This had never been the case when Muslim dynasties wielded power in India and treated the Ottomans as rivals at best.) Finally, Indian Muslim evaluations of the Ottoman Empire bore the indelible imprint of European prejudices for or against the Ottomans. Indian Muslims writing about the Ottomans constantly fought the ghosts of English writings on the Ottomans in a way that other Muslim groups did not.

The first mobilization on behalf of the Ottomans took place during the war of 1877–8, when collections were taken all over the country for the benefit of the Ottomans and committees were set up to pressure the government to side with

them. This attachment to the Ottomans only grew in the ensuing decades and was deeply emotional, largely because it was long distance. The Indian Muslim press was only tenuously connected to the trans-national reading public described above. Few Indian Muslims knew Turkish and few even among the greatest advocates of the Ottomans understood Ottoman realities. The Urdu-language press had become well established by the last quarter of the century, but its main channel of information was English, although Arabic- and Persian-language newspapers from Istanbul and Cairo did play a part in providing information to local editors. With direct contact weak, the Indian Muslim view of the Ottoman Empire was very much a mirror of the hopes and anxieties of Indian Muslim elites, as is evident in the few detailed accounts of the Ottoman Empire that appeared in Urdu. English prejudices for or against the Ottomans were, therefore, an essential ingredient in Indian Muslim evaluations of the Ottoman Empire.

The first Urdu travelogue to describe the Ottoman Empire recounted the 1892 travels of Shiblī Nu‘mānī in Istanbul, Lebanon, Palestine and Egypt. Shiblī was a renowned *‘ālim* of modernist bent who had already made his name as an accomplished prose stylist in Urdu. He taught at the Muslim college in Aligarh, the seat of the modernist movement started by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khān. He wrote an account of his travels with the explicit intent of righting biases in European accounts of the Ottoman Empire.

The circle of writers is very extensive in Europe and therefore it includes all kinds of people—biased and honest, shallow and deep. But in talking about the Turks, all difference of degrees disappears and the same sound comes out of every instrument.<sup>14</sup>

This sets the tone for the journey. Shiblī’s account of Istanbul focuses on cultural and educational progress: a survey of modern education followed by detailed descriptions of selected institutions; an account of the libraries of Istanbul and their holdings; and a brief introduction to modern Ottoman letters and printing and publishing. These were all topics close to Shiblī’s heart—Aligarh, after all, was the site of the most significant experiment in Muslim cultural reform in India—but Shiblī also saw the Ottoman state’s initiatives in these realms as an argument against the usual European characterization of the Ottomans as reactionary and fanatical.

The emotional high point of his visit to Istanbul comes when he goes to see Abdülhamid at the weekly *selamlık*. An Ottoman dignitary with whom he had struck up an acquaintance had promised to get him a ticket and told him to wait at the entrance to the Hamidiye mosque. The two did not meet up, but Shiblī was in luck. He was in the mosque when Abdülhamid arrived. As shouts of ‘Padşahım çok yaşa’ rang out, the muezzin began the *ezan*.

These two sounds together produced a strange effect on the heart...When the second *hutbe* began and [the *hatib*], pointing to His Majesty the Sultan,

read out the words, *Allahumma ansur hādha' as-sultān ibn al- sultan, al-khāqān ibn al-khāqān, al-sultān 'Abd al-Hamīd Khān*, a strange condition gripped me. Tears continuously flowed from my eyes and for a long time, words of prayer continued to issue uncontrollably from my tongue.<sup>15</sup>

Yet, for all this and although he was loath to admit it, Shiblī could never shake off a sense of foreignness in Istanbul. Fluent in Persian and Arabic, Shiblī knew no Turkish. On the boat from Suez, he struck up a friendship with a Syrian Arab and he spent a great deal of his time in the company of provincial Arabs in Istanbul. He did manage to have an audience with Gazi Osman Pasha, who had him decorated with the Mecidiye order, fourth class. Although Shiblī admits that ‘my knowledge of the morals and habits of the Turks is cursory and general’,<sup>16</sup> he nevertheless devotes a large section to the ‘morals, etiquette and the way of life’ of the Turks, which he characterizes as the epitome of hospitality and generosity, without ‘useless grandeur’. His assessment of women’s education is telling, for it encapsulates the anxieties of his audience back in India:

The thing that is most valuable and worthy of description in the culture and progress of the Turks is the education and the social life of the women. The two large nations of the world, i.e., European and Asiatic, are at the extremes in this question and therefore the condition of both is objectionable. The Turks have adopted a middle path that combines the good of both and is devoid of the ills of either. Turkish women are educated, but they are not given instruction in shamelessness, show unnecessary independence and dance (and that too with unrelated men). They veil, but they are not ignorant, nor like an animal in human shape, locked up in the prison of the house and unaware of the world.<sup>17</sup>

A second account of the Ottoman Empire, penned by Munshī Mahbūb ‘Ālam, a prominent journalist from Lahore, was more detailed and a touch less sentimental, but it did not differ significantly from Shiblī’s account. Mahbūb Ālam visited Istanbul, Syria and Egypt for a total of two months in 1900 on his way back from the World Exposition in Paris.<sup>18</sup> Mahbūb’s purpose in undertaking the journey, which also took him to Vienna, Berlin and London, was to describe ‘those civilized parts of the world where the nations are far more advanced than us in knowledge and industry’.<sup>19</sup> This concern framed the author’s account of the Ottoman Empire, which occupies a prominent place in the book. While Mahbūb ‘Ālam was impressed by Paris and the other European capitals he visited, the centrepiece of his book is doubtless Istanbul, which accounts for almost a third of his text.

Mahbūb Ālam too operates within a dichotomy between ‘Europe’/‘West’ and ‘Asia’/‘East’, and constantly tries to fit his experience of the Ottoman state into it. Upon his arrival in Istanbul, he declares that, after the months in Europe, ‘I was no longer a stranger.’<sup>20</sup> He spots some Turkish villages from his train window: ‘The

way of life of these appeared completely Eastern. Outside the village, people were sitting on the ground.’<sup>21</sup> But this feeling of familiarity is tested very quickly. In Istanbul, even south of the Golden Horn, he constantly notices differences from India and which he chalks to the influence of Europe: European dress, eating with knife and fork while sitting in chairs, but also such things as written menus in restaurants, or the procedure in a barber’s shop. The images are multifaceted and channelled through his own experience and his own position as a racially marked member of a colonized society.

Although he had taught himself some Turkish, he had come armed with knowledge about Istanbul and about the Ottoman Empire garnered from English sources, with which he argues, but which also deeply colour his experience and lead him to some interesting positions. Thus he argues that contrary to what European authors say, ‘Turkish blood’ has remained ‘pure’ after all the centuries of empire;<sup>22</sup> or that there are so many dogs in Istanbul because the Turks are kind-hearted and considerate;<sup>23</sup> or that Ottoman officials are not corrupt and that he never saw anyone take a bribe, but that they often bend rules out of kindness and a sense of hospitality towards foreigners.<sup>24</sup> Indeed, the politeness, hospitality and decency of the Turks are a constant preoccupation in the whole text.

The author takes immense pride in the splendour of Istanbul’s monuments and the majestic past that they reflect. Loving descriptions of various landmarks adorn his prose. At the same time, contemporary Ottomans symbolize Muslims’ success in assimilating modern knowledge and progress within Islam. We get lengthy descriptions of state education and contemporary cultural life. (Mahbūb ‘Ālam pays calls on many dignitaries and becomes well acquainted with Shaykh Abu’l Hudā and Ahmed Midhat.) Nevertheless, there is also concern about the low levels of industrialization and about the weak economic position of Muslims in the empire (which was first brought home to Mahbūb ‘Ālam during his very first foray into the streets of the city, when every *lokanta* he entered was owned by Christians).

The primacy of the Caliphate in Indian Muslim visions of the Ottoman Empire meant that developments in the empire itself often produced discordant reactions in India. The deposition of Abdülhamid II in 1909, celebrated in the Islamist press of Istanbul, produced widespread dismay among Indian Muslims, who saw in it a sign of the weakening of Islam, rather than its strengthening. This, in turn, drew bewildered reactions and attempted rebuttals in the Ottoman Islamist press.<sup>25</sup> However, reconciliation was swift and the numerous wars fought by the Ottomans during the Second Constitutional Period produced a groundswell of sympathy in India. Meetings throughout the land beseeched the British and Indian governments to come to the help of the caliph; donations were collected; and during the Balkan War, a medical mission went to the theatre of war. Again, this concern was expressed largely in religious language. During the Libyan War, for example, the poet Muhammad Iqbāl, in a poem of great power and beauty recounted an audience with the Prophet after the poet had left the world when ‘the worries of

the world [began to] weigh heavily' on him. The Prophet asks the poet what present he had brought for him from the world. Iqbāl answers,

Your Majesty!...I have brought you a vessel  
 which contains something not be found even in paradise  
 It reflects the honour of your *ummat*  
 It contains the blood of the martyrs of Tripoli.<sup>26</sup>

Yet, when push came to shove in 1914 and the Ottomans entered war against the British, Indian Muslims did not rebel, even though the Şeyhülislâm declared the war to be a jihad. Despite many misgivings, Muslim Indians enlisted in the British Indian army and even fought against the Ottomans. Pro-Ottoman sentiment came to the fore again only with the conclusion of war, when Muslim Indian elites organized the countrywide Khilafat movement to pressure the government to maintain the pre-war boundaries of Ottoman Empire and to safeguard the Caliphate. Driven by the desire to safeguard the symbol of Muslim unity (if no longer a symbol of Muslim strength), Indian Muslims proved incapable of understanding the strength of ethnic nationalism—in either its Arab or its Turkish forms. The Khilafat movement failed to achieve its stated goals not just because the British paid scant heed to it, but also because forces of nationalism overwhelmed the Caliphate in its own home. But, as Gail Minault has pointed out, the Khilafat movement was also a quest for a pan-Indian Islam and saw the transformations of patterns of organization and leadership among the Muslims of India:<sup>27</sup> as such, its real legacy was its lasting impact on Indian Muslim and pan-Indian nationalism.

### *The Bukharans*

A second set of visitors to the Ottoman capital came from Bukhara. After its subjugation by Russian troops in 1868, Bukhara had survived with greatly reduced boundaries as a protectorate. The Russians had left the amirs independent in internal affairs and, as such, they retained their status as Muslim monarchs. Unlike in India or in neighbouring Turkestan, which had become a province of the Russian empire, a Muslim state remained in existence, allowing for the hope that the amir would do his duty as a Muslim sovereign and lead Bukhara to reform and self-strengthening. Bukhara, therefore, had more in common with the Ottoman state than with colonial lands such as India or neighbouring Turkestan, and many would-be reformers in Bukhara looked to the Ottoman state as a model to emulate. Moreover, while the dominant language of Bukhara was Persian, Persian-Turkic bilingualism was widespread and Bukhara, much more than India, was part of the new Muslim public space. Newspapers from the Ottoman Empire (as well as *Tercüman*) began arriving in Bukhara soon after the Russian conquest and the construction of the Transcaspian railway, which also cut distances to Istanbul,

which could now be reached via Baku and Odessa, rather than by a lengthy overland journey through Orenburg.

There had long been a Bukharan community in Istanbul, centred around the Naqshbandi *tekke* in Üsküdar, but by the end of the nineteenth century a new kind of traveller began arriving in Istanbul. The amirs of Bukhara had based their legitimacy since the Russian conquest on a strict traditionalism that did not allow them to support modern education in Bukhara.<sup>28</sup> Wealthy Bukharan merchants therefore began sending their sons to Istanbul. The choice is worthy of explanation, since the use of Persian might have favoured Iran as a choice for students. Yet, few students went to Iran. Iran was Shi‘i and, more importantly, not perceived to be as strong and ‘modern’ as the Ottoman Empire. And not many went to Russia or the Tatar lands of the Volga basin, where new-method (*Jadid*) education had made great strides.

For the Bukharans, too, the Ottoman Empire represented an array of things that a close reading of selected texts helps elucidate. In 1902, Mirzā Sirāj Rahīm, the son of a wealthy merchant, set out on a grand tour of Europe.<sup>29</sup> The Ottoman state was his first destination. He arrived in Trabzon by steamer from Odessa and proceeded to Istanbul, where he spent twenty days. Like Mahbūb ‘Ālam, Mirzā Sirāj was motivated to learn about ‘more advanced’ nations and (when it came to writing), relating to his compatriots the wonders of the modern world. But in his case, the dichotomy between ‘East’ and ‘West’ is less clear-cut. He saw many similarities between European Russia and the Ottoman Empire, which had more in common with each other than with the ‘real’ Europe. As he heads for Vienna by train from Istanbul, he is excited that he is finally entering ‘Europe, i.e., Farangistān’.<sup>30</sup> He, nevertheless, liked Istanbul a great deal. The sense of Muslim pride in Istanbul is again palpable. A rhapsodic description of the Aya Sofya is followed by the comment, ‘Now this majestic building is a mosque, a place of worship for Muslims...Even a whole book written in praise of this mosque would not be enough.’<sup>31</sup> There are loving accounts of various sites in Istanbul and of the celebration of the anniversary of Abdülhamid’s ascension to the throne, which took place during Mirzā Sirāj’s stay.

But Mirzā Sirāj’s relation to the Ottoman Empire is not without its ambiguities. Bukhara’s status as a protectorate of Russia affects him. Mirzā Sirāj also wanted to witness the *selamlık* of the sultan, but was told that it is very difficult to find a place with a view. He therefore went off to the Russian Embassy, ‘the protector and supporter of us Bukharans throughout the world’.<sup>32</sup> We are treated to a lengthy description of the author’s visit to the consular section of the embassy in Büyükdere and of his reception by the vice-consul. The *selamlık* receives a definitely backhanded compliment:

A great deal of energy is spent on the superficialities (*tajamullāt*) of the despotic rulers of the East, especially Muslims. By contrast, the rulers of Europe move about without ceremony and simply and do not pay heed to superficialities!<sup>33</sup>





Figure 6.2 Abdurauf Fitrat in Bukhara c. 1920

At about the time Mirzā Sirāj finally published his work, another Bukharan arrived in Istanbul. Abdurauf Fitrat, the son of a moderately wealthy merchant, was one of several dozen students sent to Istanbul by a benevolent society called *Tarbiya-yi atfāl* (Education of Children), established in Bukhara by wealthy merchants frustrated by the absence of modern education in Bukhara. Sending students from Bukhara was the main purpose of this society and between 1910 and 1913, over one hundred students were sent to Istanbul. *Tarbiya-yi atfāl* worked in conjunction with the *Buhara Ta'mim-i Maarif Cemiyeti* (Bukharan Society for the Propagation of Knowledge), established in 1908 by Bukharans in Istanbul. The students were deeply affected by the tumult of the period and, as we shall see, carried these influences back to Bukhara.

Many of them were active in publishing—another activity not permitted in Bukhara. They tended to gravitate towards ‘Islamist’ circles. Several Bukharans appeared in the columns of *Hikmet*, *Sirat-ı Müstakim* and *Tearif-i Müslimin*. Yet they also picked up a heavy dose of Turkism (from which Ottoman Islamism was, of course, not immune), which was to be of great consequence in the identity politics of the early Soviet period. Fitrat was the most significant figure in this group. He began his public career by exhorting his compatriots to ‘awaken’ to the need for change,<sup>34</sup> and by pleading with the newly appointed *qushbegi* (vezir) to

lead Bukhara to reform.<sup>35</sup> He went on to publish three books, all in Persian, during his stay in Istanbul. These included *The Debate Between a Teacher from Bukhara and a European, in India, about New Schools*, easily the most popular and influential reformist tract to come out of Central Asian Jadidism.<sup>36</sup> (The text was proscribed in Bukhara, but widely available in Turkestan, where an Uzbek translation appeared in 1913.) His most significant book, however, was *The Tales of the Indian Traveller*, which uses the fictional eye of a modern (hence more rational and enlightened) Indian Muslim to criticize the status quo in Bukhara.<sup>37</sup> The book is an excellent example of ‘public pan-Islam’ in action: written in Persian in Istanbul, it is deeply influenced, both in style and content, by *The Travels of Ibrahim Beg*, the landmark Iranian-exile novel by Zayn ul-‘Ābidīn Maraghā’ī. Fitrat lists the desiderata of Bukharan reformers: public order through policing; long-term economic planning; the creation of a system of public health and hygiene; and above all, a system of modern education at all levels. In all of this, the state had the central role as the initiator and executor of reform. The model, clearly, was the Ottoman Empire of the Second Constitutional Period.

The fascination of Bukharan reformers with Ottoman models outlasted the Ottoman Empire itself. All the way up to 1917, Bukharan reformers appealed to the amir to do his duty: his continuing refusal to do so bred discontent, leading, in 1917, to a final rupture. Inspired by the February Revolution in Russia, Bukharan reformers sought to pressure the amir to grant political liberties and begin on the path to reform. The amir issued a manifesto in April, but promptly backtracked and cracked down on reform activists, who had begun to call themselves ‘Young Bukharans’. Many reformers fled to Russia, where their ideas were radicalized under the twin impacts of revolution and desperation. The Bolsheviks, as we shall see, had much use for discontented radicals from the Muslim world and, in 1920, lent the Young Bukharans support to topple the amir and to establish a Bukharan People’s Soviet Republic. The new government was very self-consciously modelled on Ottoman patterns: the names of the ministries (*Maorif nazorati*, *Harbiya nazorati*, and so forth), state symbols, the bureaucratic prose used in the chanceries, and often the handwriting, are all Ottoman, as indeed were many of the policies implemented in the first two years of the government’s existence. Fitrat chaired the Economic Council of the Republic and was briefly minister of education. His removal from these posts in 1923 under Soviet pressure signified the beginning of the end of the political independence of the republic. In the realm of cultural policy, his influence was longer lasting, since he and many others influenced by *Meşrutiyet*-era Ottoman debates played crucial roles in delineating new political and cultural identities for the Muslims of Bukhara (and of Central Asia more broadly). ‘Pan-Islamism’ became anathema early on in the Soviet period and in the 1930s was routinely applied to those at the receiving end of the regime’s wrath.<sup>38</sup> Fitrat himself experienced this fate in 1938.

### *The Tatars*

The final group of Muslims active in the Ottoman Empire were the Tatars from the Volga basin and the Crimea. The proximity of the Tatar languages to Ottoman and the presence of a modern educated elite among them gave Tatars a significant role in the intellectual life of the late Ottoman era. Indeed, the role was so significant as to be qualitatively different from the two cases discussed so far. I can provide only a cursory overview of this complex issue here.

Unlike the Bukharans, Volga Tatars had been Russian subjects for three and a half centuries by this time. The rise of modernist reform, underpinned by the emergence of a mercantile class in the Volga region, was an accomplished fact among the Tatars. The Tatar intellectual world overlapped with the Ottoman, leading to extensive mutual interaction. Print was a major channel: Gasprinskii's *Tercüman* was widely read in the Ottoman Empire, and after 1905, when the first Russian revolution produced a liberalization of press laws, a very vigorous Tatar press emerged in Kazan, Ufa and Orenburg.<sup>39</sup> In addition, Tatar book publishing had expanded enormously since the 1880s, giving rise to new genres of writing and engendering a flood of translations from Russian.<sup>40</sup> Although politically disadvantaged, the Tatars of the Volga and the Crimea played a significant role in all currents of opinion in the Ottoman Empire: Ismail Bey Gasprinskii, Musa Jarullah Bigiyev, Abdürreşid İbrahim, Akçuraoğlu Yusuf (Yusuf Akçura after the surname reform) and Alimcan Barudi represent a selection of these influences that helped define the Ottoman intellectual landscape of the period. And yet, their interest in the Ottoman Empire was also defined by their own political situation: increasingly, a dismissal, especially among those who emigrated to the Ottoman Empire, of any future of the Tatars within the Russian Empire and a consequent stake in refashioning the Ottoman Empire as a Turkist power. The more extreme formulations of Turkism tended to be those of Tatars who found it much easier than native-born Ottomans to imagine the jettisoning of non-Turkic parts of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>41</sup>

### **Pan-Islamism and anti-colonial revolution**

Pan-Islamism was pushed into action, as it were, by the crisis of the old world order. First, under German prompting, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) regime had the Şeyhülislâm issue a *fatwa* declaring the Great War to be a jihad, in the hope of undermining the legitimacy and the war effort of the Allies, each of whom possessed colonies with vast Muslim populations. Although, as we have seen, the *fatwa* produced negligible results in terms of fomenting discord either on the (colonial) home front or in the armies, the Germans and Ottomans continued in the hope of using Muslim solidarities to undermine their opponents. The oft-told story of the German-Ottoman mission to the amir of Afghanistan, accompanied by assorted Indian nationalists who had gravitated to Berlin upon the outbreak of war, was part of this effort. This use of the pan-Islamic appeal was

part of a broader pattern, employed by both sides in the war, of using nationalist and irredentist causes to attempt to destabilize the enemy. The Ottomans also established the Society for the Defence of the Rights of Muslim Turko-Tatars Inhabiting Russia (*Rusya'da Sakin Müslüman Türk-Tatarlarının Haklarını Müdafaa Cemiyeti*), composed largely of *émigrés* from Russia, like Akçuraoğlu Yusuf, Abdürreşid İbrahim, Hüseyinzade Ali and Ağaoğlu Ahmed (Ahmet Ağaoğlu after the surname reform), who were prominent in its activities.<sup>42</sup> The society joined the League of the Alien Peoples of Russia, a German-sponsored group and was able to send delegates to the Third Conference of the Union of Nationalities in Lausanne in June 1916, where the Bukharan Muqimiddin Bekjon, a founding member of the Bukharan Society for the Dissemination of Knowledge, spoke in the name of 'the Chaghatay nationality' that 'inhabits the khanates of Bukhara and Khiva and the province of Turkestan'. His brief speech, however, concerned only Bukhara and focused on the demand for the restitution of Bukhara's lost independence and territories.<sup>43</sup>

The Russian Revolution opened up further horizons for pan-Islamic activity. The Bolsheviks sought to strike at the bourgeois regimes of Europe, who were both ideologically and militarily opposed to them, through their empires, and therefore avidly cultivated anti-colonial sentiment. In this they found willing partners in a number of pan-Islamic activists. There was, moreover, a general radicalization of opinion throughout the Muslim world, especially after the Ottoman defeat. Pan-Islamism, both state and public, had always had a defensive aspect to it, but now the devastating terms of the armistice pushed pan-Islamism toward anti-colonialism. Many Muslim intellectuals were fascinated by the idea of revolutionary change (even if their vision of the revolution was not the same as that of the Bolsheviks). Throughout the arc of territory encompassing the Tatar lands, Anatolia, Central Asia, northern Iran, Afghanistan and, indeed, India, pan-Islamism melded easily with notions of anti-colonial struggle and national liberation, which then was seen as possible only through social revolution and with the help of the new Soviet regime, whose anti-bourgeois and anti-colonial credentials were impeccable.

The attempt to use Muslim solidarities for revolution took many forms. One of the first proclamations of the nascent Soviet regime was directed at the 'Toiling Muslims of Russia and the East', and it quickly set about creating an organizational structure for activism among Muslims in Russia itself. Such activity seldom remained within the firm control of the Bolshevik leadership. Thus, the Tatar communist Mirsaid Sultangaliev could argue that the world was divided between oppressor nations and oppressed nations; that world revolution would come not from the West but from 'the East'; and that it was up to Muslim nations, with the Tatars in the vanguard, to lead it.<sup>44</sup> Such 'Muslim national communism' had many other proponents in revolutionary Russia, although none is as well known as Sultangaliev. However, other variations were possible too.

In 1919, the Ottoman-educated Abdurauf Fitrat wrote a pamphlet called *Sharq siyosati* ('The Eastern Question') in which he argued that the solution to the

Muslim world's current crisis lay in an alliance with the only force that was anti-imperialist, Soviet Russia. 'The government of Soviet Russia has struggled with European imperialists. Its motto is "Victory or Death". This is exactly the kind of effort and exactly this kind of nobility required to unite the East.'<sup>45</sup> Fitrat also noted that 'Comrade Lenin, the leader of Soviet Russia, is a great man, who has already begun the attempt at awakening and uniting the East'—awakening and the need for unity having long been the staple of pan-Islamist and, generally, modernist discourse. The other ruler Fitrat admired was Amanullah who had just thrown off the yoke of the British and was bravely struggling for the liberation of 'the East'. The amir of Bukhara, on the other hand, was beneath contempt, a pathetic slave of the British, good only for sucking the blood of his own subjects. Liberation of the Muslim world required revolution at home (in this case, the removal of the amir of Bukhara) and therefore the support of the Bolshevik regime.<sup>46</sup>

Early Soviet Russia also attracted veteran pan-Islamic activists from abroad. In early 1919, immediately after the Third Afghan War, Amanullah of Afghanistan sent a delegation to Moscow to seek Bolshevik support in his struggle for securing independence from the British. It was headed by Muhammad Barkatullah, who had arrived in Kabul four years earlier as part of the German-Ottoman mission. While in Tashkent on his way to Moscow, Barkatullah was lionized by local modernist intellectuals (such as Fitrat) and he published a pamphlet in Persian entitled *The Bolshevik Position and the Democracy of Islam*, in which he argued for congruence between the two creeds as well as subtly hinting at the need for a strategic alliance of the Muslim world with the Bolsheviks.<sup>47</sup> Later that year, in Moscow, he met up with his old acquaintance, Abdürreşid İbrahim, whom he must have known in Tokyo. We find them both addressing a meeting of Muslim Red Army soldiers in June, calling upon them to aid the Soviets in the struggle with British imperialism.<sup>48</sup> In autumn of that year, their struggle against British imperialism took another form: along with Musa Jarullah Bigiyev, the renowned Tatar scholar, they issued a *fatwa* denouncing the Arab Revolt:

The Arabs have rebelled against Islam. Having allied themselves with bitter, merciless enemies of Islam, the British, the French and the Italians, [the Arabs] aided in the extinction from the world of independent Muslim states. As a result of this...the Ka'ba of the Muslims and the mausoleum of the Prophet are under the sway of the infidel English and the hypocrite Arabs... Therefore, the Arabian peninsula has become the Abode of War [*dār al-harb*], just as it was between the *hijra* of the Prophet and the conquest of Mecca. [During that period], the *hajj* was not obligatory on Muslims; similarly, today that obligation is suspended. That is...until Mecca is taken from the hands of the infidel English and the hypocrite Arabs and the majestic banner of Islam is raised again, the *hajj* is no longer obligatory on Muslims.<sup>49</sup>

Barkatullah was to spend three years in the Soviet Union, during which he worked closely with both the Afghan government and the Comintern: at least for some part of this time he was in Central Asia, using his religious authority to exhort Central Asians to reconcile themselves to the Soviets in order to struggle against the British. Much the same appeal was made by a delegation from 'the Anatolian Assembly' that addressed a meeting of the Soviet of the Muslim part of Tashkent in January 1920. The Anatolian representative, a certain Hüseyin Hilmi Bey, declared Bolshevism and the Anatolian resistance to be fighting the same enemy, namely, British imperialism. Mehmed Kazım Bey, who had been part of the Ottoman-German mission to Afghanistan, then spoke briefly, saying, 'My only hope and [my] motto is to destroy the despotic English government in alliance with Soviet Russia.'<sup>50</sup>

There were many other foreign revolutionaries in Central Asia during these years. The first Indian Communist Party of India was established in Tashkent in 1920; Iranian and Bukharan Communist Parties also existed then, as did a Union for the Liberation of the East. The East was, of course, the Muslim world (with India, usually represented by Muslims, also thrown in). The fallout from the Khilafat movement also reached Central Asia. In 1920, certain *ulema* in India declared India to be the abode of war and urged Muslims to emigrate to Afghanistan, where Islam was free. Thousands responded to the call. The result, the so-called 'hijrat movement', was a debacle of the highest order, as the penniless and mostly uneducated *émigrés* found themselves sent off to camps in a country much poorer than their own.<sup>51</sup> Some of the *émigrés*, however, ventured forth into Central Asia in the hoping of making their way to Anatolia, where they hoped to fight the English on behalf of the caliph. Of this group, some continued on their way to Anatolia, while others turned to varieties of socialism and the promise of Soviet support for anti-colonial effort. All of these episodes were, of course, very useful to the Bolsheviks, but to explain them away simply as Bolshevik machination is no more satisfying than to see an Ottoman hand in all pan-Islamic activity before 1914.

But—and this is an important but—even if their rhetoric was pan-Islamic, none of these movements envisioned a universal Muslim state (and of course not an Islamic one). The political realities that drove the actors we have discussed were all more locally grounded: the broadening of Tatar autonomy within the Bolshevik framework for Sultangaliev; the articulation of a revolutionary argument against the amir of Bukhara for Fitrat; and Indian independence for Barkatullah. The rhetoric of pan-Islamism had many uses because it was compelling to many, but in practice it tended to meld with other causes. And while socialism or Bolshevism attracted many during the crisis years of 1918 to 1921, it was nationalism and the nation state that actually triumphed. As Erik-Jan Zürcher has argued, the resistance in Anatolia was essentially the expression of a Muslim nationalism.<sup>52</sup> The same can be argued for modernist intellectuals in Central Asia, even though they could never lead a movement approaching the Anatolian resistance in its strength and effectiveness.

## Conclusion

The rhetoric of Muslim unity was used by many different people for many different reasons during the half-century preceding the demise of the Caliphate in 1924. It obviously meant different things in different parts of the world. For the Ottomans, state and subjects alike, the appeal to Muslim unity made sense largely, if not entirely, as an instrument for safeguarding the existence of the empire. The emotionally laden allegiance of Indian Muslims to the Ottoman state and its rulers, on the other hand, was rooted in the predicament of Muslim elites under the British and revolved around the symbolism of the Caliphate. For Bukharans, the Ottoman Empire served as a model of reform and progress and a source of enlightenment, which alone could answer the needs of the age for Muslims.

The rhetoric of Muslim unity was also always tied to the rhetoric of modernity. Pan-Islamists were modernists. Indeed, the venture of pan-Islam itself, I have argued, was a product of modernity connected to a print-based public that transcended political boundaries. And as a result of all this, pan-Islamism could blend easily with other political concerns. The radicalization of pan-Islamism during the Russian revolution is perhaps the clearest example of this, but a far more enduring synthesis was with nationalism. I have argued here that pan-Islamism, rather than being rooted in the commands of Islam itself, belonged to the species of nationalism. The same can be said of its legacy. The most tangible legacy of turn-of-the-century pan-Islamism was not a universal Muslim state, but a variety of Muslim nationalisms that differed in their specifics (as the Anatolian, Bukharan and Indian cases demonstrate).

The path from one to the other was never straight, however. In lieu of a conclusion, I will present the story of a life that illustrates very well these twists and turns. It is the story of one Zafar Hasan, born in a small town in eastern Punjab in 1894. In 1914, when the war broke out, he was a student at the prestigious Government College in Lahore. In February 1915, he tells us, he heard of the Şeyhülislâm's *fatwa* declaring the war to be a jihad. He gathered with eighteen other young men, all students in colleges in Lahore, and took an oath to obey the command of the caliph and fight the British to the best of their ability. In the ultimate pan-Islamic act, they set out for the Afghan border on foot. The Afghan amir, Habibullah, however, promptly put them under house arrest and they spent the entire war in Kabul as 'honoured guests' of the amir. They managed to make the acquaintance of several Afghan notables by tutoring them in English and, therefore, were in the right place at the right time when Habibullah was assassinated and Amanullah ascended the throne. Zafar Hasan took part in the action during the Third Afghan War in May 1919 and was bitterly disappointed when peace was signed so soon. He saw his new-found influence slipping as Amanullah, having had his independence recognized, set about mending fences with the British. In 1922, therefore, Zafar Hasan sought and received permission to leave Afghanistan and go to Soviet Russia in his quest to fight the British. After a brief period in Tashkent, Zafar Hasan went to Moscow and enrolled in the

Communist University of the Workers of the East. He stayed there for over two years, but then left for Turkey, where he enthusiastically threw himself into the tumult. It mattered little that the office of the caliph, answering whose call had begun Zafar Hasan's entire trajectory, had been abolished and Turkey was in the grip of radical change. Zafar Hasan became a Turkish citizen and joined the Turkish army in which he became an officer after graduating from officer's school. Under the surname law, he took the name Aybek; and under this name he returned to Afghanistan in 1934 as military attaché at the Turkish Embassy. He retired in the 1940s and lived on in Istanbul until his death in 1989.<sup>53</sup> After 1915, he never set foot in British-ruled territory.

There are many very important things that Aybek does not tell in his autobiography—it was written in a different age according to a different set of assumptions about history—and many things that have to be corroborated from other sources, but in its bare outlines, his life story illustrates the complex trajectory the idea of pan-Islamism underwent.

### Notes

- 1 Jacob Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990, p. 6.
- 2 Ottoman state policies about Islam have been studied recently in a number of excellent works: Mumtaz'er Türköne, *Siyasi İdeoloji olarak İslâmcılığın Doğuşu*, Istanbul: İletişim, 1991; Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909*, London: Tauris, 1998; Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community in the Late Ottoman State*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- 3 Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains*, 53–63.
- 4 For Afghānī, see the now classic study by Nikki R. Keddie, *Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn "al-Afghānī": A Political Biography*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1972.
- 5 See also Anja Pistor-Hatam, 'The Persian Newspaper Akhtar as a Transmitter of Ottoman Political Ideas', in Thierry Zarcone and Fariba Zarinebaf, (eds), *Les Iraniens d'Istanbul*, Paris: Institut Français de recherches en Iran, 1993.
- 6 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, rev. edn, London: Verso, 1991.
- 7 On Abdürreşid İbrahim, see İsmail Türkoğlu, *Sibiryalı Meşhur Seyyah Abdürreşid İbrahim*, Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1997; 'Özel Dosya: Abdürreşid İbrahim', *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 19 (July 1995), 6–28; no. 20 (August 1995), 6–23; François Georgeon, 'Un voyageur Tatar en Extrême-Orient au début du XXe siècle', *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique*, vol. 32 (1991), 47–60.
- 8 The existing accounts of Barkatullah's life all verge on the hagiographical: see, e.g., Sayyid 'Ābid 'Alī Wajdī al-Husainī, *Maulānā Barkatullah Bhōpālī: inqilābī sawānih*, Bhopal: Madhiya Pradēsh Urdū Akaidamī, 1986.
- 9 Zarcone and Zarinebaf, op. cit.



- 10 Christoph Herzog and Raoul Motika, 'Orientalism *alla turca*: Late 19th/Early 20th Century Ottoman Voyages into the Muslim "Outback"', *Die Welt des Islams*, vol. 40 (2000): 139–95; see also Ussama Makdisi, 'Ottoman Orientalism', *American Historical Review*, vol. 107 (2002), 768–96.
- 11 Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, pp. 126–32 *et passim*.
- 12 Azmi Özcan, *Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain (1877–1924)*, Leiden: Brill, 1997.
- 13 Quoted by M.Naeem Qureshi, *Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics: A Study of the Khilafat Movement, 1918–24*, Leiden: Brill, 1999, pp. 34–5.
- 14 'Allāma Shiblī Nu'mānī, *Safarnāma-yi Rūm, Misr o Shām*, edited by Muhammad Riyāz, Lahore: Maqbūl Akaidamī, 1988 [orig. 1894], p. 19.
- 15 *Ibid.*, pp. 128–9. Typically, Shibli leaves the Arabic ('God, help this sultan, son of sultan, *hakan*, son of *hakan*, Abdülhamid Han') untranslated.
- 16 *Ibid.*, p. 136.
- 17 *Ibid.*, p. 143.
- 18 Munshī Mahbūb 'Ālam, *Safarnāma-yi Yūrōp, Bilād-i Rūm, Shām o Misr*, Lahore, 1908. A second edition of the book appeared in 1925 and was reprinted in 1933. I have used a modern version based on the second edition: Maulvī Mahbūb 'Ālam, *1900 kā Yōrap: Safarnāma*, Lahore: Nigārishāt, 1997.
- 19 *Ibid.*, p. 13.
- 20 *Ibid.*, p. 459.
- 21 *Ibid.*, p. 458.
- 22 *Ibid.*, p. 491.
- 23 *Ibid.*, pp. 503–4.
- 24 *Ibid.*, pp. 474–5.
- 25 Müşir Hüseyin Kidvā'ī (Mushīr Husain Qidwā'ī), 'Hindistan Müslümanlarına Açık Mektup', *Sirat-ı Müstakim* 4 (1326/1910), 434–5. Interestingly, the text of this open letter, which reassured Indian Muslims that the new regime had not undermined the Muslim character of the Ottoman state, was in Urdu only.
- 26 Iqbāl, 'Huzūr-i Risālat Ma'āb mēn', *Kulliyāt-i Iqbāl Urdū*, 6th edn, Lahore: Shaikh Ghulām 'Alī, 1984, 197.
- 27 Gail Minault, *The Khilafat Movement*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1982.
- 28 Adeeb Khalid, 'Society and Politics in Bukhara, 1868–1920', *Central Asian Survey*, vol. 19 (2000), 369–96.
- 29 Mirzā Sirāj ud-Dīn bin Hājji Mīrzā 'Abdurra'ūf, *Tuhaf-i ahl-i Bukhārā*, Bukhara: 1911. This book has recently been translated into French: Mīrzā Sirādj ad-Dīn Hakīm, *Souvenirs de voyage pour les gens de Boukhara*, tr. Stéphane A. Dudoignon, Paris: Sindbad, 1999.
- 30 Mirzā Sirāj, *Tuhaf*, p. 57.
- 31 *Ibid.*, p. 41.
- 32 *Ibid.*, p. 45.
- 33 *Ibid.*, p. 50.
- 34 'Abd ur-Raūf, 'Hisbihāl bahamwatanān-i bukhārāyī', *Hikmet*, 11 November 1910.
- 35 Buharalī Abdürraiūf, 'Buhara Veziri Nasrullah-bi Pervaneçi Efendi Hazretlerine Açık Mektub', *Teariūf-i Müslimin*, 25 November 1910, p. 25.

- 36 'Abd ur-Raūf Fitrat, *Munāzara-yi mudarris-i bukhārāyī bā yak nafar-i farangī dar Hindustān dar bāra-yi makātib-i jadīda*, Istanbul: Matbaa-yi Islāmiye-yi Hikmet, 1911.
- 37 Fitrat Bukhārāyī, *Bayānāt-i sayyāh-i hindī*, Istanbul: 1911.
- 38 The Stalinist view of pan-Islamism was best expressed by A.Arsharuni and Kh. Gabidullin, *Ocherki panislamizma i pantiurkizma v Rossii*, Moscow: Bezbozhnik, 1931.
- 39 See Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemerrier-Quelquejay, *La presse et le mouvement national chez les musulmans de Russie avant 1920*, Paris: Mouton, 1964.
- 40 Abrar Karimullin, *Tatarskaia kniga poreformennoi Rossii*, Kazan: Tatarskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1983; Abrar Karimullin, *Tatarskaia kniga nachala XX veka*, Kazan: Tatarskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1974.
- 41 The Tatar impact on Ottoman intellectual life still requires a thorough analysis. See, however, Masami Arai, *Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Era*, Leiden: Brill, 1992; Paul Dumont, 'La revue *Türk Yurdu* et les musulmans de l'empire russe, 1911–14', *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique*, 15 (1974), 315–31; and Volker Adam, *Rußlandmuslime in Istanbul am Vombend des Ersten Weltkrieges*, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2002.
- 42 Ahmet Temir, *Yusuf Akçura*, Ankara, 1987; Ahmed Zekî Velidî Togan, *Bugünkü Türkili (Türkistan) ve Yakın Tarihi*, 3rd edn, Istanbul: Enderun, 1981, pp. 475–9.
- 43 *Compte rendu de la III<sup>me</sup> Conférence des Nationalités réunie à Lausanne 27–29 juin 1916*, Lausanne: 1917, pp. 198–9.
- 44 The life and works of Mirsaid Sultangaliev have attracted considerable attention in recent years, which have also seen the publication of his collected works; see Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, *Izbrannye trudy*, Kazan: Gasir, 1998.
- 45 Abdurrauf Fitrat, *Sharq siyosati*, Tashkent: 1919, p. 40.
- 46 See Adeeb Khalid, 'Nationalizing the Revolution: The Transformation of Jadidism, 1917–20', in Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin (eds), *A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- 47 Maulvī Barkatullah, *Maslak-i bālishivīk va jumhūriyat-i Islām*, Tashkent: 1919.
- 48 *Qizil armiya* (Moscow), 15 July 1919.
- 49 'Khitāb li ahl al-īmān', *Ishtirokiyun* (Tashkent), 25 October 1919.
- 50 'Eski shahr «ijroiya qo'mita» sida sharaflī majlis', *Ishtirokiyun*, 13 January 1920.
- 51 On the Hijrat movement, see Qureshi, *Pan-Islam*, [Chapter 3](#).
- 52 Erik-Jan Zürcher, 'The Vocabulary of Muslim Nationalism', *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, no. 137 (1999), 81–92.
- 53 Zafar Hasan Aibak, *Khātīrāt (āpbūtī)*, rev. edn, Lahore: Sang-e Mīl, 1990 [orig. 1966].



## ‘*Kütüp ve Resail-i Mevkute*’

### Printing and publishing in a multi-ethnic society

*Johann Strauss*

In many respects, printing and publishing hold a special place in late Ottoman cultural and intellectual history. The effects of the changes that occurred during the *Tanzimat* period were, perhaps, nowhere more apparent than in this domain. All communities alike benefited from these new conditions, and whereas progress in the political and economic field was slow and many initiatives proved abortive, there was a steady and continuous rise in printing and publishing. Even the ‘Era of Despotism’ (*İstibdad dönemi*), that is, the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876–1909), witnessed a remarkable increase in activity in this field. This trend reached a climax of sorts after the Young Turk revolution. Furthermore, those who were involved in printing and publishing—as well as those who supervised and controlled these activities—figure among the most important men of letters. In a society without universities, academies or public libraries, much of the role of such institutions was left to these ‘cultural workers’.

#### **Books and newspapers in a multi-ethnic society**

In the era of Abdülhamid II, the printing of books was clearly viewed as an achievement just as worthy of being recorded and extolled as achievements in other fields. The Ottoman statistical yearbooks (*salname*) contained not only statistics for newly built schools and railroads, but also, from 1880 onwards, entries for books (*kütüb*) and periodicals (*resail-i mevkute*) whose publication had been authorized by the Ministry of Public Education (*Maarif Nezareti*).<sup>1</sup> In 1891, in an obvious act of homage to Abdülhamid, Mehmed ‘Mizancı’ Murad (1854–1917) compiled a comprehensive bibliography of some 4,000 books published during the first fifteen years of Abdülhamid’s reign, the *Works of the Hamidian Era (Devr-i Hamidî Âsârı)*.<sup>2</sup>

The *Devr-i Hamidî Âsârı*, unlike the lists published in the *salnames*, which included works in other languages, contains only books in Turkish. Consequently, it does not furnish a complete picture of printing and publishing activity in the late Ottoman Empire. A more sumptuous volume issued shortly afterwards by the ministry of public education<sup>3</sup> shows the full variety of printing and publishing at that period: apart from Turkish works, it includes numerous books published in the two Islamic *Bildungssprachen*, Arabic and Persian, and—in separate

sections—those in the languages of the non-Muslim minorities (Greek, Armenian, Bulgarian) or in European languages (French, Italian, English, German, etc.), including numerous works of the American missionaries.<sup>4</sup>

Indeed, printing and publishing in the late Ottoman Empire must be regarded very much as the result of the collective effort of *all* the communities comprising this multi-ethnic empire. As late as 1914, the majority of printing presses in Istanbul were run by non-Muslims,<sup>5</sup> and printing and publishing certainly owed a great part of their success to this situation.<sup>6</sup> Even publications in Turkish relied on the skills and entrepreneurship of non-Muslims and even foreigners. It is true that there were ambivalent figures among their number (some of them are even said to have ignored the Turkish language), but there can be no doubt that these individuals played an essential part in the publishing field up to the early republican era. Newspaper publishers or editors like the Churchills, publishers of the first non-official Turkish newspaper (*Ceride-i Havadis*); Teodor Kasap (1837–97), who founded the famous satirical paper *Diyojen* and a number of other papers; ‘Philippe Efendi’ (Shahinoglu, d. 1890), publisher of the influential paper *Vakit*; and ‘Mihran Efendi’ (‘Kayserili Mihran’, i.e., Mihran Nakkashian, 1850–1944), the publisher of *Sabah*, figure among the most prominent figures in the Ottoman press in the late nineteenth or early twentieth centuries.

The first Ottoman Publishing Association (*Matbuat-ı Osmaniyye Cemiyeti*), founded after the Young Turk revolution,<sup>7</sup> included among its members the Armenians Mihran Nakkashian and Püzant Kechian (1859–1927), publisher of *Püzantion* (‘Byzantium’, founded in 1896) and the Greek, Demetrius (‘Dimitraki’) Nicolaïdes, (1843–?), publisher of *Konstantinoupolis* and for a while director at the Turkish paper *Servet*.

Another Greek journalist, Nicolas Nicolaïdes, even acted as international propagandist for Abdülhamid II. This journalist’s career and activities are particularly interesting and may be regarded as typical for the time. In Paris, Nicolaïdes published *L’Orient* (1888) and other papers and pamphlets which attacked the sultan’s (all too numerous) opponents, including ‘Mizancı’ Murad.<sup>8</sup> The French translation of a pioneering work of Turkish feminist literature, Fatma Aliye’s *Nisvan-ı İslâm* (1892), appeared in the *Bibliothèque du journal ‘Orient’ et ‘La Turquie’*.<sup>9</sup> This work was translated by Olga de Lébédeff (Ol’ga Lebedeva), also known as ‘Gülzar Hanım’ among the Turks.<sup>10</sup> She was a Russian aristocrat from Kazan who had come to Istanbul in the 1880s. There she published several Turkish translations of Russian writers (Tolstoy, Pushkin, Lermontov), including two works written in defence of Islam by the mufti of St Petersburg, Ataullah Bayezitoff (1846–1911), which had first been serialized in Ahmed Midhat Efendi’s *Tercüman-ı Hakikat*.

Papers published in the Ottoman capital by Muslims in languages other than Turkish also fit into this context. The Arabic-language paper *Al-Jawā’ib* (1861–84),<sup>11</sup> or the Persian *Akhtar* (1876–96),<sup>12</sup> soon became an integral part of the journalistic scene. Teodor Kasap, for example, ridiculed *Al-Jawā’ib*<sup>13</sup> and *Akhtar* in his satirical journals, although *Akhtar*, nevertheless, rose to Kasap’s

defence against attacks by his adversaries.<sup>14</sup> Nor is it surprising that the *Al-Jawā'ib* press also printed works in Turkish, including Şemseddin Sami's *Taaşşuk-i Tal'at ve Fitnat* (1289/1872), commonly regarded as the first original Turkish novel.<sup>15</sup> Aḥmad Fāris al-Shidyāq's Arabic grammars, which aroused controversy among Arab scholars, were translated into Turkish and used as school textbooks.<sup>16</sup> The *Akhtar* press printed books in various languages (Persian, Turkish, Greek, Armenian, French) and provided a Turkish readership with a carefully edited specimen of Fuzulī's *divan*.<sup>17</sup>

### Book production

Compared with Western standards, book production in the Ottoman Empire had remained remarkably low until the second half of the nineteenth century<sup>18</sup> and was basically intended to meet the needs of the learned classes in all communities. For many years, books for a Muslim readership were printed in Turkish, Arabic and Persian almost exclusively in the capital and predominantly on government presses, in particular the *Matbaa-i âmire*, established under this name in 1832.<sup>19</sup> This press printed a large number of religious books, but also secular didactic works on mathematics, history and astronomy, occasionally even in minority languages.<sup>20</sup>

The *Tanzimat* reforms inaugurated by the *hatt-ı şerif* of Gülhane in 1839 gave visible new impulse to printing activity, especially to meet the needs of the newly created schools. Significantly enough, certain modern, especially military schools even had their own, more or less active, printing presses,<sup>21</sup> whereas no such institutions are known for *medreses*. The *Matbaa-i âmire* underwent several reforms under the auspices of capable directors like Ahmed Vefik Pasha (1823–91) or Ahmed Midhat Efendi (1844–1912). They were assisted by specialists from other communities, in particular the Armenians (Boghos Arabian, Ohannes Mühendisian, Agop Boyajian, Janik Aramian), who were well known for their expertise in this field, but also by the pioneer of Arabic printing, Fāris al-Shidyāq (Ahmed Fāris Efendi to the Ottoman Turks),<sup>22</sup> who began his career in the Ottoman capital as a chief proofreader at the *Matbaa-i âmire*.<sup>23</sup> During the last years of the reign of Abdülaziz (1861–76), more and more private presses were founded and these eventually dominated the market.

In most of the provinces, the first Turkish printing presses were established only after the *vilâyet* reform of 1864. They usually restricted themselves to printing the rather colourless official gazettes (*vilâyet gazetesi*) and the *salnames*. A few Ottoman governors such as Sırrî Pasha (1844–95), or Abidin Pasha 'Dino' (1843–1908), took the opportunity to have their own writings printed by the *vilâyet matbaası* of their respective provinces. Thanks to people such as these, the first (and rare) specimens of Turkish books were printed at places such as Rhodes, Ankara, Trabzon or Diyarbakir. Major urban centres like Beirut, Izmir or Salonika distinguished themselves by developing their own, sometimes considerable printing activities.<sup>24</sup>

Foreign missionaries—both Catholic and Protestant—were instrumental in the development of a new print culture, notably in Syria.<sup>25</sup> But in the capital, too, growing missionary activity, in particular the publications of the *American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions*, did not fail to have its impact on typographical standards. Nor was this impact limited to the non-Muslim minorities. The first illustrated papers in the Ottoman Empire, for example, owed much to the missionaries' publications.<sup>26</sup> Among the illustrators of books and papers and the first cartoonists, there were numerous Greeks, Armenians and even foreigners. The portrait of Alexandre Dumas that adorns the first page of the seminal Turkish translation of the *Comte de Monte-Cristo*, published in 1871, was the work of Constantine Orphanoudakes, a distinguished Greek artist and professor of drawing, who also drew the cartoons for Teodor Kasap's *Çıngıraklı Tatar*. The Armenian, Nishan Berberian (1842–1907), a man of many talents, was equally well known as a printer, translator and cartoonist.<sup>27</sup>

Abdülhamid II, who was known for his watchful eye and firm grip on publications of all sorts, did not hinder the technical progress of printing. On the contrary, this activity reached a zenith of sorts during his reign. One may say that the process of Europeanizing Turkish printing and publishing was completed during this period.<sup>28</sup> Illustrated papers like *Mâlumat* or *Servet-i fînun*, founded at the end of the nineteenth century, were, apart from the Arabic characters used, little different from their Western counterparts.

Abdülhamid used various methods to intervene in publishing. On the one hand, he closed down printing presses and banned printers. On the other, there were subsidies and protection. The printing press run by one of his former chamberlains, Osman Bey (d. 1890),<sup>29</sup> for example, enjoyed special privileges: Osman Bey's *Matbaa-i Osmaniyye*, unanimously regarded as one of the best equipped presses by contemporary observers,<sup>30</sup> is even said to have been granted the exclusive right to print the Koran.<sup>31</sup>

### **‘Books printed in Constantinople’: Western observers and Ottoman book production**

Thanks to the remarkable upsurge of research into the Turkish book industry in recent years, we are now well informed on the development of printing in the Ottoman Empire.<sup>32</sup> But in many respects, one should rather speak of a rediscovery. Even to contemporaries, book production was quite transparent and well documented. It was not only the readers of Ottoman *salnames* who had access to information on book production in the Ottoman Empire: Western readers interested in this subject could also follow it closely from the beginning, thanks to the writings of Oriental scholars. As a result of their keen interest, the public in nineteenth-century Europe was well informed about books published in Turkey—perhaps more so than today's public! Prior to 1849, Joseph von Hammer (1774–1856), a pioneer in the field, regularly published bibliographical notes on ‘Arabic, Persian and Turkish’ books printed in the Ottoman capital. This he did

not only in Orientalist journals such as the *Journal Asiatique* but also in the Viennese *Jahrbücher der Literatur*. He was succeeded by a host of other dragoman-scholars (Bianchi, Schlechta-Wssehrd, Mordtmann, Belin, Huart and others) who continued this work until the early twentieth century. With few exceptions, however, most of them had very specific 'Orientalist' interests. This bias led to a certain misrepresentation in their writings, which are far from reflecting the totality of printing and publishing activity in the Ottoman capital.

Some of these men were assisted in their research by local scholars. Such collaboration seems to have been fairly common. For example, in 1869 the French dragoman François Belin (1817–77)<sup>33</sup> received a complete list of books printed by the *Matbaa-i âmire* from its director, Ahmed Vefik Pasha, who also took care to revise these lists.<sup>34</sup> This pasha, who had numerous contacts with non-Muslims and foreigners, owned a formidable private library.<sup>35</sup> Clément Huart (1854–1926) also sought his advice. Huart was also helped by a high-ranking official at the Ministry of Public Education, the Greek, John Aristocles (1831–93).<sup>36</sup> 'Aristocles Efendi' was well known as an educationalist in the Greek community and was at the same time a teacher of ethnography at the prestigious School of Administration (*Mekteb-i Mülkiyye*).<sup>37</sup>

### Booksellers' catalogues

A Western-style book trade only developed in the last quarter of the nineteenth century in the Ottoman Empire. It had its centre in the Avenue of the Sublime Porte (*Bab-ı âli Caddesi*) in Istanbul, a tradition that remained unchanged until the twentieth century. The beginnings were rather modest, but the new bookstores did not fail to impress clients who were accustomed to the piles of dusty books in the tiny shops of the traditional *sahhafs*.<sup>38</sup> The more active booksellers of the *Bâb-ı âli Caddesi* also offered their services, including subscriptions to newspapers and periodicals, to clients in the provinces.

Western scholars much resented the absence of Western-style book catalogues. This problem was eventually resolved, again thanks to members of the minorities, the 'agents of change'.<sup>39</sup> As far as Turkish books are concerned, it was an Armenian bookseller in the *Bâb-ı âli Caddesi*, Arakel Tozlian (d. 1912),<sup>40</sup> who published the first catalogue, in 1301/1884. This pioneering effort aroused considerable interest among Western Oriental scholars such as J.H. Mordtmann and Clément Huart, who were among the first to use this catalogue.<sup>41</sup> In the same year, Aḥmad Fāris al-Shidyāq issued his first *Al-Jawā'ib* catalogue, and it was sent to subscribers (*mushtarikūn*) and agents (*wukalā*) all over the Islamic world.<sup>42</sup>

After this event, many other booksellers started regularly publishing similar catalogues. Next came the Kayserian brothers, Ohannes (Ferid) Efendi, founder of the *Vatan Kütüphanesi*, and Krikor Efendi, publisher of the *Asır Kütüphanesi*. The latter, also known as Krikor Faik, was particularly active and is known to have published and edited numerous Turkish periodicals in the years 1885 to 1914.<sup>43</sup> These catalogues were distributed gratis, unlike Arakel's. To Western observers,



they were far from satisfactory,<sup>44</sup> but they contain a wealth of information on the condition of the book trade at that time. Surprisingly, they have hardly been tapped by modern researchers.

The Ottoman press also helped disseminate knowledge about books published in the Ottoman Empire. A number of papers published new book announcements, in some cases many years before the appearance of the first book catalogues. Western scholars made extensive use of these announcements for their notes on books printed in Constantinople. The German scholar, J.H. Mordtmann (1852–1932), used reviews published in papers like Philippe Efendi's *Vakit*, Ahmed Midhat Efendi's *Tercüman-ı Hakikat*, or the supplement (*'ilāwa*) of Aḥmad Fāris's *Al-Jawā'ib*. The lists published by Hammer's successor, Thomas Xavier Bianchi (1783–1864), were almost exclusively based on the announcements in Churchill's *Ceride-i Havadis* (founded in 1840), a paper from which other writers also benefited in this respect.<sup>45</sup>

### *Tefrika and forma*

There was another connection between the press and book production in the Ottoman Empire, the *feuilleton* (Ott. *tefrika*), in particular the serialized novel. In Western Europe, this system of publication had started in the late 1830s.<sup>46</sup> Its advantages were manifest: it kept alive the curiosity of the readers and simultaneously contributed to the circulation of the papers. The press of the minorities in the Ottoman Empire seems to have adopted this system relatively early. In the Turkish press, it found its place only in the last third of the nineteenth century.

The vast majority of Turkish novels, in particular the translated ones, first appeared in instalments in periodicals. These *tefrikas* were subsequently republished in book form, much to the chagrin of certain Western Oriental scholars.<sup>47</sup> Alexandre Dumas père's *Comte de Monte-Cristo*, translated into Ottoman Turkish by a multitude of translators under the supervision of Teodor Kasap in 1871, is a famous example in the Ottoman-Turkish context.<sup>48</sup> Readers of the *Diyojen* had become increasingly impatient and Teodor Kasap eventually decided to publish the translation in book form.<sup>49</sup>

Ahmed Midhat Efendi (1844–1912), the most prolific author of the Hamidian era, was perhaps the most aware of these possibilities. Nearly all his works first appeared in the columns of his *Tercüman-ı Hakikat* (founded in 1878). The *tefrikas*, i.e., novels, scientific, historical and philosophical writings, formed the *Tercüman-ı Hakikat tefrikalarından mütahassıl kütüb- hane*. Selections of other writings by various authors (including literary writings) that had originally been published in the paper were republished in three large volumes.<sup>50</sup> As to the minority periodicals, such as the Greek papers *Konstantinoupolis* (founded in 1867) and *Neologos* (1869), or the Armenian papers *Hayrenik* ('Fatherland', 1870), *Arewelk* ('Orient', 1884), and *Püzantion* ('Byzantium', 1896), many had literary supplements in which numerous novels translated from French were

serialized. The editor of the Judaeo-Spanish paper *El Tiempo*, founded in 1871, David Fresco (1850–1933), was one of the most active writers in his community and played a particularly important role in popularizing Western novels. Another prolific Jewish writer, translator and publisher, Elia Carmona (1870–1931), has left a rich autobiography that provides a rare and unique insight into the world of printing and publishing in Istanbul during the late Ottoman period.<sup>51</sup>

Books, like periodicals, were usually published in instalments (*forma, ciüz*). This practice seems to have increased in the first years of Abdülhamid's reign<sup>52</sup> and included dictionaries as well as novels.<sup>53</sup> The system was somewhat inconvenient for booksellers. The *kitabçı* (bookseller) Arakel complained, for obvious reasons, about readers who argued: 'Don't worry! One or two instalments of this book will come out. Let it be completed, then we will buy it!'<sup>54</sup> Jacques Loria's French novel, *Les Mystères de Péra* (1897, 932 pages in 56 instalments) is a particularly instructive example of this practice: it was the talk of the town for months.<sup>55</sup> Loria, a teacher at the *Alliance Israélite Universelle*, is a typical example of the Ottoman writer of the period. He wrote in several languages—novels in Judaeo-Spanish and French, dramas in Turkish. Moreover, like many writers, especially non-Muslims, he used a variety of pseudonyms ('Comte de Persignac', 'Prinkipo Bey').<sup>56</sup>

### Public reading rooms

Since books were relatively expensive, they were placed on display in public reading rooms (*kıraathane*) in the same way as journals and magazines. The importance of these reading rooms has been acknowledged in recent research.<sup>57</sup> These institutions seem to have started to flourish after the Crimean War.<sup>58</sup> Dikran (?) Serafim's *Kıraathane-i Osmanî* on the Divan Yolu (founded in 1857) made a particularly notable contribution to the intellectual formation of generations of Ottoman writers.<sup>59</sup>

Especially important were the reading rooms of learned societies, such as the *Cemiyet-i ilmiyye* (founded in 1861), the 'Greek Literary Society in Constantinople' (*Syllogos*, 1862–1922), and the Bulgarian *Chitalishte* (1866–77). In his memoirs, the Bulgarian Christo Stambolski (1843–1932), professor at the Medical School (*Mekteb-i tıbbiyye*), gives us an idea of the influence of these institutions. He was particularly impressed by the reading rooms of the Greek *Syllogos*, where all sorts of European periodicals were on display and where conferences were given by cultivated members of all communities.<sup>60</sup> The example of the *Syllogos* played an instrumental role in the creation of the Bulgarian *Chitalishte*, whose library held not only the—quite numerous—Bulgarian periodicals published in the Ottoman Empire in that period and a number of French and Greek papers, but also journals from Russia and the *Revue des Deux Mondes*. It was to become the nucleus of Bulgarian national awakening.<sup>61</sup>

### The press and its impact on literature and language

The press also played an extraordinary role in the development of the written or literary language, not only in terms of vocabulary but also in terms of style. It has to be stressed that this was not limited to the Muslim Turks. The modern Armenian literary language ('Western Armenian') to a great extent owes its formation and emancipation from the classical language (*krapar*) to the efforts of the Armenian press in the Ottoman capital.<sup>62</sup> Fāris al-Shidyāq was a linguistic conservative but his contribution to the codification and standardization of modern Arabic has now been acknowledged. Some of the neologisms he coined are still in use.<sup>63</sup> The Ottoman Greeks were also known for their linguistic conservatism. They cultivated the archaic variant of modern Greek to an extent that struck or even amused contemporary observers.<sup>64</sup>

Ottoman Turks were particularly aware of the role played by the press in the development of their language. A well-known Ottoman statesman, Said Pasha ('Küçük' Said Pasha, 1838–1914), who had been involved in journalism and printing, has left an interesting work entitled 'The Language of the Journalists' (1911)<sup>65</sup> in which he emphasizes the numerous connections between the language of literature, politics, history and of newspapers. He went so far as to write, 'even the natural language is that of the newspapers.'<sup>66</sup> In fact, this *Gazeteci Lisanı* is rather a critical survey of the development of the Ottoman-Turkish language, with suggestions for its reform, than a study of newspaper language. The booklet contains, however, observations on prominent writers of the *Tanzimat* period, many of whom had been involved for some time in publishing and editing newspapers or journals.<sup>67</sup>

The father of Turkish journalism, İbrahim Şinasî (1826–71), was also a pioneer in the field of drama and poetry.<sup>68</sup> His journalistic writings therefore deserved to be preserved in a special way for posterity. The famous printer, journalist and writer, EbuZZiya Tefvik (1848–1913, *vide infra*) started in 1886 to publish 'Selections from the *Tasvir-i Efkâr*' one of the seminal Ottoman papers founded by Şinasî in 1862, in his *Kitabhane-i Ebüzzıya* series.<sup>69</sup> These extracts were divided into three sections: politics (*siyasiyyat*), causerie (*mübahasat-ı edebîyye*), and miscellanea (*mütenevvia*). The reprinted articles were originally written by Namık Kemal (1840–88) and Şinasî himself. In a similar way, and with similar incentives, Salim Fāris (1841–1908), Aḥmad Fāris's son, published a seven-volume selection of articles previously published in *Al-Jawā'ib*: the reprints appeared in Istanbul between 1871 and 1881.<sup>70</sup>

### Booksellers and publishers

The Turkish book trade was, as has been stated above, in the hands of the Armenians for a long time. Some of them were simultaneously printers (*tâbi*), publishers (*nâşir*) and booksellers (*kitabcı*). They needed the collaboration of Muslim Turkish writers. The *kitabcı* Arakel, for example, published a series of

excellent school textbooks (*Tâlim-i kıraat, Mekteb-i Edeb*) that were corrected by Muallim Naci (1850–93), one of the most respected Ottoman writers of the period. Mihran Nakkashian ('Kayserili' Mihran) was the special publisher (*editör*, a term he was particularly fond of) of the great scholar and linguist Şemseddin Sami (1850–1904). Although less altruistic than he wanted the public to believe, his achievements must be acknowledged: Above all, he managed to publish, among other works, Şemseddin Sami's *Kamusü l-a'lâm* (6 vols., 1889–98), which remains the most comprehensive and authoritative general encyclopedia in Ottoman Turkish.

This herculean achievement is admirable in many respects. It is the work of a single scholar, even if he had to cut back the project's scope considerably in the last volumes. Moreover, most of his predecessors had failed: Ali Suavî's *Kamusu l-ulûm ve l-maarif*, published as a supplement to his paper *Ulûm* in Paris (1870), did not get beyond five instalments and the letter 'A'. The same is true of Şemseddin Sami's successors. A new attempt after the Young Turk revolution, the *Musavver Dairetü l-maarif* (1331/1913, the French title being *Dairet-ul-Mearif illustré*), was also unsuccessful. The title is reminiscent of the famous Arabic encyclopedia of the Bustânîs (*Dā'irat al-ma'ārif*, 11 vols., Beirut, 1876–1900). The new work was planned as a collaborative endeavour and even included a French professor at the *lycée* of Galatasaray, Louis Feuillet. But it too stopped with the letter 'A'.<sup>71</sup> It should be noted that it was once again a member of the minorities, the Jewish printer and publisher Elias Behar (İlyas Bayar, 1880–1945), who attempted to realize this ambitious project. Behar had founded the *Kanaat Kütübhanesi* in 1898, and his career continued into the republican period.<sup>72</sup>

Eventually, Muslim-Turkish printers and publishers also emerged to take the lead in some respects. Among these, there are some truly remarkable figures. I briefly examine three outstanding examples: Ebuzziya Tevfik, 'İkdamcı' Ahmed Cevdet (1862–1935) and 'Tüccarzade' İbrahim Hilmî (1876(?)–1963), who later adopted the family name 'Çığırçan' ('the one who opens a new road'). These individuals illustrate the potential of Ottoman printing and publishing during that period but also its limitations. From their writings, it becomes clear to what extent they were spurred on by challenge of their non-Muslim countrymen, whose activities were both admired and resented.

In an article on Armenian printing published in his *Mecmua-i Ebuzziya* in 1912, Ebuzziya Tevfik protested against the claims expressed in nationalist undertones in the Armenian paper *Azadamard*<sup>73</sup> on the occasion of the 400th anniversary of Armenian printing.<sup>74</sup> Alluding to the first book printed in Arabic characters, which dates from almost exactly the same period,<sup>75</sup> he comes to the philosophical conclusion that

the Arabic [printed] characters used for writing and publishing by us, the Turks, were created in the same year as the Armenian script. But the honour and pride of both is due to Pope Julius II, neither to us nor to the Armenians.<sup>76</sup>

### *Ebuzziya Tevfik*

Ebuzziya Tevfik perhaps best embodies the qualities and virtues of an Ottoman printer and publisher of that period. Characteristically, he was extremely versatile: printer, editor, journalist, critic, lexicographer and writer. As an eye-witness, personally acquainted with the protagonists of the *Tanzimat* period such as Şinasi, Namık Kemal, Teodor Kasap, and others, he has left the most valuable accounts of the Young Ottomans (*Yeni Osmanlılar*) and the history of the Ottoman press, which is inseparable from the general development of intellectual life in the nineteenth century. His *Nümune-i edebiyat-ı osmaniyye* ('Specimen of Ottoman Literature', first published in 1879) established a sort of canon which has shaped ideas on the development of Turkish literature to the present day.

Ebuzziya has many traits in common with Aḥmad Fāris al-Shidyāq. He was an enthusiast about the art of printing and understood its fundamental role in the dissemination of knowledge (*ilm ü irfan*). In the abovementioned article he writes: 'Printing is the world's most noble industry',<sup>77</sup> which, unfortunately, was not yet properly appreciated among Oriental peoples (*akvam-ı şarkıyye*). In his own journal, the *Mecmua-i Ebuzziya*, this topic holds prominent place.<sup>78</sup> Having acquired an unequalled knowledge of its history in the West and in the East, he felt most unsatisfied with the situation in the Ottoman Empire.<sup>79</sup>

Like most Istanbul printers, Ebuzziya was able to print in different languages (*elsine-i muhtelife*) and various scripts on his press, which was established in 1297/1879–80. He also introduced (rather modest) spelling reforms into Ottoman Turkish. However, on the whole, he remained strongly attached to the Arabic alphabet and vehemently opposed those who pleaded for the adoption of the Latin script.<sup>80</sup> He was certainly not an Armenophile, but among the writers for the *Mecmua-i Ebuzziya* was Boghos Barnassian (d. 1902), a high-ranking government official and journalist who had translated Mackenzie Wallace's *Russia* into Ottoman Turkish.<sup>81</sup> Ebuzziya displayed the same pragmatic attitude towards missionary activity. Although he felt little sympathy for their work, this did not prevent him from printing a work on education<sup>82</sup> that had been commissioned by George F. Herrick (1834–1926), an American missionary known as 'Muallim Herrick' among the Turks.<sup>83</sup>

His inexpensive collection, *Kitabhane-i Ebuzziya* (founded in 1882), played an extraordinary role in the dissemination of knowledge.<sup>84</sup> This collection was perfectly able to compete with any Western collections of the period, such as the *Reclams Universalbibliothek* in Germany. It provided readers with information on Western and Oriental (Islamic) history and literature. It included translations and original works, those by 'classical' authors as well as those of writers of the *Tanzimat* era. In terms of book ornamentation, Ebuzziya developed a very Ottoman style of *art nouveau* in which he skilfully exploited the meanders of the kufic script. Unsurprisingly, these achievements earned him the appreciation of his printer colleagues in the West.

### 'İkdamcı' Cevdet

Ahmed Cevdet ([Oran], 1862–1935) must also be regarded as a pioneer of Ottoman printing and publishing. Since he does not seem to fit the general pattern, he is one of the forgotten figures of Ottoman intellectual history.<sup>85</sup> However, his contribution to printing and publishing is remarkable.

Ahmed Cevdet took his first journalistic steps at Ahmed Midhat's *Tercüman-i Hakikat*, but he is mainly remembered as the founder, in 1894, of the daily paper *İkdam* ('Effort'). Whereas most Turkish papers dubbed themselves 'Ottoman' (*Osmanlı*), his paper bore the quite revolutionary subtitle '*Türk gazetesi*'. It was to become the most important paper of the period. It sold 15,000 copies in the beginning and up to 40,000 after 1908. For some time, the paper competed stiffly with Mihran Nakkashian's *Sabah*. Numerous distinguished writers contributed to *İkdam*, including Ahmed Midhat Efendi. Several masterpieces of Russian literature were popularized through this paper after 1908.

It is the series of this paper, the '*Kitabhane-i İkdam*', that deserves particular attention. It represents the first serious attempt at making accessible the specific contributions of the Turks to culture and civilization. The corpus contains works that are still considered highlights of the cultural legacy of the Ottoman Turks and their kinsmen and predecessors in Central Asia. Among these works were biographical dictionaries, the *tezkires* of Latifî (nr. 9), Sâlim (nr. 15), and Rıza (nr. 18); Sâî's biography of the great architect ('Mimar') Sinan, known as *Tezkiretü l-bünyan* (nr. 13); and the *Âyine-i zürefâ*, the only biographical collection devoted to Ottoman historians (nr. 6). 'Alî Sher Navâ'î's *Muḥākamatü l-lughatayn* (nr. 12) a sort of '*défense et illustration*' of the Turkish language, was published together with an Ottoman-Turkish translation by Bahauddin Veled ([İzbudak], 1869–1953). The *İkdam* press also printed the first Ottoman encyclopaedia, *Mevzuatü l-ulum* (a Turkish translation of Taşköprüzade's *Miftāḥu s-sa'āda* by his son Kemalettin Mehmed [d. 1621]); and another, more recent monument of Turkish scholarship, Şemseddin Samî's *Kamus-i Türkî*. This comprehensive monolingual Ottoman-Turkish dictionary is still valuable today.

It is true that some of these publications do not meet our more exacting standards, but it was a newspaper, not an academic institution that undertook the printing of Evliya Çelebi's famous *Book of Travels* (*Seyahatname*), whose first six volumes were published by Ahmed Cevdet between 1896 and 1900. Moreover, many of the shortcomings of this edition were due to Abdülhamid's censorship.

### İbrahim Hilmî (Çığırçan)

Our next example, İbrahim Hilmî (1876?-1963), has been rediscovered only recently.<sup>86</sup> His objectives were, in many respects, similar to those of Ebuzziya Tefik, but he belonged to another generation. As a provincial (he was born in Tulcea in the Dobruja), his career was different and he remained less close to the literary circles of his time.

This remarkable bookseller and publisher started his career at an early age.<sup>87</sup> The name chosen for his bookshop, '*Kitabhane-i İslâm ve Askerî*', distinguished him from the surrounding Armenian booksellers of the *Bâb-ı âli Caddesi* rather than denoting a specialization in religious or military works. Indeed, he lacked support from the religious authorities and his efforts to publish books and journals for the officer corps ended in disappointment. His monthly magazine, *Army and Navy (Ordu ve Donanma)* published at great expense (and with great expectations), found only 550 buyers—a small proportion of the officer corps of some 20,000 men, as he remarked with bitterness.<sup>88</sup>

İbrahim Hilmî had a pedagogical impetus. He published excellent text-books, atlases, etc., for schools. In 1914, he published a Turkish translation of the Koran.<sup>89</sup> Translations from Western languages were preceded by lengthy prefaces by the publisher that were destined to popularize the authors and their writings. He was an admirer of the poetess Nigâr Hanım (1856–1918), whom he considered the pride of Turkish women's literature.

İbrahim Hilmî was an outspoken supporter of Westernization. Having travelled in various countries, he had seen the progress that had been made in various fields (including printing and publishing) by even the Ottoman's small Balkan neighbours, whose achievements aroused his admiration and respect.<sup>90</sup> Among the volumes of his *Collection of Awakening (Kitabhane-i İntibah)* published in the wake of the disastrous Balkan War, there is one with the programmatic title 'Europeanization'.<sup>91</sup> Indeed, he considered the lack of Westernization as one of the major causes of what he called 'our catastrophe' (*felâketimiz*). His ideas on language were marked by progressive views. İbrahim Hilmî participated in the linguistic debate that intensified after the Young Turk revolution. In a pamphlet, published in 1909 under the title 'Do We Need a Purification of Our Language?' (*Tasfiye-i lisana muhtac mıyız?*) he pleaded vehemently for reform and simplification of the language, thus anticipating many of the changes to come.<sup>92</sup>

### Censorship and censors

Until the Young Turk revolution, book production and the press were closely supervised and controlled by the state. Ahmed Midhat's *Tercüman-ı Hakikat* was discretely subsidized, and a number of other papers were also dependent upon this kind of patronage. As has been seen, Abdülhamid II even sponsored papers published in Europe, such as Nicolas Nicolaïdes's *L'Orient* in Paris.

Otherwise, there was the institution called Committee of Inspection and Control (*Encümen-i teftiş ve muâyene*) which controlled, with varying severity, the writings of the sultan's subjects. Its duties even included the scrutiny of pictures (*resim, levha*), medals and coats of arms (*arma*).<sup>93</sup> Any works to be printed had to be first submitted to the *Encümen*.<sup>94</sup> Even *kıraathanes* were sometimes affected by state intervention. Dr Stambolski wrote in his memoirs that on 27 February 1875 the *kıraathane* of Şehzadebaşı, where he used to go to browse Turkish



papers, was closed down by the police, by order of the censor, since there was what he calls 'a Young Turkish flair'.<sup>95</sup>

Hardly any printer, publisher or writer was safe from the interference of the *Encümen-i teftiş ve muâyene* and many of them became victims of censorship. Ebuzziya Tevfik suffered much as a result of it, but censorship affected all communities alike. Each had its own censor appointed by the Ministry of Public Education. After 1908 and in the republican era many books and articles were written on this topic.<sup>96</sup> These accounts, usually rather stereotypical, are not always reliable. Political *émigrés* were, for obvious reasons, particularly bitter and have left many sarcastic descriptions of the censors' extravagances. Among these writers were members of the minorities, who, perhaps wisely enough, published their works under pseudonyms.<sup>97</sup>

But, concerning the censors, these accounts have to be handled with caution. In general, these officials have been described as ignorant and perfidious and some of them certainly were.<sup>98</sup> But we can also detect a number of remarkable and sometimes outstanding persons among them: The two Ottoman translators of the *Iliad*, for instance, the Albanian Naim Bey<sup>99</sup> and Hilmi from Salonika, were both members of the *Encümen-i teftiş ve muâyene*. Mehmed Zihni (1845–1911), head of the *Encümen-i teftiş* after 1894, was a distinguished Arabic scholar and teacher at the prestigious School of Administration (*Mekteb-i Mülkiyye*). His biographies of famous Muslim women (*Meşahîrü n-nisâ*, 1294) were even translated into Persian.<sup>100</sup> An Iranian member, 'Habib Efendi' (Mirza Hâbib-i (İşfahânî) ), 1835–93), the translator of James Morier's *Haji Baba of Ispahan*, was a key figure in modern Persian literature.<sup>101</sup> It was he who instructed Madame de Lébédoff in the Persian language. Theophil Loebel ('Löbel Efendi', 1859-?), a Jewish censor and native of Moldavia, wrote a learned dissertation on Turkish, Arabic and Persian elements in Romanian.<sup>102</sup> The censors of Bulgarian books prior to the Russo-Turkish War (1877), Nikola Mikhaylovski (1818–92)<sup>103</sup> and Dragan Tsankov (1828–1911) were eminent Bulgarian men of letters. The latter had taught Ahmed Midhat Efendi French during his stay in the Danube province (*Tuna vilâyeti*). The Greek inspector, Avraam Vaporides, also seems to have been a respected member of the community.<sup>104</sup> One censor of Armenian books, Mehmed Süreyya (1874–1924), was, interestingly enough, a Muslim Turk who taught Armenian at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiyye*,<sup>105</sup> where as the inspector for Persian-language papers, in particular *Akhtar* ('The Star'), published for twenty years in the Ottoman capital, was for a while the distinguished Persian scholar Bahauddin Veled [İzbudak].<sup>106</sup> Khalîl al-Khūrî (1836–1907), founder of the *Hadiqat al-Akhabâr* (1857), a pioneer of Arabic journalism, was known as a particularly lenient censor.<sup>107</sup>

### Communication between the communities

Another issue concerns the problem of how and to what extent communities separated by language and script were able to communicate with each other.



One solution would have been to publish books or papers simultaneously in different languages. This was the case of the official gazette, the *Takvim-i vekayi* (founded in 1831), which was seemingly planned to appear in six different editions (Turkish, French, Greek, Armenian [Armeno-Turkish], Bulgarian, Persian, Arabic). But some editions were never issued, and others only for a short while.<sup>108</sup> Among the provincial papers (*vilâyet gazeteleri*), there were a number published in two, three or even four different languages.<sup>109</sup> The American missionaries systematically published their journals *Avedaper* and *Angeliaphoros* ('Messenger') identically in Armenian, Armeno-Turkish and *Karamanlı*. Namık Kemal suggested in 1883 that the new illustrated magazine *Mir'at-ı Âlem* ('The Mirror of the World'), whose pictures were borrowed from the Americans, also be published as Armeno-Turkish and Greek versions,<sup>110</sup> but this project does not seem to have been realized. For political reasons, Mehmed Tahir's *Mâlumat* (founded in 1895) appeared in an Arabic issue (*al-Ma'lûmât*) and occasionally contained a Persian section (*kısm-ı fârisî*).

We do not know of Greek-Turkish or Armenian-Turkish papers, apart from the *vilayet gazeteleri*. However, there is the exceptional case of Teodor Kasap who in the 1870s, the heyday of Ottomanism, published his satirical papers *Diyojen*, *Çingiraklı Tatar*, *Hayal*, in up to five different languages (French, Turkish, Greek, Armenian [Armeno-Turkish], Bulgarian). However, the French and Greek versions are virtually unknown, and the Armenian version of *Hayal* soon became quite independent. The same is true of the Bulgarian papers *Shutosh* and *Zvânchatii Glumcho*. These too were owned by Kasap, but the editors were well-known Bulgarian writers.<sup>111</sup>

*La Turquie* and *The Levant Times* for a while appeared in Bulgarian versions (*Turtsiya* and *Iztochno Vreme*). The 'revue orientale politique, littéraire et scientifique' *L'Univers* (founded in 1874) had a Turkish issue called *Cihan*.<sup>112</sup> One of the most interesting projects was *Marifet* ('Knowledge'), published at the end of the nineteenth century by a Greek woman, Theodosia Sophroniades ('Teodosya'), hailed as one of the first female journalists. *Marifet*, 'la seule revue hebdomadaire turco-française', was published in collaboration with Ali Muzaffer (d. 1904), one of the most prolific translators of the time.<sup>113</sup>

The literary productions of contemporary writers were usually restricted to an audience drawn from their respective linguistic communities. Surprisingly enough, even Turkish books published in the Greek and Armenian scripts, known as *Karamanlı* and 'Armeno-Turkish', included very few works by contemporary Turkish authors, although a transposition would have been relatively easy in principle. Ahmed Midhat Efendi, the most popular author of the period, is the only notable exception.<sup>114</sup> As far as the Muslim Turks were concerned, the modern literature of non-Muslim minorities was more or less unknown to them. Turkish writers viewed S.Serents's 1913 anthology of modern Armenian stories almost as a revelation, as can be seen from their laudatory postscripts (*takriz*) to the volume.<sup>115</sup> In fact, it was only after the Young Turk revolution that the different communities seem to have come closer to each other in this respect. Diran

Kélékian (1862–1915), teacher at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiyye*, who had an excellent knowledge of the Ottoman-Turkish language,<sup>116</sup> observed in his translation of Krikor Zohrab's collection of stories, *Life as it is*, published in 1913,<sup>117</sup> that Turkish authors were now being increasingly translated into Armenian. This is confirmed by reference to contemporary Armenian schoolbooks, which included extracts by numerous Turkish authors.<sup>118</sup>

Whereas works of 'high literature' long remained limited to the members of their respective communities, the reception of 'popular literature', both local and Western, showed striking similarities in terms of taste and preferences. In the Ottoman Empire, the canon of published translations from Western languages was basically the same across all communities.<sup>119</sup> The French press may have played a role in this transmission. Turkish writers occasionally took their inspiration from serialized novels published in the French press in the Ottoman capital (there are several examples in Ahmed Midhat Efendi's *Letayif-i rivayât*). Books in Armeno-Turkish seem to have been particularly attractive to Muslim Turks. Ahmed İhsan (Tokgöz, 1868–1944), the publisher of *Servet-i Fünun*, wrote in his memoirs that he had learnt the Armenian script in order to enjoy the numerous translated French novels available through that medium.<sup>120</sup>

Turkish popular literature, on the other hand, for example, the numerous *hikâyes* of Âşık Garib, Shah İsmail and Gülizar, Köroğlu, etc., was widely read in *Karamanlı* and Armeno-Turkish versions. These books often also included songs. Indeed, music represents one of the few elements of a really common 'Ottoman' heritage. Armeno-Turkish books even included the *Thousand Secrets*, a compendium of popular medicine by the *hekimbaşı* Mustafa Behcet.<sup>121</sup> Armenian, and especially *Karamanlı* authors, whose works were also published in Arabic script are extremely rare. The extraordinary Vartan Pasha (1815–79) compiled a *History of Napoleon Bonaparte* which appeared in both the Armenian and the Arabic scripts. However, whereas the Armeno-Turkish version has some 1,500 pages, the Ottoman-Turkish version was considerably shorter and lacked illustrations. Both versions seem to have remained unfinished.<sup>122</sup>

It seems that the system of plurilingual editions did not really work well, be it for financial or other reasons. Many ventures were soon abandoned. Only the first issue of the commercial guide, *L'Indicateur Constantinopolitain*, founded in 1868 by an Ottoman Jew, Raphael Cervati, appeared in a bilingual edition,<sup>123</sup> the following editions being exclusively in French. Strangely enough, the Ottoman government never thought of publishing the statistical yearbooks (*salname*), which contain such a vast amount of information, in French. The *devlet salnameleri* appeared only in Turkish, while those of certain provinces also appeared in the language of the local population (Arabic, Greek).<sup>124</sup> This had its negative effects, including the widespread view, in particular among Western observers, that 'there existed no statistics in Turkey.'<sup>125</sup>

Despite these obstacles, one gets the impression that journalists in the Ottoman Empire were relatively well aware of what was written by their compatriots from other *millet*s. In Turkish papers, quotations (*iktibas*) from periodicals published in

minority languages were very common.<sup>126</sup> It was also the custom to welcome, under the heading '*Matbuat-ı cedide*', every new colleague (*refik*) in the the press. Moreover, polemics between the mouthpieces of different communities were quite frequent. Once again, the Francophone press seems to have played a pivotal role in this regard.

### Müdafaa

The example of Ahmed Midhat's polemic with the American missionary Henry Otis Dwight (1843–1917) may shed light on this issue. In 1883, a series of articles appeared in the *Tercüman-ı Hakikat* under the title *Müdafaa* ('Defence') in which Ahmed Midhat violently attacked not only the missionaries but also the fundamentals of Western Christendom.<sup>127</sup>

These articles provoked reactions in the press of the Ottoman capital. The *Eastern Express* published a sharp refutation, but the reactions of the Greek, *Karamanlı* and Armenian communities were particularly violent. Certain Turkish-speaking Orthodox Christians accused the author of being a Jew or an atheist. Reports were sent to the press in Europe and Athens. Ahmed Midhat Efendi himself seems to have been shocked, and condemned these reports in very strong terms. They were 'nauseating for everybody except for their impertinent writers'.<sup>128</sup>

The question arises whether this reaction arose out of an intensive reading of Ahmed Midhat Efendi's articles. This seems somewhat doubtful, since the responses did not refute Ahmed Midhat Efendi's arguments, but consisted of general observations on the scandalous behaviour of *Tercüman-ı Hakikat*'s publisher, who purportedly said very blasphemous things about the Christian religion, even though Islam itself recognized Christians as 'people of the book' (*Ehl-i kitâb*). The major contention was indeed that the original articles had unsettled peaceful relations between the different communities.

Interestingly enough, it was a Westerner, the American director of the *Bible House*, Henry Otis Dwight, who decided to respond. Dwight was perfectly familiar with Ottoman Turkish. He had been a member of the committee for the revision of the Turkish translation of the Bible and had chaired the committee for the publication of James Redhouse's famous dictionary, published in Istanbul in 1890.

The ensuing debate in the *Tercüman-ı Hakikat*, published in book form in the same year under the title *Müdafaaya mukabele ve Mukabeleye müdafaa*, raises many questions. Since it took place exclusively in Turkish, were the members of the Christian communities able to follow it? To what extent was a Muslim Turkish readership supposed to have been receptive to the very specific arguments of a puritan Protestant missionary? Little is known of the impact of this controversy on local Christians. What is evident, however, is that Ahmed Midhat's work eventually enjoyed the greatest popularity among the Turkish-speaking Muslims of the Russian Empire.<sup>129</sup>

## Conclusion

One may wonder to what extent there are elements in present-day Turkish printing and publishing that represent an 'Ottoman' legacy. It seems that no other post-Ottoman changes had more dramatic consequences than those in this domain. In the modern Turkish nation-state, even in the former capital, Istanbul, very few traces can be detected of the culture of a multi-ethnic and polyglot empire. The minority ethnic press (Greek, Armenian, Jewish) has, for example, become totally insignificant. Even the French press that flourished remarkably in the early republican era, is now almost extinct. However, as we have tried to show in this paper, it was this cosmopolitan character that played such an essential part in the fields of printing and publishing in the past. As far as the Muslim Turkish population is concerned, it has experienced a cultural revolution, notably the adoption of a new, Latin-based alphabet ('*Harf Devrimi*') and the radical purification of the language ('*Dil Devrimi*').

The change of the alphabet in 1928 deeply affected print culture. For many years, publications visibly struggled to adapt to the new script. The Arabic alphabet continued to remain in private use. Many books in the new 'Turkish' alphabet give the impression through, for example their spelling of foreign words, that they were simply transcribed from manuscripts in Arabic characters. For the minorities, it has been said that the difficulties of the 'old script' (*eski yazı*) deterred many of them from studying the written language.<sup>130</sup> In this respect, the Latin alphabet opened up new perspectives. As a matter of fact, this change had an inevitable impact on other linguistic communities. The Turkish Jews, for example, adopted the new script for their ethnic language, Judaeo-Spanish, which had formerly been written in the Hebrew-based *rashi* script. The new Kurdish alphabet, devised by emigrants in Syria, was also based on the new Turkish script, although it was never used in the Jacobin-minded new Turkish state.

The booksellers and publishers of the *Bâb-ı âli Caddesi* (now in some parts called *Ankara Caddesi*) gradually lost their dominant position in the book trade. A few of them, including members of the minorities, whose careers had begun in the pre-republican era, continued their activities in republican Turkey, and sometimes made an important contribution. İbrahim Hilmî Çığırçan continued to publish translations of the classical novels of world literature in various collections of his *Hilmi Kitaphanesi* (later *Kitabevi*), now located in the *Ankara Caddesi*. The corpus of translated works remained basically unchanged. He died almost forgotten in 1963.

İlyas Bayar (Elias Behar) made extraordinary efforts to adapt to the new conditions after the reform of the alphabet and did so with considerable success. In the 1930s, some of the finest books in the new script were published in his *Kanaat Kütüphanesi*, but he eventually became a victim of the *Varlık vergisi*.<sup>131</sup> A prominent Armenian bookseller and publisher of the pre-republican era, Mihran Mardirossian (1870–1936), also continued with this activity until the 1930s. Inspired by his well-known *Kütübhane-i 'Cihan'*, he adopted the Turkish family

name ‘Acun’<sup>132</sup> in 1934. In 1929, after the reform of the alphabet, Mardirossian published one of the first comprehensive Turkish dictionaries in the new script. Its author, Ali Seydi (1870–1933), had already worked with Mihran Efendi to publish a huge illustrated ‘Ottoman’ dictionary in 1914.<sup>133</sup> In the preface to a new Latin-script edition of Şemseddin Sami’s famous translation of Victor Hugo’s *Misérables* (*Sefiller*, 1880), Mardirossian gives a nostalgic account of his modest beginnings in the *Bâb-ı âli Caddesi*. In it, he refers to the influence of the Young Turk writers Abdullah Cevdet and İshak Sükûti (1868–1903) on his development, and his ingenious tactics to outwit Abdülhamid’s censor.<sup>134</sup>

While traditional booksellers and publishers lost their importance, the state, on the other hand, made remarkable efforts to develop state-sponsored printing activities,<sup>135</sup> especially under the eminent Minister of Public Education, Hasan Ali Yücel (1897–1961). Such efforts had been virtually unknown in the late Ottoman period. (Under Abdülhamid II, even the state press had been closed down in 1902). The republican state press (*Devlet Matbaası*) produced numerous high-quality textbooks, written by distinguished scholars. Some of them have remained standard works of reference. The new Ministry of Culture (*Kültür Bakanlığı*) has been engaged for decades in publishing various inexpensive collections. An ambitious project, originally launched by the Ministry of Education (*Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı*) in the 1960s under the name ‘The Thousand Basic Works’ (*1000 Temel Eser*), was continued under the title *1001 Temel Eser* by the newspaper *Tercüman*.

But it cannot be denied that in terms of typographical standards, paper quality, etc. the quality of books published in Turkey remained remarkably low for a long time. Only recently has there been a notable improvement, thanks in particular to the publishing activities of private institutions and even banks. Among these, the publications of the History Foundation (*Tarih Vakfı*) and the Bank of Construction and Credit (*Yapı Kredi Bankası*) deserve particular mention. Istanbul has remained the centre of the Turkish book trade but there is some competition from Ankara and Izmir. In terms of variety and volume of book production, no country in the Middle East can compete with modern Turkey.

The *Türk Dil Kurumu*, a semi-official institution created to promote the ‘Language Revolution’, has provided the public with a standard Turkish dictionary (*Türkçe Sözlük*, first published in 1944) and dozens of books and brochures on linguistic issues. Universities have expanded considerably since the foundation of the Istanbul *Darülfünun* in 1900. Most of them have their own printing presses. Public libraries, practically nonexistent in the late Ottoman period, developed slowly, but modern Turkey now has several ‘National Libraries’ (*Millî Kütüphane*), the most important founded in 1948, located in the new capital, Ankara.

There remains the problem of the reading public (an issue not touched upon in this paper). Despite considerable efforts in the early republican era and impressive publishing activity, Turkey has, according to most observers, still not become a ‘reading nation’. In one respect, one can even detect a decline from the late Ottoman period. The *kıraathane*—whose name now sounds quite

old-fashioned—still exists. But the customers of this undoubtedly important institution are usually busy playing cards or drinking tea, and they hardly ever read.

### Notes

- 1 One of the first Western observers to make use of these lists was the anonymous author (perhaps a missionary) of the article, 'Books and Printing in Turkey in 1882 (1299)', published in *Athenaeum*, no. 2888, 3 March 1883, pp. 278–9.
- 2 See Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, London, 1962, p. 184. 'Mizancı' Murad's has become a rare work. Since he soon fell into disgrace for his political activities, the book did not achieve the popularity it may have deserved.
- 3 It bears the title, *Cülus-i meyamîn-me'nus-i Cenab-ı padişahîden 1308 sene-i maliyyesi şubatı nihayetine kadar... tab'û neşr olunmuş âsâr-ı mütenevviannın ve müellif ve mütercimlerin esamisini mübeyyin cedvel-i mahsusdur*, Istanbul, 1308/1310 [1893].
- 4 For a detailed breakdown of its contents, see J. Strauss, 'Zum Istanbul Buchwesen in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts', *Osmanlı Araştırmaları*, no. XII (1992), pp. 307–38; 332–5.
- 5 Cf., the following statistics published by the municipality of Istanbul in 1915: Of a total of 136 printing presses, 45 were Turkish, 10 Jewish, 49 Armenian, 38 Greek and 7 'foreign' (*ecnebi*). As to periodicals in the Ottoman capital, 43 were in Turkish, 1 in Persian, 3 in Arabic, 4 'Jewish' (*Musevî*), 6 in Armenian, 5 in Greek, 4 in French, 1 in English (*1330 senesi İstanbul beldesi ihşaiyyat mecmuası*, Istanbul 1331, 112).
- 6 In his introductory article, 'Modernization and Literature in the Near and Middle East, 1850–1914' (in R. Ostle (ed.), *Modern Literature in the Near and Middle East 1850–1970*, London and New York, 1991, 3–16; 14), Malcolm Yapp makes the pertinent observation that 'the absence of any significant non-Muslim group in Iran may be an important factor in explaining why that country moved more slowly than did the Ottoman Empire or Egypt.'
- 7 See Palmira Brummet, *Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press 1908–1911*, Albany, 2000, p. 32.
- 8 See N. Nicolaïdes, *Le véritable mal d'Orient: Réponse à Mourad-Bey*, Paris, 1896.
- 9 *Nisvan-i-Islam 'Les femmes musulmanes' par Fathma-Alié* traduit par Mme Olga de Labedeff (sic) connue sous le pseudonyme de Gulnar-Hanoum, Paris, s.d.
- 10 Ol'ga Lebedeva (1853-?) may be regarded as the first female Oriental scholar. On her activities in Istanbul, see J. Strauss, 'Ol'ga Lebedeva (Gülнар Hanım) and her Translations into Ottoman Turkish', in *Arts, Women and Scholars. Studies in Ottoman Society and Culture—Festschrift Hans Georg Majer*, edited by S. Prätör and Christoph K. Neumann, 2 vols, Istanbul, 2002, vol. 1, pp. 287–314.
- 11 See on this paper and its founder, **Ahmad** Fāris al-Shidyāq (1804–87), Geoffrey Roper, 'Fāris al-Shidyāq and the Transition from Scribal to Print Culture in the Middle East', in George N. Atiyeh (ed.), *The Book in the Islamic World: The Written Word and Communication in the Middle East*, Albany, NY, 1995, pp. 209–31.

- 12 On *Akhtar*, see Anja Pistor-Hatam, *Nachrichtenblatt, Informationsbörse und Diskussionsforum: Aḥṭar-e Estānbūl (1876–96). Anstöße zur frühen persischen Moderne*, Münster—Hamburg-London, 1999.
- 13 A typical example is the satirical letter in pseudo-Arabic jargon, written by a cabbage cultivator (*lahana bağçivanı*) from Antakya, and said to be destined for publication in *Al-Jawā'ib* (see *Hayal* no. 278, 2 Temmuz 1292 [1877]).
- 14 The first five annual volumes of this important journal have now been reprinted by the Iranian National Library, (2 vols, Teheran, 1378–9).
- 15 Significantly enough, there is also an entry 'Fâris eş-Şidyâk', in Şemseddin Sami's famous encyclopedia (see *Kamusü l-a'lâm*, vol. 5, Istanbul, 1314/1896, 3336f).
- 16 E.g., his *Ghunyat al-tâlib fi munyat al-râghib* (1871), translated by Mehmed Şükrî, 2 parts, Istanbul, 1304/1887. On the controversy, cf., A.G.Chejne, *The Arabic Language: Its Role in History*, Minneapolis, 1969, p. 137.
- 17 *Külliyat-ı Divan-ı Fuzulî*, Istanbul, 1296 [1879] (2nd edn, 1891).
- 18 For more precise data, see Jale Baysal, *Müteferrika'dan Birinci Meşrutiyete Kadar Osmanlı Türklerinin Bastıkları Kitaplar*, Istanbul, 1968, pp. 62–8.
- 19 1247 *hicrî*. This is the date given in the relevant sections of the *salnames* ('*Dersaadet'de mevcud matbaalar*'). In fact, a state press existed under various names before.
- 20 Such as the first Ottoman-Turkish grammar for Greeks, the *Stoicheia tês Othômanikês glôssês* by Constantine Adossides (1817–95). See, *The Beginnings of Printing in the Near and Middle East: Jews, Christians and Muslims*, Wiesbaden, 2001, p. 62. On the Armenian publications printed by the *Matbaa-i âmire*, see Theotig [Labjinjan], *Dib u dař*, Istanbul, 1912, p. 72.
- 21 For example, the Engineering School (*Mühendishane*), whose origins go back to the eighteenth century; the Naval School (*Mekteb-i finun-i bahriyye*, founded in 1842); the Medical School (*Mekteb-i tıbbiyye*, founded in 1838); and even the School of Administration (*Mekteb-i mülkiyye*, founded in 1859).
- 22 On Aḥmad Fâris al-Shidyâq, see Roper above, who lists the relevant literature in Arabic and Western languages. This writer and his famous newspaper have also been studied by Turkish scholars: see, e.g., Atilla Çetin, 'XIX Yüzyıl Arap Kültür Dünyasında Önemli bir Basın Organı: El-Cevaip gazetesi', in *Mélanges Prof. Robert Mantran*, edited by Abdeljelil Temimi, Zaghwan, 1988, 83–92; Yakup Civelek, 'Ahmed Fâris eş-Şidyâk: Edebî Şahsiyeti ve el-Cevâib Gazetesi', unpublished doctoral thesis, Atatürk Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Erzurum, 1997.
- 23 '*Matbaa-i âmire arabî baş musahhihi*.' See Münif Efendi [later Pasha], 'Zuhur-i Tasvir-i Efkâr', *Mecmua-i finun*, vol. 1 (Muharrem 1279), pp. 44–8; 46. This article also contains interesting details on the difficulties initially encountered by Fâris al-Shidyâq in the publication of his Arabic-language paper.
- 24 This localised book production has been increasingly studied by Turkish scholars. On Izmir, see Erkan Serge, *İzmir'de Kitapçılık 1839–1928*, Izmir, 1996.
- 25 See Dagmar Glass, *Malta, Beirut, Leipzig and Beirut Again: Eli Smith, the American Syria Mission and the Spread of Arabic Typography in Nineteenth Century Lebanon*, Beirut, 1998 (Beyrouth Zokak el-Blat(t), p. 16).
- 26 See, Ahmed İhsan Tokgöz, *Matbuat Hatıralarım 1888–1923*, 2 vols, Istanbul, 1930–1, vol. 1, pp. 32–3 (on the first Turkish illustrated paper, *Mir'at-ı Âlem* [1883]). Similar observations were made by a Western observer resident in the Ottoman

- capital: 'Die Anregung zur Gründung illustrierter Blätter ist ursprünglich vom hiesigen American Bible House ausgegangen, welches schon lange verschiedene solcher Blätter in anderen Landessprachen veröffentlicht. Diese Zeitungen hatten grossen Erfolg und fanden weite Verbreitung' (J.H.Mordtmann, 'Übersicht über die türkischen Druckwerke von Constantinopel während des Jahres 1883', *Literaturblatt für Orientalische Philologie*, vol. I (1883), pp. 449–73; 458).
- 27 See J.Strauss, 'Notes on the First Satirical Journals in the Ottoman Empire', in Anja Pistor-Hatam (ed.), *Amtsblatt, Vilayet Gazetesi und Unabhängiges Journal: Die Anfänge der Presse im Nahen Osten*, Frankfurt, 2001, pp. 121–38; 134f.
  - 28 See J.Strauss, 'Les livres et l'imprimerie à Istanbul (1800–1908)', in Paul Dumont (ed.), *Turquie: Livres d'hier, livres d'aujourd'hui*, Strasbourg, Istanbul, 1992, pp. 5–24.
  - 29 See on Osman Bey Feride Çiçekoğlu, 'Osmanbey Ailesi', *Istanbul* 30 (July 1999), 112–45; *The Beginnings of Printing in the Near and Middle East: Jews, Christians and Muslims*, Wiesbaden, 2001, p. 78.
  - 30 Cf. Grégoire Zellich, *Notice historique sur la lithographie et sur les origines de son introduction en Turquie*, Istanbul, 1895, p. 55: 'l'imprimerie Osmanié, une des principales de l'Empire'. Osman Bey's fame seems to have transcended the borders of the Ottoman Empire. When Osman Bey died in 1890, an obituary even appeared in *Le Temps* (Paris, 9 September 1890).
  - 31 This Koran was the work of the famous Ottoman calligrapher, Hafız Osman Efendi (1642–98).
  - 32 Several journals devoted to the history of printing and publishing are at present being produced in Turkey. Among the first were *Müteferrika* (Istanbul) and *Kebikeç* (Ankara). A good summary of the state of this research is provided by Alpay Kabacalı, *Cumhuriyet Öncesi ve Sonrası Matbaa ve Basın Sanayii*, Istanbul, 1998.
  - 33 On this eminent diplomat, dragoman and scholar who died in the Ottoman capital, see the biographical sketch published in Istanbul, F.A.Belin, *Notice biographique et littéraire*, Istanbul, 1875.
  - 34 Belin, 'Bibliographie ottomane, ou notice des livres turcs imprimés à Constantinople durant les années 1284 et 1285 de l'hégire', *Journal asiatique* XIV (August–September, 1869), pp. 65–95; 67.
  - 35 See the *Catalogue de la Bibliothèque de feu Ahmed Vefyk Pacha* published by the Armenian printer Karekin Baghdadlian in Istanbul in 1893.
  - 36 Cl.Huart, 'Bibliographie ottomane, ou notice des livres turcs, arabes et persans imprimés à Constantinople durant la période 1294–1296 de l'hégire (1877–79)', *Journal Asiatique* (October/November/December 1880), pp. 411–39, 413.
  - 37 On Aristocles, see Ali Çankaya, *Son Asır Türk Tarihinin Önemli Olayları ile birlikte Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler*, vol. 2, Ankara, 1968–69, pp. 950f.
  - 38 See Strauss, 'Les livres', p. 14.
  - 39 The first booksellers to issue catalogues in Istanbul seem to have been two Greeks, Antonios and Nicolas Depasta, who published monthly catalogues from 1869 onwards. These were available from their bookstore, founded in the Galata neighbourhood in 1858. They did not trade in Turkish books. At the end of the century, the number of Greek booksellers issuing catalogues had considerably increased: there were the catalogues issued by the brothers Sphyra and Galanoudes (1895), by Seitanides (1896), and by the brothers Gerardou. (on these catalogues,



- see G.I.Phousaras, *Bibliographia tôn Hellênikôn Bibliographiôn 1791–1947*, Athens, 1961).
- 40 See, on Arakel, İ.Lütfü Seymen, ‘Erbab-ı mütalaaaya hizmet: I.Meşrutiyet kitapçılığı ve Arakel Tozlayan (sic) Efendinin mektupları’, *Müteferrika* 1 (Autumn 1993), pp. 67–72.
- 41 The first issue was sold for 15 *guruş* and went mainly to Europe: ‘Large numbers were bought up by booksellers in Pera, and sent to Germany, France, England, Austria and other countries’, as the publisher observes in a long preface to a subsequent catalogue (*Arakel Kitabhanesi esami-i kütübü*, Istanbul, 1304, 8).
- 42 According to this catalogue, the paper was also available from the Armenian booksellers of the *Bâb-ı âli Caddesi*, Arakel Tozlian (‘*Arâkel Agha al-kutubî*’), Garabed Keshishian, and the Armenian barber, (*hallâq*) Sarkiz Agha in Bayezid (See *Fahrasat Maṭba‘at at al-Jawā2ib/Catalogue des livres arabes, turcs et persans édités à l’imprimerie arabe d’el-Djavaïb à Constantinople* (September 1884/1301, pp. 5f).
- 43 Brummet, *Image and Imperialism*, 30. Also see on this printer, Theotig, *Dib u dař*, 117.
- 44 ‘ne contiennent pas les indications usuelles de la bibliographie, le format, le nombre de pages, le lieu d’impression, la date; ils ne peuvent donc rendre les services qu’on serait en droit d’en attendre’ (C.Huart ‘Bibliographie ottomane. Notice des livres turcs imprimés à Constantinople durant la période 1304–1305 de l’hégire (1887–88)’, *Journal Asiatique* (April/May/June 1889), pp. 428–89; 429).
- 45 The notes published by these authors in the *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, the *Sitzungsberichte der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Wien*, etc., therefore contain some strange blunders—and a considerable number of fictitious works.
- 46 *The feuilleton* was born in 1836 with the publication of Balzac’s novel *La Vieille Fille*.
- 47 Huart writes in 1891: ‘Du moment que le feuilleton des journaux est passé tout entier dans la boutique du libraire, nous n’avons pas à l’y suivre; ce genre de littérature ne mérite pas davantage l’attention des lecteurs du présent recueil.’ See ‘Notice des livres turcs, arabes et persans imprimés à Constantinople durant la période 1306–1307 de l’hégire’, *Journal Asiatique* (May–June 1891), 357–411; 358.
- 48 See on this translation Ahmed Midhat’s remarks in Mustafa Nihat Özön, *Türkçede roman hakkında bir deneme*, Istanbul, 1936, pp. 297f. It should be noted that a Greek version of Dumas’s famous novel had been published some decades earlier in Istanbul in the paper *Têlegraphos tou Vosporou* (founded in 1843). See ‘Historikai selides peri tou Vyzantinou Typou’, in *Ho Pharos tês Anatolês, Hêmerologion tou etous 1902*, Istanbul, 1901, pp. 388–94, 390. A printed Greek translation of the *Comte de Monte-Cristo* dates from 1845–46.
- 49 See Monte Kristo: *Fransa meşahîr-i şuarasından (!) Aleksandr Düma nâm şairin müellefatından meşhur hikâyenin tercemesidir*, Istanbul, 4 vols, Istanbul, 1288–90. An article published in *Çin giraklı Tatar* in June 1873 casts some light on the conditions of the book trade at that time. In an answer to an impatient reader, who complains of the high prices of the Turkish version, the ‘Tatar’ responds:

In French, such stories sell 25,000 copies a day, whereas here, only 500 copies can be sold in one year. Although we have more than 800 *guruş* of expenses for each number (*ciüz*) we are unable to sell more than 300 copies.

(*Çingiraklı Tatar*, no. 21, 6 Haziran 1289)

- 50 *Müntahabat-ı Tercüman-ı Hakikat*, 3 vols., Istanbul, s.d.; each one comprises some 800 pages.
- 51 *Komo nasyo Elia Karmona, komo se engrandesyo, i komo se izo direktor del Kudjeton*, Istanbul, c. 1926. The text has been reprinted in a doctoral thesis by Robyn K.Loewenthal, 'Elia Carmona's autobiography: Judeo-Spanish popular press and novel publishing milieu in Constantinople, Ottoman Empire, circa 1860–1932', Ann Arbor, MI, 1984.
- 52 Cf. Belin: 'le goût des romans, de la littérature légère, des pièces de théâtre, des publications par livraisons, avec *illustrations*, dont l'exécution laisse à désirer, s'est beaucoup répandu et prend chaque jour un nouveau développement' ('Bibliographie ottomane, ou notice des livres turcs imprimés à Constantinople durant la période 1290–1293 de l'hégire', *Journal Asiatique* (February-March 1877), pp. 122–47, 123).
- 53 The anonymous author of the article published in the *Athenaeum* (see n. 1) gives the following interesting account of the publication of Şemseddin Sami's *Kamus-i fransevî*:

This French-Turkish dictionary appeared in instalments of sixteen pages, and now forms a volume of 1,630 pages...It is a tribute to Turkish patience and perseverance that it was carried through 102 numbers. The Arabs say that the Turks hunt hares with waggons, meaning that if they even started a hare they would follow him with the slow bullock cart till they had run him down. So has Sami Bey run down his 'Kamus'.

(*'Books and Printing in Turkey'*, p. 279)

- 54 'Adam sende! Bunun da çıkacağı bir iki cüz'dür. Hele tekmi olson da o vakit alırız!', p. 11.
- 55 See J.Strauss, 'Le livre français d'Istanbul (1730–1908)', in F.Hitzel (ed.), *Livres et lecture dans le monde ottoman (= Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée nos 87–8)* (1999), pp. 277–301; 298f.
- 56 *The Beginnings of Printing in the Middle East*, pp. 80–1; also see n. 96.
- 57 See François Georgeon, 'Les cafés à Istanbul à la fin de l'Empire ottoman', in H.Desmet-Grégoire and F.Georgeons, eds, *Cafés d'Orient revisités*, Paris, 1997, pp. 39–78; 67–70.
- 58 One of the first may have been the '*Cabinet littéraire français*' of Beyoğlu mentioned on the title page of Alexandre Timoni's *Nouvelles Promenades dans le Bosphore* (Istanbul, 1844).
- 59 See A.Süheyl Ünver, 'Yayın hayatımızda önemli yeri olan Sarafim Kiraathanesi', *Bellelen* 43 (1979), pp. 481–9; J.Strauss, '*Romanlar, ah! o romanlar!* Les débuts de

- la lecture moderne dans l'Empire ottoman (1850–1900)', *Turcica* (1994), pp. 125–63, 140–3.
- 60 See *Avtobiografiya, dnevnitsi i spomeni na Dr Christo Tanev Stambolski ot Kazanlık*, I, Sofia, 1927, 281.
- 61 See Elena Harbova, 'Die bulgarische Lesehalle (Čitalište) in Konstantinopel (1866–1877)', *Bulgarian Historical Review*, 1993 (2–3), pp. 84–105. A 'Slav Reading Room' (*Slavyansko Chitalishte*) had been founded in January 1862 in Beyoğlu. It was directed by some Austrian nationals of Slavic origin and was supported by the Russian ambassador, Ignatiev. It was, however, soon closed down.
- 62 See Marc Nïchanian, *Ages et usages de la langue arménienne*, Paris, 1989, 290–6.
- 63 Roper, *Fâris al-Shidyâg*, p. 217.
- 64 See, e.g., the polemical pamphlet by Christos Phengaras, *To glôssiko zêtêma k'oi gazetatzêdes tês Polês*, Athens, Istanbul, 1907. On the language issue in the Ottoman Empire, also see J. Strauss, 'Diglossie dans l'Empire ottoman. Évolution et péripéties d'une situation linguistique', in N. Vatin (ed.), *Oral et écrit dans le monde turco-ottoman* (= *Revue du monde musulman et de la Méditerranée*, 75–6 [1996]), pp. 221–55.
- 65 *Gazeteci lisanı*, Istanbul, 1327.
- 66 'Lısan-ı tabii de gazete lisanıdır', *Gazeteci lisanı*, p. 8.
- 67 This applies both to Muslim and non-Muslim writers.
- 68 The Turks owe him the first domestic comedy and the first translation of Western poetry.
- 69 In the Preface of the first volume he says: 'Bu müntahabatdan asıl maksudumuz Tasvir-i Efkâr'ın zuhuriyle ibtida eden edebiyat-ı cedidenin mebadisindeki tavrını ve gitdikçe hâsıl etdiği kuvvet ve revnakı göstermek' (Şinasi ve Kemal, *Müntahabat-ı Tasvir-i Efkâr*, Birinci kısım: 'Siyasiyyat', Istanbul, 1303, 3–4).
- 70 Under the title *Kanz al-raghâib fı muntakhabât al-Jawâ'ib*, Istanbul, 1288–99.
- 71 The Ottoman Greeks, on the other hand, had successfully completed their encyclopaedia in 1890. The *Lexikon Historias kai Geographias*, was published in Istanbul between 1869 and 1890 in 9 volumes under the direction of a prominent writer and journalist, Stavros Voutyras (1841–1923), editor-in-chief of the *Neologos*, the most prestigious Greek paper published in the Ottoman capital.
- 72 See n.131.
- 73 This paper was launched after the Young Turk revolution by the well-known Armenian writer Rupen Zartarian (1874–1915), who had returned from Bulgaria whither he had emigrated in 1905. See on Zartarian, Pars Tuğlacı (ed.), *Ermeni edebiyatından seçkiler*, Istanbul, 1992, p. 402.
- 74 In 1912, both the invention of the Armenian script by Mesrop Mashtots (360–440) and the anniversary of the first book printed in Armenian characters were commemorated by the Ottoman Armenians. One of the by-products of this jubilee is Theotig's *Dib u Dař* ('*Printing and Letter*'; see n. 20), an extraordinary source for the history of Armenian printing and at the same time one of the finest specimens of this art as it had developed among this community.
- 75 The prayer book of the *Septem horae canonicae* (*Şalât al-sawâ'i*), intended for Arab Christians in Lebanon and Syria. It was printed by the Venetian printer Gregorio de Gregorii at the behest of Pope Julius II and published in Fano (Italy) in 1514.

- 76 See 'Ermenice tubaatin 400ncü sene-i ihtirai', *Mecmua-i Ebuzziya*, no. 140, 16 Rebiulahir 1330, 382f. Ebuzziya's arguments are not totally convincing as far as the chronology is concerned. The first book printed in Armenian characters, an almanac, was published in Venice in 1512 (see *Dib u Dař*, 37). The 'prayer book' he refers to was printed, as has been seen, only two years later. Pope Julius II died in 1513.
- 77 '*Dünyada tıbaat eşref sanayidir*' ('Ermeni Tıbaatin', p. 382).
- 78 The first issue (15 Ramazan 1297/22 August 1880) starts with an article on the history of journalism ('Matbuat yahud târih-i evrâk-ı havadis').
- 79 In one of his articles he writes,

The number of papers published in our Turkish language, the official language of 20 to 25 million people, is so small that one is almost ashamed to speak about figures. In particular, the annual output of all of them may not even correspond to the daily circulation of the *Petit Journal* in France! ('Matbuat-ı Cihan', *Mecmua-i Ebuzziya*, vol. II, (1298), pp. 605–8; 607)

On the *Mecmua-i Ebuzziya*, see Özgür Türesay, 'Ebuzziya Tevfik ve Mecmua-i Ebuzziya (1880–1912)', *Müteferrika*, Winter 2000–1, pp. 87–140. This article contains a complete table of contents for this important journal.

- 80 See his debate with Hayreddin Bey, a Polish convert who had proposed in an article published in 1869 in *Terakki* the establishment of a commission to change the script, in Hüseyin Yorulmaz (ed.), *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Alfabe Tartışmaları*, Istanbul, 1995, pp. 32–40.
- 81 See *Rusya: Ahval-i siyasiyye ve ictimaiyyesi*, Istanbul, 1297/1880.
- 82 *Tâlim hakkında tasavvurat-ı mütenevvia*, Istanbul, 1301/1884.
- 83 See G.F.Herrick, 'Literature for Turkish Moslems', *The Moslem World*, vol. IX (1919), pp. 375–8; 377.
- 84 See, on this collection, 'Kitaphane-i Ebuzziya—Kitaphane-i meşâhir' (Ziyad Ebuzziya), *Türk Dili ve Edebiyatı Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 5, Istanbul, 1982, pp. 370–2. On this and other collections (year books, almanacs, etc.) published by Ebuzziya, also see Fahriye (Mercanlıgil) Gündoğdu, 'Ebuzziya Tevfik'in Türk kütüphaneciliğine katkıları', in Hasan Duman (ed.), *Beyazıt Devlet Kütüphanesi 100 Yaşında*, Istanbul, 1984, pp. 125–33.
- 85 M.Ş.Ülkütaşır, 'Türk Basın Tarihinden Bir sahife: İkdamcı Cevdet Oran, 1862–1935', *Güney-Doğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi*, I, pp. 249–52.
- 86 See Başak Ocak's doctoral thesis, 'Tüccarzade İbrahim Hilmi Çığırçan, Osmanlı matbuatından Cumhuriyet yayıncılığına altmış yıl aşkın katkılarıyla bir yayıncının portresi' (1999), which is currently being prepared for publication.
- 87 The *Kitabhane-i İslâm ve Askerî* was founded on 14 Şaban 1314/21 December 1896 (See the catalogue *Fihris-i Kitabhane-i Hilmî, eski Kitabhane-i İslâm ve Askerî*, Istanbul, 1345/1927).
- 88 He comments on this as follows:

What do you say about the indifference of this army, whose members do not buy one single journal, and who are unwilling to acquire at least some knowledge concerning their profession? Three *guruş* a month, just the equivalent of two glasses of beer. In an environment which does not sacrifice this sum for the sake of the profession, should one look for feelings of love for the art and the profession?

(*Maarifimiz ve servet-i milliyemiz—Felâketimizin esbabı*, 2nd edition, Istanbul, 1329 [Kütübhan-e-i İntibah no. 5], p. 76)

- 89 Only five instalments of this translation were published then. See his Preface to second edition, *Türkçe Kur'an-ı kerim tercemesi*, Istanbul 1344/1926, p. 5.
- 90 See, e.g., the chapter 'Neşriyatımız', in *Maarifimiz...*, pp. 65–82.
- 91 *Avrupalılaştık: Felâketimizin esbabı*, Istanbul, 1332 (also see the new edition by Osman Kafadar and Faruk Öztürk, Ankara, 1997).
- 92 The text of this hitherto unknown pamphlet, together with a translation into German, was published by Milan Adamović. See 'İbrahim Hilmi und die türkische Sprachreform', *Materialia Turcica*, vol. 18 (1997), pp. 133–47.
- 93 Its functions and duties are described in the *Salname-i Nezaret-i Maarif-i umumiyye*, 3rd year, Istanbul, 1318, 526f.
- 94 The works listed in the *salnames* and the *Cedvel-i mahsus* (see n. 3) also contain only books submitted to the censor. The quality of these lists was therefore criticized:

on n'en peut tirer tout le profit qu'on se serait cru en droit d'en attendre. Cela tient, non pas tant à ce qu'une brève indication, souvent fautive ou tronquée, du titre du volume, est insuffisante pour qu'on puisse se rendre compte du contenu, mais encore et surtout à cette particularité que bon nombre de livres indiqués dans cette liste ne voient le jour qu'un ou deux ans plus tard, ou même ne paraissent pas, soit que l'auteur ou l'éditeur aient renoncé à leur privilège, soit pour tout autre motif.

(Cl. Huart, 'Notice des livres turcs imprimés à Constantinople durant la période 1297–1298 de l'hégire (1880–81)', *Journal Asiatique* (February–March 1882), pp. 164–207; 166)

The entries of the *Cedvel* (cited in n. 3) are of relatively little value for bibliographical research since titles in foreign languages are usually translated into Turkish, non-Muslim writers are cited only by their Christian names, and authors (*miellif*) are often confounded with publishers.

- 95 Stambolski, *Avtobiografiya* II (cited in n. 60), vol. 2, p. 331.
- 96 See e.g., A. Djivéléguian, *Le régime de la presse en Turquie: Comparaison avec le régime français*, Paris, 1912. The author had himself been involved in journalism. His father, Dikran Djivéléguian (1848–1907) had directed several Armenian and Armeno-Turkish papers.
- 97 See, e.g., Joseph Nehama's 'La presse turque', published in *La Revue*, (1 December 1905, pp. 373–84) under the pseudonym 'P. Risal'; Jacques Loria's article, 'Les gâtés de la censure en Turquie', published in the same paper (1 and 15

- April 1907, pp. 384–93 and 521–36 under the pseudonym ‘Comte M.de Persignac’) was even translated into Turkish (*Türkiyada sansür eğlenceleri*) and published in Cairo in 1907.
- 98 Cf. the recollections of Ahmed İhsan [Tokgöz] in his *Matbuat hatıralarım* (cited in n. 26), *passim*. A particular vitriolic critique of both censors and journalists appears in Gaston des Godins de Souhesmes’s *Au pays des Osmanlis*, Paris, 1894 (see, in particular, the caustic portrait of ‘Graty Efendi’, censor of the press in foreign languages, p. 348f).
- 99 Naim Bey (Naim Frashëri, 1846–1900) is considered as a sort of ‘National Poet’ in Albania.
- 100 See on Mehmed Zihni, Ahmet Turan Aslan, *Son devrin Osmanlı âlimlerinden Mehmed Zihni Efendi: Hayatı, şahsiyeti, eserleri*, Istanbul, 1999.
- 101 See Christophe Balaý , *La Genèse du roman persan moderne*, Teheran, 1998, 67f. Also see the obituary published in the *Musavver Nevsâl-i Servet-i Fünun*, 1st year (1310), pp. 83–5.
- 102 *Elemente turçeşti, arabêşti şi persane în limba română*, Istanbul, 1894.
- 103 Mikhailovski was censor of Bulgarian books and inspector of Bulgarian schools in Istanbul after 1868 (see *Bûlgarskata vûzrozhdenska inteligentsiya*, Sofia, 1988, pp. 428f).
- 104 He is the author of a ‘History of the Ottoman Sultans’ in Greek which was also translated into Romanian. See his picture in Constantine P.Spanoudes, *Historikai Selidês. İoakeim III*, Istanbul, 1902, p. 127.
- 105 See on Mehmed Süreyya, Çankaya (cited in n. 37), vol. 2, p. 843f.
- 106 See M.Akar, *Veled Çelebi İzbudak*, Ankara, 1999, p. 29.
- 107 See Donald J.Cioeta, ‘Ottoman Censorship in Lebanon and Syria, 1876–82’, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 10 (1979), pp. 167–86.
- 108 See on this question, Orhan Koloğlu, *Takvimi Vekayi: Türk Basımında 150 Yıl, 1831–1981*, Istanbul, 1981, pp. 32–44.
- 109 E.g., ‘Tuna’ (Ruschuk), ‘Prizren’, ‘Yanya’, ‘Selanik’, ‘Sivas’, ‘Zevra’ (Baghdad), ‘Sanaa’, etc. The official gazette of the province of Edirne is said to have been published in Turkish, Greek, Bulgarian and Judaeo-Spanish. Some of these papers were not really bilingual since they only appeared in Turkish in two different scripts (e.g., ‘Sivas’).
- 110 ‘risâlenin Ermeni harfi ile bir aynı tab’ ettirilse ve bir de mündericâtı Rumca’ya terceme olunsa, istifâde birkaç kat tezâyüd eder, sanırım.’ See F.A.Tansel (ed.), *Namık Kemal’in husûsî mektupları*, III, Ankara, 1973, p. 208.
- 111 See Strauss, ‘Notes on the First Satirical Journals’, (cited in n. 27), pp. 136f.  
See article, ‘L’Univers’ (Semavi Eyice), *Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Ansiklopedisi*, 8 vols, Istanbul 1993–5, vol. VII, p. 325.
- 113 Specimens of translations from *Marifet* can be found in Ali Muzaffer’s *Tercüme nümuneleri*, Istanbul, 1318.
- 114 In June 1877, a letter written by Ahmed Midhat was published in the Armeno-Turkish paper *Mamul* (no. 178, 8 June 1877). The editors had asked him for permission to publish some of his stories in the *feuilleton* since these were both entertaining and suited local customs (*‘memleketin ahval ü usulüne muvafik’*). Ahmed Midhat accepted this offer and wrote:

It cannot be denied that among the classes forming Ottoman society (*Osmanlılığın hey'et-i umumiyyesi*), the Armenians are closest to the true Turkish spirit (*asıl türklüğe*). This proximity stems from the fact that the Ottoman language is more widespread among the Armenian *millet* than among other populations.

- As a matter of fact, his novel *Eflâtun Bey ile Rakım Efendi* was published in an Armeno-Turkish version in 1879; another novel, *Yeniçeriler*, appeared in a *Karamanlı* version, after having been serialized in Misailidis's *Anatoli*. A comparison of these different editions has still to be made.
- 115 See *Ermeni Edebiyatı nümuneleri*, translated by S.Serents, Istanbul, 1328. The *takrizes* were written by distinguished Ottoman writers of the period: Süleyman Nazif, Abdullah Cevdet and Şehabeddin Süleyman.
- 116 We owe him the second edition of Şemseddin Sami's Turkish-French dictionary, a considerably expanded version, which continued to be reprinted until 1928. See on Kélékian, *Yaşamları ve Yapıtlarıyla Osmanlılar Ansiklopedisi*, vol. II, Istanbul, 1999, 24.
- 117 *Hayat olduğu gibi*, Istanbul, 1329. The original dates from 1911. Krikor Zohrab, deputy at the Ottoman parliament after 1908, was killed, like Kélékian, during the deportations of 1915. See *Osmanlılar Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 2, p. 703.
- 118 In Rupen Zartarian's textbook for Armenian secondary schools, *Meghraked*, published in Istanbul in 1914, we find (pp. 273–320) translated extracts from the following Turkish writers: Abdullah Cevdet, Tahsin Nahid (1887–1918), Tefvik Fikret (1870–1915), Halid Ziya ('Uşaklıgil', 1869–1945), Hüseyin Cahid ('Yalçın', 1875–1952), Cenap Şehabeddin, Mahmud Ekrem ('Recaîzade', 1846–1913), Mehmed Emin ('Yurdakul', 1869–1944), Mehmed Rauf (1874–1932), Süleyman Nazif, and Rıza Tevfik ('Bölükbaşı', 1868–1949). As can be seen, all of them were contemporary authors. On Turkish authors translated into Armenian, see Tuğlacı, *Ermeni Edebiyatından Seçkiler*, (cited in n. 73), 86–8.
- 119 See J.Strauss, 'Who read what in the Ottoman Empire (19th-20th Centuries)?', *Middle Eastern Literatures*, vol. VI/1 (2003), pp. 39–76.
- 120 *Matbuat hatıralarım*, cited in n. 26, vol. 1, p. 35.
- 121 See *Kitabı Hezar Esrar*, Istanbul, 1868 (2nd edition 1889).
- 122 See *The Beginnings of Printing in the Near and Middle East*, pp. 64–5.
- 123 It bears the Turkish title *Târîf-i Darü s-saade—Rehniüma-yı ticaret, Birinci sene 1285–1868*. Only the title page contains Greek and Armenian translations.
- 124 E.g. those for the 'Islands of the Archipelago' (*Cezayir-i Bahr-ı Sefid*), and certain Arabic Provinces.
- 125 The value of these publications as sources has been rediscovered only recently. See also the catalogue by Hasan Duman, *Osmanlı Yıllıkları (Salnameler ve Nevşaller)*, Istanbul, 1982.
- 126 For researchers, these quotations are particularly important. They sometimes refer to papers of which little is known or of which no copies are extant.
- 127 It was published in book form under the title *Müdafaâ: Ehl-i İslâmı Nasraniyete dâvet edenlere karşı kaleme alınmıştır*, Istanbul, 1300.

- 128 'fıkârat-ı mezkûreyi yazan edebîsizlerden maada cümlemin midelerini bulandıracak şeyler.'
- 129 See on this controversy J.Strauss, 'Müdafaaya mukabele ve Mukabeleye müdafaa: Une controverse islamo-chrétienne dans la presse d'Istanbul (1883)', in Christoph Herzog *et al.* (eds), *Querelles privées et contestations publiques: Le rôle de la presse dans la formation de l'opinion publique au Proche Orient*, Istanbul, 2003, pp. 55–98.
- 130 See the interesting observations of İlyas Bayar on this issue in 'Türkiye'de kültür hareketi', originally published in *La Boz de Türkiye* (29 October 1940) and reprinted in Nesim Benbanaste, *Örnekle Türk Musevi Basınının Tarihçesi*, Istanbul, 1988, 80–1.
- 131 See Reşat Ekrem Koçu (ed.), *İstanbul Ansiklopedisi*, vol. III, pp. 2214–15.
- 132 Both 'cihan' and 'acun' mean 'world'. Whereas *cihan* is of Persian origin, the term *acun* was introduced after the *Dil Devrimi*. It appears in Ancient Turkish (Uygur) texts, but is actually of Sogdian origin.
- 133 *Resimli Kamus-i Osmanî*, 3 parts, Istanbul, 1330.
- 134 See "'Sefiller" hakkında tabiinin düşünceleri', in Viktor Hügo, *Sefiller*, Istanbul, 1934, 7–10. It was also Mihran Mardirossian who printed the notes collected by a young student at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiyye* from his teachers' classes. This young man, Ahmed Halid (Yaşaroğlu, 1891–1953), the founder of the *Ahmed Halid Kitabhanesi* (1928), became one of the most famous book-sellers during the republican period. See Çankaya, (cited in n. 37), vol 4, p. 1400.
- 135 See Jale Baysal, 'Harf Devrimi'nden önce ve sonra Türk yayın hayatı', *Harf Devrimi'nin 50. Yılı Sempozyumu*, Ankara, 1981, pp. 61–72.





## 8

# Christian community schools during the Ottoman reform period

*Selçuk Akşin Somel*

The Ottoman state, the last great Islamic empire of the successive Mediterranean Muslim states since the Umayyads, was based on the principles of the Islamic Law (*Şeriat*). Within this context, the Ottoman administration regarded subject Christian and Jewish populations as ‘people of the book’ (*Ehli Kitab*) and acknowledged them as separate communities, known as *millet*s. These communities were also considered as *Ehli Zimmî*, i.e., people ‘protected’ by the Islamic authority, and each member of these communities called a *zimmî*. Each of these populations was left autonomous in civil issues such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, and education that were traditionally regarded as belonging to the realm of religion. Another feature of the religious communities was their administration by their respective church or clergy. The head of a non-Muslim community was at the same time the head of the church, i.e., the patriarch was responsible for the secular issues of his community. Before 1830 the main officially recognized non-Muslim communities within the empire were the Greek Orthodox, the Armenians, and the Jews. Though the whole institutional arrangement of the ‘*millet* system’ seemed to be settled in the later Ottoman centuries, one should note that the status of ‘Protected People’ and its members was probably not well defined. For example, the term *zimmî* seems to have been used sometimes in a more general sense to denote Christians in general, either free or slave. Moreover, conditions such as internal crisis or rebellion could lead to the loss of the status of ‘Protected People’, and whole communities were sold to slavery. The last well-known example of such a crisis happened during the Greek revolt between 1821 and 1829.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, one may state that the toleration of non-Muslim communities within the empire did not provide its individual members an absolute immunity from persecution.

The administration of non-Muslim community schools was within the jurisdiction of the governing clergy. Consequently, instruction at community schools was analogous to Muslim Quranic schools and *medreses* and was dominated by religious subjects. The instructors at community schools were generally clergy, and the language of education was often the liturgical language of the church. This was particularly true of the Greek Orthodox community schools.

It should be remembered that a religious community did not correspond to an ethnic group. For example, the governing clergy of the Greek Orthodox community consisted of ethnic Greeks or Hellenised priests, whereas the community was made up of Greek, Bulgarian, Serbian, Albanian, Romanian, Turkish and Arabic native speakers. Similarly, the Armenian community comprised not only Armenian-speaking people, but also groups of Turkish, Greek and Kurdish native speakers. In fact, prior to the nineteenth century each of these communities was an ethnic mosaic.

The origins of missionary school activity in the Ottoman Empire can be traced back to the fifteenth century. Various Catholic orders were active in founding schools in the Balkans (Shkodër, Kosovo region), Anatolia (İzmir, Kayseri, Sivas, Trabzon), and in the Arab provinces (Mount Lebanon, Palestine, northern Iraq). These schools were, prior to the nineteenth century, at a similar educational level to the local Quranic schools, due to the narrow religious character of their instruction. Nevertheless, as a result of these Catholic activities, an Armenian Catholic community emerged in Anatolia, the Maronite community in Mount Lebanon established close ties with the papacy, a Greek Catholic Church (Melkite Church) came into being in Syria and Lebanon, and the Syriacs of northern Iraq established a union with the papacy. These developments were seen by native churches as destroying the integrity of their communities, and these churches often applied to the Ottoman administration to prohibit Catholic missionary initiatives.

The political importance of non-Muslim community schools began to emerge when the values of the European Enlightenment became more widespread among some of the non-Muslim literati, and a current of nationalist thought began to penetrate these communities. These developments were first noticeable in the Greek Orthodox community, which took steps to Hellenise non-Greek Orthodox people through the community schools attached to the Ecumenical Patriarchate. This policy met the resistance of the Orthodox Bulgarian and Albanian populations of the Balkans, who initiated local alternative educational activities independent of the Patriarchate. These events led to disorder and conflict in the Orthodox community. Eventually the Bulgarians were able to separate from the main Orthodox community, and established a new, ethnically based community.

Another factor that indirectly led to the penetration of Enlightenment ideas among non-Muslims was the expansion of foreign missionary schools in the Balkans, Anatolia and in the Arabic-speaking provinces. Though the primary aim of these institutions was the diffusion of evangelical Christianity among the local communities, the pragmatic characteristics of the instruction adopted by evangelical Christians and their focus on the natural sciences unintentionally led to the growing influence of secular notions of progress and individualism. In addition, missionary schools offered instruction in the local vernacular, and provided the opportunity for pupils to learn a modern Western language such as English, French or German, depending on the national affiliation of the particular mission. By contrast, traditional community schools often used a liturgical language as the medium of education, and such languages were mostly either dead or not the

native tongue of the members of the community. Thus, those taught at missionary institutions benefited both in terms of receiving instruction in their native tongue and of acquiring access to Western culture and modernity through a Western language. As a consequence, a young generation of non-Muslims emerged who were raised in a rather different educational environment from the cultural milieu of the traditional scholastic community schools.

This new generation of non-Muslims, still members of their communities but imbued with Enlightenment values, seem to have become increasingly aware of the stagnant, corrupt and oligarchic structure of their community administrations. Not surprisingly, they became increasingly critical of their church institutions. At the same time, native-tongue instruction in missionary schools helped to strengthen an ethnic consciousness based on language. One may assume that this new consciousness provided fertile ground for the development of nationalist sentiments. In addition, provincial-level reforms attempted by the Ottoman administration led to confrontation with the provincial populations and fostered discontent with the Ottoman state.

In the face of the disturbances created by the missionaries among the non-Muslim communities, as well as the complaints of native churches about these missionary activities, the Sublime Porte took steps to limit such activities in the empire. However, the expansionist policies of Russia against the Ottoman Empire and the increasing dependency of the Sublime Porte on the diplomatic support of the other European great powers rendered it more and more difficult for the Ottoman administration to take effective steps against foreign schools. As a consequence, Catholic Armenians and Protestants, both creations of foreign missionary activities, had to be officially recognised by the government as separate communities in 1830 and 1850 respectively. Similarly, the Sublime Porte had to concede the right of full freedom to open schools for all non-Muslim communities in the Edict of Reform (28 February 1856), in return for the military support of the great powers against Russia during the Crimean War (1853–56).

This more or less compromising Ottoman attitude came to an end with the separatist movements in the Balkans in the 1870s, and particularly following the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–78. The government of Abdülhamid II (1876–1909) took steps to establish effective control over both native community and missionary schools. Another significant Ottoman policy change towards community schools was the abandonment of the neutral distancing from communities in favour of a policy of playing one community against the other. One key reason for this new attitude was the inclination of recently separated neighbouring states, such as Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria, to manipulate community schools in the Ottoman Balkans for their irredentist aims.

This chapter will discuss only the community schools of the main Christian populations, namely Greeks, Bulgarians, Orthodox Albanians and Arabs, and Armenians, and will emphasize their relationship with the Sublime Porte.

### Greek schools

Following the conquest of Constantinople, Mehmed II (r. 1451–81) invested the Ecumenical Patriarchate with religious and cultural authority over the entire Orthodox population within the imperial borders. It was the ethnic Greek element that, due to its dominant position in the church administration, determined the cultural policies of the church towards the ethnically heterogeneous mass of Orthodox believers. Though, prior to the mid-eighteenth century, the ecumenical church accepted the existence of different linguistic groups within the Orthodox community, this attitude began to change in the latter half of that century. The possible impact of the European Enlightenment on the educated Greek elite and growing secular nationalist sentiments reflected themselves in the emergent process of Hellenizing non-Greek bishoprics and schools. The decisions of the Holy Synod of Constantinople led to the abolition of the Serbian Patriarchate of Péć (İpek) in Kosovo (1766) and the closure of the Bulgarian Archbishopric of Ohrid in Macedonia (1767). Simultaneously, local parochial schools came under Hellenizing influence, and instruction in non-Greek languages was displaced in favour of Greek instruction. In parallel with this process of Hellenization was the emergence of a wealthy and influential Greek urban bourgeoisie that was engaged in international trade and shipping. Members of this new middle class closely followed nationalist currents in contemporary Europe and were influenced by them. It is a well-established fact that the Greek revolt of 1821–29 and the subsequent independence of Greece (1830) were to an important extent the achievement of this merchant class.<sup>2</sup>

Though the Greek community remaining within imperial borders continued to be administered by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the Greek urban middle class increased its influence in community issues. Following the Edict of Reform of 1856, which required secularizing reforms in non-Muslim communities, the new regulations of 1862 for the Greek community (*Genikoi Kanonismoi*, ‘General Rules’) provided the Greek lay population of Istanbul with considerable rights of community administration and education. At the same time local initiatives emerged among Greeks of Istanbul, Western Anatolia and the Balkans to promote schooling. These initiatives appeared in the shape of voluntary cultural associations, called *syllagos* (pl. *syllogoi*). The first and the most important *syllagos* was set up in Istanbul in 1861 (*O en Konstantinoupolei Ellinikos Filologikos Syllagos*). This was followed by other cultural associations in Western Anatolia and Macedonia (Thessaloniki, Monastir). After 1890, an association was founded to provide education to the central Anatolian Greeks and the Karamanli population.<sup>3</sup>

The kingdom of Greece considered the Balkans as an area of prospective territorial expansion. Since it regarded Greek education as a long-term political investment in the region, Greek consulates in Ottoman Balkan towns provided full support for the setting up of Greek cultural associations in the region. Though the ethnic Greek population in the Ottoman Balkans was mostly confined to cities and

towns, Greek cultural activities aimed at reaching the villages. The aim was to extend Greek education to Slav and Orthodox Albanian populations and to create a sense of Hellenic identity. With this object, Greek cultural associations were set up in Sarandë (1865, southern Albania), Plovdiv (1869), Tekirdağ (1869), Macedonia (1871), Edirne (1872), Lüleburgaz (1872), Thrace (1872), Epirus (1872), Varna (1872), Thessaloniki (1872), Thessaly (1873) and Monastir (1873?). From the Ottoman point of view, these Greek initiatives seemed to be the lesser of the two evils, given the increasing influence of Bulgarian separatism and the emerging Albanian nationalism. The Sublime Porte regarded Bulgarian and Albanian nationalist currents as a greater threat to its long-term interests in the Balkans, so the Ottoman administration looked upon Greek cultural activities as 'useful' in weakening Bulgarian and Albanian nationalism. Only after 1890, when Greek schools in the Balkans had *de facto* become fully part of the educational system of the kingdom of Greece in terms of both finances and curricula, did Ottoman authorities begin to regard Greek schools with greater suspicion, and local Ottoman educational administrations put the Greek educational network under increasing surveillance.<sup>4</sup>

Greek schools did not expand into the İşkodra and Kosova provinces in the north, but elsewhere in the Ottoman Balkans the Greek school system had become the most extensive system among local non-Muslim networks by the end of the nineteenth century. On the other hand, despite efforts to reach into the villages, the Greek educational network remained mostly confined to cities and towns even in those regions with significant ethnic Greek populations, such as the *sancaks* of Yanya, Görice and Monastir.<sup>5</sup>

The Orthodox community of Anatolia was under the jurisdiction of two patriarchates. While the Ecumenical Patriarchate administered the Orthodox population of western and central Anatolia as well as the Black Sea coast, the Orthodox Patriarchate of Antiochia controlled Cilicia and east and south-east Anatolia. As in the Balkans, the Orthodox population in Anatolia did not constitute a single linguistic unit. Whereas the Orthodox population of Western Anatolia and the Black Sea region spoke separate Greek dialects that were almost unintelligible mutually, the rest of the Orthodox population used local dialects that were dominated by Turkish words, or spoke only Turkish or Armenian. This linguistic situation also reflected itself in Greek cultural activities in Anatolia. Greek school networks emerged in Western Anatolia and the Black Sea region even before the nineteenth century. In the rest of Anatolia, on the other hand, Greek education could expand only through the efforts of the cultural associations in Istanbul and Athens.<sup>6</sup>

Prior to the nineteenth century, places such as Trabzon, İzmir and Ayvalık were well known as centres of Greek culture. In 1683, a teachers' college (*Frontistirio*) was opened in Trabzon, which provided a major impetus for the development of the so-called 'Pontus Renaissance', i.e., the rapid expansion of Greek education throughout the region. With the financial support of local merchants, schools were opened even in remote mountain villages. Around 1800 the Xenophon cultural

association was formed (*Filekpaidhetikos Syllogos Ksenofon*) in Trabzon and played a pioneering role in modernizing town and village schools in the region. Similarly, the teachers' seminaries opened in İzmir (1733) and Ayvalık (1803) proved to be catalysts in the expansion of Greek education in Western Anatolia. The founding of local cultural associations, on the other hand, became apparent only in the second half of the nineteenth century. In this context, one may mention the *syllogoi* of Ayvalık, Bayındır, Aydın and Giresun. In the interior of Anatolia, however, there were no cultural and educational activities similar to those mentioned above.<sup>7</sup>

Noteworthy educational initiatives for the Greeks of central Anatolia only commenced after 1870, within the political context of the *I Meghale Idea* ('the Great Ideal') whose aim was to promote the Greek language and an Hellenic consciousness among the Turkish-speaking (*tourkofon*) Orthodox population. From these activities 'The Orient: Cultural Association of Asia Minor' (*O Syllogos ton Mikrasiaton i Anatoli*) emerged in Athens (1891). An additional impetus for the promotion of cultural activities among the Orthodox populace of central Anatolia was the increasing intensity of Protestant and Catholic missionary activities among local Christian communities.<sup>8</sup>

The main aim of the 'Orient' association was to offer scholarships to bright Anatolian boys to train them as teachers in Greece, and then to have them return to their native towns or villages as instructors. These teachers were expected to become propagators of the Greek language and Hellenic ideals among the central Anatolian Orthodox population. In addition, the association was ready to supply local communities with instructors, textbooks and school curricula upon the demand of the local population. Apart from its defined cultural functions, the 'Orient' association acted as a charity organization. It provided financial assistance to Orthodox villages in cases of natural disaster or other kinds of catastrophe.<sup>9</sup>

While the Ottoman administration did not intervene in Greek cultural activities in Macedonia because of political considerations, it probably was not as tolerant in Anatolia as it was in the Balkans. For example, the Ottomans refused in 1881 to permit the foundation of a *syllogos* in Adana because, according to the official explanation, its aim was *to promote the Greek language* in the locality. It is striking that the 'Orient' association was founded not in Anatolia or Istanbul, but outside the imperial borders.<sup>10</sup>

### Orthodox Arab schools

It is not possible to find Orthodox cultural initiatives in the Arab provinces comparable to the *syllogoi* in the Balkans and Anatolia. The Arabic-speaking Orthodox population of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine was the most extensive non-Muslim community in the Ottoman Arab lands. But in terms of schooling, Orthodox Arab education was confined, until the second half of the nineteenth century, mainly to the chief towns of the region. The Orthodox Arab community was divided in terms of community administration: while the Orthodox populations of

Syria and Lebanon were under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Antiochia, those living in Palestine and in Transjordan were administered by the Patriarchate of Jerusalem.<sup>11</sup>

One reason for the lack of expansion of education among Orthodox Arabs was the fact that the middle- and higher-ranking positions in the two local Orthodox churches were monopolized by ethnic Greeks who, themselves foreigners to the region, were not keen to spend the financial sources at their disposal on the schooling of the native community. Also, the emergence of an educated Orthodox Arab elite would certainly endanger the *de facto* privileged status of the ethnic Greek priesthood within community administration. Only the lower-ranking clergy, i.e., priests of village and town churches, were of Arab origin. They, however, lacked basic education, and some were even illiterate. As a result of this cultural neglect, Catholic and Protestant missionary activities found fertile ground to expand their followings at the expense of the Orthodox Arab population.<sup>12</sup>

Educational initiatives among the Arab Orthodox population emerged as a reaction to Catholic and Protestant missionary initiatives. The first modern Orthodox school in the Arabic-speaking parts of the empire was a teachers' seminary, founded in Balamand (Tripoli, Lebanon) in 1833 (*Collège des Trois Docteurs*). This venture was followed by a primary school for boys and girls, set up in Beirut (1840) by As'ad Ya'qub Hayyat, an Orthodox Arab businessman, and a high school in Damascus, opened by Yusuf Haddad, an Orthodox priest. Arabic was used as the language of education in these institutions in place of Greek.<sup>13</sup>

These ventures, though significant, did not amount to mass education. It was mainly the benevolent activities of the Russian Imperial Orthodox Palestinian Society that brought about the expansion of modern primary education among the Arab Orthodox population. The Imperial Orthodox Palestinian Society was founded in St Petersburg in 1882, under the patronage of Grand Duke Sergei. It was able to set up schools in the Orthodox villages of Palestine, Lebanon and Syria, with high schools and teachers' seminaries located in Nazareth (Israel) and Beit Jala (West Bank). Intellectuals such as Khalil Jibran and Mikhail Na'ima were products of this school network.<sup>14</sup>

### **Bulgarian schools**

Until 1870, the Bulgarians were officially part of the Greek community. However, the earliest modern Bulgarian school was founded as early as 1835. This emergence of local Bulgarian educational initiatives was closely related to the increasing Slavic reactions to the Hellenizing policies of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The success of local educational initiatives without the support of, and, indeed, in the face of the opposition of the community administration, was greatly dependent on the existing social structure of the population in question. In other words, the existence of a relatively developed urban middle class and of an educated elite with a clear vision for the future of its people was a determining factor in the ability of this population to resist the pressures of the Ecumenical



Patriarchate and the Sublime Porte. The Bulgarian population possessed these characteristics, and eventually proved to be successful in establishing its own church. The Orthodox Albanians, in comparison, who were in a similar situation *vis-à-vis* the Ecumenical Patriarchate, lacked the above-mentioned social structure. Since this population also proved unable to secure the political or diplomatic protection of one of the great powers from the Ottoman administration, its educational initiatives were doomed to remain illegal and were subsequently suppressed.

An urban class of Bulgarian merchants emerged in parallel with the development of the Greek middle class. The Bulgarian middle class arose during the second half of the eighteenth century as a result of increasing trade between central Europe and the Balkans. Prior to the development of a Bulgarian ethnic consciousness, the Bulgarian middle class, together with the rural notables (*çorbacı*), used to finance local Greek schools. The increasingly Hellenizing educational content which emphasized the cultural inferiority of local non-Greek tongues in favour of Greek as a language of civilization, seems to have been a considerable factor for the emergence of an ethnic reaction among at least some of the ethnic Bulgarians. Also, one should not forget that Russia, a major Slavic power claiming to protect Orthodox Ottoman subjects, defeated the Ottomans in the war of 1828–29 and ensured the independence of Greece. The independence of Greece may have signified the separation of a very crucial portion, indeed the core part of the traditional Greek Orthodox community from the remaining mass. These developments probably provided an impetus in the expansion of a Bulgarian Slavic consciousness among members of the Bulgarian middle class, and resulted in the diversion of financial resources from the schools of the Ecumenical Patriarchate to the emergent educational initiatives that formed the basis of an independent Bulgarian school network.<sup>15</sup>

The first modern Bulgarian primary school was founded in Gabrovo (1835) by Vasilij Aprilov, a merchant. At this time, founding schools independent of the community administration was considered illegal. Thus, until the establishment of a separate church administration, Bulgarian cultural activists faced the problem of finding instructors for their illegal schools. This was solved in part with the support of American Protestant missionaries, and in part with teachers sent by the pan-Slavic committees in Russia. The American school in Samakov was particularly important in producing instructors for illegal Bulgarian schools. However, this situation prevented the development of a regular school system among the Bulgarians until 1870.<sup>16</sup>

Bulgarian nationalists declared the establishment of their national church in 1860, but their unilateral declaration was not recognized by the Ottoman administration. Only ten years later, when the Ottoman state faced the Cretan insurrection, triggered by Greek nationalists, was the Porte ready to acknowledge an independent Bulgarian church. The Ottoman administration took this step to weaken the Ecumenical Church. The official foundation of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870 provided Bulgarian schools in the Balkans a legal and

institutional framework. The sultanic decree of 1870 defined the geographical areas of the jurisdiction of the Exarchate, and stipulated that the area of jurisdiction could be expanded upon the request of two-thirds of a district population. It was exactly this stipulation that prompted Bulgarians to found illegal schools in areas of Ecumenical jurisdiction in order to propagate pan-Slavic ideals among the local Orthodox population and to expand the area of the Exarchate's jurisdiction. In addition, Bulgarians used the example of the Greek *syllogoi* to set up cultural associations in regions under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The associations located in Kastoria, Thessaloniki and Serrez in particular were aimed at preventing the Hellenizing propaganda of the Ecumenical Church among the local Orthodox population. Such activities resulted in bloody confrontations between supporters of the Exarchate and the Ecumenical Patriarchate, bringing civil war-like conditions in the Balkans.<sup>17</sup>

The Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–78 resulted in Ottoman defeat and Russian units reached the outskirts of Istanbul. The peace treaty of St Stefano (1878) stipulated the creation of an autonomous greater Bulgarian principality, which would encompass, in addition to present-day Bulgaria, the present Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the whole of northern Greece, including Thessaloniki and Western Thrace. But this treaty remained a dead letter because of the reaction of the other great powers, and led to the Congress of Berlin. The congress revised the borders of Bulgaria and returned Macedonia, northern Greece and Western Thrace to the Ottoman Empire. However, the shrinkage of Bulgaria produced an irredentism among Bulgarian nationalists who considered the borders of the treaty of St Stefano as the natural borders, and it became a political ideal of Bulgarian intellectuals to regain the borders of St Stefano. The Exarchate pursued a policy to expand the Bulgarian school network into regions previously stipulated to be part of greater Bulgaria by the treaty of St Stefano, and to establish Bulgarian cultural hegemony there. On the other hand, the Bulgarian revolt of 1876, the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–78, and the formation of an autonomous Bulgarian principality north of the Balkan range rendered the Bulgarian Church suspect in the eyes of the Ottoman administration. The Exarchate began to be considered by the Sublime Porte as a promoter of Bulgarian separatism. Consequently, the administration of numerous Bulgarian schools was removed from the Exarchate and transferred to the Ecumenical Patriarchate.<sup>18</sup>

These developments forced the Exarchate throughout the 1880s to adopt a policy of winning back the Ottoman administration's confidence and thus to regain the schools lost to the Patriarchate. In the 1890s, the Bulgarian Prime Minister, Stambulov, was able to reach a rapprochement with the Sublime Porte, which lessened Ottoman pressure on the Exarchate. When Bulgaria remained neutral during the Greco-Ottoman War of 1897, Abdülhamid II willingly approved the expansion of the jurisdiction of the Exarchate in Macedonia at the expense of the Patriarchate. As a consequence, the Bulgarian school network expanded to the remotest corners of the Balkans.<sup>19</sup>

This favourable circumstance for the Bulgarian community in the period around 1900 was endangered by the activities of Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO). IMRO was a secret body founded in 1893 by Bulgarian schoolteachers who were graduates of the village schools in Macedonia. The original aim of IMRO was to incorporate Ottoman Macedonia and Thrace into Bulgaria. But later, the penetration of radical socialist and republican ideals into the organization changed IMRO's political goals from nationalist to more revolutionary ones, namely the ideal of liberating all suppressed people from Ottoman oppression. Similarly, IMRO regarded the Exarchate as a corrupt body that was collaborating with the Sublime Porte against the interests of the Bulgarian people. The Exarchate, in turn, was concerned that the guerrilla activities of IMRO would jeopardize hard-won jurisdictional and educational privileges. The Bulgarian Church preferred the long-term policy of gradual cultural domination in the Balkans that would establish the demographic base for future Bulgarian expansion. As a result, the Exarchate did its best to prevent the political and military activities of IMRO.<sup>20</sup>

The Exarchate's concerns came true when IMRO staged a major rebellion in Macedonia, the St Elias (Ilinden) Revolt, in July 1903. This rebellion, suppressed only with great difficulty, swept away all the Exarchate's cultural gains in the Ottoman Balkans. Since most members of IMRO were teachers at the Exarchate's schools, the Ottoman police regarded all Bulgarian teachers as suspect, and many were deported to remote places like Diyarbakır. In addition, numerous Exarchate schools were handed over to the Ecumenical Patriarchate. It was only after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 that the Bulgarian school system acquired some degree of freedom.<sup>21</sup>

A contemporary observer, H.N.Brailsford, has compared Greek and Bulgarian schools in terms of curriculum and concluded that whereas the former emphasized literary and philosophical subjects, the Exarchate schools assigned most of the school day to technical courses and those in the natural sciences.<sup>22</sup>

### **Orthodox Albanian schools**

The Orthodox Albanian population formed the third largest non-Muslim demographic element in the Ottoman Balkans. However, unlike the Greeks and Bulgarians, the Albanians did not possess their own church and were therefore not considered as a distinct community. Both the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Sublime Porte prevented the foundation of an independent Orthodox Albanian church. The Ottoman administration feared that the recognition of a separate Albanian community would stir up nationalist sentiments among the Muslim Albanians, who constituted the basic demographic pillar of the Ottoman political presence in the western Balkans. For the Patriarchate, the emergence of an Orthodox Albanian church would mean the complete disintegration of the Orthodox community in the Balkans.<sup>23</sup>

The opposition of the Porte and Patriarchate was not the only obstacle to the emergence of an Albanian church. Albanian society in the late nineteenth century was characterized by a peasantry and a tribal structure, and Albanian notables were mainly rich landowners. The Albanians had no developed urban middle class or educated elite who could lead and finance the struggle for political recognition. Wealthy Albanian landowners, mainly Muslims, were often members of the Ottoman ruling elite and associated themselves with the Ottoman state. Despite these restrictive conditions, individual attempts were made by some priests and intellectuals to offer education in the Albanian language.<sup>24</sup>

The first attempt to create a national alphabet for Albanians was made by Naum Veqilharxhi in the early 1840s. Initiatives for an Albanian education system began in the 1870s. In 1873, a teacher at the Greek teachers' seminary of Gjirokastër (Ergiri), Koto Hoxhi, secretly began to teach students in the Albanian language and inculcated in them Albanian national ideals. Hoxhi then applied to the governor of the *vilayet* of Yanya for permission to set up an Albanian school. The Ecumenical Patriarchate excommunicated Hoxhi for these activities, and he was persecuted by armed Greek bands. Hoxhi's students, Pandeli Sotiri and Petro Nini Luarasi took over the cause of Albanian education. In the 1880s, Sotiri and Luarasi struggled to provide education in the Albanian language at the Greek schools in the villages of Korçë (Göriçe), but these endeavours were thwarted by the Patriarchate and the Porte.<sup>25</sup>

The first Albanian primary school was founded in Korçë in 1887 as a result of the efforts of Naim Bey Frashëri, the brother of Şemseddin Sami Bey. Naim Bey was able to secure official permission for this school through his position at the ministry of education in Istanbul. The Ottoman administration authorized the school provided it accepted only Christian children. However, the Albanians did not comply with this restriction and Muslim children also began to attend. This development was noted by the Ottoman authorities and school was finally closed in 1902.<sup>26</sup>

### Armenian schools

The great majority of Ottoman Armenians were members of the Armenian Apostolic Church. This community was scattered throughout Anatolia, but formed sizeable population clusters only in eastern Anatolia. Like the Greek community, the Armenians did not constitute a linguistically homogeneous entity. In about 1870, at least half this community used Turkish instead of Armenian for daily and religious purposes, and the remaining population spoke either various mixtures of Armenian and Turkish or Kurdish. Literary Armenian was spoken only by a minority of well-educated Armenians.<sup>27</sup>

The Armenian Apostolic Church, one of the most ancient churches in the world, was officially recognized by the Ottoman administration during the reign of Mehmed II (r. 1451–81). Despite the existence of an ancient community structure over many centuries, the Armenians lacked any noteworthy educational network,

even in the traditional sense, prior to the nineteenth century. There were only a few monastery schools and 'wandering teachers' (*vartapet*). From the early nineteenth century onwards, schools were founded through private initiatives in towns such as İzmir, Tokat, Erzurum and Trabzon. One symptom of the traditional weakness of Armenian education was the existence of illiterate priests in eastern Anatolia.<sup>28</sup>

Two important factors forced the Armenian community to improve its educational system. One was the educational activities of American Protestant missionaries in Anatolia, which held out the hope of filling the gaps in Armenian education. The second emerged from the political struggles among the community members in Istanbul, which led to the strengthening of the Armenian middle class's role in community affairs. Prior to the 1860s, a coalition of traditional clergy and bankers (*amira*) of Istanbul with close ties to the Sublime Porte administered the Armenian community. The rise of a merchant class, educated in European countries and imbued with the values of the European Enlightenment and liberal constitutionalist ideals, challenged this oligarchy in the first half of the nineteenth century. Following intra-communal confrontations in the 1840s and 1850s, an Armenian constitution was adopted (*Nizamname-i Ermeniyan*) and was approved by the Porte in 1863. This constitution secured a more secular and relatively participatory administrative structure for the community. This new community administration put major emphasis on the development of a modern school network.<sup>29</sup>

The relatively liberal regime provided by the Reform Edict of 1856 for non-Muslim cultural and educational activities encouraged Armenians to found cultural associations similar to the Greek *sylogoi*. The *Andznever* cultural association, established in Istanbul, aimed at teaching the Armenian language to those Armenians who came from Anatolia and did not know any language but Turkish. Another association, the *Ararathian*, was active in Eastern Anatolian towns such as Van, Erzurum and Mamuretülaziz and founded schools. The *Tebrotzasiratz Arevelian* ('School Association of the Orient') undertook similar functions in Diyarbekir, Muş and Bitlis. In addition, generous financial support from wealthy Armenian merchants promoted the expansion of the Armenian school network throughout Anatolia. For example, the Russian Armenian merchant Mıgırdıç Sanasaryan made donations for the foundation of schools in Erzurum, Van and Mamuretülaziz. In 1880, the above-mentioned cultural associations were merged into one central organization, the *Miatsial Enkerutiun Hayots* ('General Union of Armenian Schools'). This body was responsible for the standardization of the curriculum of the Ottoman Armenian schools and for setting the minimum educational standards for instructors. The donations collected previously by local associations were now accepted by this new organization.<sup>30</sup>

The development of the Armenian educational system paralleled the strengthening of Armenian nationalism. In this context, the Armenian patriarch Mıgırdıç Hrimyan devoted his energy to promoting Armenian as the native language of all Armenians within the empire. But the intertwining of education with nationalism became more marked particularly after the Russo-Ottoman War

of 1877–78, when the Armenian issue became an international question at the Congress of Berlin. The stipulation concerning the six provinces of Erzurum, Van, Diyarbekir, Bitlis, Mamuretülaziz, and Sivas required the Sublime Porte to take reform steps in favour of Anatolian Christians and provide them some degree of administrative autonomy. This development encouraged nationalist Armenian separatism, on the one hand, and led the Ottoman administration to regard the Armenian community as a potentially dangerous entity, on the other.<sup>31</sup>

Mıgırdiç Portugalyan, a pedagogue and member of the association *Ararathian*, founded a teachers' seminary in Van in 1878. But after a short time this school was closed because of reports linking it with anti-Ottoman revolutionary activities. Some of Portugalyan's former students in Van formed the secret nationalist organization *Armenakan* (1885). This organization engaged in educational activities in the Armenian villages around Van, trying to implant nationalist ideals among the traditionally minded peasantry. In fact, members of *Armenakan* and significant number of young Armenian teachers were influenced by radical Russian revolutionary thinkers. This young generation of instructors, like the young Bulgarian teachers in the Ottoman Balkans, harshly criticized the conservative character of the Armenian Apostolic Church and its connection with the Ottoman state, and considered religious subjects on school curricula as the main source of Armenian community backwardness. According to these critics, the passivity of the Armenians in the face of Ottoman domination as well as their apathy and inertia arose from the ideology of religious fatalism promoted by the church. While inculcating anti-church ideas in the students of community schools, these teachers also implanted hatred towards the Ottoman state and the Muslim population.<sup>32</sup>

These developments were watched by the Ottoman authorities and resulted in growing levels of administrative pressure on Armenian schools. State supervision of schools was further reinforced by the autocratic character of Abdülhamid II's rule. The Porte prohibited the instruction of subjects such as the 'history of Armenians' or the 'history of the Armenian Apostolic Church'. These prohibitions were, however, circumvented by Armenian instructors by being taught orally. Incidents such as the events of Kumkapı in 1890 provided the Ottoman government with the pretext to close down those Armenian schools in eastern Anatolia that were considered as centres of separatist activity. Finally, in 1893, the General Union of Armenian Schools was abolished.<sup>33</sup>

Tensions between members of the Armenian community and neighbouring Muslim populations, provoked by Armenian nationalist cells in central and eastern Anatolia, led to conditions akin to civil war and massacres on both sides in 1894–96. The Armenian school system was hardest hit among Armenian community institutions. An important section of Armenian teachers was involved in revolutionary and separatist activities, and it was this group that suffered the heaviest casualties. After 1896, many community schools remained without instructors. The new teachers appointed to unstaffed schools were young and inexperienced, and the quality of education declined.<sup>34</sup>

The weakness of Armenian community education was welcomed by Catholic and Protestant missionary schools. Because of the highly politicized character of the Armenian schools, many Armenian families preferred to send their children to local Catholic or Protestant schools. There were also cases where Franciscan or Capuchin priests began to act as instructors in the vacant Armenian community schools.<sup>35</sup>

Though the Armenian school network in Anatolia was extensive, contemporary observers noted that the educational quality of individual schools varied widely by region. Whereas significant numbers of Armenian schools in central and western Anatolia offered a higher quality of education than state secondary schools (*rüşdiyye*), many in Eastern Anatolia were comparable to traditional Quranic schools. A major weakness of Armenian community education throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was the shortage of instructors. Until 1908, there was only one teachers seminary for Armenian schools in Anatolia, located in Erzurum. After 1908 a second seminary was opened in Van. This deficit of teachers was partly offset by graduates of American Protestant schools in Anatolia.<sup>36</sup>

### **Official Ottoman attitude towards Christian community schools**

A well-defined Ottoman policy towards non-Muslim community schools emerged only during the second half of the nineteenth century. This development can probably be understood within the framework of the Edict of Reform of 1856, which explicitly declared the legal equality of Muslims and non-Muslims and underlined the 'sincere bond of citizenship' (*revâbit-i kalbiye- i vatandaşî*) among Ottomans, irrespective of religion. This new official position required a more active stance by the administration towards its non-Muslim subjects, particularly in civil issues. Not surprisingly, it was the Edict of Reform itself that specified the basic right for every non-Muslim community to found its own schools, provided these schools were supervised by the state. The Sublime Porte took a further step to integrate non-Muslim schools into a legal framework by promulgating the Regulation on Public Education (*Maârif-i Umûmiye Nizâm-nâmesi*) in 1869. According to this law, schools within the empire were classified as either 'public' (government schools) or 'private' (schools set up by individuals or communities). Private schools had to meet certain requirements. First, instructors were expected to receive a work permit (*şehadetnâme*) from either the ministry of public education or from the provincial educational administration. Also, one of these bureaucratic bodies had to examine the curricula and certify that course contents were not inimical to public morality and state policies. Only then could the school be officially permitted by either the ministry or the provincial body (*ruhsat-ı resmîye*) to continue its activities. Those schools that did not fulfil these requirements were to be closed. When a new instructor was employed by a private school, he or she had to provide a work permit from the administration.<sup>37</sup>



Although this regulation was issued in 1869, its application in the provinces only became apparent during the reign of Abdülhamid II. In 1881 a report prepared by the ministry of public education on provincial education stated that the main objective of the policy was to bring non-Muslim community schools into line with government policies. In order to attain this object, it was proposed that all financial as well as other material needs of the schools would be met by the school administration, and that the schools would at the same time be brought under effective government surveillance. The report underlined that if these measures were not applied successfully, the 'educational capital' available to non-Muslims would provide no benefit to the Ottoman state but might, on the contrary, be misused against the state.<sup>38</sup> The expansion of provincial-level educational administrations in the 1880s provided a bureaucratic basis for more efficient control over Christian community schools. Moreover, the Regulation of 1896 on the duties of provincial educational directors provided detailed stipulations concerning the surveillance of schoolbooks and courses.<sup>39</sup> However, two structural shortcomings of the late Ottoman state, namely the lack of adequate resources to finance the expanding provincial bureaucracy and the limited number of well-trained inspectors able to scrutinize books and documents in Greek, Bulgarian or Armenian, greatly hampered the Hamidian project of total surveillance of non-Muslim schools. The shortcomings of the local provincial administrations also made it easier for separatist organizations to infiltrate their supporters as instructors into provincial schools.

These structural weaknesses led the Hamidian educational administration to concentrate most of its regulatory efforts on newly founded non-Muslim schools. It would be an incorrect generalization to claim that the Hamidian state obstructed the setting up of new Christian schools. On the other hand, it was keen to keep the recently established schools under close control. A convenient means to regularize such control was by imposing mandatory Ottoman Turkish courses on school curricula: this was, indeed, stipulated in the 1896 Regulation. Instructors in Ottoman Turkish received a salary from the Ministry of Public Education, and were increasingly appointed to Christian schools. It seems that the Sublime Porte was trying to place government officials in non-Muslim schools to act as informers.<sup>40</sup>

The extreme politicization of Christian schools in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the implicit relationship between community schools and Balkan irredentism and separatism led the Ottoman administration to adopt an approach to these institutions that strictly served the political interests of the state. As a consequence, there were government measures that violated official regulations. Although the Ministry of Public Education was expected to remain neutral regarding different educational networks, the Sublime Porte, as already mentioned, exploited political differences and rivalries among community schools and played one network against the other. For example, during the 1880s local Greek clergy in the Balkans willingly acted as informers and denounced Bulgarian or Albanian instructors for their 'illegal activities'. On the basis of such



information, the Sublime Porte closed down numerous Bulgarian schools. In the 1890s, however, relations between the Ottoman Empire and Greece became strained, eventually resulting in the Graeco-Ottoman War of 1897. During this period, it was the Bulgarian community schools that received favourable treatment from the Ottomans. The *Firman* of 1870, which sanctioned the foundation of the Bulgarian Exarchate, stipulated that the area of church jurisdiction would expand only upon the request of two-thirds of the district's population. Similarly, the Regulation of 1896 specified that the founder and the director of a new non-Muslim school should belong to the community that constituted a majority in the locality. Despite such rules, the Sublime Porte did not hesitate to allow the Exarchate to expand its schools into those regions theoretically under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate as a 'reward' for Bulgarian neutrality during the conflict with Greece.<sup>41</sup> In short, non-Muslim educational institutions of the late nineteenth century Ottoman Empire effectively became a means of demarcating the spheres of political interest of neighbouring countries. At the same time, the Ottoman administration manipulated competing interests for the sake of imperial territorial integrity.

### Conclusion

Though this chapter discusses only the main native Christian educational networks in the Ottoman Empire, it does touch on a complex panorama of ethnic groups and school systems in an area stretching from the Adriatic in Europe to the Caucasus in the east and the Syrian deserts in the south. Prior to the nineteenth century, traditional community schools were governed by the clergy of the community in question, and native Christian educational networks corresponded with these clerical communities. Changes in this structure emerged as a consequence of the secularization of community administrations and the emergence of nationalist currents within these communities. When nationalism became a determining factor in community administration, it dictated the policy of linguistic homogenization by imposing the language of the elite on community education. Those members of the community who spoke a different language and possessed an ethnic consciousness different from the elite, reacted in the main by opening alternative schools. These changes led to the collapse of the traditional religious unity of the multiethnic community, particularly for the Greek Orthodox community. In contrast, the Armenian policy of teaching the Armenian language to Turkish-speakers never did mean the rejection of the native tongue. Furthermore, there is no indication that Turkish-speaking Armenians possessed a separate ethnic consciousness, like Orthodox Albanians or Bulgarians. In fact, there is no evidence that the expansion of the Armenian language among Anatolian members of the community provoked an ethnic reaction.

An ethnic consciousness different from that of the governing elite of the community was not sufficient for the establishment of an alternative educational network. Only those populations with an urban middle class to finance such

ventures and an intellectual elite to direct them, as in the case of the Bulgarians, were able to separate themselves from the dominant community. Groups such as Orthodox Albanians and Arabs, on the other hand, lacked these structural prerequisites. It was intensive Russian support that provided the Orthodox Arab population with a modern school network independent of the Greek community. Orthodox Albanians, however, never received substantial political, financial and educational support from any of the great powers, and thus were unable to have their own institutionalized school system.

Nationalism led to the politicization of community schools. Following the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–78, Bulgarian and Greek educational networks increasingly became tools of the expansionist aims of neighbouring Balkan states. Similarly, many Armenian community schools became breeding grounds for separatism. One must draw attention to certain commonalities between the Bulgarian and Armenian teaching bodies. Both educational networks were modernised, to a considerable extent with the support of American Protestant missionaries. Not a few among the young generation of instructors trained in American schools seem to have been able to break away from the traditional cultural frameworks of their communities, and possibly were influenced by the republican ideals of the American Revolution. This young generation of teachers also shared modest or even peasant backgrounds, particularly the Bulgarian instructors. Both Bulgarian and Armenian teachers were inclined towards radical democratic and revolutionary ideals, and opposed their community administrations. In other words, Bulgarian and Armenian instructors were at odds with the older generation of conformist community establishments in Istanbul. Not surprisingly, the autocratic regime of Abdülhamid II subjected Bulgarian and Armenian educational networks to close police surveillance. When Armenian and Bulgarian separatists became engaged in armed activities that led to the incidents of 1894–6 and of 1903, it was Armenian and Bulgarian instructors who generally became the objects of investigation and conviction. Thus, the effect of the politicization of community schools appeared most marked in Bulgarian and Armenian schools, where a considerable part of the teaching bodies was alienated from their respective communities.

In conclusion, the modernization of Christian community school systems in the age of nationalism not only led to the weakening of the multi-ethnic social fabric of the Ottoman Empire, but also shook the traditionally integral structures of the religious communities and opened the way for the transformation of communities into nations.

### Notes

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## Levantine state muftis An Ottoman legacy?

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As in the case of Turkish historians, modern Lebanese and Syrian historians have tended to impose a major historical break at the end of the First World War and the demise of the Ottoman Empire. This is quite understandable for nationalist reasons: after all, the war and the years leading up to it were marked by the rise of indigenous Arab nationalism, a struggle that—especially in the Syrian case—was intensified during the subsequent period of French domination under the Mandate. Moreover, the break makes sense from a less ideological point of view, too. In the aftermath of the war, Syria and Lebanon as the territorial states we know today emerged, complete with republican constitutions that have proved to be the blueprint for a political and constitutional framework that is more or less still in place.

With such a combination of political, institutional and ideological breaks—not to mention the break that was caused by the severe and traumatic experience of the war itself—it is no wonder that historical scholarship has in the main witnessed a parallel division of labour, with most scholars focusing on either the Ottoman *ancien régime* or the republican states. Apart from the attempts at positing a strong and vibrant Arab or Lebanese nationalism from the mid-nineteenth century that gradually came to fruition in the twentieth, interest in the continuity from the Ottoman era has been fairly scant. However, after a generation of scholarship that has demonstrated a greater appreciation of the scope of modernization and social transformation in the late Ottoman era, it may be interesting to explore this break again, if not to deny its existence, then at least to investigate how it occurred and what measure of continuity is still visible beneath the obvious innovations.

In this respect, the institution of mufti may provide an interesting, if minor, instance. As an authority who must be consulted whenever Muslims are in doubt about a point of Islamic law, the mufti can be said to be the embodiment of an important part of the Islamic intellectual tradition. In the Ottoman Empire, the office of mufti became formalized and hierarchically organized to a degree unprecedented in earlier Islamic legal history. How did this particular example of the Ottoman intellectual and administrative heritage fare in the history of republican Syria and Lebanon?

On an obvious level, we have an established Ottoman institution, the Provincial Mufti, who now becomes ‘Mufti of the Republic’. On another level, there is

something else going on: an old Islamic legal institution, the office of mufti, has in fact undergone significant developments in the Ottoman era, and late Ottoman bureaucratic reform shows evidence of continuous development of the institution. Similarly, despite the new setting in the Syrian and Lebanese republics, the institution retained a number of specifically Ottoman traits, some of which it gradually did away with, but some of which it still retains. Or at least, this seems to be the case when the office of State Mufti in Syria and Lebanon is compared to State Muftis in countries with no Ottoman legacy. And yet again, a comparison between the office of State Mufti in Syria and that of Lebanon shows important differences that must be seen in light of the overall development of religious politics in the two countries.

This chapter will address the Ottoman legacy and the emergence of specific national institutions of *ifta* (the giving of *fatwas*) in the modern states. I have not studied the Ottoman Shaykh al-Islam in any detail myself, and especially as regards Syria I am relying on recent academic work by local scholars. My own point of departure is primarily comparative, as I have been working on the history of the State Mufti in Egypt, and this is part of an ongoing investigation into the varieties of State Mufti institutions in the Muslim world.

### The Ottoman Shaykh al-Islam

The Ottoman Mufti, or Shaykh al-Islam, has been the subject of several studies, most of them dealing with the earlier centuries of the Empire. The office of Shaykh al-Islam represents a considerable institutionalization of the mufti office in comparison to earlier Islamic history. This seems to have been only a very gradual development.<sup>1</sup> But by the late sixteenth century, the Shaykh al-Islam was the head of the religious and legal administration of the Empire, and he was consulted by the sultan on religious issues. His *fatwas* had become legally binding and were sought by litigants in great numbers to be used by them in court. As a consequence, the *Fetvakhane* in Istanbul developed into a chancellery with clerks who prepared and registered the *fatwas*, and a new office emerged to take charge of the day-to-day giving of *fatwas*, the *fetva emini*. In Haim Gerber's study of Bursa, it appears that the *fatwas* were treated with great respect in court, which usually decided in favour of the litigant who could produce an official *fatwa* supporting his case.<sup>2</sup> Because of this role of *fatwas* in the courts, and probably to guard against litigants manipulating the details when they asked for them, official *fatwas* developed into rational and technical instruments that expressed a legal principle and omitted names, dates and details: it was for the judge to decide whether the principle actually fitted the case at hand.<sup>3</sup>

The Shaykh al-Islam was considered the head of the *ulema* (scholarly class) and was charged with making appointments to the most prestigious *ulema* positions. He was thus in charge of an entire administration, to all intents a kind of religious minister. It is therefore not surprising that, with this increasingly political role, he

received a much higher salary but lost the life tenure that had been part of the earlier, more honorific office.<sup>4</sup>

By the nineteenth century, this administration was still in place and included a fine permanent residence near the palace. The Shaykh al-Islam became a prominent member of the various ministerial councils that accompanied the growing bureaucratization of the Ottoman state, and some of the incumbents of the office managed to play a considerable political role in the more participatory political climate that gradually emerged after 1839. However, the legal reforms of the *Tanzimat* also marginalized the role of *fatwas* in the legal system. The office of Shaykh al-Islam was abolished by republican Turkey in 1924, but as early as 1916 was no longer represented in the cabinet.

An important task of the Shaykh al-Islam was to supervise the religious courts of the Empire, primarily by appointing the major kadis. The degree to which these appointments merely rubber-stamped decisions already taken locally seems to have varied with time and place, as in the case of the appointments of governors. In any event, there would often be a certain rivalry between the local muftis and the centrally appointed kadi. This was perhaps particularly the case in a major Arab intellectual city such as Damascus, with its own tradition of *fiqh* scholarship and its own important educational institutions.

### The Provincial Muftis

Damascus and Beirut were provincial capitals of the Ottoman Empire, Damascus since the early sixteenth century and Beirut since 1840. Their religious administration was thus regulated by laws and decrees from Istanbul.

Traditionally, each of the different legal schools had its own mufti who was consulted by litigants and people seeking religious and legal clarification. As the Hanafi school was the one followed by the courts—and a substantial part of the Damascene and Beirut population—the Hanafi mufti was by far the most powerful of the mufti offices. The Hanafi Mufti was appointed by the Shaykh al-Islam in Istanbul, but as he would be a local Hanafi *alim* there was considerable interest and competition among leading Hanafi *ulema* families for the position. We shall come back to this point when dealing with Damascus and Beirut separately.

Towards the end of Ottoman rule the religious hierarchy, and with it the provincial mufti, became inscribed in a more explicit and detailed legal framework. Two laws defined the various offices of *ifta*, and the Provincial Muftis' authority *vis-à-vis* minor muftis and the courts.

The 'Law of Those Judging according to the Revelation' of 1331 H (1913), sets out the following attributes of the Mufti (clause 37):<sup>5</sup>

born member of the local administrative religious council;  
gives *fatwas* to judges as well as to the public at large;  
heads the '*ulama*'; and  
supervises the religious schools.



The Provincial Mufti was elected in two stages. First, the local administrative council set up an electoral council composed of religious teachers, preachers and the elected Muslim members of the administrative and municipal councils. The electoral council elected three candidates (clause 38). The names of the candidates were sent to Istanbul where the Shaykh al-Islam chose between them and issued a decree on the appointment (clause 39). According to the law, the Shaykh al-Islam could only dismiss an appointed Provincial Mufti if, through negligence or incapacity, he proved unworthy of the office (clause 41).

Four years later, the prerogatives of the Provincial Mufti were expanded in a new law on 'The Organization of Mufti Offices'.<sup>6</sup> In terms of this law, the Mufti was made president of the local *Waqf* Council (related to the *waqf* administration in Istanbul); he was put in charge of general religious super-vision, on which he was to make reports; and he could make proposals to the Shaykh al-Islam. Moreover, the Mufti was charged with determining the appearance of the new moon and announcing the beginning of the lunar months, as well as making appointments to religious offices and issuing permits for teachers and preachers.

Thus, in the final days of the Ottoman Empire the Provincial Mufti had developed into the key religious functionary in the local religious bureaucracy, charged not only with giving *fatwas* but also heading the entire administration of religious schools, *waqf*, mosques and 'ulama in general. Through this late legislation, the Provincial Mufti was well positioned to take over a key function in the religious politics and administration of newly independent states.

### Syria

With respect to the provinces themselves, Syria provides perhaps the most interesting case of transition. Syria, it must be remembered, did not directly become a French Mandate but experienced a couple of years under the rule of its liberator, Faysal ibn Hussein, who was crowned king in 1919.

In the Ottoman era, Damascus was ruled not only by the governor but also by a number of notable urban families. Because of the prominence of this group in the biographical dictionaries and *sharia* court registers, several studies of the nineteenth century have been able to focus on the group's composition, constituencies, alliances and rivalries. The studies by Schatkowski-Schilcher, Maoz, Roded and Khoury have identified important factors in the development of the power structures in nineteenth century Damascus, such as European economic penetration, Egyptian occupation in the 1830s, the strengthening of the Ottoman control, the *Tanzimat*, the land laws of 1858 and the outcome of the riots of 1860. These latter events may be seen as starting the formation of what Khoury has called a new landowning bureaucratic elite, which was on good terms with the Ottomans and was represented in Istanbul in parliament and in the elite schools.

In these studies, the *ulema* are viewed as a distinct social group that was itself very divided in terms of access to patronage and resources, and these divisions

were exacerbated during the nineteenth century. The political significance of the *ulema* was based on their religious and moral influence, which secured them a following among the urban population and entitled them to speak in the *majlis* and *diwan* of the city.

The renewed Ottoman control of the 1840s and 1850s weakened the military-based families and gave *ulema* families the opportunity to assert themselves and seek alliances, often through intermarriage, with dominant political families. From around the 1840s, some elite *ulema* families began to orient themselves towards the Ottomans, for instance by changing to the Hanafi *madhhab* and establishing contacts in Istanbul, often through Sufi orders such as the Naqshbandiya, Khalwatiya and Qadiriya.<sup>7</sup> At the same time, there was a general feeling of unease among the *ulema* at the introduction of equal rights for Christians and Jews and the introduction of new types of schools and courts, even if this was primarily felt among the lower strata of the *ulema*, who bore the brunt of these innovations. The uprising of 1860 saw the *ulema* divided, and the subsequent Ottoman punitive measures singled out many local *ulema* for punishment. The more powerful families, on the other hand, saw new opportunities in the expanding Ottoman bureaucracy, such as the *waqf* committees.<sup>8</sup>

When they established themselves in Damascus in the early sixteenth century, the Ottomans had appointed a chief kadi from each *madhhab*, but they themselves favoured the Hanafiya. Similarly, instead of just leaving the *ifta* to the *ulema* at large, they appointed a chief mufti for each *madhhab*. These positions had always provoked particular rivalry among the leading '*ulama*, as they—in addition to their considerable honour and status—were also the source of control of *awqaf* and patronage. The most important of these posts were the *khatib* (preacher) in the Umayyad mosque, the deputy of the Ottoman grand kadi (who usually held the position much longer than the kadi himself), the *naqib al-ashraf* (head of the descendants of the Prophet) and the Hanafi Mufti. In all cases, the post was contested among certain families, some of whom could hold a virtual monopoly over the position for generations.

The Hanafi Mufti was held by no less than fifty-six persons during the Ottoman rule—an average of little less than four years per mufti.<sup>9</sup> No family ever held a monopoly on the post, even for a shorter period, but the names of certain families do recur in particular centuries. Thus a dominant family in the seventeenth century was the 'Imadis, whereas the eighteenth century saw the rise of families such as the Ajlanis and the Muradis who, in turn, had to cede the office of Hanafi Mufti to the Hamzas and several others in the nineteenth century.<sup>10</sup> The tenure of the office was for life, and when the Mufti died factions quickly emerged around various candidates. The new Mufti was appointed by the Shaykh al-Islam, but for all practical purposes was chosen by the local *ulema* community. In the early nineteenth century, it was the Grand Kadi who organized the election,<sup>11</sup> but by the end of the century it was the administrative council, as was later set out in the law of 1913. Lina al-Homsi has examined the newspaper coverage of the elections of the Provincial Mufti in 1911, for which the electoral council consisted of 204

members. The council voted on three candidates, and one, Rida Effendi al-Halabi, won a decisive victory. His appointment was then confirmed by the Shaykh al-Islam.<sup>12</sup>

Many legal decisions were made by the Provincial Mufti: he was consulted for out-of-court settlements, but he was also consulted by the courts and could act as a check on the kadi. There are several significant features about the five Muftis who held office during the last three decades of Ottoman rule.<sup>13</sup> They were all born in Damascus, or just outside the city, but only one of them seems to have come from a celebrated Damascene *ulema* family, namely Muhammad Abu 'l-Khayr al-'Abidin. They were all educated in Damascus, except for one of them, Sulayman al-Jukhdar, who was the son of the qadi of Damascus and received his education in Istanbul at the Kadi school. All of them made their careers in the courts before being elected to the Muftiship, some of them via the office of *amin al-fatwa*. But for some of them, the Muftiship was not the end of their careers: two of them were transferred to the position of kadi of Medina and Mecca. Their public role seems to have been limited. To sum up, it seems that during the final decades of Ottoman rule the Mufti of Damascus had increasingly become a top legal functionary, an important but politically subservient position in a wider Ottoman religio-legal bureaucracy.

### The French Mandate in Syria

Ottoman rule came to an end in 1918. It was followed by the brief period of Faysal's Arab kingdom, but in 1920 France landed troops and defeated Faysal's army and in 1922 France was accepted as the mandatary by the League of Nations. Lebanon was cut out of Syria as a separate entity, and Syria itself was for some years divided into several smaller mini-states, such as Aleppo. However, between 1925 and 1939 territorial Syria as we know it today came into being. The French High Commissioner governed all these territories from his residence in Beirut, but from the late 1920s parliamentary elections were held and local Syrians headed successive governments, which tended, however, to be dissolved by the French. Syria gained its independence in 1943, but French troops stayed on until 1946.

The French were well aware that they had to be careful when dealing with religious matters in Syria and Lebanon, but there was one religious institution that very soon attracted their interest. Urban planning and French commercial interests, at least, could hardly ignore the whole field of *waqf*. Decree 753 of March 1922 stated that the Muslim *awqaf* were the domain of the Muslims, but were disorganized. Consequently, the mandatary took over responsibility for the *Nizarat al-Waqf* and set up a Higher *Waqf* Council, a General Council of *Waqf* and a General Supervisor.<sup>14</sup> These bodies comprised representatives of the *ulema* in the major districts, primarily the *sharia* court presidents, but their decisions had to be approved by the High Commission. Decree 157 of December 1931 further organized the *awqaf* in the major cities by decentralizing them, thus strengthening their autonomy from the French. However, decentralization also led to a stronger

separation between Syria and Lebanon, even though Article 43 admitted the possibility of creating a common Islamic council for both countries.<sup>15</sup> None of these decrees explicitly regulated the role of the Mufti, but the latter decree in particular introduced an electoral principle in matters pertaining to *waqf* and Islamic affairs.

Very early in the life of independent Syria, however, in 1947, a legislative decree (*marsum tashri'i* 69) placed the function of *ifta* directly under the prime minister. The election of the Mufti was to take place through a new type of electoral college consisting of all the provincial judges and muftis, who would elect three candidates, of whom the prime minister would choose one. In 1953, responsibility for the Mufti and *ifta* was transferred from the prime minister's office to that of the minister of justice. In 1963 a law was passed, and is still largely in effect, that set up a ministry of *waqf* and transferred *ifta* to it, but it also expanded the position of the Mufti quite substantially so that he heads not only *ifta* but also religious teaching, mosque functionaries and an important administrative body called the Higher *ifta* Council.<sup>16</sup>

What role did the Mufti have in French Mandate Syria? His legal role was now much diminished, and in educational politics the *ulema* were also losing ground as primary and secondary education expanded rapidly and new teacher training institutions were established. The Mufti was, however, still the formal head of the '*ulama*, and, as has been noted of other countries, Islam came to symbolize cultural and political resistance towards the colonial order in the eyes of both colonial authorities and colonial subjects. The *ulema* saw themselves as the embodiment of the Islamic identity of Syria and Damascus, but to a degree, this self-perception was challenged by a number of Islamic movements, which saw themselves as more effective representatives of Syrian Islamic identity.

On the other hand, in a sense there emerged a new role for the Mufti in law. Whereas the Ottoman state had been the sole legislator, the French set up what was called a dual legal system, whereby matters of personal status were left to organizations drawn from local religions.<sup>17</sup> In 1917, the Ottoman state had passed a controversial law on personal status matters, much resisted in Syria at the time. But with the dual legal system, it was now the Mufti as head of the *ulema* who could set the guidelines for the interpretation of this law. In this sense, the gradual marginalization that the office had witnessed in the nineteenth century was now reversed. In Syria and Lebanon under the French Mandate, the office of Mufti was given an institutional basis and high public profile as the representative of the Muslims *vis-à-vis* the French in religious and personal status matters. Islam was removed from legislation, the judiciary and much of political life, but the prize was autonomy in the more limited field of religion and personal status. Here it reigned supreme, with the Mufti as its formal head.

During this period, Syria had only two Muftis, each of them holding office for almost twenty years.<sup>18</sup> Their complete *fatwa* records have been lost, but some have survived among family papers and in publications.

The first of them, Muhammad Ata al-Kasm (1844–1938) was already 74 years old when he was appointed by Faysal in 1918, but he continued to hold office until 1938. His earlier career had been mainly in education, teaching in mosques and in the elite school, Maktab Anbar. He is known to have been a Sufi and he composed an answer to the teachings of the Wahhabiya.

The second Mufti, Muhammad Shukri al-Ustuwani (1869–1955), was also almost 70 when he took office in 1938, but held it until 1954. Like his predecessor a native of Damascus from a well-known *ulema* family, he had also been a teacher but had been *amin al-fatwa* during the whole period of office of al-Kasm. He was a Naqshbandi Sufi and, again like his predecessor, a habitual visitor of saints.

To complete the picture, let me add his successor, Muhammad Abu l-Yusr al-Abidin, son of one of the Ottoman Muftis, who held the Muftiship from 1955 to 1961, when he was replaced by the Arab Socialist regime for political disobedience, since he refused to issue *fatwas* prohibiting the right to private property. He was reinstated, but pensioned in 1963, according to Böttcher because he was unacceptable to the new government.<sup>19</sup> Abu l-Yusr ‘Abidin was trained as a medical doctor and practised from his own clinic for thirty years, but he also taught at religious schools and in the Faculty of Law. He is the last Hanafi Mufti of the Republic: the two Muftis following him have been Shafi‘is.

In Lina al-Homsi’s dissertation on the Muftis of Syria in the twentieth century, she has singled out four fields of activity that have characterized all of them: education, participation in international Islamic conferences and organizations, participation in the national struggle against imperialism and participation in official events and politics.<sup>20</sup> Their educational activities have been substantial, as we have already seen. Their participation in Islamic internationalism was, however, very limited during the French Mandate, and they did not take part in the few conferences that were organized in Mecca, Cairo, Jerusalem and Geneva. Similarly, al-Homsi has to admit that the Muftis’ actual participation in the resistance against the French was only symbolic and limited to glorifying the duty of jihad.<sup>21</sup>

To sum up, if we look at the Muftis themselves, the republican Muftis have in some ways differed from the Ottoman ones, but in other ways they have been much the same. Typically, they came from Damascus, from well-known religious families. Our very limited material here suggests that this is more the case in republican than in Ottoman Damascus, a possible reason being that expertise in Islamic law had become a much narrower and more specialized field which was preserved by certain families, but not in the general educational system. This may be related to the most obvious difference between the two periods: while the Ottoman Muftis had made their way through the court system, all of them working as judges at some point, none of the republican Muftis did so. This is due to the decline of the *sharia* courts, but also to the new demands on the State Mufti. Rather than being an administrator of the *sharia* as it was practised in courts, he had become—at least in his own eyes—a defender of the *sharia* as it was internalized and acted upon by individuals, politicians and the public at large. To

borrow a formulation from Brinkley Messick, it seems fair to say that the training of the Mufti had shifted from the *mahkama* (court) to the *madrassa* (education), for it was very much his educational and communication skills that were in demand. Al-Abidin's successor, Abd al-Razzaq al-Homsi, who acted as interim Mufti in 1964, was primarily a preacher, and the first to explore the medium of the radio in the work of Islamic propagation.

### Lebanon

Until the mid-nineteenth century, Beirut was a small port and, with the exception of its legal reputation in the early Islamic era, was not known for its religious scholarship. Like other major cities in the Ottoman era, the post of Hanafi Mufti was of great importance in the juridical system and consequently the object of rivalry between leading *ulama*.

The local literature on the Muftis and *ulema* is not as elaborate as the literature for Damascus, and there are some contradictions about how long individual Muftis held their positions in the Ottoman era.<sup>22</sup> Here again, certain family names—Fakhuri, Fath Allah, Hut—appear more than once in the nineteenth century, but it is interesting to note that about half the Muftis left their positions and emigrated to Damascus. In the late Ottoman Empire, a single Mufti, Abd al-Basit al-Fakhuri (1879–1905), held office for almost thirty years. The Fakhuri family combined privileged religious status with clear political pretensions during the late Ottoman and the French periods. He also contrasts with the Damascene Muftis in being involved in the Islamic reform movement, busily founding schools and charities in the fast-growing and educationally and religiously competitive port city. Much of this work was channelled into a single, but very substantial, charity, the *Jam'iyat al-maqasid al-khayriya al-islamiya fi bayrut*. Founded in 1878, the Maqasid Society built schools, hospitals, funeral services and other community services and quickly developed into a major source of patronage, and was fought over by the leading Sunni families.<sup>23</sup> When 'Abd al-Basit al-Fakhuri died in 1905, a major struggle ensued over his succession, but after three years Mustafa an-Naja was appointed (in 1909), after intense lobbying by the leaders of the politically important Salam and Sulh families. At the same time, he was made president of the Maqasid Society. An-Naja was to remain Mufti well into the French period, until his death in 1932. One year before his death, a law was passed in the Maqasid Society making the Mufti honorary president, thereby effectively transferring the real control of the society away from the Mufti.<sup>24</sup>

### The French Mandate in Lebanon

The political situation in French Lebanon differs from Syria due to the dominance of the local Christians and the precarious position of the Sunni community in the republic during its first decades. As a rule, the Sunni community rejected the idea of a separate territorial Lebanon (with its Christian political dominance), at least well

into the 1930s. This was especially the case with the *ulema* who felt close links to the Syrian hinterland.

In 1920, the French High Commissioner Gouraud visited Beirut's Mufti Mustafa an-Naja and conferred upon him the title 'Mufti of the State of Grand Liban'. Naja, however, insisted on his old title of Mufti of Beirut and thus asserted his allegiance to the Ottoman religious administrative system. A Shadhili Sufi, Mustafa Naja had been working as a tradesman in the Suq al-'Attarin before his appointment as Mufti in 1909. His literary output is mainly on Sufism, and his *fatwas* are characterized by a certain conservatism. It is interesting to note that some of Naja's best-known *fatwas* cover the same issues as those of his contemporary colleague in Syria, Muhammad Ata al-Kasm, namely such contentious issues as the veil, insurance and music. In 1928 there was a major scandal in Syria and Lebanon following the publication of the young Beirut Nazira Zein al-Din's book *al-Sufur wa l-hijab* (Unveiling and Veiling) that condemned the veil and asserted her right to speak out on issues of Islamic law.<sup>25</sup> Mustafa Naja published a *fatwa* denouncing both these positions, but there were other scholars in Beirut who attacked the book even more vigorously.<sup>26</sup> Al-Kasm also published a booklet on the veiling issue.<sup>27</sup>

As mentioned above, Decree 157/1 of 1931 decentralized the administration of *awqaf* and in effect set up a separate administration for Lebanon. Article 23 established a Higher Islamic Legal Council (*al-Majlis ash-Shar'i al-Islami al-A'la*) headed by Mufti Mustafa an-Naja, who died, however, a month later. An electoral committee consisting of thirty-six higher Lebanese *ulema* congregated in the house of the *sharia* court president of Beirut and elected Muhammad Tawfiq Khalid as his successor. Decree 291 of 9 July 1932 changed his title from Mufti of Beirut to Mufti of the Republic.<sup>28</sup> The state of Lebanon had finally formalized its autonomy in the field of *ifta*.

Muhammad Tawfiq Khalid (1874–1951) had studied with the leading *ulema* of Beirut, taught at the national school, and in 1900 had opened an Islamic school himself. From 1909 he worked himself up in the *sharia* court, while also preaching in the popular Sunni neighbourhood of Basta al-Fawqa. As a mufti, he became involved with the nationalist movement: Khalid himself never published a book, but a number of very nationalist sermons were published after his death.<sup>29</sup> He was eager to play a role in Lebanese politics and build up his own power base.<sup>30</sup> He was actively engaged in fielding his own candidates in the parliamentary elections in the 1930s and was known to be an ally of the nationalist, Riad as-Sulh. After Lebanese independence, when Sulh became prime minister, Khalid gained his financial support to build a *sharia* college called Azhar Lubnan, and an impressive administrative building, the Dar al-Fatwa, for himself and his administration. He died in 1951.

His successor, Muhammad 'Alya (1888–1967), had a fairly similar career path. He went to one of the Maqasid schools but was taught *fiqh* by his father, an important scholar. He founded Beirut's first Islamic evening school, but from 1909 worked his way up through the Islamic court system while preaching in Basta



Tahta. He was elected Mufti in 1951 but had to withdraw for reasons of health in 1966.

In 1955, twelve years after Lebanese independence, a law was passed repealing the 1931 decree on *waqf*, as well as the Ottoman laws of 1913 and 1917 regulating the office of Mufti. With modifications, this law is still in force today. Its main aim is to give to the Sunni community of multi-confessional Lebanon a religious autonomy and administration equal to that of the Maronite—and later other—communities. Decree 18 of 1955 establishes the Supreme Legal Council, a body that is to run all religious and social affairs of the Sunni community and has powers of internal legislation. Given the confessional basis of Lebanese politics, and the state's *laissez-faire* policy *vis-à-vis* the communal affairs of the various confessions, this body is of great political significance and the leading politicians have a seat on the Council. It has, therefore, been politicized right from the beginning.

But the Mufti of the Republic is its permanent head and has life tenure. He is thus a political figure of weight in Lebanon, as became especially clear during the fifteen years of civil war (1975–90) when much of the Sunni political elite was bereft of its power, and the Mufti on numerous occasions had to act as its political head.<sup>31</sup> Article 2 states that he is the ‘religious head of all the Muslims’, the ‘direct head of all the *ulama*’ the ‘highest authority in the fields of *waqf* and *fatwas*’ and ‘the representative of the Muslims towards the general authorities’. Articles 8 and 9 deal with the election of the Mufti which—as in 1932—is put in the hands of an electoral council, but this council is no longer composed solely of *ulama*: now added to it are Sunni politicians, top administrators and professionals. In an amendment to Law 18, dated 1967, the electoral college was widened to include several thousand men, with the *ulema* in a clear majority. This, of course, reflects the evolution of the office of Mufti from legal specialist to that of a figurehead of a political community.

### Conclusion

Intellectuals are producers and upholders of social meaning. In most societies and at most times they have tended to be a stable and socially conservative group, more concerned with the transmission of received wisdom than with altering it. By and large, this is also the case with muftis, and it is the case with the Islamic theory of the mufti as it is expressed in the *adab al-mufti* literature.

By definition, a mufti is someone who is consulted and delivers *fatwas*, and this is the main function of many muftis in the world, including state muftis. The institutionalization of the mufti in the Ottoman Empire can only be seen as a further development of the role of the mufti in affirming established social knowledge and meaning. This is well illustrated in the classical description of the *ifta* procedure, whereby people formulated their questions, technicians stripped the question of particulars such as time, place, names and irrelevant details, and reformulated it in the language of legal principle to which the mufti would simply



answer yes or no. If there was any production of new social meaning, it certainly was not at the initiative or by the formulation of the mufti.

In the Ottoman Empire, however, the giving of *fatwas* was not the only function of the Shaykh al-Islam. By the end of Ottoman rule, the Provincial Muftis of Damascus and Beirut acquired most of these other duties and thus came to be seen as local heads of religion, rather than legal technicians. These duties included formalized control over the field of *waqf* and control and supervision of religious institutions such as schools and mosques, including the hiring and firing of personnel. In Damascus, the Muftis had made their careers in the courts, but in Beirut, educational and social activism was already an important part of their backgrounds.

In Syria and Lebanon under the French Mandate, the Provincial Muftis were made Mufti of their respective Republics. This enhanced their position on a national level, but also circumscribed their powers in certain respects. Most importantly, control of *awqaf* was almost immediately taken away from the Mufti and given to a broader group of Muslim dignitaries, with the final decision even lying with the French for a time. Similarly, his *fatwas* no longer had any role in court. On the other hand, the Mufti retained his newly acquired position as the head of the *ulema* and what could now be termed the 'Islamic sector' of society. It was his administrative rather than his scholarly and legal dimension that was to survive. The very few *fatwas* given by the Muftis—according to information by their aides only around fifty per year, about one-tenth of what the Egyptian Mufti issues—is indicative of this change. Within the last couple of decades, none of the incumbents of the office of State Mufti in Syria or Lebanon has been much admired for his scholarly achievements. In this respect, one may speak of an Ottoman unintellectual legacy. Among the Ottoman traditions that lived on was the tradition of the Mufti being a Hanafi (although this was discontinued in Syria from the 1960s) and his reliance on an *amin al-fatwa* for the actual preparation of the *fatwas*.

Finally, the late-Ottoman institution of the Mufti being elected through an electoral council also survives, although it has been frequently modified in both countries, but in different ways. In Syria, as we have seen, the Ottoman electoral process was kept in place until just after independence. Since then it has been modified several times, partly due to the changing ideological positions of the regimes: we have seen the dismissal of State Muftis—and perhaps the tampering with their election—for reasons of political expediency. For this same reason, the dual electoral process whereby the *ulema* only elect three candidates and the final say lies with the political authorities, has been restored. In Lebanon, on the other hand, as early as 1932 the election of the Mufti was left entirely to the *ulama*. However, since 1955, Sunni politicians and technocrats have taken part in the election on an equal footing, in effect forming a majority. The electoral procedure has been changed several times since then—indeed every time there has been an election of a new Mufti—most recently in 1997, but this only reflects a general feature of Lebanese politics. In both countries, recurrent changes in electoral

procedures testify to the continued political importance of the State Mufti office. However, in Syria it is primarily the governments that have an interest in filling the post with loyal persons, while in Lebanon it is very much the infighting in the Sunni community that has driven the politicization.

With the loss of his role in courts and the honour of being religious head with its associated official duties, the Mufti of the Republic has had another potential role to play with the public at large, through the media. In both Syria and Lebanon, a new type of Mufti has come to the fore. But while it can be said that some of the Lebanese Muftis since Muhammad Tawfiq Khalid have tried to play a direct role in politics, the Syrian Muftis have opted for—or been forced to concentrate on—preaching and a greater social activist role as defenders of the *sharia* against the threats of secularization.

But this, in a way, is much closer to another model of the intellectual, one that gained ground in Europe and the Middle East in the early twentieth century, namely to produce ideas that are critical of the social order—or rather certain institutions or directions within it—and to point out alternatives. The intellectual, in this new understanding, speaks from within society, but is at the same time capable of looking at it from the outside and judging what is in its best interests. His skill lies in his ability to discern and analyze what is wrong and argue his case persuasively with the public at large. In their attempts to defend social mores and address personal status and religious issues such as the veiling question, the State Muftis of Syria and Lebanon have been forced to turn away from their primarily administrative roles: instead of issuing *fatwas* to individual persons on individual issues or to public authorities on public issues, they have engaged in public discussion. This means following the rules of public discussion, not just falling back on ‘what the law says’, and trying to influence the public by arguing their case persuasively, implicitly accepting that it is up to individual citizens to make their own decisions. In this sense, the new State Muftis have reluctantly adopted the role of modern conservative intellectual.

### Notes

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- 3 Ibid.
- 4 Repp, *op. cit.*, p. 402.
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- 6 Published in 'Waqā'i' at-Taqwīm' vol. 2907. Hut, op. cit., p. 41; Badr, op. cit., p. 15.
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- 8 Moshe Maoz, 'Changes in the Position and Role of Syrian 'ulama in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century', in Thomas Philip, ed., *The Syrian Land in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1992, pp. 109–22, 118–21.
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- 12 Lina al-Homsī, 'al-Fatwa fi Suriya', unpublished PhD thesis, p. 145. I thank Dr. Al-Homsī for giving me a copy of her work.
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- 15 Ibid., pp. 24–9.
- 16 Annabelle Böttcher, *Syrische Religionspolitik unter Asad*, Freiburg: Arnold Bergstraesser Institut, 1998, pp. 49–56.
- 17 Elizabeth Thompson, *Colonial Citizens*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000, pp. 113–15.
- 18 Lina Al-Homsī, *al-Muftun al-'ammun fi suriya*. Damascus: Dar al-'Asma', 1996, pp. 27–34.
- 19 Böttcher, op. cit., pp. 54–5.
- 20 Homsī, op. cit., pp. 51–120.
- 21 Homsī, op. cit., p. 94.
- 22 I am relying on the lists provided by Hut, op. cit., and by Taha al-Wali, *Bayrut*, Beirut: Dar al-'Ilm ila 'l-malayin, 1993.
- 23 Michael Johnson, *Class and Client in Beirut: The Sunni Muslim Community and the Lebanese State*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, pp. 13–15.
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## The Albanian students of the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*

### Social networks and trends of thought

*Nathalie Clayer*

New Ottoman schools like the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*, the famous School of Administration that opened in 1859, contributed not only to the creation of a new elite in the Ottoman Empire but also to the formation of elites in the new states that were created later, such as Turkey, some Arab countries, and Albania. In the young Albanian state, no less than about thirty graduates of the *Mülkiye* became high-ranking officials, prime ministers, ministers, ambassadors, consuls or governors of provinces between the two world wars.<sup>1</sup> The study of such groups of former students is thus an important issue concerning the Ottoman intellectual heritage, in that a significant proportion of these officials were also intellectuals or were, at least, part of that area's very thin elite stratum during the first half of the twentieth century.

Until the end of the Ottoman period these Albanian *Mülkiye* students were not cut off from the rest of the Ottoman society and its streams of thought, such as Ottomanism, Islamism, nationalism, positivism, etc. On the contrary, in some cases they were even more receptive than others to some of these trends. This is apparent in the case of Albanianism, or Albanian nationalism. In this chapter, I examine the potential impact especially of Albanianism and Ottomanism among this group, and the dilemmas engendered by these ideologies. For this purpose, I stress the importance of both the wider political context and also the narrower social context within which each individual was formed. The reason for this combination of macro- and micro-perspectives is that the development of ideologies is not only related to general sociopolitical developments, but also to the social position of the particular individual.

I therefore start by first discussing the notion of group-belonging among the Albanian students of the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* (and more generally among the whole student body of this school). In my research into the former *Mülkiye* students in post-Ottoman Albania, I have noticed that most of them—at least at some point—had high administrative responsibilities, but that this did not prevent them from having very different, even opposed political preferences. Sociologically and ideologically they were far from forming a unified group or solidarity ('a family'). Second, I show how, at the end of the Ottoman era, these individuals were turning in social and political terms towards two different centres—the Ottoman capital and their native region—and also attaching themselves to two different ideological

movements—Ottomanism and Albanianism. Third, I study the issue of their different positions *vis-à-vis* the state on the one hand, and society on the other. The chapter is supplemented by a prosopographic appendix, which describes the profiles and careers of all the individuals included in this research.

### **A heterogeneous group emerging from a common educational and professional mould**

To study the Albanian *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*<sup>2</sup> graduates is to study a group of high functionaries, sometimes intellectuals, that had the same formation, at least in part a common education, and had created links with students from all parts of the empire, including those from the various Albanian provinces.

It is important to notice that we are here considering not one but two groups, because one can distinguish between two different periods in the history of the *Mülkiye*: before and after 1876, when Abdulhamid II came to power. During the first period the form of recruitment was exactly like that for *kadıs*. This meant that there were no Christians or Jews among the students; among the 148 students who graduated between 1860 and 1876, 9 (or 6 per cent) were natives of Ergiri/Gjirokastër and Libohova (today in southern Albania), areas that produced a large number of *kadıs* at the end of the Ottoman Empire; similarly, Ibradı, a small town (*kasaba*) in the district (*sancak*) of Teke, was also an important recruitment area (8 per cent of the graduates), as it traditionally had been for the *ulema*;<sup>3</sup> only a few students were sons of great bey families; numerous students of this first period had studied in a *medrese*, before entering the *Mülkiye*; and last but not least, very few had knowledge of the French language.

After 1876, however, there were some Christians and Jews among the students; the geographical and social origins of the graduates also became much more varied; students were not especially originated from regions that had produced a lot of *ulema*, like Ergiri and Ibradı; an important part of them were henceforth sons of great bey families; hardly any of them had studied in a *medrese* before entering the *Mülkiye*; and they all had a knowledge of French.

So it is not by chance that in the *Sicill-i Ahval defterleri*,<sup>4</sup> which contains the administrative biographies of the Ottoman officials, there is an express distinction between the ‘*Atik Mekteb-i Mülkiye*’ (or ‘*Kadim Mekteb-i Mülkiye*’), the ‘Old School of Administration’, and the ‘*Mekteb-i Mülkiye-i Şahane*’ of the Hamidian period.

On the following pages, I consider only the second group, the *Mülkiye* students of the Hamidian and Young Turk eras. But even within this period, different sub-periods are discernible. For example, according to Corinne Blake, following Çankaya, a ‘reactionary period’ began at the *Mülkiye* in 1891, resulting in more rigorous control, restriction of the number of students, and stronger emphasis on religious beliefs, etc.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, if we look at the school profiles of the Albanian students before they entered the higher sections of the *Mekteb*, we can see that



Figure 10.1 1888 *Mülkiyeli* graduates

until 1896 almost all of them had received a secondary education in Istanbul, often at the *Mülkiye* itself, in the *idadi kısmı* (secondary section, i.e., preparatory for higher education), while after 1896, 60 per cent of graduates had attended a provincial *idadi* school. In other words, some had spent only three years in the Ottoman capital, and others seven years, acquiring a deeper knowledge of life there. On the other hand, after 1896, those who attended only the superior section of the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* had often been students in the secondary school (*idadi*) in Yanya, the Ioannina of today, in northern Greece. Indeed, it is interesting to note that almost half the Albanian *Mülkiyelis* of the second phase had lived and/or studied in Yanya.<sup>6</sup> There they had the opportunity to have contact with Muslims, in particular Albanians, from different parts of the western fringe of the Balkans, and this sometimes helped them to develop sentiments in common. In his memoirs, Ali Asllani, an Albanian from the region of Avlonya/Vlora who graduated in 1906, wrote:

That is how I was in 1898 when I went to Ioannina in order to study at the secondary school. There, we were together, seven-eight persons from Vlora and Kanina,<sup>7</sup> some arrived earlier, some later, all in the boarding school. But there, we came into contact with people from [all over] the country. Helped also by what we learned, a youthful desire for a kind of patriotic liberty in tune with the time arose in our hearts.<sup>8</sup>

However, regional and social differences were certainly the main differences among the graduates, which implies that they belonged to different networks, as we can see clearly in the case of Ali Asllani, who initially made friends in the boarding school of Ioannina among those from the same micro-region.

Because of the different geographical origins of the students and the various associated cultures and networks, the Albanian graduates indeed formed a heterogeneous group. Among the eighty-one Albanian graduates investigated,<sup>9</sup>



Figure 10.2 1893s Mü lkiyeli graduates in the physics class in 1891

eleven were Gëgs, that is to say northern Albanians,<sup>10</sup> and seventy were Tosks, southern Albanians, or Greek-speaking Muslims from Ioannina. About four out of five southerners could speak (and sometimes even read and write) Greek, while the northerners could not. Indeed, the northerners from Montenegro or Kosovo had a knowledge of Slavic languages. The southerners also included those of the special *Bektashi* religious background, which was rarer among northerners.

Besides peculiar cultural characteristics, the regional origin, more precisely the micro-regional origin, seems to have remained the determinant in solidarity networks at the end of the Ottoman era and beyond. For example, entry into the school (or the opportunity to sit the entrance exam) may have been achieved through personal regional connections. Ali Asllani, a native of a small village near Vlora, was helped in this way by one of the sons of Ismail Kemal bey Vlora and of Molla Cafer Drašovitsa (Mulla Xhafer Drashovica), both from the same region of Vlora.<sup>11</sup> For some of the students, life in Istanbul outside the school was also shaped by regional networks. Şahin Teki Kolonya (Shahin Kolonja), about whom I speak later, rented a room in the Ottoman capital with two Albanians from Leskoviku, the main town south of Kolonya, his native place.<sup>12</sup> Clearly these micro-regional networks continued to operate in the post-school period. For example, it is not a coincidence that, between the two world wars, there was close cooperation between the two Geg graduates from the Debre/Dibra region (today's Debar in Macedonia). Abdurrahman Dibra (graduated in 1907)<sup>13</sup> and Fikri Rusi (graduated in 1911) were supporters of King Zog and members of the same 'Besa' pressure group, so called because of the newspaper it published.<sup>14</sup> Finally, if there were matrimonial alliances among the Albanian *Mülkiyelis*, these were principally because of regional (and social) links. Süleyman Delvina (Sulejman Delvina), of

the 1899 graduation class, married the sister of Cafer Vila (Xhafer Villa), who graduated in 1911. Both were from high-status families of the *vilayet* (governership) of Ioannina. Abidin Nepravishta, who graduated in 1911 and had an uncle who had also been a *Mülkiyeli*, Besim Behcet (Behxhet Asllani), who graduated in 1891, was from a family of *kadıs* and civil servants of Nepravishta, near Gjirokastër. Owing to the marriage of his father, Fazli ef.—a *kaymakam* who had not been a student of the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*—to a woman of the well-known Süleymanbey family of Frashëri, Abidin was related to two other *Mülkiyelis* from southern Albania, the brothers Mehmet Şevket (1891) and Hüseyin Sabri Frashëri (1893).<sup>15</sup>

Social status was generally not affected by attendance at a common school, even if attendance offered some individuals with a modest or a middle class background the possibility of challenging the political power of great families. This lack of social mobility is apparent in the analyses of students' careers in the post-Ottoman era. For example, Corinne Blake has written of the Arab graduates of the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*: 'Students from less prominent families had a difficult time gaining important promotions after graduation...and tended to be less successful than graduates from high status families.'<sup>16</sup> Three groups of Albanian students may be distinguished: the sons of very high status families (like the Vrionis, the Delvinas, the Alizotis of Ergiri/Gjirokastër, or the Villas of Frashëri); the sons of other notable families (smaller beys, *ulema*); and the less important group of sons of non-notable families (such as Mustafa Kruja, son of the administrator of Esad Pasha Toptani's land in the district of Kruja; Yusuf Hamzaraj, son of the superintendent of the Vlora family's estates; or even Bahri Omari, son of a small landowner of Gjirokastër).<sup>17</sup> We note that in the first ten years of Abdulhamid's reign, five of the six graduates were from high ranking families, a clear contrast with the pre-Hamidian era.<sup>18</sup> This is probably a result of the Hamidian policy *vis-à-vis* the important families of the region, after the Albanian League years of 1878–81. Subsequently, however, recruitment was more heterogeneous and included all three social categories.<sup>19</sup>

In spite of the fact that these men came from different geographical, cultural and class backgrounds, thereby comprising a very heterogeneous 'group', they still came to share the same educational and professional mould.

Like every modern educated Ottoman at that time, they all learned French, and consequently had access to a large literature and to a wide spectrum of cultural, political and ideological trends.<sup>20</sup> Mustafa Kruja (1910)<sup>21</sup> is said to have had works from La Rochefoucaud, Montesquieu and La Bruyère<sup>22</sup> in his own library, and Bahri Omari (1911) subscribed to the French newspaper, *Le Temps*.<sup>23</sup> In a novel written during the First World War, Mehdi Frashëri (1897) emphasized knowledge of the French language as one of the major factors behind the development of the novel's main character, the *bey*, born in southern Albania, who meets Ottoman liberal political prisoners on Rhodes. There he learns French in a Jesuit monastery and begins to read books and newspapers in French. His mind opens to new horizons, and he clearly sees the future of Albania in its European



framework.<sup>24</sup> In the foreword to the novel's second edition, Mehdi Frashëri again underscores the impact that knowledge of French could have on the development of nationalist ideas:

After the Crimean War, which ended with the Treaty of Paris in 1856, the French influence began to spread all over the East, and with it also the French language. In order to make a good career anywhere in the Ottoman Empire, the intelligent and ambitious Albanian began to learn French, through which he began to be won over to Albanian Nationalist thinking.<sup>25</sup>

As mentioned before, for the graduates coming from the southern regions, knowledge of the Greek language seems to have been almost as common as knowledge of French, even if some of them could only speak it. Those who could read Greek, however, had a further means to learn about contemporary developments, in particular the growth of Hellenism and to react to it.

In addition to this linguistic knowledge, the students were all sensitised to Ottomanism through their studies within the Ottoman educational system and through their professional careers, which gave them the opportunity to travel throughout the empire. At the same time, all of them were faced by the authoritarianism and clientelism of the Hamidian regime. All had acquired a solid education in administrative matters, and almost all of them were launched on careers as *kaymakam* in the Ottoman provinces,<sup>26</sup> dealing with local affairs. Indeed, before the Young Turk revolution, only two of them became *mutessarif* (head officials of a *sancak*) and none was appointed a *vali* (governor of a *vilayet*).<sup>27</sup> Their appointments depended on their abilities and knowledge, especially their linguistic knowledge, on their connections and sometimes on their political opinions. Their ability to speak Albanian and Greek often enabled them to be appointed in the southern regions of Rumelia or in Western Anatolia. However, at the very beginning of the twentieth century, before the Young Turk revolution, as well as during the years 1909–10, they could be sent to Eastern Anatolia or to the Arab provinces, because of their political, usually constitutionalist and/or nationalist ideas.

### **Between the native region and the Ottoman capital**

Whatever the differences in their different professional careers, for most Albanian *Mülkiye* graduates there were two centres in their lives and on their intellectual horizons: their native region and the Ottoman capital. The former was where they had spent their childhood, where they had first received their education, where generally their family had property and possessions, and often where they got married. The Ottoman capital was where they received a higher education, sometimes even secondary education, and it was the nerve centre of the administrative networks of which they were part. It was the place whence they

received orders, where their transfer from one post to another was decided, and where they probably went between appointments.

What happened at the end of the Ottoman Empire? In fact, we can still discern this double attraction in their attitudes during the progressive breakup of the Ottoman Empire—first in 1912–13, with the outbreak of the Balkan Wars, the proclamation of Albania's independence and the recognition of an Albanian principality by the Great Powers; and second, after the First World War, when the Balkan situation had stabilized, Albania had recovered its sovereignty, and the Ottoman Empire had, by contrast, been severely weakened by the Greek conquest of Anatolia. Of the fifty-nine Albanian *Mülkiyelis* serving in the Ottoman administration in 1912–13, about 60 per cent subsequently continued to do so. More generally, of the 69 Albanian *Mülkiyelis* whose contemporary situation we have knowledge of, approximately 55 per cent stayed in the Ottoman Empire, while the balance left. Later, at the beginning of the 1920s, other Albanian Ottoman officials left the empire and went to Albania. By that time, around 60 per cent of the graduates of the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* whom I have taken into account were in Albania (or in Yugoslavia), roughly the inverse proportion of 1912–13.<sup>28</sup>

If we look at this situation in more detail, we notice that the nineteen persons who left the Ottoman administration during the Balkan Wars to join the newly proclaimed Albanian state had been Ottoman officials for less than ten years, except in the cases of Mehdi Frashëri (1897), who had served fifteen years, and of Besim Behcet Asllani (1891), who had served twenty years.<sup>29</sup> Thus, they were relatively young men, none being more than 32 years old (except Mehdi Frashëri, who was 40, and Besim Behcet, who was 45). When the Balkan Wars broke out, only two of them were *kaymakams* in what became the Albanian state. Others held posts in other Balkan provinces, and some had to leave Anatolia. Ali Asllani for instance, having learned of the proclamation of Albania's independence in December 1912 through the Egyptian Press Agency, took the first available boat to Corfu in order to join the new administration.<sup>30</sup> Four somewhat older Albanian graduates left Ottoman service in the same period, but we do not know whether they subsequently stayed in Turkey or went to Albania. With respect to two others who left their position at that time, we only know that they were again active in Albania in the 1920s.<sup>31</sup>

Six other graduates who had left the Ottoman administration before 1912–13 or had never entered it, also left the Ottoman Empire at the time of the Balkan Wars. Among those who had earlier abandoned their Ottoman positions were two well-known Albanian leaders, about 45 years old: Şahin Kolonya (Shahin Kolonja) and Necip Draga (Nexhip Draga). However, Şahin Kolonya's case is unusual, because after going abroad for the second time since 1910–11, he came back to Istanbul in 1915, very sick, and died there in 1919. As for the Kosovar, Necip Draga, he had left the Ottoman administration as early as 1902. In 1908, like Şahin, he was elected to parliament. After the Balkan Wars, he remained active, not in Albania, but in the Yugoslav territories, which came to include his native country.<sup>32</sup> Three other *Mülkiyelis* who joined the new Albanian principality in 1912–13, had never

been Ottoman officials. They were very young men who had just graduated in 1911, or in 1909 in the case of a Kosovar from Prizren. The two younger ones had then become involved in Albanian affairs. Additionally, Ilyas Vrioni, a member of the well known family of Berat, had never entered the Ottoman administration. After graduation in 1905, he preferred to remain in his native city, where he became mayor in about 1909.<sup>33</sup>

The fourteen people who stayed in the Ottoman Empire after 1920 (after 1923, Turkey) were, for the most part, people from Ioannina, most probably Greek-speaking Muslims whose homeland came to be included in Greece, not Albania. Another, Hilmi Haydar Vaner, was from Podgorica, which remained part of Montenegro, not Albania. The same observation holds true for the few *Mülkiyelis* from Manastir/Bitola or other places in Macedonia, who mainly stayed in Turkey after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Of these fourteen, only three officials were natives of what became the Albanian territories and continued to serve in Turkey. However, we lack information on the family origins of the one official who was born in Ergiri. The Ottoman register specifies that his father had a position in Ergiri at the time of his birth, but we do not know if this was where the family originated. Another Albanian *Mülkiyeli* was from Leskoviku and was relatively old and sick: he retired in 1910 in Istanbul, where he died in 1917. Two young 1911 graduates never entered the Ottoman administration, but remained in Istanbul. One of them was from Prizren, but he succeeded his father in their famous shop in Istanbul.<sup>34</sup> The other was from Gjirokastër. He spent a further three years studying in the School of Law and settled in Istanbul, where he became a lawyer.<sup>35</sup>

Among those who remained in the Ottoman Empire during the years of disorder and left only in the 1920s, one was a member of the famous 'Yüzelliler' ('The hundred and fifty') who were expelled from Turkey: Mahmud Mahir (1888), the son of a *celveti şeyhi* from Berat (in south Albania), had retired in 1915 and became the private tutor of the *şehzades* (princes) during the *Mütareke* (armistice). In 1923, he was financial administrator and secretary to the last Sultan-caliph, Mehmed VI, in San Remo, and followed the Sultan until the end of his life. The others, by contrast, left the Ottoman Empire of their own initiative and joined the Albanian administration. They generally belonged to high status families. Suleyman bey Delvina (1899), from the bey family Delvina, Professor of Ottoman Literature at *Galatasaray Lisesi*, went to Albania in 1920 and became the first prime minister. Even though it could be said that he did not have sufficient knowledge of Albanian society, he was chosen to lead the Albanian government because he was a loyal nationalist, was educated in administrative matters and was politically neutral.<sup>36</sup> Cafer Tevfik bey Vila (1911) belonged to another important bey family and had been secretary in the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Istanbul since 1911. He left the Ottoman capital in 1920–21, probably because his brother-in-law, Suleyman Delvina, had become prime minister. Mehmed Rasim Kalakula (1906), from Ergiri/Gjirokastër, also left the Ottoman Empire when the Greek troops landed in Western Anatolia, where he was *kaymakam*. It is also in that period that Abdurrahman bey Dibra (1907, from Dibra/Debre), who was to play a very

important role in Zogu's Albania, left the Ottoman capital, where he was an inspector in the civil service.<sup>37</sup>

Some other Albanian graduates seem to have been even more hesitant than those who left in the 1920s, such as one former student from Leskoviku (south of Korça, in southeast Albania). In 1913, after the fall of Yanya, where he was undergoing his training, Ibrahim Edhem went to the new Albanian principality, but with the outbreak of the First World War he went back to the Ottoman capital and re-entered the administration, before leaving once again for Albania after the *Mütareke*.<sup>38</sup> One of his 'comrades', Mehmed Azmî Veziri, who was much older and from the well-known family of Janina-Aslanpashali, retired in Istanbul, went to Albania in 1922, but returned to Turkey where he stayed between 1925 and 1937, probably for political reasons, because he was an opponent of Ahmet Zogu,<sup>39</sup> before finally settling in Albania. The last example of oscillation is Nezir Remzi Leskoviku who entered Albanian government service in 1918 and was later appointed consul and chargé d'affaires in Turkey, where he also stayed after the Italian invasion of Albania in 1939,<sup>40</sup> though not as an official.

Finally, there are the thirteen other graduates who continued to serve the Ottoman state after the Balkan Wars. However, we do not know the fate of seven of them after the 1920s, while the other six died before 1920–21.<sup>41</sup>

All these cases show that choices were personal and varied. The sources, however, are too scanty to allow us a proper analysis of the choices, which arose out of various interdependent factors, such as age, family situation, social origin, financial resources, opportunities, personality and also politico-ideological views. It seems that the younger generation were quicker to join the new Albania. In the long run, however, the attraction of the native land over the Ottoman capital seems to have related primarily to socio-economic factors. The social networks (family, friends, patrons, clients), and economic potential (land, and other forms of property) were mainly in the native areas. Where the native land was not included within the borders of Albania and social networks were thus broken and property and belongings were lost, Istanbul became more attractive. This was the case for the Muslims of Ioannina, for Haydar Hilmi Vaner from Podgorica, and, to a certain extent, for Albanians from Leskoviku, whose property was often situated in regions taken over by Greece.<sup>42</sup>

Personal choices were also linked to and/or justified by political and ideological positions. However, these positions were not free from ambiguity and dilemma, as can be more clearly observed in the relationship between Albanianism and Ottomanism.

### **Albanianism and Ottomanism: two sides of the same coin**

Ottoman authorities considered cultural Albanianism and Albanian nationalism a threat to the unity and integrity of the empire. This judgement is also often found in the historiography. However, much more than constituting a danger in its own

right, Albanianism was, like Ottomanism, the result of the threat of the breakdown of the empire.

Initially, Albanianism was a romantic construction, a reproduction of and a reaction to other nation-building processes in Europe and the Balkans. It began as a reaction to Hellenism. Subsequently, five main impulses gave it a political dimension. First, there was the Eastern crisis of 1878–85, during which the first manifestations of an Albanian nationalism were manifested on the international scene, in reaction to the threat of territorial loss.

Ten years later came the crisis of 1895–97, which resulted in the Greco-Turkish War. This war was won by the Ottomans, but the victory was not complete. It now became increasingly clear that the Ottoman Empire was incapable of asserting itself, and that the days of its presence in Europe were numbered. The elaboration of a political manifesto by Sami Frashëri, published in 1899, as well as the multiplication of Albanian newspapers after 1897, was a consequence of this new situation.<sup>43</sup>

The third link in this chain of crises was the Macedonian crisis of 1903–5, which led to the creation of a European Commission of Control, followed by the establishment of an Albanian secret committee and the formation of guerrilla bands. The confrontation with the Young Turks after the 1908 revolution—especially over the question of the Albanian alphabet—and the fact that the Ottoman Empire ceased to exist in Europe after 1912–13, also led to an increase of Albanian nationalism.

Especially from 1897 onwards, the crucial question underlying the development of Albanian nationalism was whether the Albanians—here meaning the Albanian Muslims—would become *muhacir* (refugees) when the empire collapsed and have to leave their homeland and take refuge in Anatolia. How could such a development be avoided?<sup>44</sup> At the same time, Albanian intellectuals and administrators were mostly convinced of the lack of internal organisation in the Albanian territories. Around 1905, Mahmud Mahir, *kaymakam* in the Arab provinces, was asked by Ekrem Vlora, one of his ‘compatriots’, about the future of Albania. Not without a sense of humour, he answered that it was written in the history of its people:

Two thousand years ago, their ancestors, the Illyrians and Epirotes and their cousins the Macedonians and Thracians were the masters of half of the world. They were several millions. It took them two thousands years to devour each other, and at the present time there remain only one and a half million sick men. To exterminate themselves, they will need only twenty years of independence.<sup>45</sup>

There was clearly a dilemma. A new distinctive Albanian identity had to be created in order to legitimate a continued presence in the Balkans if the empire collapsed. However, until such time the maintenance of Ottoman domination was the best way to stay and live decently in the Balkans. In this way, Albanianism and

Ottomanism were two responses to the same need to resist pressure exerted by Balkan countries and the Great Powers. Understandably, the relationship between both ideologies was also very complex, since there were different forms of Albanianism and Ottomanism, and thus different forms of combination between these two trends.

Among the younger generation of Albanian *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* students—as well as the secularly educated Albanians in general—cultural Albanianism, linked with the idea of the existence of an Albanian nation, had become widely accepted in the last decades of Ottoman domination. Some of these Albanians were also persuaded that for the Albanian nation to become civilized it was necessary to enlighten the common people by teaching them reading and writing skills in their mother tongue. In practical terms, the younger generation *mülkiyelis* were often among the readers of Albanian newspapers and books and sometimes also distributed them and collaborated in their production.

For example, in 1893, Shahin Kolonja (1891), who began his career as a professor at the *idadi* school in Edirne, brought Albanian books to two young jailed Albanian *hocas* who had used the fasting month of *Ramadan* to make Young Turk propaganda.<sup>46</sup> After the crisis of 1897, the same man wrote a memorandum in which he asked the Ottoman authorities for permission to publish a newspaper in Albanian. The demand was, however, rejected. In 1899, he asked the Austro-Hungarian consul in Bitola to help him publish such a newspaper. Because he was under surveillance by the authorities but still was determined to attain his goal, he went to Europe in 1901. Finally he settled in Sofia, where he began to edit the famous *Drita*, the most important Albanian newspaper before the Young Turk revolution. Shevket bey Frashëri was of the same school promotion year. He too began his career as professor and vice-director of an *idadi* school, this time in Manastir/Bitola, and is said to have made patriotic propaganda among the Albanian students. For that reason, after only one year, he was transferred to the *idadi* school in Üsküp/Skopje. When he began his career as *kaymakam* in Luma (a region southwest of Prizren) between 1898 and 1900, he was, according to the Austro-Hungarian vice-consul in Prizren, one of the two real Albanian nationalists active in the district.<sup>47</sup> It was he who gave an Albanian Catholic teacher a book in the Albanian language that had been published in Sofia.<sup>48</sup> Later, when he was in Prilep, it was said that he was a member of the Albanian Secret Committee.<sup>49</sup> His brother, Hüseyin Sabri (1893), was also referred to as an Albanian ‘patriot’ by the Austro-Hungarian consular authorities around 1900.<sup>50</sup> From the same promotion year (1893), Mehdi bey Zavalani was said in an Austrian report to have played an important role in the ‘national awakening’ in the Dibra region, when he was *kaymakam* of Reka. In 1902, he visited the Austrian consul in Bitola to ask for a grant to open schools in that region.<sup>51</sup> When he was still at *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*, Mehdi Frashëri (1897), a younger *Mülkiyeli*, was corresponding with Faik Konica in Brussels and helped distribute his journal, *Albania*, in the Ottoman capital.<sup>52</sup> In 1901, he, together with a small group of Albanians, had been charged with installing a small press in a house cellar in Istanbul in order to print texts in



Figure 10.3 Shahin Kolonja's newspaper *Drita* (The Light).

Albanian.<sup>53</sup> Five years later, while *kaymakam* in Ohrid, he became member of the Albanian Secret Committee.<sup>54</sup> After the Young Turk revolution, Mustafa Kruja (1910) initiated the teaching of the Albanian language at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*,<sup>55</sup> and in 1909–10, Ilyas bey Vrioni (1905) was president of the Albanian club in his native town of Berat.<sup>56</sup>

These initiatives in the cultural field were also linked to various political standpoints. For some, Albanianism was connected with liberalism, decentralisation (even autonomy), and above all anti-absolutism. In Shahin Kolonja's newspaper, for example, there was constant and strong criticism of the Hamidian regime and of Sultan Abdulhamid as a person, a criticism that grew stronger with the repressive measures taken against Albanianism and other nationalist/separatist ideologies in European Turkey. In particular, the sultan was denied the title of caliph. Beyond this criticism, there was no explicit demand for a constitution. However, although he had claimed sovereignty (*şahlık*) for Albania in his newspaper, Shahin Kolonja was to be elected member of the new Ottoman parliament in 1908, before going into exile again in 1910–11. Mustafa Kruja (1910) also linked his Albanianism to anti-absolutism, but seems to have clearly worked with other non-Albanian Ottoman subjects for restoring the constitution within the framework of the *Cemiyet-i inkilâbiye*, founded in the Ottoman capital in 1904.<sup>57</sup>

For others, Albanianism was associated with Islamism and regionalism, as in the case of the Geg, Abdurrahman Dibra (1907). Immediately after the Young



Turk revolution, he had not completed his training period in Manastir/Bitola. With other Albanians from the Dibra/Debar district (including the mufti, Vehbi Dibra, future head of the Muslim community in the Albanian state), he tried to prevent the opening of an Albanian club, both because he and his friends had not been invited to the preliminary meetings, but also because they opposed the club regulations prescribing equality between Muslims and Christians. Abdurrahman Dibra and his faction insisted instead on the Muslim character of the club. During the opening ceremony of the Albanian club, Abdurrahman Dibra went so far as to announce the formation of a club for only the Dibrans of the city.<sup>58</sup>

Albanianism was also often expressly linked to Ottomanism, as witness the example of Mehdi Frashëri, later prime minister of Albania in 1935–36. On the one hand, he was a fervent Albanianist, as we have seen. In 1905, when he was *kaymakam* in Ohrid, he was denounced as a Young Turk, Albanian patriot and reader of Albanian newspapers.<sup>59</sup> On the other hand, he was the author of a book in which he stood up for the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire as against excessive extraterritorial rights for foreigners. The book was published when he was *mutessarif* in Samsun in 1909–10, before he was appointed to Jerusalem.<sup>60</sup>

Ottomanism could also be understood in different ways. For Mahmud Mahir, who was later among the expatriate ‘Hundred and fifty’ (*Yüzelliler*), Ottomanism was probably synonymous with loyalty to the sultan. For others, it meant a kind of citizenship, and for yet others it was perceived as the only possible way to escape to the annexation of Albanian territories by neighbouring Balkan countries.

Rather than being incompatible, Albanianism and Ottomanism were two sides of the same coin. However, by the beginning of the twentieth century Ottomanism began to be more and more problematic for some Albanianists. The reason was not only the character of the Hamidian regime, but also the increasingly anti-Turkish character of Albanianism, even among Albanian Muslims. One illustrative example is Shahin Kolonja’s newspaper, which had an important influence among Albanian readers. In this publication, the Albanian identity was constructed as a reaction to a Turkish identity, through the opposition of ‘European’ and Asiatic’. In this new construction, Albanians were represented as European and civilised, or wishing to be civilised. By contrast, Turks were represented as Asiatic and barbarian. In January 1907, a leader of an Albanian guerrilla group (*çete*), Çerçiz Topulli, wrote in the columns of this newspaper:

We say that we Albanians have no link to, nor any unity with the *Halldupet* [i.e., the Turks, in a very negative sense]; yes, on the contrary, you have to know that the *Halldupet* have been the leaders of the wildest *dyshmans* [*düşman* in Turkish, i.e., enemies] and enemies of our nation (*komb*) and of our progress. The reality is that we do not have to shed a single drop of blood for the Turks anymore, because they are Tartars, Mongols arriving from Asia, and, we, we are European, and one of the most perfect branches of the Caucasian races (*fare*).<sup>61</sup>






Figure 10.4 Excerpt from a biography of Rauf Fico in a Foreign Office Document

As noted earlier, the central alternatives available to the Albanian Muslims in the event that the Ottoman Empire in Europe collapsed was either to become European Muslim Albanians and be allowed the right to stay in the Balkans, or to become a *muhacir* (refugee) and have to emigrate to Asia.

### Administrators and intellectuals in the service of the state

The analysis thus far has focused on two issues: the Albanian *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* graduates' relationships with the two geographical centres, Istanbul and their native home towns, and to two different trends of thought, Ottomanism and Albanianism. Their various positions depended largely upon the evolution of the political context and upon their own social and economic situation. In order, however, to better understand these positions we must now ask a further question, namely, what kind of relationship did they respectively have to state and to society as administrators and sometimes as intellectuals as well?

The Albanian *Mülkiyelis* were above all civil servants who served the Ottoman state. There were, however, some exceptions. Shahin Kolonja, who abandoned his professional duties and fought for his ideas, was one of them. Another was Necip Draga from Mitrovica in Kosovo, who left the administration in 1902. As Ilyas Vrioni, who never enrolled as an official after school, he was from a wealthy family and preferred to manage his patrimony. Perhaps he refrained from serving

the state for political reasons as well, being an active member of the Young Turk Committee for the *vilayet* of Kosovo.<sup>62</sup> There is also the case of the young graduates who, according to Çankaya, never became officials after school. This was in 1911, however, during a very tense period.

Nearly all those who went to Albania entered the new administration. However, a few of them went into exile after Ahmed Zogu seized power, namely Mustafa Kruja, Bahri Omari, Sulejman Delvina, and Mehmed Azmi Veziri. The first two, however, came back to Albania in 1939 when the country was occupied by Italy and again played a role in the state administration. During the Italian occupation, as far as I know, only two *Mülkiyes*— Mehdi Frashëri and Rauf Fico—were sent into exile in Italy because they opposed the annexation.

In independent Albania, some *Mülkiyelis* even distinguished themselves as builders of the new administration. Rauf Fico and Xhafer bey Villa set up the organisation of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the Interior. Mehdi Frashëri led the codification of the Albanian law and generally worked for the improvement of administration in the 1920s. In 1928, Pertev Pogoni conceived the new education law.<sup>63</sup>

During the first decade of independence, when the country built up its basic institutions, Rauf Fico was considered by intellectuals of the younger generation to be the archetype of what they called the '*memuro-efendiler*', that is, former Ottoman officials of modest origin. For Halim Xhelo, a young communist, the '*memuro-efendiler*' were people who, following the Ottoman tradition, had made a professional career at the expense of the poor population and were easy tools for the beys, because money was their only goal.<sup>64</sup> The British observer, Sir Robert Hedgson, however, described Rauf Fico as a man of unquestioned honesty and patriotism, intelligent and competent, thanks to his Turkish training.<sup>65</sup>

The fact that the *Mülkiyelis* generally were loyal officials did not mean that some of them were not critical of the functioning of the Ottoman state. This was especially the case during the Hamidian period, when some of them were close to or even members of the Young Turk Committee. There were also those, like Shahin Kolonja, who were opposed both to the Hamidian regime and to the Young Turk movement. They developed this critical attitude as students at the *Mülkiye*, where, just as in other advanced schools of the Ottoman capital, reformist winds were blowing: or later, as *kaymakams* in different provinces, where they could observe the disease sapping the empire. In the Albanian state the situation was somewhat different. There, because the *Mülkiyelis* were part of a very small elite, they had better opportunities to play a central role in the competition for political power. However, in this competition it was the *Mülkiyelis* of great bey families who really held the advantage. Persons like Mustafa Kruja were not in the same privileged position as, for example, Ilyas Vrioni.

Their ideal was generally that of a strong state. Convinced that the population had to be given firm direction, most of them tolerated, even supported the introduction of monarchy, even though they had republican ideals. According to Hedgson, Rauf Fico was 'republican by conviction, but satisfied that Albania

needed a monarchy and therefore loyal to King Zog'.<sup>66</sup> Mustafa Kruja, although an opponent of King Zog, thought the same thing. In periods of crisis, as at the beginning of the twentieth century or at the end of the 1930s, some of them were even in favour of letting Albania become a foreign protectorate.

*Vis-à-vis* the wider society, the *Mülkiyelis* were rather elitist. They regarded the people as mostly illiterate and backward. Those who were from landowning families were rather conservative with regard to the social and economic reforms to be undertaken in the country. Those *Mülkiyelis* who were also active intellectuals, wanted to enlighten the population, using the press as their main tool. Like Shahin Kolonja before the Young Turk revolution, Mustafa Kruja, Bahri Omari, Abdurrahman Dibra and Fikri Rusi were, at different times, editors of or columnists in newspapers. Mehdi Frashëri, for his part, wrote literary and historical pieces with an educative character.<sup>67</sup>

If one were to classify the Albanian *Mülkiyelis* according to the three main trends that existed among the intellectuals in Albania in the 1930s—the 'Elders', the 'Neo-Albanians', and the 'Young'—they belonged either to the 'Elders' or to the 'Neo-Albanians' group (*neo-shqiptar*). Examples of the former are Abdurrahman Dibra and Fikri Rusi, who, to a certain extent, wanted to perpetuate the old Ottoman order around King Zog, and of the latter were Mehdi Frashëri and Mustafa Kruja, who favoured a transition from the East to the West, but also highlighted Albanian values. Thus they were all less radical than the 'Young', who represented the younger generation and had studied in the West, not in the Ottoman Empire. In short, the Albanian graduates of the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*, in varying degrees and in different ways, but mainly according to their respective social and economic positions, continued to travel a route between their older Ottoman horizons and their Albanian-European ideals.

## Notes

- 1 Among them was Enver Hoxha's brother-in-law, Bahri Omari (see the Appendix).
- 2 In fact, it is difficult to determine who is 'Albanian' and who is not. The records give us the place of birth, sometimes the family name, and the languages known by the Ottoman officials. I tried to combine these three elements, which of course are not sufficient to show what these people were, and more particularly how they identified themselves. Especially during the second period of the *Mülkiye*, we shall see that some of the graduates I considered were not Albanians, or did not feel Albanian, especially the Greek-speaking Muslims of Ioannina. But it is precisely in this manner that the frontier between Albanians and non-Albanians had been built by the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries.
- 3 Cf. Ali Çankaya, *Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler*, vol. III, Ankara: SBF, 1968–9, p. 20 ss. On the formation of *kadıs*, and in particular on the network of the *kadıs* from Gjirokastër and Libohova, see my, 'Les cadis de l'après Tanzimat: l'exemple des cadis originaires d'Ergiri et Libohova', *Turcica*, no. 32, 2000, pp. 33–58.

- 4 These registers are kept in the Başbakanlık Arşivi of Istanbul.
- 5 Corinne Blake, *Training Arab-Ottoman Bureaucrats: Syrian Graduates of the Mülkiye Mektebi, 1890–1920*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991, p. 116ff.
- 6 I think that, contrary to the frequent assertion made in the Albanian literature that the Muslim Albanians in Ioannina at the end of the Ottoman era studied at the Greek gymnasium Zosimea (like their elders, Ismail Kemal Vlora, or the brothers Frashëri), in fact they frequented the Turkish *idadi* school built precisely to counter Greek influence. For example, one of the future *Mülkiyeli*, Ali Asllani, was reciting verses in Turkish in summer on his way back to his native region (see, Bardosh Gaçe, *Ali Asllani në kujtimet dhe studimet letrare*, Tirana: Naim Frashëri, 1997, p. 5), which is testimony to his Ottoman education. On Ioannina at the end of the Ottoman period and its schools, see Johann Strauss, ‘Das Vilayet Janina 1881–1912—Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in einer “geretteten Provinz”’, in *Türkische Wirtschafts—und Sozialgeschichte von 1071 bis 1920* (Hans Georg Majer und Raoul Motika Hgb.), Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1995, pp. 296–313.
- 7 Kanina is a small place situated just above Vlora.
- 8 Bardhosh Gaçe, op. cit., pp. 4–5.
- 9 In this article, as the principal source indicates, I consider only the graduates, but there were also students who did not finish school for personal or sometimes for political reasons. Rauf Leskoviku and Nüzhet bey Vrioni were two of them. Rauf Leskoviku (Leskovikli Mehmet Rauf) was sent into exile in Salonica in 1895 because of his *İttihad ve Terakki* membership, while Nüzhet bey Vrioni was exiled to Anatolia along with his father in 1901 for Albanian nationalist activities (see Ali Birinci, *Tarihin Gölgesinde Meşâhir-i Meçhûleden Birkaç Zât*, Istanbul: Dergâh Yay., 2001, p. 165 and Ekrem bey Vlora, *Lebenserinnerungen*, I, München: Oldenbourg, 1968, p. 145, n. 64 (where the date is incorrect); on this issue, see Haus-, Hof—und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, PA XXXVIII/443, Viceconsul Petroviç, Valona, 9/7/1901).
- 10 One of them, Haydar Hilmi Vaner, may have been a Slavic-speaking Muslim from Montenegro who knew Albanian and had studied in his childhood in Shkodra. But in 1909, the Austro-Hungarian consul in Mitrovica, where Haydar Hilmi was *kaymakam*, wrote about him that, according to prevailing opportunity, he was acting as a Young Turk or as an Albanian (see HHStA, PA XIV/15, Liasse XI/6, Mitrovica, Zambaur, 20/2/1909).
- 11 See Bardosh Gaçe, op. cit., 1997, p. 6.
- 12 See Leskovikli Mehmet Rauf, *İttihat ve Terakki ne idi?*, Istanbul: Arba Yay, 1991 pp. 17–18.
- 13 In the following text the years in parenthesis after names refer to the year of graduation.
- 14 See the Appendix.
- 15 See the Appendix.
- 16 Cf. Corinne Blake, op. cit., p. 137, n. 81.
- 17 The frontier between these categories is not always very clear, especially in the case of the two last ones, because some bey families tended to become impoverished and to lose their status, while non-notable families tended to grow rich and to acquire the status of notables.
- 18 All five were from the *vilayet* of Ioannina.

- 19 As to regional origin, recruitment also began to be more varied.
- 20 On the knowledge of French as a marker of modern education, see Carter Vaughn Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989.
- 21 1910 is the year that Mustafa Kruja graduated from the *Mekteb-iMülkiye*.
- 22 Ernest Koliqi, 'Shatëdhjetëvjetori i lindjes së Mustafa Krujës', *Shëjzat/Le Pleiadi*, 1957, I/2–3, pp. 70–6 (cf. p. 75).
- 23 Oral information from the sons of Bahri Omari, Luan and Fatos Omari, for whose help I am deeply grateful.
- 24 See *Shëjzat*, XVII, 1973/5–8, p. 207. The novel is entitled *Nevruzi* and was published in 1923 in Tirana.
- 25 *Ibid.*, p. 182.
- 26 In a few cases, Albanian graduates had careers in the Ottoman capital. One such example was Sulejman Delvina (see the Appendix).
- 27 The two *Mülkiyelis* in question were: Ali Nevzad Alizoti (of the well-known high-status family of Gjirokastër) who was appointed *mutessarif* of Hınıs in the *vilayet* of Erzurum in Eastern Anatolia in June 1906, and Mehmed Fevzi from Yanya, who seemed to have been his predecessor for a short time in Hınıs, before being transferred in 1907 to another post in Eastern Anatolia (see the Appendix). I do not mean that no Albanian was appointed *vali* during the Hamidian period or that there were only a few Albanian *mutessarif*. On the contrary, they were numerous, but this group was formed in other ways and its members were promoted often as a result of their privileged links with the sultan. After the Young Turk revolution a wave of promotions took place, and about twelve of the Albanian *Mülkiyelis* were appointed *mutessarif* different places. After 1913, three more were appointed to such positions (see the Appendix).
- 28 The case of people from Dibra/Debar, which was conquered by the Serbs, is peculiar. Many of them fled to Turkey, others to Tirana. Of those who emigrated to Istanbul, a certain number later settled in Albania, especially in Tirana, where the Dibrans came to form an important proportion of the population of the new Albanian capital in the years after 1920.
- 29 According to his grandson Uran Asllani, to whom I am very grateful, Besim Behcet had been summoned by Ismail Kemal Bey Vlora.
- 30 B.Gaçe, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
- 31 For more data about these persons, see the Appendix, where the different groups are distinguished.
- 32 About these two figures, see below.
- 33 Some of the Albanian *Mülkiyelis* who joined the new Albanian principality left it during the First World War and the occupation of the country by foreign armies. They often went into exile in Italy and Switzerland, etc.
- 34 His father was the famous *Vefa bozacısı*, that is to say seller of *boza* (a beverage made with fermented millet meal) in the Vefa quarter of Istanbul.
- 35 See the Appendix.
- 36 See Sejfi Vllamasi, *Ballafaqime politike në Shqipëri 1897–1942 (Kujtime dhe vlerësime historike)*, Tirana: Marin Barleti, 1995, p. 135; and Ekrem bey Vlora, *op. cit.*, t. II, 1973, p. 131.
- 37 According to Çankaya, he first went back to Yugoslavia, in which the city of Dibra had been included, was elected deputy of Manastir/Bitola, and later went to

Albania. But the data given by his son (for whose kind welcome I am very grateful), as well as the biographical information provided by Taylor do not confirm this (see the Appendix).

- 38 According to Çankaya, some writers argue that he was among the 'yüzelliler', but there is no evidence to support this.
- 39 Other opponents of Zogu went into exile in Western countries (Italy, France, Austria, Romania) and not in Turkey. Among them were several *Mülkiyelis* such as Bahri Omari and Mustafa Kruja. In the case of Azmi Veziri, he had relatives in Istanbul. We know that his brother Subhi bey died in the Turkish metropolis in 1942, and that his sister was the wife of the famous Ebuziya Tevfik (see Ekrem bey Vlora, op. cit., t. II, p. 265).
- 40 The double attraction is further highlighted by the two daughters of Nezir Leskoviku, one of whom lived in Turkey, the other in Albania.
- 41 See the Appendix.
- 42 For example, Leskovikli Mehmet Rauf's father had his *çiftlik* in the district of Karaferye/Veria (see Leskovikli Mehmet Rauf, op. cit., p. 102).
- 43 The manifesto was entitled *Shqipëria: Ç'ka qënë, ç'është e ç'do të bëhetë?* (Albania. What it has been, what it is and what it will be?), with the subtitle: 'Thoughts for the Salvation of the Fatherland from the Dangers that are Surrounding it'. It was published anonymously in Bucharest in 1899. On the flourishing of Albanian newspapers after 1896–7, see my 'Du réseau d'albanistes aux réseaux de lecteurs: La première phase du développement de la presse albanaise (1860–1896)', in Anja Pistor Hatam (ed.), *Amtsblatt, vilayet gazetesi und unabhängiges Journal. Die Anfänge der Presse im Nahen Osten*, Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2001, pp. 81–96.
- 44 In the first issue of his newspaper, Shahm Kolonja (1897) wrote:

When Miss Turkey is driven out and expelled from these countries, as she has been driven out of other areas too, then the Albanians will also be dragged towards Anatolia by a chain which has taken the name of Islam, without being afraid of God and without shame before the Prophet Peygamber, and they will change the name Albanian' into 'Muhacir'!

He adds:

For those who don't want to read and write Albanian and who like the language of the *halldup* [negative name for the Turks], they had better go quickly to Sivas and Ankara in order to buy land, because later on it will be more expensive.

(see *Drita*, Sofia, I/1, pp. 1–2)

- 45 Ekrem bey Vlora, op. cit., t.I, p. 124. E.b. Vlora describes Mahmud Mahir as an educated man, but a man who looked like a 'Turk-Arab' in his manner, on account of his having left his native country since he was about fourteen years old (*ibid.*, p. 123).

- 46 Cf. *Drita*, Sofia, no.33, 21 November 1903, p. 1.  
 47 HHStA, PA XIV/18, Liasse XII/2, Prizren, Rappaport, 17/3/1898 et 22/9/1898.  
 48 HHStA, PA XXXVIII/398, Prizren, Rappaport, 3/1 1/1898.  
 49 HHStA, PA XIV/14, Liasse XI/2, Monastir, Prochaska, 21/4/1906.  
 50 HHStA, PA XIV/7, Liasse V/1, Monastir, Kral, 10/12/1900, p. 23b.  
 51 HHStA, PA XXXVIII/391, Monastir, Kral, 13/3/1902.  
 52 In his 'Mémoire sur le mouvement national albanais', written for the Austro-Hungarian authorities, Faik Konica asserts:

Il y avait en 1897 à Constantinople un étudiant intelligent, Mehdi bey, qui fit beaucoup de propagande pour la revue et en devint dépositaire. C'est ainsi qu'il allait voir Ismaïl bey Vlora et d'autres dignitaires de l'Empire qui se trouvent à Constantinople, et leur parla en faveur de cette propagande naissante. Il distribuait aussi des numéros a ceux qui prenaient les paquebots pour aller en Albanie.

(HHStA, PA XIV/18, Liasse XII/2, pp. 45–6)

- 53 HHStA, PA XXXVIII/391, Monastir, Kral, 2/7/1901.  
 54 HHStA, PA XIV/14, Liasse XI/2, Monastir, Prochaska, 21/4/1906.  
 55 See *Leka* (Shkodër), Vj. XII, Nr I (Numer i veçantë), 1942, pp. 18–19.  
 56 HHStA, PA XXXVIII/444, Valona, Kraus, 7/8/1909. About the patriotism of his father, Jusuf Vrioni (the famous translator of Ismail Kadare's works into French), wrote in his memoirs that, just after the arrival of his new wife in Berat, he asked her to play the Albanian hymn, and that he gave money to a group of Albanian guerrillas (see Jusuf Vrioni, *Mondes effacés: Souvenirs d'un européen*, Paris: J.C.Lattès, 1998, pp. 31–2).  
 57 While still a student at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*, Mustafa Kruja (1910) became a member of the *Cemiyet-i İnkılâbiye*, a revolutionary group of young Ottomans fighting for the re-establishment of the constitutional regime (see Tarik Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler*, Istanbul: Doğan Kardeş Yayınları 1952, pp. 149–50).  
 58 HHStA, PA XIV/15, Liasse XI/6, Monastir, Tahy, 15/9/1908.  
 59 HHStA, PA XXXVIII/394, Monastir, Prochaska, 23/8/1905.  
 60 R.Schwanke, 'Frashëri, Mehdi', in *Biographisches Lexikon zur Geschichte Südosteuropas* Mathias Bernath und Felix v.Schroeder hg., t. I, 1974, pp. 537–8. The exact title of the book is: *İmtiyazatı ecnebiyenin tatbikat-ı Haziresi*, Samsun, 1325. Until now, I have had no chance to look at this book. Mehdi Frashëri is also said to have published a book in Turkish entitled *The Philosophy of the Young Turk Revolution* in 1911, just one year before leaving the Ottoman Empire to join the new Albanian state (cf. Taylor, *Who's Who in Central and East Europe, 1933–34*, Zurich, 1935, p. 352). I am unfamiliar with this book.  
 61 *Drita*, no.87, 20 January 1907, p. 2.  
 62 See Çankaya, op. cit., t. 3, p. 512.  
 63 See Sejfi Vllamasi, op. cit., p. 237, and M.Schmidt-Neke, *Entstehung und Ausbau der Königsdiktatur in Albanien (1912–1939)*, München: Oldenbourg, 1987, pp. 152 and 336.  
 64 Schmidt-Neke, op. cit., p. 284.

- 65 The source of this data is a document produced by the Foreign Office, a copy of which was given to me without precise reference by the son of Rauf Fico, Bardhyl Fico, for whose kind welcome I am deeply grateful.
- 66 Ibid.
- 67 See the Appendix.





# Appendix

Nathalie Clayer

This prosopographic appendix contains the biographies of the graduates considered in [Chapter 10](#), classified according to their attitudes towards the Ottoman administration in the period 1912–20. Within each category, biographies are presented chronologically, based on the year of graduation (in brackets).

## Main sources (with abbreviations)

**Çankaya:** Ali Çankaya, *Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler*, t. 3 and 4, Ankara: SBF, 1968–71.

**Fischer:** Bernd Jürgen Fischer, *King Zog and the Struggle for Stability in Albania*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1984.

**SA:** *Sicill-i Ahval, Başbakanlık Arşivi*, Istanbul.

**Schmidt-Neke:** Michael Schmidt-Neke, *Entstehung und Ausbau der Königsdiktatur in Albanien (1912–39)*, Munich: Oldenbourg, 1987.

**Selenica:** Teki Selenica, *Shqipëria më 1927*, Tiranë, 1928.

**Taylor:** Taylor, *Who's Who in Central and East Europe*, 1933–4 Edition, Zurich: The Central European Times, 1935; 2nd edition, 1937.

**Vllamasi:** Sejfi Vllamasi, *Ballafaqime politike në Shqipëri 1897–1942 (Kujtime dhe vlerësime historike)*, Tirana: Marin Barleti, 1995.

**Vlora:** Ekrem bey Vlora, *Lebenserinnerungen*, 2 vols, Munich: Oldenbourg, 1968–73.

## Albanian Mülkiyelis who died before 1912–13

**Hüseyin Bedri (1890):** son of Fraşarlı Mehmed Pasha, born in Frashër in 1871. After studying at the local *rüştiye*, he went on to the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* in Istanbul. He made a career as a teacher and director of *idadi* schools in Ankara, Bursa, Kayseri, and Beirut. He died in 1899, while he was director and teacher at the *idadi* school of Üsküp/Skopje (Çankaya, B/332).

**Ahmed Midhat Salih (1901):** son of the *kaymakam* Salih Lutfi bey, he was born in Delvina, where his father was an official (so he may not have been of Albanian origin). After a period of administrative training in Salonica, he served as a *kaymakam* until 1911. He is said to have committed suicide (Çankaya, B/763).

**Ahmed Reşad (1901):** son of Hayri bey, president of the municipality of Yanya/Ioannina. He was born in that town in 1877 and studied at the local *idadi* school and then in Istanbul in the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. He underwent his administrative training in Ioannina, and made a career as a *kaymakam* in Lezhë (northern Albania) and Metzovo (Pindus), where he was assassinated in 1909 (Çankaya, B/749).

**Albanian *Mülkiyelis* who left the Ottoman administration  
before the Balkan Wars, but about whom we have no  
further information**

**Ali Nevzad [Ali Nevzad Alizoti] (1888):** son of Naim bey Alizoti, who was the *kapıcıbaşı* of the sultan's palace, the *vali* of Ioannina and a notable of Ergiri/Gjirokastër. Ali Nevzad was born in Ergiri/Gjirokastër in 1858. He studied at a *rüştiye* and later in Istanbul at the *Galatasaray lisesi* and at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. From 1889 onwards, after a period of administrative training in Salonica, he served as a *kaymakam* in different places in Anatolia. In 1906, he was appointed *mutessarif* Hınıs. We do not have any information about his subsequent life (Çankaya, B/122; SA 25/147).

**Mehmed Tahsin (1888):** son of Veysel efendi. He was born in Ergiri/Gjirokastër in 1864 and studied at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye (idadi and ali kısmı)*. He knew Turkish, Albanian, Greek and French and was first Professor of History at Edirne. He received his administrative training in the same city. After 1895 he was appointed *kaymakam* in Eastern Anatolia and later in the *vilayet* of Edirne. His last known appointment was in 1898. We do not know what became of him thereafter (Çankaya, B/170).

**Abdullah Ekmel (1889):** born in Berat in 1867. He studied at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye (idadi and ali kısmı)*. After a period of administrative training in Eastern Anatolia, he held different *kaymakam* posts. It is possible that he died before the Balkan Wars (Çankaya, B/239).

**Abdülhamit (1890):** son of Hafız Suleyman ef., he was born in Kalkandelen/Tetovo in 1863. He studied at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye (idadi and ali kısmı)* and was appointed to various ministries and administrations in Istanbul. His last known appointment was in 1902 (Çankaya B/297, SA 60/427).

**Ibrahim Sirri Leskoviku (1890):** son of Salih Zeki bey, he was born in Leskovik in 1863. He studied at the local *rüştiye* and later in Istanbul at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* (secondary and superior sections). He knew Turkish, Albanian, Greek and French. For a while he taught history at the *idadi* in Salonica, where he had his administrative training. From 1895 onwards, he was a *kaymakam* in several places in the *vilayet* of Salonica. After the Young Turk Revolution he was appointed to Prizren. In 1909, he became *mutessarif* first in Drama and then in Balıkesir. The same year, he was elected deputy for Yanya. We do not know what became of him thereafter. It is possible that he was active in Albania in the 1920s. Indeed,

according to Selenica, a certain Siri Leskoviku was the prefect of Shkodra in 1927 (Çankaya, B/454; SA 42/449; Selenica, p. XXXV).

**Mehmed Fevzi (1891):** born in Yanya/Ioannina or in its district in 1869. He studied at the *Yanya rüştiyesi* and then in Istanbul at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* (in the secondary and superior sections). He began his career in Beirut, where he taught History and Geography at the *idadi* school, and where he obtained his training for his administrative career. In 1897–9, he was a *kaymakam* in the Arab provinces. From 1899 to 1906, he was transferred to different places in the *vilayet* of Salonica and on the island of Imroz. In May 1906 he was promoted and became *mutessarif* in Eastern Anatolia. The following year, he was transferred to another post in Eastern Anatolia, this being his last appointment mentioned by Çankaya (Çankaya, B/396).

**Fehim Memduh [Koka] (1894):** son of Rapush Aga, brother of **Ali Riza Koka (1894)**. He was born in Progonat (Kurvelesh) in 1869 and studied at the *rüştiye* of Ioannina, then in Istanbul at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* (in the secondary and superior sections). His administrative training was in Rodos, the centre of the Archipelago's *vilayet*. There, he also taught at the *idadi* school. In 1897, he was appointed *kaymakam* in Goseneka, but we do not know what became of him thereafter (Çankaya, B/528).

**Hasan Hüsni (1894):** son of the landowner Kasım efendi, he was born in 1867 in the region of Görice/Korça, in the village of Kishince (Dishnica?). He studied at a local *rüştiye* and later in Istanbul at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* (in the secondary and superior sections). He began his career in 1895 in Istanbul. Two years later he commenced his administrative training in Bitola for the post of *kaymakam*. In 1898, he was appointed *kaymakam* of Lezhë (northern Albania). One year later, he seems to have left the Ottoman administration (Çankaya, B/493; SA 92/107).

**Albanian Mülkiyelis who had never entered or who had left  
the Ottoman administration before the Balkan Wars and  
lived outside Turkey thereafter**

**Şahin Teki [Shahin Kolonja] (1891):** son of Kahraman bey, a notable from the Bektashi family Ypi of the village of Starja in the Kolonya/Kolonja district (south of Korça), and descendant of Süleyman Paşa, *mutessarif* of Plevlje. He was born in 1865 (or 1867) in Starja and studied at the *rüştiye* school of Görice/Korça and at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* (secondary and superior sections). He could speak, read and write in Turkish, Greek and Albanian (he had learned Albanian from his teacher Petro Nini Luarasi when he was a youth in his native region). He also had some familiarity with Arabic, Persian and French. During his studies in the Ottoman capital, he was introduced by Ibrahim Temo to the Committee of Union and Progress. He also met the brothers Frashëri (Sami and Naim). In 1892, after completing his studies, he was appointed Assistant Director of the Agricultural School in Salonica, and later taught at the school. In 1893 he was transferred to the *idadi* school of Edirne, where he was an assistant teacher with responsibilities for



Figure 11.1 Shahin Kolonja

teaching Turkish, physics and mathematics. In 1896 he was appointed director of the *idadi* school in Gümülcine/Komotini and taught history and geography as well as Turkish. At that time, he distributed Albanian books published in Romania to his ‘compatriots’. In 1897, he addressed a demand to the Ottoman authorities in Istanbul to publish an Albanian newspaper, but this was rejected. In January 1898, because he had attained the required age, he began a career as *kaymakam* in Kozani (*vilayet* of Manastir). At that time, he spoke of his publication project to the Austrian consul in Manastir. In March 1900, he was transferred to Mont Athos/Ayonoros, but was dismissed soon because of a letter he received from Ismail Kemal bey Vlora asking him to come to ‘Europe’ to join him in publishing a newspaper. During a stay in Istanbul, he translated Sami Frashëri’s 1899 political manifesto, *Albania: What It Has Been, What It Is and What It Will Be*, into Turkish. In November 1900, he was appointed *kaymakam* of Vlora, but fled abroad. In Brussels, he disagreed with Ismail Kemal and Faik Konica, and settled in Sofia, where between 1901 and 1908 he published an Albanian newspaper entitled *Drita* (‘The Light’) with the help of Kristo Luarasi and the financial support of Austro-Hungary. This was the most widely read Albanian organ of this period and was resolutely opposed to the sultan’s despotism and to the Young Turks. After the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 he returned to the Ottoman Empire and was elected Ottoman deputy for Görice/Korça. In November 1908, he took part to the Albanian Congress for the Alphabet. In December 1908, he became a member of the Ahrar’ Party, founded by Ismail Kemal bey Vlora, and in 1910 he joined the Democrat Party founded by Ibrahim Temo and Abdullah Cevdet. However, about 1910–11, he again went abroad because of his hostility towards the Young Turk Committee. In 1913, he spent some months in Vlora. In 1915, by which time he was very ill (he was an alcoholic), he settled in Istanbul with his family (he had married the daughter of Naim Frashëri). From this time until his death in 1919, he



Figure 11.2 Nexhip Draga

did not participate actively in politics (Çankaya B/345; SA 78/103; Kaleshi, 'Kolonja, Shahin', *Biographisches Lexikon zur Geschichte Südosteuropas*, München, Oldenbourg, 1974–81, s.v. ; Leskovikli Mehmed Rauf, *İttihat ve terraki ne idi*, Istanbul, 1911; Piro Tako, *Shahin Kolonja*, Tirana, 8 Nëntori, 1984).

**Mehmed Necip [Nexhip Draga] (1893):** son of the notable Ali Pasha Draga from Mitrovica, who owned lands in the Sandjak of Novi Pazar. Mehmed Necip was born in Mitrovica in 1867. He studied at the local *rüştiye* before going to Istanbul, where he studied at an *idadi* school and at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. He could speak, read and write Turkish, French and Serbian, and spoke 'Boshnak' and Bulgarian as well. He undertook his administrative training in Üsküp/Skopje where he also taught at the local *idadi* school. From 1896 onwards he was appointed *kaymakam* at different places not far from his native region: in Kratovo, Köprülü/Veles and Yenipazar/Novi Pazar. However, in the spring of 1902, he resigned. In Üsküp, where he was living and attending his own business (in particular, he owned a sawmill near Mitrovica), he was one of the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress. In 1908, he used the Albanian Assembly in Ferizović to support the Constitutionalist movement. After the Young Turk Revolution, he was elected deputy for Uskup. He played an important role in the Albanian uprising of 1912 and gave nationalist form to it. During the Balkan Wars, he was interned in Belgrade. He was released in 1914 and went back to Mitrovica. After the integration of Kosova into the kingdom of Yugoslavia, he founded, with Kenan Ziya from Manastir/Bitola, a political organisation called *Cemiyet* to defend the rights of Muslims from 'South Serbia'. In 1920, he was elected member of the




Figure 11.3 Iljaz Vrioni

Yugoslav Parliament with seven other representatives of the *Cemiyet*. He died some months later in Vienna, where he had undergone an operation for cancer (Çankaya, B/420; SA 76/295; H.Kaleshi, 'Draga, Nexhip', *Biographisches Lexikon zur Geschichte Südosteuropas*, München, Oldenbourg, 1974–81, s.v.; Villamasi, see the index; Nathalie Clayer, 'Le Kosovo: Berceau du nationalisme albanais au XIXe siècle?', *Les Annales de l'Autre Islam*, no.7, INALCO-ERISM, Paris, 2000, pp. 145–67).

**Ilyas Vryon [Iljaz Vrioni] (1905):** son of the notable Mehmet Ali Pasha of the well-known Vrioni family (beys and landowners from Berat), and cousin of **Hüseyn Vrioni (1904):** born in Berat in 1883 and studied at the local *rüştiye*, at the *idadi* school of Ioannina and then at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. He never entered the Ottoman administration. He returned to Berat, where, after the Young Turk Revolution, he was mayor and president of the Albanian club. In 1912, he took part in the Assembly of Vlora. He was chosen as a senator. During the First World War, he lived with his family in Corfu. In 1920, he was present at the Albanian national congress in Lushnja. He was twice Prime Minister of the newly created state: from November 1920 to October 1921, and in 1924. Between 1921 and 1924, he was a Member of Parliament. Between 1927 and 1929, he was Minister of Foreign Affairs and of Justice, and/or ambassador in Paris and Rome. He died in 1932, sapped by alcohol. By his wife from the well-known Dino family (from Preveza) he had three children, among them Yusuf Vrioni, the translator of Ismail Kadare into French (Çankaya, B/53; Schmidt-Neke, p. 355 ad index; Pietro Kuaroni, *Valixhja diplomatike*, Tirana, Albinform, 1993, pp. 137–45 (translation from Italian); Jusuf Vrioni, *Mondes effacés: Souvenirs d'un européen*, Paris: JC Latès, 1998).



Figure 11.4 Bahri Omari

**Hamid (1909):** son of Şerbetçi Musa Çavuş from Prizren, born in 1886. He studied at the local *rüştiye*, in the *Mercan idadisi* in Istanbul and then at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. It seems that he went back to his native town and he never entered the Ottoman administration (Çankaya, B/1121).

**Bahri [Bahri Omari] (1911):** son of Ilyas Hilmi, a small landowner in Ergiri/Gjirokastër, he was born in 1888. He studied at the local *rüştiye* school, at the *idadi* of Ioannina, and then at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* in Istanbul. It seems that he did not enter the Ottoman administration. In 1913 (or 1914) he was appointed by the new Albanian administration as sub-prefect of Himara. At the beginning of the First World War he fought against the Greeks. In 1914 he went to the USA, where in 1916 he became director of the famous Albanian newspaper *Dielli* ('The Sun'), organ of the Vatra Federation. In 1919, he returned to Albania. In 1921 he was elected deputy of Gjirokastër and was opposed to the party of Myfid bey Libohova, the main bey of the region. In 1923 he was re-elected to the parliament. In 1924, during the short-lived government of Noli, he was General Secretary of the National Democrat Party and editor of its organ *Shekulli* ('The Century'). After Noli's fall, he went into exile to Italy. Like **Sulejman Delvina (1899)**, he was a member of the *Bashkimi Kombëtar* (National Union) organisation in Bari. After Albania's annexation by Italy in 1939 he went back to Tirana. There, he was appointed member of the council of state. He was a member of the nationalist National Front Party (*Balli Kombëtar*). During the German occupation he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs (February-May 1944). For that, he was condemned and executed in April 1945 by the new Communist authorities under the leadership of his own brother-in-law, Enver Hoxha (his wife was Enver Hoxha's sister) (Çankaya, B/1297; Schmidt-Neke, p. 347 and index; Selenica, p. XXI; information given by his sons, Luan and Fatos Omari).



**Hüseyn Vehbi Ohri (1911):** son of Osman ef., who was a notable from Ohrid, he was born in 1890 in that city. He studied at the local *rüştiye*, at the *idadi* of Ioannina and at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. He never entered the Ottoman administration. Indeed, he is said to have joined the new Albanian administration after 1912 (Çankaya, B/1339).

**Albanian *Mülkiyelis* who left the Ottoman administration  
in 1912–13 and went to Albania**

**Besim Behcet [Behxhet Nepravishta] (1891):** son of the *kadı* Arslan efendi, he was born in the region of Pravishta (probably in the village of Nepravishta), in the district of Gjirokastër, in 1867. He undertook his secondary and superior studies in the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. Because he was too young to be an administrator, he was initially appointed as a teacher and/or director of *idadi* schools in Salonica, Ioannina and Hama. In 1898, he became *kaymakam* in Yemen, a position he also filled successively in Tirana (where he was arrested because of a conflict with the local beys of the Toptani family), in Alasonya and in Western Anatolia. In September 1910 he was transferred to Istanbul, and in 1911 he became an inspector of the civil service. This was his last position with the Ottoman administration. Indeed, in 1913, summoned by Ismail Kemal bey Vlora, he went to Albania with his three brothers. Between 1914 and 1915 he was prefect for the new Albanian administration in Berat and Durrës. During the Italian occupation of south Albania, he went to Bari along with his family. He went to the USA in order to collect funds from the Albanian diaspora in America for the Albanian refugees from the Greek zone. He died at the beginning of 1916, after his plane crashed en route from Shkodra to Sarajevo (Çankaya, B/360; Uran Asllani, *Studentët shqiptarë të Austrisë dhe veprimtaria e tyre*, Tiranë, 2000, p. 144; information given to me by Uran Asllani; Taylor, p. 54).

**Mehdi Frashëri (1897):** son of Ragip bey of Frashëri, *kaymakam* in Metzovo (killed by the Greeks in 1879). He was born in February 1872 or in 1874. He studied in Ioannina at a private school, then in the *idadi* of Manastir/Bitola before entering the higher section of the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. He could speak, read and write Turkish, French and Greek, spoke Albanian and could read Bulgarian. In Istanbul, he helped disseminate (even among high-ranking officials of Albanian origin) the Albanian journal *Albania*, published by Faik Konica in Brussels. He undertook his administrative training in Rodos, the centre of the *vilayet* of the Archipelago, where he also taught history, mathematics, algebra and sciences at the local *medrese*. Between 1901 and 1903, he was *kaymakam* in Peqin (central Albania). Until October 1906, he was active in Ohrid (Macedonia). There he was denounced by a group of local Muslims as a Young Turk and an Albanian nationalist. In Ohrid, he also had contact with the Balkan Committee of London through people such as H.N.Brailsford. Between October 1906 and the Young Turk Revolution he was *kaymakam* in different *kazas* in Thrace (Dardere, Çorlu,



Figure 11.5 Mehdi Frashëri

Lüleburgaz). The Young Turk authorities made him *mutessarif*. He was appointed successively to Seniçe (Sandjak of Novi Pazar), to Seres and to Samsun, in Anatolia. There he published a book on the Capitulations in the Ottoman Empire (*İmtiyazatı ecnebiyenin tatbikat-ı Haziresi*, Samsun, 1325). In 1912, he was transferred to Jerusalem but resigned because of Albania's declaration of independence. He first went to Egypt and moved on from there in April 1913 to Albania. He was appointed prefect of Berat in the new Albanian administration. During the First World War he was in Switzerland and in Italy, in particular in San Demetrio Corone (an Italo-Albanian locality), where in 1916 he wrote a novel in Albanian entitled *Nevruzi*. In 1918, he became Minister of the Interior for two years in the government formed in Durrës by the Italians. He also became Minister of Foreign Affairs and was Albania's delegate to the Versailles Peace Conference. In 1921, he was elected deputy for Elbasan and was a member of the Progressive Party in parliament. Before the Second World War he played an important administrative, political and intellectual role in his country. He was Albania's representative at the League of Nations and in other commissions. He taught economy at the law school in Tirana from 1927. He directed the codification of Albanian law and had been law counsellor in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He served as minister on several occasions (Minister of Civil Engineering and Agriculture in 1921, Economics Minister in 1930–31). In 1929, he became Member and President of the Council of State and was Prime Minister and Minister of Justice in 1935–36, when Ahmed Zogu agreed to experiment with liberalisation. He wrote several political, historical and literary texts and is said to have written a book in Turkish on the philosophy of the Young Turk Revolution. In Albanian he wrote pamphlets on Greek culture in Albania (1924), on Epirus, on

the choice of Tirana as capital of Albania, on agriculture in Albania. He also translated from the French the work of Vasa Pasha ('The Truth about Albania and the Albanian', first published in 1878). In addition, he wrote an historical essay on the League of Prizren (1927) and the first volume of a History of Albania (*Ancient History of Albania and the Albanians*, 1928, 2000). As well as his novel *Nevruzi*, he wrote a tragedy. In 1939, he openly expressed his opposition to the Italian invasion and was subsequently imprisoned in Rome. In 1943, he again served as a member of the Council of State. With the arrival of the Communists in 1944, he fled abroad and died in Rome in 1963 (Çankaya, B/594; SA 96/271; Schmidt-Neke, p. 335–6 and index; R.Schwanke, 'Frashëri, Mehdi', *Biographisches Lexikon zur Geschichte Südosteuropas*, München, Oldenbourg, 1974–81, s.v.; Selenica, p. XXXII; Fischer, p. 244–6 and 283; Taylor, 1st ed., p. 280–1 and 2nd ed., p. 351–2; Ernest Koliqi, 'Mehdi Frashëri si shkrimtar', *Shêjzat*, XVII, 1973/5–8, p. 167–217).

**Abdurrauf [Rauf Fico] (1903):** son of Tahmas Remzi ef., from Gjirokastër, *kadi* of Shkodra. He was born in 1881 in Gjirokastër (or in Sana, where his father was *kadi*). He studied at the *rüştiye* school in Shkodra and at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* (secondary and superior sections). He received his administrative training in Ioannina, after which he was appointed *kaymakam* in Konica (*vilayet* of Ioannina in 1906), but because of his origins and of his relations (and maybe because of his Young Turk sentiments), he had to be transferred to another *vilayet*. Consequently he was appointed to Eastern Anatolia, to the *vilayet* of Sivas (Gümüşhacıköy, and Kangal). After the Young Turk Revolution, he again had the opportunity to serve as *kaymakam* in the province of Ioannina, in Himara, and later in Margiliç/Margariti. In the autumn of 1910, he was sent back to Eastern Anatolia, in Yabanabad, before taking up his last post in the Ottoman administration in Kırçova/Kičevo, in the *vilayet* of Manastir. At the end of 1912, he joined the Albanian government formed by Ismail Kemal Vlora, as counsellor in the Ministry of the Interior. Under the government of Prince von Wied, he was prefect of Berat. In 1916, during the Austrian occupation, he was appointed sub-prefect of Tirana. From 1920 to 1923, he was counsellor in, then General Secretary of, the Ministry of the Interior. In December 1921 he even served as Minister of the Interior during the short-lived government of I. Kosturi. From 1922, he also served as the prefect of Shkodra. Between 1923 and 1928, he was deputy for Durrës. After the return of Ahmed Zogu, to whom he was close, he began a diplomatic career as ambassador to Turkey (1926–7), to Bulgaria, and to Yugoslavia (1928). In April 1929, he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, a post he held simultaneously with that of Minister of the Interior after March 1930. Because he did not enjoy the confidence of the Italians, he was dismissed in November 1930 and returned to the diplomatic service. He was ambassador to Yugoslavia (1933–6), to Greece (1937) and to Germany (1938–9). In 1939 he returned to Albania, but was interned in Italy. He died in Tirana in 1944. Rauf Fico was considered a competent and intelligent administrator by foreign observers, but for young Albanian intellectuals he was the archetypal old-fashioned Ottoman official (Çankaya, B/849; SA 112/483; Selenica,

p. XXI and XXX; Schmidt-Neke, p. 334–5 and index; Taylor, 2nd ed., p. 332–3; Foreign Office document provided to me by Bardhyl Fico, Rauf Fico's son).

**Mehmed Necip (1904):** son of Yusuf aga, known as Şaban Beşe, a landowner from Ipek/Peć/Peja, in Kosova. He was born in Ipek in 1883 and studied at the local *rüştiye*, at the *idadi* school of Üsküp/Skopje, and in Istanbul at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. He spoke Albanian (his mother tongue), Turkish, French and several Slavic languages. After a period of administrative training in Üsküp, centre of the *vilayet* of Kosova, he was appointed *kaymakam* in various places in Macedonia and Kosova (Radovišta, Kumanovo, Köprülü/Veles, Nevrokop, Mitrovica) until the Balkan Wars, when he left the Ottoman administration. According to Çankaya, he entered the new Albanian service, and was sub-prefect and prefect in different places until his death in 1934 (Çankaya, B/903).

**Hüseyin Vryon [Husejn Vrioni] (1904):** son of Aziz Paşa Vrioni, important notable of Berat and a member of the local administrative council, and cousin of **Ilyas Vrioni (1905):** born in Berat in 1882 he studied at local *rüştiye* and *idadi* schools, and then in the Ottoman capital at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. He could speak, read and write Albanian, Turkish, Greek and French. He began to work in Istanbul in the office of the Grand Vizier. After the Young Turk Revolution, he was appointed *kaymakam* in Tirana, in Luros (*vilayet* of Ioannina) and, in September 1912, in Ioannina. When the Balkan Wars broke out, he left the Ottoman administration and took service with the new Albanian principality. He was sub-prefect and later prefect in various places. In 1920, he was elected senator and minister without portfolio in the government of **Sulejman Delvina (1899)**. Between 1921 and 1923 and after 1925, he was a deputy. He also served in several governments. In 1921–22, he was minister of justice, and from 1925–27 and 1931–33 he served as Minister of Foreign Affairs. He also occupied the post of vice-president of the Albanian parliament. He died in Tirana in 1938 (Çankaya, B/892; SA 156/161; Selenica, p. XXI and p. XXVIII-XXIX; Schmidt-Neke, p. 354–5; Fischer, p. 106).

**Ahmed Vefik (1905):** son of Musa Kazim bey, notable of Leskovik and chief secretary in the finance office of the Ioannina *vilayet*. He was born in Leskovik in 1882 and studied at the local *rüştiye*, at the *idadi* school of Ioannina and at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. He knew Albanian (his mother tongue), Turkish, French and Greek. His administrative training took place in Ioannina. In 1909, he was appointed *kaymakam* in the *vilayet* of Kosova (district of Osmaniye). Then he was transferred to Eastern Anatolia and later to Western Anatolia. According to Çankaya, he entered the Albanian administration in 1913 and died in 1934, when he was prefect of Kavaja (Çankaya B/930; SA 156/377).

**Ali Sabri (1905):** son of Selman ef., a notable of the *kaza* of Kolonya/Kolonja, he was born in the village of Kaltan/Kaltanji in that district in 1880. He studied at the *rüştiye* school of Beyazit in Istanbul, at the *idadi* of Bursa, and at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. He knew Albanian (his mother tongue), Turkish, Serbian and some French and received his administrative training partly in Manastir/Bitola and partly in Beirut, where he also held the post of vice-director of the technical school. Just

after the Young Turk Revolution, he was appointed *kaymakam* in Pekin (central Albania), but in the spring of 1910 he was transferred to the *vilayet* of Konya in Anatolia, and two months later to the *vilayet* of Salonica. After the Balkan Wars, he left the Ottoman administration to join the new Albanian administration. According to Çankaya, he occupied different posts of sub-prefect and prefect in Albania and was killed in 1943 by the Communists (Çankaya, B/930).

**Mehmed Naki Muharrem [probably Neki Ruli] (1905):** son of Muharrem Sidki efendi, who was *kadı* of the *sancak* of Berat. He was born in Libohova in 1881 and studied at the *rüştiye* of Berat, and in Istanbul at the *Vefa idadisi* and in the superior section of the *Mülkiye*. He knew Albanian (his mother tongue), Turkish, Greek and some French. He underwent his administrative training in Berat. From December 1909 to the First Balkan War he was successively *kaymakam* in Kavaja, Lesh and Tepelen, in the Albanian provinces. After that war he left the Ottoman administration to join the new Albanian administration. If he was indeed also known as Neki Ruli, he was elected senator in 1920 (Çankaya, B/940; Schmidt-Neke, p. 322).

**Yusuf [Jusuf Hamzaraj] (1905):** son of Abbas Aga from Kanina, near Vlora, superintendent of the Vlora household. He was born in 1883 and studied at the *rüştiye* school of Vlora and at the *idadi* school of Ioannina before entering the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. He knew Albanian (his mother tongue) and Turkish. After three years of administrative training in Bursa after September 1908, he was appointed *kaymakam* in Inegöl (Western Anatolia), and from January 1910 until the Balkan Wars he held this position in the Western Balkans: in Koniçe/Konica, Rekalar (*vilayet* of Manastir) and Pogon (*vilayet* of Yanya). At the beginning of the Balkan Wars, he left his post and in 1912–13 joined the newly created Albanian principality. In 1914, he was a member of the Albanian delegation to Prince von Wied (Çankaya, B/965; Vlora, t. II, p. 52).

**Abdülkerim Sabit [Sabit Lulo] (1906):** son of the *kadı* Hacıbeyzade Ali Hifzi efendi, he was born in Ergiri/Gjirokastër in 1883. He studied at the local *rüştiye* and in Istanbul at the *Mercan idadisi* and at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. He knew Albanian, Turkish, Greek and some French and undertook his administrative training in the administration of the *sancak* of Ergiri. From 1909, he served as a *kaymakam* in different localities: Tepelen, Çermik and Rize in Eastern Anatolia. However, in June 1913, he left his post because he favoured Albanian insurrection and fled to the new Albanian principality, where he is supposed to have entered the new administration. According to a local newspaper, in 1928, he was a simple official in the registry office in Gjirokastër (Çankaya, B/972; *Demokratia* (Gjirokastër), no.174, 29/9/1928).

**Ali Asllani (1906):** son of the mufti and *müderriis* Aslan efendi b. Süleyman from a village of the region of Vlora. He was born in Vlora in 1884 and was orphaned at a very young age. With the help of his father's friends and parents, he studied at the *rüştiye* school in Vlora. He also went with some Christian friends to the Greek school in order to learn the Greek alphabet. In 1898, he began to study in Ioannina



Figure 11.6 Ali Asllani

at the *idadi* school. During this period he began to compose poems in Turkish and Persian. In 1902 he went to the Ottoman capital to study medicine, but he abandoned this field after a year and, with the help of Ismail Kemal Vlora's son and of Mulla Xhafer Drashovica, he passed the entrance examination of the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. After school, he underwent his administrative training in Ioannina. There he was a member of the Albanian Club. Because of that and his connection with Ismail Kemal, he was transferred to Halepo, but he went to Corfu. From there he took part in the Congress of Dibra in July 1909 as the representative of Vlora. Later, he was obliged to go to the Ottoman capital. After the return of Ismail Kemal and through the intervention of **Shahin Kolonja (1891)**, he was able to re-enter the administration. He was appointed *kaymakam* in Eastern Anatolia, since he was not allowed to perform his duties in the European provinces. At the end of 1912, when he learned that Albania's independence had been proclaimed in Vlora, he left his position and went to Albania. There he was appointed general secretary of the presidency and of the ministers' council, a post he held until January 1914. He was also responsible for the organisation of the police. In February 1914, he was appointed sub-prefect in Fier. When riots broke out in central Albania, he fled to Italy. He returned at the end of 1915 to Vlora, where he was appointed general secretary of the local administration, a position he occupied until January 1917. Thereafter he went to Italy, where he met some Italo-Albanians. Between December 1918 and November 1920, he was head of the municipality of Vlora. At that time, he was appointed counsellor to the prime minister. In January 1922, he became general secretary to the prime minister, but two months later, he began his

wished-for diplomatic career as consul in Trieste. In 1925, for political reasons, he was transferred to Sofia as vice-chargé d'affaires, first secretary and finally ambassador. In 1930, he was appointed ambassador to Athens, but two years later he was recalled to Tirana. Between 1934 and 1939, he was president of the municipality of Vlora. After Albania's annexation by Italy, he was appointed a member of the Council of State, but he left political life after a few months and returned to his native region. After the Second World War he worked as translator of historical documents in the Academy of Sciences and was the founder of the Writers' League. He died in 1966. He was the author of numerous poems, initially in Turkish and Persian, but after 1913–14 in Albanian (Çankaya, B/1001; SA 164/499; Bardhosh Gaçe, *Ali Asllani në kujtimet dhe studimet letrare*, Tiranë, Naim Frashëri, 1997).

**Hayreddin [Hajredin Fratar] (1906):** son of Ragib efendi, from the Vezonan (?) family of Malakastra, he was born in the village of Fratar (district of Gjirokastër) in 1880. He studied at the *rüştiye* in Berat, then at the *idadi* of Yanya and at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* in Istanbul. He could speak, read and write Turkish and French, and was familiar with Albanian and Greek. He undertook his administrative training in Ioannina and in Berat. In 1909, he was appointed *kaymakam* in Starova. In September 1910, he was transferred to Western Anatolia. He was dismissed in September 1913 because he left his post without permission in order to join the new Albanian principality. In Albania, he entered the new administration. However, as a nationalist, he was killed in 1915 by Albanian Muslim rebels (Çankaya, B/1005; SA 165/341; Vllamasi, p. 71; Vlora, t. II, p. 72, who wrongly calls him Mehmed).

**Ibrahim Perteve [Perteve Pogoni] (1908):** son of Hoca-zade Mehmed Avni ef., chief-*kadi* in Salonica, he was born in the district of Gjirokastër in 1888. He studied at the *rüştiye* of Ergiri, at the *idadi* of Manastir and at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* in Istanbul. He could speak, read and write Turkish, French and Albanian, and knew Greek. He underwent his administrative training in Salonica and Istanbul between 1908 and 1910. According to Uran Asllani, he studied at the Pedagogical Institute in France until 1912. From 1927 onwards, he was General Secretary of the Ministry of Public Education in Albania (he elaborated the 1928 law on the organisation of the education). In 1939, he was in charge of education in the new government formed after Albania's annexation by fascist Italy and he was a member of the Council of State (Çankaya, B/1127; SA 189/245; Selenica, p. LXI; Schmidt-Neke, p. 152 and 277; information given by Uran Asllani).

**Mustafa Asim [Mustafa (Merlika) Kruja] (1910):** son of Mehmed ef., administrator of the lands of the great landowner Esad Paşa Toptani. He was born in 1887 in Kruja (northern Albania) to a Bektashi family. Despite his modest background he was given the opportunity to study, thanks to Esad Paşa. According to E.Koliqi and Bashkim Merlika he studied at the local *rüştiye*, at the school in Ioannina and at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. According to Çankaya he studied at the *rüştiye* school of Elbasan and at the *Mercan idadisi* in Istanbul, before entering the




Figure 11.7 Mustafa Kruja

*Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. He knew Albanian (his mother tongue), Turkish and French. In the Ottoman capital, he took part in the leading council of the ‘Cemiyet-i inkılabiye’ against the despotism of Abdülhamid and in support of the constitution. After the Young Turk Revolution, he worked in support of the teaching of the Albanian language at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* and wrote articles in the liberal press against the Committee of Union and Progress using the signature ‘Asim Cenani’. Contrary to the wishes of his protector, who wanted him to be a *kaymakam*, he chose a career in education. In 1910, he was appointed the secretary of the administration of the *idadi* schools in the Ministry of Public Education in Istanbul. A year later he was appointed Director of Public Education for the *sancak* of Elbasan (and possibly teacher at the *idadi* of Durrës). He was active in the Albanian uprising of 1912, and as representative of Kruja, in Vlora he signed the declaration of independence. He was also a member of the senate formed at that time. Later he was appointed counsellor for public instruction in the new administration under Prince von Wied. During the First World War he was in Italy. From this time on he worked on a voluminous dictionary of the Albanian language. He also contributed to various periodicals: to the page in Albanian in the newspaper *Il Corriere delle Puglie* (around 1914); to the Albanian newspaper published in Rome in 1918 under the title *Kuvendi* (‘The Assembly’); to the newspaper *Mbrojtja kombëtare* (‘The National Defence’) published in Vlora between 1920 and 1923; and subsequently to numerous other political and cultural periodicals. Simultaneously, he continued in his political career. In 1918 he was present at the Albanian congress of Durrës. He was appointed Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in the new pro-Italian government. He himself favoured an Italian protectorate. In the 1920s, as a deputy, he belonged to the progressive trend opposed to Zogu and close to the Kosovars. For that reason, he was obliged to flee abroad for an extended period. In 1922, he fled to Yugoslavia after an attempted coup with the north-eastern Albanians. He participated in the so-called ‘Revolution



of June 1924' and was appointed prefect in Shkodra. After Fan Noli's fall, he again went into exile. In Zadar and Switzerland, he was a member of the National Revolutionary Committee (KONARE). He returned to Albania in 1939, after the Italian annexation. He became senator and president of the Italo-Albanian Institute of Albanian Studies. In 1941, he was appointed Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior. He resigned in 1943 and lived the rest of his life in exile in Austria, Italy, Egypt and the United States. He died there in December 1958. In exile, he co-founded with Ernest Koliqi the Independent National Front organisation. He continued with his intellectual studies of and essays about the Albanians, their language and their ancient history, some of which he published in periodicals or as books. Other studies remained unpublished but several of these are now being published in Albania by his descendants (Çankaya, B/1144; Selenica, p. XVII; P.Bartl, 'Kruja, Mustafa', *Biographisches Lexikon zur Geschichte Südosteuropas*, München, Oldenbourg, 1974–81, s.v.; Karl Gurakuqi, 'Testamenti i Mustafa Krujës', *Shêjzat*, 111/11612, November-December 1959, pp. 381–2; Ernest Koliqi, 'Mustafa Kruja si njeri kulture', *Shêjzat*, XVI, 1972/9–12, pp. 299–345; Mustafa Kruja, *Anthologji historike*, Tirana, Sejko, Elbasan, 2001; T.Z. Tunaya, *Siyasi partiler*, p. 149; *Leka* (Shkodra), Numer i Veçantë, 1942, see the index; Schmidt-Neke, pp. 342–3).

**Ihsan Murad (1911):** son of Mehmed Murad bey, a notable from Ohrid and *kaymakam*. He was born in Ohrid in 1886 and studied at the local *rüştiye* school, at the *Mercan idadisi* of Istanbul and at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. He had begun his administrative training in Ioannina before leaving for Albania because of the Balkan Wars. Later he was an under-prefect, a position he held at the time he was killed (Çankaya, B/1355).

**Zeynelabidin [Abidin Nepravishta] (1911):** son of the *kaymakam* Fazli ef., he was born in 1887 (or in September 1889) in the district of Ergiri/Gjirokastër, in the village of Nepravishta. He studied at the *rüştiye* school of Ergiri and then in Istanbul at the *Mercan idadisi* and at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. He began his administrative training in Manastir/Bitola (or Yanya/Ioannina) in 1911, but, because of the outbreak of the First Balkan War, he fled to Albania. In 1912–13, he was prefect of Berat. Between 1914 and 1921, he was a lawyer. Then, he recommenced his administrative career: in 1921, he was prefect of Tirana; in 1922 of Elbasan and Shkodra; in 1923 of Durrës; and in 1924 of Shkodra. In 1926, he was appointed Director of the Albanian National Bank and prefect of Durrës. In 1929–30, he founded and directed the 'S.A. Anonyme de Construction Publique' in Durrës. In 1930, he became prefect of Korça. In 1932–3 he was transferred to Vlora, before being appointed for several years as mayor of Tirana, the Albanian capital (Çankaya, B/1357; Selenica, p. 222; Taylor, 1937, p. 777).

**Ahmed Şevket [Shevqet Çelo] (1911):** son of Tevfik bey, one of the notables of Leskovik. He was born in Leskovik in 1889 and studied at the local *rüştiye* school, then at the *idadi* of Ioannina, and then at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* in Istanbul. In 1911, he began his administrative training in Manastir/Bitola, but in 1912 he left for Albania. We do not know what he did afterwards, except that in 1929 he was

inspector of town councils for the region of Gjirokastër (Çankaya, B/1181; *Demokratia*, no. 209, p. 4).

**Fikri Zihni [Fikri Rusi] (1911):** son of Talib bey and grandson of Selim bey, one of the most influential notables of Debre/Dibra. He was born in Dibra in 1888 and studied at the local *rüştiye* school, then at the *idadi* of Ioannina (or in Salonica), before entering the superior section of the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. He underwent his administrative training partly in Manastir/Bitola and partly in Adana. In 1914 he left the Ottoman administration and went back to Albania, where he worked as an official in the administration led by Prince von Wied. During the Austro-Hungarian occupation he was sub-prefect of several districts (Mat, Kruma and Gora). After 1920, he worked in the Ministry of the Interior, and from 1921 (or 1924) onwards, he was a deputy. He was, along with **Abdurrahman Dibra (1907)**, a member of the Besa group, pro-Zog and conservative, and was editor and director of its organ (cf. Çankaya, B/1347; Selenica, p. XXI and XXXIV; Schmidt-Neke, p. 323 ss.; Taylor, 1st ed., p. 840).

**Abdulmuin [Myin Mezini] (1912):** son of the farmer Ismail, born in the district of Avlonya/Vlora in 1892. He studied at the *rüştiye* school in Vlora, at the *idadi* of Ioannina and then at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* in the Ottoman capital. In November 1912, he began his administrative training in the central administration of the *vilayet* of Ioannina, but when the war broke out, he left for Albania. He is said to have entered the Albanian administration thereafter (Çankaya, B/1381; *Leka* (Shkodra), Numer i Vegantë, 1942, p. 45).

#### ***Mülkiyelis* who left the Ottoman administration around 1912–13 and were in Albania in the 1920s**

**Mehmet Şevket [Şefqet Frashëri] (1891):** son of the notable Yusuf bey of Frashëri, brother of **Hüseyin Sabri bey (1893)**. He studied at the *rüştiye* school of Korça/Görice, and at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* (secondary and superior sections). He could read, write and speak Turkish, Albanian and French. He first became teacher and vice-director of the *idadi* school in Manastir/Bitola. There, along with Hüseyin ef. Ceka, he is said to have influenced the Albanian students in a patriotic sense. For this reason he was transferred to Üsküp/Skopje. In the winter of 1899, he was appointed *kaymakam* of Luma (in the north-east part of modern Albania). According to the Austro-Hungarian vice-consul in Prizren, he was one of the two real Albanian nationalists active in the district at that time. For example, it was he who gave to an Albanian Catholic teacher a book in Albanian that had been published in Sofia. At the beginning of 1900, he was transferred to Preševo. Later on he occupied the post of *kaymakam* in various places in the *vilayet* of Manastir (Florina, Prilep, Manastir, Prilep). In Prilep, around 1905–06, he was a member of the Albanian Secret Committee. At that time, because of his marriage to the daughter of Çerçiz bey of Korça, he had links with other Albanian ‘patriots’. After the Young Turk Revolution, he became *mutessarif* the Anatolian provinces. In 1913, he decided to retire. We do not know where he was and what he did during

the First World War. In 1925, he was prefect of Berat, in Albania. In 1929, he was a member of the council of state (Çankaya, B/393; SA 76/303; Selenica, p. 170; *Shqipërija më 1937*, p. 79; HHStA, PA XIV/18, Liasse XII/2, Prizren, Rappaport, 17/3/1898 and 22/9/1898; PA XXXVIII/398, Prizren, Rappaport, 3/11/1898; HHStA, PA XIV/14, Liasse XI/2, Monastir, Prochaska, 21/4/1906).

**Ali Riza [Ali Koka] (1894):** son of Rapush Aga Kokazade, *müdüir* of the *nahiye* of Zagor, and brother of **Fehim Memduh (1894)**, he was born in 1871 in Progonat (a village in the mountainous region of Kurvelesh, in the *vilayet* of Ioannina). He studied first privately, then at the *rüştiye* of Ioannina, and finally at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* (*idadi* and *ali kısmı*). He could read, write and speak Turkish, French and Greek, spoke Albanian and had some understanding of Italian. In 1894, he was appointed to the Commission for Books in Greek in the Ministry of Education. After one year, he went to Ioannina in order to undergo his administrative training. He began his career as *kaymakam* in Gramsh (near Elbasan), Prilep, Kesendire/Kasandra and Mont Athos. Finally, he became the *mutessarif* the *sancak* of Berat in 1912. With the outbreak of the Balkan Wars, he went back to Istanbul but seems not to have remained in the Ottoman administration. We do not know what he did during the First World War. Under the Italian administration, in 1920, he was prefect of Gjirokastër. In 1925, he was appointed prefect of Durrës (Çankaya, B/532; SA 112/115; Vllamasi, p. 144; Selenica, p. 222).

#### **Albanian *Mülkiyelis* who left the Ottoman administration around 1912–13 but for whom we have no other information**

**Mehdi Tayyar [Mehdi Zavalani] (1893):** son of the farmer Yusuf Nuri bey, born in Yanya/Ioannina in 1867. He studied possibly privately and then in the middle and upper sections of the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* in Istanbul. He knew Turkish, could speak Albanian, Greek and some Bulgarian, and had some knowledge of Arabic, Persian and French. He began his career as a teacher in the *idadi* of Manastir/Bitola (in general history, mathematics, chemistry, etc.). In addition to his teaching, between 1896 and 1899 he underwent his administrative training in the central administration of the *vilayet* of Manastir. In July 1899, he was appointed *kaymakam* of Rekalar (in the region of Debre/Dibra). Two years later he left his position because of a charge brought against him. In an Austrian report, he is said to have played an important role in the ‘national awakening’ in the Dibra region, where he was the *kaymakam* of Rekalar. In 1902, he visited the Austrian consul in Bitola to seek a grant for opening schools in the Dibra region. From 1904 onwards, he was successively *kaymakam* in Metzovo, Tepelen and Pogon (in the *vilayet* of Ioannina). In November 1909, he was sent as *kaymakam* to Eastern Anatolia, where he stayed until July 1911. Then he was appointed *kaymakam* in Mirdita and subsequently in Kruja (from May 1912). This was apparently his last post in the Ottoman administration. We do not know what he did thereafter (Çankaya B/449; SA 81/295; HHStA, PA XXXVIII/391, Monastir, Kral, 13/3/1902).

**Mahmud Celeleddin (1896):** son of Shahozade Ergirili Lebib ef., he was born in Ergiri/Gjirokastër in 1870. He studied at the *Mekteb-i Osmaniye* in Salonica, and then at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* (*idadi* and *ali kısmı*). He could read and write Turkish, French and Greek, could speak Albanian and had some familiarity with Bulgarian. After his administrative training in Salonica, he was *kaymakam* in Gilan, in Kosovo, from 1901 to 1904. Between 1904 and 1912, he held posts at different places in the *vilayet* of Salonica. His last appointment was in November 1912, in the *vilayet* of Edirne (Çankaya B/572; SA 81/339).

**Celal Riza (1900):** son of Karanfil aga, a landowner, he was born in the district of Ergiri/Gjirokastër in 1876. He studied at the *rüştiye* school in Ergiri, then at the *idadi* of Yanya, and finally at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. After receiving administrative training in Bursa, he was appointed *kaymakam* in different places in Kruja, but after a lawsuit he was sent to Eastern Anatolia: he stayed there until 1910 when he was transferred to the *vilayet* of Salonica and to Western Anatolia. He left his job in September 1913 (Çankaya, B/732; SA, 112/5).

**Burhaneddin [Burhanedin Kumbare] (1901):** son of the *kadı* Musa Kazim efendi (of the Kumbarat family) from Libohova. He was born in that town in 1875 and studied at the *rüştiye* school in Yanya, then at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* (*idadi* and *ali kısmı*). He could read, write and speak Turkish, French and Greek, spoke Albanian, and had some familiarity with Arabic, Persian and Armenian. After an administrative training at the administrative centre of the *vilayet* of the Archipelago, he was appointed *kaymakam* in different places in Western Anatolia between 1904 and 1912 (with the exception 1909–10 when he held office in the Arab provinces). He left his job in Western Anatolia in October 1912, but we do not know what became of him (Çankaya, B/783; SA 112/217).

#### **Albanian *Mülkiyelis* who stayed in the Ottoman administration until the early 1920s and then left the Ottoman Empire**

**Mahmud Mahir (1888):** son of the *celveti* shaykh Şeyh Musa from the Kethüda-zade family of Berat, where he was born in 1858. He received a traditional religious education from Hoca Feyzullah el-Khaldi in his native town. Then he taught at the local *rüştiye* school as an assistant teacher for four years. In 1883, he decided to go to Istanbul to enter the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*, but he failed because of his lack of knowledge of French and geography. He was nevertheless accepted through his own determination and graduated in 1888. He knew Arabic, Persian, Turkish and French, and could speak Albanian. His career, as with his early years, did not follow the typical path. Indeed, he began to work for the French consul in Baghdad on archaeological excavations in the *vilayet* of Basra. Then in August 1889 he was appointed director of the *idadi* school of Manastir and teacher of history and geography. However, a few months later he was transferred to Aydın (Western Anatolia) for administrative training. In December 1890 he began a career as *kaymakam*, a post he occupied successively in the *vilayet* of Aydın




Figure 11.8 Sylejman Delvina

(Western Anatolia), in the Albanian territories (Kolonya and Pekin), in Eastern Anatolia, in Halepo, in the *vilayet* of the Archipelago, in the Sandjak of Novipazar, again in Anatolia, in Mont Athos and again in the Arab lands (Sayda). Then, in 1905 he was dismissed and for three years held no posts. After the Young Turk Revolution he was appointed *mutessarif* in the *vilayet* of Basra. In 1911 he was transferred to Thrace and in 1912 to Draç/Durrës, in Albania. When the First Balkan War broke out, he fled to Istanbul. He retired in 1915, but he re-entered the administration in 1918 and remained as *mutessarif* in Western Anatolia and Thrace until 1921. During the *Mütareke* he was teacher of the Shehzade in the imperial palace. Because of that and because of his opposition to the National Fight, he was among the ‘Hundred and Fifty’ persons expelled from Turkey. In 1923 he was administrator of finance and secretary of the last sultan-caliph in exile, Mehmed VI, in San Remo. In 1889, he published a booklet of poetry entitled ‘Terennüm’ (‘A Singing’) (Çankaya, B/199; SA 25/395; Vlora, t. 1, pp. 123 and 238).

**Süleyman Fehmi [Sylejman Delvina] (1899):** son of Selim bey from the high status family of the same name from the town of Delvina (in southwest Albania), where he was born in 1872. He studied at the *rüştiye* school in Ioannina and in the secondary and superior sections of the *Mekteb-i Müülkiye*. In September 1899, he entered the Ottoman Ministry of the Interior. In May 1901, he became Professor of Ottoman Literature at the Istanbul *idadi* school, and from September 1905 on he occupied the same post at the prestigious *Galatasaray lisesi*. In 1909, he wrote a manual, republished in 1910 and 1912, on Ottoman literature for the Ottoman *lycées*. In 1916, in addition to his professorial duties, he resumed work at the Ministry of the Interior until the *Mütareke* was signed. He was part of the delegation of Albanians of Istanbul at the Peace Conference in Paris. In 1920, he became Prime Minister of Albania for a few months. In 1921, he was appointed



Figure 11.9 Abdurahman Dibra

Minister of the Interior. He was a deputy from 1921 to 1925. In 1924 he was Minister of Foreign Affairs under Fan Noli. After Zogu's return, he went into exile in Corfu and Italy. He returned to Albania to die there in 1932. He married the sister of **Xhafer Vttla (1911)** (Çankaya, B/687; Schmidt-Neke, p. 332; Selenica, p. XVI, XXIX and XXXIII; Vlora, t. 2, p. 125, 131; Fischer, pp. 19–20).

**Mehmed Rasim (Kalakulazade) [Rasim Kalakula] (1906)**: son of Kalakulazade Ahmed Şaban ef., he was born in Ergiri/Gjirokastër in 1882. He studied at the local *rüştiye* school, at the *idadi* in Manastir/Bitola, and then in Istanbul at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. He knew Albanian (his mother tongue), Turkish, Greek, Serbian and French. From 1907 to 1910, he underwent his administrative training in Ioannina. From May 1910 to 1917, he was *kaymakam* in different places in Eastern Anatolia; in 1917 in the Arab provinces; and from 1918 until the arrival of the Greek troops, in Western Anatolia. At that time, he left for Albania, where he joined the Albanian administration. He was an inspector in the Ministry of the Interior. In the 1920s, he was appointed the prefect at different places (like Vlora and Shkodra). In 1926, he became president of the municipality of the new Albanian capital, Tirana. He died in 1933 (Çankaya, B/995; Selenica, p. XXXI, p. 385 and p. 465).

**Abdürrahman Remzi [Abdurahman Dibra] (1907)**: son of Elmas Lami bey, who was a notable from Dibra and an official in that *sancak*. He was born in 1883 or 1885 in Dibra. He studied at the local *rüştiye* school, at the *idadi* school of Manastir/Bitola and at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. According to his son, he was the roommate of the future king Zogu during his school years. He knew Albanian (his mother tongue), Turkish, French and Serbian. He had his administrative training in Manastir, where after the Young Turk Revolution he emerged as one of the leaders

of the small Albanian community from Dibra that claimed a Geg and Muslim identity *vis-à-vis* the Albanian nationalists. Between 1910 and 1916, he was *kaymakam* in the *vilayet* of Manastir (in Nasliç and Kumanova) and in Istanbul (Fatih). From 1916 until the *Miütareke* he was inspector of the civil service. He came back to Albania for the elections of 1923, summoned by Ahmed Zogu. As a close associate of Ahmed Zogu, he was elected as a Member of Parliament. Between 1924 and 1939, he was part of almost all the governments formed under Zogu: he served as Minister of the Interior, Minister of Finance, Minister of Education and Minister of Justice. He was one of the leading members of the conservative pressure group known as *Besa* ('The Word of Honour') and one of the editors of its organs, the newspapers *Besa* (1931–6) and *Shqiptari* (1936). In 1939, he was interned in Italy. He never went back to Albania and died in exile in 1961 (Çankaya, B/1021; Taylor, 1st ed., p. 204; Selenica; Vllamasi, p. 243; Schmidt-Neke, p. 333; Fischer, pp. 244–5; information given by his son, Uran Dibra).

**Cafer Tevfik Vila [Xhafer Villa] (1911):** son of Tevfik bey, who was a landowner and a notable from Frashëri. He was born in 1888 or 1889 and studied at the *rüştiye* school of Përmet/Premedi and then at the *idadi* of Ioannina, before entering the superior section of the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. He knew Albanian (his mother tongue), Turkish, Greek and French. In Istanbul, he entered the Ministry of Finance for a short time in 1911 before joining the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he remained until 1921. Possibly in response to a summons from his brother-in-law, **Sulejman Delvina (1899)**, who presided over a new government in 1920, he entered the Albanian administration. In December 1921, he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in a government that, in fact, never came into being. From 1922 to 1925, he was General Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and contributed significantly to the organisation of that ministry. In 1925, he was appointed *ad hoc* chargé d'affaires in Paris. In 1929, he was sent as ambassador to Belgrade, and between 1932 and 1934 to Athens. In 1933, he simultaneously held the office of Minister of Foreign Affairs. In 1934, he was appointed ambassador to Rome (he was in favour of Italian support). He was also president of the tennis club of Tirana. He died in 1938, in a plane crash in Italy (Çankaya, B/1298; Selenica, p. XXIX; Vllamasi, p. 237; Schmidt-Neke, p. 355; Taylor, 1<sup>st</sup> ed., p. 1041, and 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., p. 264; Fischer, pp. 238–9).

### **Albanian *Mülkiyelis* who oscillated between Albania and Turkey**

**Mehmed Azmi Veziri (1883):** son of the *mutessarif Yanyalı* Hayreddin Paşa, born in Libohova in 1862 or 1864, and the brother of Ali Subhi (1882). He studied in Ergiri, at the *rüştiye* school, and then for two years at the *Mahreç- i Aklam* school in Istanbul and at the *Mülkiye*. He knew Greek, Albanian and French. Between 1883 and 1905, he made a career in the Ottoman capital as a secretary in various ministries and as Professor of History in the *Mülkiye*, in the Pedagogical




Figure 11.10 Nezir Remzi Leskoviku

School and in the *Mercan idadisi*. Between 1905 and the Young Turk Revolution, he was the Director of the School of Law in Salonica. After the revolution, he entered upon an administrative career, being successively appointed *mutessarif* Berat, Serfiçe and Kırkkilise until the arrival of the Bulgarian troops there. He retired in 1915 to Istanbul. In 1922, he went to Albania, but in December 1925, possibly for political reasons, he went back to Turkey, which he left once more for Albania in 1937 (Çankaya, B/53).

**Nezir Remzi Leskoviku (1896):** son of Mehmed Arif ef., preacher (*hatib*) of Pazar mosque of Leskovik, where he was born in 1876. He studied at the Kapudanpaşa *rüştiye*, at the *idadi* of Yanya/Ioannina and at the *Mekteb-i müлкиye* in Istanbul. He could speak, read and write Turkish, French and Greek, and knew Arabic, Persian and Albanian. He undertook his administrative training partly in Yanya and partly in Salonica. Between 1900 and 1908, he was *kaymakam* in Alasonya, Yenice-i Vardar and Yanya. Suspected of being an Albanian nationalist, he was sent to Istantköy. From 1910 to 1916 he was *kaymakam* in Western Anatolia, and during the period 1916–18 he was an inspector of the public service in Istanbul. In 1918, he resigned and joined the Albanian administration but went back to Turkey as the Albanian consul in Istanbul. Later, from 1933 to 1939, he was *chargé d'affaires* in Ankara. After the Italian annexation of Albania, he lost his position but remained in Turkey, where he was still living in 1966. We do not know what became of him thereafter. He had two daughters, one living in Turkey, the other in Albania (Çankaya, B/556; SA 81/203; Selenica, p. XXXI).



**Ibrahim Edhem (1910):** son of the *kadı* Savfet Hulusi ef., born in Leskovik in 1888. He studied at the local *rüştiye*, at the *idadi* of Yanya, and then at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. He underwent his administrative training in Yanya/Ioannina between 1910 and 1913. When the city was seized by the Greeks, he went to the newly created Albanian principality. Shortly after, he went to the Ottoman capital, where he was appointed teacher of Turkish language in Bakırköy, and then in Istanbul itself. In 1917, he became *kaymakam* in Aziziye. After the *Mütareke*, he went back to Albania (Çankaya, B/1 171).

#### **Albanian *Mülkiyelis* who left the Ottoman administration before 1912–13, but remained in Turkey**

**Seyyid Ali (1883):** son of Abdülhamid ef., he was born in the village of Radani, near Leskovik in 1859. He studied at a primary school in Leskovik, in the *rüştiye* of Yanya and then in Istanbul at the *Mahreç-i Aklam* school and the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. From 1883 to 1906, he was *kaymakam* in different places in Rumelia (in the *vilayets* of Kosova, Salonica, Ioannina and Edirne). Because of his health problems, he went to Istanbul, where he spent two years on half pay. After the Young Turk Revolution, he was appointed *mutessarif* in Izmit, but he retired in 1910 and spent the rest of his life in Istanbul, where he died in 1917. He was buried in the Yahya ef. Dergahı's cemetery (Çankaya, B/46).

**Mustafa Azmi Ömer Akalin (1883):** son of Ömer Şevki Pasha, who was a *mutessarif* and a notable from the district of Narda/Arta. He was born in Narda in 1858 and studied at the *rüştiye* of Prishtina, and then in Istanbul at the *Galatasaray lisesi* and at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. He made a career in Istanbul (above all, as teacher and administrator of public education) and in Anatolia, after having been suspected of political opposition. In 1908, he was elected a deputy of the *sancak* of Preveza. However, having been appointed *vali* of Bursa, he could not participate in the work of the assembly. In 1910, he was dismissed for being among the leaders of the 'Hürriyet ve Ittilaf' Party. In 1914, he officially retired and stayed in Istanbul, where he wrote various works prior to his death in 1940 (Çankaya B/63).

#### **Albanian *Mülkiyelis* who continued to serve the Ottoman Empire after 1912–13, but died before 1920**

**Mehmed Namik [Vlora] (1884):** from the well-known Vlora family of southern Albania, son of Avlonyalı Mustafa Nuri Paşa and brother of the Grand Vizier Ferid Paşa. He was born in Vlora/Avlonya in 1859 and studied in Istanbul at the famous *Galatasaray lisesi*, then at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. He knew Greek, Italian, Arabic and Albanian. From 1884 onwards, he made his career in different ministries or administrations in the Ottoman capital. Notably, he was the Director of Customs at the Sirkeci station, and the Director of the Health Council. Around 1885, he also was the Professor of Ottoman Grammar at the *Galatasaray lisesi*. He

died between 1913 and 1919. His family went back to Albania (Çankaya, B/75; Vlora, t. 1, p. 40 and t. 2, p. 113).

**Karaosmankurizade Mehmed Nusret (1899):** son of Behram efendi, examining magistrate in Preveza, and brother of **Karaosmankurizade Osman Cevdet (1890)**. He was born in Preveza in 1875 and studied in Ioannina (*rüştiye*) and in Istanbul at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* (secondary and superior sections). He could speak, read and write Turkish, Greek and French, and knew Albanian. He undertook his administrative training in Ioannina and Konya. For one year, 1901–02, he taught Turkish at the Armenian and Greek schools of Konya. Then he was appointed *kaymakam* in the *vilayet* of Erzurum and in different places in the *vilayet* of Ioannina (Tepelen, Aydonat, Filat, Metzovo, Delvina). Between the end of 1909 and autumn 1910, he was transferred to the Arab provinces (*vilayet* of Beirut). In September 1910 he was transferred to Thrace (Uzun Köprü and İskeçe/Xanthi), where he worked until the Balkan Wars. Between 1914 and 1919, he was *kaymakam* and *mutessarif* Eastern Anatolia. In 1919, he was arrested and later condemned and executed (in 1920) for having authorised killings and sackings during the deportation of the Armenians. In Kemalist Turkey, he was considered as a '*Milli Şehid*' (B/682; SA 112/177).

**Mehmed Şefik (1899):** son of Güzelzade Abdülhamid Aga, notable and landowner in Margiliç/Margariti (today in north-western Greece). He was born in 1876 in Margiliç and studied at Erzincan, at the military *rüştiye* school, and then in Istanbul at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* (secondary and superior sections). He knew Turkish, Greek and French, and spoke Albanian. He underwent a short administrative training in Ioannina and in Preveza. Between 1900 and 1912, he was appointed *kaymakam* and later *mutessarif* different places in the Arab provinces and in Anatolia. In 1912, he was elected the representative of Humus (Syria) in the Ottoman parliament. In 1913, he again became *mutessarif* in Eastern Anatolia and in the Arab provinces. He died in Baghdad in 1916 (Çankaya, B/688; SA 92/309).

**Hüseyin Saadet (Hafız) (1899):** son of the notable and landowner of Ergiri/Gjrokastër, Mehmed aga. He was born in 1873 in that city and studied at the local *rüştiye*, and then in Istanbul at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* (secondary and superior sections). He knew French and Bulgarian. He started his administrative training in Üsküp, the centre of the *vilayet* of Kosova, but after a year resigned and returned to his native town. Eight years later, in June 1908, he was appointed *kaymakam* in Filat (today in northern Greece). From 1911 until his death in 1918, he served in Anatolia (Çankaya, B/696).

**Bahri [Karagjozi] (1910):** son of Sabri ef. Karagjozi from Ergiri/Gjrokastër, he was born there in 1886. He studied at the local *rüştiye*, then in the *idadi* of Manastir/Bitola and in the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. He had his administrative training in Manastir between 1910 and 1912, when he was appointed *kaymakam* in İskeçe/Xanthi in Thrace. According to Çankaya, he was killed there in November 1913 by Greek *komitadjis* (Çankaya, B/1 150).

**Ziyaeddin (1912):** born in Ipek/Peć (in Kosovo) where his father, the *kaymakam* Ali bey, was an official (so it is not certain that Ziyaeddin was an Albanian). He studied at Manastir/Bitola, at the *askeri rüştiyesi*, then in Istanbul at the *Vefa idadisi* and at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. He underwent his administrative training in the Ottoman capital, but joined the army in 1914. He died in Çankakkale in 1916 (Çankaya, B/1421).

**Albanian Mülkiyelis who continued to served the Ottoman Empire after 1912–13, but for whom we have no information for the subsequent years**

**Ali Subhi (1882):** son of the *mutessarif* Yanyalı Hayreddin Paşa, brother of **Mehmed Azmi Veziri (1883)**, born in 1859. He studied in Istanbul at a *rüştiye* and at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* (secondary and superior sections). He knew Greek, Albanian and French. He began his administrative career in various Ottoman ministries. After the Young Turk Revolution, he was appointed *mutessarif* Jerusalem. In 1910, he became the mayor of Istanbul, before being appointed governor of the *vilayet* of the Archipelago. After the Italian conquest in 1912, he went back to Istanbul and stayed there until 1919, when he was again appointed *vali* in Konya, a post he occupied for one year. He retired in 1922, but we do not know where he lived thereafter (Çankaya, B/31; SA 76/377).

**Mehmed Vassaf (1889):** son of Abdullah ef., born in 1864 in Ioannina. He studied at the *rüştiye* school there, and then in Istanbul at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* (*idadi* and *ali kısmı*). He knew Greek and French (if he did indeed have no knowledge of Albanian, it may be that he was not an Albanian but a member of the Greek-speaking Muslim community of Ioannina). He began his career as a teacher in the *idadi* schools of Ioannina and Bitola, before becoming Director of Public Instruction of the *vilayet* of Halepo and Bitola. From 1903 onwards, he served as a *kaymakam* in Tirnova, in Mont Athos and in Western Anatolia. After the Young Turk Revolution, he was *mutessarif* different places in Anatolia and Albania. After refusing to go to Berat in 1911, he was out of office until 1919, when he was appointed *mutessarif* Kırkkilise in Thrace. He retired in 1920, after the arrival of the Greek troops. We do not know where he lived thereafter (Çankaya, B/248).

**Mehmed Cemal (1893):** son of Kasim Aga from Preshte (or Prishtë) in the *vilayet* of Manastir. He was born in 1870 and studied at the *rüştiye* of Kesriye/Kastoria and at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* (secondary and superior sections) in Istanbul. He could read and write Turkish and Albanian, spoke Greek, and knew Arabic, Persian and French. After an administrative training in Salonica, he had a career as *kaymakam* in different places in Rumelia and in the Arab provinces. In 1915, he was appointed *kaymakam* in Eastern Anatolia, and retired one year later (Çankaya, B/402; SA 76/167).

**Hüseyin Sabri [Sabri bey Frashëri] (1893):** son of Yusuf bey, a descendant of Süleyman bey (general of Ali Paşa Tepelen), and brother of **Mehmet Şevket**

(1891). He was born in Fraşer/Fraşhëri in 1872 and studied at the *rüştiye* school in Korça and at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* (secondary and superior sections). He obtained his administrative training in Manastir/Bitola. In 1896, he began his career of *kaymakam* in Tergovište (*vilayet* of Kosova). Thereafter he served in Macedonia (Koçani, Kozani and Stip). In 1900, he was considered by the Austro-Hungarian authorities as an Albanian nationalist. In 1902 he was put on trial because of a problem with Bulgarian guerrillas. In 1903, he was again appointed *kaymakam*, but this time in the *vilayet* of the Archipelago and in Western Anatolia. He served the Ottoman empire until the beginning of the 1920s. In 1920 he was appointed *mutessarif* in Sinop. Thereafter, we do not know what became of him. He was the son-in-law of a Herzegovinian notable, Hamdi Paşa Resulbegović from Trebinje, whose brother was *kadı* in Bitola. He was also the brother-in-law of a fervent Albanian nationalist, Fehim bey Zavalani, who lived in Bitola (Çankaya, B/401; HHStA, PA XIV/7, Liasse V/1, Kral, Monastir, 10/12/1900).

**Mehmed Kadri (1897):** son of Ali ef., official in the local administration in Premedi/Përmet, where he was born in 1873. He studied at the local *ibtidai*, at the *rüştiye* of Leskovik and at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* (secondary and superior sections). He could speak, read and write Turkish, Greek and French, and spoke Albanian. He had his administrative training in Ioannina. In 1901, he was appointed *kaymakam* in different places in the same *vilayet* (Tepelen, Leskovik, Delvina). In 1910, he was transferred to Anatolia (Safranbolu, and Şiran in Eastern Anatolia), but we do not know what became of him thereafter (Çankaya, B/607; SA 96/209).

**Ali Zülfikar (1897):** son of Molla Bekirzade Ahmed Aga, a notable from Narda/Arta. He was born in that city in 1868 and studied at Ioannina (*rüştiye* and *idadi* schools) and in Istanbul at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. He received his administrative training in Üsküp/Skopje, Manastir/Bitola and Görice/Korça. In 1901 he was appointed *kaymakam* and served until his retirement (in 1914) in the Arab provinces and in Eastern Anatolia. (Çankaya, B/613).

**Rüstem Fehmi (1898):** son of Abdi Nuri ef., an accountant at the branch office of the Agricultural Bank in Leskovik. He was born there in 1872 and studied at the *rüştiye* school in Leskovik, at the *idadi* of Ioannina, and at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. He could read and write Turkish and French, and could speak Albanian and Greek. He had his administrative training in Salonica. From 1902 until June 1912, he was *kaymakam* in various places in the Rumelian *vilayets* (Selanik, Edirne, Manastir and Yanya). Between June 1912 and 1916, he was transferred to Eastern Anatolia. Finally, from 1916 to the arrival of the Greek army in 1920, he served in Western Anatolia. We do not know what became of him thereafter (Çankaya, B/664; SA 81/441).

### ‘Albanian’ *Mülkiyelis* who continued to serve the Ottoman Empire and later the Republic of Turkey

**Musa Hilmi Demo [Demokan] (1890):** son of the *kaymakam vekili* of Margëliç/Margariti Mehmed Demo, he was born in Ioannina in 1865. He studied Arabic and

Persian at the local *medrese*, as well as French and Greek with a private tutor. He also attended courses at the local *rüştiye*, and went to Istanbul to study at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* (secondary and superior sections). He obtained his administrative training in various places (Samsun, Debre/Dibra and Samsun again). In 1896, he was appointed *kaymakam* and served as such in different *kazas* (two years in Eastern Anatolia, and later in the Albanian and Macedonian provinces). In 1911 he became *mutessarif* Debre/Dibra. Because of the Balkan Wars, he went to Istanbul. Between 1913 and 1918, he served in Anatolia. Thereafter he was exiled to Malta for being a member of the Committee of Union and Progress. He returned to Istanbul in 1921. After 1924, he worked for the Turkish administration. He died in Istanbul in 1929. (Çankaya, B/308).

**Karaosmankurizade Osman Cevdet (1890):** son of Behram ef. from Yanya, notable from Ioannina and examining magistrate, nephew of the famous shaykh of that city, Ahmed ef., and brother of **Karaosmankurizade Mehmed Nusret (1899)**. He studied at the local *rüştiye* school and in Istanbul at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* (secondary and superior sections) and at the *Mekteb-i Hukuk* (School of Law). He taught at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* and in other schools while working in the ministry of public education. From 1920 until his death in 1929, he lived and worked as a teacher of physics in Zonguldak (Çankaya, B/309).

**Mehmed Fethi (1896):** son of a merchant from Ioannina, Ömer Çavuş-zade Hacı Ahmed ef., he was born in Ioannina in 1873. He studied at the local *rüştiye* and *idadi* schools and in Istanbul at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. He had a career as teacher and director of *idadi* schools in various places in the *vilayet* of Ioannina, in Anatolia, in the *vilayet* of Kosova, and in Beirut. In 1918 he retired and settled in Istanbul for the rest of his life. He was probably the brother-in-law of **Karaosmankurizade Osman Cevdet (1890)** and **Karaosmankurizade Mehmed Nusret (1899)**, having married the daughter of Behram ef., who was also probably the father of the two aforementioned *Mülkiyelis* (Çankaya, B/578).

**Mehmed Nusret (Metya, prof.) (1898):** son of Osman ef., born in Ioannina in 1877. He studied at the local *rüştiye* school and in Istanbul at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* (secondary and superior sections) and at the *Mekteb-i Hukuk*. He knew French, Greek and Turkish. His entire career was spent in various schools (as professor of law), administrations and ministries in Istanbul. He died in 1946 in Istanbul (Çankaya, B/646).

**Abdürrahim Naim Şehri (1899):** son of Mehmed Şehri ef., official in the administration of the Pious Foundations (*Vakıflar*). He was born in Ioannina in 1875 and studied in the Ottoman capital at the *Galatasaray lisesi*, the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* and at the *Mekteb-i Hukuk*. He spent his entire career in Istanbul and later in different Turkish administrations and ministries. He died in 1935 in Adana. He was married to a member of the Renda family (see **Mustafa Abdulhalik Renda (1903)**). He was a Freemason. Possibly, he was not of Albanian origin (Çankaya, B/671).

**Haydar Hilmi Vaner (1899):** son of Hacı İbrahim Şevki ef. from the Lekić family of Podgorica, where he was born in 1873. He studied at Shkodra (*rüştiye*) and

Istanbul (*Mekteb-i Mülkiye*, secondary and superior sections). He could speak, read and write Arabic, Persian, French and all Slavic languages, and spoke Albanian and some Kurdish. He underwent his administrative training in Van (Eastern Anatolia), where he began to work as vice-secretary and director of the official newspaper. From 1901 on he was appointed *kaymakam* in different places in the *vilayet* of Van. In 1907, he was transferred to the *vilayet* of Kosova (Mitrovica and Köprülü/Veles), where, after the Young Turk Revolution, we find him as a strong partisan of the Committee of Union and Progress. In Mitrovica, he created an Albanian club. According to the Austrian consul, at that period he acted as a Young Turk or as an Albanian as the situation demanded. In 1910 he was appointed inspector of the civil service so that he could be in Istanbul, where he became a member of the Albanian club. From 1912 he became *mutessarif* in Anatolia and Thrace. From 1916 he occupied different *vali* posts in Eastern Anatolia. He remained in Turkey where he was *vali* and a member of Parliament. He died in 1954 in Istanbul. (Çankaya, B/698; SA 92/359; HHStA, PA XIV/15, Liasse XI/6, Mitrovitza, Zambaur, 20/2/1909 and PA XXXVIII/387, von Zambaur, Mitrovitza, 31/8/1909).

**Mehmed Raşid Bigat (1900):** son of Sadullah Bekir bey, official in the provincial administration in Ioannina, where he was born in 1879. He studied at the local *idadi* school and at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. He underwent his administrative training in Ioannina. Until the end of 1909, he was *kaymakam* in different parts of the *vilayet* of Ioannina (Pogon, Tepelen, Leskovik). Then he was transferred to the Arab provinces. In 1910, he was appointed inspector of the civil service. In 1917, he became *mutessarif* Anatolia. Thereafter, he occupied different positions in the Turkish administration and in various companies. He died in Ankara in 1959. He knew Turkish, French and Greek (if he had no knowledge of Albanian, it may be that he was not an Albanian but a member of the Greek-speaking Muslim community of Ioannina) (Çankaya, B/739).

**Mustafa Abdülhalik Renda (1903):** son of the notable from Ioannina, Rendazade Aslan ef., he was born in 1881 in that city. He studied at the local *rüştiye*, at an *idadi* school in the Ottoman capital, and finally at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. In 1903, he began to work in the Agriculture Bank, but a few months later he was transferred to Rodos. There he taught at the *idadi* school and at the same time began his administrative training, which he continued later in Ioannina. From 1907 he was appointed *kaymakam* in several places in the *vilayet* of Ioannina (Tepelen, Metzovo, Pogon, Delvina). In the spring of 1910, he was promoted *mutessarif vekili*, a post he held again in the *vilayet* of Ioannina (in Berat, Çamlık and Ergiri). In July 1913, he was appointed *mutessarif* Siirt in Eastern Anatolia. In 1914, he became *vali* and was appointed as such in different places in Eastern Anatolia and in the Arab provinces. Later on, he was interned by the British authorities in Malta, along with other members of the Committee of Union and Progress. From 1922 onwards he held important positions in Turkey (member and president of parliament, minister, etc.). He knew French, English, Turkish, Greek and Bulgarian (if he had no knowledge of Albanian, he may not have been an

Albanian, but a member of the Greek-speaking Muslim community of Ioannina) (Çankaya, B/835).

**Ibrahim Hakkı (Müftizade, Aktan) (1903):** son of Mehmed Emin ef., member of the court of appeal of Ioannina. He was born in 1878 in Ioannina, where he studied, as well as in Istanbul in the superior section of the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. He knew Greek, Turkish and French. He undertook his administrative training in Anatolia (Antalya) and taught there at the *idadi* school. From 1907, he was *kaymakam* in Western Anatolia. In 1914, he became a *mutessarif* and served in different places in Anatolia. He retired in 1924 and became a merchant in Zonguldak. He died in 1938 (Çankaya, B/865).

**Hasan Nizameddin Ataker (1906):** born in 1882 in Ergiri/Gjirokastër where his father, Ahmed Asım bey, son of the *reisülküttab* Raif bey (whose father was from Kastamonu) was an official. He studied at different places (Salonica, Halepo, Istanbul and Bursa) before entering the superior section of the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. He also studied at the *Mekteb-i Hukuk*. He knew French, Arabic, Persian, Albanian and Greek and undertook his administrative training in Salonica. From 1909, he held different posts as *kaymakam* in Anatolia and Rumelia. He joined Mustafa Kemal in Sivas and was appointed *mutessarif* and later *vali* or inspector by the new Turkish authorities. He retired in 1948 and died in Istanbul in 1962 (Çankaya, B/1006).

**Ibrahim Hakkı Tankut (1906):** son of Mehmed Tevfik efendi, notable from Tirana, where he was born in 1883. He studied at the local *rüştiye*, then in Salonica (*idadi* school) and in Istanbul (*Mekteb-i Mülkiye*). He had some knowledge of French. He underwent his administrative training in Shkodra, where he also occupied a position in the local administration before being appointed *kaymakam* in 1910. He served in various places: six months in Anatolia and two years in Rumelia (Pekin, Vuçitrn, Koçani). After the Balkan Wars he remained in the Ottoman administration, serving as *kaymakam* in different places between 1915 and 1919. Thereafter he worked for the Ottoman Tobacco Company and for the Turkish Alcohol Monopoly. He died in Antalya in 1942 (Çankaya, B/1002).

**Hüseyin Qazim Demi (1906):** son of Demizade Mehmed Efendi, a notable from Ioannina who had been *kaymakam* of Metzovo, and nephew of Cafer Demi Pasha (who prepared the *Kuleli vakası*). He was born in Ioannina in 1883 and studied in his native town (*rüştiye*, *idadi*) and in Istanbul, at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. He could speak, read and write Turkish, Albanian, Greek and French. After administrative training in Ioannina, he was appointed *kaymakam* in Kičevo, Kermasti, Ayanik and Halepo. He remained in Turkey, where he died in 1969. He was married to a woman from the Renda family of Ioannina, the same family as that of **Mustafa Abdülhalik Renda (1903)** (Çankaya B/1003; SA 165, p. 369).

**Mehmed Alaeddin Kısaoğlu (1908):** son of Ömer Sabri ef., a notable from Ioannina, he was born in that town in 1885. He studied in Ioannina (*rüştiye*, *idadi*) and in Istanbul at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. He knew Turkish, French, Greek and Albanian. He obtained his administrative training in his native town, simultaneously teaching at the *idadi* school. In 1913, he was appointed as a

teacher in Izmit. He remained in Turkey, working for the municipality of Istanbul. He died in 1966 (Çankaya, B/1071).

**Ismail Vehbi Berk (1911):** son of Naim ef., born in Leskovik (southeast Albania) in 1890. He studied at the local *rüştiye* school, then at the *idadi* of Ioannina and at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* in Istanbul. He knew Albanian, Turkish and French. In 1911, he commenced his administrative training in the central administration of the *vilayet* of Ioannina, but when the First Balkan War broke out he went to Istanbul. There he worked as supervisor (*muid*) in the *Davudpaşa sultanisi*. From 1914 onwards, he was *nahiye müdürü* in Zalof and Maksudlu, then *kaymakam* in different places. His entire career was spent in Turkey (Çankaya, B/1381).

### **Albanian Mülkiyelis who never entered the Ottoman administration but remained in Turkey**

**Ismail Hakkı Vefa (1911):** son of the *bozacı* Hacı Sadik ef., he was born in Prizren in 1887 and studied at the *Mercan idadisi* before entering the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. However, he never entered the civil service but stayed in Istanbul to manage the brewery owned by his father, the famous *Vefa bozacısı* (brewer and seller of *boza*) (Çankaya, B/1219).

**Hasan Hüsnî (1911):** son of Şahin bey, a notable from Ergiri/Gjirokastër, he was born in that district in 1890. He was a student in the local *rüştiye* and in the *Mercan idadisi* of Istanbul. After his studies at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*, he remained in the Ottoman capital to study law at the *Mekteb-i Hukuk*. He completed his studies in 1914. Thereafter, he was a lawyer in Istanbul (Çankaya, B/1279).





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