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The Image of the Other in
the European Intercultural
Dialogue

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Acknowledgements

The present volume explores issues raised by cultural identities, media productions, trade, the ever changing role of the institutions in public life, the necessity of new policies for the European integration, issues in which the Other and his or her image operate in different ways underlying the importance of dialogue in solving problems and conflicts.

The collection of papers were presented to the Jean Monnet Conference “*The Image of the Other in the European Intercultural Dialogue*”, event organized with the support of the European Commission Jean Monnet Action Programme of the European Union. The articles, the case studies span a large area of problems: image, identity, culture and communication at different levels of everyday life, in order to devise new means of solving the issues raised by the contemporary society. It was a great opportunity for the academics and students from different universities to discuss and disseminate their recent research findings and we would like to thank all the conference participants coming from different countries of Europe for their interesting and valuable contributions. This volume could not have been possible without the serious work and research done by the contributors to whom we express our gratitude.

Image, Culture, and Communication

*Dana PANTEA**

The globalized world we are living in has determined new patterns of people movement, networks and boundaries. The last ones are losing more and more their specific characteristics of being physical, geographical, acquiring symbolic attributes given in the process of communication in which culture has a significant role. Consequently, we witness a new spatial dynamics which influences communication and affects identities. Due to the massive human migration waves Europe has faced in the second half of the 20th century and nowadays, we assist to confrontations even conflicts between cultures, nations, and ethnic groups, each of them striving to keep their identity, and memories.

The migrants have brought with them their traditions, culture, and respect them in an attempt to keep their identities, thus trying to feel at home in Europe. But in this way they have become the Other when interrelating either with the native population or with different ethnic groups. The images of the Other, their representations and the relations between them form a landmark in the vast system of social representation that has an important contribution to the way world is seen, interpreted and experienced. By studying the images, researchers can establish the links between past and present, point out the role of mental representations in the life of mankind and elaborate new concepts and policies that can help them

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give solutions to the issues raised by the growing xenophobia against the asylum seekers and migrants. The image has a determinant function in communication as it bears a meaning which helps us understand and define the alterity from different perspectives. By means of comparative approach and concepts from the field of social psychology we can study the starting point of a prejudice, which can easily develop into a cliché and their evolution into discrimination. The relation between prejudice and discrimination, which manifests itself mostly in culture, reveals the strong connection between self-image and the image of the stranger, the Other. When these images can be found in writings, in the collective mentality, the stereotype is borne, which is nothing but an exaggerated image of certain characteristics (Mitu, 2000 265-265), later on to be applied to all individuals of a nation or ethnic group even if they are not bearers of such attributes. Thus, sometimes it will be difficult for researchers to point out the relation between the negative image and the reality, to find the real causes and significance of these images.

The image of the Other is also relevant in the bilateral relations between countries as it offers new perspectives on different fields of human activity such as the economic, political, cultural ones thus paving the way for the academic research of alterity at international level. The research can be extended by studying public opinion because the image of a country or a nation is best reflected in the public opinion of another country through the means of media: television, radio, internet, consequently governments' and politicians' decisions concerning economic and foreign policy can be better analysed and understood.

Our contemporary life, being more and more dominated by globalization over different aspects of life, reveals new shapes of identity determined by "location and specific context" (Weedon, 2004, 22). As Chris Weedon points out, in Western societies all the forms of identity are

tied to national, local and family history, tradition, which together with collective memories give the individual the sense of belonging. With all the migration movements, asylum seekers, diaspora determined by dismantling empires, globalization, conflicts, wars or economic reasons, the sense of belonging to a certain group becomes loose, and identity awareness is a problem both for natives and newcomers. From this point of view, a good example is the issue of Britishness, its meaning – whether it represents the same thing as it used to in the nineteenth century or not, because today we speak about a multi-ethnic Britain. Dealing with cultural and ethnic diversity in Britain is not an easy job for the government, for the education institutions for officials and business people, as it is quite difficult to understand all cultural nuances in a white supremacy country in which only in the capital, London, more than 300 foreign languages are spoken and there are at least 50 non indigenous populations (Wood & Landry, 2012:25)

The problem of identity questions not only nations and ethnic groups, but also the families. The concept – transnational family - has been used in an attempt to study the impact of international division of work, trade relations, globalization, economic migration upon families, their way of living, whether they integrate or are assimilated in the new host countries. There is also the problem of different kinds of experiences regarding work, children, family relations, the roots (Kelley, 2013, 4-9) of the so called ex-pats.

An important role in creating, transmitting and maintaining identity has communication. This dynamic, ever changing process helps people interact by means of symbols in order to create and interpret meanings. And because all human civilizations shape and are shaped by culture (Moll 2012, 3) the individual's identity has suffered changes in this world where communication and movement are becoming easier and faster every day. As a result, institutions, organizations, corporations – the whole business

world – have become culturally sensitive to the global environment, thus developing effective intercultural communication skills is of paramount importance for people working in all fields of activity. A deep look into culture, gender, race, and ethnicity has revealed the fact that they interact with each other in the intercultural communication and, consequently we can chart ourselves, but also we can deepen our understanding of the Other and his image, an attitude that may help us overcome communication challenges and barriers. Surveys, researches, case studies have pointed out the need of people in 21st century, to become effective communicators and to put at the heart of intercultural communication the human being who requires respect, dignity and compassion.

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CHAPTER I

National and European Cultural Institutions - Dialogue and the Idea of Interculturality

*Maria Manuela TAVARES RIBEIRO**

Abstract: *L'Europe se caractérise par une diversité culturelle qui découle des identités et des entités nationales, régionales et locales. Ces identités culturelles nationales et régionales coexistent avec « l'identité culturelle européenne ».*

Envisagées ainsi, les actions communautaires visent à susciter des dialogues et des échanges interculturels, à financer des projets de dimension européenne et à affirmer l'histoire et l'héritage communs à travers des manifestations emblématiques.

Grâce à des initiatives lancées par des organisations internationales et européennes se sont établies des relations culturelles renforçant les liens entre les Etats.

La culture est considérée de plus en plus comme une composante essentielle des stratégies de développement économique et social, au niveau des politiques régionales et locales.

Les instituts culturels ou, parfois, les centres culturels ont été fondés en vue de promouvoir la culture et la langue nationales à l'étranger. Ils sont, peuvent ou doivent être, des médiateurs entre le pays qu'ils représentent et le pays étranger qui les accueille.

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Construire une “identité européenne” est une tâche ardue. La diversité de peuples, de langues, de cultures, explique cette difficulté. Aussi peut-on affirmer que « l’identité culturelle européenne » est avant tout une « communauté imaginée », pour des raisons essentiellement politiques.

Toute tentative pour “européaniser” les différentes identités nationales et régionales, pour fortifier l’identité européenne des citoyens de l’Europe, ou pour renforcer leur sentiment d’appartenance à l’UE, devra toujours passer par une politique de communication. De là l’importance des médias comme pilier central de la médiation des questions européennes.

La stratégie de communication européenne et la dynamisation des médias doivent être repensées afin de rendre plus transparents les rouages de la communication sociale et de leur permettre d’intégrer la « véritable essence sociale, culturelle et politique européenne. » Une telle exigence suppose que la communication et ses agents se pénètrent d’une vision « symbolique identitaire ».

Key words: *identités culturelles, politique de communication, instituts culturels*

Denis de Rougemont wisely stated: “Celui qui veut participer à la culture européenne doit s’intégrer à une communauté, qui a transmis cette culture et qui lui donne ses conditions de réalité, de création, de signification” (Rougemont, 1990, p. 6).

EU policy should be complementary to national policies, but there are also private initiatives developing inter-European networks. These all important networks foster the awareness of European citizens, reflecting a common cultural heritage.

Europe is characterised by cultural diversity that derives from the national, regional and local identities and entities. These national and regional cultural identities coexist alongside the “European cultural identity”. We recall here in this regard the principle of subsidiarity and complementarity – Art. 128 of the Maastricht Treaty and Art. 151 of the Amsterdam Treaty.

In the light of the former, Community action is particularly in line with the idea of fostering intercultural dialogue and exchange, financing projects with a European dimension and asserting the common history and heritage of emblematic manifestations (Wolton, Dominique, 1999, 25-33).

Through the activities of international and European organisations, cultural ties enhancing inter-State relations were established.

The Research and Information Centres for cultural development sprouted in the member-countries of the European Union. An example is the CIRCLE (1984) in London, and the ERICarts (Institut Européen de Recherche Comparative sur la Culture) (1993) in Bonn, which include members from different countries. CULTURELINK, at a global level, publishes in its Gazette the programmes and projects of the Council of Europe and UNESCO, and discloses the themes of international conferences and documents (STICHT, 2000, 81).

In the 1980s and 90s culture was increasingly seen as a key component of the economic and social development strategies and of regional and local policies.

National institutions in the European framework

As is known, the cultural institutes, or the cultural centres at times, were founded in view of promoting the national culture and language abroad. They are, may or should be the mediators between the country they represent and their host country.

What were the first institutions?

The first institutes and cultural centres were founded in the 19th century. In this respect it must be underlined that there was an intrinsic link with the political concept of nation. Examples include the *Sociedade Dante Alighieri* (1889) or the *Alliance Française* founded in 1883. The *Association Française d'Action Artistique* also enjoyed prestige from 1902. In France, the *Office des Relations Publiques et de la Propagande* became public in 1919, with the mandate to disseminate the French culture abroad. In Germany, also in 1919, and later in 1925, similar institutions developed. They were the predecessors of the renowned *Goethe – Institut*, which started operating in 1932. In 1929, the Italian government in turn sponsored the *Istituto Italiano di Cultura*, represented in several European cities. The *British Council* dates from 1938.

These and other cultural institutions supported diplomatic relations between the two world wars. During World War II some served as propaganda tools. After the war they resumed their mission to disseminate the national culture abroad. In some countries like Germany, they took on a democratic character, i.e. they became more liberal during the process of European construction.

Governed by different statutes, the non-profit cultural institutions from several EU countries had representation in Paris. The *Centre Culturel Calouste Gulbenkian* of Portugal, for example, had its headquarters in Paris since 1965. Its programmes included works of art by visual artists, exhibits, concerts, conferences, workshops, film exhibitions, book promotion (the *Centre Culturel Calouste Gulbenkian* in Paris sponsored publishers and the translations of Portuguese books).

In the countries of Central Europe, which are today EU members, Poland created a prestigious *Institut Polonais Paris* (1979), and more

importantly in 1993 the *Institut Franco-Allemand-Polonais*, in Warsaw, became a key player.

Cooperation in the European context of the *Centre Culturel Roumain* (1990), for example, and of many others, at the meeting in 1995 hosted by the French Film Library translated this common intent. Indeed, this was not always the case, considering the different purposes of these cultural institutes and centres.

Reforms were needed for the ideas of *partenariat* and the importance of national and regional cultural institutions to be part of the intercultural dialogue and the spirit of the European construction, which did occur in France after 1994. The idea of dialogue between cultures assumed particular significance, despite the focus on the promotion of the national culture (Sticht, 2000, 88-89).

Cultural federation?

The *Institut Européen de la Culture* in Brussels, which was the offspring of the federation of several cultural institutes, is a paradigmatic example. However, it gave rise to the impossible. In other words, this unique project was defined by the diversity characterising the European area: the Europe of cultures.

Within the European Union, European initiatives and projects are determined by the Member States' national conceptions and interests. It should be recalled that, according to the principle of subsidiarity, the power over cultural issues derives from national policies. Consequently, there is no supranational cultural policy. And some economic and social factors interfere with the national cultural policy, which means that they highlight national values over interculturality. This harmonisation project is faced with serious difficulties. Naturally supranational or international bodies, like the Council of Europe or UNESCO, and independent initiatives and

networks, play a very important intermediary role in national cultural policies (Autissier, Anne-Marie, 2005, pp. 392-394).

As Pamela Sticht puts it: “mais il ne soit pas nécessaire de renier les différences qui caractérisent la richesse de la culture humaine” (Sticht, 2000, 118).

The enlargement of the EU to the Centre and East of Europe sought to expand a vision in which the people of Europe, united under an institutional framework, could come together for a joint security, development, prosperity, peace project. Besides the institutional mark, the integration process envisaged achieving "Europeanisation" at the political, economic, social, cultural level, among others. Nevertheless, national and regional identities did not diminish. On the contrary, in some cases, they were encouraged (Montassier, 2002, 101-130).

The construction of a “European identity” seems to be, I underscore, a difficult journey. The diversity of people, languages, and cultures justifies and explains such hardships. In brief, the “European cultural identity” is, above all, an “imagined community” for political reasons mostly (Alargament, 2006, 349-354).

Media in the mediation of European affairs

Any attempt to “Europeanise” different national and regional identities, to strengthen the European identity of the citizens of Europe, or to reinforce their sense of belonging to the EU will always depend on a far-reaching communication policy. Therefore, media are the cornerstone of the mediation in European issues.

We know very well that the media play, on the one hand, a leading part in cultural intermediation and, on the other, they foster symbolic constructions of the social reality. They may and, I add, must play a role of social integration and inclusion. However, the space of the media is one

where most excluded groups – women, immigrants, sexual minorities – are, as a rule, less represented. Consequently, resources and technology are not distributed on an equal basis between and through Diaspora groups, which is why many groups of the Diaspora use channels in their languages of origin. Therefore, interactivity and participation among and through citizens is lost.

In the case of Portugal, the communities of immigrants from Eastern European Countries, which were growing until recently, also have communication means to respond to their needs in terms of communication and the exchange of information. These include, for example, the press that keeps them connected with the countries of origin and helps with better integration in the host country.

Therefore, the strategy of European communication and media enhancement must be redesigned in order to foster greater transparency among press agents, all of which with a view to embodying “the true social, cultural and polessness of Europe” This will require that new impetus be given to communication for intensifying a "symbolic vision of identity”.

A survey conducted in Portugal, in February 2006, highlighted a broad consensus; over 2/3 of respondents pointed at the positive input of EU communication and information policies, for example, the fostering of civic participation of citizens, communication between them and Governments and developing communication networks. Moreover, it has to be underlined that 80% of respondents found that national and local media could have a key role to play in the construction of a European conscience and identity. They highlighted the dissemination of culture and local economies as the drivers.

Some of the academic respondents believed that EU policies regarding communication can be useful and vital instruments for reinforcing the European cultural identity. While others said that “both

globalisation and some 'cultural hybridisation' are more powerful forces than Community policies”

We believe it can be said that the EU information and communication policy takes the form of an instrument capable of promoting the European identity, although its failure is partly due to the lack of such identity. We are still faced with many challenges for sustaining and taking forward a cooperation and integration project. Although the political purpose of communication was laid down in the 1990s, and particularly after the year 2000, in effect the recipients are still regarded as “absorbents” and not so much interlocutors.

In conclusion, was there rather not the intention to create a virtual public space for overcoming the lack of support from citizens to the European project? (Terra, 2008, 722 and Figueiredo, 2013).

One may conclude - based on what was said before - that to the present day there is no real supranational cultural policy, nor is there a European Institute for Culture. The concept of national culture in the European context has thus prevailed.

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CHAPTER II

From the Nation of the State to the Nation of Society. The Political Challenge of the Emergence of a Cultural Polysemy of Collective Identities.

*George CONTOGEORGIS**

Abstract: *The main goal of this work is to examine the concept of nation as the identity phenomenon par excellence in forming the image of oneself and, consequently, the image of the “other”. Hence, I will explore the political stake raised by this phenomenon in as much as it is at the origins of the emergence of a project for a cultural polysemy of collective identities with regards to the former monoculturalism and the emerging doctrine of multiculturalism.*

Key words: *nation, society, state, image of the Other, collective identities*

1. The concept of nation defines the cultural community upon the foundation of which societies politically organise themselves as States. From this perspective, for the ‘nation’ to exist, the following are necessary: (a) the cultural fact, a sense of belonging to a community whose members share the same values and sense they have a parental relationship (ethnicity); and (b) the political project, the will of the cultural community

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to coagulate itself, in terms of freedom, into an autonomous political entity, as the State.

The main school of thought teaches us today that the nation represents a previously unseen phenomenon, a phenomenon invented/built by the modern State, and not an original social phenomenon.

I would like to say, from the beginning, that these two assumptions of modernity are totally wrong and ahistorical. The nation is a social phenomenon inherent for the anthropocentric societies, namely for the free people who recognise themselves through their own autonomous identity.

As a historical phenomenon, the nation appears with the emergence of anthropocentric cosmosystem, in the Hellenic era of the city-states. So then, it should be noted that the concept of “other” is to great depths different both in anthropocentric and despotic societies. In despotic cosmos the (collective) identity refers to the affiliation to a third, owner or holder of autocratic power. This means that the nation is neither a modern phenomenon, nor a specific construction of the modern State.

More precisely, in modern times the nation has emerged within anthropocentric cells that were developed under the despotic/absolutist State, in a deep relationship with the Hellenic literature. Compared to the nation at a small scale, the nation at a large scale of anthropocentric cosmosystem is profoundly different. Hellenism, that embodied the anthropocentric cosmosystem at a small-scale, built its collective (and political) identity on the fundamental society of the city-state or, later, on the cosmopolis. The modern world, having been founded on a large scale, the nation served as a collective project for the foundation of the society of the State.

This difference for the national political project is fundamental in terms of the image of the construction of the “other” and, at the same time, for the relationship to be established between the cultural community and

freedom. In the Greek world, at national level, it is the “other” who is in charge with the global political project. In the statocentric phase the national freedom of Greeks goes through the freedom of the city-states, and later, within the ecumenical phase, through the freedom of both the city-states and the metropolis located within the cosmopolis. For the moderns the political project of the nation was assumed by the unitary State and, more precisely, by the political power of the State.

In modern times the argument of nation was used, in the first instance, to remove the old regime and to deliver the political sovereignty to the legal personality of the State. In the second instance, it was used so that the doctrine of cultural homogeneity put a stop to other cultural communities to formulate their own political project. And, finally, it was used to dispose of the old regime and restore the unity of society in terms of anthropocentric parameters. It is the doctrine: “*one State, one nation, one language etc.*” As political liberalism and socialism are required to impose cultural uniformity, the *monoculturalism* calls for social culture. The “other” is considered as an enemy of the nation and, basically, of the unitary State. Hence, in the best conditions the “other” is submitted to a cultural minority status, if it is not erased on behalf of the national purity.

This political option can be explained by the fact that, starting with Europe, the transition from despotism to anthropocentrism considered as a priority the creation of a collective identity built on freedom, as well as the elementary anthropocentric presupposition, the individual freedom. Both the national and individual freedoms are, of course, compatible with a political system embodied in the State, or identified by this one, as in the old regime. In fact, in the nation State that succeeded the absolutist regime the relation between the social and the political levels does not change its nature, the society being limited outside the system, in the private space.

Thus the nation, considered as a construction of the State, has served as an argument for the property of the State on the system and to legitimise its political sovereignty upon the society. Outside of an asserted awareness, the will of the society is far away from being the purpose of politics. This is, as I have just said, the *nation of the State*, a distinct or even opposed to society concept. Henceforth, the nation of the State allows the holders of the State / system to define its will by proclaiming itself both *mandatory and mandate/principal and representative*. However, the ideological development of the concepts (as for example the vote, the citizenship, the alternation of parties in power, the liberty) or the supremacy of adjectives over the concepts (i.e. the so called direct or indirect, participatory and non-participatory democracy) allowed the categorisation of an *elective monarchy system with an oligarchic basis* in the typology of democratic systems.

Arguing that the modern political system is both democratic and representative, provided that the two systems are incompatible with each other and that, in any case, the modern political system is none of the above, is as talking about a miracle. However, this assertion is not without consequences, first of all because it teaches that the modern world has no alternative choice except authoritarian system, and its future is present time. Therefore, it escapes to the consideration of moderns that as part of this system, the global society, including any individual who could be considered as a citizen, takes the place of the “other” vis-à-vis to the holder of the economic and political system. They are excluded from the political system, with which the relationship, under the tutelage of the State, is one of affiliation and not of a partnership. The difference between the *citizen of the state* and the *citizen of political system* is typological.

The above remarks show that the question of the “other” is more synthetic than we think. The fact that modernity considered the other in

terms of his “uniqueness” prevents, in reality, the awareness of the proto-anthropocentric nature of his “biology”.

2. Our present differentiated approach to the “other” exudes from the cosmo-systemic epistemology, from a cosmosystemic restoration of cosmohistory, which is based on its own nature, the freedom. A freedom that is defined as *autonomy*, related to individual, social and political levels. I emphasize this specification, because “modernity”, with the exception of individual liberty, defines social and political freedom in terms of ‘rights’. However, ‘rights’ defines the area of individual freedom, where one is not free, that is to say autonomous. It happens in this way in the modern socio-economic and political space where the system belongs to a ‘third’ as an autonomous power.

Having the right to protest by demonstration or strike proves that the other is excluded from the economic and political system, he does not participate in the decision-making process, and, finally, he is not free/autonomous. Unawareness of this phenomenon shows that the system of values of our time prefers a socio-economic and political system that limits the social “other” to the situation of a *simple minority*. Thus, in the present state, collective / national freedom stands against the “other” national and, at the same time, it does not accept that the nation is a plural phenomenon, composed of several groups / identities. Also it ignores the issue of *the responsibility of the nation* raised by political freedom. Just the opposite, the concept of *plural nation*, such as *the responsibility of the nation*, refers to another type of State: in a *politically plural State* and beyond to a disconnection of the political system to the legal personality of the State. From the unitary State we get to the plural/polysemous state, from the State / system we get to a State / servant of the society, which henceforth embodies the political system. This new perspective of the nation and state ends by removing the status of the minority / excluded

“other”. Hence, the “other” cultural group becomes a political partner, while the social / people accessing to the political category of the society of citizens, and the individual citizen acquires partnership status in the political system.

In the past the *nation of the State* served as a given sense of progress, but it has already become a valuable argument to prevent the enlargement of the social and political space of freedom. We have even gone so far as to prevent (Hobsbawm among others) the opponents of the sovereignty of the State over society (namely the State’s one-dimensional property of political system) that their questioning will lead to the disappearance of the nation. It is clear that the possibility of a transition from the *nation of the State* to the *nation of society* terrorises especially the oligarchic intelligentsia.

3. To date we have considered the problem of the “other” as part of the fundamental society of the modern State, not being influenced by external factors. Nevertheless, the developments of the last decades, as basis of transition to a later stage in proto-anthropocentrism, determined new phenomena, that have profoundly changed the internal framework of States. I refer to the emancipation of some parameters, such as the economy and communication vis-à-vis the State, and to their profound effects in advanced societies and the Third World. The State knew the weakening of its external sovereignty and, as a consequence, its connection with the political purpose of the society. From now on, the purpose of the State is primarily oriented towards the interests of the markets, the nation being considered as a potential provider in terms of cohesion of society against the power. Similarly, to the internal “other” joins the external “other”, the emigrant, who claims a place in the common house of the national citizen.

The decision concerning the status reserved to the newcomers is related to some questions that we need to answer. First of all we need to

search for the solution to the social problem not on the spot –in the original national framework – but by studying the relocation in the host country. This phenomenon completely overturns the certainties on which the traditional ideologies were based. Thus the substitution of *the class struggle* by *a project of Christian philanthropy* gradually deserved the interest of the market proponents to relieve the social tensions from the countries of origin. At the same time, the presence of the “other” foreigner puts the citizen in a multileveled uncomfortable position: of the cultural cohesion, of working citizen, of the framework of law and welfare, of the redistribution of resources, of the citizenship and even of the connection between the political forces and the purpose of the State.

However, the remaining question is whether the economic migrants and citizens meet at the level of *metoikos* that transforms *work in a simple commodity*. There is an issue, amongst others, that shows that the actual approach is not able to answer to the new challenges. And by that I mean a new balance between the social, economic and political levels depending on many significant factors, associated with the break with the static way of our times.

It is not a coincidence that the market forces stand against the cohesion of a social body based on the nation, emphasizing the idea of the old regime that makes it depend on its belonging to the state. They accuse the *majority* – namely the society of citizens – and especially freedom, of being an enemy that is opposed to the rights of minority / of the “other”. We advance the so-called “*constitutional patriotism*” which, however, is identified with the State that exercises any perspective of a participation of society in the decision-making system.

This argument that boasts *multiculturalism* against the former *monoculturalism* hides a truth and a project: the truth is that it is power that mobilizes all coercive arsenals against the excluded, including the society,

on behalf of the nation of the State. The project belongs to the existent oligarchy that attempts *to molecularize the society of citizens* – its cultural foundations – in order to prevent it to redirect its values, to claim the sharing of the political system with the State. Because, on final analysis, the transition of the “other” from the status of minority to the status of autonomous “other” requires an establishment in the system in terms of partnership. This is the promise of transition of the political system from the current *monarchical oligarchy* to representation and, in the long term, to *democracy*. And, prior to that, it is the promise of transition from *the nation of the State* to *the nation of society*.

4. The concept of *nation of society* recommends the approach of collective identities as a phenomenon that expresses the *conscience of society*, and, on the other side, as a *culturally polysemous* phenomenon in the sense that it consists of various cultural subgroups. In spite of this, this *plural nation* asks for its own capability to accommodate the different, in a political framework going from *the State as a unitary political system* to a *plural State*.

This quality of the nation, which expresses the consciousness of a plural society, could not be satisfied either by the project of *political/constitutional patriotism*, or by the *project of multiculturalism*. The latter risks to lead to an explosion of the social, and as a consequence, of the State. The first has an incomplete character, being feed by several special factors (socio-economic and others), and, in the end, there is not a system that involves the unanimity. Now we can make the choice between the parliamentary oligarchic system and its authoritarian deviation. In the future, the citizens will have more choices between the various forms of representation or of democracy.

Nonetheless, the system (socio-economic and political) determines the status of the social, its members included. It is a fundamental element

that is able to induce the individual or a group to leave the country or to oppose to its followers. It weighs heavily with the consciousness of the society, but it cannot substitute it.

We consider that our generation, facing its deadlocks, will be quickly brought to choose between a *state of many nations or societies* (the society of citizens, the society of work, etc.), where the majority of its members will be submitted to the status of *metoikos*, and the stake of *cultural polysemy* of the collective identities in a *politically plural State*, which responsibility will belong in part (representation) or in all (democratic) to the *society of citizens*.

All things considered, the issue of the status of the “other” which opposes to the *polysemy of the national*, understood as a social phenomenon (a consciousness of society), to *monoculturalism* or *multiculturalism*, replies to the “biology” of the social and to an evolutionary typology which is inherent to the anthropocentric cosmo-system. It answers both to the question of social cohesion and to the request of the “other” to be accepted in a plural political framework based on freedom and not on the rights of the excluded. It places itself, ultimately, in the perspective of a restoration of balance, which once again will transform the society into the purpose of the State policy.

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CHAPTER III

New Narration of the EU Frontiers

*Ioan HORGA**

Abstract: *Nowadays, it has become very clear to anyone reading an article related to the frontiers of the EU how relevant the geographical-physical separation lines are for understanding the dynamics of both the EU integration and EU enlargement. No matter the analysis perspective: economic, political, social, environmental, cultural, the borders are very relevant, especially when it comes to EU. Discussing about security or external relations or other geopolitical aspects receives an increased added value if one brings into discussion the various types of borders. Danuta Hübner, Member of the European Commission responsible for Regional Policy, acknowledges the fact that discussing about frontiers of Europe is rarely about geography, ethnography or even history and more about foreign policy, security, governance.¹ This study is about borders, about frontiers and the multi-faces and multi-perspectives the European² borders and about how the study of frontiers can provide further knowledge about EU policies, EU external relations, EU development and dialogue inside EU.*

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¹ Danuta Hübner, "The Borders of Europe," (Speech delivered at The Club of Three Conference on the Frontiers of Europe, Warsaw, 3-6 February 2006), accessed September 28, 2013, <http://presseuropa.com/press-releases/danuta-hubner-member-of-the-european-commission-responsible-for-regional-policy-the-borders-of-europe-the-club-of-three-conference-on-the-frontiers-of-europe-warsaw-3-february-2006>.

² We use in this article "EUropean" in order to emphasise the difference between EU related aspects (EU politics, EU borders) and European which might also be seen as related to the whole Europe.

Key words: *borders, cultural identity, deepening, widening, enlargement, integration*

History proves how important borders were from ancient times, although until recently their study was neglected. A lot of the world's conflict were and still are related to borders in their various forms: states went on war for preserving or for further expanding their borders, states went on war when their borders were trespassed, states involved in many actions to stretch their economic and political borders; history witnessed even situations when cultural borders or religious borders collided and fueled violent conflicts.³ Borders were subjects, objects and at the same time rewards in wars, in this sense “borders are scars of history”.⁴ But borders are also subjects and reasons for cooperation, dialogue. Despite all these facts, scholars just recently, became preoccupied in studying the impact of borders on politics, economy, international relations, culture and people.

The paper tries to explore the challenge that establishes the identity borders of the EU raise upon the study of its external relations and the communication of the European policies. The connection between borders, external relations, policies and identity can be very easily resumed by the fact that borders serve as demarcations of both the territory and sovereignty of one state as well as of its identity. Without knowing which is the subject of your policies and the territory under your jurisdiction and which is the end of this jurisdiction it is hard to design both internal and external policies. As well, without knowing who you are and how you want to be

³ For example: the conflicts heated by the propagation and promotion of various religions, Crusades. Samuel Huntington spoke about the advent of a possible clash of civilisations, or cultures.

⁴ Carsten Yndigejn, “Between Debordering and Rebordering Europe: Cross-Border Cooperation in Øresund Region or the Danish-Swedish Border Region,” *Eurasia Border Review* 2, 1 (Summer 2011), 48, accessed September 20th, 2013, http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/publicn/eurasia_border_review/ebr2/4_yndigejn.pdf.

perceived by the others it is hard to draft and implement policies and engage in external relations and to properly explain, communicate your policies. To put it plain and simple, we can use as an example J. Anderson's explanation of the role of borders: "The modern state with its sovereignty defined by familiar territorial boundaries, seems as firmly rooted as ever; tax-collectors stop at the borders, immigrants are stopped at the same border and transnational linkages can still be snapped off by independent state power." (Anderson 1995, 1) The territoriality "classifies, communicates and controls by drawing borders, assigning things to particular spaces and regulating cross-border movements and access in or out specified areas". (Anderson et al. 2003, 6) We will not linger on the definitions and functions of boundaries as one of the articles comprised within this chapter, "European Union Identity's Borders as Tools for Differentiating Inside-Outside EU's Policies," provides enough insight on this theoretical issues.

An important point in this article will be to explain how identity borders need to be understood, how they are influencing EU policing and intra as well as extra communitarian relations between member states, nations, peoples and various sub-groups as well as to show how the public perception about EU borders and policies are constructed and influenced by the media. In this essay we aimed to first shortly explain the importance of the study of borders in general, to move later on to a more particular problem regarding EU borders, namely how these influence EU policing, and more specifically, to explain the impact of border on the enlargement policy and integration dynamics as well as how these major EU preoccupations influence the roles and functions of borders

The EU has survived the end of Cold War, and its evolution became closer to the project that its founding fathers had in their minds and hearts, that were seen as unreachable dreams by those who did not grantee many

chances to the European Union. There are two important aspects that deserve an increased attention as they had the role to develop the EU and the prosperity of Member States and the welfare of their citizens and increase, at the same time, its potential power and influence at international level. These two aspects that were a constant preoccupation for the EU institutions and that proved to grant its survival and transformation are the enlargement and the integration. Both are related to the study of borders and both influenced and were at their turn influenced by frontiers. The processes of widening and deepening EU made subject of many analysis and proved to be very challenging and controversial, opinions being split about how these influence one another. There is on the one hand the perception that the two go hand in hand and are in a direct relationship as further enlargement contributes to further integration, so that widening is enhancing deepening. At the opposite pole it is argued that widening and deepening are in an indirect relation: the more the EU enlarges the more difficult to deepen the integration and cohesion will be. Despite our title, the borders and the two processes are not in an adversary relation, but in a direct relation linking the processes of deepening and widening and the re-bordering and de-bordering. As EU enlarges, the borders change and we witness a re-bordering of EU. As EU deepens its integration we witness a de-bordering inside EU related to specific identity borders: economic, political, cultural, as specific demarcations/barriers are removed.

Deepening versus Widening or Deepening via Widening?

Enlargement is sometimes seen as a dynamic within the process of European integration, in the sense that widening is perceived as a horizontal integration, while deepening was seen as a vertical integration (ex. the transfer of competences and changes at the decision-making at

EUropean level).⁵ There are more definitions of deepening and widening, but we will refer just to one: EU deepening can be defined as “a rise in scope and level of European integration in terms of institution-building, democratic legitimacy and European policies affecting both the EU's polity an policies, being therefore a process of gradual vertical institutionalism”, while EU widening was broadly defined as a process of “gradual and formal institutionalization, a process of geographical spill-over”. (Umbach and Hofmann 2009, 6) Regarding the divergent opinions on the mutual relationship and interdependence between deepening and widening we can bring into discussion few perspectives. For example, in 2007, the Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn argued that “deepening and enlargement are not contradictory, but complementary. It is the amalgam of the two that has made the Europe of today stronger, more powerful and more influential.”⁶ In accordance with this declaration, other scholars argue that widening in fact has a meaningful impact on deepening, as it generates new pressures for the reform of institutional structures and for a better implementation of EU policies. (Umbach and Hofmann 2009, 9)

Such perception might prove valid if we consider the fact that in the last decade EU almost doubled the number of member states and at the same time it gained unprecedented powers and competences, especially after Lisbon Treaty. Also, as Ray Hudson observes, the EU not only increased the number of its member states, but actively involved in constructing itself. In the 1960s it is considered that progress towards deepening economic integration was rapid enough during these years being created a customs union, a common

⁵ Gaby Umbach and Andreas Hofmann, “Towards a Theoretical Link between EU Widening and Deepening,” (Paper presented at the EUSA Eleventh Biennial International Conference, Los Angeles, 23-25 March 2009), 3, accessed September 20, 2013, http://aei.pitt.edu/33151/1/umbach_gaby.pdf.

⁶ Olli Rehn, “Europe's Great Challenge: How to Combine Political Deepening and Gradual Enlargement?,” (Speech delivered at the National School of Administration (ENA), Strasbourg, 20 June 2007), accessed September 20, 2013, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-07-410_en.pdf.

external tariff and the Common Agricultural Policy. Within this period there were established the economic borders of the EU. After the 60s, the process of deepening slowed, mainly because the Communities started to be preoccupied about widening. With the 1980s though the process of vertical integration accelerated as new forms of supra-national regulations emerged, it was created a common market and later on in the 1999 a single euro currency. At the same time, the borders of the single market as well as those of the Eurozone did not coincide anymore with the borders of the member states, as some were included and other were not included in the Euro-zone. (Hudson 2000, 411- 413) Drawing new types of borders inside the EU had consequences upon its unity, as no matter how they are defined, borders serve also the role of obstacles and demarcation lines. Re-bordering inside EU lead to the creation of divisions between those who were members of the areas of deeper economic integration and those who weren't, it also lead to the emergence of a two speed EU, clearly separated by the economic frontiers of the euro-zone. This shows how borders have a significant impact upon the deepening of the EU in a negative manner as it lead to the creation of two spaces with different identities and of a division between insiders and outsiders within the EU borders.

For economists deepening means the implementation of the four freedoms in economic relations among member states and the transfer of certain economic competences from national to the supranational level. (Jurgen 1977, 39) From this perspective we might argue that widening, in the sense of enlarging EU is in fact actively contributing to the deepening of the economic integration as new markets open, new people can travel and work freely inside EU, it is deepening the integration from a quantitative point of view. The same might happen if a de-bordering happens concerning the euro-zone and new members join the area that can be seen for the moment as the maximum of economic integration

implemented at the EU level. The economic borders can be seen as the demarcation between two economic systems, two markets between which there are certain relationships. (Şoproni 2013, 54-61) Thus from the point of view of re-bordering and de-bordering we can say that removing some political and economic frontiers between the member states will cause a deeper integration.

Ignoring the possibility that in a sense a more larger, diverse EU with more members might be harder to be cohesive and the process of decision making might be hardened, in practice, widening and deepening worked as mutual reinforcing elements for one another, as mutual preconditions for the other's successful achievement. Allan F. Tatham exemplifies (Tatham 2009, 3) this correlation observing the chronological succession of events: the first enlargement was preceded by the adoption of the Common Fisheries Policy and a new Regional Policy, the second and third enlargements were accompanied signed the Single European Act and its single market, a deeper social policy and greater powers for the European Parliaments. The fifth and sixth enlargements were followed by a deeper political integration and a EU institutional deepening after the signing of Amsterdam and Nice Treaties, the discussions about the Constitutional Treaty and in 2007 by the signing of the Lisbon Treaty that moved to another level the integration of the external relations fields. It can be said that the enlargements have increased the EU's weight at international level and brought economic benefits and at the same time contributed at the removal of some political barriers, overall acting as a “catalyst for economic growth and modernisation in the EU”. (Ruiz- Jimenez and Torreblanca 2008, 5-6) So, EU not only increased the number of members, its population and GDP, but it also suffered qualitative changes with each enlargement. (Haukkala 2006)

Before widening happens, member states and the EU institutions have to agree upon the enlargement conditions, this implies a process of accommodation of interests for providing a unitary response. (Landuyt 2012, 8) Thus, with any widening of the EU, it can be said that the cooperation between EU member states deepened. Thomas Plumper and Christina J.Schneider argue that the conflicts regarding enlargement mainly resulted from the redistributive effects (Plumper and Schneider 2007, 568) of the widening, thus, depending on the losses and gains a member state will oppose or not. So states will negotiate before any widening takes place, creating new interactions and cooperation patterns.

Deepening and Widening EU Implications over the Processes of De-bordering and Re-bordering

Analyzing identity borders, it can be addressed the issue of why considering that deepening and widening are not going hand in hand. Neglecting the argument related to the fact that a larger EU will be a less cohesive and less united on various policy matters, we can see how widening affected deepening. Widening EU means moving some borders, in the sense of enlarging the area of freedom of movement of people, goods and services and capital. Enlarging meant eliminating the borders that were hindering these freedom, a process of de-bordering, and building or highlighting new borders, those of the new member states with non-member states in order to mark the area of such freedoms, a process of re-bordering. But while EU was widening it was at the same time creating mechanisms and instruments to allow it to deepen the integration, in some cases these instruments concluded in the creation of an area of single currency or in a area where internal borders truly vanished in the sense that the borders were not anymore subjects of border checks, the Schengen zone. These areas are clearly delimited by certain frontiers, that were not

immediately lifted with the accession of new member states into the EU, so from the point of their creation, enlargement was not necessarily enhancing deepening as there was no widening within these areas, moreover, deepening integration between new members and old members was hindered as the cohesion between the categories of member states is not so easy to be truly achieved when there are some borders between them.

Put it in another words de-bordering can be seen as underpinned by the process of Europeanisation and the notions of supranational citizenship and identity. (McCall 2012, 214) European integration and the enlargement of the EU can be considered the major factors in the de-bordering of Europe, as EU integration changed borders from being markers of demarcation to symbols of a past to be overcome. (Yndigejn 2013, 50) Considering the fact that borders shape identities, trying to build a EU citizenship and a EU identity could be easily achieved if the borders between EU citizens vanish and those of the EU with the non-EU countries are made more visible. So de-bordering leads in this case to re-bordering. Especially after 9/11 the de-bordering became more a re-bordering as for security issues the Union felt the need to better secure its external frontiers. After terrorism was considered a threat to EU, the re-bordering and hardening of the external frontier of the European Union lead to a certain deepening of EU member states cooperation in the fields of border control and security cooperation.

The processes of de-bordering and re-bordering can be linked to globalisation. In a larger sense we can see also globalisation as a reason for deepening and widening EU. In order to adapt to globalisation and take advantage of opportunities while being careful at the threats, the EU widening and deepening could be seen as offering EU a chance to increase its influence power and its economic and political leverages. According to Walters the globalisation encompasses a meaning of quasi-borderless world

being expected a de-bordering at global level, but according to him, this tendency of de-bordering is more an actual re-bordering of states and actors, territoriality shifting rather than diminishing. He offers the example of the de-bordering implied by the Schengen Agreements that led to the abolishment of internal border controls within EU, similar with the completion of internal market. He observes that softening the internal frontiers implied in practice a hardening of the external frontiers of the EU and of the surveillance and controls. (Rieckmann et al. 2010, 152) This reflects “the ongoing dualism of European politics”. (Yndigegn 2013, 46) With de-bordering the EU internal borders became premises for integration and inclusion, while re-bordering of external frontiers allowed it to increase political cooperation and deepen the integration of security and defence related aspect.⁷

Nowadays, there are authors who argue that “when confronted with other borders in the world, EU inner borders seem to be particularly boring, as they seem to have become irrelevant”⁸, and the focus should be shifted to the outer borders which have hardened. This affirmation reflects the fact that today the removal of internal border controls is something people got used to and therefore the impact and implications the external frontiers have upon EU policies is far more interesting. It might be true, but at the same time inside EU remain various identity borders that worth to be analysed as they can have an impact upon the EU's policies and the EU social cohesion and unity.

In the article “European Union Identity’s Borders as Tools for Differentiating Inside-Outside EU’s Policies”, Alina Mogos (Mogoş 2013:

⁷ Michelle Comelli et al., “From Boundary to Borderland: Transforming the Meaning of Borders in Europe through the European Neighbourhood Policy,” Deliverable D40 within the Project No. 513416, EU-CONSENT Wider Europe, Deeper Integration? Constructing Europe Network, 31 July 2006, 4.

⁸ Martin van der Velde, “Boring European Borders?! Integration and Mobility across Borders,” *Eurasia Border Review* 3, 1 (Spring 2012), 115, accessed September 27, 2013, http://srch.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/publicn/eurasia_border_review/ebr3/velde.pdf.

36- 51) offers a valuable analysis of the way EU external frontiers can serve as tools for defining and differentiating the European society, identity, citizenship and policing. At the same time the study explains the concept of border, border identity, the relationship between borders and identity and exemplifies which might be the consequences of the existence of more EU identities within the geographic borders of Community. According to the author, identities and borders are self-constituting concepts. Alina Mogoş emphasises the difficulties in defining which EU's true identity is and how the overlapping identities affect the organisation's policing inside and outside its borders. Within this paper, the author explains the changes that the Schengen Agreements, and the adjoining de-bordering and re-bordering processes had upon the concept of frontier, the inside-outside relationship and how this Agreement contributed to both increasing integration, deepening cooperation and uniting the EU, and at the same time created new dividing lines between EU member states that are Schengen members and those who are not. The last part of its paper illustrates how borders serve as tools for defining inside-outside EU policies. It illustrates very well the challenge of identity borders in policing both within EU, but especially outside EU. It brings into attention not only how difficult it is to define the identity of the EU, but also what implication can have the overlapping identities and overlapping frontiers upon the process of deepening EU policies.

Within the article it is emphasised the way the issue of migration is tackled inside EU as well as outside, the existence of different identity borders is proved by the fact that intra-migration is a problem. From the point of view of how EU policies are communicated, the author explains what implications can have the way EU portrays itself as a fortress or as a welcoming land as well as how different EU member states relate to each other and to the EU. The migration issue is very much linked to the

question of widening and deepening EU and the retaining of some identity borders inside EU. As Martin O. Heisler, quoted by Alina Mogoş, explains, migrants do not belong to a certain territory; therefore their presence requires explanation and justification that can take either a pro-migration stance or an anti-migration one. (Heisler 2001, 228- 229) Integrating new member states into Schengen Area and removing the barriers for workers inside EU is part of a process of deepening vertical integration. Simply widening the area without being prepared to allow the integration of the new member states into Community's various areas is not the best way of deepening EU as this article shows it up by providing the examples of the way Romania was depicted by Great Britain's policy-makers and media, similar to how Spain was treated when it had to integrate into the Schengen Area. Despite de-bordering process, the issue of intra-EU migration proves that the borders still exist and the citizens of various member states still have to be integrated as citizens of the EU, as subjects that belong to the whole EU territory. This essay shows that EU has both boundary-removing and boundary-constructing features, that while it removes some barriers it establishes others. (Geddes 2003, 84) As the concluding recommendations of this article point out, it is very important that EU avoids creating unnecessary barriers inside its geographic borders, barriers that could lead to the creation of a “club-in-the-club” (Berglof 2008, 133) that would hinder confidence and solidarity among EU people and the creation of a solid European identity. The euro-zone could be perceived as a inner club inside EU to the member states that by economic reasons are not able to meet the Maastricht criteria, same goes for the Schengen Area, (Berglof 2008, 137) the feeling of not-belonging to these areas combined with the perception of a inner club might diminish the emergence of an EU identity. Certainly, if the EU it is not clearly demarcated, with insiders not accepting identical obligations with some not enjoying same opportunities,

while some outsiders enjoy privileged access, (Hill 2002, 105) it is difficult to EU to properly communicate its external policies.

The article of Adrian C. Pop, “Media misconceptions concerning identity borders in communication of EU policies” (Pop 2013, 52- 62), explores how the press covers and explains the EU enlargement and the changing of frontiers, both from a quantitative point of view, as well as from a qualitative perspective, aiming to identify the common misconceptions when dealing with European identity borders. Speaking about EU policies there is an important element that cannot be ignored even if one speaks about deepening or widening EU or changing borders, and that is the people public opinion. In October 2006, the European Parliament stressed “the importance of taking into account public acceptance of enlargement and the responsibility of Europe's political leaders in explaining to the public the goals and mutual advantages of enlargement and integration. (Ruiz – Jimenez and Torreblanca 2008, 1) But as the article of Adrian C. Pop shows, the media are the main transmitters of information and play an important role in the opinion-formation. Adrian C. Pop tries to answer to the questions if the media influences the citizens' perception on EU's border and if the media is engaged in reproducing mass stereotypes or they contribute to reinforce the European reality.

Monitoring the period of the last 2004 and 2007 enlargements, Adrian C. Pop has chosen United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France and Romania and one quality newspaper from each country, respectively - *The Times*, *Le Monde*, and *Adevărul* in order to reveal the role of mass media in promoting the EU. From the author's point of view the European identity consists of a complex compound of religious, cultural, social and political elements brought together by the joint history. Adrian C. Pop cites Carlos Eduardo Pacheco Amaral who argues that “Europe is not built. Europe needs to be built.” (Pacheco – Amaral 2009:

168) This assumption reflects very well why it is important the analysis undergone by Adrian C. Pop. He finds out that the journalists' knowledge of EU policies has a great influence upon the agenda of the media and how news is presented or it is omitted from any public debate. At the same time, the citizens are pretty much influenced by the media in forming their opinion about political issues, this rendering even more important the role of the media.

Adrian C. Pop observed a topic that appeared during both rounds of EU enlargements: Turkey's accession to the European Union, which the author considers as a way of the media to address the concern for keeping safe the European values. In his concluding remarks, Adrian C. Pop holds the view that the EU's policy offers the framework for harmonising all national media into a pan-European media, and that among the methods to increase public awareness and understanding of EU issues, EU's self-communication should be more salient as the coverage of EU affairs is poorly achieved and EU's visibility lower than necessary. Very valuable are the recommendations that Adrian C. Pop provides at the end of its article related to how stopping the dissemination of misconceptions concerning the EU affairs and the EU's borders. This article reflects another challenge of communicating EU's policies raised both by the complexity of the border identity study, with which journalists are very unfamiliar, and by the fact that the EU and the member states do not make the necessary efforts to raise public awareness about their policies.

Centring upon the European Union's unique political dimension, Ana Maria Ghimiş in "Communicating the EU political priorities as the EU member states' national preferences as the new external communication of the EU" (Ghimiş 2013, 52-62) unfolds along four major thematic axis. In a first moment, following a brief introduction, the text looks at the EU as a "normative and soft power", exploring its neighbourhood policy as

instrument to the production of a “high degree of security, predictability and openness to cooperation” along the three distinct frontier regions of Europe, Mediterranean, Caucasian and Eastern European. It is grounded upon the perception that instead of being “hard shells”, radically separating the EU from its enviroing spaces, Europe’s frontiers are permeable and no longer capable of ensuring that what goes on in the adjacent countries does not impact directly, negatively, upon the EU itself. Accordingly, instead of being alien to Europe, these spaces, their peoples and their economic, political, social and security requirements represent, instead, manifest interests of the Union. Instead of foreign, they are Europe’s neighbours and partners as well. Adopting a case study perspective, the article goes on, in a second and third moment, to focus on the security dimension, looking, in a first moment, to the Georgian war and the Abkhazian and Ossetian tensions, as well as to Transnistria, charting both the challenges they present to Europe and the reactions of the EU and of the member-states. The section ends with a dual presentation of the Georgian war as, simultaneous, a success and a failure. A fourth moment is dedicated to the Cypriot financial crisis and its repercussions, particularly upon Russia’s interest in Europe. The article closes with an extensive bibliography and a few recommendations regarding what the author perceives to be the strengths and the weaknesses in Europe’s presentation of its political priorities to its neighbours and partners, especially to the Russian Federation.

The article “Participative democracy and fostering of EU neighbour constructive relations” of Alina Stoica, is devoted to the “return to Europe” of Central and South-East European states and to the challenges of contemporary participatory democracy. (Stoica 2013, 140- 154) Starting with an exercise of conceptual archaeology, the author looks at the concept of governance, charting its emergence and development, particularly with reference to the works of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. Linking

governance to democratic life, the text addresses the known problem of “democratic deficit” of the EU, looking at the new possibilities open at the European level to citizen participation, not merely in terms of participation at European elections – important as that is in itself –, but mainly in terms of participation in public debate and contributing to the emergence of a European public sphere. After identifying and exploring the mechanism of “citizen’s initiative” foreseen in the Treaty on European Union for the presentation of European legislative proposals, the author borrows Sherry Arnstein’s “Ladder of citizen participation” to present the eight hierarchical stages of citizen political involvement, from non-participation manipulation, at the bottom, to citizen control of political life, at the top. In a following moment, it addresses the legal framework of the EU regarding decisional transparency, both within the EU and at its Eastern border, understood as the mechanisms that are made available to citizens for the monitoring of the quality of its actions, particularly with regard to fighting corruption and ensuring good government. In this context, particular attention is paid to HURO cross border program as well to the work of the Soros and the Carpathian Foundations. A final section is reserved for an in depth discussion of the “role of public debate in cross-border cooperation in the EU”. Aiming at a broad, European, analysis, the text focuses on Romania where the author identifies a low level of citizen participation in the political life, ensuing from a high degree of impreparation of its citizens. From that discussion, the article looks at possible roles for NGO’s in promoting a stronger participation of citizens in national and European democratic life. And, opening itself to Eastern Europe, in general, concludes with an original and most interesting discussion of selected academic experiences across borders and their impact upon, not only the scientific community, but also in the political empowerment of civil society at large.

Alina Oros shifts our attention Westward, from the Eastern to the Atlantic frontiers of the EU, to Europe's maritime periphery and ultra-periphery which, (Oros 2013, 169- 182) extending the continent westwards, all the way to the central Atlantic and to the Caribbean, as well as southwards to the Indian and the Pacific Oceans, imprint upon the Union a truly planetary dimension. Pushing the physical frontiers of Europe across the globe, these spaces, the author argues, constitute important agents in the communication to the outside of Europe's political priorities. Accordingly, following an introductory presentation of these Western spaces of the EU and grounded upon a solid bibliography, the text unfolds addressing three major themes: firstly, the level at which these spaces are representative of the EU, secondly, the means and instruments available to them for such a task, and thirdly, the kinds of frontiers they establish with their neighbouring environments.

The demands of contemporary life, and the complexity that ensues from them, dictate the incapacity of the sovereign state to constitute an adequate framework of either domestic or international order. Paradigmatic of this novel reality is the increasing erosion of the traditional cleavage between internal and external affairs, which requires an increasing sharing of traditional sovereign responsibilities of the states with the Union, as well as with its regions. In this context, the author looks at the emergence and consolidation of the regions in Europe throughout the twentieth century as political agents of their own right, both domestically, within the context of their respective states, and internationally, across frontiers, in the European Union and in the international system. Centring attention upon a very particular subset of European regions, the Outermost regions of the EU, which are presented with competent care and interest, the author underlines their importance at three fundamental levels. Firstly, in terms of the large maritime spaces they open up to the Union and the value they represent, particularly in

the context of maritime and environmental matters. Secondly, in terms of the opportunities for cross-border cooperation at the planetary level that they represent. And thirdly, at the level of the opportunities they offer in terms of the External affairs of the Union, while outright platforms, scattered across the planet allowing for an effective planetary projection of the EU.

The analysis offered by Edina Mészáros highlight the gradual development of European policies toward migration and the perceived threats associated with it. (Mesazros 2013, 209- 236) The great contribution of her paper consist in the in depth analysis of discourse of national and European leaders in relation with the perception of the situation as well as the options for managing different security consequences. The main challenge for EU is to manage the dual features of its borders as access points but also surveillance ones. As the European Security Strategy states, the first line of defence will often be abroad and the borders became relevant in securing the Union.

The differentiation between the particular character of Southern and Eastern borders, and the correspondent migration flows requires distinct approaches both for the Union and its specialised agencies as well for national authorities. The concluding remarks are suggesting that the Union is still in search to promote policies and develop specific instruments in order to contain the negative effects of illegal immigration and a more integrated approach might be included within a stronger supranational approach.

In conclusion we find out that the European Union achievements are many, but maybe among the most important one is the fact that it managed to bring peace among historic former enemies and it made them invest and work together in developing this “supranational institutionalised framework”. For explaining the creation of the European Union, new theories were developed, like the integration theories, while others become

more salient, like the constructivism. Although they become influential during the last two decades, the border/frontier studies were very much influenced by the European Union's transformations which became subject of many books and articles that were mainly concerned with the study of borders. Studying the EU frontiers proved to be a constant *new narration* given the evolution of this organisation and the continuous changes.

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CHAPTER IV

Freedom – a Condition for Positioning of the Individual in Society: Legal and Moral Issues

*Ludmila ROȘCA**

If you are grave, you will not be treated with disrespect.

If you are generous, you will win all.

If you are sincere, people will repose trust in you.

If you are earnest, you will accomplish much

If you are kind, this will enable you to employ the services of others.

(The Analects of Confucius, Book XVII, Ch. 6)

Abstract: *The actuality of this investigation is justified by several openings / orientations of the individual who wants to live with dignity, be helpful to his fellows and to the community, but does not know what to do in order to attain his existential goal. The object of this research is the individual who consciously assumes the responsibility of the roles imposed by the social environment. If every person would meditate only for a few moments upon the roles that he performs as a student / teacher / employee of the company, friend / spouse / grandfather / son / nephew, citizen / member of a party / member of an NGO etc., then he would notice that satisfying all the components of a human being (biological, psychological, socio-cultural) is a complex problem that each of us takes responsibility for. Taking responsibility, at its turn, is manifested in duty, devotion,*

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correctness of behaviour and communication. Between the components of human existence there is interdependence, leading to the fact that a failure in one of the sub-systems has negative repercussions among other components. Fails at work, for example, lead to insomnia, bad communication with family members, lack of self-contentedness, the consequences of all of these producing severe dysfunctions at the biological and physiological levels, or, otherwise saying – illness.

Key words: *individual, social environment, choice, differences*

We live in world overloaded with risks and challenges. We wish to overcome each situation with dignity, but a lot of times our intentions don't meet the expectations of other people. Because of this, people suffer and the failure of others to assess this moment can lead to changes in the components of the mental life of a person. We hurry, we suffocate from the exteriorization of mental life, we continue not to pay attention and after a while ask ourselves when did our good, benevolent, caring, focused on finalities in actions fellow turns into a cruel, indifferent, and careless stranger. In our opinion, here is concentrated the cause of lack of interpersonal communication, of failed destinies, of personal breakdowns, which usually give way to suffering and frustrations.

A theoretical support of human potential exploitation is practical philosophy, human ontology. (Roşca 2013, 93-134) Philosophers affirm that every community crystallizes its ideals, interpreting their content through various means, and imposing them as moral or legal norms. From the diversity of interpretations of norms, values, and life-styles, each person – autonomously, through self-training, or with the help of a professional in the field of education – can reach to self-understanding, a process reflected by the Hegelian triad: individual conscience (thesis), social conscience

(antithesis), and self-consciousness (synthesis). In Hegel's work, man is defined through the unity of matter and spirit, a unity in which the Idea may take the form of self-consciousness, an elaborated form of individual conscience. Hegel affirms that man not only perceives himself as a material individuality, but is aware of his self-consciousness as a spiritual individuality. In this context, it is very important for the human community at any level of organization (family, rural, urban, national, regional, and global) to create favourable conditions and to monitor the process of socialization of the individual, the ultimate purpose of which is the integration of the person in social structures, attaining self-sufficiency through constant reproduction of the unity of the components of the human being. Following Hegelian triad independently or guided from thesis to synthesis depends on the willingness / intention of the person to adapt to the natural environment of life, to integrate into the social milieu, to find himself into all of his actions, and to fully exploit his freedom.

Man asserts himself in the social group through everything he does. He decodes and realizes his own potential. It is simple and yet very complicated, because the act of choice is a subjective and personal one, but its effects often influence the existence of the objective world. For this reason, although the individual choice is and has to be a free act, it implies assuming responsibility for its positive or negative influences. Choice is a socio-human phenomenon designating the intermediate segment between two complex processes: knowledge and action. Choice as a final act of the cognitive process is multidimensional and has a complex motivation. The success and efficiency of individual activity depend on the significance of the degree of awareness of the choice. Usually people act following customs, habits, and traditions. As a result of the simplification of choice by reducing the cognitive process to a simple comparison or incorrect

analogy, the contemporary man risks not only to rot his destiny, but to condemn himself to an arbitrary, random existence.

The analyses of choice, the characterization of rational choice and of factors that influence it, involve highlighting and enhancement of several phenomena, the most important among them being motivation, desires / needs, preferences, freedom, duty, responsibility, satisfaction, pleasure, happiness etc. At each stage of development of the socio-cultural process their content is altered. The choice should be correlated with change, and it is supposed to be before the latter's realization. Kant emphasized that every change that occurs in the order of nature has a cause: it is a law of intellect from which we are not allowed to deviate, no matter of reason. (Kant 2002) This thesis initiates the analysis of freedom's autonomy, the conclusion of which is the following: any event is tied up in a web of required causal links. Everyone is considered the author of his own actions, which he produces without being influenced by external constraints.

An important problem faced by any person, any moral agent, is that of the choice of goals. Kant noted that the choice of goals should start with the understanding of the type of transcendental freedom that arises from the worldview of the person. In this context, freedom lies in choosing a goal for me. Any derivation of a person's goals from another, outer, source is equivalent with the submissiveness of the person in relation to the source. Any natural process that governs the actions of a person decreases his own freedom. In this way the person becomes a passive tool of natural forces. Finally, Kant concludes: "I act freely whenever I act, and unfreely whenever some other agency acts through me".

Multiple controversies produce Kant's following statements: I am the author of an action whenever I decide to act based only on its evaluation. I do not check my desires, interests or "other empirical conditions", because by doing so I would comply with natural causality. I do nothing else than

meditate upon the action and choose it for itself as a goal *per se*. this is the paradigm of free action: an action that relies only on reason. Such an action cannot be attributed to any natural force, to any causal “empirical” chain. It occurs spontaneously, as a result of a rational process and of individual will. We could discuss on Kant’s thesis that the individual retains his freedom of choice only when the choice is appreciated as a goal in itself. In social practice multiple difficulties occur, especially when people are motivated by a “causal empirical chain”.

In the work *Lectures on the philosophy of history* Hegel comes in support of Kant’s assertions mentioning if we are said that generally freedom is the possibility to act as you wish, such a representation can only be considered as a total lack of culture of thought, where there is no trace of free will, law, morality, etc. (Hegel 2001) Individual’s choice, isolated from everything else, is the result of arbitrary circumstances. Therefore, it is not absolutely free.

Starting with the statement that people live in a certain society, Hegel convinces us that we are shaped by this society and by the historical time we live in. From this perspective, individual freedom is nothing else than the freedom to act as we are obliged. Some of desires of the individual are the product of his nature. Here we can refer to the need to feed ourselves, a need the individual is born with. Other individual desires originate in the process of training and education. No matter of their origin, biological or social, it is important to know that we don’t choose our desires. Because of this, our activity impelled by desire is not free. And if we eliminate from the motivation of human activity the desire/preference, then what is left? In Kant’s practical philosophy is mentioned that what is left is reason. Action should be base only on reason. We could talk endlessly about the actions and consequences of these in the case of a rational person, and that of an irrational one. The evaluation of these activities is possible only in relation

to ultimate goals of the actors. The only type of action that does not result from individual desires, be them innate or socially conditioned, is the action that is consistent with categorical imperative. Only the action performed in accordance with the categorical imperative can be free. “If duty is a concept that is to contain significance and actual legislation for our actions, then this duty could be expressed only in categorical imperatives”. (Kant 2002, 42)

Describing the categorical imperative, Kant states that it imposes only on the basis of reason, which removes the differences between rational agents according to their desires, interests, ambitions, and all the “empirical conditions” that circumscribe their actions. The categorical imperative opens a new perspective for individual activity, placing it outside of individual experience, therefore could be adopted by any rational being. Kant emphasized that one does better in moral judging always to proceed in accordance with the strict method and take as ground the universal formula of the categorical imperative: Act in accordance with that maxim which can at the same time make itself into a universal law. (Kant 2002, 42)

Analyzing different opinions about the man, especially those designating the fundamental differences of the man as biological species and as subject of social relations: *Homo sapiens* (rational being) and *Homo faber* (being able to produce working tools), Mihai Ralea highlights their insufficiency.

The Romanian philosopher claimed that “humanity is more than the ability to think. It is all that fabric of affects, noble or ignoble feelings, passions and obsessions, complications (...), beliefs (...) or doubts, hopes, desires. The human encompasses the intellectual, moral, unconscious, and emotional forces”. (Ralea 1972, 33) All the assessments that highlight the manifestations of human beings are unquestionably important for understanding the motivation of a choice or a decision. Mihai Ralea

mentioned that man is a creator of obstacles, in order to have some freedoms. In communities that adopt the norms of the model of liberal democracies, where the emphasis is on individual freedom, the assimilation of the concept of freedom by each member is very important.

The phenomenon of individual freedom is a complex one and its theoretical concept reflects several aspects, among which the most important are the philosophical/moral and legal ones. Liberty consists in being able to do everything that is not harming others; so, the exercise of natural rights has no limits while it ensures the exercise of the same rights for the other members of the society. The philosopher Constantin Radulescu-Motru applies the concept of individual freedom when defining the personality, emphasizing: to not be free means to be obedient to moral and biological imperatives. A free man is the one who managed to rise and to approximate the norms of social life. The philosopher states, as well, that the man perfected by culture is a free one. (Rădulescu – Motru 1984)

From legal point of view freedom means the possibility of a person to think and act in accordance with the opinions about the needs and desires, of achieving his goals, and, in this way, succeeding in the objective world. In the legal sense, freedom is a social value promoted, developed, and protected by legal norms, meaning that human personality finds its display in the established freedoms ensured by the rule of law. In legal literature there is a difference between freedom as an attribute of human being and freedom as a fundamental right of the citizen. In the first meaning, freedom presupposes the possibility of a person to move, accompanying all its social manifestations, and being included in the concept of inviolability of the person. In the second meaning, it appears as a set of rights recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution.

Individual freedom is a fundamental human right. Fundamental rights are individual rights and indispensable for the free development of

personality, which are listed and guaranteed by rules as statements of rights, constitutions or basic laws. As a fundamental human right, freedom of the individual is a major component of the human condition, an imperative imposed by the need for progress of contemporary society. As a member of a community, the man has a set of rights and freedoms and the rights and freedoms, which are recognized as far as their transposition, in fact, depend on the economic, social and political situation of each country. Denying or suppressing individual liberty, fundamental rights, equals to person's oppression, with braking development and social progress, as far as manifestation without any limit to individual freedoms creates the danger of anarchy and leads to the disintegration of the organic unity of life of the community represented. Of the community wishing to avoid extremes, the state of freedom of the person is a subject to the regulation rules of law, which determine the content and determine its scope, giving himself a "status libertatis" of the person. In these circumstances, freedom is a social value conditioned by the state of our society, which by regulatory plan takes the form of the right to valorize all the qualities, attributes, interests and legitimate desires of the person. Article 25 of Moldovan Constitution stipulates that "liberty and security of the person are inviolable". For the first time on the European continent individual freedom is mentioned in the first British constitutional act *Magna Charta Libertatum* of 1215 in Article 19, which provided that "no freemen shall be taken or imprisoned or diseased or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land". (*Magna Charta Libertatum*) Also by this act, Article 36 strengthens the institution of judicial review of the lawfulness of the arrest of the accused and the possibility to release the guarantee institution in Britain and by the Charter of Freedoms, which later is known as a procedure for the protection of the individual as "habeas

corpus”. The procedure of “habeas corpus” originally meant the right of arrested person to be brought within 24 hours before the judicial body for judges to verify the detention (arrest) to protect the individual’s right of liberty. Individual freedom is found still in England, gaining a broader development in Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, as well as in the Bill of Rights of 1688, which included a rudimentary form in eliminating arbitrary detention of persons. (Habeas Corpus Act)

In 1776, the Declaration of Independence of the United States appears on the American continent, influenced by the English style of constitutions that proclaim “these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. – That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, – That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government”. (The Declaration of Independence) The US Constitution, adopted in 1787, strengthened national human rights and fundamental freedoms set out in the Declaration of Independence of the United States, ratified by the legislative assemblies of the states during 1789-1791. “The Bill of Rights” contains the first ten amendments to the US Constitution. The fourth Amendment of the US Constitution stipulates that “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized”. (The Bill of Rights)

One of the motives behind the French Revolution was the issue of ensuring individual freedom that is provided in the Declaration of the

Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789, which outlined the concept of fundamental rights and freedoms, inspired by natural law theory and the theory of social contract. Article 7 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen stated that “no man can be accused, arrested nor detained but in the cases determined by the law, and according to the forms which it has prescribed. Those who solicit, dispatch, carry out or cause to be carried out arbitrary orders, must be punished; but any citizen called or seized under the terms of the law must obey at once; he renders himself culpable by resistance”. (Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen) The Article 4 of French Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen reads: “Liberty consists of doing anything which does not harm others: thus, the exercise of the natural rights of each man has only those borders which assure other members of the society the enjoyment of these same rights. These borders can be determined only by the law”. (Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen) In order to ensure individual freedom, the Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen expressly prohibited the practice of administrative detention under the famous “Lettres de cachet”, issued by the king, which contained only the order of imprisonment without indicating the period of detention charges. Often “Lettres of cachet” were given to favorite people in white, making possible arrest of any person.

In legal concepts of last decades it is recognized the practice according to which liberty must be guaranteed by the legislation of any state, the provisions that allow privation of liberty as punishment for criminal or judicial measures correspond to broad applicability standards enshrined in various international documents. Thus, Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 states in Article 3 that “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person” (Universal Declaration of Human Rights) and Article 9 states that “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile”. (Universal Declaration of Human Rights)

An important role in guaranteeing individual freedom and its respect social institutions have, which help people to solve their fundamental problems arising from the need for fair trade, adopting a collective decision, collaboration, cooperation of resources and means to achieve a common goal. Contemporary scholars specializing in structural-functional analysis of social institutions note that the cyclical instability problem would not exist if no decision would result of no vote; we would have fewer problems with communication, cooperation or coordination if there were no social dilemmas; specialization and delegation of powers did not produce agent costs if the information would be available without involving any cost; *ex post* opportunism should not be a problem if there were no non-simultaneous exchanges etc. Such institutions address issues and offer created compromises, paving bargains that would occur in their absence. Faced with such problems, institutions offer solutions that reduce uncertainty and induce stability in relationships. An actual problem, highlighted by economists and political scientists, is the problem of rational choice.

In assessing institutions we distinguish two ways: the institution is a balance in a social fundamental game and the institution provides rules, procedures, and decision-making mechanisms. In support of that balance formula as the institution of a social fundamental game, Schotter emphasizes self-supporting capacity and coordination function. Through self-sustaining, Schotter stresses, institutions avoid instabilities of decision and collective action, instabilities that improve them. From this perspective, institutions highlight some terms of the collaboration among which to mention common knowledge, shared information and supporting strategies. The experience of institutions-balances in a social fundamental game allows us to conclude that self-sufficiency solves problems of cooperation, coordination, cultivating “key points”.

The responsible institution for the development of the individual personality is the university. University is one of the oldest institutions in Europe, which enjoys continuity until present. According to the philosopher K. Jaspers, founder of the concept of the university as a socio-cultural institution, exposed in the work *The idea of the university*, the university develops a philosophical sense of truth. (Jaspers 1959) Currently, universities are communities that offer higher education and research. Namely universities crystallized positive thinking nucleus around which is formed a protective strip of personality – civic consciousness, which includes political and legal knowledge, philosophical concept of individual liberty. It is at university a person learns and understands that freedom produces responsibility and rights – obligations. The more anyone is aware of his position in society, social group, the more he is free because he developed through knowledge and self-learning the ability to take responsibility. (Roşca and Lazari, 2014)

During the investigation we used the concept of individual liberty, the most representative's philosophical interpretations offered by Immanuel Kant, Hegel, Constantin Radulescu-Motru and Michael Ralea. All this is necessary to explain the phenomenon of positive thinking. Interpreted positively, freedom means action, knowledge creation, self-realization, fulfillment and self-sufficiency. These characteristics of individual existence are structured hierarchically depending on the period of life. For example, youth cannot talk about sufficiency because at this stage of life the person reaches the highest levels of social activism, the creation of self-affirmation. Analysis of several biographies of successful people allows us to see that their success is largely due to positive thinking, adequate approach to life, and priorities. If we relate to work, then positive thinking is related to vocation, and this can be found in the process of self-knowledge (Hegelian triad synthesis). If we analyze our relations with

others, with family members or outside family, then positive thinking stimulates manifestation of fairness, respect, devotion, love. In our relationship with the self, positive thinking encourages us to initiate new projects that we capitalize most effectively own cognitive and creative potential. But positive approach to life / work / others / self is in the power of free man. Not coincidentally philosophers say: freedom is the condition of authentic being in man.

Conclusions. The world we live in has multiple obstacles for adaptation to life medium, in valorizing individual cognitive and creative potential. Realization of own potential depends on individual's ability to valorize capabilities, to define priorities, to get skills, required in various fields of professional / social-useful activity. In elaborating the research we intended propose to reduce the number of those acting unconsciously, who fail to master the existential condition, those that do not know or do not honor social obligations / roles.

In creating favorable conditions for learning and valorization of person's cognitive and creative potential, an important role is played by institutions of democratic state of law, the only model that serves individual, ensuring and guaranteeing the fundamental rights and freedoms. In the democratic state of law, social institutions are obliged to create necessary conditions for the development of human personality, for completing the process of socialization, training, in the result of which man comes to self-knowledge, understanding essentials.

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European Social Dialogue, a Hidden Phenomenon of the Intercultural Dialogue in Europe

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Abstract. *Talking about intercultural dialogue in Europe we think about the dialogue between the actors within the European Union and/or between its people. The intercultural side of the European social dialogue as it is established in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) does not automatically come in our minds. If we consider however that the actors of the social dialogue are coming from different industrial relations schemes, that the national social dialogue within the EU member states have its own specific character a look on the cross-border social dialogue is worthwhile. Not only on a national level but on the European stage social dialogue plays an important role in forming a European labour law within the European Common Market. This particular niche of intercultural dialogue in Europe the article is dedicated to. Within the cross-border social dialogue, different systems collide which is a challenge as such. As far as the bipartite and tripartite social dialogue is concerned it is already difficult enough to bring together the different approaches of the national cultures. And it is evident that it is a huge challenge on the corporate level, where workers of different companies of different countries*

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meet each other, obliged to come to common results concerning the information and consultation rights given to the European Works Councils (EWC) by law. This phenomena is to be found in all transnational European companies, namely in those with EWC but also in companies with a specific European legal form such as in the Societas Europaea (SE) where we find works councils and supervisory boards with members from all countries concerned.

Key words: *intercultural dialogue, communication, social dialogue, culture pattern*

Introduction

Intercultural Dialogue in Europe is a topic which has been evident from the beginning of “European culture”. Intercultural dialogue in the EU has at least two meanings, the intercultural dialogue between the actors within the EU and the intercultural dialogue with its neighbours. If we talk about intercultural dialogue it is necessary to stress also on the European social dialogue, which is part of the Lisbon strategy and has been fixed in the Treaty of Functioning of the European Union (Articles 152 ff. TFEU). The social dialogue, on what level ever consists of a conglomeration of different approaches of social dialogue. EU forms new types of intercultural communication that doesn't confine within the limits of the dialogue between separated persons belonging to different cultures.

Employers meet employers of different countries, trade unions meet trade unions of different countries, workers meet workers of different countries and employers meet workers of different countries. All these groups are part of social structure they show themselves through the social dialogue as elements of intercultural communication.

As the systems of social dialogue are extremely different in the European member states and these systems are part of the prevailing culture, social dialogue is an important part of the European social dialogue.

The article is going to describe both, the basics of intercultural dialogue as it is generally understood and the levels of European social dialogue, focusing on the intercultural importance in the social dialogue on different levels.

I. Social rules in the intercultural communication

Communication is not simply exchange of data; communication is a complex process including individual and common characteristics of those who are taking part in it. In the process of communication we send and receive messages. While creating message to send we have to convert our thoughts and feelings into sounds, words and action, we call this process coding, when we receive the message we encode it in order to understand it. To create the sense of our message we realize very specific human cognitive activity that includes our personal characteristics and our cultural experience as social beings. In terms of communication message sense forming is complicated cognitive process that depends on the context of the message where the data are projected upon the dynamic system of patterns. Systems of patterns are different for different people. The system of patterns itself depends on cultural, moral, linguistic environment, behavior rules and stereotypes of the culture we belong to. During the process of communication it (system of patterns) could change. When we communicate and create the sense of messages, the whole process of sense forming depends on the history of communication, on the information we have and also on the physic, social, historic and psychological environment of the process of communication.

To have effective communication the participants of communication process have to understand each other – it means to understand the system of patterns of each other, the code they use in creating the message as well as the background of communicative process, and to take under account their systems of values and psychological and social identities.

We discover the system of patterns in language, behavior, emotions and customs of those who take part in communication.

The system of patterns reflects all the elements of our culture. Being stereotypes patterns influence the process of perception and its results (Lippman 1965). Patterns are result of culture and social life of our society. So, patterns are related with the rules of social life defined by moral customs, law and political norms. It is clear that every society has its own language, customs, law and political rule, that we adopt in the process of socializing. Some of these rules (as law) have restrictive character, limiting our natural wishes ore acts. We accept all this rules as members of the society. In terms of patterns we could say that we use them in our language, our behavior even if we don't realize it. We form stereotypes due the possibility of our consciousness to fix the information about similar facts, phenomenon and people and to connect this information with categories that already exist in our mind. We form the most part of our stereotypes between the age of 12-th and 30-th years of our life. And these stereotypes conduct our perception, evaluation of the facts, information, and other people. After the period of formation of the stereotypes it's very hard to change them. We fix the similar objects in our consciousness as images, concepts, evaluations and doing this we create the basis to exchange information with other people and that means to understand each other and to elaborate the same system of values. We could see then that cognitive process and communication relate to our experience based on generalization of typical ideas.

In professional terms we could evaluate communicative efficiency analyzing the transformation of pattern (sender)-sign-pattern (receiver), doing this we could predict the result of communication. It is important to analyze the difference between patterns sender – receiver to understand what we have to do to understand better each other, to discover the barriers of communication to overcome them.

As we had mentioned the system of patterns is connected with language, behavior, emotions and customs of those who take part in communication according to the culture they belong to.

So, to improve the intercultural communication (Hirsh 1978) we have to analyze the cultural factors forming the system of pattern. There are patterns that determine the standards of our behavior according to the rules of the society (written or non-written) (Walton 1988).

And as we belong to the society we are involved in the concrete culture revealing in the ideas, customs characteristic of group in the certain period of time (Richard-Amato and Snow 1992). The culture could be regarded as a system of knowledge and rules for perception, evaluation and action. The culture is also the system of behavior standards accepted by society that helps people to interact with their environment (Fatehi 1996). The culture includes standards and rules (Gudykunst and Kim 2002), instructions and plans, cognitive (Goodenough 1957) or symbolic (Geertz 1997). The culture standards influence the system of patterns being rules and models for behavior (restricting – in some sense). Social rules define what one person is allowed, how he has to do it and what would happen in case if he is doing thing he is not allowed. In the society there is politic, law, moral, religious, corporative and other rules acting in the frame of normative system being specific social regulator. Growing up in the certain we adopt its culture, language and social rules.

In terms of communication we could say that culture standards

define the system of patterns as each culture defines its own system of pattern, so culture standards influence the process of inter-cultural communication as social standards.

In fact, our entire repertory of communicative behaviors is dependent largely on the culture in which we have been raised. Culture, consequently, is the foundation of communication. But our perceptions can be influenced by differences in values, approach, or priorities relative to the kind of social organizations to which we belong. Growing up in the society we adopt social rules of the culture we belong to. So, we adopt law and politic rules, religious ideas, corporative rules as a part of culture standards fixed in documents, norms, declarations, religious books and other papers. These rules are deeply found in our behavior, we adopt them (Berry et al. 2011) in the process of socialization when we learn the rules of behavior of our culture (from our birth until we're teenagers). In this period we build the basic principles and models of our perception and acting towards others, some of them are unconscious. All the principles built in this period are very stable and it's really hard to change them, this is why conflict between these stereotypes and new information could arise. For us is really difficult to accept new law and political rules because of these stereotypes we already have in the context of culture we've adopted (Hall, 1984).

Conflict between stereotypes and law rules could arise while communication in different countries, even we know the rules we could make mistakes, using our stereotypes (knowing how to proceed in the transport in the country we're we could make mistakes acting automatically on the basis of our habits).

With development of European Union new law frame are formed and that could mean appearance new possibilities for communicative misunderstanding. The difference between culture stereotypes EU law could cause a big number of intercultural communicative problems. So, it is

very important to discuss such problems analyzing intercultural communication.

II. Social Dialogue

1. Global understanding

1a. General definition

There is no universally agreed general definition of social dialogue. There are wide-ranging differences in the use of the term “social dialogue”. Let us start with the ILO (International Labour Organization is a specialized agency of the United Nations) definition and then move on to an explanation of other usages of the term.

1b. The definition of the International Labour Organisation (ILO)

The ILO has a broad working definition of social dialogue, reflecting the wide range of processes and practices which are found in different countries. Its working definition includes all types of negotiation, consultation or simply exchange of information between representatives of governments, employers and workers, on issues of common interest relating to economic and social policy (ILO Declaration). The ILO recognises that the definition and the concept of social dialogue varies from country to country and over time. Exchange of information is the most basic process of social dialogue. It implies no real discussion or action on the issues concerned, but it is an essential starting point towards more substantive social dialogue. Consultation is a means by which the social partners not only share information, but also engage in more in-depth dialogue about issues raised. While consultation itself does not carry with it decision-making power, it can take place as part of such a process. Collective bargaining and policy concentration can be interpreted as the two dominant types of negotiation. Collective bargaining is one of the most

wide spread forms of social dialogue and is institution-realised in many countries. It consists of negotiations between an single employer, a group of employers or employers' representatives and workers' representatives to determine the issues related to wages and conditions of employment. Successful collective bargaining results in collective agreements. Collective bargaining can be centralised at national level or decentralised at sectoral, regional, enterprise or bargaining unit level. It can be regarded as a useful indicator of the capacity for social dialogue within a country to engage in national level tripartite policy concertation (<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/sd/index.htm>)

The definition of concertation differs depending. For example Visser (2001, 184) uses policy concertation and social dialogue inter-changeably and defines it primarily as a platform for setting out a common understanding of the status quo. Some give a wider definition of the process of moving towards consensus through dialogue among the social partners. The term "concertation" in English-speaking countries is usually regarded as identical to cooperation or participation, whereas in France and Italy it is regarded as decision-making through consensus. Some, (i.e Compston 2002, 4), define concertation as "the codetermination of public policy by governments, employers' organizations and trade union confederations". Tripartite policy concentration or "social concentration" can be regarded as the "full bloom" of social dialogue whereby "employers', workers' representatives and governments have developed a reflex for acting in a concerted multifaceted manner to address all major national economic and social policy issues by seeking consensus" (Trebilcock, 1994, 4). However, this is only possible when the Government fully recognises the legitimacy and constructive functions of social

partners' participating in national policy-making. The results of successful tripartite policy concentration are sometimes manifested in social pacts.

Any of these forms of social dialogue can be informal and ad hoc or formal and institutionalised. However, in reality social dialogue often takes place as a combination of the two. Informal processes are often as important as formal ones. Social dialogue exists as a tripartite process with the Government as an official party to the dialogue or in only bipartite direct relations between labour and management with or without indirect involvement of government. It can take place at the national, regional, sectoral or at enterprise level. It can be inter-professional, sectoral or a combination of all these.

1c. Other definitions

A narrow definition (Visser 2001, 184) differentiates between social dialogue from collective bargaining. According to him, social dialogue “is not the same as bargaining, but provides a setting for more efficient bargaining by helping to separate bargaining over ‘the state of the world’ from bargaining over the division of costs and benefits.” In other words, social dialogue is an initial stage of finding a common understanding or framework of reference by “separating the digestion of facts, problems and possible solutions”, which may lead to collective bargaining where social partners engage in negotiation of their positions. His definition was endorsed by the European Union High Level Group on Industrial Relations, which defined social dialogue as “a process, in which actors inform each other of their intentions and capacities, elaborate information provided to them, and clarify and explain their assumptions and expectations” (www.europa.eu/socialdialogue)

2. European Social Dialogue

Social Dialogue is an essential element of the social model and European governance. It is the process of negotiation by which different actors of society (or social partners) reach agreement to work together on policies and activities. Social dialogue takes place at European level, sectoral as well as national level. “Bipartite” dialogue social dialogue brings together workers and employers whereas “tripartite” social dialogue also involves governments or EU representatives (<http://www.etuc.org>).

Pursuant to Article 152 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) the European Union (EU)

- recognises and promotes the role of the social partners at European level
- facilitates dialogue between the social partners, respecting their autonomy

According to Article 154 of the TFEU, the Commission consults social partners before submitting legislative proposals in the area of social policy. This consultation aims at guiding EU action and, if the Commission considers it necessary the content of legislation.

Consultation with European social partners could lead to contractual relations, including agreements, according to the terms of Article 155 of the TFEU.

There has to be distinguished between the bipartite and the tripartite social dialogue, as the bipartite is conducted between social partner organisations only. In the tripartite social dialogue is conducted between wage earners, employers and European institutions..

Besides this differentiation another structure has to be recognised:

- the cross-industry social dialogue
- the sectoral social dialogue
- the corporate social dialogue

a. The bipartite social dialogue is conducted between social partner organisations. At cross-industry level it takes place principally within the Social Dialogue Committee. Under the framework of their cooperation, the social partners may adopt agreements which are implemented in the Member states through national procedures and practices (Article 155 of the TFEU)

b. The bipartite cross-industry social dialogue (also called “Val Duchesse Dialogue”) is meant to open a social dialogue about big horizontal themes of work and the social issues which concern all branches and all workers.

The employees are represented in the cross-industry **social** dialogue are represented by

- the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC)
- the European Managers – Confédération Européenne des Cadres (CEC)
- the Council of European Professional and Managerial staff (EUROCADRES))

The employers are represented by

- BUSINESSEUROPE
- The European Association of Craft, Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (UEAPME)
- The European Centre of Enterprises with Public participation and of Enterprises of general Economic Interest (CEEP)

Tripartite cross-industry social dialogue takes place on political and technical issues, particularly in areas such as macroeconomic policies, employment, social security, education and training.

Outcomes of the cross-industry social dialogue can be either framework agreements implemented by European Directives such as parental-leave (1996/2008), part-time leave (1997), fixed-term contracts

(1997), autonomous framework agreements such as telework (2002), work-related stress (2004), harassment and violence at work (2007) and inclusive labour markets (2010) or framework of action such as lifelong development of competences and qualifications (2002) and a framework of action on youth employment (2013). The social partners committed to promote solutions to reduce youth unemployment and called on national social partners, public authorities and other stakeholders to also actively work towards that goal.

The Tripartite Social Summit (Article 152 para 2 TFEU) contributes to the effectiveness of social dialogue for the drafting and implementation of the economic and social policies of the European Union (EU). It is a forum for cross-industry social dialogue, used to conduct a dialogue on general policy issues.

c. European sectoral social dialogue supplements the cross-industry social dialogue. It is led by representatives of European employers and employees, grouped by economic sector of activity. It represents a level of discussion and negotiation that enables a better understanding of the issues facing each sector.

Each occupational sector may make a request to establish a sectoral dialogue committee. Actually there exist 45 joint committees, 3 in the natural resources sector, 15 in the manufacturing sector and 27 in the services sector. They cover more or less all essential European economic activities. The sectoral social dialogue committees consist of a maximum of 54 social-partner representatives, with an equal number of representatives of both employers and employees. They are chaired either by one of the social-partner representatives or, at their request, by the representative of the Commission, which in all cases provides the secretariat for the committees. The committees have been set up by the Commission. The decisions, declarations and agreements adopted by these committees

concern nearly 150 million workers, or three-quarters of Europe's active population. The committees have adopted more than 500 texts, and in particular certain agreements which are set to be implemented in the Member States in the form of directives or national procedures. But not all of these committees are really active although they have to meet at least once a year.

d. The social dialogue on corporate level takes place in multinational enterprises either in European Works Councils (EWCs), Works Councils and supervisory boards in Societas Europaea (SE).

EWC are bodies representing the European employees of a company. Through them, workers are informed and consulted at transnational level by management on the progress of the business and any significant decision that could affect them. The right to establish EWCs was introduced by Directive 94/45/EC for undertakings or groups of undertakings employing at least 1 000 employees in the European Union and the other countries of the European Economic Area (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) with at least 150 employees in each of two Member States. Some 970 EWCs represent over 15 million employees, favouring social dialogue and anticipation of change in multinational companies. The legal framework for EWCs dates back to 1994 and needed to be adapted to the evolution of the legislative, economic and social context and to be clarified. After consulting the European social partners and carrying out an impact assessment, the Commission submitted in 2008 a proposal to recast the directive. This new directive was adopted in 2009 by the European Parliament and the Council, with some amendments mainly suggested by the European social partners. Building on the results of the existing legal framework, recast Directive 2009/38/EC aims, in particular, at ensuring the effectiveness of employees' transnational information and consultation

rights, at favouring the creation of new EWCs and at ensuring legal certainty in their setting up and operation.

Works councils in SE, also representing the European employees of the company, are also composed of representatives of the countries/companies of the enterprise, sent by the subsidiaries following the relevant national legislation.

III. Social Dialogue as part of intercultural dialogue

On all three levels, the European cross-industry social dialogue, the European sectoral social dialogue as well as on the corporate level an intercultural dialogue takes place and is an essential part of the result finding processes.

In the bipartite and tripartite dialogue between organisations coming from the employers and the workers side the social dialogue is characterized by an exchange of national approach in both the employers and the employee's camp. Different management cultures based on history, mentality and education on the one side, different work structures, different understanding of labour law, different industrial relations schemes and different mentality have to be considered in setting a common opinion among the members of both camps. But also in the negotiations between the two parties the result finding process is characterized by intercultural differences to be solved, sometimes assisted by European authorities.

Finally the corporate level, European Works Councils and internationally composed supervisory boards in Societas Europaea (SE): Of approximately 2400 companies affected, over 1200 have a EWC. Approximately 18.000 members represent almost 19 million workers.

In 2015 almost 2400 SE with "mixed" works councils (SEWC) and "mixed" supervisory boards do exist. This shows the intercultural dimension of the topic. The members of the EWC and SEWC are selected

by the relevant legislation of their land. Following the principle of representation, each country/company being part of the group/enterprise is sending, in principle, at least one member in the EWC or the SEWC.

Both councils have to be informed and to be consulted by the management about all across the border matters. The members of both councils are obliged to inform their national committees about the results of the councils. They are responsible to accompany the implementation of the measures following their national regulations.

These processes are of high intercultural relevance. Presentations given by the central management often are not understood properly by the representatives of the countries concerned, the dialogue is often characterized by the above mentioned different factors regarding the dialogue with the management but as well within the councils. This makes result finding processes difficult and perfect transmission is not always guaranteed although papers might be translated in the mother tongues.

Other crucial points are the questions of the role of trade unions/workers representatives as well as how workers are allowed to react on management decisions, which mean the different understanding of industrial relations and industrial conflicts in the European member states. The different models of collective bargaining, the different understanding of participation rights as well as the how different industrial conflicts are understood in the European member states show that intercultural differences influences European social dialogue on the corporate level to a big extent. Strike in the Mediterranean countries has another meaning as for example in Germany, where strike is defined as a “collective action by a number of employees consisting in the agreed cessation of work, with the intention of resuming work once their stated demands have been successfully achieved in the form of a collective agreement” (Weiss:-296). As a consequence spontaneous cessation of work and political strikes are

not legitimated. German representatives have their problems to explain this fact to their colleagues who are coming from countries, where spontaneous and political strikes are important part of their culture.

IV. Conclusion

Intercultural Dialogue as it is defined practiced includes all forms of the European social dialogue previewed in the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The dialogue between employers, associations or management of companies, and workers, trade unions or individuals on the one hand and the dialogue in their own groups brings up a great number of intercultural questions caused by different history, culture and mentality in the member states concerned. It is a big challenge to bring together the different approaches and expectations in order to find an adequate way to produce good results with a (hopefully) common result: to improve work conditions an, with that, to improve living conditions of the people in the common market of the European Union.

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Image of the Other: the Perspective on Ethnicity

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Abstract: *In the world village nowadays it is rather impossible to distinguish between the blurred lines and partitions in terms of groups and belonging. We speak freely of us, of integration, not assimilation!, of communities, of identity, of minority within the majority. We do that and more: we separate ourselves from the Other, we push aside what we fail to understand, we pass bills and laws to integrate minorities, we have possibly all that is needed for the ideal type of integration (whatever this is), but the everyday perception tells a whole different story. Our research gives a three-tier approach of the minority-majority perception: the official-legislative perspective, the institutional perspective and the everyday perspective. In the end, we will propose a model of analysis for the image of the minority through the eyes of the majority.*

Keywords: *stereotypes, discrimination, minority, majority, ethnicity, perception*

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Ethnicity and race

There is a large belief that ethnicity and race are one and the same. While race is a term pertaining to biology, describing subspecies of organisms, ethnicity operates with concepts like community, language, religion, geography, ancestry. Because populations have never been isolated enough to develop into different biological races the term race refers to rather the animal life. The variations in human genetic characteristics are minimal and if we talk about race in humans then it is a social construct. A social race defines itself as different because it operates with community values out of which cultural traditions weigh the most. Studies have shown that in general, ethnicity is believed to be just a politically correct term for race.

Ethnic groups are part of the society but act as a community: common beliefs, customs, history and such are shared values. For our argument it is important to remember that ethnicity supposes identification with a given ethnic group, while at the same time entails a detachment -- a distinction -- from other groups, be they ethnic or not.

In the context of society we further have to add the status. If people are born into it the status is ascribed, and if people acquire a certain position by means of individual accomplishment then the status is achieved. Status refers to any position in a society that can be filled by an individual.¹ For our investigation, the ascribed status weighs more, as within complex societies, ascribed status can describe the minority and the majority as the largest subgroups. From the minority-majority relationship we can study the differences in the socio-political power.

¹ Foladare, Irving S., "Clarification of "Ascribed Status" and "Achieved Status"". *The Sociological Quarterly*, 10(1), 53–61. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4105001> in February 2016

Most statuses can change subject to the influence of social contexts. Social category labels are applied based how other perceive the status, and not so much on own assertion of a status.

Taking the investigation one step further, we have to pay closer attention to what is the relationship between the majority and the minority. In sociological terms, a minority is a group with *lesser* gains -- lesser income or lesser authority, while in political terms, a minority is a lawfully recognized group with certain rights that other groups do not have (affirmative action, or positive discrimination).²

Ethnic Groups, Nations, and Nationalities

They overlap, and if we are to try to draw some guiding lines we could say that in a top-down approach, a nation can have more than one ethnic groups together with state-nationals who do not necessarily belong to a certain group. If the nation-state and the nations are centrally organized and have political status, ethnic groups more often than not lack such political organization. The majority of the nation-states contain more than one ethnic group; they are called multiethnic. The increasing migration has led to a growing multiethnicity factor.

Of course, the next issue is what to do with the minorities in a multiethnic state? There are two options, either assimilation, or integration. When an ethnic group blends in the host culture by adopting their own norms to fit the pattern of the host culture, we deal with assimilation. Lately, there has been increasing talk against this *melting pot* concept and in favor of multiculturalism. While assimilation expects subordinate groups to take on the culture of the dominate group while abandoning their own,

² Keefer, Philip; Kheman, Stuti, Democracy, Public Expenditures and the Poor, for World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People, retrieved from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTINVTCLI/Resources/WBRO_democracypublicexpandtheppoor.pdf accessed in February 2016

multiculturalism promotes “unity in diversity”, regarding this diversity as something desirable.

“The equation of debates on European identity can be extended to analyze European interests versus national interests of countries that make up the union. Common interests can bring to the discussion table national states. The European construction, also in terms of identity, can benefit from the negotiations and compromises between states. When the discussion reaches issues related to the vital interests of the states everything³ can change, and the common edifice begins to falter. The effect can be both positive (in the sense that states are more conciliatory and cooperative when their primordial interests are threatened from outside). „National interests combine usually security with material concerns, on the one hand, and moral and ethical concerns, on the other hand”. (Huntington, 1997, 28-49)

Beyond national or European interests, the question can open to national preferences or the EU’s preferences, as an international organization. Andrew Moravcsik makes reference to the three levels of analysis (internal / domestic, inter-state and supranational) and proposes a model regarding the impact of national preferences on economic realities (Moravcsik 1993, 497-498), which can be extended to a wider framework,

³ For more details, see the typology of national interests done by Hans Morgenthau, who proposes to group them on vital interests (geared on the existence, security and survival of the state) and secondary interests (political, economic, cultural, social, human, ethno-religious or environmental).Morgenthau, Hans.2007, *Politica între națiuni. Lupta pentru putere și lupta pentru pace*, Iași: Polirom; Apud Dușu, Petre; Bogzeanu, Cristina. 2010, *Interesele naționale și folosirea instrumentelor de putere națională pentru promovarea și apărarea acestora. Cazul României*, București:Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I”, București, p. 8-13. Cujba, Anastasia; Ejova, Cristina.2013; “Repere istoriografice și teoretico-conceptuale ale cercetării interesului național”. *Studia Universitatis Moldaviae (Revistă Științifică a Universității de Stat din Moldova)* nr.3(63):32-38.

that of the decision-making⁴. The theoretical analyses⁵ capture on the other hand a dispute around the identity of subjective and objective dimensions. Unlike the concept of national origin, which refers to something given, inherited by birth, national identity is, above all, the expression of the awareness of belonging to a cultural community that is defined as a political community. National identity in this case is linked to the concept of nation, the latter understood as a population which shares a territory (to which it reports through the historical dimension), shared myths and historical memory, a mass culture, a common economy, and rights and legal liabilities common to each member (the latter making reference to the state political organization).

Prejudice and discrimination

The dictionary definition of *prejudice* is an unfair feeling of dislike for a person or group because of race, sex, religion, etc. *Discrimination* is the practice of unfairly treating a person or group of people differently from other people or groups of people. If we incorporate prejudice and discrimination in the equation, where do we place ethnicity? Let us look generically at the closest divide between ethnicity, white vs. black ethnicity. Stemming from the group, individuals act to shape meaningful identities; to do this they have to navigate a social landscape that is all too well fragmented by prejudice, discrimination, racial stigmata and such. To identify as white (as opposed to black) gives them a safety net. White ethnicity identifies itself as a meaningful positive divide. Sociologists Gans and Waters conceive the idea that if feelings of alienation appear inside the

⁴ For more details, see Costea (Ghimiş), Ana Maria.2015, National Preferences of the EU and NATO Member States at the Eastern Border. Study Case: Romania and Poland, doctoral thesis, Babeş-Bolyai University from Cluj-Napoca, 2015.

⁵ For further reading, see one of our previous studies, Brie, Mircea; Blaga, Daniela.2015. "Identity Rematch in the European Space", in Cultural Diplomacy at the Western and Eastern Borders of the European Union, edited by Stoica, Alina; Horga, Ioan; Brie, Mircea. 112- 125. University of Oradea Printing House.

group, seen from outside white ethnicity is a pool of available cultural resources (holiday traditions, family customs, consumer culture and the media) from which individuals voluntarily draw to create personally enriching identities and to temporarily connect themselves with larger collectivities. In this respect, traditions provide a sense of belonging, feelings of uniqueness, of being connected. (Waters 1990, 150)

Social sciences define the a minority as a “self-identified group of people” (Triandafyllidou and Anagnostou 2005, 49), culturally, politically, ethnically distinct from the dominant group that it coexists with, “who have in common a historic language and culture particular to a geographical place, but which does not benefit of its own state” (Triandafyllidou and Anagnostou 2005, 49). Then this group is not independent. It means that there has to be a degree of subordinancy. Social scientist use terms like “minority” and “majority” as “subordinate group” vs. “dominant group”. This is not to say that one group is better than the other, but only that one group dominates the other. It is about cultural diversity and anthropologists maintain that there is “neither superiority in culture, but only a relative diversity, nor classification criteria that can order the different cultures hierarchically”. (Beitone et al. 2000, 200)

As far back as 1907 William Graham Sumner minted the term of “ethnocentrism” to describe “the technical name for this view of things in which one’s own group is the centre of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it”. (Graham Sumner 1959, 13) This is the theory that explains models of behavior like the American exceptionalism, the European imperialism, the Nazi doctrine of Aryan superiority. Even literature gives us examples which prove that such an issue has been with societies forever⁶. Cultural diversity has been around forever, but only in the twentieth

⁶ The Merchant of Venice by Shakespeare gives one of the most famous speeches of all time, often cited, in and out of context. The scene pictures an intense disagreement between Shylock

century scientists recognized and coined the terms differences and cultural diversity.

Cultural cohabitation has become one of the most important stakes for the twenty-first century, since humankind has entered the era of multicultural civilization. One of the most important objectives of our century is to create a bridge between the different cultures. [...] (Sonia Catrina 2013, 77-97) The process of recognition of cultural diversity does not see races as superior or inferior, viewing this as a form of racism which, while denying the acceptance of cultures, rejects different others by their nature, considering them “barbarians,” “wild,” “underdeveloped” or “uncivilized.” (Sonia Catrina 2013, 78) However, some discriminatory attitudes, prejudices, stereotypes and stigmatizing of the different other can define multicultural societies.

In this context enters the Other. Ethnic identity is inherently problematic, it seems, but the concept of *The Other* covers all that has not checked out -- it balances between majority and minority, between stability and change, between perception and reality, between objectivity and subjectivity. It creates a web of confrontation, conflict and self-positioning that is always challenging to identity. Identity is organic, dynamic and “refers in the same time to what remains, what distinguishes and what brings together.” (Chevallier and Morel 1985, 3)

Starting off from these intertwining theories and notions, if we consider the many minorities groups living in the Romanian territory⁷ we are safe to say that Romania is a multicultural country. (Salat 2008, 9-29)

To bring the general to particular - the theory to the practice of the Romanian space - and to see where we stand today, we have looked on a


and Antonio; the latter, a Christian, always scorns Shylock for being a Jew. Shylock asks: “If you prick us, do we not bleed? If you tickle us, do we not laugh?/If you poison us, do we not die? And if you wrong us, shall we not revenge?”, where “us” is reference to Jews.

⁷ 20 minority groups represented in Parliament, and 23 categories of identity recorded by the census, thus occupying the third place among countries with a significant number of minority, after the Russian Federation with 45 national minorities and Ukraine with 23.

series of current surveys regarding the perception of interethnic relations. According to the given data from the National Institute of Statistics on the 2002 census⁸, the main ethnic group in Romania is the Romanians, as Romanian language speakers, representing 89.5% of the population. An important ethnic community (6.6% of the population) is that of the Hungarians, with more than 1.4 million and the Gypsies (2% of the population), the Germans (0.3%) and the Ukrainians (0.3%). The other ethnicities are underrepresented (0.2%)

Perception of minorities

In term of perception of minorities, rather self-explanatory is the graph below, which is part of a global comparative data on ethnic diversity and on racial tolerance ran by World Values Survey, provided by the Institutul pentru Politici Publica (Institute on Public Policy). 2003. *Intoleranță, Discriminare Autoritarism: În Opinia Publică* (Intolerance, Discrimination and Authoritarianism in Public Opinion), Bucharest: Institute on Public Policy.



Source: *The Washington Post*, May 17, 2013⁹

⁸ <http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/RPL2002INS/vol4/cuvvol4.pdf> , accessed in February 2016

⁹ <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/05/17/5-insights-on-the-racial-tolerance-and-ethnicity-maps-from-an-ethnic-conflict-professor/> accessed in February 2016

In the latest survey performed by the National Council for Combating Discrimination¹⁰, an independent body of the Romanian Government, created to implement the principles of equality and non-discrimination, we found some shifting in the public perception of minorities.

The dominant perception of the discriminated groups in Romania refers mainly to people with HIV/AIDS (65%), but also to drug addicts (57%) or to people with mental or physical disabilities (55-56%). Over half of the respondents indicated these categories as much and greatly discriminated against in Romania. Immediately after come the following categories: Roma people (49%), people with another sexual orientation (49%), institutionalized children (48%) and Romanians where they are seen as minority (48%). With a lesser degree of discrimination are perceived the elderly people; people without income; women; and people with certain chronic diseases.

Another measure of tolerance towards certain groups of people is represented by accepting interactions with them in everyday life. Using a scale of social distance adapted from the scale of Bogardus, where 1 is the closest relationship accepted by a group (relatives), and 7 farthest (to visit Romania), it can be seen that compared to drug addicts there is a significant lower tolerance for other groups that were analyzed. 39% of respondents would go as far as to not accepting them as inhabitants of Romania.

On the next tier ranks the group of people with a different sexual orientation, followed by people with HIV / AIDS and the Roma people. A higher tolerance is seen in relation to the unemployed, people without income or people with another religion. Over half of the respondents are willing to accept these people in their circle of friends or family. Over two

¹⁰ http://nediscriminare.ro/uploads_ro/166/Sondaj_TNS_CNCD_2015.pdf, accessed in February 2016

thirds of the respondents (67-77%) believe that minorities have the same rights as other citizens of Romania. There are respondents who consider that the Hungarian minority, and the Roma people enjoy more rights than the majority (17%).

The low level of education or the lack of education in relation to discrimination is the main reason that favors the manifestation of the phenomenon of discrimination in Romania. Two out of three Romanians believe that the lack of education can lead to discriminatory behavior. The lack of information in relation to this subject is also a reason why people discriminate.

Another important reason, mentioned by half of those surveyed, is carelessness or indifference shown by people in relation to their peers. Moreover, the lack of tolerance in society (43%) combined with the level of perceived corruption (44%) create a favorable background for the manifestation of discrimination. Groups that discriminate based on perceived frequency, politicians are the group most strongly associated with discrimination. Thus, 59% of respondents believe that politicians discriminate in Romania.

Another category of the public domain, namely the public servants of public institutions, is associated with discrimination in Romania (46% of respondents indicating this association). It is important to note that about the same proportion (47%) of respondents believe that ordinary people are those who discriminate in Romania.

In the fight against discrimination, the most important obstacle pointed out by respondents is related to education. Consistent with the low level of education that fosters the manifestation of the phenomenon of discrimination, two-thirds of respondents considered educational barriers as the main obstacle in the fight against discrimination. The public perception is that to solve this issue, the Romanian state should have educational

programs for non-discrimination - 88% of respondents. Moreover, the state should consider civil servants training to prevent discrimination.

Financial (47%) and political considerations (44%) are important factors in combating discrimination, both perceived as barriers in the fight against discrimination.

According to respondents, it is very important for Romania to have a national strategy on discrimination. The main factors involved in the implementation of such a strategy are the Government - through ministries concerned (89%) and National Council for Combating Discrimination (89%). An important contribution is with the NGOs who develop programs to combat discrimination (82%), and various national agencies or departments within ministries (for equal opportunities for people with disabilities, interethnic relations, for the Roma, etc.).

In the media, cases of discrimination are present rather on television and in the papers. The cases presented are primarily concerned with the problem of obtaining a job, half of respondents indicating this. In the next place, with 45% of mentions, lies the access to healthcare. A third of the respondents indicate the access to education as a subject of discrimination.

In what concerns the types of discrimination, discrimination based on ethnicity is considered to be the highest in Romania -- 44%. About 28% of respondents believe that discrimination based on age and mental disabilities ranks second in order of importance. About a quarter of respondents indicated four criteria of discrimination in Romania with high importance: physical disabilities, HIV / AIDS, sexual orientation and sex.

The minorities complain about being ill-treated but in turn, on the territory on which they hold a majority, they often have an inappropriate

behavior with the majority, as seen in many situations. The patriotic message that defends the dignity and integrity of a country was not and cannot be considered extremist, like, unfortunately, it happens sometimes.

In a survey ran by INSCOP Research we find out what Romanians believe about the new Muslim migration problem that Europe has been facing.¹¹ In the context of discussions at the European level on refugee quotas and redistribution of refugees between Member States, 56.2% of Romanians believe that our country should not receive refugees, 35.5% believe the country should receive them (8.3% non-answers). Even in the segment of those who believe that Romania should receive refugees, 82.1% believe that the Romanians must be the ones to decide their own quota of refugees, only 14.6% agree with the number of refugees demanded by the EU. As for the acceptance of migrants near them, 26.5% of Romanian would agree that refugees should settle in Romania, while 65.3% disagree with this, and 24.4% would agree to share the same locality with the refugees, while 67.1% would not accept refugees in their own place to live.¹²

Conclusion

From the perspective of the above mentioned, we suggest, as a possible methodology in the analysis of the rapports between majority and minority the content analysis and the synchronous comparative method. However, the principles and values nowadays are combined with the historical past function as determinants of the ethnic integration/assimilation. We can conclude by stating that the study of the rapports majority - minority is still profoundly influenced by the competing ideologies that balance between nationalism and multiculturalism. There is

¹¹ <http://www.inscop.ro/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Problema-migratiei1.pdf>, accessed in February 2016

¹² See more here: http://adevarul.ro/news/politica/sondaj-inscop-romanii-iiaccepta-refugiati-stea-ograda-altora-1_560038a7f5eaafab2cd936a9/index.html, accessed in February 2016

also much tension that is politically determined and society cleansing is no longer possible in the globalize world.

What alternative academic practice will provide to help us solve this puzzle? Can we praise the attention mediated by the society to human action without canceling social agency? Furthermore, how can we move beyond the subjectivism and objectivism when the answer depends on which group you are part of. A focus on ethnographic research on a person's history associated with ethnicity might shed light on how the immigrant and ethnic past shape socially meaningful sense in the present. The inscription of the collective memory in the social memory of a minority group is the product of history. Therefore, the identity is also built as difference, a difference given by the cultural specificity. Ethnic groups are part of the society but act as a community: common beliefs, customs, history and such are shared values.

In the current context, many European societies develop a strong sense of “self-protection,” which takes not only an economic form, but also one of preservation of their identity and culture. Moments of crisis or excitement can easily lead to the emergence of nationalist sentiments that dilute the “Europeanist” perception of the border. Such a dilution occurs in parallel with the strengthening of identity-community cohesion, in the spirit of ethno-cultural belonging to a nation. It is a time when many European nations have reaffirmed that they “regain identity” by returning to the national, despite the “unity” and solidarity affirmed at the level of European institutions through officials of Member States. National borders, created in different periods and historical and political contexts, have contributed to national economic integration and the cultural periphery. In the current context, with the EU accession of the Central and Eastern Europe states, there has been a reverse phenomenon—the disintegration of the national market and administrative decentralization have led to the integration of

peripheries in the national systems, including the cultural. In terms of cultural relations, it is obvious that we are now dealing with a streamlining of trades without being able to talk about a loss of national, regional or local specificity. Cultural specificity brings into question the cultural border, separating different areas of identity and building what we call the European cultural space of cultures.

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Image and Communication: the Strawberry Pickers and the Representation of Transnational Experience¹

*Gabriela GOUDENHOOF**

The notion of diaspora had a long journey and today it came to designate almost any group living out of the country of origin and developing a self-consciousness, an emergent identity and specific relationships with homeland and hostland. Conceived as “imagined” or real communities the revived interest in studying diaspora comprises almost every aspect of this old but also modern or maybe postmodern form of social existence.

Recent decades, especially the lifting of restrictions on the labor market in the EU have led to a significant wave of Romanian migration to Western European countries and have led to the formation of stereotypes and prejudices in the collective mind and collective imaginary as is the expression "strawberry pickers".

Ambivalent positioning both in Romania mass media and abroad against the Romanian diaspora generates natural reaction of revolt and defense and new patterns of perceiving and representing diaspora.

Key words: *diaspora, transnationalism, media discourse, strawberry-picker*

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The notion of diaspora had a long journey and still it is the subject of scholar definitions, losing or achieving connotations and being extrapolated to such extent that today, as “an all-purpose word” (Faist, 2010), it came to designate almost any group living out of the country of origin and developing a self-conscience, an emergent identity and specific relationships with homeland and hostland. Conceived as “imagined” or real communities, the revived interest in studying the diaspora comprises almost every aspect of this old but also modern or maybe postmodern form of social existence.

Diaspora and transnational experience²

Nowadays, by diasporans, one is targeting in a very confusing way “immigrants, guest-workers, ethnic and ‘racial’ minorities, refugees, expatriates and travellers” (Vertovec, 2009: 131-132). Anyway, one chooses to define this term while staying true to the idea of nation, thought as an “imagined community”³ or as, before him, Hugh Seton-Watson called it a “fictitious nation” (1977: 5).

Nevertheless, Manuel Castells has criticized the theory of the nation imagined as a community, observing that the distinction between “real” and “imagined” communities is not very useful from an analytical point of view and “empirically inadequate” beyond, of course, the natural demystification of ideologies of “essentialist nationalism à la Michelet” (Castells 2010, 31-32). He believes that ethnicity, religion, language and territory can neither build, *per se*, nations, nor, induce nationalism, but “shared experience” can.

² A first and previous literature on transnationalism presentation was made at the beginning of the research in Gabriela Goudenhooff, “Diaspora is going online. Identity, language and digital communication”, in JRLS Journal of Roumanian Literary Studies, Volume 6/2015, pp.150-159.

³ “I propose the following definition of the nation: it is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” – (Anderson, 2006: 5-6)

In and despite the crisis of legitimacy our world is facing, Castells thinks that power continues to exist and is still ruling society through new forms and “new codes of information and in the images of representation around which societies organize their institutions, and people build their lives, and decide their behaviour. The sites of this power are people’s minds” (Idem, 425). There are “multiform networks”, there is “mass self-communication” (*autocomunicación de masas*)⁴ and all of them are staying under the power of identity.

The use of the concept diaspora in very different contexts (academic writings, political discourse, institutional strategies, media or journalistic discourse) it is also a reason and source of some ambiguities. Conceived as any national group of people scattered from their homeland to other places around the globe, or as national segments of population dispersed outside traditional homeland is the object of interest of a lot of research all the more it is talking nowadays by different forms and types of diaspora. Robin Cohen for instance is talking on *victim diaspora, labor diaspora, imperial diaspora, trade and business diaspora, homeland diaspora, cultural diaspora*. (Cohen, 2008) And the discourse on diaspora itself reveals a lot of aspects of the phenomenon: social, cultural, linguistic, economic, politic, communicational, and historical, which occur wherever the idea population dispersion appears: „Where once were dispersions, there now is diaspora” (Tölölyan 1996, 3)

Given this many contexts, broad meanings and many purposes of using the term *diaspora*, it is maybe too harsh to label the spread of literature on diaspora as misuse, even in the recent decades its acceptance is exceeding the original meaning⁵ and the link to the Jewish, Armenian or Greek groups reference and/or religious feature.

⁴ See also Constantin Schifirnet: “a new form of communication by which the individual exposes himself in front of a wide audience through new media” (2014: 260)

⁵ „The word ‘diaspora’ derives from the Greek diaspeirō ‘to distribute’; it is a compound of speirō, ‘to sow, to scatter’ like seed, and dia- ‘from one end to the other’. The term has, of

The proliferation of diaspora's discourse is also related to the post-modernism in the global age (Cohen, 2008). Robin Cohen highlights the link between diaspora mobilization and globalization, diaspora's mobilization being made by the contribution of several conditions and factors: a globalized economy enabling greater connectivity; new forms of international migration - limiting and fragmenting family ties specific other way for permanent settlements; the development of cosmopolitan sensibilities specific to many "global cities"; the revival of religion as a focus for social cohesion, linked in many ways with the diasporic phenomenon (Cohen 2008, 141).

The key of understanding the specific of diaspora compared with migration and exile is related to the "heterogeneous transnational networks" providing the hard core for solidarities beyond the framework of national societies. "Diaspora speaks to issues of globalization and transnationalism in ways that migration and exile, with their terminology of nostalgia, integration and homeland/host-land duality, cannot" (Budarick 2014, 144).

So in modern or post-modern societies we can apply the extended notion of diaspora in all those situation where we can find some common features as they were synthetized by Safran (1991), Cohen (2008: 161-162) and Vertovec (2009: 133):

1. Dispersal from an original homeland, often traumatically, to two or more foreign regions;
2. Alternatively, the expansion from a homeland in search of work, in pursuit of trade or to further colonial ambitions;
3. A collective memory and myth about the homeland, including its location, history and achievements;

course, become associated with the Jewish historical experience, and hence is associated with being a dispersed people sharing a common religious and cultural heritage". (Vertovec, 2009: 129).

4. An idealization of the putative ancestral home and a collective commitment to its maintenance, restoration, safety and prosperity, even to its creation;

5. The development of a return movement that gains collective approbation;

6. A strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long time and based on a sense of distinctiveness, a common history and the belief in a common fate;

7. A troubled relationship with host societies, suggesting a lack of acceptance at the least or the possibility that another calamity might befall the group;

8. A sense of empathy and solidarity with co-ethnic members in other countries of settlement; and

9. The possibility of a distinctive creative, enriching life in host countries with a tolerance for pluralism.

To these features Safran underlined the ultimate „triadic relationship” between „(1) a collectively self-identified ethnic group in one particular setting, (2) the group’s co-ethnics in other parts of the world, and (3) the homeland states or local contexts whence they or their forebears came” (Vertovec, 2009: 133). These relations could be a starting point of an endeavor of explaining the vital social role which diaspora is playing as agent of development in their homeland⁶ and as influential agent also in the host country from a cultural but also economical, demographic point of view. The diaspora’s dynamic is also an important issue to be studied in international relation research.

Also in order to define and find the limit within diaspora might be used as a modern notion, Rogers Brubaker (2005: 5) underlined three major

⁶ „They bridge the gap between the individual and society, between the local and the global, between the cosmopolitan and the particular. Diasporas can be used to spread liberal democratic values to their home countries” (Cohen, 2008: 174).

theoretical poles: dispersion in space („trans nationality out of the borders”), orientation to a “homeland” – a real or even a imagined one as Anderson would describe it defining the notion of “nation” and boundary-maintenance (“the preservation of a distinctive identity vis-à-vis a host society (societies”). So here we find the necessary idea of being scattered, territorial dispersion, and a non-symmetrical relationship with homeland and host land. Diaspora is oriented and is defining itself as identity through what homeland can survive out of its borders, meaning collective memory, national myths, an ideal kinship with a homeland as a virtual possibility of returning. Preserving identity even reshaping the idea of homeland helps diasporans and it is conditioned by maintaining boundaries in and towards host country. Sometimes, according Brubaker observation this goes to a type of resistance to assimilation through several processes as it is self-enforced endogamy or as a consequence of social exclusion. Hence there is in the current literature a position of emphasizing distinctive communities held together by solidarity and positions talking on a very prominent hybridization, fluidization, even syncretism. So on boundary dynamic one can notice an antinomy: boundary maintenance versus boundary erosion.

There are three aspects targeted by the diaspora’s discourse, as Vertovec stressed out. Using the notion ‘diaspora’, one refers either to the process of becoming scattered (a phenomenological usage of the term), or to the community living outside homeland (a cultural and social approach), or simply at the geographical destination of dispersal phenomenon (a spatial, territorial and geographic meaning).

But for a long period diaspora has been a notion “associated with suffering, loss, and victimization. Do contemporary, globally scattered communities opt to characterize themselves in this way?” (Modernity linked it to the nation-state idea and post-modernism questioned the nation-state empowerment perceiving it as hegemonic, discriminatory or culturally

homogenizing. Nowadays by diasporans ones are targeting in a very confusing way “immigrants, guest-workers, ethnic and ‘racial’ minorities, refugees, expatriates and travelers” (Vertovec 2009, 131-132).

Following the scholarly evolution we can observe the distinction made between diaspora, migration, minority status and transnationalism⁷. Robin Cohen introduced a classification of diaspora’s types. He is talking on *victim diaspora* (Jews, Palestinians, Armenians), *labor diaspora* (Indian and Chinese workers), *imperial diaspora* (British, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, French during the colonial period), *trade and business diaspora* (merchant communities), *homeland diaspora* (Zionist, Sikhs), *cultural diaspora* (post-modern concept related to post-colonialism, indicating Afro-Caribbean, a cross-border culture spread to U.S., U.K., the Netherlands) (Cohen, 2008 and Lewellen, 2002).

Structuring the very successful idea of nation, revisiting the idea of imagination and its critics, using as a common issue the idea of representation and self-representation and, as in all forms of representation, we have to deal with language, because no representation could be formed outside language and lacks words as a vehicle of image. In short, all terms: diaspora, transnationalism and migration operate in this context⁸ as cross-borders entities/processes. Diaspora and transnationalism involve nuanced studies and some accuracy and specificity in application, while the mainstream public discourse easily uses migration as a general, non-specific term.

The concept of diaspora integrates the idea of geographical dispersion of a population, the development of a specific consciousness, a myth of

⁷ „By transnationalism I refer to the actual, ongoing exchanges of information, money and resources – as well as regular travel and communication – that members of a diaspora may undertake with others in the homeland or elsewhere within the globalized ethnic community. Diasporas arise from some form of migration, but not all migration involves diasporic consciousness; all transnational communities comprise diasporas, but not all diasporas develop transnationalism”. (Vertovec, 2009:136).

⁸ The clarification of the international context is necessary also when one may speak about internal migration.

homeland associated with nostalgia and a suspended possibility of an eventual return, distinctive responses and attachments towards homeland and host country based on a shared cultural identity.

On the other hand, the notion of transnationalism involves as a hard core the idea of cross-border and lateral ties (Faist, 2010)⁹: flows, counter-flows, networks, based on the development of means of communication, supranational institutions and “the illusion of non-permanence” of their stay in the host country (Kastoryano 2007, 160); it permits the development of social networks and modern infrastructures to easily link nation-states over vast distances (Vertovec, 2004). Related to this, one can speak mainly about transnational processes and actions, not necessarily on communities, as the diaspora term does (Bauböck and Faist, 2010) about transnational spaces and porous identities or fluid identities, as we intend to call and describe them in the following sections.

We can observe several differences in the use of the terms diaspora and transnationalism: *transnationalism* being a broader term, but not operating with collective identity as *diaspora* does; involving new patterns of cross-border mobility and migration and, in time, focusing on recent migration flows, while diasporas “have often been defined as formations reaching across generations, if not a generational *longue durée*” (Bauböck and Faist 2010, 22). But due to the proliferation of terms, we may find both of them useful and involve them in a “complementary interpretation” of the social phenomenon regarding identity nowadays.

⁹ “The diaspora literature usually emphasises the cultural distinctiveness of diaspora groups, while parts of the transnational literature have started to look more extensively into migrant incorporation and transnational practices. This is perhaps related to the fact that most scholars following a transnational approach are situated in immigration countries and frequently also take their cues from public policy debates characterised by keywords such as ‘integration’ and ‘social cohesion’.” – (Faist in Bauböck and Faist, 2010: 20)

Intentions, politics and representations

As an imagological¹⁰ exercise the patterns of representing Romanian community from abroad in different media channel, lead to the conclusion that the way the diaspora is presented by newspapers in Romania and the way diasporans perceive themselves are different for so many reasons: they express different intentions, come from different ideological perspectives and are meant for different types of public or recipients.

We have often noticed an ambivalent positioning towards diaspora. In the case of self-presentation (diaspora's media) we have noticed a predilection for presenting in an optimistic manner the success stories of Romanians abroad, simultaneously with the frustration felt by the double rejection that comes from the Romanian media and the one from abroad. We have noticed that the image of the Romanian diaspora is marked by negative stereotypes released mainly by politicians (in Romania from the left wing ideology, trying to manipulate public opinion and to gain votes, or to justify their losses.

Hugo Dyserinck, a Belgian theorist of imagology, uses (Dyserinck 1996, 107-120) an important distinction between *hetero-image* – stereotype images about others, and *self-image* - stereotype images about oneself. Also, he refers to images from another land "Bildes vom andern Land" as "mirages" or "images".

The current state of research makes us perceive the cultural identification as a more useful pattern than identity, and moves the spotlight onto attitudes and perceptions rather than essences or immutable reality and given truth. One of the most important means for maintaining, spreading or changing these perceptions and stereotypes is mass media, due to its significant power to shape popular ideas and attitudes.

¹⁰ The purpose of an imagological approach to the media is to analyse the stereotype images of Romanians in different types of media products.

A study on transnational television (Aksoy and Robins, 2000) places diaspora in an interesting perspective of loyalties and long-distance nationality. It concludes that Turkish people use Turkish media in order to recall their original homeland, the one from memories, and the emotional one, not in order to be in touch with current realities. By interviewing Romanian journalists from Germany, I have found out another situation: Romanians from the diaspora use media for information in order to adapt, to solve administrative and bureaucratic issues. They do not read German papers, unless they are already integrated: ethnic Germans, Romanians living for many years and married to German partners, being part of a German speaking family etc. The Romanian diaspora in Germany uses Romanian broadcasts and Romanian newspapers in order to recreate “in small” a Romanian reality in Germany (Dani Rockhoff- *Hotnews*). They wish to live in a Romanian reality/island inside Germany on German money (Dani Rochoff-*Hotnews* and Lucian Hedco - *Agero*). They have a double consciousness when mixing things, “thinking German and speaking Romanian” (Hedco).

According to an IRES study (Dancu, Orban and Bageac, 2015), more than a third of Romanians from abroad (34%) are involved in daily communication with their family left behind, a quarter do it several times a week, 19% weekly and 15% less. The most widely used means of communication is the phone, followed by social networks and email. How do Romanians see those who are leaving the country? “Three quarters of the respondents say they feel good and very good about Romanians leaving the country to work temporarily abroad and favourability drops to 63% for those who have left the country for good”. 72% of the respondents from the IRES study believe that due to the departure of Romanians for working abroad, Romania loses workforce, decreases its population, loses

specialists, good and intelligent people, and only 15% believe that Romania stands to gain from their departure, through remittances and investments.

Identity and prejudice: *strawberrypickers*

Hybrid identity, a hyphenated definition and label of diasporans is a complex phenomenon that deserves to be the subject of a special research. Being *Romanian-in-Italy*, *Romanian-in-Spain*, *Romanian-in-Germany* and so on, however, are expressions that show the special nature of diasporans' identity.

Between 2.5 and 3 million Romanians are working abroad and a significant number as seasonal in agriculture. So was born the expression strawberry picker.

Strawberry pickers – they were named so for the first time after 2007, with Romania's accession to the European Union. It was them who went strawberry picking to Spain or Germany.

Strawberry pickers is the name given by the Romanian press which most often has a deprecatory, humiliating meaning. It depicts seasonal workers, with low or less qualification, who go to work for a few months a year, leaning down, kneeling or lying on their bellies to pick strawberries, asparagus or other fruits and vegetables in the countries of Western Europe.

On the other hand, new identities were born from these roots. This identity is revealed by Dany Rockhoff in her book *The Strawberry Pickers* (2013):

"Being a strawberry picker is a state of mind. After more than twenty years of living and working abroad, I still feel like a strawberry picker. A man temporarily departed from country, oscillating between two worlds. A man in search of more-good, because good is not enough."

In this confession, we can see a profile for identifying the new diaspora in time and space and in ideals: temporariness, the distance from

home, the desire for happiness. In this profile fit people being departed from home for a while, or thinking they are apart for a while, searching for a better life and ceasing to feel at home somewhere. This temporariness and disunion are the basis of building the fluid identity of the diasporan. How is he perceived by the homeland media and hostland media is a contribution to the public image of the diasporan's identity and to the communication function of identification.

Despite the public opinion reflected above, Romanian newspapers are less kind. The most commonly used label and also negative stereotype is *strawberry picker*. Why is this label imposed by the journalistic discourse?

Rodica Zafiu (2004) has found a pertinent explanation: it designates a large and spectacular phenomenon: a great number of Romanians left to earn money by seasonal work in agriculture, especially in Spain, where they pick strawberries. The term was derived slightly ironically and it came to refer generically to any person who works abroad. The *strawberry picker* tends to become more emblematic because he strikes the collective imagination through a certain tenderness, an idyllic and self-ironic way, specific to Romanians.

“Romanian strawberry pickers are those who chose to leave their homeland, risking, in a foreign country, without knowing anything about the culture, language, customs and traditions in Western Europe, so as to make money. They chose to do despicable work and to provide services hated by Germans, Spaniards, Italians or French for money. They left aside the shame, practicing often humiliating jobs that they would never have done before in Romania”. (*Adevarul*) (Stan, 2013)

The "strawberry pickers'" remittances have saved the Romanian economy: see the evolution of remittances from 2000 to 2014 (*Ziarul financiar*, 14.06.2015).

Many attacks and much negative positioning appeared in the Romanian press after the Presidential election of 2014. One of the most ironic and acid articles was published by *Ziarul de Cluj*, "How programmers and strawberry pickers understand the well-done work in Romania"¹¹. They are presented in the article as very simple people, ignorant of political issues; they are coming back home for the holidays, with cars full of gifts and playing the liberator roles. "The same people who until recently were called strawberry pickers and elderly caregivers now call themselves the "diaspora". All their stories begin with the memory of Presidential elections and surely by the words so dear "we, the diaspora". It is a sort of consolation for them, after all these years when we called them "strawberry pickers" and "ass-washers"¹². In fact, the author expresses Romanians' hostility towards those who left Romania, not paying taxes and contributions to the healthcare system even though they have family (old parents and children) at home to take care of, towards those who forgot to contribute to education, healthcare, social assistance, but dare to criticize the system, towards the IT specialists who do not pay any taxes and expect quality and good services from a country they no longer support. The author's conclusion it all of the (diaspora) does not qualify in fact for a vote because they left the country for selfish reasons, they do not contribute to the country's welfare, they don't know and don't care about much.

Politicians, especially from PSD¹³, are the authors of most declarations against the diaspora, and the negative stereotypes. Hallucinatory statements of politicians pretended they had no idea that Romanians who had left Romania had any interest in voting or were interested in the country left behind. Sebastian Ghita, who announced his resignation from PSD on Friday, said in an intervention on Realitatea TV

¹¹ The article was written by Claudiu Mocan and published in 24.12.2014

¹² <http://www.ziardecluj.ro/cum-inteleg-programatorii-si-capsunarii-romania-lucrului-bine-facut>

¹³ The Social Democratic Party

that the disaster in the diaspora vote in the I and II rounds of the presidential elections was not caused intentionally. "We were not evil, we were fools, I had no idea that these people were interested in Romania and wanted to vote."¹⁴

Mircea Pal, from PLR¹⁵, wrote an open letter, also posted on his Facebook account, a very sarcastic and mean one, titled "Dear Diaspora, you've come but you are already left ... this is not right!!!", addressed to "those who until yesterday were called strawberry pickers, day labourers, and caregivers for the aged, and now call themselves diaspora". The liberal politician reproaches those who have gone abroad, leaving their children behind and forgetting to contribute to any budget, either for their children's education and healthcare, or for the pension budget of their parents. He criticizes the Romanians who left the country for more money but have to pay taxes, and yet are claiming the right to make a revolution from afar. He thinks it is not right to ask for services you did not pay for, and to use slogans, to delegate rights and intervene generally in a climate to which you have not contributed in any way. Of course the letter was widely criticized, called politically incorrect, considered a vile attack against Romanians from the diaspora.¹⁶

Gunther Krichbaum, the chairman of the Commission for European Affairs in the Bundestag, sent a letter to the president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, pinpointing numerous problems in the vote during the first round of presidential elections. "There was no merely accidental inconvenience, but an intentional action of hindering the vote, as it is a well-known fact and confirmed by the previous elections that Romanians living abroad tend to mostly vote for the centre-right parties

¹⁴ http://adevarul.ro/news/politica/cum-si-a-batut-joc-psd-deromanii-diapsora-varianta-geoana-vanghelie-1_5478a676a0eb96501e2ca24d/index.html

¹⁵ The Reformist Liberal Party

¹⁶ <http://www.curentul.info/politic/8660-atac-marsav-la-romanii-din-diaspora-al-unui-adjunct-al-lui-tariceanu>

and candidates”. “So, polling stations subordinated to the Social Democratic Romanian government have received clear indications from Bucharest to block the votes favouring the centre-right candidates. This is not acceptable for an EU member state and the European Commission has to condemn the situation.”¹⁷

Gabriela Vranceanu Firea, a politician and spokesperson of PSD¹⁸, criticized Krichbaum’s position, describing it as "an opinion based on incomplete information, distributed probably specifically in this way", as well as based "on affinities within the European political families".¹⁹

Another PSD representative, senator Olguta Vasilescu, posted on her Facebook page a message against the diaspora, in a derisive form: “We are waiting for the diaspora to come home after they have taken back the country, as they are saying”, with the new President “promising jobs, so unemployment would be null.”²⁰ She added after a while, ironically, that she was offering land free of charge, to so-called investors.²¹

In conclusion, the mainstream journalistic discourse on the Romanian diaspora is fed by ideas launched by left wing politicians, negative stereotypes and is arguing against their right to vote or the legitimacy of their vote. Many politicians and political parties are against electronic voting or mail voting policies, which would benefit the diaspora and reduce politicians’ control over the status quo.

¹⁷ http://media.hotnews.ro/media_server1/document-2014-11-3-18452018-0-scrisoarea-lui-gunther-krichbaum.pdf

¹⁸ The Social Democratic Party

¹⁹ <http://www.curentul.info/politic/7938-exasperata-de-romanii-din-diaspora-firea-il-acuza-pe-gunther-krichbaum-ca-nu-si-face-datoria>

²⁰ <http://www.gandul.info/politica/olguta-vasilescu-asteptam-diaspora-acasa-dupa-ce-si-a-luat-tara-inapoi-le-pun-la-dispozitie-teren-13578359>

²¹ <http://www.evz.ro/lia-olguta-vasilescu-recidiveaza-la-capitolul-tupeu-asteptam-diaspora-acasa-dupa-ce-si-a-luat-tara-inapoi-le-pun-la-dispozitie-teren.html> and <http://www.revista22.ro/olguta-vasilescu-psd-asteptam-diaspora-acasa-dupa-ce-si-a-luat-tara-inapoi-punem-la-dispozitie-terenul-gratis-lipsa-taxelor-si-impozitelor-locale-50429.html>

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CHAPTER VIII

“Hannibal ante portas” or the Role of the Perception about the Irregular Migrant in the Construction of a Common European Identity

*Edina Lilla MÉSZÁROS**

Abstract: *In the past few years thousands of immigrants from Africa and the Middle East fleeing civil wars or in search of a better life had adventured to the EU. This has lead to the fortification of the communities’ external borders and growing antipathy, and thus to the portrayal of immigrants as criminals or social enemies. In the articulation of this perception about immigrants two elements have played a major role, such as the existence of a distinguished common European identity and that of fear. In the construction of the European identity the image of the other has an important role, as the people residing inside the confined borders of the Union perceive themselves as Europeans as a consequence of the contrast with the non-European (non EU) realities. The existence of immigrants, depicted as the others has contributed to the delineation of a European, and consequently to a common “EU” identity. The German philosopher Friedrich Hegel also links the process of the identity formation to the self/other dichotomy, affirming that by recognizing the other the self has the ability to “to give or withhold recognition, so as to be constituted as self at the same time.” In this research our intention is to unfold the role of*

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the irregular immigrant classified as the 'other' in the construction of a distinguished European identity, translated through social delineation and security centred provisions, in the prism of current migratory events at the Mediterranean sea and Western-Balkans route. In order to understand the phenomenon of securitization of migration and the negative construct of immigrants in the EU we shall apply the constructivist paradigm, embracing the assumption according to which both identity and threats are social constructs, constantly changing depending on the circumstances and personal preferences or interests.

Keywords: *constructivism, securitization, self, other, safe third country, Dublin regulation, asylum, refugee, Calais jungle, welfare chauvinism*

What is European identity? Conceptual delimitation

Since the birth of the European Communities/European Union, there have been various debates concerning the existence of a common European identity. By *identity* we understand the qualities, beliefs, etc., that make a particular person or group different from other (Merriam Webster Dictionary, "Identity"), more precisely how individuals. In social interactions between different individuals, groups, nations and cultures, *identity* plays an important role, as one can establish its own identity by comparing, and learning about the identities of other individuals and groups. This is how we manage to know about the similarities and differences between each other, thus being able to construct the identity of the *self*, by delineating it from the *other*.

Deconstructing the concept of *common identity* leads us to individuals or a group of people who identify themselves with the same values, norms, traditions, history, beliefs, religion etc. These individuals are

members of the so called *common-identity groups* sharing a social category and being attracted to the group's norms, objectives, activities and its other representative characteristics (Gaffney and Mahajan 2009, 117).

Defining what *European identity* means, normally departing from the presumption according to which a common European identity exists is a rather challenging endeavour. In overall, we may define *European identity*¹ as a dynamic concept, implying the disclosure of the historical and life referents and setting up a communication allowing the collective construction of this concept by establishing and emboldening divergence and coexistence (Gomez-Chacon 2003, 15).

According to Camino Canon Loyes, President of the Education for Independent World (EDIW) from Belgium, the traditional definition of identity is obsolete, as nowadays in our globalized world is no longer determined by factors of adhesion or belonging to a particular group, tribe, country or nation, but it's built by individuals "through their interaction with groups with which they are associated in one way or another and through which they find their places in the society they belong to. These groups are shaped by new generations in multicultural, multiethnic and multi-religious ways" (Canon Loyes 2003, 28).

Embracing the definition given by Canon Loyes, we contend that besides its traditional factors, nowadays the European identity is being constructed and greatly shaped by the interaction with other groups and cultures, in our case irregular immigrants being portrayed as the *others*. Furthermore, we stress that the current shift in the attitude of the European citizens towards immigrants is a result of the encounter of two civilizations with seemingly incompatible world views and the failure of the Europeans to integrate these migrants into their societies.

¹ European identity as a substantive definition, derived from normative ethics, of what the EU is ought to be.

In the *Lisbon Treaty* we find the declaration of the 27 EU member states accepting the collocation ‘united in diversity’ as the motto of the European Union, which besides the anthem based on Beethoven’s Ode of Joy, the flag with the 12 golden stars, Euro as the common currency and finally 9th of May as the Day of Europe, has become the symbol expressing the sense of community of the people of the European Union and their allegiance to it (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 267). On the other hand, the preamble of the treaty highlights the Union’s responsibility to respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and to ensure the safeguard and strengthening of Europe’s cultural heritage (Ibidem, 11). Furthermore, Article 136a stresses the commitment of the EU to recognize and promote the role of the social partners, taking into account the *diversity* of national systems with the purpose of facilitating dialogue between the social partners, while respecting their autonomy (Ibidem, 81).

The formula ‘united in diversity’ appeared for the first time in the preamble of the *Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe*, sentenced to failure and never implemented due to the French and Dutch veto. Under the auspices of this maxim, the drafters of the treaty have expressed their strong belief that the EU was offering to its citizens the best chance of pursuing, having high regard for the rights of each individual and in awareness of their responsibilities towards the upcoming generations. As it is emphasized in the preamble “while remaining proud of their own national identities and history, the peoples of Europe are determined to transcend their former divisions and, united ever more closely, to forge a common destiny” (Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe’⁹). Thus, we may conclude that the formula ‘united in diversity’ have become the buzzword of a common European identity, bolstering the promotion of a sense of community and belonging among European nations (Bottici 2008, 51). European identity is twofold: one the one hand it defines a set of

common political values, delimiting the normative framework of unity, while on the other hand it allots to cultural diversity a central role in this scheme (Kraus 2008, 8).

Peter A. Kraus tries to raise awareness of the hidden dangers of overexposing the concept of *European identity*, which in the process of integration has been used so frequently that it might turn into a catchall formula with arbitrarily varying meanings, depending on the given context (Ibidem, 37). In the midst of the current migration crisis, the concepts of European identity and Judeo-Christian legacy versus non European/non EU identities are being constantly evoked, depicted as dividing lines between two different cultures with apparently incompatible ideologies.

The self and other dichotomy, the role of identity, fear and religion in the European perceptions about immigrants

In the EU it can be identified a constant desire to control the movement of those persons who are perceived as superfluous, non-Western opportunists jeopardizing the European social cohesion and comfort zone. In the formation of this perception about immigrants two elements have played a major role, such as the existence of a distinguished common European *identity* and that of *fear* (Mészáros, "Is the EU turning into a gated community"). In the construction of the European identity the image of the *other* plays a major role, as the people living inside the Union perceive themselves as Europeans as a consequence of the contrast with the non-European (non EU) realities (Varsori *and* Petricioli 2004, 81-90). We contend that the existence of immigrants, perceived as the *others* has contributed to the shaping of a European, and consequently to a *common EU identity*². Friedrich Hegel also associated the process of the identity formation to the self/other dichotomy, stating that by recognizing the *other*

² Referring to a common identity of those countries which form part of the European Union

the *self* has the ability to “to give or withhold recognition, so as to be constituted as self at the same time” (Hegel 1977, 112 apud Neumann 1999, 3). Approaching this matter from a constructivist perspective we’ll see that identity is not perceived as a static, pre-given characteristic, but rather a constantly changing social construct (Udrea 2011, 122).

Fear has also contributed substantially to the contouring of the European perceptions about immigrants. In their attitude towards immigrants, in the EU citizens fear can take many shapes, from the fear of losing jobs, social benefits, national welfare to the fear of the unknown, and of the *stranger* who might deconstruct the social-, religious-, cultural-identity and the so conscientiously built up feeling of belonging to a certain territory or geographical space. If we wonder since when does this fear and animosity exist towards immigrants in the EC/EU we reach the conclusion that a deliberate will of delineation from the outside world and everything that is on the other side of the imposed borders, has existed since the very birth of the European Community. We may call it an automatic reflex of self-preservation of a newly established administrative unit in front of certain real or perceived risks prowling in its neighbourhood and later a reflection of the (in) security concerns of an entity (European Union) reached maturity through subsequent waves of enlargements and the process of integration (Mészáros, ”Is the EU turning into a gated community”).

Since the establishment of the first human settlements, later city-states, empires and countries those who were inside felt the necessity to secure themselves of potential harmful elements that might come from the outside. This idea of securitizing the polis (or city-state) already appears in Aristotle’s masterpiece *Politics* (Aristotle, “Politics”). In case of the European Community this need for distancing has deepened as with Schengen the borders have vanished inside the community, on one hand

enabling the free movement of people, -services, -capital and –goods, while on the other hand leading to the securitization of the external frontiers (Mészáros, "Is the EU turning into a gated community").

In the midst of the current migration crisis *religion* is more and more evoked as a major dividing line between the Europeans with a Judeo-Christian legacy and the predominantly Muslim immigrants. Looking back to the history of the continent, from the Middle Ages, Europe and the European identity has developed in opposition between the *Christian self - the res publica Christiana* - and the *Muslim other*. Even though Christian hegemony prevailing in culture and politics was challenged during the period of the Enlightenment, the Muslim world at that time symbolized by the Ottoman Empire was subject to a continuous criticism concerning its decadent and despotic way of ruling. Thus, it may be ascertained that the traditional religious physiognomy of Europe is Christianity, and even though nowadays the European Community and its member states are moving towards secularization, favouring a rather neutral approach towards religion, the common subconscious and shared "religious heritage has been, and possibly will be in the future, one of the crucial factors in the continent's development, influencing a whole range of cultural values" (Davie 2000, 6 apud Silvestri 2007, 15). Some scholars argue that the contribution of Islam to the contouring of a distinguished European identity is just as important as the Christian legacy, Islam leaving crucial landmarks in Europe. Besides the historical animosities between Christian Europe and the Muslims (departing from the Crusades and the emergence of the Ottoman Empire), Muslim culture had also a major impact on the evolution of European knowledge in the field of sciences, arts, philosophy, architecture, natural sciences etc. This finding shows that the Muslim influence on the European culture and identity was not a totally negative

one, as it emphasized in some current nationalist propaganda (Silvestri 2007, 16).

Currently, Islam is often wrongly associated with terrorism, religiously inspired violence, a threat to global security and order. In our opinion it is nothing more but religious fanaticism, deliberate manipulation and misinterpretation of religious principles by a group of extremists who pervert the original message of Islam for certain political, ideological or economic purposes.

In our viewpoint it's worth unravelling the fact that in the eyes of the EU citizens, today Islam is equivalent with immigration, simply because the vast majority of the immigrants coming to the EU, originate from countries where Islam is the main religion (such as, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Middle East countries etc.) One thing is clear, regardless of the fact that immigration involves white, black, Asian, Christian, Muslim people it has a destabilizing character, because it influences and alters the economic and ethnic balance, the cultural and religious background of a given geographical space. Immigration represents a challenge to the prevailing status quo, as immigrants want to reside on a territory and use the resources which belong to an indigenous population, who might perceive this as a threat to their everyday existence. As an automatic reflex for self-preservation this leads to the formation of defensive attitudes against any immigrants, who are depicted in this equation as the *others*. Thus, we may ascertain that the current securitization of borders and of migration in the EU was enhanced and hastened by the presence of Muslim immigrants/incidents of Islamic terrorism, but not triggered by it in the first instance (Ibidem, 20).

Constructivism and the security identity nexus

In this subchapter we intend to unfold how immigration (with a special emphasis on the irregular migration) has turned into a security issue in the European Union lately, departing from the presumption that security is a socially constructed phenomenon, implementing the constructivist paradigm. The constructivist approach will also enable us to identify the existing relation between security and identity (Mészáros, “Security Dimension...” 2015, 25-29).

Since its inception in the 80s, *constructivism* has become a theoretical approach increasingly more important for the discipline of International Relations. Constructivism combines critical theory with sociological approaches, its followers claiming that the world is socially constructed through inter-subjective interaction, emphasizing that ideational factors, such as norms, identities and ideas in general are crucial for the formation and dynamics of world politics. As Matt McDonald perceives, constructivism "it is less a theory of International Relations or security, however, than a broader social theory which then informs how we might approach the study of security" (McDonald 2008, 59-60). The only exception is the Copenhagen School, whose representatives have given a new impetus to security studies by developing an approach to building security framework based on *speech acts*, identifying particular problems as existential threats against a referent object. According to the assumptions stated by constructivists, international relations can be built in a social way, based on normative terms, without being the result of clash of interests. For the representatives of constructivism the concept of *security* is much more flexible, arguing that neither security nor threats are not fixed phenomena, but are socially constructed, provided for a particular event, situation to become subject to a security problem or threat, it is necessary that the event/situation to be presented by a/an national/international player that appeals to start a process

of securitization. In other words, if a problem is presented as something critical, then it becomes a threat that must be tackled.

Within constructivism we can talk about two major approaches, namely *critical constructivism* (or post-modern constructivism) and *conventional constructivism* (or modern constructivism) (Balzacq 2010, 57). In view of Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen *conventional constructivism* is typically centered on the analysis of state behaviour, and presents a counterpoint to the materialist analysis highlighting the importance of ideational factors such as culture, beliefs, norms, ideas and identity (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 35). Trying to demystify the concept of security through *conventional constructivism*, we realize that the supporters of this paradigm seem to prefer the traditional approach of security studies, promoting the military state-centric *national security* as the subject of analysis, the only innovation being its disclosure rather by ideational and not by material factors.

Buzan emphasizes that the representatives of conventional constructivism have not only accepted the concept of military security of the state, but also have complied adopting a traditionalist and epistemologically independent research agenda, which considered that both International Relations and International Security Studies should be devoted to explaining state behaviour, thus finding similarities between this type of constructivism and the realistic approaches of traditional security. Thus security is nothing but a behaviour that simply should be explained not argued, as supported by other theoretical approaches, being a concept that is inherently contested politically (Ibidem, 192). Among prominent representatives of *conventional constructivism* we find Peter Katzenstein, Alexander Wendt, James der Derian, Elizabeth Kier, Michael Deutsch, etc.

Unlike conventional constructivism, *critical constructivism*, which emerged in the second half of the 90s', doesn't have a state-centric approach, the state no longer being in the centre of analysis, the focus of

this theoretical approach heading towards other communities and international entities, although it will also become concerned about military security on a later phase (Ibidem, 36). The biggest difference through which critical constructivism is distinguished from the conventional one is that on the one hand, the supporters of this paradigm analyze speeches and connections between the historical and discursive constitution of identity, and on the other hand it leans on security policies. The representatives of critical constructivism contested the normative privileging of state as referent object for securitization, disapproving the confirmation of the state as the main object of analysis (Ibidem, 197).

Another major difference between these two branches of constructivism lies in the way these perceive the relationship between identity and security, most constructivists considering identity as a key element in security building. Sometimes the dividing line between critical and conventional constructivism is so thin that we can talk about overlapping areas rather than insurmountable differences. The debate on the relationship between identity and security are some very useful tools for exploring the differences between conventional and critical constructivist approaches. On the relationship between identity and security, for the devotees of conventional constructivism, the basic concern lies in revealing how national identity, associated with historical experiences or cultural background plays an important role in determining the agenda of the state and its interests, thus predicting how it will act on the international stage. According to this paradigm identity is relatively stable or sedimentary element, which has to be discovered through analysis which enables the analyst to understand and explore how states act in their relations with other states or entities, suggesting a causal link between identity and interests (McDonald 2008, 62).

Leaving aside the differences between constructivist approaches, each of these assumes as its central hypothesis that both security and identity are social constructs. The authoress of the book *Critical Approaches to International Security*, Karin Fierke believes that "to build something is an act which contributes to the birth of a subject or object that otherwise would not exist" (Fierke 2007, 56 apud McDonald 2008, 61). Through this statement Fierke does not deny the existence of security and does not say that it would be a notion without meaning, security can be understood for example as preserving the core values of a group. According to Matt McDonald this definition of security is quite wide, which does not reveal information about the group itself, or the values on which it is based, nor the nature and origin of the threats, or how these values can be defended (McDonald 2008, 61). Because the followers of constructivism consider the entire international system as a social and not a given construct (Karacasulu and Uzgören 2007, 32) also the responses to the concerns articulated above differ depending on the context, being developed through social interaction between players. Thus, the answers to these questions are the result of negotiations in a particular social and historical context through social interaction that creates security (McDonald 2008, 61).

If according to the constructivist perspective both the international system and security are the result of a social interaction, then the question is whether the threats are also social constructs? While traditional security studies focus on threats, constructivism considers security as a political construction, highlighting the role of identity, rules and regulations. It can be ascertained that if the international reality is a social construct, then by default the enemy, threats and conflicts must also be social constructs due to material and ideational factors. This creates a reality socially constructed, with which agents must face, where threats are not inevitable,

nor static, states (or any other securitization agent) having the right to change their threat perceptions depending on developments in their own environment and the altering of certain practices (Karacasulu and Uzgören 2007, 38-39).

With this theoretical analysis our intention was to unfold the relation between identity and security, but also to prepare the ground for the upcoming subchapters meant to inspect the securitization of migration, and the negative construction of irregular immigrants, embracing the assumption according to which both identity and threats are social constructs, constantly changing depending on the circumstances and personal preferences or interests.

European attitudes towards immigration, a quantitative analysis

In order to understand the current attitude of the EU citizens towards immigration and immigrants per ensemble, it is essential to inspect the evolution of their perception using the issues of Eurobarometer, the largest public opinion survey conducted regularly on behalf of the European Commission since 1973 (Mészáros, “Security Dimension as Trigger...”, 115-117).

If we make a brief historical analysis, we realize that in the first issue of the *Eurobarometer* from 1974, migration does not appear as a problem in the nation states or at community level, some respondents from the EC countries expressing only an aversion towards immigrant workers (Euro-Barometer 1, 23).

From 1974 to 1990 no change is being registered concerning the researched topic. Eurobarometer no. 34 from 1990 was inquiring the European public opinion on the preservation, expansion or restriction of the rights of immigrants in the European Community, with the following results: 39% of those interviewed said that the Community institutions

should decide on social and political rights of immigrants, while 23% felt that these decisions should be taken by national governments, 29% believed that the decision had to be the result of intergovernmental consultations, and 8% did not know who should decide. 34% thought immigrants' rights should remain the same, 33% of respondents supported their extension; 19% believed that these rights had to be restricted, while 14% of respondents did not know (Eurobarometer 34, 77). In just two years, in Eurobarometer no. 38 from 1992, immigration was already becoming a source of concern for the interviewed citizens, while stressing the need to have common rules on migration, asylum and refugee policy (Eurobarometer 38, 44). The report revealed the fear of member countries concerning the establishment of a common market, which in their view would have generated more immigration, which would have led to the loss of identity (Ibidem, 57). Thereafter, according to the data provided by Eurobarometer, the phenomenon of immigration would gradually become a major concern not only at the level of the nation states, but also at the level of the European Union.

More recent issues of Eurobarometer from 2009 (Eurobarometer 71, 167-169) and 2010 (Eurobarometer 75, 59) showed that the EU citizens (25% of respondents) ranked immigration among the top three major preoccupations, after economic affairs, social and health problems. According to the survey, those Europeans who are very interested in politics are more likely to mention economic and monetary policy than the vast majority (43%), putting immigration policy on second place of the priorities, stressing that the European institutions should focus on strengthening the Union (36%). Eurosceptics in turn, bring immigration (37%) and fighting crime (36%) ahead of economic policy (34%), while the latter is seen as a top priority for those who trust the EU (42 %). Noting a clear impact of the Arab Spring, in the Eurobarometer from 2011, the

European public opinion has changed its perceptions, considering immigration policy the second most important priority with 33% (Ibidem).

According to the Eurobarometer no. 80 from 2013, migration was less important for the EU citizens, ranking barely on the 6th place (with 12%); the people being concerned especially about unemployment, economic situation, inflation, health and social security (Eurobarometer 80, 13). Among the member states, Malta was the only country where 63% of the population was more concerned with immigration than unemployment or economic problems (Ibidem, 14). In our opinion, this situation can be attributed to the migratory events from the second half of 2013 and the disproportionately high number of illegal immigrants which had been targeting Malta in recent years.³ It is paradoxical that, although Italy through its island Lampedusa, faced an equally or even higher number of immigrants, only 8% of the Italian citizens perceived immigration as their greatest concern, 56% putting the problem of unemployment on the first place (Eurobarometer 80, 14). With the beginning of the influx of Syrian refugee, Eurobarometer no. 83 from July 2015, ranked immigration on the first place as the main concern of the EU citizens with 38%, followed by economic problems on the second place with 27%. On national level also immigration is perceived as the main problem with 38%, more than half of the people interviewed in Malta (65%), Germany (55%) Estonia (54%) and in Denmark (50%) ranked immigration as their most pressing preoccupation, only respondents from Portugal (16%) and Greece (27%) didn't mention immigration among the three most important issues facing the EU, being mostly preoccupied of economic issues and unemployment (Eurobarometer 83, 16). This result in case of Portugal is understandable, as it is not a destination country of immigrants, but with respect to Greece, which is the main entry point of especially Middle Eastern third country

³ The population of Malta is only 412.000 inhabitants

nationals, it is a huge surprise. However, in the current migration crisis the image of the EU was rather positive with 41% of the respondents giving a vote of confidence to the EU, while 40% expressed their trust in the Community (Ibidem).

The difference between an economic migrant and refugee and the inspection of the EU law on asylum procedure

Professional accuracy demands a conceptual framing, and brief classification of categories of unauthorized immigrants. These immigrants can be classified based on various criteria, but if we categorize them based on how they react to *pull* and *push* factors, we can speak about *economic* and *non-economic* migrants. The persons reacting to pull (attraction) forces⁴ can be considered as *economic* migrants, because they move in order to improve their lifestyle and to gain certain economic benefits; the people responding to push factors may be identified as *non-economic* migrants due to the fact that they are leaving behind places of origin because they have experienced serious problems, such as war, ethnic conflict, persecution, environmental disaster, genocide etc. (House of Commons International Development Committee, 22).

According to the United Nations Population Division *immigrants* are considered “persons outside of their country of birth or citizenship for at least 12 months, for any reason and in any legal status” (Martin, Martin and Weil 2006, 10). In our case we shall consider an individual as being an immigrant (Mészáros, “The Pillars of Schengen Crumbling” 2013, 85) from the time he/she leaves his/her country of origin and decides to stay in Europe for a prolonged time. The phenomenon of *irregular migration* is perceived by the International Organization for Migration as “a movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and

⁴ Such as economic welfare, better social service, higher level of life.

receiving countries. There is no clear or universally accepted definition of irregular migration. From the perspective of destination countries it is entry, stay or work in a country without the necessary authorization or documents required under immigration regulations. From the perspective of the sending country, the irregularity is for example seen in cases in which a person crosses an international boundary without a valid passport or travel document or does not fulfil the administrative requirements for leaving the country. There is, however, a tendency to restrict the use of the term illegal migration to cases of smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons” (International Organization for Migration). On the other hand an *irregular migrant* is seen as: a person who, owing to unauthorized entry, breach of a condition of entry, or the expiry of his or her visa, lacks legal status in a transit or host country. The definition covers inter alia those persons who have entered a transit or host country lawfully but have stayed for a longer period than authorized or subsequently taken up unauthorized employment (also called clandestine/undocumented migrant or migrant in an irregular situation). In EU jargon the term *irregular* is preferable to *illegal* because the latter carries a criminal connotation and is seen as denying migrants' human nature (Ibidem).

An *asylum-seeker* is being **identified** as “a person who seeks safety from persecution or serious harm in a country other than his or her own and awaits a decision on the application for refugee status under relevant international and national instruments. In case of a negative decision, the person must leave the country and may be expelled, as may any non-national in an irregular or unlawful situation, unless permission to stay is provided on humanitarian or other related grounds” (Ibidem).

However, due to the current migration crisis the differences between these categories of migrants seem to blur, as it is a difficult task to differentiate between the economic migrants and the genuine refugees. At

the level of the Union we also find a rather puzzled behaviour and due to the opening of the borders, lack of consensus amongst various national and European decision-makers the EU is incapable of enforcing its own laws, jeopardizing not just the entire regime of free movement but also the European Social Model. Pandora's Box has been opened, triggering the mobilization of hundred thousands, even millions of people, on the long run causing the saturation of the European Union.

Before the beginning of the mass influx of mostly Syrian immigrants in 2015, labelled as refugees by the EU's supranational policymakers⁵, thanks to the implementation of the existing European legislation on migration and border control⁶, in the Union was a controlled immigration and asylum policy. This meant that the doors of the European community were sealed for the so called *bogus asylum*⁷ or *redundant fortune seeker* (van Houtum and Pijpers 2006, 54) giving clearance only to those people who complied with all the necessary criteria for entrance. Article 5(1) of the Schengen Border Code enumerates the conditions for the entry of the third country nationals to the EU, highlighting that they (Schengen Borders Code, L105/5).

a) have to be in possession of valid travel document or documents authorising them to cross the border;

b) have to be in possession of valid visa, if required pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, except where they hold a valid residence permit;

⁵ This labelling is contested by various member states, such as the countries of the Visegrad Group, according to which the vast majority of the fleeing people are not refugees, but economic migrants in search of economic benefits, not to mention the fact that there are many migrants who are not coming from Syria.

⁶ Such as Schengen Border Code ad Dublin Regulation.

⁷ Fake asylum-seekers

c) have to justify the purpose and conditions of the intended stay, and they must be in possession of sufficient means of subsistence, both for the duration of the intended stay and for the return to their country of origin or transit to a third country into which they are certain to be admitted, or are in a position to acquire such means lawfully;

d) there is no alert issued on them in the Schengen Information System for the purposes of refusing entry on the territory of the EU;

e) are not considered to be a threat to public policy, internal security, public health or the international relations of any of the Member States, in particular where no alert has been issued in Member States' national data bases for the purposes of refusing entry on the same grounds.

Article 5(4)c contains a loophole stressing out that even though a third country national does not fulfil one or more conditions laid down in Article 5(1) he/she may be authorized by a member state to enter its territory on humanitarian grounds, on grounds of national interest or because of international obligations. Practically, Germany uses this loophole in order to allow a mass influx of unauthorized people on its territory, completely disregarding the existent regulation on the management of asylum claims and refugee status laid down in the *Dublin Convention*, or the prevailing legislation concerning the common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (Ibidem, L105/6).

The *Dublin Convention* (Mészáros, "Security Dimension...", 146-147) commonly regarded as the pillar of the Union's immigration and asylum policy deals with the responsibility of member states for examining asylum applications. This Convention had the role to find a solution to the problems of refugees, who were moved from one country to another, as a ball passed from one track to another during a football match, the member states having the right to refuse to review their asylum claims. This

situation was clearly not in accordance with the spirit of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 (Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951) relating to the status of refugees. In order to remedy the situation the principle of *first host country* was introduced, meaning that people in need of asylum may request it of the first member state they physically enter, thus preventing their higgledy-piggledy moving. The first country where the asylum application was submitted was bound to deal with the application (van Münster 2009, 32). At the surface it was meant to provide assistance to the people seeking asylum at its borders, and to end their *perpetuum mobile*⁸ from one country to another, but at a closer inspection the Dublin Convention was rather exclusionist in its origin, designed to keep refugees out, rather than providing them genuine protection. The Convention with its rule of *first entry* prohibited the asylum seekers to submit consecutive applications in more than one country, and finally it did not contain any mechanisms which would prevent refugees to be sent back to their countries of origin. We may conclude that instead of easing the asylum application procedures for the third country nationals, the Dublin Convention had become the bedrock of readmission agreements between EU states and third countries (van Münster 2009, 32). The Dublin II (343/2003) Regulation amending the Dublin Convention from 1990 further enhanced the principle of “single application”, prohibiting persons to apply for asylum in more than one country. It assures the asylum seekers of a fair review of their application, but also contains mechanisms which prevent the abuse of the system by the lodge of several applications for asylum by one person. However, based on the “single application” principle member states may also decide to refuse an application, referring the applicant to the authorities of a fellow state. In such cases the member states are bound

⁸ Perpetual motion or movement.

to give a reasoned motivation of their decision not to examine an asylum claim (Brouwer 2007, 65).

After the humanitarian catastrophe in the summer of 2013, when thousands of African migrants died on the Mediterranean, while adventuring to the EU, in January 2014 the Dublin II system was amended. The Dublin III Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 118/2014) is based on the same principles as its two predecessors, reiterating the *first entry principle*, namely that it is the first member state that should be responsible for examining a person's asylum application. It is clearly stated that asylum seekers would be transferred back to the first destination in case if they would decide to travel in another country leaving the state in which they've entered the first. However, there are exceptions to such transfers, for example if the asylum seeker has family already residing in another member state or if the person is in a particularly vulnerable situation due to a disease (Wikström, "Dublin III Regulation"). An innovation has been introduced to the Dublin III-Regulation (Mészáros and Horga 2014, 63) prohibiting a member state from transferring a person to another EU country, if there's risk that the person will be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment. Also an early warning mechanism has been introduced, making easier to detect the problems and get assistance from the EU Commission or the EASO (European Asylum Support Office), thus preventing collapses in the asylum system as happened in Greece (Wikström, "Dublin III Regulation"). However, what would have meant a major breakthrough, the possibility to request asylum in more than one country has remained out from the Dublin III Regulation.

According to the Dublin scenario a person, regardless of the humanitarian emergency of which he/she is fleeing, can lodge his/her asylum application in the first country in which he/she physically enters the EU. What is happening now is total mock and disregard of EU legislation, as

people entering the Community via Greece, are not being registered, but set loose and allowed to go wherever they want in the EU, without having proper information concerning their identity, country of origin or true purposes.

The clear delimitation of refugees from economic migrants and the designation of third countries as safe countries have also proved to be scanty, as people fleeing wars, persecution, and genocide according to international law should apply for asylum and protection in the closest safe countries. It is rather thoughtful what kind of humanitarian catastrophe is that in which the people involved choose not to apply for asylum in the surrounding safe states, don't stay in the refugee camps provided for them in the first safe countries (Turkey⁹) after departing their homeland, and cross from 4 to 6 (safe third countries from the western Balkans region (EU Parliament, "Safe countries of origin...", 5) and the EU such as, Macedonia¹⁰, Serbia¹¹, Montenegro¹², Kosovo¹³, Bosnia and Herzegovina¹⁴, Albania¹⁵ Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary, Austria, depending on the chosen route) in order to reach a country¹⁶ or countries arbitrarily chosen considering economic benefits. There is a difference between the concepts of *safe country of origin* and *third safe country*, while the first defines countries are safe to live in, due to their stable democratic system and compliance with international human-rights treaties (European Parliament,

⁹ Turkey is considered as a safe country of origin only by two EU member states, Bulgaria and Luxembourg.

¹⁰ Macedonia is considered as a safe country of origin by Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Luxembourg, UK.

¹¹ Serbia is considered a safe country of origin by Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Luxembourg, UK.

¹² Montenegro is considered a safe country of origin by Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Slovakia, Luxembourg, UK.

¹³ Kosovo is considered a safe state by Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, UK.

¹⁴ Bosnia & Herzegovina is considered a safe state by Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Luxembourg, UK.

¹⁵ Albania is considered a safe state by Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Luxembourg, UK.

¹⁶ Germany, Sweden etc.

“Safe countries of origin...”, 2), the second describes a country that it safe for asylum seekers of nationalities other than that of this country (European Stability Initiative 2015, 1).



Figure 1. Western Balkans Route (Western Balkans Quarterly Q3, 4)

The principle of *safe country of origin* is used according to the Asylum Procedures Directive applicable since 21 July 2015, allowing the use of accelerated procedure without prejudice to the final decision if the applicant comes from a country labelled as safe according to the above mentioned standards. On the other hand, according to EU law a state can receive the status of *safe third country*, if it complies with certain conditions (Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, L180/80):

- a) life and liberty are not threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion;
- b) there is no risk of serious harm;
- c) is respected the principle of *non-refoulement* in accordance with the Geneva Convention;

d) the prohibition of removal, in violation of the right to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as laid down in international law, is respected;

e) exists the possibility to request refugee status and, if found to be a refugee, to receive protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention.

The concept of *safe third country* is important when it comes to the examination of asylum claims coming from a person who has entered on the territory of a state (in our case an EU member state) transiting a country labelled as a safe third country, highlighting that “member states may provide that no, or no full, examination of the application for international protection and of the safety of the applicant in his or her particular circumstances as described in Chapter II shall take place in cases where a competent authority has established, on the basis of the facts, that the applicant is seeking to enter or has entered illegally into its territory from a safe third country according to paragraph 2 (Ibidem, L180/81).

Looking for the intrinsic definition provided by the *UN Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees* from 1951, a *refugee* “is someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion” (Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951, 3). The Convention also establishes the principle of *non-refoulement*, which means that a refugee cannot be expelled or returned against his or her will, in any manner whatsoever, to a territory where his/her life would be in danger, and there shall be no discrimination against him/her based on sex, age, sexuality, race, country of origin or religion. The document further stipulates that, “subject to specific exceptions, refugees should not be penalized for their illegal entry or stay. This recognizes that the seeking of asylum can require refugees to breach immigration rules” (Ibidem).

Unfolding the meaning of the concepts of *safe country of origin*, *safe third country* and *refugee* enable us to get a clearer picture of the current migration crisis, as any EU country can dismiss asylum applications of people who have transited third countries identified as safe, on the presumption that the person had a genuine opportunity to seek and obtain international protection, but for some reasons refused to do so. By designating Serbia as a safe country, in the second half of 2015, Hungary refused to examine almost all applications for international protection made on its territory, thus entering into a quarrel with its fellow EU members states and international entities, like the UNHCR, which have disagreed with the labelling of Serbia as a safe country, as in their opinion it could not provide authentic opportunities for protection in order to be considered a safe third country (Asylum Information Database, 2015).

Securitization, criminalization and the negative construction of immigrants in the EU

After being a barely politicized issue for years, managed exclusively on the level of member states, currently the reduction of illegal/irregular migration and trafficking in human beings has become a top priority in the EU. In recent years as a result of the exclusionary policies at the EU's external borders, strict asylum and return policies, heavy visa regimes and cutting-edge technologies the EU has received various nicknames, being labelled as a *fortress*, *privatopia*, *gated community*, or *pan(ban)opticon*.

Implementing the *security spectrum* (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010, 77)¹⁷ developed by the representatives of the Copenhagen School¹⁸ of

¹⁷ This spectrum reveals the answer to the question concerning how securitization takes place. Buzan and his colleagues affirm that we may perceive the securitization process as a spectrum that goes through three stages, the first non-politicized (signifying a matter that is not the subject of a public debate), the second *politicized* (referring to an issue that is part of the public debate) and, lastly, the securitized stage (when a matter is perceived as an imminent existential threat that requires solutions which go beyond normal political practices).

Thoughts into the present research illustrates how in recent years irregular migration has turned from a non-politicized matter into a politicized and finally a securitized issue in the European Union. In the past two decades have emerged certain security based approaches in the discourses of Western European leaders that have depicted immigrants (especially the irregular ones) as *public* or *social enemies*, giving birth to the so-called *criminal migrant thesis*, criminalizing illegal immigration/immigrants, ‘crimmigration’ (Parkin 2013, 1) associating migration to illegal activities such as organized crime, terrorism, money laundering, human-, drugs- and arms trafficking, petty crime and urban violence etc.

Securitization is described as a process in which "socially and politically successful speech act of labelling an issue a security issue, removes it from the realm of normal day-to-day politics, casting it as an existential threat, calling for and justifying extreme measures" (Williams 1998, 435). The urgent nature of the threat justifies the extreme measures taken by the securitization actor, the authorities claiming a power that in other circumstances they wouldn't be entitled to, or restricting rights and freedoms, which are ought to be respected in normal situations. Thus, we have a very simple formula concerning the question when does something become a security issue, namely "An Existential Threat to Referent Object = A Security Issue" (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 77).

Lyubov Zhysnomirska perceives the securitization of immigration as the discursive construction of migration as a security issue in political discourse, and in her opinion, the representation of immigration as a threat to societies within the EU has contributed to blurring the differences between immigrants and asylum seekers, respectively legal and illegal immigrants (Zhysnomirska 2008, 147).

¹⁸ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde.




Figure 2. The securitization spectre (Buzan, Waever and Wilde 1998, 23-24)

Anastassia Tsoukala identified three main principles which stood on the basis of the rhetorical arguments used in the discourses on the perception of political leaders concerning immigrants, namely (Tsoukala 2005, 163-164).

1. **Socio-economic principle** associated immigration with rising unemployment, development of a parallel, shadow economy, welfare state crisis and deterioration of the urban environment;

2. **Securitarian principle** linked the contribution of immigration to increased security concerns, ranging from petty crime to urban insecurity and fundamentalist terrorism;

3. **Identity principle** emphasized that migration and especially immigrant inflows pose a threat to European societies' demographic balance and identity.

It's enough if we open our TV sets, listen to the radio or search on the internet to find out that the management of irregular migration is a pressing issue on the agenda of the European and national policymakers. Today irregular migration is being perceived as a security issue crying out for the establishment of coordination and cooperation processes at more levels and with more actors (Ceccorulli 2009, 2). The current wave of irregular immigrants coming from Africa and the Middle East also raises the problem of *insecurity*, which as the concept of *security* is also considered a politically and socially constructed phenomenon, representing a danger or threat to a referent object (Huysmans 2006, 2). Both in academic and political circles, everyday conversations and channels of mass media on many occasions the immigrants are presented as untrustworthy, disturbing elements to the status quo, normal flow of life and to the well established common identity of Europeans, leading to societal insecurity (Ibidem, 46).

However, recently we observe a clear difference and conflict of interests between the discourses launched at supranational and at intergovernmental level, while the first sees this influx of irregular immigrants as an opportunity meant to be exploited in order to resolve Europe's ageing population (Population Ageing in Europe. Facts, Implications and Policies, 8, 18)¹⁹ problem, the latter perceives it as a threat

¹⁹ On the long run the EU needs unskilled and cheap labour which will be supplied especially by the African countries. On the other hand for some policymakers migration is considered as a panacea preventing the consequences of population ageing. According to predictions from 2008 and 2010 the EU's population will rise by 5 % till 2040-2050, being followed by a slight decline thereafter. The EU's population is expected to reach 517 million in 2060 with a major population decline in about half of the member states. Changes in the age composition are also expected, especially in the share of old-age and working-age groups in the population. The most important decline is being foreseen in the share of the population between 15-64 years

which could lead to the dismantling of the European Union. The EU's supranational leaders base their arguments on the assumptions elaborated by economic analysts', who stress that on the long run immigration is beneficial for the continent, because beyond demographics it could also improve the EU's economic performance leading to increased competition in certain labour sectors, by harvesting the various skills and aptitudes brought in by these people (Portes, 2015). However, the EU policymakers didn't take into account one small detail, that the vast majority of these immigrants are unskilled and don't speak any foreign languages. In a given society the level of education of social groups is one of the most important factors contributing the economic growth, and in case of immigrants it also influences their chances of integration and employment on the EU job market (Schumann 2013, 101).

It is also a paradox that some member states like Austria, want to reduce the number of skilled and educated EU citizens originating from Eastern Europe, such as Romania or Bulgaria on its job market, in order to increase the occupation rate of these unskilled non-European migrants. On the other hand there's no unitary approach on the intergovernmental level either, the member states being divided over the issue of irregular immigration and how it shall be tackled. Back in 2014 and the first half of 2015, many statesmen, mostly of a German origin, stated that immigration was a good thing. Wolfgang Schaeuble, the German finance minister in an interview given to Bild Online said "that the world is more open and immigration helps everyone. Just as we used millions of refugees and expellees after World War Two to rebuild [...] so we need immigration today" (The Telegraph, 2014). During the summer of 2015 Angela Merkel

from 67 % in 2010 to 56.2 % in 2060. This equals with the decrease of the working-age population by nearly 42 million in the upcoming 5 decades. In 2060 is projected that the elderly will make up 29.5 % of the total population of the EU, thereby immigrants will be needed to fill in the gaps by the low birth rates and ageing population for the assurance of economic growth and prosperity.

opened Pandora's Box, when in one of her public statements she said that all the Syrian refugees are welcome (Independent, 2015) in Germany, thus triggering an endless influx of immigrants in the EU, influx which has proved to be impossible to handle by the Berlin administration, thus pressuring the fellow EU member states under the aegis of solidarity to share the burden of responsibility and take their part in the relocation and integration process of these immigrants. While initially some member states²⁰ expressed their willingness to take in refugees, others²¹ were reluctant. Although still maintaining its open door policy, the German Chancellor somehow wants to backtrack and considerably reduce the exodus of immigrants to Germany, facing the growing antipathy of her voters, who have expressed their criticism and divergent opinion on the migrant crisis at the state elections held on the 13th of March, backing up other political parties, such as the anti-immigrant *Alternative für Deutschland* (Dailymail, 2016).

In our opinion, in case of Angela Merkel the *path dependency* theory could provide us a hint to understand the rationale behind her actions. *Path dependency* stipulates that if one decision is made, it tends to make it more likely that the policy continues to develop in the same direction (Bache, George and Bulmer 2011, 25). Practically it means that once a certain decision have been made or a direction, policy has been chosen, (in our case opening up the borders in front of the refugees) it is difficult, if not impossible to return to the previous policy (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 73).

In the midst of the current migrant crisis, the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán poses as the most vivacious politician and self-declared defender of the European identity, values and Judeo-Christian

²⁰ Sweden, Netherlands.

²¹ Visegrad countries.

legacy. In one of his interviews given to the Spanish Intereconomía Television on the 23rd of October 2015 he affirmed the only way to save Christian Europe is if these migrants are not allowed to enter the EU, as if they do they will set up parallel societies. At the meeting of the European People's Party in Madrid he declared that he does not support *multiculturalism*, because on the long run it'll lead to the formation of parallel societies, due to the fact that based on the democratic pillars of the Union once in, these migrants would keep their communities based on the values brought with themselves and then sooner or later, even if these values are different from the European ones, the Europeans would have to accept them for the sake of cohabitation. This would lead to the erosion of the common European identity and Judeo-Christian legacy (Thüringer, 2015). Moreover, recently he came out with some serious accusations, blaming the leaders from Brussels for the migrant crisis, affirming that they want to create a United States of Europe which would swallow up nation states (Alexe, 2016). The scenario of creating a United States of Europe appeared in Count Kalergi's controversial book *Praktischer Idealismus*, in which he foresaw for Europe a rather gloomy future, indicating that in few decades Europe will have new inhabitants, products of miscegenation and interbreed between Europeans, Asians and coloured races. In Kalergi's view this newly created race would have no quality and it would be easily controlled by the ruling elite. This would lead to the disappearance of the nation states on the old continent (Coudenhoven Kalergi 1925, 22).

Linking multiculturalism with the set up of parallel societies is not a novelty in the EU's political space, as a few years ago the British Prime Minister David Cameron openly admitted in one his speeches held in 2011 in Munich, Germany that the "state of multiculturalism" has failed in the UK, referring to the incapability and unwillingness of mostly Muslim communities to integrate, accusing his country of encouraging different

cultures to live separate lives. He raised his voice against all kinds of extremism and radicalization, urging for a stronger national identity in the UK (BBC News, 2011).

One of the most vivid examples of the failure of the management of the migration crisis in Europe and also the materialization of parallel societies (and the *self* and *other* delineation) set up by irregular African immigrants is the so called *Calais jungle*. Improvised camps set up by African irregular immigrants near the French city of Calais, have existed since 1999. Calais is the place from where the transit from France to the UK is the easiest through the Channel Tunnel, thus becoming the favourite gathering spot of irregular immigrants who want to reach the UK. Instead of the specially managed reception centres provided for them by the French government they have decided to live in improvised camps, as for the usage of the official housing arrangements registration²² would be necessary, what they do not want. The immigrants refuse to submit themselves to the necessary procedures, perceiving that this might jeopardise their chance to get to their land of desire, El Dorado (UK), and instead of applying for asylum and asking for international protection they cling to lorries and trains in order to get to the UK (van Nuland 2011, 14).

The residents of Calais have been asking for years the French authorities to resolve the situation of this improvised camp, nicknamed the 'Jungle'. One thing is sure: the present situation is not good neither for the residents of Calais nor for the immigrants. While the residents feel threatened by the presence of unidentified third country nationals lurking in their neighbourhood, the immigrants are stuck between France and UK, as the UK doesn't allow their entrance on its territory, living in improvised camps without sanitation, complaining of inhuman and improper treatment.

²² In order to be eligible for this types of accommodation, applicants for international protection need to have a 1-month provisional residence permit (APS) or a 6-month receipt recording the filing of an asylum application.

Since 2002 the French authorities have been trying to evict the migrants, closing up jungle after jungle. The demolishing of the current camp started in March 2016, triggering the prompt response of human rights activists and human rights organizations stressing that the demolishing of the camp will not solve the humanitarian crisis, but on the contrary it'll worsen it (Mesley, 2016).

In our opinion if the current migration crisis won't be handled properly, the continuous influx of immigrants will conduct to the creation of other Calais 'Jungles' in various states of the EU, thus leading to the set up of parallel societies and the 'ghettoization' of Europe. The presence of these immigrants will activate the fear in the European citizens, which could lead to the transformation of the Union into a *gated community*²³. Gated communities exist in various countries of the world from the most to the least developed ones, representing the materialization of the fears of indigenous population who feel the need to secure their well-being and properties from the slum outside the fenced walls, thus fostering a clear form of social segregation (Sassen 2010, XI). In our viewpoint the borders of this gated community will not coincide with the external frontiers of the EU, but they will be situated inside the territory of the EU member states, as in case of Calais.

Concluding remarks

According the social constructivist approach promoted by Ian Manners the European Union is a normative power, established on common values, with the ability to create its own rules and norms within the borders of rational judgment. This normative power thesis starts off

²³ Through *gated community* we understand a residential development established on a territorial area surrounded by walls, fences or natural barriers, restricted access through a secure entrance, guarded by a professional private security personnel using refined technologies, monitoring and control devices

with the presumption that the European Community is a complex system evincing through traditional well established norms, such as freedom, democracy, rule of law, and human rights and through more convoluted goals like social development and lack of discrimination, climaxing in the Copenhagen Criteria and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (Whitman 2011, 1). As a conclusion we may ascertain that the EU's is embodied by these rules and objectives (Mészáros and Horga, 45-46). The 2nd Article of the Treaty of Maastricht reflects this normative character of the EU clearly stipulating that “the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail” (Treaty of Lisbon, 19). Also the former president of the EU Commission, José Manuel Durão Barroso's in speech held at the official ceremony to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome emphasized the importance of these values, affirming that “our unity is based on deep ties: common roots and common values. It is those values that make us a Community and a Union, not just a market. The triumph of the last 50 years has been the triumph of those values in Europe, of freedom and solidarity, delivered through a Community of law. Our challenge for the next 50 years is to propose, but not to impose, those values beyond Europe's borders. This is the unfinished European adventure” (A Stronger Europe for a Successful Globalization, 2007).

On the other hand, European identity was defined by the former Czech president. Vaclav Havel as “a new and genuinely clear articulation of European responsibility, an intensified interest in the very meaning of European integration in all its wider implications for the contemporary

world, and the re-creation of its ethos or, if you like, its charisma” (Bekemans 2014, 37). He pinpointed the *recognition of tolerance, humanitarianism* and *fraternity* as the fundamental European values and ideals. The current migration crisis seems to erode these values upon which the EU was built decades ago. However, it is a rather contradictory that on the long run the EU needs fresh foreign workforce due to the ageing of its population in order to maintain its economic progress, but the vast majority of the European political discourse depicts migration outside the Community as a risk factor, a threat, jeopardizing the European identity, conveying the self-image of a culturally homogeneous society. Leaving aside the cultural, ethical, historical and religious characteristics of the EU, we might identify the existence of a *welfare chauvinism*, targeting the protection of the social model, and of the accumulated goods and gains of the internal labour market, immigrants being portrayed as competitors who want a slice from the welfare cake, thus committing a fraud, due to the fact that they want to benefit from the earning of a community to which they do not belong to (Karolewski 2010, 149).

As a conclusion we affirm that the illustration of the irregular immigrant as the *other* has contributed to the delineation of a common European identity, mostly translated through the desire to preserve the European welfare system and comfort zone.

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CHAPTER IX

Catalan, Basque and Galician. Regional Languages at the Borders of Spain. The Culture of Region

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Abstract: *One of the most interesting things about the Spanish Culture is the Culture of Region. There are not a few of the regions of Spain that have also a particular language. Three of these Regions, Cataluña, Galicia and The Basque Country have their own regional language: the Catalan Language, the Galician Language and the Basque Language. Does this language influence the culture of the region? Or these regions have a regional language because of their position near to the border?*

Key words: *The culture of region, regional languages, Spain, Catalan, Basque, Galician*

Our society of the 21st century is characterized by specialists as anarchic, globalized, fragmented, heterogeneous, complex and interdependent. The end of the Cold War and the evolution of the modern states towards decentralization have favored the creation of new structures on ethnic grounds. Samuel Huntington's viewpoint is that "in the new world order, the most important and dangerous conflicts will be the ones between people who belong to different cultural entities"(Huntington: *The Clash of*

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Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 1997:26) But one may say that differences between regions, entities, nations etc. don't need to turn into violent conflicts; they can be resolved by means of diplomatic negotiations or a better communication between the parts involved in each situation.

Many modern states include different linguistic, religious or ethnic groups perceiving themselves as different from the population of the country they live in, they defend their identity and specificity through political action or conflict. The great number of open conflicts that took place throughout history shows us that dialogue, not violence can stop identity clash, especially if we consider the rise of regional power in Europe (Stoica, Mărcuț: *Communication and Nationalism at the French-Spanish Border. The Basque Country*, in Eurolimes, 2011:162)

The case of Spain is one of the most interesting in Europe because the existence of a dual self-identification expressed by the citizens of the Spanish *Comunidades Autonomas* represents one of the main features of the relations in the country (Moreno, Arriba, Serrano: *Multiple Identities in decentralized Spain: The case of Catalonia*,2006:1)

The aim of this paper is to analyze many types of differences between the autonomous communities of Spain putting an emphasis on the importance of the language. We will take into consideration those Communities that have a regional language beside the official one, which is the Castilian. The hypothesis of this work is that the increasing differences among the cultures of the communities of Spain lead to different languages and to the willing of independence. Therefore, maybe is not just a casualty the fact that these Regions are situated at the border of Spain. Because disparities among the autonomous communities are very complex, this paper will focus only on certain characteristics such as: linguistic, cultural and the implications of the autonomy of the regions for the Spanish state as a whole.

Short historical evolution of Spanish Regions

The Second Republic in Spain (between 1931 and 1939), even if it was very short, contributed largely to the resolution of an ethno territorial conflict. One of the improvements that brought was the constitutional design of State as a regional model. This offered statutes of autonomy to Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia. There is obvious that this regional autonomy played a fundamental part in the political polarization process before the Civil War in Spain and the regionalist-centralist issue created innumerable controversies (Moreno, Arriba, Serrano: *Multiple Identities in decentralized Spain: The case of Catalonia*, 2006: 4)

In the 20th century, during the Spanish republic, Basque and Catalan nationalists emerged and they were strongly opposed to Franco's nation-building campaign since they had a pre-nationalist sentiment from the previous century. They no longer had to resist any attempts of nationalization after Franco's death and the adoption of the new Constitution. As we have already known the Constitution guarantees the right of Spanish provinces to form autonomous communities with different level of self-determination. Decentralization and devolution were and still are the order words in Spain and this process gave birth to new 17 autonomous regions (Dirdala: *Before the pact: The early stage of the Spanish transition to democracy*, 2011:1-3)

Cultural and linguistic homogenization among the 17 autonomous communities has never been 100% successful. Furthermore, the homogenization process has worryingly decreased in the last years. Therefore, we can speak about an obvious case of failure in the attempt of building a large Spanish nation-state. Unfortunately, Spain wasn't able to follow the Westphalian model of a uniform nation-state and step by step it was moving away from this ideal. Not even the establishment of democracy was helpful in this hard process. At this point, in the

contemporary era it seems to be impossible to build a cohesive political order, power monopoly or homogenization of the population in Spain (Šonka: *Thirty years of Spanish transformation*)

After Franco's death in 1975, the transnational process to democracy began. The democratic parties did not have a clear model for the type of decentralized state they broadly advocated. However, the majority wanted home rule for all the Spanish nationalities and regions. The 1978 Constitution made it possible for the Autonomous Communities to be self-governing. However, the formulation of a clear division of powers based on federal techniques was avoided.

The construction of the *Estado de las Autonomias* had to follow a "top-down" process of decentralization (Moreno, Arriba, Serrano: *Multiple Identities in decentralized Spain: The case of Catalonia*, 2006:5). The result in the twentieth century is a series of practices of federal nature, involving a series of politically competitive units. The process of decentralization has undergone a long period of consolidation. However, we can say that this process has been assimilated by the majority of Spanish people.

Political reality has been changing lately because of recent developments. After enjoying a great economic growth in the last decades, now economic hardship is being linked to emerging regional identities. In the framework of a strong regionalization of Spain, some mini-nationalisms seem to be very radical because they consider themselves as being different from the rest of Spaniards. They would rather support the idea of a regionalized Europe instead of a united Europe. Spain's accession into the Western community was the perfect reason for developing a great national pride. After being integrated in the European Union and NATO, Spain didn't feel anymore the inferiority complex in relation with the rest of Europe. The role of the state in the international arena was growing and

Spain came to become an important international actor (Louk, Csepeli, Dekker, Farnen: *European Nations and Nationalism. Theoretical and historical perspectives*, 2000: 206-208).

Although integrated in the European Union, the Europeanist spirit is not compatible at all with Spain's national pride. Specialized literature contains relevant information about the relationship between these two feelings: "Whatever the evolution of the EU may be, the prevalent discourse in Spain is that nation-states are going to 'wither away' and there is, therefore, little point in waging battles on borders, national currency, or armies since they are supposed to disappear or be unified. The ideal of 'Europe' thus helps us to solve many intricate internal problems. This may be one of the reasons why Spaniards is that are so enthusiastically Europeanist. This feeling is common among the Madrid government's supporters as well as among Basque or Catalan nationalists, but for different reasons. Both tend to present the current situation as one of constant diminution in state powers" (Louk, Csepeli, Dekker, Farnen: *European Nations and Nationalism. Theoretical and historical perspectives*, 2000:208).

The regionalization and its consequences in Spain

The administrative division of Spain is the Autonomous Communities (*Comunidades Autonomas*). By the Constitution of 1978 Spain is divided into 17 territorial entities which groups 51 Provinces equipped with a high level of administrative and legislative autonomy. Spain is the best example of a regionalized State where the Autonomous Communities have large powers and legislative, financial and administrative autonomy, but they are not participating in a direct way at the exercise of the competences of the State. Also, the Autonomous Communities of Spain have extremely different powers. Therefore, the

lately evolution of the country may let see the possibility to evolve into a federal structure, even though Spain is a centralized unitary system.

While speaking about languages, as defined by the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML), “regional or minority languages” are languages traditionally used within a given territory of a state by nationals of that state who form a group numerically smaller than the rest of the state’s population; they are different from the official language(s) of that state, and they include neither dialects of the official language(s) of the state nor the languages of migrants (Spongerberg, *Catalan, Basque and Galician get EU language boost*).

The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML) is an international treaty designed on the one hand to protect and promote regional and minority languages as a threatened aspect of Europe’s cultural heritage and on the other hand to enable speakers of a regional or minority language to use it in private and public life. The charter is supervised by the Council of Europe and adopted by many EU Member States (European Commission, *Speaking for Europe, Languages in the EU*).

The official language of Spain is Castilian, but in some Communities like Catalonia, Galicia and The Basque County the people is speaking another language, a regional language very different from the Castilian, but official in that region. The Languages spoken in the regions of Spain are not minority Languages, but Regional Languages, as the Charter mentions above. The most obvious are: Catalan, Basque Language and Galician.

The question that we are asking ourselves and the main subject of this article is why these communities have in addition a regional language and how it influences the differentiation from the other, so we will try to highlight the difference from the other. Lastly, it is worth noting that they are the language spoken in regions at the border of the country. We can say

that this position influences as well, in a certain way, the existence of another language within the region.

Fig. 1: Communities of Spain that have a Regional official Language



Source: <http://spanish.about.com/od/spanishlanguageculture/a/spainlanguages.htm>

Even though Spain is a state composed of autonomous regions, and in many cases it may resemble with a federal state, in fact, it is not a federal state. In a federal state, regions have the tendency to create an outset for controlling a certain area and they inherit already structured institutions, while in Spain regions are free to decide upon the desired level of autonomy and the eventually development of a process towards full-autonomy. Powers granted to autonomous communities were different depending on the route by which they obtained autonomy. The problem is that the Constitution didn't explicitly specify the limits of this autonomy and the wording is quite vague: "after five years and following reform of their statutes, these autonomous communities will be able progressively to extend their powers within the framework of article 149" (Spanish Constitution, article 142.8) but there is no reference explaining these new powers (Newton, Donaghy:*Institutions of Modern Spain. A political and economic guide*. Cambridge: 1997, 136).

The Spanish author Eliseo Aja, devotes some chapters in his book to this particular issue. He argues that the contemporary Spanish state, structurally talking, is somewhere in between the unitary and the federal state. On the one hand, according to Eliseo Aja, Spain is not a unitary state because here we have two levels of powers (central and regional) that decide upon the whole national territory and not a single structure of authorities like in the unitary states. On the other hand, Spain has a double-leveled power bodies like the federal states but they don't work in the same way (Aja, *El Estado Autonómico Federalismo y Hechos Diferenciales: Alianza Editorial 1999:82*). The absence of the autonomous communities in the constitutional reform process may be the biggest difference between the federal state and the Spanish state. Anyway, the referendum, a constitutional provision in Spain, is highly important because it guarantees that a constitutional reform cannot be made unless a majority of the votes of Spanish citizens is reached.

A similarity between these two types of state is the fact that both member states of a federal system and autonomous communities have their own laws and regulations which form the juridical framework of their institutions. In the federal state each Land/Länder (member state) has its Constitution and in Spain, each autonomous community has its statute of autonomy that is more or less the same thing as the Constitution of a Land. In Spain the Constitution is above the statutes of autonomy, as well as in federal states the Federal Constitution is superior to the constitution of each member state (Aja, *El Estado Autonómico Federalismo y Hechos Diferenciales: Alianza Editorial 1999:83*).

Besides the name, the most important difference between a statute of autonomy and a constitution of a Land lies in the way they are approved. In the federal system it depends only on the institutions of each Land. Meanwhile, in Spain for establishing and reforming a statute of autonomy

there is needed a consensus between the respective autonomous community and the state itself. In other words, they need a double approval from the Parliament of the autonomous community and the Parliament in Madrid; in some special cases (Catalonia, Galicia, Basque Country, Andalusia), the statute of autonomy cannot suffer any change without a referendum. Unlike in the federal system, the Spanish Constitution doesn't define statutes of autonomy as constitutional laws, but organic laws. Without specifying it clearly, the Spanish Constitution itself gives the statutes the rank of constitutional laws of second level (Newton, Donaghy: *Institutions of Modern Spain. A political and economic guide*. Cambridge: 1997, 140).

Linguistic diversity

Language is perhaps the most obvious element of multi-nationality in Spain in a long-term historical and cultural perspective. The language spoken by one nation is a highly important social and human factor. Its juridical recognition implies the political dimension and respect for individual and collective rights of the people; it is also a great stimulus in social cohesiveness.

The Castilian or Spanish is the language spoken by the majority of Spaniards, but not all consider it as a mother tongue. In fact, there are other major regional languages: Catalan, Valencian, Galician, and Basque. Other languages are Aranese, Aragonese and Leonese or Bable. Some of these languages, especially the Catalan and Basque, enjoy a well-developed publishing industry, producing journals and other periodic publications. In recent decades, local governments try to enhance learning and the use of minority languages. Note that, associated with these linguistic differences, there is a strong sense of unique identity in several regions, especially in the Basque Country, Galicia and Catalonia, who have also major nationalist groups.

The history of Spain faced a great change when the 1978 Constitution came into force. It recognizes and protects the plurality of languages existing in the state. The Constitution declares Castilian (Castellano) as the official language of the country and allows regional languages to be co-official in their respective communities according to the Statute of Autonomy. Here we can mention Basque Country (Euskera), Catalonia (Catalan), Galicia (Galician) and Valencia (Valencian). The Statutes of Autonomy of Basque Country, Catalonia, Balearic Islands, Galicia and Valencia declare their languages as co-official together with Castilian. To see what this is about, below we can see article 5 of the statute of Galicia (Aja, *El Estado Autonómico Federalismo y Hechos Diferenciales*: Alianza Editorial 1999:166):

1. “The own language of Galicia is Galician.
2. Galician and Castilian are the official languages in Galicia and everybody has the right to know and speak them.
3. Public authorities of Galicia ensure the normal and official use of both languages and they will boost the use of Galician in all the aspects of public life, culture and information and they have the necessary means to facilitate awareness.
4. No one can be discriminated on linguistic grounds.”

Other bilingual communities established the so-called “linguistic normalization laws” in 1982-1986 that had more or less the same principles as the above mentioned Galician article but applied to their respective regions. The laws were considered appropriate and reasonable by the High Court of Justice. The first Catalan linguistic law was adopted with unanimity in 1983; this was replaced by another law in 1977 which created controversial discussions in the public area regarding the compulsory doubling of the movies into Catalan (Aja, *El Estado Autonómico Federalismo y Hechos Diferenciales*: Alianza Editorial 1999:166).

Linguistic policy is different from one community to another; there is no general rule applicable in the whole country. To illustrate this I will give you two examples. On the one hand, teaching in Catalan non-university education system is conducted normally in Catalan language but teachers are required to know both Castilian and Catalan. On the other hand, in the Basque Country we can find three ways of teaching: (1) educational programs taught in Castilian having Euskera as language course, (2) educational programs taught in Euskera having Castilian as language course and (3) a mixed educational program which combines the first two programs. The point is that however different they may be in wording, linguistic public policies and laws move around two capital axes: social co-officialty and normalization of the languages (Lapo, *Rethinking the European Language Policies: From Linguistic Colonization to Linguistic Federalism*, 2012:1-3)

Having a co-official language together with Castilian in a community implies a right for the citizens and many obligations for the public administration framework. The population enjoys the right of using any of the official languages whenever they feel so. In terms of public administration, all the official documents need to be issued in both languages and they values equally no matter in which of the two languages have been written. Castilian, as the official language of Spain, is the communication language between regional and central institutions (Lapo, *Rethinking the European Language Policies: From Linguistic Colonization to Linguistic Federalism*, 2012:1-3)

In the last decades, the heads of regional governments paid special attention to the linguistic normalization especially those who wanted to highlight their regional language. By means of well-done public policies, autonomous authorities promote bilingualism in all the areas of the society: education, media, relationship between citizens and institutions, etc. Using

their own language in media has a vital importance for autonomous communities. The efficiency of the means of communication (television, radio, internet, etc.) is very high because it can easily reach all the corners of the region/country and it increases the prestige of the language. Galicia, Catalonia, Basque Country and Valencia have important and well-known TV and radio networks in their own language that depend on their respective regional governments (Aja, *El Estado Autonómico Federalismo y Hechos Diferenciales*: Alianza Editorial 1999:169).

Anyway, in some cases, the state needs to regulate somehow the use of the languages inside the country especially when dealing with citizens who wish to express in their language when dealing with central institutions. According to the Organic Law of Judicial Power, citizens have the full right to use the autonomic language if they wish so; furthermore, knowing an autonomic language would be an advantage for those who aspire to high positions such as legal secretaries, judges or magistrates.

Table 1: *Subjective national identification by region*

	Catalonia	Basque Country	Galicia
Spanish only	13	8	5
More Spanish than Catalan, Basque, etc. (regional)	8	5	7
50-50	35	27	52
More (regional) than Spanish	25	23	27
(Regional) only	16	31	6

Source: Louk, Hagendoorn; György, Csepeli; Henk, Dekker; Russel, Farnen, *European Nations and Nationalism. Theoretical and historical perspectives*, Ashgate Publishing Company, 2000, p. 211

From all the autonomous languages of the Spanish communities, the ones that did amazing progresses in the last 20 years are Catalan, Euskera and Galician. This is not surprisingly at all if we think of the fact that Basque and Catalan are the communities that require the most their independence

nowadays. Probably their linguistic normalization process will be achieved with the shift of the generations if no violent conflict will occur in the foreseeable future (Lapo, *Rethinking the European Language Policies: From Linguistic Colonization to Linguistic Federalism*, 2012:3-5).

Linguistic minorities and linguistic homogenization or normalization in Spain represent a serious political concern. There cannot be neglected the fact that 20% of the Spaniards don't speak Castilian language but Basque, Catalan or Galician and about 40% of them live in autonomous communities which have two official languages. This is how cultural plurality appeared in Spain. The next table shows the percentages of a survey about the dual identity of the Spaniards (Louk, Csepeli, Dekker, Farnen: *European Nations and Nationalism. Theoretical and historical perspectives*, 2000: 210)

Fortunately, the Spanish linguistic pluralism doesn't lead to significant conflicts in everyday life among bilingual groups. In the Basque Community existed violent conflicts between ETA and the police and they also initiated some social movements against the Spanish symbols. In most of the cases, the conflicts take place at political level. Linguistic pluralism is used as weapon in political fights (Louk, Csepeli, Dekker, Farnen: *European Nations and Nationalism. Theoretical and historical perspectives*, 2000:210).

Cultural diversity

When talking about culture we might raise a question about the real meaning of the word. Is it culture the day-to-day life of the people? Or is it rather a high expression of sophisticated and complex ideas developed by the intellectual elite of the society? Whatever the answer may be, in Spain we can find examples of both.

Spain is a country with a diverse culture that encompasses many forms of expression in a mosaic: from literature to painting, music or architecture. Since ancient times (with important examples of cave paintings such as Altamira) until today, the culture in Spain has occupied a relevant position. Regional differences are evident, as shows the great variety of representations such as Galician bagpipes or Andalusian flamenco and many others (Aja, *El Estado Autonómico Federalismo y Hechos Diferenciales*: Alianza Editorial 1999:170).

The distinction between popular and elite culture, which raises the question of what is culture may not be as drastic as it sounds. A good example of this closeness can be found in the characteristics of Spanish architecture. There are perfectly strong examples of buildings of more than 2000 years old, originally from the times of Roman hegemony. And from the Roman to Romanesque, Gothic, Moorish, Renaissance, and all the artistic styles that would emerge later, Spanish architecture has been shaped both by aesthetic considerations as well as by the specific conditions of the country. For all his spectacular nature, Spanish architecture owes as much to the circumstances of everyday life as the coexistence of Muslim, Christian and Jewish, and the conscious development of aesthetic ideals. This is true for architecture, but also the case of literature that developed in parallel with the culture that produced it as a reflection (in both senses of the word) of the reality of their time. In fact, this is true for the vast majority of Spanish culture, forging truly national forms of expression, such as flamenco, to the paintings of the great masters such as Goya (Snyder, *Global Mini-nationalisms. Autonomy or Independence*, Lodon: 1994).

Besides the well-known tourism "sun and beach", the culture is becoming a consolidated alternative, given the wealth of museums, monuments, traditions and Spanish cultural manifestations. Spain is one of the world's richest countries in terms of architectural heritage, with the

highest number of World Heritage Site statements granted by UNESCO. An approximate inventory numbers more than 20,000 major monuments in the country. In Spain, there is a strong maritime tradition, by the fact of being a peninsula and, consequently, being surrounded by water. Even in cities in the interior river port, such as Seville, we see that tradition. Air transport has facilitated the beaches of the Mediterranean, especially the Costa del Sol, hosting millions of tourists every year (Lapo, *Rethinking the European Language Policies: From Linguistic Colonization to Linguistic Federalism*, 2012:4-6).

From day-to-day habits, like the variety of dishes that make up a delicious cuisine to the institutional support for artistic creation, Spain holds surprises in every corner of its territory. Gastronomy varies from the simple Mediterranean diet that has plenty of fresh land and sea products, to the ingenuity of recipes from the center of the country that have a more rustic style such as roast suckling pig or the famous Castilian soup. We can say that Spanish culture is extremely heterogeneous, due to both geographical and historical circumstances. The fascinating mosaic of different cultures that exist in each region extends beyond issues such as local food patterns or dressing habits. The different traditions that have defined each of the regions have deeply permeated every aspect of Spanish culture, from which liquor to take after finishing eating to the kind of materials used in the construction of buildings in each area (Lapo, *Rethinking the European Language Policies: From Linguistic Colonization to Linguistic Federalism*, 2012:4-6).

Two of the most famous traditions of Spain are the bulls and flamenco. The so-called corridas (runs of the bulls) are famous all around the country but especially in Pamplona. There, the bulls are left free and they go after the people in the city. Flamenco is a folk tradition in southern Spain, especially in Andalusia which is considered to be the land of the

roots of singing, dancing and flamenco guitar. During the month of April, in Sevilla there is celebrated the well-known April Fair (Feria de Abril); during one week you can enjoy traditional singing, dancing, Jerez wine and typical local cuisine. A tradition that brings together millions of people is being held every year in a village called El Rocio where Saint Rocio (Virgen del Rocio) is venerated. Another famous festival is “Las Fallas de San José” hold in Valencia, in March; the entire city is gripped by fireworks and spectacular pyrotechnic shows. “La Tamburrada” festival that takes place every month of February in San Sebastian is considered by the local people as being a “wild week”. One of the most typical holidays in Madrid is “San Isidro” which hosts the most important bullfighting of the year. Carnivals in Santa Cruz de Tenerife and Cadiz are the most popular in the country (Aja, *El Estado Autonómico Federalismo y Hechos Diferenciales*: Alianza Editorial 1999:171).

Known for its history, art, bullfighting, flamenco beaches and many hours of sunshine a year, Spain is much more than that. It has been used up to saturation the topic of "Spain is different", but the question is: “Spain is different” from what? Well, it's really different from everything: from Europe, the world, and especially herself. It is a country full of contrasts, starting with its climate and diverse landscapes which have brought to Spain the title of "little Europe". Indeed, in Spain we can find climates and landscapes reminiscent of very remote points of the European continent or even the African (not surprising if considering the fact that Spain is separated from Africa by the Strait of Gibraltar) (Lapo, *Rethinking the European Language Policies: From Linguistic Colonization to Linguistic Federalism*, 2012:6-9).

At the same time, each region, each city within the same region, and sometimes each village, presents a reality so different and fascinating. This is due to the rich history of this country and the many ethnic groups that

inhabited bringing customs, traditions and diverse artistic expressions that sometimes merged into something completely new and indigenous and sometimes remained unchanged for centuries (Lapo, *Rethinking the European Language Policies: From Linguistic Colonization to Linguistic Federalism*, 2012:10).

Conclusions

Spain is very particular country in Europe and its culture and development as well. While speaking about regions and languages, we can sum up that those Spanish regions that have a regional language used that language even before the existence of what we call today *Comunidad Autonoma* and they have already had a specific culture of the region. So, the language existed even before the borders of the actual region.

It is not a casualty the fact that those regions that have a regional language are situated at the borders of Spain. This is only the proof that they existed before the existence of the Nation-State, which is another demonstrated idea of the large cultural Spain. Furthermore, by making official the existence of another language beside the official one, brings between the Spanish people the conscious of a differentiation and, of course, the willing and desire of independence. One cannot forget that a language is, and it always was, a sign of power, a sign of differentiation, of individualization.

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CHAPTER X

The Image of Israel in the Published Documents regarding the Bilateral Politics of Romania – Israel during the Years 1948- 1969.

*Anca OLTEAN**

Abstract: *This paper deals with the problem of the emigration of Romanian Jews in Israel as revealed by a few historical writings and in published documents. The Romanian Jews' emigration in Israel was a continuous process in spite of the communist regime established in Romania after the war and it was one of the main priorities of Romanian – Israeli diplomatic relations. The research focused on the years 1948- 1969. The relationships between Romania and Israel evolved in time, manifesting interest in economic life, cultural life, human rights field, migration, religion.*

Keywords: *Jews, Romania, Israel, diplomacy, cold war, emigration*

1. The emigration of Romanian Jews in Israel during the years 1948-1953

The evolution of diplomatic rapports Romania – Israel can be reconstituted from the documents published in the collection *Romania – Israel. Diplomatic documents 1948- 1989*. (Bleoancă et al, 2000)

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The Ministry of External Affairs of the state of Israel answers to the telegram from June 9 1948 by asking from Romanian state to acknowledge the state of Israel. From the very beginning, the state of Israel shows its consent concerning the idea of emigration of the Jews of Romania. Thus, by this first telegram, there are announced the decisions of the National Jewish Council: “Conseil a declare que Etat israélien sera ouvert [à l’] immigration [de] tous les juifs, se consacra [au] développement du pays au profit de tous ses habitants, sera base sur les principes [de] liberté, justice et paix, maintendra [l’] égalité sociale et politique, [de] tous citoyens sans distinction de race, religion ou sexe, garantira entiere liberté de conscience, education, langue; sauvegardera la saintété et inviolabilité de sanctuaries et lieux saints [de] toutes religions, se dovouera [aux] principes [des] Charte [des] Nations Unies”. (Bleoancă et al, 2000: 4) After a telegram addressed by Ana Pauker to the minister of External Affairs of the provisional govenment of the state of Israel, the Romanian government declares he agrees with the establishment of a legation of Romanian state in Israel. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 4-5) Reuven Rubin was named extraordinary minister of Israel to Bucharest.

The problem of the Romanian Jews appears as a constant theme of negociation between the Romanian diplomats and the Israeli one. In a telegram from March 11, 1949, it is shown that the Israeli government is worried by the evolution of the emigration of the Jews from Oriental Europe. The Israelians shows their gratitude that Romanian government authorized the departure in Israel of several thousands of Romanians. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 6-10)

The state of Israel motivates its need of emigrants both because its military situation (it is surrounded by hostile neighbours), but also because of the need of employees for the economic deelopment. These objectives required a growth of population of Israel and a professional quality of its

population. The telegram stipulates that, in the past, the first groups of immigrants in Israel came to great extent from Oriental Europe. In several occasions, the representatives of Israel ask for guarantees from the Romania government that the emigration will continue. The aggressive attitude of the Romanian state concerning the Zionists movement and the anti- Zionist campaigns from the Romanian press provoked the worryness of the Jewish state for which the Zionist were working. It was required the emigration in Palestine of 5000 of members of the movement Halutz for which the emigration was the most important goal in life. (Bleoancă et al, 2000: 10)

In the same time, the Romanian Legation established at Tel Aviv sent periodical reports to the Ministry of External Affairs from the country, Ana Pauker. In the reports there are relevated dayly facts, as it would be the fact that Romanian diplomats did not have enough money at them, that they did not received money from israeliens, that they were discontented with the hotel that the Israelians had chosen for them. In the dialogues with the Israelian repreentatives, the Romanian diplomats referred to the Romanian Jews more in terms of cohabiting nationalities than in terms of ethnical minorities. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 13) The Romanian diplomats represented one of the first legations established in Israel after the Soviet one, American, English and French.

The Zionists were not persecuted only by the Romanian communists, but also from the other states from Eastern Europe. In a discussion between Romanian diplomats and the Soviet ones, all agreed that the Zionists are bourgeois nationalists. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 14) In the same time, the documents relevates fragments from the life of the Romanian legation to Tel Aviv. Thus, the members of legation faced difficulties at Tel Aviv because they did not now, the English language and the Hebrew, aspect that prevented them to employ a teacher of English language and a young

man that made translation from Hebrew. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 17-19) They did not have any secretary, they did not have a car, they were suffering by the absences of their families. The lack of experience in diplomatic world was also a great handicap.

The documents describe different concrete situations in the evolution of Romanian – israelian. Thus, Ana Pauker enjoyed a special prestige in Israel. The Israeli minister of External Affairs, Moshe Sharett, name it „exceptional women”. She was all the time informed of the evolution of the Romanian – Israeli relations during the period when she was minister of External Affairs. The president ad-interim Sprintzak acknowledged in front of the Romanian diplomats the special role which the Romanian Jews had in the construction of Israel. The documents describe aspects from the activity of Romanian Legation at Tel Aviv. The Legation have relations with the authorities, political life, representatives of economic life and it was trying to get involved in the cultural life. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 24) The representatives of the legation shared their daily responsibilities. Thus, they were involved in the consular problems, daily payments, economic attributions and cultural, press relations. They received ideologic materials from the Ministry of External Affairs which they had to read.

Still, it appeared aspects of controversy concerning the Romanian – Israelis relations which revealed the difficulties of emigration of the Jews of Romania. Thus, in a discussion with Romanian representatives, in 1949, the minister Ben Gurion asserts: „I am worried of the faith of the Jews who, wanting to come to Israel, do not have the permission of the Romanian government. Israel can not strenghten and develop only with the Jews from here and needs the Jews outside of Israel. The development of the relations between the two countries depends on the economic reports and on the emigration of the Jews who would like to leave from Romania. Please, be so kind, and send this information to the Romanian government”.

(Bleoancă et al., 2000: 26) The Romanian Ambassador promised that the Romanian state would give visas to the Israeli citizens. In another discussion, from October 19, 1949, the Minister of External Affairs of Israel draws the attention on the problem of emigration, because of the fact that Popular Republic of Romania will enact visas to the Israeli citizens. In another discussion, from October 19, 1949, he draws the attention on the issue of emigration, because of the fact that Popular Republic of Romania did not stop the emigrations that started in 1948, continuing to enact visas only for 100- 200 of persons. (Bleoancă et al., 2000:27) The Jewish citizens of Romania could not travel with the ship “Eylath” which was in the port and for which they had tickets. The Romanian authorities imposed to travel with the ship “Transilvania”, although it was partially destroyed. The discussions continued around this problem. In the same time, it was forbidden to Romanian Jews to emigrate in groups. As a consequence of the repeated requests of the Israeli officials to accelerate the emigration of Romanian Jews, the representative of the direction of the ministry of External Affairs of Romania formulated the next conclusion: “I underlined to be clear that the problem of Romanian Jewish citizens who would like go to Israel is a problem that regards exclusively the authorities from Popular Republic of Romania and nobody can involve”. (Bleoancă et al., 2000:31) Moreover, it took place protests of the Israeli representatives against the arrestment of the leaders of Zionist movement initiated by the Romanian state. The Minister Sharett said that there can not be diplomatic relations Romania – Israel, if it is not reached a consensus concerning the emigration of the Romanian Jews. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 33) In this sense, as a sign of protest, Israel redraws his diplomatic representatives from Romania, Rubin and Agami, writes the minister at Tel Aviv, Nicolae Cioroiu, in November 21, 1949. The relations between Israel and Romania depended on the attitude of the Soviet Union: “Sharett will have to use his

presence at United Nations Organization in order to reach an understanding with the Minister of External Affairs of Soviet Union in the problem of the relations with the Eastern block”. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 33)

The Romanian Legation from the Tel Aviv had a propagandistic role, disseminating to the personalities and Israeli institutions the press from Romania, newspapers such as “Scânteia”, “Roumanie nouvelle” and the newspaper “Unirea”. The legation has connections with the communist Israeli party, furnishing materials in Romanian about the situation from Popular Republic of Romania. The Legation sent journals from Israel in Romania. (Bleoancă et al, 2000: 35) The emigration of Romanian Jews was a problem especially important for the state of Israel, because the Popular Republic of Romania had a bigger number of Jews from the countries of Oriental Europe, a well known aspect by the Israeli minister of External Affairs, Sharett. (Bleoancă et al, 2000: 37) Sharett describes the hostile attitude of the Romanian press towards the state of Israel as an impediment in the evolution of the relations Romanians- Israeli.

In the correspondence between the Romanian diplomats and the Minister of External Affairs of Romania appears the problem of the creation of a Romanian consulate in Ierusalim, in the situation in which the problem imposed was to establish the capital of Israel here. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 48)

After the recall of the minister- diplomat Rubin at Tel Aviv by the Israeli state, the newspapers wrote that if the government of Soviet Union will not change his hostile attitude towards the Zionism and Israeli state, the place of Rubin will remain free. (Bleoancă et al, 2000: 49)

Moreover, the Romanian diplomats had remarked the hostile attitude of Israeli press towards Romania. Only the press of Communist Israeli Party was not hostile to the Communist Romanian Party. It is represented by the newspapers “Kol Haam”, “Al Itiahad”, “People’s voice” (Glasul

poporului), “Kol Hapoel”, “Kol Hanovar” which never took stance in front of the problem of the emigration of Jews from Romania, they did not discuss the problem of Zionism. (Bleoancă et al, 2000: 50) Among the activities of the Romanian legation it is remarked the organization of an exhibition with Romanian paintings, books, magazines and Romanian journals. They were presented Romanian movies, among which we remind you the Congress of intellectuals, the Cup of Youth, The city does not sleep and August 23.

The Israeli press protested against the prohibition of the emigration of Jews from Oriental Europe in Israel. Thus, the newspaper “Hațofe” published two articles about emigration in which it condemned the politics of Soviet Union, Popular Republic of Romania and Hungary: “What escaped from the furnaces is destroyed by assimilation. The emigration from Eastern Europe is a problem of life for us and must stay always at the day order. If Israel will not succeed to obtain the emigration, we are in front of a national catastrophe”. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 53)

In a telegram of Romanian Legation at Tel Aviv towards the Ministry of External Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania, from January 18, 1950 it is shown that Israel decided the nomination of a new minister to Bucharest, but it was not decided yet whom to be. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 53) In another document, it is made a description of the representatives of the Legation of the United States, showing “the infiltration” of the United States in Israel. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 55) The plenipotentiary minister at Bucharest, named by the state of Israel, was Ehud Avriel, plenipotentiary minister at Prague and Budapest.

It had been appeared incidents that put in danger the Romanian – Israeli relations. Thus, at February 23, 1950, it was announced that the location of Romanian Legation in Israel was broken and some of its goods disappeared. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 60) It was required a new location for

the personnel of the delegation. Other aspects of tension are frequent. Thus, the newspaper “Palestine Post” published a tendentious article – in the opinion of the Romanian legation at Tel Aviv – concerning the situation of Romanian Popular Republic and of the diplomacy from Israel in Romania. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 62) Ben Gurion, in an interview, talked about the persecutions against the cohabiting nationalities in Romania.

At April 28, 1950, a telegram of the Romanian Legation at Tel Aviv towards the Minister of External Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania assets that in the press it was published a declaration of the Popular Republic of Romania according to which starting with May 3 there have been made easier the formalities of emigration in Israel. The documents show that the entire Israeli press wrote about the nomination of Avriel as a minister in the Popular Republic of Romania. Instead of Avriel, in Budapesta and Prague it was proposed dr. Eliasiv, director of the section “Eastern Europe” from the Ministry of External Affairs. Instead of Eliasiv it will be nominated an Israeli counselor in Moscow. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 68)

The documents shows different forms of manifestations of the economic crisis from Israel, considered more and more dependant by the American policy. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 70) There are made a lot of descriptions of the situation from Israel. Thus, the Zionists were against the Communist Israeli Party, the workers from Israel required the rise of the wages, the Israelis were suffering of Hungriness. Ben Gurion required a loan of 35 millions dollars from Americans and the support of the American Jewry. He organized a conference to Ierusalim where he invited 45 of wealthy Americans. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 71) The information was a complex one and probably exaggerated: “In this difficult economic situation, each new emigrant that comes up is a new hardening of the situation. More than 100 000 of people from camps don’t have accommodation, they have no work, live without a perspective. But their

number increases, always”. (Bleoancă et al, 2000: 72) The Jews from Israel often critics the Romanian government: “But the main attacks against us concerned two questions: the propaganda from the country against the departures and the arrestment of some Zionists leaders. I communicated by telegraph, the attacks against us”. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 72) It is explained the fact that the hostile attitude of the Popular Republic of Romania is caused by the profound bounds that the state of Israel has with Americans. In the camps of emigrants where they were detained at the beginning the Romanian Jews are organized conferences, courses in Hebrew”. (Bleoancă et al, 2000: 73)

The moments of tension in the Romanian – Israeli relations continued to manifest. Thus, the Israeli “Iedioth Ahronot” (The last news) and “Heruth” wrote that the delegation of Israel to United Nations will vote the proposal of Western powers to accuse Romania for not respecting the conditions of armistice and the annihilation of individual rights. The journal asserts that it will accuse Romania of anti- Zionist repressions, the prohibition of emigration in Israel and the arrestment of leaders of the Zionist movement, it is asserted in a telegram of Romanian Legation to Tel Aviv towards the Ministry of External Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania, in September 21, 1950. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 75)

A constant theme of negotiation for the Israeli parties is the problem of Jewish emigration from Occidental Europe. Thus, the Zionist parties made from the emigration of the Jews in Israel the basis of their program. Paul Davidovici, one of the representatives of Romanian Legation at Tel Aviv, asserts that there are individuals in these parties that consider that the emigration in Israel has to be stopped or limited. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 77)

The arrestments of Zionist leaders are a constant theme of reflection with Israel. In several diplomatic documents published in the collection coordinated by Dumitru Preda and Victor Boștinăru are formulated protests

of Israeli representatives with regards to these arrestments which infringed the human rights. The attacks of Israel against the Romanian state are considered by the Romanian diplomats as manifestations of American imperialism. It is asserted that, according to the law of repatriation elaborated by the government Ben Gurion, any Jew can emigrate in Israel.

It appears in the documents reflections of economic issues between Romania and Israel. Thus, madame Weizmann, the wife of the president of the state of Israel, asked from Romanian diplomats that Popular Republic of Romania to sell oil to the Israel. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 90) In the documents of the Romanian – Israeli relations, is reflected the detail that at February 11, 1953, the Soviet government wanted to break the diplomatic relations with Israel as a consequence of the fact that at February 9, it exploded a bomb at the centre of the legation of Soviet Union at Tel Aviv, in spite of the fact that the president of Israel condemned this terrorist act and apologised to the authorities from Kremlin. The Russian – Israeli relations were restored at June 20, 1953. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 91)

The departure of Jews from the socialist countries in Israel surpass the monthly rate of 1200 of people. In a propagandistic style, the letters of Romanian Legation from Tel Aviv show that thousands of emigrants from Romania regret they emigrated in Israel and asked for their return home.

At December 7, 1953, Moshe Sharett succeeded to Ben Gurion as prime minister. The diplomat Virgil Huțanu, one of the representatives of the Romanian Legation from Tel Aviv, shows that the demise of Ben Gurion was due to his own leadership: “In the period that preceded the confirmation of the tendency of Ben Gurion to resign and until to its presentation, the bourgeois press worked hardly to present Ben Gurion to the population as a clean man, as a real leader of the people who did not have anything in common with the hardely internal and external situation in which it was the Israeli state. In articles, on whole pages, the newspapers

were looking to show that the population regrets deeply that Ben Gurion leaves from the position of leader of the state and prime- minister and that it would be a great loss for the people.

From the party press, but also from the discussions with the local friends, it comes up that the real reason of resignation is not fatigue, but the negative consequences of his government both on political plan but also economical internal, but also on external political plan”. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 95)

As a conclusion of the analysis of the diplomatic reports Romania – Israel during the years 1948- 1953, the diplomatic relations appear full of difficulties, especially concerning the emigration of the Jews from Romania, but also in what concerns the persecution of Zionist leaders that followed after 1949.

2. The emigration of Romanian Jews in Israel during the years 1953- 1969

The problem of Jewish emigration from Romania to Israel (Zionism) was a central theme of negociation between the Romanian and Israeli diplomats. Thus, on May 26, 1954 near the sinagogue of Tel Aviv, 700 Jews were staying in hunger strike, refusing to eat as a sign of protest against the persecution of Zionists in Romania¹. (Bleoancă et al, 2000: 99-100) Foreign delegations visited the protesters and their purpose was to raise awareness against the Zionists trials in Romania. The reaction of Romanian authorities was, in the first instance, their intention to send a protest note against the Israelian involvement in internal affairs of

¹ Daniela Bleoancă, Nicolae – Alexandru Nicolescu, Cristina Păiușan, Dumitru Preda, România – Israel. 50 de ani de relații diplomatice (Romania – Israel. 50 years of diplomatic relations), volume I., 1948-1969, 99. See the document entitled Telegram of Romanian legation at Tel Aviv towards the Ministry of External Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania concerning actions of protest concerning the measures taken at Bucharest against some Zionist leaders, p. 99-100.

Romanian Popular Republic². (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 101-102) Protesters and the Israeli public opinion motivated that Zionism stayed at the base of the creation of the state of Israel that gathered together the Jews from everywhere and that the Israeli state can not watch with indifference the persecution of Zionist Jewish leaders in Eastern Europe³. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 102-103) In the same time, the Israelis are pursuing their own support for Romanian Zionists, and had not a policy against the Romanian state and its social and political regime, according to the declarations of the prime-minister, Sharett⁴. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 103-104)

Another problem in the Romanian – Israeli diplomatic dialogue in the year 1954 was to conclude a commercial agreement between the Romanian state and Israel.⁵ (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 104-111) It appears in the documents the presence of John Gordon who was the representative in Israel of some of the Romanian societies. After the signing of these commercial agreements, Zeev Argaman, the Israeli business representative in Romania, offers to do an analysis of economic flux between Romania and Israel of the situation existent before September, 1955⁶. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 111- 112) This analysis shows that it exists possibilities of development of the exchanges Romania – Israel. Israeli shows their

² Ibidem, 101. See the document entitled Telegram of Romanian legation at Tel Aviv towards the Ministry of External Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania concerning certain actions of protest towards the measures taken to Bucharest against some Zionist leaders, p. 100- 101.

³ Ibidem, p. 102. See the document entitled Telegram of Romanian legation at Tel Aviv towards the Minister of External Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania concerning the reflection in Israeli press of the position of the government from Bucharest towards the problem of repatriations, p. 102-103.

⁴ Ibidem, p. 103. See the document entitled Communication of Romanian legation at Tel Aviv addressed to the Ministry of External Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania concerning the position of the government from Bucharest regarding the problem of repatriations and the answer of Israeli government, p. 103- 104.

⁵ Ibidem, p. 105. See the document entitled Report of the engineer Mihai Petri, the chief of Economic Romanian Legation, addressed to the Ministry of External Affairs of Popular Romanian Republic concerning the opening of negotiations and the conclusion of the first commercial agreement with Israel, p. 104- 111.

⁶ Ibidem, p. 111. See the document entitled Note of audience with regard of entrance in the Ministry of External Affairs of Zeev Argaman, representative with businesses of Israeli state at Bucharest, in connection with the stage of bilateral economic relations, p. 111- 112.

interest to buy Romanian cereals for the next three years⁷. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 112)

Other interests of the Romanian – Israelian relations was to develop cultural relations between the two countries. Such an exemple was to organise a concert of Romanian popular music in Tel Aviv with 1000 of participants including Romanian and foreign diplomats⁸. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 113) The concert was very appreciated.

The documents published in the collection of documents *Romania – Israel diplomatic documents* signal also reasons of discontent in the relations Romania – Israel. Thus is revealed the attitude of Israelian press of hostility especially in the litigious cases like the problem of emigrations and reunification of families of Romanian Jews in Israel, or the problem of arrested Zionists in Romania⁹. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 114-117) Israelians officialities, as the minister of External Affairs of Israel, Golda Meyersohn involved in the negociations with Romanians to free the Jewish prisoners. She also took stand for the reunification of dismantled families from Romania and Israel¹⁰. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 117-118)

In 1956, first semester, a certain opening appeared in the diplomatic relations Romania – Israel fostered by Israelian state which wanted to improve relations with the communist block. But, on the other hand, Israelian media, press and public sphere openly criticised the communist system. In the same time it appeared the problem of separated families and

⁷ Ibidem, p. 112.

⁸ Ibidem, p. 113. See the document entitled Telegram of Romanian Legation at Tel Aviv to the Ministry of External Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania concerning the echo in israel of the concert of popular romanian music.

⁹ Ibidem, p. 114. See the document from the general report of romanian legation at Tel Aviv in semester ii – 1955, concerning the relations Israelo- Romanian, p. 114- 117.

¹⁰ Ibidem, p. 117. See the document Note of speaking of Gheorghe Chitic, representative with business of Romania at Tel Aviv, with Golda Meir, new minister of External Affairs of the state of Israel, concerning the bilateral relations, p. 117- 118.

the wish of Israeli authorities to name a new minister to Bucharest¹¹. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 118-121) In the same time, economic relations Romania – Israel were more fruitful than political ones. From Israel, the Romanian state imported medicines, coffee and cocoa.

Another fact that reveals cultural cooperation Romania – Israel, as it confirms the diplomat Elkana Margalit, Israeli diplomat to Bucharest, is that the minister of Israel in Romania saw at Jewish State Theatre the play Anna Frank¹². (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 124-125)

At August 9, 1957, a diplomatic document from the present collection of documents asserted that from 180 arrested Zionists, all were liberated after these negotiations¹³. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 127-128) Other contemporary problems revealed by the diplomatic documents was the problem of Jewish emigration to Israel that continues day by day. Zionist Leaders from Israel declared their availability to cooperate with revolutionary governments from Central and Eastern Europe in order to obtain the emigration of Zionist members from Central and Eastern Europe in Israel¹⁴. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 128-131) In the opinion of the prime minister of Israel, Ben Gurion, the peace of Israel was depending of alia¹⁵. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 130)

The cooperation between the Jews of Israel and the Jews of Romania reaches from time to time religious nuances. A document sent by the Romanian legation to Tel Aviv to the Minister of External Affairs of

¹¹ Ibidem, p. 118. See the document From the general report of Romanian legation at Tel Aviv on first semester- 1956 concerning the relations Israel – Romania, p. 118- 121.

¹² Ibidem, p. 124. See the document Note of conversation of Caius Frantescu, director of the direction protocol of the Ministry of External Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania, with Elkana Margalit, representative with businesses of the state of Israel to Bucharest, p. 124- 125.

¹³ Ibidem, p. 127. See the document Note of speaking sent by Romanian legation to Tel Aviv to the Ministry of External Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania concerning the problem of reunification of Jewish Families, p. 127- 128.

¹⁴ Ibidem, p. 129. See the document Note of speaking sent by Romanian legation at Tel Aviv to the Ministry of External Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania concerning the problem of reunification of Jewish families, p. 128- 131.

¹⁵ Ibidem, p. 130.

Popular Republic of Romania was showing the view of the Israeli rabbi Isaac Nissim who expressed his opinion towards mosaic religion in Romania. In Romania there are two schools of Talmud- Thora and a few schools with teaching in idis language. The rabbi from Israel tried to send religious books to the Jews in URSS but he failed, and he hopes to send some books in Romania. He would like to meet the Jewish rabbi from Romania, Moses Rosen¹⁶. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 131-135) The rabbi draws the attention that most communist governments sustained the Arabians in Middle East, in the detriment of Israel. Romanian deputies share their opinion that in Israel there exist religious freedom.

In a document of 12 September 1957, it appears that there are litigious aspects between Romania and Israel, such as the problem of reunification of remaining members of Jewish families in Romania with the rest of their families, found in Israel. It appears that in Romania there are still 10- 12.000 of Jews in Romania with a rate of emigration in Israel of a few hundreds/yearly. In this document, it appears the problem of a Romanian diplomat that considers that Israel is acting against his own interest when allowing a press campaign against countries with popular democracies, such as Romania¹⁷. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 138-141)

In order to approach the Eastern block, the Israeli diplomacy use the topic of cultural relations inviting the Soviets to a Congress of Atomic Energy, where they refused to go. Another attempt was to invite the Soviets to a Congress of Judaic Sciences, but they also declined participation. On the other hand, Israel refused to sell Russian science books on his

¹⁶ Ibidem, p. 132. See the document entitled Note of discussion sent by Romanian legation to Tel Aviv to the Ministry of External Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania concerning the meeting with chief rabbi of sephardic cult from Israel and some aspects of the bilateral relations, p. 131- 135.

¹⁷ Ibidem, p. 139. See the document Note of discussion of Romanian legation to Tel Aviv sent to the Ministry of External Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania concerning the stage of billateral relations and some aspects of the situation from Near East, p. 138- 141.

territory¹⁸. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 140) In the same time, Israeli diplomats suspect that the Russians send arms to Egyptians and Syrians to fight against Israel. Towards these new diplomatic challenges, Romanian diplomacy came with two proposals: 1. to stop arms sending on both camps; 2. the countries from Near East are invited to talk among them the litigious problems.

In a declaration of Chivu Stoica, president of the Council of Ministers of Romanian Popular Republic, it was acknowledged the issue of Jewish sufferings in Europe: “The Government of Popular Republic of Romania knows which was the faith of Jews, the persecutions and the actions of annihilation to which Jewish population was submitted, together with the most population from fascist or found under fascist rule countries, during the Second World War”¹⁹. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 145-146) The document, enacted in December, 1957, acknowledges that the problem of families reunification are solved in Romania case by case and where the claims are pertinent they are solved according to the legislation of Popular Republic of Romania.

The subject of families reunification is started over by Ben Aaron, secretary general of the party Ahdut Haavoda and member of Knesset who is very glad that the problem of Jewish emigrants from Romania is on the forefront and asserted that the Jews who come to Romania usually belongs to the “middle class”²⁰. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 151- 153) Other problems that come up is that in 1958, the Arabians refuse to acknowledge the actual

¹⁸ Ibidem, p. 140.

¹⁹ Ibidem, p. 146. See the document entitled Letter of Chivu Stoica, President of the Council of Ministers of Popular Republic of Romania, addressed to David Ben Gurion, Prime- minister of the state Israel, in the problem of families reunifications, p. 145- 146.

²⁰ Ibidem, p. 151. See the document entitled Note of conversation with the Romanian legation at Tel Aviv with the delegation of the party ahdut haavoda sent to the Ministry of External Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania concerning the situation from Middle East and the Romanian – Israeli Relations, p. 151- 153.

boundaries of Israel²¹. (Bleoancă et al, 2000: 153) They take place some incidents from the boundary with Syria. During November- December 1958, weekly come from Romania 3-400 of Romanian Jews to Israel²². Referring to the Jews that come from Romania, the minister of External Affairs of Israel, Golda Meir, says that they are people of good quality²³. (Bleoancă et al, 2000: 157)

In a document revealing the meeting of S. Bendor, the minister of Israel to Bucharest with Chivu Stoica, there are expressed, again, many thanks from Israel because the problem of families reunification continues to be solved and intensified by the Romanian state²⁴. (Bleoancă et al, 2000: 161-163) In the same document appear also the next conclusions: economic relations Romania – Israel will develop as a consequence of a commercial agreement; 34 000 of Jews registered to leave in Israel, but only 19 000 left. The problem of reunification of families is seen by the Romanian authorities as a humanitarian problem which must be solved²⁵. (Bleoancă et al, 2000: 161) In the same time, Israeli diplomats undertook the task of not letting Israel to cause any harm to Romanian state as a reward for emigrations from Romania to Israel. Golda Meir, was another diplomat who thanked to Romanian state for solving the problem of families reunifications. She also took stand in order to make the Romanian state to free some former employees of the Legation of Israel in Romania, arrested

²¹ Ibidem, p. 153.

²² Ibidem, p. 156. See the document entitled Note of discussion of Romanian legation to Tel Aviv with yitzhak korn, president of h.o.r. Concerning the problem of emigration of Jewish population from Popular Republic of Romania.

²³ Ibidem, p. 157. See the document entitled Note of discussion of Romanian legation to Tel Aviv with Golda Meir, Minister of External Affairs of the State of Israel, concerning some aspects of the bilateral relations and the situation of Ortodox Church from Jerusalem, p. 157- 158.

²⁴ Ibidem, p. 161. See the document entitled From the information of the Ministry of External Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania addressed to Petre Manu, extraordinary representative and plenipotentiary minister of Romania at Tel Aviv, concerning the stage of the Romanian – Israeli relations, p. 161- 163.

²⁵ Ibidem, p. 161.

because they activated against the security of the Romanian state²⁶. (Bleoancă et al, 2000: 163-166) A fact that seems peculiar for Romanian diplomats, is how the Legation of Israel to Bucharest tries to act as the representative of Jewish minority in Romania, when it was obvious that the relation between the two countries were solved by international agreements. Among the interests of Israel in Romania, Golda Meir mentions: maintenance of contacts between Israel and Jewish population of Romania, maintenance of the volume of bilateral commercial relations (Israel is interested in the imports of oil and wood), the strengthening of the position of Israel in comparison with Arab countries by having good relations with the communist countries²⁷. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 165) In the same time, Israeli and Romanian officials admit that there are no cultural relations between Romania and Israel. Other problem of the time was the situation of the immobile goods of Orthodox Patriarchy in Israel and its restitution in the possession of the Orthodox Church. Bendor, the Jewish minister to Bucharest, wanted to obtain for the Romanian state, proves, for the accusations in the process of Adolf Eichmann.

Israel, in the years 1960, was an economy with a high productivity, with a rise of exports and imports in which had entered the foreign capital. Israel was representing in Asia, “the promontory of the civilized world”²⁸. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 167-185) The alliance between United States and Israel was a reality of cold-war years. In the same time, in the report of Romanian Legation to Tel Aviv addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania it is mention the problem of Israeli relations with the country of Eastern bloc. In what concerns, the relations

²⁶ Ibidem, p. 163-164. See the document entitled Note of the Minister of External Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania concerning the relations with the state of Israel, p. 163- 166.

²⁷ Ibidem, p. 165.

²⁸ Ibidem, p. 171. See the document entitled General report of Romanian legation to Tel Aviv addressed to the Ministry of External Affairs concerning the internal and external politics of the State of Israel, p. 167- 185.

Israel – Soviet Union, are, in the opinion of the Romanian diplomats as cold as ever, Soviet Union regarding at Israel with enmity. Between Soviet Union and Israel do not exists cultural relations. Some Soviet movies were ruled on in Israel. The reality is that Israel often criticized Soviet Union by its press, official declarations, congresses, Knesset, etc²⁹. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 181) In Soviet Union, more and more synagogues are closed. In what concerns, the relations between Popular Republic of Poland and Israel, the public opinion from Poland considers the neo- Nazism and Jews are its enemies, they did not send a delegation to Eichmann trial and Israel promised that it did not put forwards of reparations from Polish state to Israel. The economic relations Israel – Poland are modest³⁰. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 182-183) In what concerns the relations between Israel and Czechoslovakia, they are cold, this state furnishing information in Eichmann trial. There are not cultural relations between the two states. Some Czech movies were ruled on in Israel. According to a survey 90% of the Israeli press is favorable to Czechoslovakia. Economic relations Czechoslovakia – Israel almost does not exist³¹. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 184) And last, but not least, it appears in the documents the opinion of Romanian diplomats concerning the relations between Israel and Popular Republic of Romania. It seems that Israeli press is no more hostile to Romania. Romanian state resolved the situations of family reunifications. Commercial relations between the two countries are good. The Romanian Legation tried to make known the activity of Popular Republic of Romania in Israel³². (Bleoancă et al., 2000:184- 185)

It seems that the problem of emigration of Romanian Jews in Israel was a problem that existed continuously, during the communist years, in the

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 181.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 182- 183.

³¹ *Ibidem*, p. 184.

³² *Ibidem*, p. 184-185.

Romanian state. Thus, in October 16, 1961, V. Dumitrescu, vice-director of Ministry of External Affairs met Katriel Salmon, the minister of Israel in Romania. Salmon emphasized the cooperation between Romanian and Israeli authorities in order to accelerate the rhythm of these emigrations from Romania³³. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 193-195) The Minister of Israel referred to the development of economic relation between the two countries, and at the fact that he does want to undermine the internal solidarity of the Romanian state. In another note from December 18, 1961, Israel is suspected of wanting to get involved in the internal affairs of the Romanian state, and the Legation of Israel to Bucharest is accused that they broke the laws of the Romanian state and of Zionist manifestations among the Jewish masses³⁴. (Bleoancă et al. 2000: 195-197) The same note added that during 1958-1960, 4 Israeli diplomats were named “persona non grata”.

Also, in December 18, 1961, the same document reveals the Israeli intention to establish cultural relations with Romania. Among the two states there still has to be solved some litigious situations such as the immobile property from Ierusalim of Romanian Orthodox Church and the return of the goods that formerly emigrated population from Romania to Israel that almost lost his material properties when they decided for emigration³⁵. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 197)

In a telegram of March 23, 1962 from Tel Aviv, a Romanian diplomat (n.n.- Popescu) informs the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from Bucharest that he was invited at the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and informed about incidents that took place at the boundary with Siria, in the

³³ *Ibidem*, p. 193. See the document entitled *Note of conversations of Ministry of External Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania with Katriel Salmon, extraordinary minister and plenipotentiary minister of the state of Israel to Bucharest concerning the bilateral relations*, p. 193-195.

³⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 195. See the document entitled *Note referring to the situation of the relations between Popular Republic of Romania and the state of Israel*, p. 195- 197.

³⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 197.

area of the lake Tiberia which is situated on the territory of Israel³⁶. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 198) Another problem was the visit of rabbi Moses Rosen from Romania in Israel. A telegram from September 10, 1963 informs the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that it was nominated the new minister of Israel in the Popular Republic of Romania, K. Salmon. Among the objectives of his new mandate are: economic development of Romania, the industrialization of Romania, the introduction of new techniques in agriculture. In a telegram of the Romanian Legation to Tel Aviv to the Ministry of External Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania concerning the relations between Israel and USA it is mentioned the visit of Mr. Feldman, counsellor of the American president in Israel³⁷. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 213-214) Among the debated problems were the security of Israel, Israeli – American cooperation in desalinization of sea water, the political evolution of the situation in the region of Jordan after the Arabian Conference from Cairo. Other problems approached by the American diplomacy was the problem of nuclear research in Israel, the situation of Arabian refugees in Palestine, the evolution of the Arab – Israelian conflict concerning the exploitation of the waters of Jordan. The American power intended to deliver modern American armament to Israel.

In a telegram of Romanian Legation to Israel towards the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from August 26, 1964, it is shown that Golda Meir made a historical analysis of Israeli external politics, mentioning that Israel wants to have peaceful relations with the countries from Eastern Europe, independant of their leading ideologies. It seems that countries such as Popular Republic of Bulgaria, Popular Republic of Poland,

³⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 198. See the document entitled *Telegram of the Romanian legation to Tel Aviv towards the Ministry of External Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania concerning the position of Israeli government towards the incidents from the frontier with Syria*, p. 198- 199.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 213. See the document entitled *Telegram of Romanian legation at Tel Aviv to the Ministry of External Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania concerning the relations Israel – United States*, p. 213- 214.

Iugoslavia, Popular Republic of Romania are countries of utmost importance for the politics of Israel in Eastern Europe.³⁸ (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 221- 223) It seems that Israeli government is content by the diplomatic stance of Romania and between the two countries are established good diplomatic, commercial and touristic relations. In the commercial field, it could be achieved fruitful relations pursuing the advantage of both sides. Golda Meir points out that the interest of Israel for Romania is very high. Thus, Moshe Dayan, the Israeli minister of Agriculture, manifested his interest to know the Romanian agriculture.

In a note concerning the discussion of Grigore Geamănu, secretary of State Council of Popular Republic of Romania with Zvi Ayalon, extraordinary representative and plenipotentiary minister of Israel to Bucharest concerning the problem of Jewish emigration from Romania from September 3, 1964, it is shown that at August 31, 1964 Grigore Geamănu received in audience the minister of Israel to Bucharest, Zvi Ayalon. The discussion started from remembering the good existent relationships between Romania and Israel. Zvi Ayalon asked information about what else he can visit in Romania. He added that Israel is not reach in natural ressources, while G. Geamănu expressed his conviction that with the help of Israeli people, one day Israel could look like a beautiful garden. The two diplomats promised to pursue good relations between the two countries, also for the future³⁹. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 223-225)

Among the personalities that expressed their wish to visit Romania in September 1964 was Mordechai Namir, mayor of Tel Aviv, who, at the

³⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 221. See the document entitled *Telegram of the Romanian Legation at Tel Aviv to the Ministry of External Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania concerning the position of Israeli government towards Romania and its rapports with other Socialist countries*, p. 221-223.

³⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 224. See the document entitled *Note of conversation of Grigore Geamănu, secretary of the Council of State of Popular Republic of Romania with Zvi Ayalon, extraordinary representative and plenipotentiary minister of the state of Israel to Bucharest concerning the problem of emigrations of Romanian citizens in Israel*, p. 223- 225.

suggestion of Israeli government, as a participant to the the confederation of cities from Warsaw, wanted to make a visit to Bucharest. M. Namir is an important personality in Israel and, also, member of Mapai governing party⁴⁰. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 225-226)

In a telegram of Valeriu Georgescu, extraordinary representative and plenipotentiary minister at Tel Aviv, to Corneliu Mănescu, minister of External Affairs of R.S. Romania, concerning the actual stage of development of Romanian – israelian relations from February 22, 1966, it is revealed the discussion between Valeriu Georgescu and Abba Eban, Israeli Minister of External Affairs who considered that cultural relations have a wider field of development. The commercial relations are full of difficulties because the exports from Romania are small in the payment ballance, but there came up a perspective of improvement of these relations. Israeli state and Romanian state policy have a good field of development in the areal of Middle East where they can influence the conception of cohabiting nationalities.⁴¹ (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 236-237)

In a telegram relating the discussion of Zalam Shazar, president of Israel during the years 1963- 1973, and the minister of Foreign Affairs of the state of Israel, Abba Eban, from February 23, 1966, the last one presented the state of the relations Romania – Israel. The approached problems focused on: the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries; the support brought by the Jews originary from Romania to the construction of the state of Israel; the development of Romania from an economic, social and cultural point of view; the achievements brought by

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 225. See the document entitled *Note of conversation of Pompiliu Macovei, vice-minister of External Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania with Zvi Ayalon, extraordinary representative and plenipotentiary minister of the state of Israel to Bucharest, concerning the projected visit of the mayor of Tel Aviv in Romania*, p. 225- 226.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, p. 236. See the document entitled *Telegram of Valeriu Georgescu, extraordinary representative and plenipotentiary minister at Tel Aviv, to Corneliu Mănescu, minister of External Affairs of Socialist Republic of Romania concerning the stage of the Romanian – Israeli relations*, p. 236-237.

Israel in the field of economy and science; to greet the Romanian president of the State Council, Chivu Stoica and the wish of prosperity to Romanian people⁴². (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 237-238)

Concerning the aspects of the relations between Romania and Israel, in a note relating the discussion between Valeriu Georgescu, extraordinary representative and plenipotentiary minister at Tel Aviv with Aviezer Chelouche, director of the Economic department of Ministry of External Affairs of the Israeli state concerning the development of economic bilateral relations from April 26, 1966, there are reflected the next problems: as Israeli experts made a study concerning the economic and commercial relations of Israel with the Socialist states, they noticed that, during the years 1961 – 1965, the total amount of bilateral shifts doubled in comparison with the precedent years. Romania is an interesting partner for Israel for some of its products that Israel needs, such as the meet, conventional compustibles or diesel. In what concerns the development of commercial relations between Romania and Israel, Israel sent his commercial delegation in Romania, and, approaved a technical credit⁴³. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 240-242)

In a telegram of Valeriu Georgescu, extraordinary representative and plenipotentiary minister to Tel Aviv, to Eduard Mezincescu, vice-minister of External Affairs concerning the Israel's position towards the situation from the region and bilateral relations, it is made reference to the party offered by E. Doron, director of the Division of Eastern Europe, in May 3, 1966, to which they were invited some Romanian diplomats. Some

⁴² *Ibidem*, p. 238. See the document entitled *Telegram of Valeriu Georgescu, extraordinary representative and plenipotentiary minister at Tel Aviv, to Corneliu Mănescu, minister of External Affairs of Socialist Republic of Romania, concerning the discussion with the president Zalam Shazar and the minister of External Affairs of the Israeli state*, p. 237-238.

⁴³ *Ibidem*, p. 240-241. See the document entitled *Note of conversation of Valeriu Georgescu, extraordinary representative and plenipoentiary minister of Socialist Republic of Romania at Tel Aviv, with Avizier Chelouche, director of Economic Department of the Minister of External Affairs of the state of Israel concerning the development of bilateral economic relations*, p. 240 – 242.

problems that arose in the discussion were Israel's intention to attract on his side the main leaders of western model democracy such as United States, France and England, but also Soviet Union that to take stance in his favor in the Arab- Israeli conflict. Israeli diplomats try, in consequence, to have good relations with Soviet Union. E. Doron underlined the favorable way in which Israel is regarded by Polish Republic, Popular Republic of Romania and also Popular Republic of Hungary. The Israeli diplomats manifested their intention to militate for better relations with the Romanian state that this is manifested in the intention to put a sum of money in deposit in hard currency to the disposition of the Romanian state. The problem of the money deposit, is in the opinion of the Romanian diplomats, a problem of the two National Banks of Romania and Israel⁴⁴. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 243-244)

A note of discussion of Eduard Mezincescu, vice minister of External Affairs of Socialist Republic of Romania with Zvi Ayalon, extraordinary representative and plenipotentiary minister of Israeli state to Bucharest reveals that in May 19, 1966, it took place the meeting of Eduard Mezincescu with Zvi Ayalon. E. Mezincescu expressed his conviction that Zvi Ayalon goes back in Israel with good opinions about Romania and its people. After seven years of being foreign diplomat in Romania, Zvi Ayalon goes back in Israel with the conviction that Israel will develop its relations with communist countries⁴⁵. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 245-246) Concerning the departure in Israel of Zvi Ayalon, former minister of Israel in Romania, in a discussion of Ayalon with Chivu Stoica, president of the

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 243- 244. See the document entitled *Telegram of Vlad Georgescu, extraordinary representative and plenipotentiary minister al Tel Aviv to Eduard Mezincescu, vice – minister of the Ministry of External Affairs of Socialist Republic of Romania concerning some Israeli positions towards the situation from the region and bilateral relations.*

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 245. See the document entitled *Note of discussion of Eduard Mezincescu, vice-minister of External Affairs of Socialist Republic of Romania, with Zvi Ayalon, extraordinary representative and plenipotentiary minister of the state of Israel, at Bucharest, referring to some aspects of the bilateral relations*, p. 245- 246.

Council of State of Romanian state from June 2 1966, the Israeli diplomat acknowledges that Romanian people works to develop rapidly the country. Ayalon considers that August 23, 1944, Romania passed through a process of positive change of mentality. Peoples should decide alone their destiny, without external forces. In the field of economic exchanges and cultural relations, there is room for deepening the cooperation⁴⁶. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 248- 250)

Mordechai Avgar, the diplomat with business affairs of Israel in Romania, presented in a note his desiderates that the diplomatic missions of Romania in Israel and of Israel in Romania, to become embassies. Another request was that Mr. Eliezer Doron to be named minister of Israel in Romania⁴⁷. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 255-256)

A telegram of Romanian Legation at Tel Aviv to the Minister of External Affairs of Socialist Republic of Romania debates the Israeli perceptions concerning the military agreement between Syria and Egypt. It seems that a military agreement between Egypt and Syria could prevent the Syrian government from any action against Israel. Another comment is that the military agreement Egypt – Syria will not last too much because of the instability of Arab world, but also because of the fact that Israel and pro-occidental states from region are against this agreement⁴⁸. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 257)

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 248- 250. See the document entitled *Note of discussion of Chivu Stoica, president of the Council of State of Socialist Republic of Romania, with Zvi Ayalon, extraordinary representative and plenipotentiary minister of the state of Israel to Bucharest, referring to the evolution of bilateral relations with the occassion of closing its mission*, p. 248- 250.

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 255. See the document entitled *Note of discussion, director of protocol in the Ministry of External Affairs of Socialist Republic of Romania, with Mordechai Avgar, representative with business of the state of Israel, referring to the accreditation of a new diplomatic Israeli representative to Bucharest and the rise to the rank of diplomatic missions*, p. 255- 256.

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 257. See the document entitled *Telegram of the Romanian legation to Tel Aviv to the Ministry of External Affairs of Socialist Republic of Romania concerning the Israeli perception concerning military agreement Syria – Egypt*.

In a telegram of Valeriu Georgescu, extraordinary representative and plenipotentiary minister at Tel Aviv, to the Ministry of External Affairs of Socialist Republic of Romania regarding the cultural issues of the collaboration Romania – Israel, is reflected the meeting of the Israeli minister of culture Zalman Aranne with the Romanian representative, the academician Stefan Balan to make a visit in Israel. He states that the majority of Romanian immigrants that emigrated from Romania to Israel are well trained, educated, having a bright horizon because of the education they received in Romania⁴⁹. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 262-263)

Concerning the same issue of cultural exchanges Romania – Israel, in a telegram of Romanian Legation to Tel Aviv to the Minister of External Affairs of Socialist Republic of Romania from January 26, 1967, it is presented a cultural action that took place at Ierusalim, a concert directed by Ion Voicu, very appreciated by the Israeli counterparts. The cultural representations will continue with a Romanian exhibition of paintings in Israel⁵⁰. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 263-264)

Another document is enacted by Romanian legation at Tel Aviv to the Ministry of External Affairs of Socialist Republic of Romania concerning the maintenance of diplomatic cooperation between Socialist Republic of Romania and Federal Republic of Germany from February 5, 1967. For signing of these agreements of cooperation the Romanian minister Corneliu Mănescu went to Bonn. The establishment of a relation between Romania and Federal Republic of Germany is a rupture of “Hallstein doctrine” that stipulated that if a state acknowledged the state of

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 262. See the document entitled *Telegram of Valeriu Georgescu, extraordinary representative and plenipotentiary minister at Tel Aviv, to the Ministry of External Affairs of Socialist Republic of Romania, concerning the collaboration and the cultural exchanges between the two states*, p. 262 – 263.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 263. See the document entitled *Telegram of Romanian Legation to Tel Aviv to the Ministry of External Affairs of Socialist Republic of Romania concerning the Romanian – Israeli cultural exchanges*, p. 263- 264.

Democratic German Republic, Federal Republic of Germany will break off the relationship with the respective state⁵¹. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 264-266)

The external politics of Romania in the context of the evolution of the rapports with the Arabian countries from the Middle East is evaluated by Israel and these reflections are revealed by a telegram of Romanian legation at Tel Aviv to the Minister of External Affairs of Romania. The telegram mentions a discussion with Israel Galili, the minister of Informations, that remarked the initiative, the active role and the effort of the delegation of Socialist Republic of Romania at the last session of United Nations Organization “in order to base the relationships between countries with different social systems on the respect of their sovereignties, independence, equality and the law of each people to decide its own destiny, without external interference”⁵². (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 266- 267) Romania, having good relations with Arab world, mediates the improvement of the relations between Israel and Arabian countries.

Concerning economic bilateral relations between Romania and Israel, there is a telegram of Valeriu Georgescu, extraordinary representative and plenipotentiary minister at Tel Aviv to Ilie Verdeț, prime- vice- president of the Romanian Council of Ministers where it is mentioned the presence of Israeli delegation formed from ministers of finance (Sapir), industry and commerce, finances, development of agriculture, tourism, of banking system. Thanking for the presence of Romanian delegations in Israel, the Israeli representatives considers that the economic relations and exchanges Romania – Israel did not reached a

⁵¹ *Ibidem*, p. 264- 265. See the document entitled *Telegram of Romanian Legation to Tel Aviv towards the Ministry of External Affairs of Socialist Republic of Romania concerning the Israeli reactions to the external policy of Romania*, in the context of the evolution of the rapports with Arabian countries from the zone, p. 264- 266.

⁵² *Ibidem*, p. 266. See the *Telegram of the Romanian legation to Tel Aviv to the Ministry of External Affairs of Socialist Republic of Romania concerning the appreciations of the Israeli government concerning the external politics of Romania in the context of evolution of the rapports with the Arabian countries from this areal*, p.266- 267.

high level of performance and they envisage that in 2-3 years the flux should be of 20 million dollars for each side. Israel would build factories and institutions in Romania and accept to be paid in products. Other future prospects are cooperation of technical and scientific nature⁵³. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 268-269) The same problem of bilateral economic relations is revealed by a telegram of Valeriu Georgescu, extraordinary representative and plenipotentiary minister at Tel Aviv, to the Minister of External Affairs of Socialist Republic of Romania concerning the project of the economic agreement between Romania and Israel. Israel had the intention to develop commercial relations with socialist states from Oriental Europe and, on the other side, Romania wanted to pursue economic relations with all the states from the world independent of their social and economic system. Romanian diplomats are very well trained and know what means bilateral cooperation on tertiary markets⁵⁴. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 269-270) In the same field of economic cooperation, there is a note from April 13, 1967 which relates a discussion between Corneliu Mănescu, minister of External Affairs of Socialist Republic of Romania with Pinhas Sapir, ministry of finance of the state of Israel. Israeli minister, Sapir paid a visit to Romanian Minister of External Affairs, Corneliu Mănescu. Both parties would like to do more than do the actual commercial existent agreement. There is a possibility that Romania and Israel to help each other on tertiary markets. According to the discussion there were identified the domains in which economic bilateral cooperation Romania – Israel to produce. Sapir studied the Romanian proposal of possibilities of building economic objectives with

⁵³ *Ibidem*, p. 269. See the *Telegram of Valeriu Georgescu, extraordinary representative and plenipotentiary minister at Tel Aviv to Ilie Verdeț, prime- vice- minister of the Council of Ministers of Socialist Republic of Romania, concerning the development of Romanian – Israeli Relations concerning the bilateral economic cooperation*, p. 268-269.

⁵⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 270. See the document entitled *Telegram of Valeriu Georgescu, extraordinary representative and plenipotentiary minister at Tel Aviv, to the Ministry of External Affairs of Socialist Republic of România towards the project of Economic Romanian- Israeli Agreement*, p. 269- 270.

the payment in products. There were, in consequence, to be built enterprises of ailments industry (meat, conserved fruits and vegetables, powder milk) for which the Israelis to pay 10 – 15 million dollars. In the future, Israelis will buy more Romanian products and the flux will reach the level of 20-25 million dollars for each of the parties concerned. Cooperation Romania – Israel on tertiary markets is envisaged. Different social – political systems of Romania and Israel are not impediments and can not hinder the actual cooperation. Exchange of specialists in agriculture and scientific research is envisaged⁵⁵. (Bleoncă et al., 2000: 270-273)

In problems of external politics concerning the aggravation of the relations Israeli – Arabian states, there is the telegram of Valeriu Georgescu, extraordinary representative and plenipotentiary minister at Tel Aviv towards Petre Burlacu, vice- minister of External Affairs of Socialist Republic of Romania. Valeriu Georgescu is informed from Ariel Ilan, the director of the division Eastern Europe from Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs, about the events that happened during the last 24 hours at the boundary with Israel. The situation is tensed because of the terrorist movement Al Fatah⁵⁶. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 278- 280) A telegram from Romanian Legation to Tel Aviv shows that the military offensive from the boundary of Israel with Egypt are obvious. Foreign diplomats were invited to the Israeli Ministry of External Affairs to be informed about the closure of Tiran stretch underlining the danger that resides in Egypt's military preparation⁵⁷. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 280- 281) Another telegram is

⁵⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 273. See the document entitled *Note of conversation of Corneliu Mănescu, minister of External Affairs of Socialist Republic of Romania with Pinhas Sapir, minister of Finances of the state of Israel, concerning the evolution of the economic bilateral relations*, p. 270-273.

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 279. See the document entitled *Telegram of Valeriu Georgescu, extraordinary representative and plenipotentiary minister at Tel Aviv to Petru Burlacu, vice- minister of the Minister of External Affairs of Socialist Republic of Romania concerning the increase of tension in Israeli- Arabian relations*, p. 278- 280.

⁵⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 281. See the document entitled *Telegram of Romanian Legation at Tel Aviv to the Ministry of External Affairs of Socialist Republic of Romania concerning the escalation of Israeli- Egyptian incidents and the mobilisation of both armies*, p. 280-281.

mentioning the attack of Jordan- Israeli artillery that hindered the Orthodox Romanian Church from Jerusalem⁵⁸. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 282) The Israeli – Arabian conflict is revealed by a telegram of the Romanian Legation at Tel Aviv to the Minister of External Affairs of Socialist Republic of Romania. Israel promised not to attack any neighboring country until it will not be attacked by other states. The foreign diplomats think that in case of armistice, Israel will not take his troops from Sinai and Gaza, only if Egypt gives up to the blockade from Eilat port⁵⁹. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 282-283)

In a telegram of Valeriu Georgescu, extraordinary representative and plenipotentiary minister at Tel Aviv, towards Petru Burlacu, vice- minister of External Affairs of Socialist Republic of Romania concerning the position of Communist Israeli Party towards the conflict with Arabian countries from June 20 1967, Tel Aviv, Israeli representatives sent, from the beginning, many thanks to president Nicolae Ceaușescu for the position adopted and the envisaged measures in order to dismantle the crisis from Middle East. The Communist Party from Soviet Union supports the Arabian countries and accuses Israel concerning the present conflict.⁶⁰ (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 292- 294) Concerning the international public opinion towards the Arabian conflict, we find the text of a telegram of Valeriu Georgescu, extraordinary representative and plenipotentiary minister at Tel Aviv to the Ministry of External Affairs of Socialist

⁵⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 282. See the document entitled *Telegram of the Romanian legation from Tel Aviv towards the Ministry of External Affairs of Socialist Republic of Romania concerning the avariation of Orthodox Romanian Church from Ierusalim after the Jordanian – Israeli shootings*.

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 283. See the document entitled *Telegram of Romanian Legation to Tel Aviv towards the Minister of External Affairs of Socialist Republic of Romania concerning the evolution of Israeli- Arabian conflict*, p. 282- 283.

⁶⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 292. See the document entitled *Telegram of Valeriu Georgescu, extraordinary representative and plenipotentiary minister at Tel Aviv, towards Petre Burlacu, vice-minister of External Affairs of Socialist Republic of Romania concerning the position of Communist Israeli Party towards the conflict with Arabian countries*, p. 292- 294.

Republic of Romania. It is very appreciated the speech of Romanian President of the Council of Ministers, Ion Gheorghe Maurer in the General Assembly of United Nations. Also, the position of Romania in the conflict is highly appreciated. The position of Romania is appreciated by French ambassadors and Netherlands, but also by the president Nixon⁶¹. (Bleoancă et al, 2000: 296)

In a telegram of Valeriu Georgescu, the extraordinary representative and plenipotentiary minister of Tel Aviv, to Corneliu Mănescu, minister of External Affairs of Socialist Republic of Romania concerning the discussions with Abba Eban, minister of External Affairs of the state of Israel, Valeriu Georgescu presents his meeting with Abba Eban in August 4, 1967. In the context of Arabian war, „Romanian diplomacy illustrated for other countries the way of maintaining relations with all the states, independant of their regime, filosofic or social, and it succeeded to maintain relations with all the socialist states with all divergencies existent among them”⁶². (Bleoancă et al, 2000: 300-302) The litigiuos positions between Israel and Arab countries were debated in the framework of United Nations Organisation. Not only the existent conflict has to be solved, but also it had to be changed the political, judicial and psihologic position of Arab states have to be changed.⁶³ (Bleoancă et al, 2000: 301) Among Arabian countries and Israel must be established treaties. Even Soviet Union tries to convince Arabian countries not to militate for the distruction of Israel.⁶⁴ (Bleoancă et al, 2000: 302)

⁶¹ *Ibidem*, p. 296. See the document entitled *Telegram of Valeriu Georgescu, extraordinary representative and plenipotentiary minister at Tel Aviv, to the Minister of External Affairs of Socialist Republic of Romania concerning some Israeli and foreign comments concerning the attitude of Socialist Republic of Romania in the problem of Near East*.

⁶² *Ibidem*, p. 301. See the document entitled *Telegram of Valeriu Georgescu, extraordinary representative and plenipotentiary minister at Tel Aviv towards Corneliu Mănescu, minister of External Affairs of Socialist Republic of Romania, concerning the discussions with Abba Eban, minister of External Affairs of the state of Israel*, p. 300- 302.

⁶³ *Ibidem*, p.301.

⁶⁴ *Ibidem*, p.302.

The diplomatic correspondance between the Romanian diplomats to Israel and the Ministry of External Affairs from Romania continues either with problems related with economic cooperation Romania – Israel, or with different positions of Romanian state towards the crisis from Middle Orient. Thus, in a telegram of Valentin Lipatti, extraordinary ambassador and plenipotentiary at U.N.E.S.C.O., towards Vasile Gliga, vice-minister of External Affairs of Socialist Republic of Romania towards the position of Israeli government concerning the solving out the crisis from Near East from January 23, 1968, Paris in which is reflected that Israel ambassador to UNESCO, M. Avida, states that Arabian countries want to challenge Israel one more time and want to start a new war with the financial help of USSR. Israel asks for „de jure” acknowledgement of Israel by the Arab countries. Israel detains an advantage in the region, it detains the Arabian territories occupied in June 1967. Avida declares that United States want to support Israel. Special attention is given by the document to Romanian – Israeli relations. Israel appreciates the wise Romanian politic which is in its favor and has on its base economic and commercial relations⁶⁵. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 334-336)

In a telegram of the Romanian Legation at Tel Aviv to the Ministry of External Affairs of Socialist Republic of Romania concerning the measures taken by Israeli authorities in the occupied territories from February 11, 1968, Tel Aviv, it was reflected that after the inquiries of foreign diplomats it seems that after terrorist actions of the organisation „Al Fatah”, the Israeli Defence minister strenghtened military administration of

⁶⁵ *Ibidem*, p.335. See the document entitled *Telegram of Valentin Lipatti, extraordinary ambassador and plenipotentiary to U.N.E.S.C.O. towards Vasile Gliga, vice-minister of Ministry of External Affairs of Socialist Republic of Romania, concerning the position of Israeli government towards the resolation of the crisis from the Near East*, p. 334- 336.

the Arabian people, in Jordanian territory and Gaza strip⁶⁶. (Bleoancă et al., 2000: 361) The situation is very tensed in these regions. Families are separated. A lot of terrorist incidents take place. All Arabians from this area blame the terrorist organisation „Al Fatah”.

In a telegram of Romanian Legation to Tel Aviv to the Minister of External Affairs of Socialist Republic of Romania concerning the Israeli reactions to the decision of the Council of Security of U.N. of condemnation of military actions in Jordan. The Council of Security of United Nations blamed the recent military actions from Jordanie. The event was that on March 21, 1968, 15000 of people were involved in a raid on the territory of Jordanie against Palestinian resistance and this action of Israel was blamed by the United Nations. The Israeli Parliament considered this invasion as being necessary and unavoidable⁶⁷. (Bleoancă et al, 2000: 361- 362)

These are only a few problems emphasized by the collection *Romania – Israel. Diplomatic Documents*, edited by Dumitru Preda et al., only a few facts from Israeli- Romanian diplomatic life during the years 1948- 1989. The relationships between the two countries evolved in time, manifesting interest in economic life, cultural life, human rights field, migration, religion.

⁶⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 343. See the document entitled *Telegram of Romanian Legation at Tel Aviv to the Ministry of External Affairs of Socialist Republic of Romania concerning the measures taken by Israeli authorities in the occupied territories*, p. 343- 344.

⁶⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 361. See the document entitled *Telegram of the Romanian Legation at Tel Aviv towards the Minister of External Affairs of Socialist Republic of Romania concerning the Israeli reactions to the decision of the Council of Security of United Nations of condemnation of military actions in Jordania*, p. 361- 362.

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Challenges in Extracting Spatial Features from Old Maps and Engraving Prints of Oradea

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Abstract: *Getting spatial information from old maps or engraving prints might seem pretty straightforward when precision is not important. However, getting more accurate information such as location or measurements, with the purpose of overlaying the extracted data on new maps is a difficult task. Old maps are not as precise as new ones, as technological developments were limited in the past. Another drawback of old maps is that many were not produced on location, but by using other maps as a basis for new ones or textual descriptions. This method of map production is and was always will be susceptible to error propagation. Engraving prints hold even less precision in the geographical information they depict and distortion is often present, caused by the different techniques employed in portraying the urban landscape of those times.*

Keeping in mind all of the possible issues mentioned above, the focus of this study is to analyse a collection of old maps and engraving prints of Oradea, with the purpose of distinguishing between accurate and less accurate information and overlaying them on new maps through Geographical Information Systems (GIS) technology, giving the possibility of providing a precise representation of the city's image through the times.

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Keywords: *map analysis, old maps, engraving prints, Oradea, Geographical Information Systems (GIS)*

The current paper represents the initial part of a more comprehensive study on the evolution of the city of Oradea through the centuries. Obviously, information relevant to this study can be obtained either from descriptive historical texts or from graphical representations of the city. The focus of this study falls on graphical representations such as maps and engraving prints found in the collection of the Criş County Museum of Oradea and in the Zgardan personal collection.

In shaping the evolution of the city of Oradea we shall use time-enabled GIS technologies, to which we aim to provide relevant information from the above mentioned graphical representations. In providing data for GIS, it is of maximum importance to define its accuracy and quality and to identify and minimize all possible errors.

The study starts off with a presentation of the documents used further on, focusing on information relevant to GIS analysis from the point of view of the appropriateness of the data they provide. To name a few, information considered relevant includes the date or period in which the representations were created, graphical and descriptive sources used in the editing of the maps, available technologies at the time of their editing and biographical information related to the authors, if available or relevant.

Next, attention is given the speciality literature dedicated to the digitization and GIS analysis and processing of old cartographic representations. Emphasis will fall on the studies that analyse the documents used in this study. Further on, the process of comparing up-to-date GIS data and old cartographic representations, with the purpose of identifying relevant spatial features they provide and to outline issues

related to accuracy, quality and the presence of any kind of errors is briefly presented.

To close up, we shall outline the fact that different angles of analysis and several sources are necessary to be able to extract appropriate and accurate information from old cartographic representations.

Old maps and engraving prints referring to Oradea (XV-XIX)

Early records of the existence of city from the river banks of the Crişul Repede are available due to its strategic positioning at the crossroads of medieval commercial roads and its military and administrative importance within the Kingdom of Hungary.

Furthermore, since the relics of the sanctified king Ladislau were laid in the cathedral of the fortress, a thaumaturgy king that benefited from a special cult, after the year 1192 it also became a pilgrimage site, with religious significance.

In the following paragraphs we aim to outline a clear image of the first maps and engraving prints that make reference to the historical city of Oradea, which we shall supplement in a future study with documentary information.

As it is commonly acknowledged, the work of Claudios Ptolemaios is a model for Renaissance



Figure 1. The map of Hungary by Lazarus Secretarius (1528)

geographers, amongst others. During this period, the geography of Ptolemy was the reedited a total of 57 successive times.

In this context emerge the first maps referring to Transilvania (about the toponymy of Transilvania see: Dana and Radu 2002) and the surrounding regions. Crişana holds a special place amongst them, mainly due to its religious significance. Its authors belonged to the monastic environment where early globes and maps occasionally accompanied theological or geographical works.

A first mention of the toponym “Varadinum” on a map, is attributed to geographer Nicolaus Cusanus, a prominent figure of the European “cinquecento”. Cusanus has drawn his maps based on personal observations as well as on observations he received through correspondence. It is a known fact that he was in close relations with the Bishop of Oradea Ioan Dominic, who most probably provided data to the author of the maps (Grof 2005)¹.

Another map that makes reference to the city of Oradea was realised near Venice, in the Monastery of St. Michael from Murano, by Fra Mauro from Camalduleb. Apparently, the author worked on this world map of 196 cm. in diameter between 1457 and 1459. This map fits that category of “monastery cartography” created by monks which, freed from the canons of the TO maps, focused more on creating an accurate image of the known universe. On the map of Fra Mauro, Oradea appears under the Varadinum toponym (about this important document see: Urechia 1881; Popescu-Spineni 1938, 80; Hadnagy 1983).

Also worth mentioning from the same period, is a map elaborated by Francesco Roselli, printed in 1482 that, under the toponym of Oradea, in

¹ According to recent research, the original map of Cusanus has been lost as it was only conveyed in copies.

the legend states „Hic Jacet corpus sancti Ladislai”, that makes refernece to the statute of pilgrimage site of the city.

If these early maps are tributary to schematism and geographical inaccuracies², the map of Lazarus Secretarius from 1528 (Figure 1) is one step above all previous mapping works and will influence for more than a century the cartography of Central European Space.




Figure 2. Engraving print of the fortress of Oradea, by Cesare Porta (aprox. 1598)



Figure 3. Engraving print of the fortress of Oradea, by Georg Hoefnagel (1598)

The map of Lazarus will be copied, with all the errors inherent to such a work, by other geographers that came after him. Some of the names worth mentioning are: Mathias Zyndt (1567), Wolfgang Lazius (1570), Johannes Sambuccus (1570) (according to: Hadnagy 1983).

As time went by, the technical advances started adding up and thus, in their need to justify territorial claims and as military quests required more precise maps, the Hapsburgs will initiate a new stage in the history of cartography that we will cover later on.

The situation of the engraving prints of Oradea is not any different from that of the maps (more on this issue can be found in: Bubics 1880;

² This is mainly due to the lack of standardization of the mapping techniques up until the 17th century.

Kisari Balla 2000). Two primary sources stand out: the sketch of Cesare Porta representing the bastion fortress of Oradea (Figure 2), used as the main iconographic source for the archaeological researches that were conducted after 1989 in the fortress (a research synthesis regarding the city of Oradea was recently published in: Marta 2013) and the engraving of Georg Hoefnagel from the same time period (Figure 3).

The engravings realized after the turn of the century, from the 16th to 17th, are inspired by the one made by Houfnagel³. Some add new elements like the positioning of the fortress onto a hill that dominates the city. This proves that the authors have not seen the fortress and the resulting images where idealized. We find the following example to be edifying: in an engraving from 1660, a church, probably from the Velența neighbourhood, is depicted with a crescent on the belfry, while in 1692, the same image appears on the medals issued in honor of the conquest of the city of Oradea by the imperials (Ghemiş and Zgardan 2012). The image clearly demonstrates that the engraver of the medal from 1692 used as an inspiration an older source – probably Italian – that was also doubtful in regard to the image of the city.




Figure 4. Engraving of Oradea (1660)

After the fortress was conquered by the imperials, the situation of the stamps and of the plans referring to the city of Oradea changed in a radical way. Plans are drawn of what remains of the city after the seven month siege. The Karlsruhe archives includes some of the plans that present in

³ An identical copy was published in 1617.

much detail the siege of Oradea (Kisari Balla 2000, 85, no. 82). Another, more detailed, plan of the 1692 siege are reproduced in the 1907 edition of the Scholtz Bela volume that presents the history of the fortress of Oradea (Scholtz 1907, pl. VII).

After this turning point, a new phase begins in the evolution of the city and, implicitly, in the production of maps, many of which are kept in different archives and future research will be dedicated to the efforts of bringing them together.

Starting with the second half of the 18th century more precise cartographical documents are offered, starting with the first military survey of the Habsburg Empire. A second survey followed in the beginning of the 19th century, with more accuracy than the previous and a third one in the second half of the same century conceived at two different scales (1:25.000 and 1:75.000).

This overview does not have the goal of identifying all the existing cartographic representations of the city of Oradea, however, further efforts will be dedicated to this endeavour in future research.

What this initial retrospective of the history of maps and engraving prints dedicated to or mentioning the city of Oradea does is to edify us on how to catalogue and analyse them for integration in GIS. In short, dating, the identification of the authors and the cartographical techniques they used, a comparison to the graphical and textual sources used to create them as well as to other documents describing the evolution of the city, all provide vital information on how these documents can be used in order to respect GIS



Figure 5. Silver medal issued in honor of the conquest of the city of Oradea by the Habsburg Empire (1692)

requirements as far as data accuracy, quality and the elimination of errors are concerned.

Using GIS to obtain spatial information from old maps and engraving prints

There are two major steps to the process of obtaining spatial information from old cartographical representations. The first one involves all the specific activities required for their integration into GIS format (scanning, image processing, mosaicking, creating georeferenced raster layers). The second step involves a series of processes required for obtaining vector feature layers, completed with attribute data, through which GIS specific querying and measuring is possible (a more technical description of these processes is described in: Gregory 2003; while a less technical one in: Knowles 2002). The two major steps will be presented, in the order they were mentioned, in the following paragraphs.

The two types of visual representations of the city of Oradea will be discussed separately in this section of the study due to the inherent differences of the perspectives the two types of representations use: the bird eye view of the engraving prints, similar to modern three dimensional GIS representations of the terrain, as opposed to the view from above, created by the projected representation of the terrain, of a two dimensional map. Furthermore, in this stage of the study, we shall concentrate only on the most important historical cartographic representations of the city.




Figure 6. Section of the map of Lazarus (1660). Oradea appears on the right under the toponym of Wardein.

The digitization process includes several steps, among which a very important one is the mosaicking of the map sheets in an appropriate projection system. However, early maps were lacking in accuracy,

consequently, to obtain accurate information from them and to find an appropriate projection system are often difficult tasks, though quite a few studies have successfully done so.

One of the first maps to be based on mathematical principles is that of Lazarus Secretarius, to which much attention has been given in the speciality literature and that can be rectified to reasonably good accuracy and error values



Figure 7. Section of the map depicting Oradea, from the First Military Survey (*Source:* Arcanum)

using the Ptolemian projection (for details see: Gábor Timár et al. 2009). However, this is a rather general map, with a calculated scale of 1:281.340 (Gaudenyi and Jovanović 2012, 121), which does not provide much information about the evolution of the city of Oradea, except its location and, presumably their importance, based on the symbols used to depict the settlements. However, a crosscheck with historical documents is necessary since some errors have been identified, such as the representation of the city of Debrecen as the most important one in Hungary (Gaudenyi and Jovanović 2012, 126). Oradea seems to be a less unimportant settlement at the time, according to this map (Figure 6).

The map sheets of the first military survey, realized at a scale of 1:28,800, offer a general view of the extension of the city of Oradea at the end of the 18th century, however, spatial information are limited and seem to be




Figure 8. Section of the map depicting Oradea, from the Second Military Survey (*Source:* Arcanum)

incomplete, as a rather large area around the fortress seems to be un-built in this map, though it is depicted otherwise by engraving prints shown above (Figure 7). A comparative check on the contents of the map with other sources, in both textual and graphical form, is necessary. Previous efforts to obtain georeferenced map sheets of the First Military Survey achieved an average error range of 100 to 200 meters, through the use of ground control points (GCPs) and further enhancements are possible locally, through the introduction of more GCPs (see Gábor Molnár, Timár, and Biszak 2014 for details).



Figure 9. Sections of the maps depicting Oradea – 1:25,000 on the left and 1:75,000 on the right –, from the Third Military Survey (*Source*: Arcanum)

The second military survey, just as the first one, was put together at a scale of 1:28,800 and was conducted over a period of more than 60 years, mostly in the first half of the 19th century. The georeferenced versions of the map sheets produce errors of up to 15m in most regions (G Timár et al. 2006). The map sheet that depicts Oradea is more detailed than the one in the previous survey and should provide more useful information for the purpose of our study (Figure 8).



Figure 10. On the left, Oradea during the times of the second military survey, with the path of the Peța River emphasized by thick dark lines. On the right, the former path of the Peța River emphasized by dotted lines.

The third military survey, as shown in the previous section of this study, was realized at the scale of 1:25,000, based on which map sheets at the scale of 1:75,000 were produced (Włoskowicz 2015, 33, 34). Both versions, just as previous military surveys, have been georeferenced and are available online (www.mapire.eu). The same process is used to obtain georeferenced map sheets for both available scales, by which a maximum error of 35-44m is achieved. However, since the process is described only for the map sheets with a scale of 1:75,000, error levels might be lower for the ones at the scale of 1:25,000 (see G Molnár and Timár 2009 for details)⁴. Obviously, in the case of this survey, the 1:25,000 scale map version is preferred for the vectorization process due to the fact that the 1:75,000 map sheets are a secondary product of the original scale of the survey. Just as in the case of the second military survey, the contents of the map seem to be appropriate for the purpose of the study.

⁴ The process used to provide a geographical reference to both versions of the maps, as stated on the www.mapire.eu website, is the same and is described in the study this footnote is attached to.

Another important cartographic resource is the collection of cadastre maps created in the second half of the 19th century, towards the end of the second survey, for land taxation purposes. A provisional set was created under Austrian rule and a final one under the dualist state (G Timár and Biszak 2010, 559). The importance of this collection is given by the large scales it uses – a general scale of 1:2880 and a scale of 1:1440 in the built up areas –, the very good accuracy of the georeferenced maps (errors are generally under 3m with occasional local shift corrections) and by the spatial information it depicts (G Timár and Biszak 2010, 560–562).

All the cartographic material presented above will be part of a raster catalogue that will be the basis for the vectorization process through which spatial features will be obtained for further analysis.

Due to the bird eye view of the engraving prints, the classic overlaying technique specific to GIS analysis cannot be used. One possible analysis is a comparative one between each engraving print and three dimensional representations covering the same area, viewed from the same angle as the engraving prints, created based on present day elevation data and data from reliable old maps. At this point, the two images, the engraving print and the three dimensional representation can be overlaid, outside of a GIS. What these engravings can provide is information with regard to the composition of the city of Oradea at different moments in time, provided that their content is backed by other documents of the same period. Architectural elements might also be provided in some cases.

Outside of the information regarding the built environment, old maps and engraving prints can also provide information about natural elements such as hydrography, which can be observed in all the images included in this paper. Figure 10 presents a comparative view of a section of Oradea, which outlines how the former path of the Peța River gave the shape of some of the roads of present day Oradea. However, elevation features

might not be appropriate elements to obtain from engraving prints since, as it was previously stated, most of them were idealized to some degree.

In order to achieve the best possible accuracy for the feature layers we shall derive from these cartographic sources, besides using modern day maps, we also intend to integrate information, especially spatial ones, provided by previous archaeological researches. In this respect, the perimeter of the fortress is well covered by such activities; however, the same cannot be stated about the rest of the city, at least not for the time frame we're investigating.

Conclusions

Following this presentation of how the most important visual representations of Oradea can be included into GIS, a few general steps that we set before us for the future stages of this study are described below:

1. Creating a data base with all the documents, cartographical or otherwise, used during the study;
2. Creating a raster catalogue that includes all available maps and engraving prints from the two collections mentioned at the beginning of the paper, the local archives and other sources we may find;
3. Vectorization of each of the maps will be done, each of the resulting layers being completed with attribute data that the maps provide;
4. Addition of a few modern day layers of data, including aerial photographs, vector layers containing the buildings of present day Oradea along with other types of vector features, such as roads or hydrography and a digital elevation model, amongst other;
5. Digitization and vectorization of plans acquired from previous archaeological researches;
6. Obtaining time aware layers of data, regarding the evolution of the city of Oradea (extent, cadastral borders, buildings, roads, hydrography

etc.), using modern day layers as bases for obtaining the spatial characteristics of Oradea in different moments in time;

Sufficient attention has been awarded previously to the second step of the process. The next step, that involves the vectorization of the old maps, after an initial raw process of extracting spatial feature as they are presented by the maps, will be passed through a process of cross-checking, by combining data from different sources, including text documents, in order to correctly identify each element on the map. Chronological data regarding the existence of a building or any other spatial feature will also be provided.

The modern day layers will be used in several ways. Elevation data will be used, as presented above, to compare to the engraving prints. Aerial photographs are suitable for overlay analysis. The most important layer though is the one containing the buildings, as it will be used to create the most precise representation possible of each of the cartographic documents used. One way of doing that is by using the date when the buildings were built to go back as much as possible in time by hiding all the buildings from present day Oradea that did not exist in those moments. The date when a terrain feature is no longer present will also be noted as an attribute.

Any elements present in the final layers of the geographical database will have to be confirmed by at least one document from the database of documents mentioned in step one, any uncertainty being noted as well.

We can anticipate that, as centuries passed on and an increasing number of cartographical sources became available, delivered with more precision each time, the GIS representation of the urban evolution of the city we should achieve will become less *blurry* as we approach the present times and more uncertainties will be present as we go back in time. The final purpose of the study is to remove, as many of the uncertainties as possible, through the use of GIS analysis.

The process that we described is without a doubt, difficult, time consuming and the final result is expected to be susceptible to changes all the time. Consequently, the database should be open to changes and a web application should be considered for building, to facilitate this process. Also, a history of the changes that have affected it should be considered for implementation, through an automated process.

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Mixed Marriages in Nădlac

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Abstract: *Nădlac is a small rural community in western part of Romania (Arad). It is however an interesting community, taking in consideration that in this small town there are more ethnic groups that influenced each other for almost 300 years. To observe how the inter-confessional and inter-ethnic relations evolved in this period means basically to observe how this community developed. If the period of 1800's was a century of peaceful coexistence, the period of 1900's represented the end of exclusive endogamous marriages. The ethno-religious communities in Nădlac had to develop a deeper cooperation between each other taking in consideration the cultural and geographical particularities of the region.*

Keywords: *Nădlac, Orthodox, Lutheran, ethno-religious community, endogamous marriage, exogamous marriage*

Introduction

1699 is an important year, and a turning point in the history of Europe in general and the history of south-east Europe in particular. This is the year when the Peace of Karlowitz was signed. After signing this peace treaty, the Habsburg monarchy acquired Hungary, a huge buffer zone, which would protect the empire against the Ottoman armies. The status-quo

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was accepted by the Ottoman sultan, being the first time when the Porte recognized the Habsburg-Ottoman frontier. (Pedani 2007, 197- 200)

After the peace treaty was signed the region called Alfold (The Lower Lands) came back under the rule of the Christian feudal nobles, which regained their lost lands, to the Ottomans. (Siracky 1985, 104) As a result of a long period of conflicts, the region was in an acute need for work labor. The new landlords, as well as the old ones, which have come back to The Lower Lands, to reclaim their lands, were in a great need to find workers for their lands. (Siracky 1985, 105) These vast areas, with great agricultural potential, were deeply suffering from a demographic point of view. This is why a series of relocations of population were needed inside the Habsburg Empire. Slovaks, as Romanians or other ethnic groups from the former Hungarian Kingdom, had a great demographic development in this period. Overpopulation of the villages was one of the most important reasons why Slovaks have chosen to leave the High Lands (Felvidek – Upper Hungary). The colonization process took place in more waves. (Husarik 2005, 5)

One of the common features of the Slovaks from The Lower Lands was the fact that in the majority of the cases they were living in a multiethnic environment. They kept strong ties with the other coexisting ethnic groups, which in the majority of cases were of a different religion than the Slovaks. The Slovaks from the Lower Lands were not only an ethnic community. One of the primary reason that made them migrate South-East (except poverty and overpopulation) was the fact that the majority of the migrants was of Lutheran belief.* If one is to take in consideration this important detail, has to understand that a ethno confessional conscience was developed in these communities. More than two thirds of the Slovaks from the Lower Lands were Lutherans. (Kmet 2010, 172)

Slovaks living in Romania (in the Banat region) constitute an integral part of the Slovak family from the Lower Lands. The members of this ethno religious group live in different countries of today's South-East Europe (Hungary, Croatia, Serbia and Romania). In more than 200 years of living in the territories of today's Romania, Slovaks from the Banat region followed an ascendant evolution. (Pădureanu and Bolovan 2005, 275) This led to the development of dynamic communities which left a mark in the local history as well as in the history of the region.

1. Demographic development of Nadlac

“To estimate the number of Slovaks living in the European diaspora is not an easy task. It is hard to estimate because the official data that refers to the existing ethnics in a country are analyzed from different perspectives... from another point of view some countries do not even make a separate counting of the national minorities...” (Sveton 1943, 5)

The demographic data offered by the Hungarian authorities up to the year of 1918, cannot be considered 100% valid, taking in consideration the historical and political background of that era in Austro-Hungry. However the official statistics, corroborated with the demographic data offered by the Church documents, can create together a more realistic picture of the real demographic development of the Slovak community in Nadlac. These data is not important only from a demographic point of view. It is important also in the process of understanding the social, ethnic, economic and cultural evolution of the complex community of Nadlac. As is already stressed out the Slovaks living in Nadlac had a dynamic (positive) demographic evolution in different periods of their existence in this area.

To convince a large community of people to move from their motherland to another place is not an easy task. The Hapsburg authorities had to offer a series of favors to the Slovak peasants to convince them to

move to the Lower Lands. The date of colonization of the first Slovaks in Nadlac was 24. 03. 1803. This was not a deserted place. Romanians and Serbs already lived here when the first Slovak colonists came in 1804. The first group of colonists consisted of approximately 200 families. These families brought with them a Lutheran priest and a teacher. (Stefanko 2004, 82) The 200 families that came to Nadlac in 1803 represented around 800-1000 people. (Zajac and Haan 1994, 43) Right after that, in 1805, another 600 Slovaks moved to Nadlac from Stamora, as well as from other regions of Banat. (Stefanko 2004, 82)

There is an incipient period, up to 1867, when the Slovak community from Nadlac consolidated its position in the Csanad County. (Stefanko 2004, 275) Taking this in consideration, it is easy to understand why the relatively small community was able to hire very well trained teachers and priests (pillar of rural communities), and so strengthen their ethno religious and national identity.

The period between 1900 and 1918 was one of the most dynamic periods in the history on the town. The economic and demographic evolution was on a growing trend. In 1900 Nadlac had more inhabitants than many other municipalities from Romania. For example the population of Suceava was smaller in this period than the population of Nadlac. In the same period Nadlac had the tenth biggest Slovak community in the world. This is another reason why this small town had a huge importance in issues regarding the Slovaks in Austro-Hungary and in the world. The leaders of the Slovak community in Nadlac were not only marginal leaders. They were advocats of the Slovak cause in the whole Empire.

The Counties of Bekes and Csanad had noticed the same development as Nadlac in this period*. The main economic activity in this region was agriculture. Many localities were inhabited by Slovaks. In some of these localities Slovaks were the dominant ethnic group. Some of these

agricultural workers gain more land, and slowly became the rich elite of these communities. The amount of these landowners was way bigger in the Lower Lands than in today's Slovakia.¹

Bekes and Csanad Counties were very mixed up from an ethnic point of view. Along the Slovaks lived also members belonging to other ethnic minorities like Germans, Magyars, Romanians, Serbs, as well as Romas, Rusyns, Armenians and Hebrews (in a smaller percentage). In 1840 the Slovaks represented 29.5% of the total population of the two counties (45 202 ethnic Slovaks). Slovaks communities from the two counties had a natural growth up to the beginning of the XX century. Official state statistics (census from 1900) present that the amount of Slovaks in the already mentioned counties was of 64 467 persons. (Sveton 1942, 106) However, Church statistics offer us a way bigger number of Slovaks living in this region (around 83 000 persons). (Siracky 1980, 61)

Locality	1880	1920
Albert	96,3 % (out of 886 inhabitants)	94,8 % (out of 1 377 inhabitants)
Ambróza	77 % (out of 866 inhabitants)	92 % (out of 1 063 inhabitants)
Békešká Čaba	77,7 % (out of 32 616 inhabitants)	52,9 % (out of 46 633 inhabitants)
Gerla	49,3 % (out of 701 inhabitants)	-----
Nadlak	52 % (out of 10 765 inhabitants)	59,6 % (out of 14 021 inhabitants)
Pitvaroš	92 % (out of 2 351 inhabitants)	90,7 % (out of 3 091 inhabitants)
Sarvaš	61,8 % (out of 22 504 inhabitants)	40,7 % (out of 25 224 inhabitants)
Slovenský Bánhedeš	66,7 % (out of 2 255 inhabitants)	59,6 % (out of 5 245 inhabitants)
Slovenský Komlós	90,4 % (out of 8 416 inhabitants)	86,4 % (out of 10 420 inhabitants)
Véged'háza	28,2 % (out of 687 inhabitants)	8,3 % (out of 1 677 inhabitants)

After the border between Hungary and Romania was permanently drawn in 1922, Nadlac was the only locality from the ones already mentioned (from the two counties) that remain inside the boundaries of Romania. This brought a series of changes in the everyday life of Slovaks from this small rural town.

* Nadlac administratively belonged to the Csanad County. Bekes and Csanad Counties were the two Counties with the highest concentration of Slovaks in the Lower Lands.

¹ Kmet, Miroslav. *Historiografia Dolnozemskech Slovakov v 19. Storoci*. Bekesska Caba: Vyd. Vyskumny ustav Slovakov v Madarsku. (Kmet 2010, 18)

2. Ethnic and religious development of Nadlac

The 1850 census presents a growing Slovak community in Nadlac (4.877 ethnic Slovaks). This dynamic evolution is a strong advocate of a solid, economically stable community. The positive demographic trend was not only local but it took place more or less in the whole Empire. In what concerns the ethnic and confessional structure of the town, this was very complex. For example in 1850 the ethno religious texture of the town looked like this.

Population	Number	Percentage
Total number of inhabitants	9.353	100%
Romanian population	3.390	36,24%
Out of them:		
Orthodox	2.909	85,81%
Greek-Catholic	481	14,19%
Slovaks	4.877	52,14%
Out of them: Lutheran	4.733	97,04%
Serbs	221	2,31%
Magyars	471	5,03%
Germans	58	0,62%
Greeks	10	0,10%
Bulgarians	4	0,04%
Roma	119	1,27%
Hebrew	203	2,17%

Zajac, D., Haan, L., *Dejepis stareho I noveho Nadlaku, Slavia, Nadlac*, 1994, pp. 16-17

Up to 1912, the Slovak population of Nadlac almost doubled. One of the most important characteristics of the Slovak community was the fact that approximately 98% of the members of the community were Lutherans by confession. This thing was beneficial for the development of the community, taking into consideration that exogenous marriages were a rarity in that period. The table sketched out by father Ivan Bujna in his book *Strucny nastin dejin cirkve evanielicke A.V. v Nadlaku od roku 1853 do roku 1912* in edifying in what concerns this problem.

Confessional structure of Nadlac in 1912 (Bujna 2000, 94)

Popouion according to its religion	Number	Percentage
Lutheran	7.463	53,14
Orthodox	3.807	27,1
Roman-Catholic	1.257	8,95
Greek--Catholic	1.066	7,59
Israeli	254	1,8
Calvin	142	1,01
Baptist	29	0,2
Unitarian	25	0,17

In what concerns the ethnic structure of the community, it was a very diversified. There were two major ethnic groups that combined represented 85% of the entire population. These two communities were the Slovak one, and the Romanian community.

Population according to their ethnicity	Number	Percentage
Slovaks	7.651	54,48
Romanians	4.330	30,83
Magyars	1.439	10,24
Serbs	251	1,78
Germans	150	1,06
Romas	110	0,78
Malorussians (Rusyns)	106	0,75
Czecho-Moravians	2	0,01
Flemish	2	0,01
Bulgarians	1	0,007
Poles	1	0,007

Nadlac has continued to flourish up to 1918. Its evolution was stopped due to different factors, political or geographic. Its importance would have been bigger if it would have not been situated on the border between Romania and Hungary. Even the demographic element suffered because of this new status quo. Nadlac was divided in two, the bigger part remained in Romania, while the smaller one became a locality in Hungary.

The 2002 census confirmed the decreasing demographic trend in Nadlac. The decreasing trend of the population is an ongoing process on

the whole territory of Romania. Even so, the Slovak minority is feeling this effect in a more drastic way (3844 Slovaks, 48%²). This involution has more reasons, which will be partially explained further, that influenced generally the community and in a particular way the Slovak ethnic group living in this community.

3. Mixed marriages

After the Austro-Hungarian dualism (1867), the situation of ethnic minorities in the Magyar ruled Austro-Hungary deteriorated rapidly. The Slovaks from the Lower Lands were situated at a considerable distance from today's Slovakia, which made them more predisposed to assimilation by Magyars. (Geoffrey 2000, 94) Among the Slovak intelligentsia from this area, more opinions about how should the Slovaks from the Lower Lands keep intact their ethno confessional heritage, were stated in public.

The majority of the Slovak intellectuals came to the conclusion that there should be developed a system of double identities. On one hand they believed that there should be developed a sentiment of Slovak ethnic appurtenance, while on the other hand, in a broader picture, there should be respected also the national appurtenance to the Hungarian Kingdom, respectively Austro-Hungary.

Before the Magyarization process became state policy in Hungary, Jan Kollar one of the most important leaders of the emancipation movement of Slovaks, living in Pest, came up with a plan. Being part of the Slovak community in the Lower Lands, he tried to impose different trends among the Slovak intelligentsia living in these parts of the Empire, in topics regarding the issue of nationality and national consciousness. The maintaining and development of the national identity of the Slovaks, was one of the most important desiderates of Jan Kollar. His desire to keep

² Census 2002, <http://recensamant.referinte.transindex.ro/?pg=3&id=82>

intact the ethno confessional community of Lutheran Slovaks was taken to another level. He wanted to attract to this community foreigners that were “speaking the same language”. He had in mind other colonists from regions like Silesia, today’s Czech Republic and Moravia, which spoke in resembling dialects to those spoken by the Slovaks from the Lower Lands. (Kollar 1831, 9)

Kollar had a lot of sympathizers among the representatives of the Slovak intelligentsia from the Lower Lands. These ones tried to follow him in his projects. Others considered that the Magyarization of the Slovaks from these regions would be a beneficial thing for Hungary as a possible emerging state. (Kmet 2010, 173)

Slovaks from the Lower Lands were confronted with a much broader spectrum of ethno confessional communities, than their brothers from Upper Hungary. The marital relations inside the same confessional community were kept mainly with German and Magyar ethnics, while the marital relations inside the same ethnicity were developed with Slovaks of Roman or Greek-Catholic belief. (Kmet 2010, 173)

In the Lower Lands lived a diverse palate of nationalities that belonged to other religions than Lutheran. That’s why Lutheran Slovaks had to develop relations of good vicinity with ethnic Romanians, Serbs, Bulgarians, Germans, Magyars, etc. Their religious beliefs were different, from the Orthodox, to Catholic or even Judaic. These religions were accompanied by newly formed neo-protestant sects like the Baptists or Nazarenes in the second half of the XIX-th century. The inter-confessional relations, communication or contacts between distinct groups have influenced the evolution of the ecclesiastical congregations from the Lower Lands. This fact can be observed in many different historic papers or in some cases in the correspondence or the publicist activity of the leaders of communities. For example E. Kolenyi was

saying about the Magyar Calvin believers: *to discuss with them is impossible, to live with them is trouble.* (Kmet 2010, 174)

If one is to take in consideration Kolenyi's words, this would mean that Slovaks had a hard time to cope with other ethnic or religious groups. There is another example of Slovak colonists that left Stamura for Nadlac, because of the conflict developed with the local (Stamura) German community regarding the Lutheran church. (Zajac and Haan 1994, 10-18)

However the Lutheran priests from Nadlac described a different state of affairs in the small rural town. They described in their books how Slovaks and Romanians from this town coexisted peacefully and in complete harmony.

The good cohabitation of people in Nadlac, is demonstrated by the statistic data offered by the priest Ivan Bujna, in the matter of mixed marriages. In 1910 10% out of the total percentage of the marriages that took place in the Lutheran parish in Nadlac were mixed marriages. 80 marriages were performed that year out of which 8 were mixed marriages. Six pears (out of the mixed ones) chose to get married in the Lutheran rite. This represented 75% of the total mix marriages. Two pears decided to get married in a different rite, which represents 25% of the total mix marriages. (Nădac Church Archive)

Even if this percentage seems to be low, one should take in consideration that the rural community of Nadlac was used to the endogamous and endo-religious marriages.

Mixed marriages were often endogamous but exo-religious. As was already mentioned in the Lower Lands region and in Nadlac as well, lived Slovaks of different religions. Mixed marriages in Nadlac had a positive evolution due to different reasons. The first one is the fact that in the second part of the XIX-th century a big group of Greek-Catholic colonists came to Nadlac. The second reason is the fact that neo-Protestantism

became a popular trend in the same period in Nadlac. The last reason was the fact that Slovak craftsmen began to consider themselves being Magyar. This developed in a wave of marriages between Slovaks of Lutheran religion and Magyars of same or different religion.

Conclusions

After the end of The First World War, new boundaries between countries were drawn. In 1922 when the definitive western border of Romania was established, the Slovak community in Nadlac found herself divided from the other Slovak communities of Bekes and Csanad counties. These became part of Hungary. The economic relations as well as the natural connections developed between Nadlac and the other Slovak communities were held back by the newly established border. This also had an impact on the marital relations that were established often between Slovaks from different localities.

Another reason that led to a greater development of exogenous marriages (in what concerns Lutheran Slovaks) was the fact that in the period between 1945-1949 there has been a repatriation program of Slovaks to the motherland called "Mat' Volá" (The mother is calling). After this program was ended, almost half of Nadlac's Slovak population has left the locality to live in Czechoslovakia. This detail corroborated with the fact that Slovaks from other neighboring localities (Pereg, Semlac, Pecica) decided to emigrate, led to an even lower probability of maintaining a high rate of endogamous marriages.

The forced collectivization of the lands during the communist period was the peak of the evolution of mixed marriages in Nadlac. Even if up to this point there were noticed many exogenous marriages, collectivization rose drastically the percentage of mixed marriages. These kinds of marriages became popular due to another reason. After the collectivization large

numbers of ethnic Slovaks from the Bihor and Salaj counties decided to relocate to Nadlac. These groups were of Roman-Catholic belief. This made the multiethnic and multi-religious picture in Nadlac even more complex.

In the western part of Romania, in today's Nadlac mixed marriages are very often, being considered something natural. It is highly likely that in the next decades marital rituals of exogamous or ecumenical character will become more and more popular, taking in consideration the particularities of this small rural community.

Year	Groom Greek-Catholic				Total	Bride Greek-Catholic				Total	Total mixed mar.	Total mar.
	Bride					Groom						
	Or.	Rc.	Re.	Ev.		Or.	Rc.	Re.	Ev.			
1850	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	5	5	21
1851	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	5	5	28
1852	1	1	-	-	2	6	-	-	-	6	8	18
1853	1	1	-	-	2	6	-	-	-	6	8	36
1854	-	-	-	1	1	3	-	-	-	3	4	38
1855	-	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	2	37
1856	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	1	2	34
1857	-	1	-	-	1	2	1	-	-	3	4	31
1858	1	-	-	-	1	4	-	-	-	4	5	25
1859	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	1	9
1860	-	2	-	-	2	2	-	-	-	2	4	18
1861	-	1	-	-	1	4	1	-	-	5	6	42
1862	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	2	19
1863	-	1	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	2	3	11
1864	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	2	11
1865	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	1	14
1866	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12
1867	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15
1868	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	25
1869	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
1870	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	21
1871	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	10	10	24
1872	-	-	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	7	7	17
1873	2	-	-	-	2	8	2	-	-	10	12	27
1874	4	-	-	-	4	7	-	-	-	7	11	23
1875	-	1	-	-	1	8	-	-	-	8	9	18
1876	4	1	-	-	5	5	1	-	-	6	11	17
1877	6	-	1	-	7	2	-	-	-	2	9	15
1878	3	-	-	-	3	6	-	-	-	6	9	23
1879	3	1	-	-	4	3	-	-	-	3	7	11

1880	1	1	-	-	2	4	-	-	-	4	6	10
Total	26	14	1	1	42	100	11	-	1	112	154	658

Year	Orthodox groom				Total	Ortodoxă bride				Total	Total mixed mar.	Total mar.
	Bride					Groom						
	Rc.	Gc.	Re.	Ev.		Rc.	Gc.	Re.	Ev.			
1853	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	1	27
1854	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	2	16
1855	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12
1856	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
1857	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	13
1858	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30
1859	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	1	11
1860	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12
1861	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	41
1862	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	2	32
1863	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	21
1864	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	1	11
1865	-	1	1	-	2	-	6	-	-	6	8	38
1866	-	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	2	29
1867	-	4	-	-	4	-	11	-	-	11	15	18
1868	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	10	10	42
1869	-	2	-	-	2	-	6	-	-	6	8	31
1870	1	-	1	-	2	-	5	-	-	5	7	31
1871	-	2	-	-	2	1	7	-	-	8	10	44
1872	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	5	5	32
1873	-	1	-	-	1	1	4	1	-	6	7	40
1874	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	-	-	8	8	41
1875	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	2	2	22
1876	1	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	1	2	25
1877	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	2	27
1878	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	4	4	22
1879	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	3	3	24
1880	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	5	5	25
1881	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	1	30
1882	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	2	28
1883	-	1	-	-	1	-	6	-	-	6	7	25
1884	1	3	-	-	4	-	2	-	-	2	6	23
1885	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	3	3	25
1886	-	1	-	-	1	1	6	-	-	7	8	28
Total	5	17	3	-	25	7	100	2	-	109	134	887

Source: D.J.A.N. Arad, *Registre de stare civilă*, Nădlac, Registrul nr. 12

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CHAPTER XIII

The Role of the Intercultural Dialogue in preventing Separatism at EU Eastern Border: the Moldovan Case

*Aurelian LAVRIC**

Abstract: *The intercultural dialogue in the Republic of Moldova is the major and the most effective tool of ensuring the cohesion and consolidation of the society, i.e. the societal security. The ethnic diversity of Moldova is a wealth and, in the same time, a challenge. The Moldovan authorities still have not proceed to the nation building (there is no a policy regarding societal security), in order to achieve a consolidated political (civic) multiethnic nation, which is a guarantee of a successful development of the country. In Republic of Moldova there are a few specific regions: the Nistrrian region (since 1992 so-called Transnistrian conflict remains frozen), the Gagauz (ethnic) autonomy (since 1994), the possible future national-cultural rayon (district) Taraclia, with Bulgarian population (in 2015 the law was adopted in first lecture), and in the Northern Moldova – some parts of the territory inhabited by ethnic Ukrainians. All the national minorities of the Republic of Moldova have undergone a process of denationalization and Russification during the Soviet times: 1940-1991. In the period of national liberation movement (1989-1991) some conflicts between parts of the Republic of Moldova population have emerged. The stake of the disputes between the majority population and the Russian*

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spiking minority from Transnistria, between majority population and Gagauz minority from the Southern region was a geopolitical one: it was about belonging of the Republic of Moldova to a civilization space – to the European or to the Eurasian. Even after the signing, by the prime minister of the Republic of Moldova, of the Association Agreement with EU (2014), the split between two parts of society, which have different geopolitical views, still remains. This split is, inter alia, a consequence of a weak intercultural dialogue and of a lack of integration. A negative consequence of this split is the danger of separatism. A successful country is one which has a society which shares common aspirations. In a multiethnic society this can be achieved thru an efficient intercultural dialogue.

Keywords: *Separatism, intercultural dialogue, societal security, nation-building, Republic of Moldova.*

Introduction

In the multiethnic states from the extra-community East European space, nearing the frontier of the European Union, there are risks concerning the emergence of new conflicts, or rather the triggering of older ones which were frozen amongst other factors (such as the geopolitical or the political-economic) and also the ethnic factor (or ethnopolitical). Conflicts such as these can destabilize the situation both locally and also in the entire region, moreover they may even affect the whole European Union: be it through possible refugee influxes from the conflict zones, or the deterioration and the closing of gas pipelines which transit the region coming from the Russian Federation towards the EU; in the midst of military clashes there is the danger of taking down civilian planes, that might be carrying European citizens on board, since their routes are passing through the air space of states in which conflicts might be

triggered. One of the instruments that can be used in order to prevent some conflicts that may spring from the ethnopolitical factor, is the *intercultural communication* between the ethnical communities from the states of Eastern Europe.

Through the syntagma *the region of Eastern Europe* we refer to the six states (Belarus, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia) included in the Eastern Partnership of the European Union – elaborated and implemented in within the European Neighbourhood Policy. The Republic of Moldova, which is part of the Eastern European region, has a multiethnic population structure, being comprised of numerous ethnical minorities. On its eastern side, near the left bank of the Dniester River, next to a Moldavian community, there are also cohabiting both a Russian and a Ukrainian community. There is a conflict frozen in time ever since the year of 1992 (the heat phase of conflict was between the 2nd of March – 21st of July 1992). In the south of the country, there is the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauz Yeri – where the overwhelming majority of the population are the Gagauz (which means it is an territorial-administrative ethnic-based autonomy). Likewise, the Taraclia rayon that is populated by a Bulgarian majority, can obtain the statute of a national-cultural rayon. In the north of the republic there are areas which are inhabited by Ukrainians (in the rayons Briceni, Ocnița, Edineț etc.).

According to the last census (2004), the population of the Moldavian Republic is ethnically structured in the following way:

- 75,8% - Moldavians and 2,16% - Romanians, in total: 77,96%.

The main *minorities*:

- Ukrainians 8,34%,
- Russians 5,95%,
- Gagauz 4,36%,

- Bulgarians 1,94%¹.

This data clearly shows how important it is for the authorities at Chişinău to make efforts in order to ensure the *societal security* – to consolidate the Moldavian society with the use of some political (civic) principles which are shared by all the cohabiting communities.

Moldova's main problem in the societal field, remains the low grade of integration of the ethnical minorities into the culture of the majority of the population. The representatives of these minorities from the Republic of Moldova, lack the necessary knowledge in order to speak the language of the country. Due to this issue, it is difficult for them to get hired in important positions, such as state administration, academic field, etc. A specific situation in Moldova is that of the national minorities which were put through a process of denationalization, and respectively russification in the Sovietic period (1940-1941, 1944-1991). This had as an end result the creation of a *Russian-speaking linguistic minority*, that is still here at present, encompassing all the ethnic minorities. Even numerous representatives of the titular ethnic group from the former Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic were russified due to the lack of the necessary numbers of kindergartens and schools with teaching in the Moldavian language (as it was called the Romanian language in the Soviet times). In the period of national liberation (1989-1991) some conflicts have appeared between different parts of the population of the Moldavian Republic (it can be confirmed that the respective conflicts were inspired and maintained by structures from Moscow, which have used the ethnical aspects in order to attain their political scope – keeping the Republic of Moldova in a „reformed” Soviet Union). The stakes of the dispute between the majority of the population (the Moldavians) and the Russian-speaking minority from

¹ Concerning the totals of the 2004 population census. Demographic characteristics, national, linguistic, cultural, accessed 28.06.2015, <http://www.statistica.md/newsview.php?l=ro&id=2358&idc=168>.

Transnistria on the one hand, and the dispute between the Moldavian majority and the Gagauz from the south of Basarabia were actually geopolitical. It was about the development vector and the belonging of Moldova to a civilizational space: the European (European Union) or the Eurasian one (whose power center was and currently is the Russian Federation). Even at present there are certain points of view that are different when it comes to the vector of development of the country, from the standpoint of belonging to either the European civilizational space or the Eurasian space. The Russian-speaking minority largely offers its support to the political parties which promote the eastern vector of development of the Moldavian Republic.

The Geopolitical Context

By signing the Association Agreement with the European Union, the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, have begun to integrate into the Western civilization space. Through this act the geopolitical border between the sphere of influence of Russia and the geopolitical space of EU have been modified by the exit of the three post-sovietic states from the space of influence of Russia, and the entrance in the European economic space because of integrating within it. However, the Russian Federation is trying to compromise the European integration process of these three countries by various instruments of destabilization. Russia used almost the same scenarios in the Moldavian Republic (ever since 1992), Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014-2015). The lack of an adequate reaction from the international community during the 1992 war in the Republic of Moldova, made possible the war from 2008 in Georgia, then the war in Ukraine between 2014-2015. The ethnic minorities are an instrument used by the Russian Federation in the context of a hybrid war that is waged against these three states, in order to destabilize the situation. The American

researcher Joseph S. Nye Jr. defined *hybrid war*: „In such hybrid wars, conventional and irregular forces, combatants and civilians, and physical destruction and information warfare become thoroughly intertwined”. (Nye 2012, 51) Through „civilians” it is also envisioned that the ethnic minority groups from within one state can constitute the object of aggression of another state which practices the hybrid war.

The problem of integrating ethnic minorities in the Republic of Moldova is a crucial matter in the context of ensuring both societal security and the security risk management internally and externally. In the context of the hostilities from the Eastern Ukraine, and also the scenarios of the growing conflict from the regions of Lugansk, Donetsk and towards the region of Odessa, the risks determined by the precarious interethnic relations from within the Moldavian Republic may increase because of the influence of the external factor on the situation of the Republic. Until the present, even after the signing of the Association Agreement with the European Union by the prime minister of the Moldova(27th of June 2014), the rift between the two parts of the society which have different points of view regarding the geopolitical direction, still remains a current topic of discussion. Frequently, the option towards an external political vector or the other one is tied to the ethnic component. The Russian-speaking minority from the Republic of Moldova is naturally attached to the cultural space of the Russian Federation. However the natural connection of different ethnical communities from a state, with their countries of origin should not affect the societal security of the state whom they inhabit. Thus, the division within the Moldavian society is, among others, a consequence of a lacking set of common civic values (the idea of a country, the project of a country, the mission of the state), all things that would unite the communities. Furthermore, the division in question is also a consequence of the lack of a well established and developed intercultural dialogue

through which the ethnic communities in Moldova to meet, interact and respectively work together in an effective manner in order to achieve common goals. Last but not least, the division inside the Moldova State is a consequence of the lack of a profound integration of the ethnic minority communities in the culture of the main population (majority). All of these causes have created a divided, unconsolidated and deficient society from the point of view of security, thus missing its cohesion and solidarity. It may be noted that a direct link exists between the ethnic minorities and the security within a state or a region (in this case: Eastern Europe – the states from the Eastern Partnership: the eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy). The ratio of *ethnic minority – security*, from the perspective of preventing the conflicts, represents a theme that sits in the spotlight of both researchers from the field of Security Studies (the sector of societal security), and also the political factors (the makers).

One of the negative consequences of the division within the Moldovan society may be *separatism*. Currently there are concerns over the manifestation of new separatist tendencies in Moldova, other than those in Transnistria. This is regarding the south of the country especially, since it is inhabited compactly by the Gagauz minority.

The Phenomenon of separatism: conditions of occurrence and manifestation

From a theoretical point of view, separatism is a phenomenon which can manifest itself in a multiethnic state, when two conditions are met:

1. The power of attraction from the state's center of power (centripetal force) is smaller.

2. The power of rejection from a / from several regions (centrifugal force) is bigger.

The British researcher Barry Buzan, who works in the field of Security Studies, shows that states „who deal with a diversity of indigenous national identities, are highly vulnerable and insecure in this regard.(...) Separatists can opt for separation, as the population of Ibo in Nigeria did.”. (Buzan 2014, 84) B. Buzan mentioned:”As long as these states do not succeed in solving the problem of their nationality, they remain vulnerable to dismantling, interference, instability and internal conflict, in ways inexperienced normally by states that are in harmony with their nationalities.” (Buzan 2014, 84)

In his analysis, B. Buzan reached the conclusion that states which „do not have a natural unifying principle (...) consequently are more vulnerable to dismantling, separatism and political interference”. (Buzan 2014, 86) Notably, the Republic of Moldova does not have a natural unifying principle – it is not a mono-ethnic state, thus, being comprised of several regions that are inhabited by ethnic minorities, it is subjected to risks of conflict, including the risk of separatism because of the inability of the political center from Chişinău to make the Moldovan state attractive. Referring to the dismemberment of states (the author invoked the example of an imperial state such as the Soviet Union), B. Buzan showed that separatism can manifest “when *prosperity* or *central authority diminishes*”. (Buzan 2014, 87)

The end of the Cold War meant the disintegration of federal states such as Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. The next phase in the process of fragmentation of states after the obtaining statehood by the entities that had the status of *republic* within the federal states, targeted the separation of some entities that did not have the status of federal subject – for example Kosovo. This precedent is invoked by Russia both in reference to the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and also with reference to Crimea.

Separatism can be prevented through certain specific actions:

1. In a multiethnic state, authorities should continuously manage the interethnic relations, formulating and promoting the idea of a state, which is then embraced by all the ethnic cohabiting communities, constituting a cornerstone of statehood.

2. It is necessary to develop a *multicultural policy* that leads towards the consolidation of society

3. Institutionalized intercultural dialogue is an effective tool for implementing multicultural policies and ensuring cohesion, the consolidation of society, societal security and the prevention of conflicts.

It is mentionable that particularly in the case of Moldova, the separatist threat to its security can come both from the interior (from structures of the representatives of ethnic minorities), as well as the exterior (structures from other states can inspire forces that can destabilize the internal situation, using representatives of some ethnic minorities as instruments in the case of a hybrid war). Therefore, we can see that the internal and external factors are in a close connection to each other. Also, it can be said, that in the event of setting in motion these separatist scenarios concerning the Republic of Moldova, the impact of these potentially violent conflicts will be not only internal, but also regional, involving the EU frontier security. The emergence of a (or some) new uncontrolled regions by the authorities of an internationally recognized state, means the generation of a (or some) new source of conflict. By efficiently managing the risks of occurrence and manifestation of certain societal conflicts with an ethnical tint, including the risk of emerging separatism, the authorities of the Moldavian Republic could ensure that their national security (especially, the societal security) could also become a security provider in the Eastern European region, bordering the European Union.

Unfortunately, the authorities from Chişinău do not pay the necessary attention to the construction of a Moldavian nation which is built on a multiethnic policy (civic) – formulating the idea of a state, developing a mission of the state, developing a state project. At present, there is no visible concern over the development and implementation of a multicultural (societal) policy, that also has as a target the consolidation of the Moldovan society. The grade of attraction of the political center from Chişinău in comparison to other regions is still small, largely due to the high level of registered institutionalized and widespread corruption (*of the captured state*).

However, without doubt, in the actual context, engaging the danger of the possible destabilization of the internal situation, including the issue of separatism, must be done in a close relation to the external factor. In the context of the hostilities from eastern Ukraine, the implementation of certain scenarios for extending conflicts from the separatist regions and also the scenarios of the growing conflict from the regions of Lugansk, Donetsk and the area of Odessa would amplify the risks determined by separatist tendencies from the Moldovan state (especially in the south of the country, which is largely inhabited by the Gagauz minority). This would increase the vulnerability of the Moldavian Republic to the Russian Federation, which is working to preserve its sphere of influence in a post-Soviet space and also to keep Moldova in it.

The military intervention of the Russian Federation in Syria (September 2015 – March 2016) showed that the Russian state can afford to play an active role in other parts of the world, different from the ones which it controlled in the past, moreover it can impose control on certain states from its *close vicinity*, including through military means.

The Transnistrian separatism

In the Republic of Moldova the phenomenon of separatism manifested itself ever since the period when the USSR collapsed. Between the years of 1990 – 1992, in the Nistrian (eastern) region an armed conflict took place (2nd of March – 21st of July 1992). It resulted into five districts and the city of Tiraspol on the left bank of the Dniester river, including also the city of Bender and six villages located on the right bank, they all left from the jurisdiction of Moldova. Since the 2nd of September 1990 the region of Tiraspol has proclaimed itself the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR, also known as Pridnestrovia), however it is currently unrecognized by any state. The war of 1992 was stopped through "The Agreement on the principles of reconciliation of the armed conflict in the Transnistrian region of Moldova", signed on the 21st of July 1992 by the president of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin and by the president of the Moldovan Republic, Mircea Snegur.

This shows that the parties in conflict were the Russian Federation and Moldova, including the 14th regular army of Russia, which participated in the war against the Moldovan forces. The Transnistrian conflict remained "frozen in time" since the 21st of July 1992 up until the present times, which means that the state authorities from Chişinău, lost their control over approximately 11% of the country's territory (a part that was controlled before by the authorities from Tiraspol with the support of Moscow).

The impact of the Transnistrian conflict in regards to the security of the Moldovan Republic, and also on the course of its European integration, is great. This matter of the Nistrian region constitutes one of the impediments which keeps the Moldovan state from its development. Engaged in a process of leaning towards the EU, which implies both modernization and europeanisation, the Moldavian Republic is obligated to make efforts concerning the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict,

especially since the administration from Tiraspol is against the process of European integration. Currently the negotiations between Chişinău and Tiraspol are taking place in a 5+2 format, where the number 5 represents the Moldavian Republic and the administration from Tiraspol (parts in conflict), OSCE (as the mediator), Russia and Ukraine (as mediators and guarantors), lastly, the number 2 – USA and the EU (as observers).

With the incorporation of the Russian Federation of Crimea in March 2014, the armed clashes in the Lugansk and Donetsk regions (2014-2015) have created a new context where the conflict on the Dniester river must be tackled, since the events in Ukraine changed the European and regional geopolitical context. Ukraine, who is both a mediator and guarantor in the 5+2 format, adopted a more firm position towards the unrecognized PMR (the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic) in order to determine the Tiraspol administration to reach an agreement with the authorities in Chişinău. Furthermore, the new context requires the Moldovan Republic's authorities to have a different approach towards the Transnistrian conflict. It is necessary to clarify the fundamental matters regarding the conflict: who are the actors, what is the nature/essence of this conflict, (Ghica and Zulean 2007, 222) what types of historic precedents can be applied in order to solve the issue. It can be said that from the beginning of the Transnistrian conflict until now, the stake has geopolitical – involving civilizational belonging of the Moldovan state: to the *European space* versus the *Eurasian space*. While the population of the Pruto-Nistrean region is oriented mostly to the West, the population in the Transnistrian region is turning to the East, specifically to the Russian Federation.

Even so, the fact that in Chişinău and other regions of Moldova there are hundreds of internally displaced people who are mostly belonging to an ethnic majority (Moldovan), denotes that in the period of the conflict, at the end of the 80s – the beginning of the 90s, there have been interethnic

tensions in the Nistrian area. Although in the unrecognized PMR there is a numerous Moldovan community (the population of the region is 500.000 people, being comprised of: 1/3 Moldovans, 1/3 Ukrainians, 1/3 Russians), and one of their "state" languages along with the Russian and Ukrainian ones is formally the Moldovan language. Respecting the cultural rights of the Moldovans raises some interesting points: the number of kindergartens and schools with teaching in Moldovan is small. There are also just a few radio and TV shows, and few newspapers in the language of the Moldovan community. Regretfully, the authorities from Chişinău do not support the regional Moldovan community, nor do they support the schools with teaching in Moldovan (in the Cyrillic script). Furthermore, they do not contribute to ensuring that the school libraries and the public libraries have the necessary textbooks and artistic literature (at least the classics of their literature), however both the Russian Federation and Ukraine support ethnic communities in that area. Another problem is that of the six schools in the Transnistrian region (the unrecognized PMR), which are under the Ministry of Education from Chişinău (thus under Moldovan jurisdiction). About 300 students and 46 teachers of the high school from Grigoriopol, who were deprived of their school building in their village, are now forced to undergo a daily journey of 36 km from Grigoriopol to the commune of Doroţcaia, a commune that is under the jurisdiction of Moldova, in order to be hosted in their high school building. (Filip 2011, 210)

With regret, their problem has remained unsolved since 2004. A responsible attitude of the government in Chişinău would seek to ensure support to the Moldovan community in the Transnistrian region, including certain actions of *soft power* regarding the entire regional population: the resolution of the conflict, by reintegrating the Transnistrian area into the Moldovan state, can not take place without the Republic of Moldova becoming attractive for Transnistria's ethnic communities.

The Gagauz from the Republic of Moldova

The ethnical communities that inhabit the Republic of Moldova are split into two categories: 1) *national minorities* – the ones who having a motherland outside the Moldovan state (Ukrainians, Russians, Bulgarians, etc.; can become citizens of these states because the legislature of the Moldovan state allows a dual citizenship) and 2) *ethnic minorities* – where determining the motherland is more difficult (the Gagauz and the Romani people). In the respect of the Roma people, Nicolae Iorga considers India as their place of origin - "from which come most of our Roma, pariahs". (Iorga 1997, 198) However, regretfully, nowadays there are no relations between the Roma community in the Republic of Moldova and the authorities from India, despite the fact that in March 2016 the Foreign Minister of India said that India will grant citizenship to the Roma population everywhere.²

An interesting case is that of the *Gagauz's*. In an article dedicated to the status of the ethnic minorities in the Habsburg Empire and the processes of assimilation – “Austro-Hungary and the Nationalities” (published on 11 April, 1880) – writing about the Habsburg Empire ethnicities, Mihai Eminescu mentions, through comparison, the Gagauz inhabiting the Balkans. Revealing that the Austrians pursued subtler politics of denationalization than the Turks, the great Moldavian intellectual wrote: “The Turks used a simpler implementation. To denationalize they would cut off the tongues, sentencing tens of thousands of people to muteness. The results were brilliant. The Gagauz, who are their descendants, pass in East as incredibly obedient and quiet individuals” (Eminescu 1990, 243) In the same article Eminescu criticized the forced denationalization, showing that „There are indeed happy cases of

² All the Romani in the world could get Indian citizenship, <http://stirileprotv.ro/stiri/actualitate/toti-tiganii-din-lume-ar-putea-primi-cetatenia-indiana-vestea-primita-cu-entuziasm-in-romania-o-doamne-mama-india.html>, accessed: 21.03.2016.

denationalization but those are organic, not imposed. The frequent contacts with a different nationality, racial kinship, daily interests, interbreeding and other thousands of circumstances work together towards an organic denationalization. But, by force, with haste, imposed, never, at least we don't know any case in history. (Eminescu 1990, 243) So, Eminescu decried the forced Turkish conversion in the community that even in his time was called *Gagauz*. Still, Eminescu failed to offer relevant information regarding the Gagauz' origin. He did not provide an answer to the important question: the representatives of which ethnicity were converted by Turks and what ethnicity was called, after denationalization, Gagauz?

In turn, Nicolae Iorga approached as well the enigmatic ethnicity of the Gagauz. In one of his papers, the great historian noted: "The eminent ambassador of Turkey in Romania, Mr. Sufi Tanröer, a poet and a nationalist dreamer, accustomed with great and bold exaggerations, thought of moving our Turkish minority to Minor Asia, but that minority has been there, in Dobrudja, since 1390. Mr. Tanröer wished to move the Gagauz as well, a very kind and interesting population, smart and beautiful people, about which, a certain young man with an important administrative office, taught me that, since < Uzi > was the name of the old Cumans, are a remnant of Cumans. But it is unthinkable that a nomad population leave such well-preserved traces about itself. Gagauz mean: people you can't get along with, just like the Slavs called Germans: nemets or nemtsy, which means people that speak but you can't understand them. Greeks and Romans called everyone else: barbarian because they thought they just repeat one syllable that made no sense. The Jewish people used Zomzonim for those that spoke too much, making only <zom-zom>. The Gagauz are, then, people that when talking, seem to say: ga-ga, because you can't understand them". (Iorga 1996, 242) If we are to corroborate the two

references – Iorga’s and the one written by Eminescu – we can infer that you couldn’t comprehend the Gagauz population because too many of them had their tongues cut off and couldn’t articulate the sounds (hence the constant “ga-ga” that Nicolae Iorga mentioned). Still, just like Eminescu, Iorga failed to answer clearly to the one vital question: what ethnicity had their tongues cut off and converted by Turks?

It must be mentioned that information about tongue excision among the Greek speaking population can be found amid the Caucasus Greeks that formerly inhabited the East Asia Minor and were relocated in the Caucasus area. Being orthodox, they identify as Greeks although they speak Turkish. Many of them repatriated in Greece, after the dissolution of the USSR. Iorga mentions in the same paper that: “Asia Minor Greeks were moved to Macedonia and the Turks from Thrace were brought in Asia Minor” [Iorga 242]. As this paragraph is found in 1939 papers, it is clear that Iorga refers to the population exchange from 1923 – 1924 when the Turkish speaking Greeks from Anatolia (Karaman, Cappadocia regions) were relocated in Greece. Some of them were called *karamanlî*, possibly inspired by the name of Karaman province, in southern Turkey. At the same time, the government in Athens made an appeal to the eastern Bulgaria Gagauz (Varna region) to move to Greece, the Hellene authorities considering them Greeks, just like the *karamanlî* and the other Orthodox population brought from Asia Minor. In 1923 – 1924 a large segment of Gagauz populations migrated to Greece. So, *karamanlî* are a Turkphone and orthodox population from Anatolia (Asia Minor) which, in 1923, following a population exchange, moved to Greece, where, for the most of it, kept Turkish as a language of communication. At the same time, in 1923, the government from Athens contacted the Dobruja Gagauz (especially the Cadrilater ones) to repatriate, considering them just as Greek even if they spoke Turkish.

It is important to note that on the European continent there are two branches of Gagauz population: the one in Macedonia (a few villages populated by Macedonian Gagauz) and the other – from Bulgaria (wherefrom they left in 1812, arriving in Bessarabia, today a territory part of the Republic of Moldavia, being called Bessarabian Gagauz). In turn, the Gagauz from Bulgaria – Varna and Cadrilater regions, can be split in two distinct categories: 1) the coastline Gagauz – called *Greek Gagauz* and 2) western ones, inhabiting the inland grassland, being called *Bulgarian Gagauz*. It cannot be excluded that the inland ones have mixed with the native Bulgarians (hence, the *Bulgarian Gagauz* name) while the coastline population have kept their original identity and the name of *Greek Gagauz*. In 1812 representatives from both communities, Bulgarian Gagauz inhabiting inland settlements and Greek Gagauz from the coastline relocated in Bessarabia. The Bulgarian Gagauz settled in the northern part of the area occupied today by the Bessarabian Gagauz whilst the *Greek Gagauz* relocated to the southern part of the same area. *Vulcănești Gagauze* are *Greek Gagauz*. The few Gagauz that remained in Bulgaria, when asked who they were, answered that they were *Urum*, which means Greeks (the Turkish term for Greeks was *Urum*, ever since the Byzantine period). In the Gagauz autonomous zone there are people having *Urum* as their surname.

It must be mentioned that in 1821, during the Greek revolution, the Bessarabian Gagauz, as the ones in Bulgaria, massively enlisted for the Alexandru Ipsilanti's army and sacrificed their lives for the independence of Greece.

The theory of *Gagauz' Greek origin* is neither exotic nor extravagant. In Greece the Gagauz are considered of Greek ethnicity. A possible version, requiring thorough further investigation states that they came to Europe – in Macedonia and Dobruja – from Anatolia. There they were assimilated from a linguistic point of view (they were made Turks)

but managed to keep their orthodox religion and the structure of their Greek language, taking only the lexicon of a foreign language – the Turkish one. An argument that favors this theory is given by genetic research, which proved that Gagauz are Indo-European, not Turonian (Ural-Altai) population. This is why the Greek Gagauz, visiting the autonomous Gagauz region from Republic of Moldavia express their deep astonishment at the sight, in the museum of Beşalma village, of the map of Altai – the supposed origin place of Gagauz’ ancestors. The Gagauz intellectuals in Greece have solicited the opening of schools taught in Greek in the autonomous province of the Republic of Moldavia.

The Gagauz’ case can be compared with the one posed by *karamanlî*. The main difference though is that, unlike *karamanlî*, the Gagauz came to Europe earlier than 1923, possibly – centuries earlier.

Another version of Gagauz’ origin was presented by the Russian savant Lev Gumileov who stated that, “the remaining of Pechenegs has built a people that still exists today – the Gagauz³.”

Even so, to this day there isn’t a unanimously accepted theory regarding the origins of the Gagauz. In the political circles of Comrat the theory widely accepted is the one highly disapproved by Iorga – the Turkish origin of the Gagauz people.

According to the last census (2004) in Republic of Moldavia live 147.500 Gagauz, which means 4.36% of the total population. During the 90’s, when the Soviet Union was falling apart, it was proclaimed a Gagauz republic, at Comrat, not recognized on international level. On October 12th, the first Gagauz People’s Congress took place which established the Socialist Soviet Autonomous Gagauz Republic as an integral part of Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. A year later, on 19th of August 1990 takes place the first Congress of the elected deputies, representing the

³ Лев Гумилёв. От Руси к России, Издательство АСТ Москва, Москва, р. 90.

Gagauz settled area of Moldavia. It proclaimed the Gagauz Republic (Gagauz-Yeri, which translated from Gagauz language, means Gagauz' land) around the city of Comrat, this time, as a part of USSR. Moldavian government from Chişinău did not recognize the self-proclaimed republic.

On the 23rd of December 1994 following years-long negotiations, mediated by the Turkish president Süleyman Demirel , the Chişinău Parliament adopted the “Law regarding the special judicial statute of Gagauz (Gagauz-Yer)⁴”. Censuses were organized in the settlements with a majority of Gagauz people which established three districts for the autonomous area: Comrat, Ceadâr-Lunga and Vulcăneşti. In Comrat functions a University and the Gagauz language is, together with Moldavian and Russian the official language of the region.

On February 2nd, 2014 in the autonomous Gagauz area a census was organized with 98.9% of the voters (Gagauz Yeri inhabitants) stating that they will support the independence, given that the Republic of Moldavia loses its sovereignty and 98.47% wishing for the Republic of Moldavia to join the Eurasian Customs Union whilst the remaining insignificant percent voted for joining the European Union. The organization of the censuses was agreed upon on 27th of November 2013 by the Popular Assembly of Autonomous Region Gagauz Yeri with the titles: “Concerning organization of the census regarding the separatist statute of Gagauz people and their rights to external self-determination” and “Concerning the consultative census”. Through these motions the provisions of the Moldavian Constitution were breached, together with the Electoral Statute Book and other legislative acts. Hence, the censuses were deemed illegal by the Moldavian justice. The census was qualified by some mass-media trusts as a manifestation of separatist tendencies. The presence at the polls was at

⁴ Law regarding the special judicial statute of Gagauz (Gagauz-Yeri), accessed 28 June 2015, <http://lex.justice.md/viewdoc.php?action=view&view=doc&id=311656&lang=1>.

70,4%, which means 70.777 voters, even if Chişinău authorities advised population not to participate. For the external self-determination of Gagauz Yeri people, in the specified conditions, voted 68.023 citizens and 1324 voted against. For the adherence to the Eurasian Customs Union voted 68.182 people and 1057 against. 1718 voted for Gagauz Yeri to join EU while 66643 voted against.

The results of the census showed the huge discrepancies in geopolitical orientation (including differences in mentality) between the majority of Moldavians (pro-European) and the Gagauz minority (pro-Eastern, closeness to the Russian Federation). Also, the results put in alert the institutions responsible with the national security because in the context of Ukrainian crisis, together with the extended conflict in the separatist regions of Lugansk, Donetsk and all the way to Odessa, (a neighboring province of Gagauz Yeri) Gagauz radicals could have threatened the territorial integrity of the Moldavian Republic through promoting separatist feelings.

Even if highly displeased with the pro-European geopolitical approach chosen by the Republic of Moldavia, it must be mentioned that the Gagauz people enjoy all the rights of an ethnical minority. There aren't any state programs inside the multicultural policy regarding the assimilation of Gagauz culture in the broader majority through extensive studies of Moldavian culture and language. Even if there is the possibility to promote and use the Gagauz language in the educational institutions, until today the teaching process takes place mostly in Russian – a reminiscence of the Soviet period.

Bulgarians inside the Republic of Moldavia (Taraclia district)

The Bulgarians living inside the Republic of Moldova form an 88.400 large community, in accordance with the last censuses. They

constitute 72% of the total population inside the Taraclia district, located in southern Moldova, neighboring the administrative-territorial Gagauz unit. During the 90's, in the past century, when in the Dniester and Gagauz regions conflicts were recorded due to the proclamation of some "republics" unrecognized by Chişinău authorities, the Bulgarians did not manifest any separatist tendencies, remaining loyal to the Moldavian state. Even so, since 1999, the local authorities asked from Chişinău authorities the right and the power to self governance for the Taraclia district. "These claims reflected more the wish for control over the local resources rather than special cultural rights". (King 2005, 179) This right took the form in the collocation *statute of national-cultural district*. On April 2nd, 2015 the parliamentary groups of Moldovan Democratic Party (MDP), Moldavian Socialist Party (MSP) and the Moldavian Communist Party (MCP) voted, inside the Chişinău Parliament, after the first reading of a bill proposal that would allow special statute for the Taraclia district⁵. However, the bill was not passed after the second and final reading by the Moldavian legislature.

The initiative was promoted by the socialist faction in Bulgaria, under the leadership of Serghei Stanişev. In November 2014, at the opening of the electoral campaign for Parliamentarian elections, the president of ESP (European Socialists Party) and the delegation of the European socialists supported the Democratic Party of Moldavia (DPM) and addressed for the Moldavian Legislature a request to adopt the project that would allow the Taraclia district a special statute. "Obtaining the national-cultural statute would be a success, not only for the Bulgarians inhabiting the Taraclia district but for all Bulgaria. This is more than a guarantee to preserve the Bulgarian culture and language among our conationals, it is as well a solid step towards relaunching economical and touristic activities

⁵ Taraclia district might have a special statute. The project was voted by PCRM, PSRM and PD, accessed on 28 June 2015, <http://unimedia.info/stiri/raionul-taraclia-ar-putea-avea-statut-special--proiectul-a-fost-votat-de-pcrm--psrm-si-pd-91613.html>.

and strengthening the relations with Bulgaria itself. And not least this is one of our efforts to keep and develop the only Bulgarian institution of greater education abroad – “Grigore Țamblac” State University from Taraclia⁶” S. Stanișev declared

Still, pressures existed, even from the inside of Taraclia district. Local leaders threatened with the annexation to the Gagauz Autonomous administrative unit if their queries, regarding the special national-cultural weren't satisfied.⁷

Just like the Gagauz minority, the Bulgarian ethnic group was colonized in the southern Bessarabia by the Imperial Russian authorities in 1812. Likewise, the Gagauz people, the Bulgarian population of Moldova were assimilated in greater deal by the Soviet institutions. (King 2005, 180) It must be mentioned that when in 1998 the Republic of Moldova authorities decided on a set of territorial-administrative reforms which changed the 40 districts for 9 counties and the Taraclia district was to become part of Cahul County, then the local authorities organized a census in which the districts' Bulgarian population pronounced for the status quo. The district was kept in its original form. So, the administration of Tarclia proved that, in case of necessity they have the power to mobilize the Bulgarian population just like, it had been demonstrated before, the Comrat leaders can mobilize the Gagauz minority.

As a note, to this day, there aren't any hindrances that would forbid or even delay the multilateral development of Bulgarian community in the Republic of Moldavia (Taraclia district) without the special statute of national-cultural autonomy. Currently the Bulgarian minority enjoys all the

⁶ Bulgarian press: PD supported the awarding of a special statute to the Taraclia district following the request of the Bulgarian socialists, accessed on 28 June 2015, <http://agora.md/stiri/7390/presa-bulgara-pd-a-sustinut-acordarea-statutului-special-raionului-taraclia-la-solicitarea-socialistilor-bulgari>.

⁷ Bulgarians of the Republic of Moldova demand autonomy and threaten Chișinău with annexation to Gagauz, accessed 28 June 2015, <http://www.paginaeuropeana.ro/bulgarii-din-republica-moldova-cer-autonomie-si-ameninta-chisinaul-cu-alipirea-la-gagauzia/>.

cultural rights – kindergartens, schools, high schools and even a university. Regretfully, under the pretext of lacking the educational personnel (in reality, due to Soviet period inertia) the teaching in the said educational institutions is held, mostly and still in Russian, including in the “Grigore Țamblac” State University from Taraclia.

Conclusions

Ethnic diversity is a wealth and at the same time a challenge for a state like the Republic of Moldavia. Regretfully, its authorities failed to understand and to assume the urgent necessity of building a civic Moldavian nation just as they failed to start building it. Presently, there doesn't seem to exist a visible preoccupation, no policies have been elaborated and applied regarding a multiethnic, civic (politic) Moldavian nation, consolidated and thriving. The authorities of a multiethnic state should permanently manage the interethnic relations inside its own borders. *Intercultural dialogue* on an institutional scale is an efficient instrument to assure a cohesive and consolidated society, to assure social security and to prevent conflicts – hence its impact is both intern and regional, referring to the security at the European Union borders. Assuring its internal social security, Republic of Moldavia could become a security pillar in the Eastern Europe.

Regretfully, to this day, Republic of Moldavia presents to the observer's eye a faulty integration of its ethnic minorities in the larger, Moldavian society. Minorities, especially the southern ones, Gagauz and Bulgarian, speak the national language on a basic level only and therefore, are insufficiently represented in the political, academic life and the state institutions.

Intercultural dialogue can be, from a certain point of view, the guarantee of a successful national development (contributing to the

attainment of national interest: preserving the independence, the security and the wealth). It supposes for the minority to assimilate the language and culture of the Moldavian majority and for the majority to understand the specific and individual cultures of each different ethnicity.

A multiethnic country is one in which all ethnic communities forming the society share common aspirations, common morals, a common national goal and a common national project. In a multiethnic society this can be achieved:

1. through the process of *building a political nation (civic nation)*
2. through building a *state identity*
3. elaborating and implementing a *multicultural policy*
4. through an efficient *intercultural dialogue*

In the Moldavian Republic the intercultural dialogue may be the most important and efficient instrument to assure social cohesion and organization of a consolidated society – so, an instrument to assure social security and, respectively, national and regional security at the European Union frontier.

To this day the Moldavian authorities failed to pursue consciously and systematic a *civic Moldavian nation* (there isn't a state policy in this direction) in order to consolidate the multiethnic society which in turn, would guarantee a successful, long term national development.

Inside the Moldavian governmental structure there is an institution that can be vested with the mission to facilitate and manage the intercultural dialogue: The Office for Interethnic Relations. This institution should play a fundamental role – to elaborate and implement a multicultural policy, programs to consolidate the society which would, in turn lead to *social security*. Technically though, the institution referred lacks visibility in the public space and its activities have a much reduced

effect on the society. Still, an institution responsible with elaboration and implementation of a multicultural policy could be efficient in a larger, broader specter – if Republic of Moldavia would assume a mission in Eastern Europe through a national project. But as long as there isn't a clear vision regarding the development of the Moldavian state it is hard to elaborate and implement any worthwhile multicultural policies.

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European Identity the Context of Wider Europe

*Liubov MELNYCHUK**

Abstract. *The article deals with the problem of European identity in the context of wider Europe. The body of the article goes on to discuss the problem of the European identity formation in the context of multicultural paradigm; a single European cultural space molding peculiarities, the cultural factor impact on the European's identity formation, European citizenship establishing as a special phenomenon of the Unified Europe and on the process of the European integration. The author depicts what European identity means today and how it is related to European integration.*

Key words: *European Union, European identity, European citizenship, nationalism, patriotic constitutionalism, multiculturalism.*

Introduction

One of the necessary conditions for positive intercultural interaction is molded identity, as countries that are unable to reproduce their own identity, are doomed to “dissolve” in the surrounding world. In the most general sense of the term “identity” means awareness of the person belonging to a group that is based on the geographical, linguistic, cultural

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and other types of community, allowing it to define its place in social and cultural space and easily integrate in the world around us.

But how, in this case, can national and European identity coexist? How can people from different nation-states unite?

Historically and culturally European Union fosters feelings of belonging to a united Europe, according to its problem of a common European idea formation and the idea of common characteristics of European civilization became, on topical basis of which a sense of the European identity is formed. The European identity is implemented in the characteristics, combining Europeans, establishing their civilization and culture.

In 1946, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill called for a remedy to the European tragedy of World War II: the creation of a "European Family". Citizens could share a sense of "patriotism and common citizenship" across a peaceful continent. It was in this particular context, a wreck manufactured by destructive nationalisms, that the narrative of a shared European identity came into vocalized realization. The new narrative of European identity granted a visionary, emotive quality to the prosaic necessity of finding remedies for the collective economic disarray of the postwar era. 'European identity' was the construct of a Europe torn apart by World War - a Europe hard-pressed by the requirement to rebuild its economic and moral strength.

European identity is a social construction. It has meant different things to different people across the past seventy years. Out of the rescue-remedy of the postwar decade, European identity emerged in the 1960s as a channel through which to forge a secure space in a world polarizing between two Cold War global superpowers. The 1990's witnessed the pinnacle of the utopian vision of European identity: it seemed that European politicians had succeeded in integrating nations into a strong Europe, with a coherent identity of peace and prosperity. At the helm stood

Jacques Delors, propagating a myth by which pragmatic initiatives were interpreted in retrospect as part of a determined march towards a united Europe. A narrative was conceived that constructed a shared past and a shared future for Europe's citizens.

In the twenty-first century, however, we have reached a crisis point in the construction of European identity. The 'peace and prosperity' that apparently underlie what it means to be European are mutually deteriorating before our eyes. The European Union is under enormous strain. The financial crisis exacerbated underlying tensions among member states, and saw Europe slow in the global race against emerging markets in China and South Asia. The rejection of the 2005 Constitution and the protracted, embattled road to ratification of the Lisbon Treaty four years later represented minor constitutional crises at the heart of the European social and political project. Europe's peace and security is under external threat: the rise of an aggressive Russia on its eastern borders, and of a terrorizing ISIS in the Middle East constitute newly urgent dangers for European defense. To top it off, the risk of a 'Brexit' looms large with the future referendum set to take place in the UK by 2017. The uncertainty and fragmentation of the twenty-first century is threatening the narrative of continental solidarity that held European identity strong through the 1990's.¹

What are the roots of European identity?

The ideas of the European nations' unity and appropriateness of their association has deep roots. One of the first researchers, investigating issues on the European identity, was political scientist Emile Durkheim. He described in the early twentieth century the formation of collective

¹ Chloe Colliver. 2015. "European identity: a crisis of construction in the 21st century?" The world post, may 29. Accessed november 1, 2015. [Http://www.huffingtonpost.com/european-horizons/european-identity-a-crisis-of-construction-in-the-21st-century_b_7463922.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/european-horizons/european-identity-a-crisis-of-construction-in-the-21st-century_b_7463922.html)

consciousness of European societies. He noted, European nations bear in their minds the idea of united European society, grounded on its self-identity and the primordial establishment².

Throughout last century, this problem has become even more urgent. Conception of the European identity was widely introduced into the world scientific circulation and the political lexicon. European citizenship is a special phenomenon, a kind of “post-national” citizenship based not on the principle of nationality and exercise of universal rights, which implies the existence of multiculturalism or cultural pluralism.

The European identity elements have a common historical and cultural background, economic and social goals, democratic ideals (legal society, respect for human rights, etc.), the assimilation of these elements requires the development of “the status of European citizen.” Cultural policy and education consolidate these concepts in the population mentality. First of all, European integration must develop with citizens’ vigorous involvement.

The key idea of the united Europe is searching of social self-organization new forms, that is paramount not only for current reality, but for liberalism fundamentals and European identity formation by redefining basic liberal values, but without sharp devaluating of national citizenship. But it, naturally, remains the main tools of political self-identity. (Littoz – Monnet 2007, 54-56)

Currently, there are practical implications for long-term prospects of a European identity. Firstly, by increasing the number of students willing to get further education in European Erasmus program institutions (Erasmus). One of Euro-dimensional identity establishing cons is educational, academic and political societies’ creation.

² Edy Korthuls Altes. 1999. “What is it? Why do we need it? Where do we find it?”. Reflections on European identity. Edited by Thomas Jansen .Working paper. European commission. Accessed October 12, 2015. http://www.pedz.uni-mannheim.de/daten/edz-mr/pbs/00/european_identity_en.pdf

The second consequence is the right of free movement turned out to be the exception for European Union non-citizens. For example, in EU airports a clear and distinct segregation between new Europeans and non-Europeans could be witnessed (two separate queues for EU citizens and for all others). With the development of internal-rights movement formed increasingly strict immigration policy. On the other hand, the traditional division between "its" and "alien" is on the line belonging to Western culture. Europeans do not consider each other as real foreigners.

Although, the European identity implies integration and overcoming nationalism, it included Europeans in the common economic, political and cultural project. This means exclusion from the system of European relations for non-citizens.

The leading theorists of the national issue Helner Ernest and Anthony Smith noted that people can be considered representatives of a nation when they have a sense of collectivity and recognize common civil rights and certain mutual obligations. All this takes place in today's EU, and therefore we can talk about the common European identity. The European identity doesn't exist always, but it is neither stable nor fully achieved, it is not one-dimensional, because over the years integration will enhance. At the same time Europeans are developing and their understanding of identity will change as well. The European identity is embodied in the characteristics that unite the Europeans (and at the same distinguish), create their civilization and culture.

Throughout many centuries, Europe was both of "geographical and normative value" because its regional values are always changing; geographical territory was shifting and remained. Spiritual boundaries of Europe were constantly changing for centuries. (Littoz – Monnet 2007, 54-56) Art, literature, science, philosophy has never been restricted in Europe by any regional borders, but conflicts in the history of the spiritual life

emerged on the European level: i.e. in particular the case of Church and State. At present day Europe has acquired a number of characteristic features distinguishing it from the other civilizations: democratic constitutional state as a form of political system, nation-states as a system of territorial governance, capitalism as the central driving force of the economic growth, originally connected with religion, as a way to success.

The Europeans have never been aware of political unity or a common language: in no place of the planet you can find such a big diversity on a thin space. However, this diversity was not a simple co-existence, but it was always tight interaction –verge a friend to a foe. The history of Europe is a profound dialectical conflict between two major trends - confrontation of nations, collision of interests, ideology and their bonds (relationship).

It is impossible to ensure the active participation of citizens in the life of the Union without values; still it is impossible without democratic legitimacy. European identity is a key element that allows EU citizens to feel as an integral part of a Union, not only because of historical facts or geographical location, more over especially, that the new European realities increasingly affect their everyday lives³.

The first phase of European construction was successfully conducted. There were created common European structures and formed policy significantly increased the level of economic integration. But moral integration still failed. This is a process that unites its members through awareness of their belonging to the Union.

The time has come when you receive a more integrated Europe, which has its own identity on the international scene. It induces to search

³ Носенко Елеонора. 1999. “Культурно-психологічні проблеми інтеграції України в Європейське співтовариство”. Грані. №2 (4). р.59-61.

overall identity, which would allow residents of EU member states to have common values, aspirations and active participation in the life of Europe.

This process should be developed according to features of the EU, where there are no clearly established state's territory from the political point of view, European citizenship, a common language, homogeneous culture. There are integration process elements in the history of European that reflect the theory of "union nationalism" and features cosmopolitanism (the so-called "patriotic constitutionalism"), based on a common political culture, which professes loyalty to universal principles. The concept of "union nationalism" based on the inability to detach the historical and cultural identity from the political one.

European identity should be based on a common past, with an emphasis on cultural homogeneity, the overall economic life and the common goals of social policy. As the result there should be a new sense of belonging to the Common Union that would take advantage of belonging to a separate state (Dirk Jacobs and Robert Meyer).

The twentieth century has brought brand-new moments having a significant impact on the European identity – two systems confrontation, the conflict between Eastern and Western Europe. The pros to Europe mean to say "yes" to political freedom. This legislative grounds understanding of the European identity could not be regionally limited. Disputes on what Europe should be, what expansion boundaries should be, combine two different approaches: political (Europe is a "political unity"), historically and culturally Europe is proximity. Europe is said to be there where the Europeans feel as the Europeans, and this feeling is based today not only on political realities, but primarily on cultural, greatly encouraged in history and being aware of it a common European history.

In the European history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries nation states dominated, and this is one reason why the path of the European

integration is so thorny. In Europe, national identity is deeply rooted among the people, and there is no need to destroy it. No events that shaping the European civilization were considered to be its invention. Common European traditions include the Roman law, political democracy, parliamentary institutions and cultural heritage. (Littoz – Monnet 2007, 54- 56)

According to A. Toynbee's concept of civilizations by on the cultural foundations of the European identity, one can specify the following: Firstly, a particular cultural phenomenon always occurs in a certain region. In diversity lies the secret of the European sustainability.

Secondly, the European civilization is picked up by the passion for updates. The fact that Europe is undergoing the new wave of crisis should not stir pessimism, because there is a tradition of depression and reconstruction.

Thirdly, it is incorrectly assumed, that all of civilizations are doomed. The European Union is a new entity. (Dunkerley and Hodgson 2002, 118)

According to scholars Dirk Jacobs and Robert Meyer, there are three strategies of a European identity. The first one is similar to that one how national identities were constructed. That is, through historical myths about the common Christian (religious) background starting from the Roman Empire and the Renaissance humanist traditions. Moreover, the ideology of Europe as a democratic and modern project as well as some pragmatic rituals (i.e. Euro elections) and Euro symbolism (flag, anthem, and ID) were used to emphasize the common cultural identity. The second strategy encompasses supranational system of law being introduced, that guaranteed European citizens fundamental rights and freedoms. Finally, a new form of European citizenship was introduced – “a citizen of European Union”, which confirmed the right of free movement on the territory of the Member States, the right to appeal to the European Parliament.

Inconsistencies of processes, occurring in Europe, are expressed also in the regional and European traditions interaction. The threat to cultural identity supports activation of conservative tendencies, least of all, not only in Europe. Regional movements in Europe emphasize on the preservation of cultural diversity with the minimum required level of European unity.

Modern European culture inherited duality – it is the source not only of European unity, but nationalism as well, that is generated by national cultures. Simultaneously, European culture is dialogic: it is based on a desire to understand the others, to exchange with other cultures, but remote concerning itself.

The modern concept of Europe as a federation of communities is based on the concept of ethnic pluralism that respects the interests and rights of peoples as ethnic and cultural communities. Ethnic pluralism involves fundamental differences between peoples, those are expressed not only in external features, but also spiritual and mental differences in the different perception of reality and position according to it.

What does European identity mean today and how is it related to European integration?

Europe is a stronger place when its citizens work together both within their states and between them. The two levels of identity - the national and the European - can give Europe's citizens the best of both worlds: patriotic belonging alongside European cooperation and communality. T. S. Eliot once stated that, "the unity of culture, in contrast to the unity of political organization, does not require us to have one loyalty". It is through this understanding, by focusing on social and cultural values, that a viable future for shared European identity can be found. In searching for a narrative that can tie the divergent strands of European identities together in the present dilemma, there is no longer space for an

idealistic, utopian account that can match the emotional resonance of the 'American dream' across the Atlantic. In a time of strain, we must return to the rational and realistic tenets on which Europe was first constructed. It retains a precious common framework of justice and human rights, where democratic standards are protected and cultural links are fostered. These values can provide a compelling basis for communal identity, even in a time of vulnerability and struggling economies. Focusing on the shared cultural engagement, the common historical inheritance, and the fraternization of peoples that have been steadfast qualities of the European ideal since 1945 - qualities that impact the everyday lives of the European man or woman, far from the bureaucracy of Brussels - will allow European identity and a concept of European belonging to endure among the young generation.

While politicians fight over 'Anglo-Saxon', 'French' or 'German' visions of Europe, the publics of the EU's member states are being left behind. European identity is about people. It is about connecting the millions who live within a continent that houses shared values of democracy in politics, humanitarian justice in the law, a vibrant and open exchange of goods and technology, and energized transnational cultural production. Only with a continued and concerted efforts to engage populations from London to Lisbon, from Sofia to Stockholm, can these positive and precious traits of European identity be renewed and strengthened at this critical juncture⁴.

There are four main theoretical concepts that drive the study of European identity:

- European identity and identification with Europe. Identity has an individual component of active choice coupled with a collective component

⁴ Chloe Colliver. 2015. "European identity: a crisis of construction in the 21st century?" The world post, may 29. Accessed november 1, 2015. [Http://www.huffingtonpost.com/european-horizons/european-identity-a-crisis-of-construction-in-the-21st-century_b_7463922.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/european-horizons/european-identity-a-crisis-of-construction-in-the-21st-century_b_7463922.html)

where individuals orient themselves to one or more aggregate groups or collectivities. The collectivities to which one orients depend upon context and can be multiple, so it is more accurate to speak of a mosaic of situation-specific identity rather than identities being nested one within another. Although few people may have a primary identity as ‘European’, such an identity can become salient in specific contexts.

- Europeanisation refers to a hypothesized trend towards national institutions and nationally-based fields of activity or perspectives being supplanted by institutions or fields at the European level. The validity of the concept can be questioned since Europeanisation in reality may be only a peripheral variant of a larger trend of globalisation.

- Transnationalism is contrasted to permanent migration and refers to ‘cross-border’ living where, thanks to modern infrastructure, a person can maintain a social existence both in their current country of residence and their country of origin.

- Cosmopolitanism refers to actively seeking out and appreciating contact with other cultures and hence coincides with perceived European values of tolerance and equality⁵.

Adam D. Rotfeld argued that history and common memory are understandable and natural requirements for search of national identities. Problems appear when history is treated selectively and national memory is decreed by politicians and the institutions they establish.

He highlighted that the difference between “historical memory” and “historical policy” is the same as between truth and half-truth, between seeking historical truth and attempts at its instrumentalization and exploitation for specific political goals by different groups, parties and state institutions.

⁵ The Development of European Identity/Identities: Unfinished Business. A policy review. 2012. Accessed November 1, 2015. https://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/pdf/policy_reviews/development-of-european-identity-identities_en.pdf

Rotfeld devoted special attention to the process of reconciliation between the Poles and Germans and between the Poles and Russians. He underlined a different course for the dialogue and search for understanding, but pointed out that in both cases, however, a pivotal role has been played by the recognition of universal moral and ethical values and adoption of the principle that future-oriented dialogue should be based on truth about the past and adherence to certain common values.

For Rotfeld the truth is not and cannot be subject to negotiations. Truth never hinders understanding or inflames mutual relations. The process of reconciliation will not be durable and effective if the full truth is not told without reticence or deception⁶.

We have one more opinion about European identity. According to Tzvetan Todorov, the growing unhappiness with the European Union (EU) amongst the population should be understood as a response to politicians' lack of vision for the European project. Interminable debates on bureaucratic rules and regulations, coupled with inadequate responses to the economic and social crises facing Europe's citizens, leave citizens discouraged.

He remains convinced that the rationale in favour of the EU is still valid and suggests that building a cultural, or even spiritual, identity for Europe may help to overcome many disappointments and strengthen people's connection with Europe.

Tzvetan Todorov notes the benefits from the richness of European culture, its plurality and diversity of traditions and ways of life, but he also sees difficulties with attempts to define a shared identity. He opts for an identity which refers to the constitutive pluralism of the EU as a basis of unity. This should embrace tolerance, emulation, critical thinking, generalised secularism, "*general will*" (Rousseau) and "*common sense*"

⁶ Rotfeld Adam D. 2014. "European Values and Search for Identities". Council of Europe. Debates of European Identity (2013-2014). Accessed October 12, 2015. http://www.coe.int/t/policy-planning/Debates/Identity_Debates/default_en.asp

(Kant). He draws particular attention to the significance and status of *diversity* as well as *common memories* and the *coexistence of national and regional identities* (*'Europe as a form of cohabitation between nations'*)⁷.

Regional and personal identity

In a world where we find more than 200 independent states and self-governing entities and from a cultural perspective over 6500 spoken languages, introducing the regional dimension at the European scale, could be a major step forward for EU. A step that is nowadays enforced through various administrative means such as *The European Charter of Local Self-Government*, *The European Outline Convention on Trans-frontier Cooperation*, *The European Urban Charter*, *The European Landscape Convention*, or various regulations supported by the *Committee of the Regions*. Therefore, at first glance and expressing mainly an economist's view, the *Union of regions* appears as a federalist approach, especially conceived for a better specification of the division of powers between central and regional levels designed for the ultimate goal of *reducing the cost of all sorts of transactions*. On the other hand, if one takes into consideration that today's institutional framework of EU rests primarily on national states and the fact that national governments are the EU's channels of communication and they are capital in any enlargement juncture, we must face the reality that national governments control the overall direction and pace of the evolution we discuss. It becomes clear for even lesser documented parts that European federalism is still far away from being effective. Even supranational bodies considered by many as omnipotent, such as the EU Commission, operate mostly as intermediaries of the EU's national governments. Well, true enough, not all of them.

⁷ Todorov Tzvetan. 2014. "In search of Europe". Council of Europe. Debates of European Identity (2013-2014). Accessed October 12, 2015. http://www.coe.int/t/policy-planning/Debates/Identity_Debates/default_en.asp

Equally learned opinions as those previously invoked conclude to the overall assessment that we cannot expect a different outcome today since we lack a so called *pan-European cultural identity*. (Minc 1992, 208- 223) Now, whether agreeing or disagreeing with that, considering it a blessing of history or a curse, a setback or just a rational premise for competitive advantage, we think we can and even must approach the issue of regional development, as ground for a new type of identity, beyond the so long dominant European identity, the national one. The point, in the long run, is to determine how relevant this regional level actually is for the evolution of Europe as a whole, economically, socially, politically, etc. The issue of European identity was under heavy scrutiny at a time when the *Treaty of Maastricht* gave perspective, since back in 1992, to potential *European citizenship*. Until the late 80s integration within EU structures was naturally conceived mainly in the economic frame, to promote the common market, gradual convergence and not much beyond. Starting with the 90s, social, cultural and political issues became critical, especially after the fall of the *Iron Curtain* and the virtual cultural enlargement to the geographic Centre and Eastern territorial units of the continent with such a different background but sharing to such an extent the common EU values. What was called elsewhere for decades, one must say with notorious envy, the *European life style* and was spotted in areas such as leisure, tourism, media, sports, literature, international education, not to mention cosmopolitan approaches of the day by day life. All these had and still have a peculiar regional flavor and a specific transnational impact, in a world bound for global values and patterns so often grounded on economic efficiency and branding arguments. (Knox; Agnew and McCarthy 2003, 379- 396)

It worth to say, that regional development occurs today roughly all across EU in a dual manner. Sometimes it happens consonant and sometimes evidently in spite of the typical historical European social and cultural

diversity. Due to the long-term implications and negative consequences of these phenomena, the political consistency of the process that gives birth to the new forms of European governance could easily overshadow the real outcome of the process, namely the new territorial institutional frameworks, the *Euro-regions*. We cannot deny that pre-industrial Europe existed more or less in a regional shape and in many parts, including South-Eastern Europe, even in sub-regional forms and this situation was encapsulated in the national patterns that were put in place during the industrial age. But present day regionalization generated firsthand exogenously as we already suggested, contradicts the historical pattern to the benefit of none. There are obvious new spatial dimensions of development in present day EU, especially when we tackle the issue from the perspective of sustainable development. This leads to the preliminary conclusion that a new type of territorial scaling appears to be necessary for further effective results of the overall process of European regionalization. (Maniu 2015, 158)

Personal identity, and by extension a person's European identity if they possess one, has both an individual and a collective component. The person orients herself/himself to one or more aggregate groups or collectivities (either real or imagined) through a process of identification. In terms of geographical entities, the body to which one refers may be local, regional, national, European or even global. Aside from some political, administrative and economic elites, few people have 'Europe' as their primary locus of identification. However, identification is also dependent upon context. Under the right conditions, such as travelling abroad and discovering oneself as being typed as 'a European' or discovering one's citizenship and/or right of residence being challenged by a border control body, one's identity as a 'European' can come to the fore. Hence, rather than to think of geographically-based identity as a set of categories nested within each other like a Russian doll, it is more accurate to conceive of

geographically-based identity as a ‘mosaic’, where different levels of geographical orientation become relevant depending upon context. Furthermore, the most significant collectivities for a person’s identification need not be geographic at all, but can relate to a variety of other types of aggregate, such as gender or sexuality, ethnic or linguistic group, social class, affiliation with an organisation or political party etc. Again, depending upon context, any of these aggregates may be the most significant at any given time. Hence, as well as being a ‘mosaic’, identity can be seen as multiply-determined with the determination as least partially under the control of the individual as an active agent. Regardless of their view of identity, none of the projects reviewed here would assert that there is a ‘zero-sum’ relationship between a person’s sense of European identity and their other potential sources of identity⁸.

Conclusions

European identity cannot be based on an integrated European culture. It can only survive as a way of solving problems, united by a common political culture inspired by Kant and embodied in the rule of law, multilevel democracy and human rights. This remains a Europe worth having⁹.

Identity arises only in relation to social action. Neither individual persons nor social movements nor whole societies begin with a fully formed or articulated identity. Identities are created in action and express not an underlying consciousness or essence, but the self-understanding and self-recognition of the social actor. Since these changes in the course of time, the identity of the actor will also change.

⁸ The Development of European Identity/Identities: Unfinished Business. A policy review. 2012. Accessed November 1, 2015. https://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/pdf/policy_reviews/development-of-european-identity-identities_en.pdf.

⁹ Held David, McNally Kyle. 2014. “Europe, the EU and European identity”. Open Democracy. Accessed October 30, 2015. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/david-held-kyle-mcnally/europe-eu-and-european-identity>

Thereby, the European identity can not be opposed to national identity. There are several levels of identity: national, regional and European. They must be compatible. Recognition of common belonging to Europe – European identity – does not deny its previous levels of identity.

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The Impact of Europeanization on the Quality of Democracy in the Republic of Moldova

*Simion ROȘCA**

MOTTO: “Europe owns its exceptional spiritual richness
to the great variety of nations it includes.

This variety can only exist in a European order,
where no Nation prevails: an order that is an equitable balance
of national sovereignties, under a European sovereignty
with minimum powers needed for this goal...

Europe has to be one, but European nations and people of Europe
need to feel freer in this new Europe,
than in the anarchic and divided Europe of the past”

Salvador de Madariaga

Abstract: *European Union enlargement to the states from Central and Eastern Europe required a significant effort both from the EU, and the candidate countries from former communist space. For states from Central and Eastern European, that in the 90s were only initiating their democratic experience, selecting European Union as a partner for dialogue, a partner with an immense capacity to share knowledge and best practices in the area of democratization, transition to market economy, reveal a well thought strategy.*

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Keywords: *values, democracy, Europeanization, Republic of Moldova*

European values, those of a veritable democracy represent ideas and beliefs that are important for members of the community. These become concrete practices through the behaviour of their citizens and public authorities and guide political actions. The democratic mechanisms are developed and applied based on these principles, including voting process or organization and functioning of public authorities.

In this context, the article will analyse an important subject, first for the Republic of Moldova, and then for other EU candidate-states – the impact of Europeanization on the quality of democracy. This approach was considered as it represents a special academic/scientific interest, since it can provide a new perspective on the role of the European Union for the Republic of Moldova as democratization agent, and leads to observing the effects produced by the Europeanization process on the quality of democracy in Republic of Moldova. To be able to do this, we need first to introduce the two key concepts of our theme – Europeanization and quality of democracy, noting that both of them are quite vague for Republic of Moldova.

Let us start with the concept of Europeanization, which is relatively new in the political science, especially in Republic of Moldova and is linked with research on European integration. The different approaches that exists regarding Europeanization have led to the occurrence of a range of distinct definitions. First, we analyse Robert Ladrech definition, who emphasized that Europeanization is an “incremental process that refocuses the direction and form of politics in such a manner that the political and economic dynamic of the EU becomes part of the organizational logic of the national

politics and of the internal public policy development”¹. One can note that the focus is on modelling the organizational logic, understood as “a process of adaptation of organization to a changed or changing environment”² and of developing public policies depending on the economic and political climate determined by the European Union. Considering the same approach, Risse, Cowles and Caporaso have defined Europeanization as the „emergence and development of distinct structures of governance, political, judicial and social institutions at the European level, associated with solving political problems that formalize interactions between actors, but also networks of specialized policies in creating some European rules that would prevail”³. A new and important argument introduced in the operationalization of the Europeanization concept by the authors mentioned above refer to the emphasis on the need to delimitate Europeanization of other factors or processes, like for examples globalization or other internal factors. (Cowles; Caporaso and Risse 2001, 3)

Knill and Lehmkhul provide a counterargument to the two above-mentioned approaches, which look at the concept of Europeanization from an institutional angle. While the definitions presented above focus mainly on the changes produced by the Europeanization in institutional terms and of formulating public policy, Knill and Lehmkhul affirm that a change may

¹ Ladrech, Robert *apud* Radaelli, Claudio M., *Whither Europeanization? Concept stretching and substantive change*, European Integration online Papers (EIoP), Vol. 4, Nr. 8, 2000, p.3, available at <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-008a.htm>

² *Ibidem*.

³ Cowles, Maria Green. Caporaso, James. Risse, Thomas, *Transforming Europe. Europeanization and Domestic Change.*, Ed. Cornell University Press, New York, 2001, p.3 available at http://books.google.ro/books?id=p0rqkDVhBsMC&dq=transforming+europe+europeanization+and+domestic+change&pg=PP1&ots=9IaPaXIWp5&sig=itP2S1m_Em1_lq3MdTaXGzgBRdk&prev=http://www.google.ro/search%3Fhl%3Dro&q=Transforming+Europe:+Europeanization+and+Domestic+Change&oi=print&ct=title&hl=ro#PPA3,M1

also exist in terms of “altering beliefs and expectations of national and sub-national actors, based on a cognitive logic”⁴.

Analysing the approaches one can note that they do not exclude, but complete each other, determining the extension of the Europeanization concept. Thus, the class of attributes to which this concept may be applied (extension) is characterized by both political structures (like for example institutions, public administration etc.), public policies, but also cognitive and normative structures (like for example discourse, norms, values). (Radaelli 2003, 35)

As for the intension, as we mentioned at the beginning to be able to talk of Europeanization, a process of European integration should be in place, which either has taken place or is in process. For this reason, one can sustain the fact that the intension of the concept does not include only member states, but also candidate ones.

Once the intension and extension of the Europeanization concept defined, we have selected as working definition the one provided by Claudio Radaelli, considering that this includes best of all the considerations made above. Therefore, according to Radaelli, Europeanization is “a process of building, diffusion and institutionalization of the formal and informal rules, of the procedures and policy paradigms, stiles, ‘modalities to solve things’, of beliefs and norms shared. These are defined and strengthened first in the European public policies and in the European politics, and then are incorporated in the logics of the discourse, identity, political structures and national public policies.” (Radaelli 2003, 30) Conceptualizing Europeanization represented a first step towards theoretical argument of this research, however for the rigor of the study; we have selected to present also the mechanisms of Europeanization, following

⁴ Knill, Christoph. Lehmkuhl, Dirk, *How Europe Matters. Different Mechanisms of Europeanization*, European Integration online Papers(EIoP), Vol. 3, Nr. 7, 1999, pp. 2-3 available at <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1998-007a.htm>.

the considerations made by Radaelli. He presents two types of Europeanization mechanisms: vertical and horizontal ones. According to Radaelli, vertical mechanisms are those that mark clearly the European level, where European politics and community policies are defined, from the national level, where these have to be metabolized, and what is more important, they are based on the existence of a pressure to adapt. (Radaelli 2003, 41) Unlike these, horizontal mechanisms regard Europeanization as a process where there is no pressure to adapt to conform with the European model of politics and processes; they reside in a form of adaptation to the European Union based on types of socialization and influenced by the market. (Radaelli 2003) One can observe that these categories lead to defining certain mechanisms that can be characterized based on the existence or not of a prescribed European model, regarding policies, processes and institutions.

As for the mechanisms conditioned by the presence of a prescribed European model, these are coercion and miming, and in the lack of such a model, one sees the regulating competition. In addition, the author mentions a range of supplementary mechanisms defined as framing, and precisely consideration of policy solutions from the EU, convergence around certain policy paradigms and dissemination of the network governance model. (Radaelli 2003) Since in the process of analysis for the paper, we focused on the coercion mechanism, we will further present this one. Therefore, coercion refers mainly to imposing directives by the EU, which have to be applied by the member states after a certain period and to create further regulating arrangements. (Radaelli 2003, 42)

Now, let us analyse the second concept – the quality of democracy. Before talking about the quality of democracy, from more than two hundreds definitions of democracy we have selected the following. Democracy is “a governing system where rulers are constantly responsible

in front of citizens for their actions in the public space, acting indirectly, through a process of competition and cooperation taking place between elected representatives”. (Schmitter and Terry 2002, 5) In this complex approach to democracy, authors emphasize the most significant features of the phenomenon, like the continuous responsibility (accountability) of rulers, active involvement of citizens in the political and decision –making process, as well as the cooperation and competition of governors.

To talk about the quality of democracy, we took this definition of democracy as working one, however we took into account the minimum procedural conditions for the existence of a democracy proposed by Robert Dahl. These conditions are considered as indispensable for the existence of a modern political democracy:

1. Control over governmental decision regarding public policies belongs according to the constitution to elected representatives;
2. Representatives are elected in periodic electoral competitions, conducted transparently, where no coercion is allowed;
3. Practically, any adult person has the rights to elect their representatives;
4. Practically, any adult person has the right to candidate to public functions
5. Citizen have the right to express themselves, without the danger of being punished for broadly defined political purposes;
6. Citizens have the rights to look for alternative sources of information. Moreover, alternative sources exist and are protected by law;
7. Citizens have the right to create associations or organizations relatively independent, including political parties and interest groups⁵.

⁵ Robert Dahl, *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy*(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 11, quoted by Phillippe C. Schmitter si Terry Lynn Karl, „*What Democracy Is...And Is Not?*”, *Journal of Democracy*, 2:3(1991), 75-88. The Johns Hopkins University Press and National Endowment for Democracy; *Ce este...si ce nu este democratia (What is and what is not*

Dahl, in his famous paper *Polyarchies* states that the fundamental feature of democracy is “constant receptivity of the governance to citizens preferences, considered equal from the political point of view.” (Dahl, 27) For a political system to maintain its receptivity to preferences of its citizens, these need to benefit of *unblocked opportunities*: to form their preferences, to make their preferences known to other citizens and the government through individual and collective actions, and the government needs to consider equally the preferences, without discrimination based on their content and source. (Dahl, 28)

Therefore, departing from these considerations, we will follow the interpretation of Leonardo Morlino and Larry Diamond regarding the quality of democracy. According to these two authors, eight dimensions characterize the quality of democracy, namely:

- Five procedural – rule of law, participation, competition, vertical accountability and horizontal accountability
- Two substantive – respect for civil and political rights and higher political equality, and
- One results oriented – responsiveness, understood as citizens perception regarding the degree of compatibility between their normative expectations and the policies promoted by those elected. (Diamond and Morlino 2005, XII)

Now, let us see if these dimensions of the quality of democracy find themselves in the political life in Republic of Moldova.

Post-communist transition has produced different results than in countries of the former socialist bloc. Ex-soviet republic, unlike countries from Central and Eastern Europe, did not register too many successes in the area of quality democracy. Compared to Baltics states, other ex-soviet

democracy), Revista Romana de Stiinte Politice (Romanian Journals of Political Science), vol. 2, nr. 1, April 2002, Societatea Academica Româna (Romanian Academic Society).

republic still conform difficulties in applying democratic rules and norms, in organizing the political process. The majority of former non-European republics of SU, practically, have rejected the democratic ideals, their elites being actively involved in building authoritarian regimes.

What happens today in the European republics of former SU – the so-called occidental states of CIS – also raises concerns among the adepts of democratic development. Russian Federation and Ukraine – the two biggest republics from demographic point of view and economic development – provide uncertain results regarding the acceptance and implementation of democratic principles. The events that took place in these countries signal growing differences in their development paths. While the events of the so-called ‘orange revolution’ in Ukraine marked the beginning of a new period, for which a high degree of openness and pluralism is characteristic, while in Russia last years were characterized by the decrease of possibilities for political competition and civic participation⁶. As for Belarus, after acceding to power of the president A. Lukašenko, initiated in a straightforward way the development of a authoritarian personalist regime, which duration is hard to define. (Korosteleva; Lawson and Marsh 2003)

With these failed or un-finalized transition processes on the background, the experience of Moldova in the democracy sphere deserves a relatively positive appreciation. Looking at an index widely used, and often criticized – the degree of political freedom, developed by the international organization “Freedom House” –, the successes of the democratic transformations in the Republic of Moldova, starting mid-90s were more

⁶ Processes of post-communist transformations in Russia and Ukraine were extensively studied in the academic literature. For example: M. Steven Fish. *Democracy derailed in Russia: the failure of open politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005; Timothy J. Colton and Michael McFaul. *Popular Choice and Managed Democracy: The Russian Elections of 1999 and 2000*, Washington D.C.: Bookings Institutions Press, 2003; Paul D’Anieri. *Understanding Ukrainian Politics: Power, Politics and Institutional Design*, M.E. Sharpe, 2006.

significant than in the other former soviet states, except the Baltic states. (Freedom House 2005) The relatively positive political climate in Moldova contrasted, especially, with the severe worsening of ensuring respect of political rights in Russia and with the stagnation in the democratic development of Ukraine, during Kucima leadership. It is true though that today, despite the war in Eastern Ukraine, tacitly supported by Russia, democracy has considerably advanced in Ukraine. Compared to other post-soviet countries, Moldova has considerably advanced also according to another quantitative index estimating the progress in democratic consolidation: the frequency and mode for rotation of executive power⁷ Moldova is the first of western states of CIS, where the president changed several times and this change took place in a peaceful manner, respecting all procedures (despite that fact that the procedure itself was modified before presidential elections in 2001). Academic research, based on qualitative indexes, as well as different reports of international organizations that are active in the post-soviet area, confirm the thesis that Moldova has achieved better results than other post-soviet countries. (OSCE Election Report 2003, Way 2003, 454-482) Of course, one does not need to overestimate Moldova's successes in strengthening democratic governance. Problems of democracy in Moldova are obvious for any attentive observer and scientists gave sufficient time to analyse these issues⁸. Still, it is necessary to underline and to explain this relative success in the political transformation of Moldova. Moreover, it is necessary to take into account that the political transformation represent a phenomenon conceptually different from the economic transformation, although both are

⁷ This indicator of democratic consolidation success is used, for example, in Power, Timothy J. Gasiorowski, Mark. (1994). „Institutional and Democratic Consolidation in the Third World”, *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 123-155.

⁸ See for example, the chapters dedicated to the themes of political process problems and changes in the civil society in Ann Lewis. *The EU & Moldova: on a fault line of Europe*, London: Federal Trust for Educations and Research, 2004

inter-linked at multiple levels (economic transformation is a feature more problematic of post-communist transformation in Moldova). The fact that democracy in Moldova functions relatively better than in the context of its neighbours from post-soviet space, presents in itself a set of important information that deserves a more detailed analysis and theoretical explanation.

Regarding the explanation of such a parameter of democratic transformations examined like the character of functioning of party system, one needs to mention that we cannot ignore the analysed of historical factors. The argumentation in one of the most known theoretical approaches regarding the explanation of differences in the evolution of party systems, led by Herbert Kitschelt, starts with the study of influence from pre-communist and communist inheritances. The nature of this inheritance, probably, exercises a fundamental influence on the character of relations between parties and electorate: they will develop based on ideological programme approached or client ones. The low level of economic development and of urbanization would favour, historically, the development of patron-client relations in the society. Consequently, this type of relations was transferred to other relations in the state apparatus, especially considering that the state was late with the professionalization of its bureaucratic system⁹. (Kitschelt 1995, Kitschelt et al 1999)

Apart differences from precommunist development period, countries in the Eastern Europe have had different experiences also in the communist period. The character of communist regimes was differing depending on the degree the state bureaucracy was leg by official rules and norms, as well as the degree of acceptance of pluralism and independent civic

⁹ Example of sociological approach to the problem of influence from the heritage of social client relations can serve the work of Melanie Tatur, ed., *The making of Regions in Post-Socialist Europe-the Impact of Culture, Economic Structure and Institutions*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag fur Sozialwissenschaften/GWV Fachverlage GmbH, 2004.

activism. -Combining different features of pre-communist and communist heritage have allowed Kitschelt to elaborate a classification of communist regimes in three types: authoritarian-bureaucratic communism (Kitschelt presents as examples: Czech Republic and form RDG), communism of national conciliation (Poland and Hungary) and patrimonial communism (Romania and Bulgaria). The term 'patrimonial' is used by the author to assign that type of social relation that is characterized by a lack of clear delimitation between official relations and the non-formal ones, as well as with a lack of clear definition of the limits of empowerment of power-holders. This term is used in anthropological researches to describe society where reminiscent traditional power relations (patriarchal) were preserved¹⁰. The experience of the patrimonial communism, which is specific for Republic of Moldova, facilitates the least the development of programmatic or ideological political parties. (Kitschelt 1995) These types of historical heritage does not represent the only factor that influences the possibility of emergence of a programme-based party system.

The legislative norms and rules that regulate the functioning of new democratic institutions can be considered the key factors that influence directly the configuration of the party system and that of mutual relations between party and electors. In this context, two types of norms are especially important: the electoral system and the principle of organization of executive power. Generally, the proportional electoral system has the tendency to depersonalize the political process and to favour crystallization of ideological political parties, while the majority system, especially in transition context, blocks both processes. The existence of a presidential institution with large attributes assigned by the Constitution has as well the tendency to hinder the development of the party systems. The

¹⁰ Vezi: M.H. Афанасьев, Клиентализм и Российская Государственность (Москва: Московский общественный научный фонд, 2000).

parliamentary model of organizing the executive power supposes government dependency to the parliament and facilitates the relatively rapid emancipation of parties; tasking them with the responsibility for creating the executive power and maintaining its functioning capacity.

The institutional option, made by the elites of the Republic of Moldova at the beginning of the transition period, created premises for establishing programmatic relations between parties and voters. Both the scrutiny model, and the form of the executive power as outlined in constitutional acts, are favourable to strengthening the primordial role of the parties in the political process and to fortifying the programmatic aspect of party relations with voters. Parties hold real control on the persons who reach in the parliament, who hold function in the executive power's bodies and form the government, as well as on the whole duration of the government mandate. All these features are a proof that during post-communist transformations, parties in Moldova have become main actors of the political processes in the society earlier than this happened in Ukraine and in the Russian Federation, for example.

In this way, in the case of Moldova, structural features of pre-communist and communist heritage and post-communist institutional reforms give a different impulse to the development of party systems. This heritage (due to which Moldova is placed in the group of countries with unfavourable characteristics) hinders the development of programmatic party systems, while institutional innovations, on the contrary, favour it. However, the quality of democracy in the Republic of Moldova has many deficiencies. Many things are initiated and are not finalized. The impression of miming Europeanization persists.

From 5 April 2009, a new phase in the evolution of democracy in the Republic of Moldova starts. After two consecutive mandates, the communists with 60 mandates win again the parliamentary elections,

insufficient to vote for the president of the republic. The opposition contested seriously this scrutiny, initiating youth protests in the main square – of the Big National Assembly. During repeated parliamentary elections on 29 July 2009, the opposition managed to get 53 mandates, versus only 48 for the communist party; and this because the former speaker of the Parliament, Marian Lupu left from the communist party to the democratic one. The Alliance for European Integration (AIE1) was created and for the first time in the last eight years, the communist party had to go in opposition.

The communist were a harsh opposition, sometimes even obstructionist, which resulted in prolonging the impossibility of electing the chief of state by the Parliament. In September 2010, because of weak vote turn out, a referendum for direct election of the president failed, and the electorate was convoked again to ballots for the second round of repeated parliamentary elections, on 28 November 2010, when AIE parties, balloting separately received 59 mandates versus 42 for communist party.

The AIE-2 government was created and it looked like things are moving in the right direction. However, members of the parliament started to flee the communist party, creating under the leadership of Igor Dodon a distinct fraction in the parliament, that later adhered to the Socialist Party. This group contributed in March 2012 to the election of Nicolae Timofti, a magistrate without political affiliation, as president of the Republic of Moldova. However, once the challenge that placed the country in constitutional vacuum for three years was overcome, the relations between the three parties in power started to deteriorate irrevocably. It looks like the main reason was the conflict from the Prime-Minister Filat and the Prime-Deputy Speaker of the Parliament, the magnate Vladimir Plahotniuc from the Democratic Party. Plahotniuc's ambitions, the owner, among others, of an influential media trust, confronted to the coercive, partially authoritarian

style of the premier Filat. The conflict polarized the coalition, with the Liberal-Democratic party on one side and the Democratic Party, and the Liberal Party on the other one. The conflict exploded virulently further to the mysterious death of a young man during a hunting on the 23 December 2012 in the Padurea Domneasca (national reservation), where many officials participated, among which the Prosecutor General, Valeriu Zubco. The lack of transparency of the investigation and involvement of key politicians in the judicial sector offered a good reason for mutual accusations. The conflict Filat – Plahotniuc worsened and the Communist Party benefited to create a conjectural alliance with LDP and to dismiss the first-deputy speaker Parliament Plahotniuc. The political revenge was not late: DPM declared war to the premier Filat, who on his turn announced the withdrawal of the LDPM from the AIE. The Communist party profited, and immediately turned against Filat's party, suggesting a vote of censure to the Government that was supported by DPM parliamentarians. The vote of censure is the result of dissolving the ruling coalition – the Alliance for European Integration created by the LDPM, DPM and LP.

The falling of Filat government further to a vote of censure puts an end to a surreal period of four years in the history of Moldovan democracy. The above radiography of the political life of the country, unfortunately, proves once again the superficiality of implanting democracy here.

This is how the AIE was destroyed, while it had a legitimate goal, declared by its meaning, and that failed lamentably since it did not ever function as a coalition, but only as a governance divided in three, just like in a famous fable where three animals pursue three different directions (Racul, Broasca si o Stiuca). It is not the first time when a coalition government fails in the Republic of Moldova: this is how the Alliance for Democracy and Reforms ended in 1998 -1999, opening the way to the communist governance during 2001-2009.

After elections from November 2014, long negotiations were held for the creation of a new pro-European government, but in the end we ended up with a minority alliance- the Political Alliance for a European Moldova (PAEM) between the LDPM and DPM. In the alliance agreement, the parties assume responsibility for reforming the prosecution, this being an ‘immediate priority’ for PAEM that promises to ask the support of a EU mission in the area of justice. Moreover, the two parties engage to ‘apply’ and to ‘respect’ the stages for implementing the Association Agenda and the EU- Government of Moldova Association Agreement, to fight corruption, including by depoliticizing law institutions etc. (Kitschelt 1995) Though, there are very few political analysis in Chisinau, who would believe these promises.

Corruption is the main impediment in the way of country Europeanization. Fighting corruption is the main expectation of people in the Republic of Moldova – expectation to which the power-holders are obliged to respond in a firm, positive way, with no hesitation. “The requests from the Europeans have sent a clear message: the fight with corruption in the Republic of Moldova becomes another “political criteria” in Chisinau’s European path”, mentioned the director of the Institute of Political Science and International Relations of the Romanian Academy, Dan Dungaciu¹¹.

Europe waits for reforms from Chisinau. Some of them were initiated, but all of them need to be finalized. There is no other way. About this mentioned at the beginning of February 2015, the head of the EU Delegation in the Republic of Moldova Pirkka Tapiola. “We need to focus now on implementing reforms, there are many things to be finalized for this agreement to be viable – said Tapiola. -The quality of democracy and of reforms in Moldova will determine its relation with the EU. Therefore, let

¹¹ www.dw.de/pldm-și-pdm-și-au-împărțit-funcțiile-pl-a.../a-18215253

us focus on doing these reforms”¹². According to Tapiola, the Republic of Moldova has biggest arrears in implementing reforms in the judiciary sector, banking system, but also to combatting corruption¹³.

In conclusion, we can mention that as long as the dimensions of the quality democracy are not reflected in the political life of the Republic of Moldova, there will be stagnation concerning the Europeanization. Europeanization is a very complicated process, but it is not impossible. Considering the geopolitical context, political parties from the Republic of Moldova need to show political will for the implementation of the Association Agenda and of the Association Agreement between Republic of Moldova and the European Union.

¹² *Ibidem.*

¹³ www.publika.md/pirkka-tapiola--despre-reformele-din-moldova-si-cerere.

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The EU Seen as the Other in the UK

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Abstract. *In the context of a “shaking Europe”, the Euroskeptical voice sounds more loudly than ever. Known as a highly Euroskeptical member, the United Kingdom, through the lens of the rising political power of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), doubts the European Union’s plan regarding a strong and prosperous Union and it sees itself better off out of the Union after more than 40 years of rather tensed membership. This article tackles the UK’s Euroskepticism in the light of the UK-EU membership referendum in 2016, also known as Brexit.*

Keywords: *Euroskepticism, UKIP, United Kingdom, Brexit, UK-EU membership.*

I. The Rise of Euroskepticism in Europe

The term “Euroskepticism” first appeared on November 11, 1985, in the British newspaper, *The Times*, to describe a skeptic opposition towards the European Union and its policies. (Apodaca, 2015)

Once seen as a British virus, Euroskepticism is now spread all over the continent. Being associated with the idea of disagreement regarding the

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goals of the European project, radical Euroskeptics are frightened not only of the economic effects concerning EU enlargement, but also to a great extent, of national sovereignty for the states that decide or have decided to enter the European area. (Condruz-Băcescu, 2014)

The causes of Euroskepticism and the groups of Euroskeptics are very diverse. Firstly, there are those citizens who are inherently skeptical of the EU, perceiving it as a threat to national self-determination and a violation of state sovereignty. In the United Kingdom, a lot of people seem to belong to this group, perceiving continental Europe as something else, both culturally and historically.

Secondly, a common voiced concern is the loss of identity as the fear of pan-European identity suffocating the national identity seems to frighten people. Linked to the loss of identity is the free of labor and the immigration policies of the old member states – new immigrants and laborers from Eastern Europe will impact the Dutch, French and German cultural traditions.

Thirdly, the groups of disappointed citizens from the new member states that hoped to see the benefits of EU subsidies quickly, and who imagined a rapid leap towards Western European standards of wealth.

Moreover, in the last decade, namely since the first signs of economic instability in 2008, trust in the European Union has fallen dramatically, dividing the European countries between debtors and creditors, depending on the country of origin.

Citizens in creditor countries have become more and more repellant to taking responsibility for the debts of others without having mechanisms for controlling their spending. With the fiscal compact and demands by the European Central Bank for comprehensive domestic reforms, Eurocrats have seemingly crossed many of the red lines of national sovereignty, extending their reach way beyond food safety standards to exert control

over pensions, taxes, salaries, the labor market and public jobs. These areas go to the heart of welfare states and national identities. (Torreblanca and Leonard, 2013)

The depth of the economic crisis, exemplified by Greece, has brought instability and it seriously threatens the survival of the EU. The insecurity felt in the European Union is a problem that indeed affects its image. Within the European Union, Europeans' fears are linked to the changes in unemployment and general economic insecurity. Europeans feel victims of unfair policies, and the responsibility of this situation belongs to their state union. (Condruz-Băcescu, 2014)

All these struggles, together with the lack of visible improvements caused a massive decline of confidence in the European Union as an institution and its ability to achieve objectives.

This Euroskeptic portrait has been confirmed following the 2014 European Parliament elections. The collective success of the UK Independence Party (hereinafter as UKIP) and of other Euroskeptic and anti-establishment parties have heightened the concerns about the future of the European integration and, implicitly, of the European Union. The Economist wrote an article with the headline "The Eurosceptic Union" (The Economist, 2014) on that the anti-establishment parties had received a quarter of the vote or more in member states such as Greece, Italy, Denmark and France, as well as Britain. Among the parties of Euroskeptic grouping there are the aforementioned UKIP, *Front National* (in France), *Lega Nord* (in Italy) and *Golden Dawn* (in Greece).

In the case of the United Kingdom – the country to be analyzed in this article, it stands as a world power and, as such, it continues to look for recognition while maintaining a distinct identity and status, which includes a special relationship with the United States. Euroskeptic views in the UK question and reject the idea of a political union among the member states of

the EU and they stand against further political integration.

Euroskeptic views defend the exceptional and unique character of Britishness; this refers to the identity of the nation and its sense of forming a distinct community. In some instances, Euroskepticism is a response to “too much” diversity; an attempt to control political change, to preserve the past and protect a way of life that is fading away (Guibernau, 2016).

II. The UK as Euroskeptic Member

Britishness Seen from Within and from Without

World politics and international relations taught us that every country has a certain idea of its role in the world, an idea that shapes its identity and the way it sees itself in relation to other countries. There is no doubt that the historical epoch of the British Empire has significantly influenced the way the British political elite sees the position of the country in Europe. Throughout time, the British Empire had colonies on every continent and in all the oceans, which later on became independent. In the mid-20th century, the British Commonwealth was created - a voluntary intergovernmental association mostly composed of the former colonies of the Empire. All of the subordinate territories are now independent states with sovereign governments, but they all more or less remain symbolically loyal to the British Crown. Hence, Britain shaped the history of the world for over three centuries, and it comes as no surprise that many British politicians and a large part of its population still feel somewhat superior to the other European countries.

Indeed, Britain’s history has been very different to that of most continental powers. Its colonies, trade, investments and patterns of emigration and immigration have been focused on North and South America, Africa and Asia as much as on Europe. Although Britain has been involved in countless European wars, its history has been more oriented to

other continents than that of any continental power. (Grant, 2008) This had an important impact on how UK perceives the Union, as the British historian Vernon Bogdanor points out “for centuries, we lived in splendid isolation, protected by the Navy and the Empire... Now, of course, that period of isolation has long gone, but perhaps it still retains some of its impact upon the British people, who do not want ties with the Continent.” (Bogdanor, 2013)

The British have never been terribly popular members of the European Union. Long before they joined, many continentals thought them too different to be constructive members of what was then the European Economic Community (EEC). In January 1963, General de Gaulle held a press conference to set out his reasons for vetoing UK’s application for membership. Some may still resonate today: “England in effect is insular, she is maritime, she is linked through her exchanges, her markets, her supply lines to the most diverse and often the most distant countries; she pursues essentially industrial and commercial activities, and only slight agricultural ones. She has in all her doings very marked and very original habits and traditions... In short, the nature, the structure, the very situation [conjuncture] that are England’s differ profoundly from those of the continentals. What is to be done in order that England, as she lives, produces and trades, can be incorporated into the Common Market, as it has been conceived and as it functions?” (De Gaulle, 1963)

The UK’s Rocky Relationship with Europe: A Short Incursion into History

The formation of the European Union had its origins following the Second World War, in the desire to tie Europe’s nations so closely together that war will no longer bring such damage on each other. Winston Churchill was the one who fully supported this idea, proposing for Europe

“a structure under which it can dwell in peace, in safety and in freedom (...) a kind of United States of Europe”. (Churchill, 1946)

Britain did not partake in the founding of the EU. The founding club of states established basic rules that cannot easily be changed, and thus members who join later will very often encounter difficulties to adapt to the rules already in place.

However, Britain had a couple of opportunities to participate, but it decided to stay on the sidelines. The first step towards creating a federal Europe was made in the 1950s, when negotiations over the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community began. The Labour Government of Clement Attlee was invited to take part but officially declined the offer. Later, when the ECSC was put in place, the six founding countries wanted to extend the common market for coal and steel into a general common market. In 1957, the Treaty of the European Community (also known as the Treaty of Rome) was signed, which led to the creation of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. This was a very important event in the formation of the modern European Community, but the Conservative Government of Anthony Eden did not recognize its importance and refused to sign the treaty.

Jean Monnet, one of the architects of the ECSC, said “I never understood why the British did not join. I came to the conclusion that it must have been because it was the price of victory – the illusion that you could maintain what you had, without change.” (Wilson, 2014)

In the aftermath of the treaty, the six EEC members flourished economically whereas Britain suffered continuous economic decline. In 1961, the Conservative Government, led by Harold Macmillan, launched the idea of opening negotiation for admission to the EU but it was vetoed by the French President Charles de Gaulle. He argued that their strong link to the USA as well as the British Commonwealth could hinder the British in

their dedication to the EEC. In 1967, the Labour Government, led by Harold Wilson filed another application but the De Gaulle rejected it once again. Two years later, the new French President Georges Pompidou removed the veto and finally in 1973, the UK, led by the Europe-oriented Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath, joined the EEC.

At the time, the Labour party was opposed to the EEC and promised to hold a referendum on withdrawal if they came into power. In 1975 the Labour Government, led by Harold Wilson, kept its word and held a referendum. However, in June 1975, 67% of voters agreed on continuing the membership in the EEC.

In 1979, Margaret Thatcher was appointed Prime Minister. The Iron Lady is often referred to as being Euroskeptic as she openly expressed her very negative attitude towards the EEC. The period of her service was marked by an increasing political isolation of Britain from Europe. She was ardently against complete economic, political and social integration. Her Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Geoffrey Howe, argued that Britain contributed much more to the European budget than the other countries. In response, in 1984 Margaret Thatcher's government negotiated a rebate on the British contribution, and thus received some of its money back. The main reason for this was the fact that a great share of the European budget is spent on the Common Agricultural Policy and since farming does not represent a major sector in the UK economy, Britain felt that it benefited much less than other countries.

Moreover, for Margaret Thatcher, Britain was losing its independence and sovereignty by transferring the power of decision-making to Brussels. In her "Bruges Speech" in 1988, she stated that "to try to suppress nationhood and concentrate power at the centre of a European conglomerate would be highly damaging and would jeopardize the objectives we seek to achieve (...) Working more closely together does not

require power to be centralized in Brussels or decisions to be taken by an appointed bureaucracy.” (Thatcher, 1988)

However, Margaret Thatcher had been unable to stop Europe’s march towards political union, and was gone by the time the Maastricht Treaty was signed by her successor John Major in 1992. This involved huge transfers of power to the new European Union. Britain secured opt-outs from the single currency and the social policy chapter. But to the treaty’s critics – including many Tory rebels – it undermined the British tradition of the inviolable sovereignty of parliament. (Wilson, 2014)

The Rise of UKIP

UKIP’s origins trace back to 1993, when Alan Sked established the Anti-Federalist League, which campaigned against the Treaty of Maastricht. Currently led by Nigel Farage, who has been an insider since the party’s foundation, it distinguishes itself as the British party calling simply and directly for UK withdrawal from the European Union. UKIP is situated on the center-right of the political spectrum, and the party states that it is a patriotic party. (Hope, 2014) Patriotism in this context, this should be understood as proudness of Britain and its current standing, and firmly believing in the country being better off without the EU. (Vuorinen, 2015)

UKIP’s success was not obtained overnight. Small parties, as it was the case of UKIP in the 1990s, have the habit of disintegrating into internal warfare or being wiped out by unexpected changes of the electoral system and political fashion. But UKIP managed to keep on its own track and defy the predictions of those who did not take them into consideration. (Hunt, 2014)

After many years in which UKIP almost did not matter on the British political stage, but with an increasing influence among its citizens year by year, the party managed to achieve its first seats from the European Parliament in 1999, when three Members of the European Parliament were

elected. In 2004 EU-elections UKIP performed very well, as the party 12 seats (16% of the votes) from the European Parliament. In 2009, the party came second in the EU-elections in the UK winning 13 seats (16.5% of votes). On the following round in 2014, UKIP, against all odds, beat the current governmental parties, the Conservatives and Labour, winning 27.5% of votes. UKIP's success has steadily grown, as time by time, the party has increased its number of seats in the European Parliament (Hunt, 2014). These electoral outcomes undeniably underline the "rise" of the party; consequently, UKIP is Britain's most prosperous single-issue party.

Nowadays, most of the UKIP's actions are largely centered on Nigel Farage, who is the most known figure of the party. In an interview conducted by Catherine Dalton, Farage is characterized as being polite, yet persuasive character. It seems that Farage's dauntless style and personality bisect people, and he is either loved or hated (Dalton, 2013). His colorful and verbally rich speeches are made well known by the media: he has insulted German chancellor Angela Merkel saying that "she is incredibly cold. I always say – I agree this is a bit rude – but whatever you think of the public image of Merkel, in private she is even more miserable. I warm to more extrovert people." (The Guardian, 2014) As concerns the former President of the European Council - Herman van Rompuy -, Farage declared that he "has the charisma of a damp rag and the appearance of a low-grade bank clerk." (The Guardian, 2010) Farage's comments in the media are generally rather witty and drastic, but it should arguably be seen as part of his public character.

Some of Farage's comments on the EU are indeed very harsh. During a European Council meeting held in Strasbourg on November 24, 2010, Nigel Farage said that "we don't want that flag. We don't want the anthem. We don't want this political class. We want the whole thing consigned to the dustbin of history." He had also a few comments for the

Eurocrats saying that “your obsession with creating this Euro state means that you’re happy to destroy democracy. You appear to be happy for millions and millions of people to be unemployed and to be poor. Untold millions must suffer so that your Euro dream can continue.” (Farage, 2010)

During the various occasions when they have the chance to speak, UKIP members actively highlight the EU-memberships costs to Britain, and offers alternatives as though what an independent Britain would look like. They argue that Britain would save £55 million of membership fees daily, if UK withdraws. UKIP manifestos feature a large variety of policies, but everything is centered on Euroskepticism. UKIP had come up in 2015 with tougher policies regarding various issues, three of them being considered as highly important: immigration, NHS (National Health Service) and the economy.

Immigration is seen by UKIP as being far too high, seeing that “seven million immigrants came to live in Britain under the last Labour government and another two million have arrived under the Tories” (UKIP, 2015a). UKIP demands that border control must be completely return to Britain, and immigrants entering the UK must be financially independent for five years. Within these five years, immigrants are not allowed to use the services of the private sector. For these reasons, UKIP promises to “set out in full how we would aim to reduce migration, guarantee border security, accommodate sensible numbers of foreign students, protect asylum seekers, and make sure new migrants do not place undue pressure on our NHS”. (The Telegraph, 2015) On the matters of social benefits and other civil assistance, these are to be awarded for British citizens only, or to people who have stayed in the UK for five or more consecutive years. Child benefits will only be paid for children who are UK-citizens, and live in the country for good.

These exacerbated tensions and pressures coming from UKIP has been felt by the ruling Conservatives, with Prime Minister David Cameron promising to renegotiate Britain's role in Europe and hold an "in-out" referendum on EU membership in the next Parliament, if his party won the majority at the 2015 Parliamentary elections – which, against all expectations, he did. (Mason, 2014)

Later on, David Cameron has called for this (second) referendum on Britain's membership of the EU to take place on June 23, 2016. The implications of this referendum – the UK outside the EU and the EU without UK – are to be presented in the next section of this article.

All things considered, UKIP nowadays portrays itself as a significant minor party with over 35,000 members (UKIP, 2015b). The rise of the party has been noteworthy, and UKIP can now safely be considered as a true, political force that can conveniently challenge the current governmental parties. The success of UKIP attracted broad attention, widely taken as evidence of a wave of public Euroskepticism across the continent.

III. Brexit 2016: The UK without the EU and Vice Versa

As it is very difficult to predict how will the picture of the UK look like after a possible Brexit, the arguments of both sides – "remain" and "leave" – will be presented in this section. Several fields will be taken into consideration in order to depict this picture: trade, immigration, international influence and the identity conflict between British and European.

Trade

The discussions on the UK trade with Europe and with other international actors are very diverse when it comes to perceive them

through the lens of Brexit. On one side of the spectrum, there is the pro-Europe thinktank, the Centre for European Reform (CER) that says that on its own, the UK would have much less bargaining power than being part of the EU (CER, 2014), while on the other side, there is the Euroskeptic Bruges Group saying that Britain will be able to negotiate with other international trade actors without being encumbered by the differing interests of other EU nations that often have different outlook to the UK (Myddelton, 2013).

The EU's single market employs several tools to boost trade among EU countries. First, it eliminates tariffs on goods. Second, it establishes the right of companies and people to sell their goods, services or labor, or to invest in other member states. Third, it reduces the cost of potential exporters having to comply with 28 different national rules. Thus, the EU creates regulatory standards, and then requires all member states to allow goods that comply with those standards to be sold unhindered across the single market. (European Commission, 2012)

However, one of the chief reasons why UK wants to leave the EU is that it wants to conclude its own agreements with other international trade actors like China, Brazil, Japan and India, but the EU regulation hinders it to do so. CER writes that the EU has a "plethora" of foreign trade agreements with third countries and a complex system of unilateral trade preferences and if Britain leaves, it will not inherit the EU's bilateral trade agreements; it will have to renegotiate trade agreements with non-European countries from scratch. Renegotiating these would be far from straightforward. The process would be time-consuming, leaving Britain's exporters facing higher barriers to trade and uncertainty over market access, which would reduce investment (CER, 2014).

The Bruges Group is for the UK to leave the EU saying that less than 10% of the British economy is involved with trade with the EU yet 100%

of the economy is hamstrung by excessive EU regulations which disproportionately harm small and medium sized enterprises (Myddelton, 2013). Outside of the EU, Britain can retake its seat on the World Trade Organization and negotiate according to its best interests instead of being represented by an EU trade commissioner who is currently from Belgium. Britain will then be able to negotiate without being encumbered by the differing interests of other EU nations that often have different outlook to the UK (Myddelton, 2013).

Immigration

Immigration is a disputed political issue in the UK both because the costs and benefits are not distributed evenly and as perceptions have become disconnected with reality, partly due to hostile media coverage (Irwin, 2015).

The free movement of people – one of the “four freedoms” of goods, capital, services and labor – is a fundamental principle of the EU’s single market. Member states open their labor markets to immigrants, knowing that the others will do the same. However, since the EU’s enlargement to the East in 2004, many Britons feel that the reciprocal arrangement has broken down: free movement is no longer perceived to be an arrangement that works for the mutual benefit of both Britons and other Europeans. (CER, 2013)

UKIP wants to see a work permit system introduced, so that EU nationals would face the same visa restrictions as those from outside the EU, which it says would reduce migration numbers. This would create job opportunities for British workers and boost wages, as well as easing pressure on schools, hospitals and other public services.

According to CER, there are many high-skilled European immigrants in the UK, who raise British workers’ productivity and hence their wages.

EU immigration is good for the public finances, as immigrants pay more in taxes than they receive in public spending. There are some costs that arise from higher demand for housing and public services, but current levels of immigration help Britain to deal with the costs of an ageing population, by replacing retiring workers and by raising more taxes to pay for health and pension costs. (CER, 2014)

If Britain left the EU, it would almost certainly reduce immigration in a period when demographic and economic changes make access to European labor a significant benefit. And it might endanger the residency rights of over one million Britons living on the continent. Ultimately, Britain must decide whether the economic benefits of free EU migration are a reason to stay in Europe.

International Influence

The UK currently enjoys considerable influence both in and through the EU. In the event of Brexit, changes will be inevitable, affecting the impact the international influence the UK and the EU will have.

Language plays a fundamental role in influencing beyond one's borders. The English language is the most commonly used language of EU institutions and in the event of Brexit it is likely that this will stay the case as English is so widely spoken and used internationally. Changing it to any other language would affect the influence the EU has on its global reach and external communication.

According to the Global Diplomatic Forum, 5% of all staff from EU institutions are British nationals, who are regarded as offering significant contribution especially to the European External Action Service. Brexit may result in loss of qualified talents for the EU institutions (Global Diplomatic Forum).

The UK has traditionally taken leadership (alongside France) in major EU negotiations and engagements with the international community, as seen with the Iranian nuclear deal and the war on terrorism. Brexit may affect the influence the EU has in major international events, given that at present there are underlying doubts and concerns over the coherence and efficiency of the European Common Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. With Brexit, the UK will lose the EU umbrella, affecting the significant leverage it has on the international scene. The UK may also lose France and Germany as major international partners in coordinating international policies (Global Diplomatic Forum).

Identity Conflict: British or European?

For some Britons, the Brexit vote is not just a vote on economic issues or on immigration, but it goes deeper than this. Their problem is that of identity, which makes them question whether they are British or European.

For a great share of the British population, it is crystal clear that the direction in which the EU is heading is that of continuing centralization of power in the EU and away from the member states, that the Eurozone accelerates its moves towards being a single European Superstate (Fiske, 2016).

While further integration seems worrying to them, the part that troubles them the most about the European project is the repeated and continuing attempts to create a “European identity”. The Leave campaigners contest what they call the focus on indoctrinating children into a European identity. This indoctrination is, they say, a great deal of EU propaganda in schools with colorful cartoon books having been distributed to primary schools for several years, all of which promote the EU.

Moreover, a legislation called “Learning EU at School” was even passed in the European Parliament (European Parliament, 2015).

The Brexiters perceive the proposals the EU is planning as frightening as it proposes to massively integrate the EU into the daily education of British children, with textbooks being rewritten to give more prominence to the EU and for children to be taught the “values on which EU integration is based”, with the aim for them to take an active interest in European Integration and to overcome Euroskepticism. Euroskeptics see this as an attempt to ensure that their children grow up feeling more European than they do British. Thus, the message of the Leave campaign is that of a Britain that is not only independent, but a Great Britain which is proud of retaining its own sense of national identity (Fiske, 2016).

Conclusions

The implications of Brexit are major. In a world in which Europe’s demographic, economic, financial, military and diplomatic weight is already in a certain decline, it would lose its second-most populous member, its second-largest economy and its principal military power. Brexit would alarm the EU’s allies around the world, led by the U.S., which is unequivocal in its support for continued U.K. membership of the EU. But it would comfort the EU’s rivals, first and foremost Vladimir Putin’s Russia.

Brexit would also represent the most tangible manifestation of European disintegration. It would strengthen the already strong and growing tendencies in the EU and risk unleashing a chain-reaction that would culminate in other member states deciding to leave. At the end of this road could lie, in the worst case scenario, the collapse of the Euro, the fragmentation of the European market, a much weaker Europe in the world, and less peaceful international relations in Europe.

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**Social Contract and State Sovereignty: Crisis, Regional
Autonomy and Integration.**

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Abstract: *Far from being something foreign and new to its historical record, migration is a phenomenon that would appear to lie at the very roots of European civilization. The briefest scrutiny of the continent's past will clearly highlight to all but the most unheeding, that ours is a history of migrations, of successive waves of migrations and invasions, coming from the North, from the East as well as from the South. Only the wideness and depth of the Atlantic Ocean seems to have prevented any meaningful Western wave of migration, or invasion of Europe.*

Key words: *autonomy Europe, regionalism, social contract, state sovereignty*

It would appear that coupled to the continent's capacity to assimilate those who seek it, for whatever reason, migrations lie at the very heart of European identity – as well as at the roots of the continent's historical capacity for growth and worldwide projection. This is a trait that seems to accompany European history and civilization from the very dawn of history – and which the mythological narratives of the continent's origin capture with crystal clarity. Is not Europe, herself, a migrant, and a forced one at

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that – Europe, the mythological Asian princess, who was kidnapped by the father of the gods and forcefully brought to Europe, the continent, where, continuing to follow the myth, she would give birth to the first Europeans? And was not Cadmos, her brother, also a migrant? Cadmos, who, in obedience to the oracle, to search for Europe, her sister, took a cow for a guide, following it until its death. Setting camp there, then getting another cow and following it until it too dropped dead, and setting camp again at that site, only to repeat the process, roaming, in the process, the entire Mediterranean basin and yet, never finding his sister. And, as the great XX century Europeanist, Denis de Rougemont liked to underline, was it not in such a migrant fashion that, while searching for Europe, his sister, Cadmos ended up peopling the continent through the establishment of its major Mediterranean cities and, therefore, creating Europe, the continent? And, in close parallel to the Greek myths, doesn't the Jewish narrative inform us that it is an Asian, originally from Ur, in Chaldea, present day Iraq, who is the founding father of all the monotheistic believers – including the Europeans, of course? And, does not the *Old Testament* tell us of Japhet, one of Noah's three sons, who after the flood would inherit Europe – a task, however, that he would complete by *inhabiting* the tents of his brother Sem, who ended up with Asia, and *dilating* them westwards?

According to the Greek myth, Europe, the continent, first emerges on the world stage in a dream of Europe, the Phoenician princess, the night before she is kidnapped. And there, while Asia, the homeland of Europe, the princess, is identified by name, Europe, the continent, is not, but referred to only as *the land that lies in the face of Asia*. So much so that, without material content, without an identity of its own, without even a name, Europe, the continent, so the myth tells us, will receive shape and form from the more or less willing migrants that will reach it coming from the East. Europe's civilizational blankness makes it a sort of *tabula rasa*, as

the empirical tradition will propose, upon which it will be possible to imprint and give new dimensions to the civilization matrix arising from outside, from the East. Likewise, the Jewish narrative tells a similar story. Cleansed by the great flood, Europe became a great big blank slate: an empty and yet fertile field, ready to receive the civilization that had emerged in the East – a civilization that, in the new, European, environment, would surpass anything that the ancestral East had been able to produce. Without *tents* of his own, the Jewish text seems to suggest, Japhet will *inhabit* those of his brother, Sem. And he will take them with him when it became time to claim his inheritance, Europe. There he would *dilate* the Asian tents borrowed from his brother and imprint upon them a projection they had never known in their original Asian homeland.

Starting with these mythological narratives, one could even draw the history of Europe from that of the successive waves of migrations and invasions that have swept the continent throughout the centuries – from its mythological origins all the way to the present.

I still recall, as a boy born and raised in an island in the middle of the Atlantic ocean, going to the coastline after a storm, to search for the treasure the waves had left behind while rolling back (all kinds of interesting stuff which the centuries have taught insular and maritime peoples to treasure: woods, buoys, navigational apparatus, etc.). So too the waves of migrations and invasions that have swept Europe in more or less systematic fashion, could not, like their oceanic counterparts, fail to leave behind their civilizational fingerprint in a plurality of dimensions: linguistic, cultural, social, architectural, moral, juridical, etc.

Furthermore, it would appear that far from representing threats, these migrations have been instrumental, not only to the emergence of a European identity and civilization, but also to the richness and success they

have presented worldwide. That, after all, is the basic lesson of the mythological narratives.

It would be with the dawn of modernity that, under the spell of the modern idea of the State, this historical characteristic of Europe would be substantially altered. Change can, of course, be traced to earlier times, to the purges of minorities, including the persecution, forced conversion, expulsion and ultimately the holocaust of Jews, for example. Yet, it would be modernity and its ideal of national sovereignty that would entail a radical break with this historical dimension of European identity.

As a matter of fact, the themes of multiculturalism and interculturality emerged in the contemporary West, precisely because, up to now, the modern sovereign State had no place for them. Under the narrative proposed by the social contract theory that anchors the discourse of sovereignty, modernity only has space for monoculturalism: each State, its culture – that which it is capable of producing and imposing upon all those who live within its borders and, therefore, find themselves under its political reach. From Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, at the dawn of modernity, up to John Rawls, already in the second half of the twentieth century, the social contract theory proposes, eloquently the reduction, within each State, of plurality to singularity.

In a nutshell, contrary to the kaleidoscope of social and political organizations that made for the rich and multifaceted tessitura of medieval life, the modern sovereign State possesses, by definition, a structurally unitary character which, so the social contract narrative goes on to explain, ensues from an inter-related double process.

In a preliminary moment, it is necessary to establish who are to be the parties to the contract, and to strictly delimitate them from all others. Once that is established, they are to take possession of a certain territory, which they henceforth call their own, strictly delimitating it with

impermeable and impenetrable frontiers. From the identification of who are going to be the contractors, and, therefore, the members of the future sovereign state, its citizens, and their effective delimitation from all the rest of mankind, the foreigners, it is possible to initiate the negotiations without risk of contamination. These, however, are not to be just any negotiations, possessing, instead, a very peculiar character.

In a first moment, it is necessary that each of the parties to the social contract – i.e., all those who find themselves within the frontiers of what is to become the State – while holding on to the specific features that characterize them as the concrete *private* persons that they are, abdicate, and transfer to the State, one after the other, any and all *public* identities, privileges, powers and rights that they may possess. So much so that, at the close of the first part of the social contract, even as the parties hold on to their *private* ascriptive identification markers that characterize them as the concrete persons that they are (with regard to sex, skin pigmentation, height, weight, eye color, degree of beauty, intelligence, etc), they find themselves utterly stripped of *public* characteristics (including rights, duties, privileges or prerogatives).

That is how at the end of the first phase of the social contract it becomes possible to witness the emergence of two new entities. On the one hand, the parties to the contract, installed within the frontiers erected to delimitate the territory upon which they are to live and which they call their own. They are entities of a rather peculiar type for, while remaining the concrete *private* person that each one is, at the *public*, political, level, they were left wiped clean by the social contract, becoming, therefore, entirely destitute of political identity and rights. Or, as John Rawls will convoke us to think, a *veil of ignorance* must fall upon each of the parties to the social contract so that they may all become oblivious of the specific characteristics individuating each one of them, and, wiped clean of the

smallest vestige of subjectivity, so that they may emerge as purely rational contractors. Furthermore, the modern narrative requires that any and all subjective characteristics that may taint the rationality of the parties to the social contract be not only bracket or forgotten but effectively transferred to a third party, the sovereign. On the other hand, the sovereign State emerges precisely through the accumulation of the *public* characteristics, privileges, rights and powers that it receives from the parties to the social contract. Moreover, this transfer cannot be partial. In order to assure the rationality of the parties and that none cedes to the temptation of imposing himself against his fellow citizens, the sovereign needs to be able to count on the full and complete power available within its territory.

When the first stage of the social contract is terminated, it becomes possible to observe sovereignty in all of its splendor: the reunion in a single person of all the political power previously dispersed throughout the territory and the social fabric delimited by the existent frontiers. At that juncture, however, no State can yet be found. There is no political nation. There are no citizens. All that can be perceived is a mere assembly of politically amorphous individuals, of whom nothing can be predicated and who share nothing among themselves, except that they exist and that they are capable of receiving the identity, the powers and the rights that may be entrusted to them – just as nothing can be said of a blank sheet of paper, or of a blank canvas, except that it exists, and is capable of receiving the text (in verse or in prose) that may be written in it, or the painting that may be drawn in it.

The social contract introduces a thorough break with the Middle Ages, heralding a social and political framework in which the pulverization of political power among the plurality of entities that integrated and made up for the peculiarly medieval paradigm of political organization was overcome and gave way to the radically new modern unitarian conception.

The evident challenges of medieval political multiculturalism had been overcome. But only in so far as it had been raised to the ground. The project of modernity required a second step, of a constructive nature. The State, the modern nation-State had yet to be constructed – precisely by the sovereign. That is what the second part of the social contract theory explains.

According to the intuition of Thomas Hobbes, the social contract unfolds following a “resolutive-compositive” methodology. The wreckage of the resolutive moment is required in subsidiary fashion. Its interest lies in the fact that it opens the way for the sovereign to act, offering it the shapeless raw material upon which to exert its sovereign power, shaping it and furnishing it the material identity that ensues from the system of right it elects to adopt.

At the conclusion of the respective resolutive moment all social contracts produce exactly the same result: they but offer the respective sovereigns the raw matter with which to build the respective States, the blank slates upon which each may freely write what it may. Before anything is written upon them, all blank slates are exactly alike. And they all allow whoever possesses them the conditions to imprint upon them whatever he or she may will: a poem, a short story, a letter, a painting, a watercolor, or whatever he or she may fancy. Likewise, just as a blank slate offers its owner the opportunity to write, or to draw, so too the resolutive moment of the social contract opens the way to the constructive moment whereby each sovereign builds its State by offering its people a singular identity and system of right.

That is, besides, what allows for the fundamental equality of States. As sovereign they are equal in so far as each one is responsible for shaping itself and granting its people the system of right responsible for assuring the singular and unitarian *public* identity of all of its members. And that is

how the second moment of the social contract culminates with the emergence of the citizens, without whom there can, obviously, be no State. Furthermore such a *public* identity assumes two equally important dimensions. The citizens of a State, it should be underlined, are defined by the fact that they all received the same body of right, freely adopted by the respective sovereign in order to give them the shape and the identity that defines them as the concrete people that they are. Such a prerogative accomplishes, moreover, two interrelated functions.

Firstly, it elevates all citizens to equality. The double nature of the social contract assures that all citizens are utterly equal. By means of the first, resolute, moment of the social contract they all divest themselves of any traces, however slight, of a specific *public* identity and power – transferring all their possessions unto their sovereign. Moreover, because equally void of ascriptive *public* characteristics, all citizens gather the conditions that allow the sovereign to imprint upon each of them, in the compositive moment of the social contract, the exact same identity and body of right. This is the context in which, as modernity will present us, the sovereign emerges as a kind of mortal god, creator of its citizens, who, by definition are exactly alike in so far as they were equally created by it. No discrimination is possible within the sovereign state. Not among citizens. And neither can there be any special identity or interest, specific to this or that class of citizens. In a word, there can be no plurality. The sovereign State demands no less than absolute homogeneity so that, ultimately, it may possess a thorough unitary nature.

The social contract, therefore, produces two parallel effects. Firstly, among themselves, citizens constitute a body of equals in so far as they all received the very same system of right from a single sovereign. Secondly, and correlatively, members of different social contracts emerge as foreigners, radically different from each other, precisely for the reason that

they are defined by a different system of right, adopted by a different sovereign.

This is the broad conceptual framework adopted by modernity for the organization of political life across the planet. Forged in Europe, and undoubtedly at the roots of Europe's capacity to project itself across the entire planet, this conceptual framework of modernity would be claimed worldwide. So much so that, following the Two World Wars of the last century, the Earth itself ended up divided in sovereign States. This is the framework that allowed for a strictly dualist vision of the planet, integrating two types of radically different peoples: citizens and foreigners. So much so that on a *public*, political, dimension, modernity will adopt an integrated double perspective.

With the planet organized in sovereign States, and in so far as each one freely adopts the singular legal system responsible for the very definition of its citizens, there can be no multiculturalism of *public*, political, relevance within each nation-state. The fundamental equality of the citizens effectively prevents it. Correlatively, just as citizens are radically equal in so far as they all ensue from the same State that beget them all, so too foreigners are radically different in so far as they are creatures of different States. Therefore, just as within their midst, States have no place for multiculturalism, so too, across their borders there can be no common conception of humanity, of public, political relevance, that is. Domestic radical equality requires an equality radical alterity across borders. Thus the double arrangement of all social and political life adopted by modernity, in either politics or international relations.

The first of these arrangements, politics, deals with the permanent relations that a unitary body of citizens (made equal by the fact that they share a common right) freely decide to adopt. The second, international relations, deals with the conjunctural, utilitarian, relations that peoples,

radically different from each other may decide at any moment to establish so as to better gratify their national interests. As a unitary *body politic*, each sovereign State is a community of equals, whereas the international system is a complex of *foreign aliens*. The first, politics, unfolds along the values determined by the system of right freely adopted by each national constitutional tradition. The second, international relations, knows of but one measuring rod: the gratification of the interests of the sovereign States that so engage in relations with each other.

This broad conceptual proposal of modernity, however, has been eroding throughout Europe, almost from the time of its universal consolidation. Its manifest incapacity to constitute an adequate framework for the organization of social and political life has thrown the *Old Continent* into a profound structural crisis, particularly since the Two World Wars of the XX century.

The contemporary crisis, it could be argued, ensues from the fact that the social contract proposed by modernity is far from constituting an adequate narrative for the construction of our present national, and international societies. It is as if nowhere the social contract sketched above was able to reach its full completion. As if having been interrupted somewhere in its implementation process, it never assured, either the absolute *public* equality that it promised within the frontiers of each sovereign State, nor the equally radical alterity that it required across borders.

At the internal dimension of States, the crisis ensues from the plural nature of European national societies not just in *private* terms, but in *public* terms as well. And it has required no less than the transformation of the unitarian sovereign States through the recognition of political autonomy to those communities that find themselves identified by specific characteristics and interests that cannot be confined to the *private* realm of

the individuals that possess them but, instead, demand *public*, political, recognition. In a word, the crisis has required the replacement of the modern idea of *sovereignty* by the idea of *autonomy*. And regionalism is the movement that best describes this challenge to the modern idea of social contract.

In a broad stroke, the contemporary history of regional autonomy can be traced to the Aaland Islands, and to their assignment of political autonomy in the aftermath of World War I. Autonomy translates into a double recognition. Firstly, that, instead of unitarian, Finland is a plural State, integrating Finns, of course, but also a community that is of Swedish language and culture. Secondly, that this plural character holds beyond the strictly *private* realm, deserving a *public*, political dimension, duly recognized and assured. The aftermath of World War II heralded similar transformations to the Danish and to the Italian States: the recognition of their plural nature, integrating individuated communities that, because of the specific characteristics that shape their identity deserve to be autonomous, to have their share of political power, so as to freely live their identity within the broad framework of the respective States. From these beginnings, the idea of regional political autonomy appears to have spread a bit throughout the entire continent, its manifest success ensuing from the evident crisis brought unto the modern sovereign State paradigm by the empowerment of the plurality of individuated regions and communities demanding recognition and autonomy.

In its external dimension, the present crisis would appear to ensue from a parallel flaw of the modern social contract. Just as, internally, the social contract was unable to lead to the transformation of all persons into blank slates upon which their respective State was then freely able to imprint its own system of right and build a community of equals, so too, externally, the radical *alterity* proposed by modernity is nowhere to be

found. In contrast to the requirements of the social contract, domestically, our societies are plural, thus the requirement of autonomy, and internationally, they share a common substrate, thus the requirement of integration, both regional, as represented in paradigmatic fashion by the European Union, and cosmopolitan, as heralded by Human Rights.

In both cases, it is the groundlessness of the modern promise of the social contract and of the idea of State sovereignty ensuing from it that is eloquently presented by the contemporary crisis. Accordingly, today, just as at the dawn of the last century, or in the aftermath of the Second World War, overcoming the crisis would not appear to point to a return to a Europe of sovereign States, to the recuperation of our old national borders, currencies, social policies and security mechanisms and, ultimately, to the conclusion of the social contracts that modernity appears to have been unable to terminate. Perhaps it would be wiser to recognize the requirements of the modern social contract paradigm, the shortcomings that it presents when confronted with our contemporary world, and to look for an alternative paradigm of social and political organization, more adequate to the challenges facing our societies, both domestically and internationally. And here the kernel and interrelated ideas of autonomy and integration appear to present a value and an interest that is far from trifling.

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CHAPTER XVIII

Media Communication and Country Image. The Case of Romania in EU

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Abstract. *Although the media, by its nature, contributes to the enhancement of individual curiosity (satisfying the human need for communication), it can also shape and influence people's perceptions about national, regional and international events. Therefore, media can emphasize, on the one hand, the elements that bind individuals and nations and create convergence and, on the other hand, can highlight the differences between people and furthermore, the negative aspects in every society.*

The image of Romanians and Romania in foreign media has clear negative aspects after the entrance of massive waves of Romanian immigrants in the European Union in the last 10-15 years, with bad consequences not only at social level, but also at cultural, economic or political levels (despite the official reactions of national authorities and EU officials).

Keywords: *communication, media, image, Romania*

Communication and media

Mass communication stands for the communication that is transmitted to large segments of population, which is achieved by using one or more media¹

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(television, radio, written press, cinema, Internet). This process of communication oriented towards very large masses of people is possible due to its systemic, industrial nature (Turow 2014, 6), which is due to the fact that a large number of companies are working together within the media industries (film, television, Internet, etc.), each being part of the production process. Horkheimer and Adorno, the representatives of Frankfurt School, are the ones who introduced the concept of *cultural industry* as an alternative to the mass communication in order to illustrate, on one hand, the industrialization process of the culture that evolves according to commercial principles and, on the other hand, the function of capitalism in manipulating the audience. (Dobrescu&Bârgăoanu&Corbu 2007, 190-191)

Media as tools of communication, mediates events and real conditions (Rayner &Wall&Kruger 2004, 47), creating a relationship with the audience. They form "content industries", aiming at reaching a wider audience through integrated communication models, standardized or interactive, promoted by giant corporations. (Hartley 2004, 142-143) Thus, the media represent a fundamental tool for the transmission of information across the Globe, allowing the establishment of relations and connections between people, companies, states or regions located in different points of the planet and at the same time, they contribute to forming and shaping of opinions and social behaviors through the function of representation they have. Given this role, we can say that media are the "knights of global communication", promoting and supporting the globalization of this sector.

This is possible due to the functions fulfilled by mass-media that allow them to form opinions and draft patterns of behavior in all fields. The media power at global level is obvious, and the connection with the structures of economic and political power stems from several reasons: (McQuail 2010, 87)

¹ Jack Lule, *Understanding Media and Culture: An Introduction to Mass Communication*, (Flatworld Press, 2012), 20, <http://2012books.lardbucket.org/pdfs/mass-communication-media-and-culture.pdf>

- each media has an economic cost, and its value is the subject of international competition for access and control;
- media is a subject of political and economic state regulations;
- media is considered an instrument of power, having the ability to influence the audience in different ways;
- the power of mass media is not equally accessible to all groups of interests.

Because of these features many large corporations want to hold and control the global media networks, to ensure their supremacy and influence on the markets and international actors.

Functions of mass-media

As a basic tool of communication, the media fulfills the following functions: information, interpretation, instruction, diversion and bonding ².

Information function responds to the need of people to satisfy their curiosity, to reduce uncertainty and to better understand how we fit into the world. Access to information allows individuals to act so as to contribute to the progress and change for a better society they live in.

Interpretation function relates to the fact that media (be it newspaper, magazine, television or any other mean), through the messages transmitted to the public, is full of subjective interpretations of the reality, depending on the author's desire or motivation or the context that generated the event. This can lead to the transmission of messages less explicit and sometimes lacking in ethics and morality, especially when media companies are controlled by certain groups of political or economic interests.

Instructive function is the one through which the media, in addition to the transmission of information, also instruct the audience (for example, through

² *A Primer on Communication Studies*, 887, <http://2012books.lardbucket.org/books/a-primer-on-communication-studies/s15-media-technology-and-communic.html>

television channels with geographical, historical, scientific or arts specific); this fact contributes to the growth and development of society.

Bonding (or socialization) function refers to the ability of media to bring people having similar values, interests and concerns closer together (the case of forums and of the groups who discuss online); it also refers to its power to gather groups of people on different events of general interest by using media – television, radio, newspapers, social networking sites.

Diversion function, whereby media gives people the opportunity to escape the day-to-day life, helps them to relax.

Media has also *the gatekeeping function*; they affect or control the information that is transmitted to their audiences. Filter role is the responsibility of the publisher, of the artists producers, of the producer or promoter of the artistic events, of the media manager or media company owner, who controls the information and is influenced by his personal ideology and values, by his culture, and also by the social and organizational factors that influence the corporation activity (news sources, advertising industry, pressure groups or authorities) (McQuail & Windahl 2004, 134-135) (Hartley 2004, 94-95) This function has four elements³:

- transmission of the message, action that uses technology and equipment that only media can access and control;

- bounding, which refers to the editing of the message before it is transmitted through the media channel, due to the limited and expensive commercial areas, time constraints, censorship, prejudgments or sometimes even personal interests. A television or a newspaper decides whether they will broadcast information or not, in light of the factors described above, which are often related to the editorial policy of the media group they belong to.

- extension of the message, by using research instruments and additional sources to make the information more clear and believable and thus the public is better informed. The reverse of this situation is also possible (even if it is

³ A *Primer on Communication Studies*, 888-889

unethical) falsification of truth or inventing details untrue to intentionally lead the audience in a particular direction.

- reinterpretation, used when the message is too complex or incomprehensible (technical, juridical or medical) and it has to be transformed and „translated” in order to be understood by the people.

Depending on how media accomplishes every component of the filter function, it can fulfill or fail to fulfill its role as the „fourth estate” of government or the role of „watchdog”.

All the above functions sustain the argument that the media is an indispensable mechanism for the good functioning of society; they have a strong on public opinion. It plays a role of *mediation* between individuals and social reality, which includes various aspects: informing, negotiating, or attempts of manipulation and control. These ways in which media facilitate the connection between people and reality can be captured through a series of communicational symbols: *window* to the world, which allows the society to see what is happening without any interference from others; *mirror* of the social events, which however may distort the image by highlighting certain aspects desired by some people; *filter*, selecting only certain aspects of experience and hide others, deliberately or not; *guide* or *interpret*, explaining the unclear events; informational and opinion platform for society, with feed-back option; *dissemination agent* which only transmits the information; *interlocutor* or *discussion partner*, that involve an interactive behavior. (McQuail 2010, 84-85)

The power of media arises from the effects they have upon the society: attract and direct public opinion, persuasion on opinions and beliefs; influence behavior; provide definitions of reality, confer status and legitimacy; provide information quickly and completely⁴. (McQuail 2010, 87)

⁴ *Ibidem*, 87

Romania's image and international media coverage

Media coverage achieved by the foreign press, mostly hostile and defamatory against Romania, created and maintained an unfavorable development of attractive images of the country both at the European level and internationally.

The Swiss newspaper *Le Temps* published a caricature in 2008 related to the way the Romanians use their right of free movement. The cartoon shows a beggar in front of a bank and the policeman tells her: "Move". The caricature is an answer to the Protocol signed between the EU and Switzerland concerning the extension of the agreement on the free movement of citizens of the European Union for Bulgaria and Romania. Related to this incident, Romania has taken action – the Romanian Ambassador in Berne and the Ambassador of United Nations in Geneva replied to the newspaper that the drawing is insulting for the Romanians who live and work honestly in Switzerland.⁵

In France, Dominique Grimault, the TV host on the TV channel M6 called Romanians „hen thieves” several times during the „100% Euro” broadcast, after the football game between France and Romania ended with 0-0 score. He didn't apologize, but he mentioned that he was not the only person who addressed to Romanians in a denigrating way⁶, fact that clearly shows the hostile position of France mass-media against Romanian citizens.

Italian press talks of rape cases committed by Romanians as a phenomenon, a real scourge for the safety of the Italians, creating confusion that affect both the image and the safety of the Romanian community from Italy and Romania's image as a whole. Just some of the latest news from Italian newspapers are more than eloquent for the violence committed by some

⁵ „Imaginea României, făcută țândări în Europa”, 6 June 2008, *Romanian Global News*, http://www.rgnpress.ro/Social/Imaginea-Romaniei-facuta-tandari-in-Europa.html#Scene_1; *HotNews.ro*, 5 June 2008, [ziarul-elvetian-temps-publicat-caricatura-ofensatoare-adresa-romanilor-ambasadorul-roman-elvetia-cel-onu-din-geneva-dat-drept-replica.htm](http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-international-1171111-ziarul-elvetian-temps-publicat-caricatura-ofensatoare-adresa-romanilor-ambasadorul-roman-elvetia-cel-onu-din-geneva-dat-drept-replica.htm)

⁶ „Quand un journaliste de M6 dérape et traite les Roumains de «voleurs de poules»”, 11 June 2008, *RFI*, http://www.rfi.fr/sportfr/articles/102/article_67380.asp; „M6 mise en demeure par le CSA pour \"propos injurieux””, 10 June 2008, <http://www.ozap.com/actu/m6-demeure-csa-injures/143492>

Romanian citizens, but also for the Italians' attitude towards them, after the start of anti-immigrant campaign in Italy: Romanian credit card forgers arrested in Rome (*Corriere della Sera*, 11.02.2009: "Arrestata a Roma una banda di rumeni che clonava carte di credito"), Rome rapists are Romanians (*Corriere della Sera*, 17.02.2009: "Stupro Caffarella, fermati due rumeni. «Perché l'ho fatto? Per dispetto»"); *La Stampa*, 18.02.2009: „Presi gli stupratori della Caffarella "L'abbiamo fatto solo per dispetto"”), drunk Romanian charged for rape attempt (*La Repubblica*, 17.02.2009: "Romeno ubriaco entra in una casa e tenta di violentare una anziana"), Romanian killed by a drunk and drugged Italian (*Corriere della Sera*, 23.02.2009: "Italiano drogato e ubriaco al volante travolge e uccide operaio romeno").

In a movie that was part of a presentation series of the 16 participating teams at Euro 2008 the representative image of Romania was a group of fat men with huge necklaces. The movie, made by Virgin Media, UK, analyzes the chances of Romanian football team to get out from the group of „death” group, where it was along with Italy, France and Holland. What is striking here is the fact that, the static image of the fat men with huge necklaces (considered „representative” for Romania) is set as background during the last 35 seconds of this video. Each participant at Euro 2008 has a really representative image in the other 15 videos. Russia has a representative image of Red Square, Austria – image of a mountain resort, Italy – the image of Colosseum, Germany – The Brandenburg Gate in Berlin. The „representative” image of Romania was the image of the gypsies. Virgin Media apologized to the Romanian Embassy in London "for any offense" in presenting Romanian team in that video. The company has assured the Romanian side that it "acted immediately to withdraw the video from YouTube" and promised to restore the shot of the video.⁷ Although, the message already sent cannot be changed and UK image about Romania is obvious again.

⁷ „Simbolul României la Euro 2008 – niște burtoși tuciurii, cu lanțuri groase de aur ”, in *Gândul*, 6 June 2008, <http://www.gandul.info/sportul/imaginea-romaniei-la-euro-barbati-cu-burta-si-lanturi-mari-de-aur-video.html?3941;2688666>; „Virgin Media a prezentat scuze ambasadei României la Londra”, *mediafax.ro*, 5 June 2008, <http://www.mediafax.ro/politic/virgin-media-a-prezentat-scuze-ambasadei-romaniei-la-londra.html?1687;2688951>

This orientation of UK mass-media has been confirmed in 2015 by the broadcasting of a controverted documentary on Channel 4, „The Romanians Are Coming”, made of 3 episodes of 60 minutes each, showing how Romanians live and work in UK. Broadcasting the series has generated protests of Romanian Community in United Kingdom and reactions from the public institutions, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Romanian Embassy in London, saying that this message about Romanians is not objective. In this context, Ofcom (*Office of Communications*), the British equivalent of National Council of Audiovisual decided to investigate Channel 4 after it received 120 complaints about the way in which the documentary describes the Romanian and Roma communities in UK; they reckon that these complaints regard a “potentially offensive material "not justified by the context"⁸.

Conclusions

Because the Romanian state takes no actions sustained by the public diplomacy and by the real actions of some Romanian citizens from different European countries and also because this process is also maintained by mass-media, the construction of a country brand is a problem of communication and a necessity for Romania in order to be able to position itself on the world market and to access and attract funds, investors and tourists. The process involves the identification and transmission of Romanian specific values and symbols which show Romanian uniqueness in the whole world.

Not even the national audience believes that Romania has a good external image, whereas promotion actions have not been effective. Thus, the evaluation research "Romanians' perception about the country brand of Romania",

⁸ „CNA-ul britanic investighează postul Channel 4 pentru documentarul "The Romanians Are Coming"", *mediafax.ro*, 31 March 2015, <http://www.mediafax.ro/cultura-media/cna-ul-britanic-investigheaza-postul-channel-4-pentru-documentarul-the-romanians-are-coming-14090922>; „Romanian ambassador ‘bitter’ over C4’s migrant series”, in *The Guardian*, 7 March 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/mar/07/romania-mps-ambassador-attack-channel-4-immigration-documentary>

achieved in 2013 in the online environment through the action of some Romanian bloggers, sustained by the Kooperativa 2.0 and Mednet Marketing Research Center, shows that 93,8% of the respondents are not happy with the way in which Romania is promoted.

The reasons identified as being responsible for the fact that Romania does not have a country brand are: the lack of a consistent strategy, lack of brand construction process, lack of identity, lack of consistency, not understanding the need for the existence of the brand, the internal problems of an economic or social nature and the divergent political interests⁹.

The image campaigns were miscarried out because they tried to promote and sell the country as a product without life, dynamism and people. In fact, the people, not the products, create the image. The inhabitants of a country are the most prominent image in the international press, the most visible ambassadors. But the Romanian decision makers did nothing but vehemently discuss about the necessity of a strong brand for Romania. There is no coherent Government action plan to analyze why the attempts to create a country brand have failed so far, to draw the necessary conclusions and formulate an integrated strategy in this field. There are several elements it can be started from. We have worldwide known products (wines, bio food, mineral water), we have important personalities (Brâncuși, Cioran, Nadia Comănești, Ilie Năstase, Gheorghe Hagi), regions (Danube Delta, Moldova and the monasteries, Maramureș and the wooden churches, Bucegi Mountains and the Sfinx and Babele).

If you want to create a brand, you first need to "sell" it internally. It is important that Romanians show respect for themselves and have a good opinion about their own country. If we do not respect each other's values, surely no

⁹ Mihaela Ivan, Charts – Research study “Romanians' perception about the country brand”, <http://www.mihaelaiivan.ro/grafice-studiu-de-cercetare-perceptia-romanilor-despre-brandul-de-tara/>, accessed on 19 June 2016

foreigner will do. Also, in order to have a successful brand it must show the reality, because this is the right way to build the reputation of a country.

Whether we do something or not, the events are carried out, and also the public perception in respect of Romania and its people. However, if these things are produced consistently, and the positive aspects are highlighted in a plan through a program conceived with the frame of a national strategy, involving the cooperation of public and private actors, everything will go better and more efficiently.

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